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The Rising Threat of Email Based Attacks, and How To Counter It

October 9, 2017

Markus Jakobsson

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The last fifteen years in one minute

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Email Identity Deception, circa 2004

3

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Email Identity Deception, circa 2004

4

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Email Identity Deception, circa 2004

5

L\

Look for misspellingsLook for poor grammar

Is it not addressed to you?Does it look unprofessional?

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Email Identity Deception, 2016

6

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Email Identity Deception, 2016

7

Hi John

CHANGE PASSWORD

Slick logos

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Email Identity Deception, 2016

8

Hi John

CHANGE PASSWORD

Slick logos

L\

Look for misspellingsLook for poor grammar

Is it not addressed to you?Does it look unprofessional?

L\

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Email Identity Deception, 2016

9

Cyrillic o

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Email Identity Deception, 2016

10

Spoofed partially

protected subdomain

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The amount of emailin one minute

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Wanted email: ~60 million

The amount of emailin one minute

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Wanted email: ~60 millionScattershot attacks: ~3000

The amount of emailin one minute

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Wanted email: ~60 millionScattershot attacks: ~3000

Targeted enterprise attacks: ~55

The amount of emailin one minute

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Targeted enterprise attacks: ~55

The amount of emailin one minute

2370% increase 2015-2016 (FBI/IC3)

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Trend: increasing sophistication

greedimproved psychologybetter design competenceand a confluence of attack tools

16

$5Bn

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Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychologybetter design competenceand a confluence of attack tools

17

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Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychologybetter design competenceand a confluence of attack tools

18

16%

“Social Phishing”, Jagatic et al.

Yield of generic attack

16%

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Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychologybetter design competenceand a confluence of attack tools

19

16%

“Social Phishing”, Jagatic et al.

16%

Yield of targeted attack

73%

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Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychologybetter design competenceand a confluence of attack tools

20

© 2017 Agari. All rights reserved. Confidential and Proprietary.

Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychologybetter design competenceand a confluence of attack tools

21

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Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychology

22

Incoming eFax: Elections Outcome Could Be revised [Facts of Elections Fraud]

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Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychology

23

Taylor Fax <securefaxsolutions@gmail.com>

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Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychology

24

PIN CODE: 3209

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Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychologybetter design competenceand a confluence of attack tools

25

PhishMe 2016 Enterprise Phishing Susceptibility and Resiliency Report

20.2%

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Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychologybetter design competenceand a confluence of attack tools

26

© 2017 Agari. All rights reserved. Confidential and Proprietary.

Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychologybetter design competenceand a confluence of attack tools

27

© 2017 Agari. All rights reserved. Confidential and Proprietary.

Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychologybetter design competenceand a confluence of capabilities

28

© 2017 Agari. All rights reserved. Confidential and Proprietary.

Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychologybetter design competenceand a confluence of capabilities

29

© 2017 Agari. All rights reserved. Confidential and Proprietary.

Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychologybetter design competenceand a confluence of capabilities

30

© 2017 Agari. All rights reserved. Confidential and Proprietary.

Trend: increasing sophistication

greedmore targetingimproved psychologybetter design competenceand a confluence of capabilities

31

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Things can (and will)

get worse

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Why do people look in their spam folders?

33

1 3 1 4

11

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Why do people look in their spam folders?

34

1 3 1 4

11

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Why do people look in their spam folders?

35

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Why do people look in their spam folders?

36

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Why do people look in their spam folders?

37

your spam filter is not tuned correctly

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Why do people look in their spam folders?

38

your spam filter is not tuned correctly

look for a message sent by Google

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Why do people look in their spam folders?

39

your spam filter is not tuned correctly

look for a message sent by Google

If the message is in your spam folder

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Why do people look in their spam folders?

40

your spam filter is not tuned correctly

look for a message sent by Google

If the message is in your spam folder

Make sure to review the alert first

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Why do people look in their spam folders?

41

From: spam.notification@googlemail.com

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Why do people look in their spam folders?

Inbox

42

Spam folder (quarantine)

~0%

~10%

~20%

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Why do people look in their spam folders?

43

trust transfer trick(For more details, look for my upcoming paper with

Hossein Siadati, Toan Nguyen, Nasir Memon)

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

44

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

45

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

46

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

47

There’s no account associated with this email.

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

48

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

49

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

50

You may need to check your Junk or Spam folder.

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

51

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

52

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

53

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

54

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

55

Compromise@paypal.alert1822.com

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

56

Compromise@paypal.alert1822.com

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

57

Compromise@paypal.alert1822.com

Att_Update <att-services.2072668872@emailff-att-mail.com>

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

58

Compromise@paypal.alert1822.com

Click here

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How attackers can turn services into opportunity

59

just anothertrust transfer trick

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use yourknowledgeagainst you

Another way attackers can

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Did you know this?

61

bank checks can bounce

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Did you know this?

62

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Did you know this?

63

wirescan not

bounce

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Attacker does: Victim thinks:

64

Ask victim for wire information

Drop fake checkin night deposit

I will receive money

Money was wired

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Attacker does: Victim thinks:

65

Ask victim for wire information

Drop fake checkin night deposit

I will receive money

Money was wired

To sum it up:You may think you were paid. Maybe you were not.

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Account Take Over on the rise

66

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Account Take Over on the rise

67

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Account Take Over on the rise

corrupt

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monetize

corrupt

Account Take Over on the rise

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corrupt

collect + launch

Account Take Over on the rise

monetize

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Understandthensolve

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Impostor Authentic

Spoof Look-alike Domain Display Name Deception Account OwnerCompromiseSender

Source Internal External

Classification

Fraud Legitimate Email

URL Attachment

Social Engineering

Unsolicited Email

Grey Mail

Con

TargetedScattershot

SPAM

Destination Internal External

StrangerTrusted partyEmployee webmail

Objective Monetary Data/Credential Theft Denial of Service

First understand the problem – then solve it

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Impostor

Spoof Look-alike Domain Display Name Deception CompromiseSender

First understand the problem – then solve it

6%

10% 84%puny

but

exploding

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Addressing deceptive display names

1.List of trusted parties.“Bo Bigboss <bb@yourcompany.com>”

2.Incoming email “Bo BigBoss <joe123@aol.com>”

3.High risk? Warn-and-deliver!“Stranger Danger! <joe123@aol.com>”74

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Addressing deceptive display names

1.List of trusted parties.“Bo Bigboss <bb@yourcompany.com>”

2.Incoming email. “Bo BigBoss <joe123@aol.com>”

3.High risk? Warn-and-deliver!“Stranger Danger! <joe123@aol.com>”75

© 2017 Agari. All rights reserved. Confidential and Proprietary.

Addressing deceptive display names

1.List of trusted parties.“Bo Bigboss <bb@yourcompany.com>”

2.Incoming email. “Bo BigBoss <joe123@aol.com>”

3.High risk? Warn-and-deliver!“Stranger Danger! <joe123@aol.com>”76

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Impostor Authentic

Spoof Look-alike Domain Display Name Deception Account OwnerCompromiseSender

Addressing compromised accounts

OriginCompromised device Compromised credentials Compromised API access

Local scriptOAuth

Easiest for the attackersEasiest for the defenders

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Addressing compromised accounts

78

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Addressing compromised accounts

79

SMS to associated phone number

Proprietary

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but filteringis not everything

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Our view Attacker’s view

Filtering?keeps us safe

81

Filtering? press pedal harder!

Malicious emails sentrisk: loss/threat

Malicious emails sentopportunity: money

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Our view Attacker’s view

Filtering?keeps us safe

82

Filtering? press pedal harder!

Malicious emails sentrisk: loss/threat

Malicious emails sentopportunity: moneyrisk: loss/threat opportunity: intelligence

(Look out for upcoming papers, one of which is with Hossein Siadati and Yifan Tian)

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Want to talk?

mjakobsson@agari.com