The Marriage Market, Labor Supply and Education ChoicesThe Marriage Market, Labor Supply and...

The Marriage Market, Labor Supply and EducationChoices

P.A. Chiappori, M. Costa Dias, C. Meghir

Columbia University, UCL and IFS, Yale University

Workshop ‘Risk and Family Economics’IFS, June 2014

Chiappori, Costa, Meghir (Columbia University, UCL and IFS, Yale University)Labor Supply and EducationWorkshop ‘Risk and Family Economics’IFS, June 2014 1

Gary Becker, 1930-2014

Education, matching and labor supply

Education as a human capital investment

What are the returns?

Obvious: labor market (higher wages, lower unemployment, bettercarreer,...)As important, but largely ignored: marriage market

Education affects

Marriage probabilitySpouse’s education and incomeTotal surplus generated by marriageIntra-household division of that surplus

Matching models useful to analyze these returns

Education affects

Obvious: labor market (higher wages, lower unemployment, bettercarreer,...)

As important, but largely ignored: marriage market

Education affects

Marriage probability

Spouse’s education and incomeTotal surplus generated by marriageIntra-household division of that surplus

Education affects

Marriage probabilitySpouse’s education and income

Total surplus generated by marriageIntra-household division of that surplus

Education affects

Marriage probabilitySpouse’s education and incomeTotal surplus generated by marriage

Intra-household division of that surplus

Education affects

A Beckerian Paradox

Consider two of Becker’s fundamental intuitions:

Role of specialization

Matching as an effi cient allocation (surplus maximization)... and a paradox:

Effi ciency may require specialization (one spouse specializes indomestic production) ...... but then why should matching be assortative on education?→ In principle, if one spouse does not work, one may expect negativeassortative matchingData: clearly positive assortative, even ‘back then’, even for coupleswhere one spouse does not work

Possible answer (‘domestic capital’): domestic productivity alsoincreases with education

A Beckerian Paradox

Effi ciency may require specialization (one spouse specializes indomestic production) ...

... but then why should matching be assortative on education?→ In principle, if one spouse does not work, one may expect negativeassortative matchingData: clearly positive assortative, even ‘back then’, even for coupleswhere one spouse does not work

A Beckerian Paradox

Effi ciency may require specialization (one spouse specializes indomestic production) ...... but then why should matching be assortative on education?→ In principle, if one spouse does not work, one may expect negativeassortative matching

Data: clearly positive assortative, even ‘back then’, even for coupleswhere one spouse does not work

A Beckerian Paradox

Assortative matching in education

Figure: Wife’s education by H’s Year of Birth, US.

This model: main ingredient

Two person household

Leisure, private and public consumption; public good domesticallyproduced

Matching based on human capital

Human capital’s role is twofold:

Increase potential wageIncrease domestic productivity

Extension: risk sharing

Basic issue: When do we expect assortative matching?

Note that the model will typically be ITU!

Increase potential wage

Increase domestic productivity

Matching models: three main families

1 Matching under NTU (Gale-Shapley)Idea: no transfer possible between matched partners

2 Matching under TU (Becker-Shapley-Shubik)

Transfers possible without restrictionsTechnology: constant ‘exchange rate’between utilesIn particular: (strong) version of interpersonal comparison of utilities→ requires restrictions on preferences

3 Matching under Imperfectly TU (ITU)

Transfers possibleBut no restriction on preferences→ technology involves variable ‘exchange rate’

Matching models: three main families

Similarities and differences

All aimed at understanding who is matched with whom

Only the last 2 address how the surplus is divided

Only the third allows for impact on the group’s aggregate behavior

Formal structure: Common components

Compact, separable metric spaces X ,Y (‘women, men’) with finitemeasures F and G . Note that the spaces may be multidimensional

Spaces X ,Y often ‘completed’to allow for singles:X = X ∪ {∅} , Y = Y ∪ {∅}A matching defines of a measure h on X × Y (or X × Y ) such thatthe marginals of h are F and G

The matching is pure if the support of the measure is included in thegraph of some function φTranslation: matching is pure if y = φ (x) a.e.→ no ‘randomization’

Formal structure: differences

Defining the problem: populations X ,Y plus

NTU: two funtions u (x , y) , v (x , y)TU: one function s (x , y) (intrapair allocation is endogenous)ITU: Pareto frontier u = P (x , y , v)

Defining the solution

NTU: only the measure h; stability as usualTU: measure h and two functions u (x) , v (y) such that

u (x) + v (y) = s (x , y) for (x , y) ∈ Supp (h)and stability

u (x) + v (y) ≥ s (x , y) for all (x , y)ITU: measure h and two functions u (x) , v (y) such that

u (x) = P (x , y , v (y)) for (x , y) ∈ Supp (h)and stability

u (x) ≥ F (x , y , v (y)) for all (x , y)

Defining the problem: populations X ,Y plusNTU: two funtions u (x , y) , v (x , y)

TU: one function s (x , y) (intrapair allocation is endogenous)ITU: Pareto frontier u = P (x , y , v)

Defining the problem: populations X ,Y plusNTU: two funtions u (x , y) , v (x , y)TU: one function s (x , y) (intrapair allocation is endogenous)

ITU: Pareto frontier u = P (x , y , v)

Defining the problem: populations X ,Y plusNTU: two funtions u (x , y) , v (x , y)TU: one function s (x , y) (intrapair allocation is endogenous)ITU: Pareto frontier u = P (x , y , v)

Defining the solutionNTU: only the measure h; stability as usual

TU: measure h and two functions u (x) , v (y) such that

Defining the solutionNTU: only the measure h; stability as usualTU: measure h and two functions u (x) , v (y) such that

u (x) + v (y) ≥ s (x , y) for all (x , y)

ITU: measure h and two functions u (x) , v (y) such that

Defining the solutionNTU: only the measure h; stability as usualTU: measure h and two functions u (x) , v (y) such that

Formal structure: differences (cont.)

Characterization:

NTU: existence (Gale-Shapley), uniqueness not guaranteed (latticestructure of the set of stable matchings)ITU: existence (Kelso-Crawford’s generalization of Gale-Shapley),uniqueness not guaranteedTU: highly specific

Stability equivalent to surplus maximizationtherefore: existence easy to establish‘generic’uniqueness

In a nutshell

NTU: intragroup allocation exogenously imposed; transfers are ruledout by assumptionTU and ITU: intragroup allocation endogenous; transfers areparamount and determined (or constrained) by equilibrium conditionsTU: life much easier (GQL → equivalent to surplus maximization) ...... but price to pay: couple’s (aggregate) behavior does not depend on‘powers’, therefore on equilibrium conditions

Characterization:NTU: existence (Gale-Shapley), uniqueness not guaranteed (latticestructure of the set of stable matchings)

ITU: existence (Kelso-Crawford’s generalization of Gale-Shapley),uniqueness not guaranteedTU: highly specific

In a nutshell

Characterization:NTU: existence (Gale-Shapley), uniqueness not guaranteed (latticestructure of the set of stable matchings)ITU: existence (Kelso-Crawford’s generalization of Gale-Shapley),uniqueness not guaranteed

TU: highly specific

In a nutshell

Characterization:NTU: existence (Gale-Shapley), uniqueness not guaranteed (latticestructure of the set of stable matchings)ITU: existence (Kelso-Crawford’s generalization of Gale-Shapley),uniqueness not guaranteedTU: highly specific

In a nutshell

Stability equivalent to surplus maximization

therefore: existence easy to establish‘generic’uniqueness

In a nutshell

Stability equivalent to surplus maximizationtherefore: existence easy to establish

‘generic’uniqueness

In a nutshell

In a nutshellNTU: intragroup allocation exogenously imposed; transfers are ruledout by assumption

TU and ITU: intragroup allocation endogenous; transfers areparamount and determined (or constrained) by equilibrium conditionsTU: life much easier (GQL → equivalent to surplus maximization) ...... but price to pay: couple’s (aggregate) behavior does not depend on‘powers’, therefore on equilibrium conditions

In a nutshellNTU: intragroup allocation exogenously imposed; transfers are ruledout by assumptionTU and ITU: intragroup allocation endogenous; transfers areparamount and determined (or constrained) by equilibrium conditions

TU: life much easier (GQL → equivalent to surplus maximization) ...... but price to pay: couple’s (aggregate) behavior does not depend on‘powers’, therefore on equilibrium conditions

In a nutshellNTU: intragroup allocation exogenously imposed; transfers are ruledout by assumptionTU and ITU: intragroup allocation endogenous; transfers areparamount and determined (or constrained) by equilibrium conditionsTU: life much easier (GQL → equivalent to surplus maximization) ...... but price to pay: couple’s (aggregate) behavior does not depend on‘powers’, therefore on equilibrium conditions

Imperfectly transferable utilities

General case:

Transfers possible...

... but the ‘exchange rate’is not constant.

In practice:u (x) = P (x , y , v (y))

with P decreasing in v , usually increasing in x and y .

Stability:u (x) ≥ P (x , y , v (y)) ∀x ∈ X , y ∈ Y

But: no longer equivalent to a maximization (‘total surplus ’notdefined).

Imperfectly transferable utility: theory

Stabilityu (x) ≥ max

yP (x , y , v (y))

and equality if marriage probability positive. Hence:

u (x) = maxyP (x , y , v (y))

1st O C:

∂P∂y(x , y , v (y)) + v ′ (y)

∂P∂v(x , y , v (y)) = 0

satisfied for x = φ (y)

Knowing φ, if ∂P/∂y > 0, v defined up to a constant by:

v ′ (y) = −∂P∂y (φ (y) , y , v (y))∂P∂v (φ (y) , y , v (y))

Stabilityu (x) ≥ max

yP (x , y , v (y))

and equality if marriage probability positive. Hence:

u (x) = maxyP (x , y , v (y))

1st O C:

∂P∂y(x , y , v (y)) + v ′ (y)

∂P∂v(x , y , v (y)) = 0

satisfied for x = φ (y)Knowing φ, if ∂P/∂y > 0, v defined up to a constant by:

v ′ (y) = −∂P∂y (φ (y) , y , v (y))∂P∂v (φ (y) , y , v (y))

Assortativity

1st OC:H (y , φ (y)) = 0 ∀y

H (y , x) =∂P∂y(x , y , v (y)) + v ′ (y)

∂P∂v(x , y , v (y)) .

therefore∂H∂y+

∂H∂x

φ′ (y) = 0 ∀y ,

2nd OC:∂H∂y≤ 0 ⇔ ∂H

∂xφ′ (y) ≥ 0.

or:(∂2P∂x∂y

(φ (y) , y , v (y)) + v ′ (y)∂2P∂x∂v

(φ (y) , y , v (y)))

φ′ (y) ≥ 0 ∀y .(1)

Assortativity

1st OC:H (y , φ (y)) = 0 ∀y

H (y , x) =∂P∂y(x , y , v (y)) + v ′ (y)

∂P∂v(x , y , v (y)) .

therefore∂H∂y+

∂H∂x

φ′ (y) = 0 ∀y ,

2nd OC:∂H∂y≤ 0 ⇔ ∂H

∂xφ′ (y) ≥ 0.

or:(∂2P∂x∂y

(φ (y) , y , v (y)) + v ′ (y)∂2P∂x∂v

(φ (y) , y , v (y)))

φ′ (y) ≥ 0 ∀y .(1)

Assortative: φ′ (y) ≥ 0 therefore

∂2P∂x∂y

(φ (y) , y , v (y)) + v ′ (y)∂2P∂x∂v

(φ (y) , y , v (y)) ≥ 0 ∀y . (2)

∂2P∂x∂y

(φ (y) , y , v (y))−∂P∂y (φ (y) , y , v (y))∂P∂v (φ (y) , y , v (y))

∂2P∂x∂v

(φ (y) , y , v (y)) ≥ 0 ∀y .

(3)TU case: P (x , y , v (y)) = s (x , y)− v (y), hence ∂2P

∂x∂v = 0 and condition

∂2P∂x∂y

=∂2s

∂x∂y≥ 0

The model

Two spouses, utilities:

ui (Ci , Li ,Q) = C1−δii Lδi

i + γiQ

→ heterogeneous:

MRS between leisure and private consumption (δi )preference for public good (γi )

Domestic production: Cobb-Douglas:

lnQ = α ln τ1 + αH lnH1 + β ln τ2 + βH lnH2 + θ lnX

where τi : time in home production by spouse i , X : expenditure ingoods for home production, Hi : human capital of i→ main features:

complementarity between time and HC (→ high HC parents shouldinvest more) and between spouse’s times.heterogeneous productivity of domestic timedomestic productivity depends on HC, flexible

The model

i + γiQ

→ heterogeneous:MRS between leisure and private consumption (δi )

preference for public good (γi )

The model

i + γiQ

→ heterogeneous:MRS between leisure and private consumption (δi )preference for public good (γi )

The model

i + γiQ

The model

i + γiQ

complementarity between time and HC (→ high HC parents shouldinvest more) and between spouse’s times.

heterogeneous productivity of domestic timedomestic productivity depends on HC, flexible

The model

i + γiQ

complementarity between time and HC (→ high HC parents shouldinvest more) and between spouse’s times.heterogeneous productivity of domestic time

domestic productivity depends on HC, flexible

The model

i + γiQ

The model (cont.)

Budget constraint

C1 + C2 + w1L1 + w2L2 = Y − (w1τ1 + w2τ2 + pX )

where Y = y + w1 + w2 : total household resources

Wages → two versions:

without uncertaintywi = WiHi

with uncertaintywi = WiHi ei

The model (cont.)

Budget constraint

C1 + C2 + w1L1 + w2L2 = Y − (w1τ1 + w2τ2 + pX )

The model (cont.)

Budget constraint

C1 + C2 + w1L1 + w2L2 = Y − (w1τ1 + w2τ2 + pX )

The model (cont.)

Budget constraint

C1 + C2 + w1L1 + w2L2 = Y − (w1τ1 + w2τ2 + pX )

Solution: conditional sharing rule (BCM)

Two stage process

Stage 1: decide on Q, therefore on (τ1, τ2,X ) (cost minimization),and allocate Y − (w1τ1 + w2τ2 + pX ) between spousesStage 2: agents each choose private consumption and labor supply

Backward resolution → stage 2:

maxCi ,Li

C 1−δii Lδi

st ρi = Ci + wiLi

Li = δiρiwi, Ci = (1− δi ) ρi and

vi = (1− δi )1−δi

(δiwi

ρi + γiQ

= ∆i (wi )−δi ρi + γiQ

Two stage processStage 1: decide on Q, therefore on (τ1, τ2,X ) (cost minimization),and allocate Y − (w1τ1 + w2τ2 + pX ) between spouses

Stage 2: agents each choose private consumption and labor supply

maxCi ,Li

C 1−δii Lδi

st ρi = Ci + wiLi

vi = (1− δi )1−δi

(δiwi

ρi + γiQ

Two stage processStage 1: decide on Q, therefore on (τ1, τ2,X ) (cost minimization),and allocate Y − (w1τ1 + w2τ2 + pX ) between spousesStage 2: agents each choose private consumption and labor supply

maxCi ,Li

C 1−δii Lδi

st ρi = Ci + wiLi

vi = (1− δi )1−δi

(δiwi

ρi + γiQ

Two stage processStage 1: decide on Q, therefore on (τ1, τ2,X ) (cost minimization),and allocate Y − (w1τ1 + w2τ2 + pX ) between spousesStage 2: agents each choose private consumption and labor supply

maxCi ,Li

C 1−δii Lδi

st ρi = Ci + wiLi

vi = (1− δi )1−δi

(δiwi

ρi + γiQ

Stage 1: cost minimization

Effi ciency implies cost minimization:

minτ1,τ2,X

w1τ1 + w2τ2 + pX

such that

lnQ = α ln τ1 + αH lnH1 + β ln τ2 + βH lnH2 + θ lnX .

Solution

w1τ1 + w2τ2 + pX = κ′(w α1w

θH−αH1 H−βH

2 Q) 1

α+β+θ

κ′ = (α+ β+ θ) exp(− (α ln α+ β ln β+ θ ln θ)

α+ β+ θ

Pareto frontier

Equation:vi = ∆i (wi )

−δi ρi + γiQ

gives∆−11 w

δ1 v1 + ∆−12 w

δ2 v2 = s (H1,H2)

s (H1,H2) = maxQ

{ρ1 + ρ2 +Q

(γ1∆1w δ1 +

γ2∆2w δ2

)}= max

{Y − (w1τ1 + w2τ2 + pX ) +Q

(γ1∆1w δ1 +

γ2∆2w δ2

)}Note: straight line, but not TU since the slope depends on the spouse’scharacteristics

Public good

Optimal amount Q solves:

[Y − (w1τ1 + w2τ2 + pX ) +Q

(γ1∆1w δ1 +

γ2∆2w δ2

[Y − κ′

(w α1w

θH−αH1 H−βH

2 Q) 1

α+β+θ+Q

(γ1∆1w δ1 +

γ2∆2w δ2

)]which gives:

Q = κ′′(

γ1∆1w δ1 +

γ2∆2w δ2

) (α+β+θ)1−(α+β+θ) (

w α1w

θH−αH1 H−βH

) 1α+β+θ−1

and finally

s (H1,H2) = Y + κ′′(1− κ′

) (γ1∆1w δ1 +

γ2∆2w δ2

) 11−(α+β+θ)

(w α1w

θH−αH1 H−βH

) −11−(α+β+θ)

Pareto frontier

∆−11 wδ1 v1 + ∆−12 w

δ2 v2 = s (H1,H2)

therefore

v1 = ∆1w−δ1 s (H1,H2)− ∆1∆−12 w

−δ1 w δ

2 v2= P (H1,H2, v2)

TheoremSuffi cient condition for PAM:

αH − α ≥ 0 and βH − β ≥ 0

Intuition

Fact1:∂2P

∂H1∂v2= ∆1∆−12 δw−δ−1

1 w δ2 > 0

Transfering utility is relatively cheaper for wealthy people

→ Suffi cient condition for PAM:∂2P

∂H1∂H2≥ 0

Fact 2:∂2P

∂H1∂H2=

∂2Q∂H1∂H2

+ (≥ 0)

→ Suffi cient condition for PAM:∂2Q

∂H1∂H2≥ 0

Fact 3:∂2Q

∂H1∂H2≥ 0 if αH − α ≥ 0 and βH − β ≥ 0

Intuition

Fact1:∂2P

∂H1∂v2= ∆1∆−12 δw−δ−1

1 w δ2 > 0

∂H1∂H2≥ 0

Fact 2:∂2P

∂H1∂H2=

∂2Q∂H1∂H2

+ (≥ 0)

∂H1∂H2≥ 0

Fact 3:∂2Q

∂H1∂H2≥ 0 if αH − α ≥ 0 and βH − β ≥ 0

Intuition

Fact1:∂2P

∂H1∂v2= ∆1∆−12 δw−δ−1

1 w δ2 > 0

∂H1∂H2≥ 0

Fact 2:∂2P

∂H1∂H2=

∂2Q∂H1∂H2

+ (≥ 0)

∂H1∂H2≥ 0

Fact 3:∂2Q

∂H1∂H2≥ 0 if αH − α ≥ 0 and βH − β ≥ 0

Need a cardinalization:

ui (Ci , Li ,Q) =

(C 1−δii Lδi

i + γiQ)η

(∆iw−δ

i ρi + γiQ)η

Q (w1,w2) = κ′′(

γ1∆1w δ1 +

γ2∆2w δ2

) (α+β+θ)1−(α+β+θ) (

w α1w

θH−αH1 H−βH

) 1α+β+θ−1

Need a cardinalization:

ui (Ci , Li ,Q) =

(C 1−δii Lδi

i + γiQ)η

(∆iw−δ

i ρi + γiQ)η

Q (w1,w2) = κ′′(

γ1∆1w δ1 +

γ2∆2w δ2

) (α+β+θ)1−(α+β+θ) (

w α1w

θH−αH1 H−βH

) 1α+β+θ−1

Effi cient Risk Sharing:

maxρ1,ρ2

∫ (∆1w−δ

1 ρ1 + γ1Q (w1,w2))ηf (e) de

+µ∫ (

∆2w−δ2 ρ2 + γ2Q (w1,w2)

)ηf (e) de

ρ1 + ρ2 = Y − κ′(w α1w

θH−αH1 H−βH

2 Q (w1,w2)) 1

α+β+θ

Note that if

u (ρ) =(

∆1w−δ1 ρ+ γ1Q (w1,w2)

then−u′′ (ρ)u′ (ρ)

= − (η − 1)

ρ+ γ1

(∆1w−δ

)−1Q (w1,w2)

and preferences are ISHARA, therefore TU (SW 2007)

Effi cient Risk Sharing:

maxρ1,ρ2

∫ (∆1w−δ

1 ρ1 + γ1Q (w1,w2))ηf (e) de

+µ∫ (

∆2w−δ2 ρ2 + γ2Q (w1,w2)

)ηf (e) de

ρ1 + ρ2 = Y − κ′(w α1w

θH−αH1 H−βH

2 Q (w1,w2)) 1

α+β+θ

Note that if

u (ρ) =(

∆1w−δ1 ρ+ γ1Q (w1,w2)

then−u′′ (ρ)u′ (ρ)

= − (η − 1)

ρ+ γ1

(∆1w−δ

)−1Q (w1,w2)

and preferences are ISHARA, therefore TU (SW 2007)

Conclusion

1 Domestic production (especially children) has a potentially crucialimpact on matching patterns

2 Potential conflict between two logics - specialization versus PAM3 PAM requires HC to be an important factor in the ‘childrenproduction function’.

4 Risk sharing may reinforce the PAM logic, although the mechanismsare quite complex:

High HC people have higher but risquier income (or wage)Still better to marry a high HC person ...... but what matters is the ‘second cross derivative’→ less clear!Previous work (CCM): without domestic production, still PAMWith domestic production: TBE!

Conclusion

2 Potential conflict between two logics - specialization versus PAM

3 PAM requires HC to be an important factor in the ‘childrenproduction function’.

Conclusion

High HC people have higher but risquier income (or wage)

Still better to marry a high HC person ...... but what matters is the ‘second cross derivative’→ less clear!Previous work (CCM): without domestic production, still PAMWith domestic production: TBE!

Conclusion

High HC people have higher but risquier income (or wage)Still better to marry a high HC person ...

... but what matters is the ‘second cross derivative’→ less clear!Previous work (CCM): without domestic production, still PAMWith domestic production: TBE!

Conclusion

High HC people have higher but risquier income (or wage)Still better to marry a high HC person ...... but what matters is the ‘second cross derivative’→ less clear!

Previous work (CCM): without domestic production, still PAMWith domestic production: TBE!

Conclusion

High HC people have higher but risquier income (or wage)Still better to marry a high HC person ...... but what matters is the ‘second cross derivative’→ less clear!Previous work (CCM): without domestic production, still PAM

With domestic production: TBE!

Conclusion

The Marriage Market, Labor Supply and Education ChoicesThe Marriage Market, Labor Supply and...

Documents

Transcript of The Marriage Market, Labor Supply and Education ChoicesThe Marriage Market, Labor Supply and...

Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor · which marriage partners bargain simultaneously over consumption, numbers of children, and childrens’ education; while

Female Labor Participation in the Arab World€¦ · Arab country to date to model female labor participation in Morocco. The paper finds marriage, household inactiv-ity rates, secondary

MARRIAGE UNLICENSED MARRIAGE VALIDITY

Marriage Market and Labor Market Sorting

Marriage Matching with endogenous labor supply

Marriage Market and Labor Market Sortingconference.iza.org/conference_files/transatlantic_2021/... · 2021. 7. 2. · Marriage Market and Labor Market Sorting Paula Calvoy Ilse Lindenlaubz

1 God’s Design of Society LIFE (protected)LIFE (jeopardized) MARRIAGE & FAMILY (strong & functioning) MARRIAGE & FAMILY (weak & disfunctional) LABOR &

Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household …Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply* Pierre-André Chiappori†, Bernard Fortin‡, Guy Lacroix Résumé

Marriage, Social Insurance and Labor Supply - Yale … · Marriage, Social Insurance and Labor Supply ... risk sharing model with limited commitment of Ligon, Thomas and Worrall ...

Marriage Networks, Nepotism and Labor Market …...man’s labor market outcomes, I use panel data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey covering the period 1991 to 2006 to compare

Chapter 3 Marriage and the Family marriage and family trends gains from marriage marriage market marriage and family trends gains from marriage marriage.

Hard Marriage with Heavy Burdens: Labor Unions as Takeover ...

Marriage Now, Marriage Happens

Characterizing Group Behavior - Columbia Universitypc2167/GCJETfinal.pdf · Characterizing Group Behavior ∗ P.A. Chiappori † I. Ekeland‡ February 2005 Abstract We study the

Chiappori, Fortin & Lacroix (2002)

How Do Sex Ratios Affect Marriage and Labor Markets?ftp.iza.org/dp368.pdf · Sex ratios, i.e., relative numbers of men and women, can affect marriage prospects, labor force participation,

Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor - Smu

Matching models of the marriage market: theory …Matching models of the marriage market: theory and empirical applications Pierre-AndrØ Chiappori Columbia University Cemmap Masterclass,

The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identi cation ...fm Introduction An in uential empirical model of intra-household allocations is the collective model of Chiappori (1988, 1992).

Marital / Gender Roles and Division of Labor. What stereotype about marriage is portrayed in this cartoon?