The Demographic Transition—Some

Features and Effects

Tim Dyson

Netherlands

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

England and Wales

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000

Spain

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010

Taiwan

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

Egypt

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010

World Population Growth over Two Millenia

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

0 500 1000 1500 2000

Year

Population Urban population

Between 1750 and 2050 the ‘growth multiple’ of the human population is expected to be roughly nine. In Europe, populations increased by factors of two or three as they went through the transition. In China the factor will be about three or four. In India it may be about five. However, in many poor countries it will be anywhere between five and twenty—indeed, even higher growth multiples are possible.

Russia 1950

15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

Number (000s)

Nigeria 1950

15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

Number (000s)

Russia 1950

15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

Number (000s)

Nigeria 1950

15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

Number (000s)

Russia 2000

15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

Number (000s)

Nigeria 2000

15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

1

3

5

7

9

11

13

15

17

19

Number (000s)

Russia 1950

15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

Number (000s)

Nigeria 1950

15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

Number (000s)

Russia 2000

15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

Number (000s)

Nigeria 2000

15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

1

3

5

7

9

11

13

15

17

19

Number (000s)

Russia 2050

15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

Number (000s)

Nigeria 2050

15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90-94

Number (000s)

The consequences of low and high fertility can be illustrated by a comparison of Russia and Nigeria over 1950-2050. Russia’s population rose from 103 to 147 million, and even assuming some recovery in fertility it is projected to fall to 116m by 2050. The figures for Nigeria are 37m, 125m and 289m. Barring a meteorite hit, or a nuclear war, the broad picture shown is inevitable

Figure 5.2(a) Crude death and birth rates for urban and rural areas of Sweden, 1750-1960

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

1750 1800 1850 1900 1950

Year

Pe

r th

ou

sa

nd

CBR-R CDR-R CBR-U CDR-U

CRNI-R CRNI-U

‘Rapid population growth is found to have exercised a quantitatively important negative impact on the pace of aggregate economic growth in developing countries … rapid fertility decline is found to make a quantitatively relevant contribution to reducing the incidence and severity of poverty’ (Birdsall and Sinding 2001: 6)

The main factor behind rapid urban growth in developing countries is rapid population growth. However, as Preston has observed: ‘Oddly, family planning services are rarely seen as a candidate for slowing urban growth’ (Preston 1979: 210-11)

The relationship between urban and total population growth rates, 111 countries, 2000-

2005

y = 1.5272x

R2 = 0.7172

-2.00

-1.00

0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

8.00

-2.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00

Population growth rate of country

Urb

an g

row

th r

ate

Other things equal, population growth has an upward influence on CO2 emissions—an effect that is much greater in rich countries than in poor countries (see Dyson 2005).

Population matters!

In many ways the demographic transition has been a very good thing.

But it also represents a period of considerable destabilization—at both the household and the national levels.

The provision of safe, effective, and affordable contraception is the main way of minimizing this destabilization. Contraception provides people with choice.

And all the evidence is that, given the possibility of making the choice, then eventually women and men always decide to take it.