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7/31/2019 The Carter Doctrine
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The carter doctrine
The era of dtente would prove to be short-lived. Challenges to the Nixon
administration emerged from both the right and left of the American political
spectrum, questioning the moral basis as well as the geopolitical rationale of
engaging the Soviets as equal partners. President James Earl Carter was no more
adept at salvaging the spirit of cooperation than was President Gerald Ford
before him. Carter's focus on human rights alarmed Soviet leaders, who were
accustomed to Nixon's disregard for such issues. From Carter's perspective, a
series of events, including conflict in the Horn of Africa and the discovery of
Soviet troops in Cuba, led Carter to adopt a more hawkish position toward the
USSR. Moscow's invasion of neighboring Afghanistan would bring him more
firmly into the cold warrior camp. The Kremlin's December 1979 push south of its
border jolted the administration, leading Carter to take several measures that,
collectively, marked the clearest indication that relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union were in a free fall.
The president clarified the new situation one month later in his State of the
Union Address of 23 January 1980. Referring specifically to the Soviet invasion,
Carter declared that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the
United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means
necessary, including military force." By the following morning, theNew York
Times had given that policy a name: the Carter Doctrine.
Although the Soviet invasion was the proximate trigger for the Carter Doctrine,
momentum for the president's policy shift had been building over the previous
two years. Much of that energy flowed from concern over the fate of Iran. One of
the "two pillars" undergirding America's security structure in the Middle East,
Iran had been supporting U.S. interests for close to twenty-five years. Its position
was so vital that the administration rarely, if ever, questioned Iran's ability to
play that role; Carter himself labeled Iran "an island of stability" as late as
January 1978. Yet in just over a year, the shah would be deposed, Ayatollah
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Ruhollah Khomeini would return from France and transform the country into an
Islamic republic, and fifty Americans would be taken hostage by Iranian students
and militants. With the Nixon Doctrine in tatters, U.S. policymakers sought to
fashion a new strategy for the region.
Fears of regional instability were only partly responsible for Carter's movement
toward a new strategic posture. According to the president, an amalgam of three
distinct forces had combined to prompt his declaration of U.S. policy: "the steady
growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders;
the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from
the Middle East; and the press of social and religious and economic and political
change in the many nations of the developing world, exemplified by the
revolution in Iran." In all, a host of events had led the administration to conclude
that American interests in the Persian Gulf were under grave threat. Only a more
forceful statement of purpose could begin the process of redressing the regional
andin the administration's calculationglobal balance of power.
The doctrine also emerged out of a long-running debate within the
administration over its policy toward the Soviet Union. Carter's principal foreign
policy aides, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and national security adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski, differed over the degree to which Washington should
confront the Soviets. It was Brzezinski's contention that Moscow had never
stopped probing for weak spots around the globe; for him, instability in both
Central America and Africa testified to the Kremlin's continuing desire for
ideological competition, especially in the developing world. Dtente, he surmised,
had merely allowed the Soviets to continue their expansionist thrust there under
the cover of superpower cooperation. In contrast to Vance's preference for
conciliation, Brzezinski had been lobbying for a more aggressive stance towardMoscow since the earliest days of the administration. A series of developments,
including the discovery of Soviet soldiers in Cuba and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, provided further support for Brzezinski's arguments. By the time
that Carter delivered his State of the Union Address in January 1980, the
Brzezinski approach had won out.
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A host of measures associated with the Carter Doctrine followed quickly on the
heels of its enunciation, signaling a new phase in Carter's approach to the Soviet
Union and to his overall practice of foreign policy. Within a month of his address,
Carter sanctioned the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force, a contingent of as
many as 200,000 troops, designed to expedite the projection of American
military power around the globe, and especially in the Middle East. He would
take additional steps to improve America's combat readiness, preparing the
groundwork for a reimposition of the military draft and asking Congress for a
sharp increase in defense spending. Other policies would impinge on U.S.Soviet
relations as Carter enacted a partial grain embargo and boycotted the Moscow
Olympics. Still further actions, whereby Carter withdrew a second Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty from senatorial consideration and extended the number ofSoviet sites targeted by U.S. missiles, recast the nuclear dimension of the two
countries' relationship. On top of those actions, Carter embraced Pakistani ruler
Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, indicating his willingness to subordinate human rights
concerns to the struggle against Soviet aggression. By and large, those measures
appealed to a Congress eager for action after the previous year's indignities.
They also struck a chord with the American public. Opinion polls revealed
general support for the president's statement, suggesting that Carter hadcorrectly gauged the popular mood. Responding to criticism that Carter had
engaged in pandering and political grandstanding, Brzezinski defended his
president, explaining that the administration needed to make such a
proclamation if only to steel the public for the demands ahead. Journalists,
however, while hardly indulgent of Soviet behavior, interpreted Carter's speech as
a fundamentally political move, designed to reshape the president's image at the
outset of an election year. Scholars, too, have subjected the doctrine to withering
critiques. Some have described it as little more than empty posturing, crafted
more to improve Carter's political fortune than to alter Soviet behavior. Still
others maintain that Carter acted rashly, drawing conclusions about Soviet
motives based on very little evidencemotives he himself would qualify
throughout the remainder of his presidency. Still others have faulted the Carter
Doctrine for its ambiguity, noting that it failed to define, with any sense of
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precision, the nature of aggression, the characteristics of an outside force, or even
the boundaries of the Persian Gulf itself.
Moreover, scholars have argued, the Carter Doctrine and policies associated with
it offered little in the way of tangible benefits. None of the measures aimed at the
Kremlinnot the grain embargo, nor the Olympic boycott, nor the curtailment of
additional tradeforced the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Nor did the president's
unilateralism sit well with his European allies; only British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher supported Carter's approach. At the same time, however,
European business capitalized on the chillier relationship as several firms
concluded lucrative deals at America's expense.
While the Carter Doctrine secured few if any tangible gainseven its progenitor
lost at the ballot box that Novemberit would continue to shape U.S. policy
during the Cold War, largely because subsequent administrations bought into its
premises. President Ronald Reagan and his advisers regarded the Soviet Union as
an aggressive, expansionist power; if anything, they, and the Bush administration
that was to follow, were even more willing to protect U.S. interests in the Persian
Gulf from Soviet predations and political instability.
The Carter Doctrine also hastened the buildup of American arms, a process that
was already under way by January 1980, and for which some historians give him
high marks. It would be the Reagan administration, however, that would
capitalize on the perceived need for military expenditures, expanding the size and
cost, and revamping the shape, of America's military forces.
In relation to other Cold War presidential statements, the Carter Doctrine fit
squarely within their rhetorical barriers. It maintained Truman and Eisenhower's
focus on the Mediterranean and Middle East, a region that had become
increasingly vital to U.S. officials in the aftermath of the October 1973 Yom
Kippur War and the ensuing Arab oil boycott. Indeed, it echoed the excited
language of both the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines, offering to assist those
nations threatened by totalitarian aggression. And in associating himself with
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those two statements of national policy, Carter distanced himself from the
previous two administrations. His willingness to intercede unilaterally in Middle
Eastern affairs testified to the poverty of the Nixon Doctrine's "twin pillar policy,"
the very structure of which was now obsolete. Nevertheless, U.S. support for the
Afghani resistance to the Soviet Union suggests that elements of Nixon's
approach remained intact; the United States would continue to assist proxy
forces resisting Soviet advances when such a policy proved fruitful, and would
seek to impose its own forces when the situation demanded it.
Read more:The carter doctrine - Doctrines
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doctrine.html#ixzz20wPwVZmm
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