Sistem Otomasi Proses

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Sistem Otomasi Proses untuk Safety & Reliability

ALARMS

SIS

RELIEF

CONTAINMENT

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

BPCS

Strength in Reserve

• BPCS - Basic process control System

• Alarms - draw attention

• SIS - Safety interlock system to stop/start equipment

• Relief - Prevent excessive pressure

• Containment - Prevent materials from reaching, workers, community or environment

• Emergency Response - evacuation, fire fighting, health care, etc.

AUTOMATION

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Key Concept in process Safety: REDUNDANCY

SAFETY STRENGTH IN DEPTH !

PROCESS

RELIEF SYSTEM

SAFETY INTERLOCK SYSTEM

ALARM SYSTEM

BASIC PROCESSCONTROL SYSTEM

Closed-loop control to maintain processwithin acceptable operating region

Bring unusual situation to attentionof a person in the plant

Stop the operation of part of process

Divert material safely

Seriousness of event

Four independent protection layers (IPL)

In automation

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Objectives of Process Automation Control

1. Safety

2. Environmental Protection

3. Equipment Protection

4. Smooth Operation &

Production Rate

5. Product Quality

6. Profit

7. Monitoring & Diagnosis

We are emphasizing these topics

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Basic Process Control System (BPCS)

• First line of defense

• Process control maintains variables at set points, which are fixed at some desired values

• Technology - Multiple PIDs, cascade, feedforward, etc.

• Guidelines

• Always control unstable variables (Examples in flash?)

• Always control “quick” safety related variables

Stable variables that tend to change quickly (Examples?)

• Monitor variables that change very slowly

Corrosion, erosion, build up of materials

• Provide safe response to critical instrumentation failures

- But, we use instrumentation in the BPCS?

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Where could we use BPCS in the flash process?

F1

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The level is unstable; it must be controlled.

The pressure will change quickly and affect safety; it must be controlled.

F1

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2. Alarm System

• Alarm has an anunciator and visual indication

- No action is automated!

- require analysis by a person - A plant operator must decide.

• Digital computer stores a record of recent alarms

• Alarms should catch sensor failures

- But, sensors are used to measure variables for alarm checking?

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2. Alarm System

• Common error is to design too many alarms

- Easy to include; simple (perhaps, incorrect) fix to prevent repeat of safety incident

- One plant had 17 alarms/h - operator acted on only 8%

• Establish and observe clear priority ranking

- HIGH = Hazard to people or equip., action required

- MEDIUM = Loss of RM, close monitoring required

- LOWLOW = investigate when time available

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Where could we use alarm in the Flash Process ?

F1

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A low level could damage the pump; a high level could allow liquid in the vapor line.

The pressure affects safety, add a high alarm

F1

PAH

LAHLAL

Too much light key could result in a large economic loss

AAH

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3. Safety Interlock System

• Automatic action usually stops part of plant operation to achieve safe conditions

- Can divert flow to containment or disposal- Can stop potentially hazardous process, e.g., combustion

• Capacity of the alternative process must be for “worst case”

• SIS prevents “unusual” situations

- We must be able to start up and shut down- Very fast “blips” might not be significant

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3. Safety Interlock System

• Also called emergency shutdown system (ESS)

• SIS should respond properly to instrumentation failures

- But, instrumentation is required for SIS?

• Extreme corrective action is required and automated

- More aggressive than process control (BPCS)

• Alarm to operator when an SIS takes action

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3. Safety Interlock System

• The automation strategy is usually simple, for example,

If L123 < L123min; then, reduce fuel to zero

steam

water

LC

PC

fuel

How do we automate this SIS

when PC is adjusting the valve?

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If L123 < L123min; then, reduce fuel to zero

steam

water

LC

PC

fuel

LS s s

fc fc

15 psig

LS = level switch, note that separate sensor is used

s = solenoid valve (open/closed) fc = fail closed

Extra valve with tight shutoff

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3. Interlock System3. Interlock System

• The automation strategy may involve several variables, any one of which could activate the SIS

If L123 < L123min; orIf T105 > T105max

…….then, reduce fuel to zero

SIS100

L123T105…..

s

Shown as “box” in drawing with details elsewhere

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3. Safety Interlock System3. Safety Interlock System

• The SIS saves us from hazards, but can shutdown the plant for false reasons, e.g., instrument failure.

1 out of 1 must indicate

failure

T100s

2 out of 3 must indicate

failure

T100T101T102

Same variable,multiple sensors!

s

Falseshutdown

Failure on demand

5 x 10-35 x 10-3

2.5 x 10-6 2.5 x 10-6

Better performance,more expensive

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3. Safety Interlock System3. Safety Interlock System

• We desire independent protection layers, without common-cause failures - Separate systems

sensors

SIS system

i/o i/o………….

sensors

Digital control system

i/o i/o………….

BPCS and Alarms SIS and Alarms associated with SIS

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SAFETY STRENGTH IN DEPTH !

PROCESS

RELIEF SYSTEM

SAFETY INTERLOCK SYSTEM

ALARM SYSTEM

BASIC PROCESSCONTROL SYSTEM

Closed-loop control to maintain processwithin acceptable operating region

Bring unusual situation to attentionof a person in the plant

Stop the operation of part of process

Divert material safely

These layers require electrical power, computing, communication, etc.

KEY CONCEPT IN PROCESS SAFETY - KEY CONCEPT IN PROCESS SAFETY - REDUNDANCY!REDUNDANCY!

What do we do if a major incident occurs that causes

• loss of power or communication• a computer failure (hardware or software)

Could these all fail due to a common fault?

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4. Safety Relief System

• Entirely self-contained, no external power required

• The action is automatic - does not require a person

• Usually, goal is to achieve reasonable pressure

- Prevent high (over-) pressure- Prevent low (under-) pressure

• The capacity should be for the “worst case” scenario

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RELIEF SYSTEMS IN PROCESS PLANTS

• Increase in pressure can lead to rupture of vessel or pipe and release of toxic or flammable material

•• - Also, we must protect against unexpected vacuum!

• Naturally, best to prevent the pressure increase

• - large disturbances, equipment failure, human error, power failure, ...

• Relief systems provide an exit path for fluid

• Benefits: safety, environmental protection, equipment protection, reduced insurance, compliance with governmental code

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Location of Relief System

Identify potential for damage due to high (or low) pressure (HAZOP Study)

In general, closed volume with ANY potential for pressure increase

- may have exit path that should not be closed but could be- hand valve, control valve (even fail open), blockage of line

Remember, this is the last resort, when all other safety systems have not been adequate and a fast response is required!

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Standard Relief Method: Valves

BASIC PRINCIPLE: No external power required - self actuating - pressure of process provides needed force!

VALVES - close when pressure returns to acceptable value- Relief Valve - liquid systems- Safety Valve - gas and vapor systems including steam- Safety Relief Valve - liquid and/or vapor systems

Pressure of protected system can exceed the set pressure.

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Standard Relief Method: Rupture Disk

BASIC PRINCIPLE: No external power required - self acting

RUPTURE DISKS OR BURST DIAPHRAGMS - must be replaced after opening

.

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Relief ValvesTwo types of designs determine influence of pressure immediately after the valve

- Conventional Valve -pressure after the valve affects the valve lift and opening- Balanced Valve - pressure after the valve does not affect the valve lift and opening

Conventional Balanced

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Some Information about Relief Valves

ADVANTAGES

- simple, low cost and many commercial designs available- regain normal process operation rapidly because the valve closes when pressure decreases below set value

DISADVANTAGES

- can leak after once being open (O-ring reduces)- not for very high pressures (20,000 psi)- if oversized, can lead to damage and failure (do not be too conservative; the very large valve is not the safest!)

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Rupture Disk/Burst Diaphragm

ADVANTAGES- no leakage until the burst- rapid release of potentially large volumes - high pressure applications- corrosion leads to failure, which is safe- materials can be slurries, viscous, and sticky

DISADVANTAGES- must shutdown the process to replace- greater loss of material through relief- poorer accuracy of relief pressure the valve

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Symbols used in P&I D

• Spring-loaded safety relief valve

Process

To effluent handling

• Rupture disc

Process To effluent handling

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Add Relief to the Following System

F1

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Add Relief to the Following System

F1

The drum can be isolated with the control valves; pressure relief is required.

We would like to recover without shutdown; we select a relief valve.

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Add Relief to the Following System

Positive displacement pump

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Add Relief to the Following System

Positive displacement pump

The positive displacement pump will be damaged if the flow is stopped; we need to provide relief.

We would like to recover without shutdown; we select a relief valve.

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Add Relief to the Following System

Why are all those valves

in the process?

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Add Relief to the Following System

The extra “hand”`valves enable us to isolate and remove the heat exchanger without stopping the process.

The shell side of the heat exchanger can be isolated; we need to provide relief.

We would like to recover without shutdown; we select a relief valve.

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In some cases, relief and diaphragm are used in series – WHY?

Why is the pressure indicator provided?

Is it local or remotely displayed? Why?

• What is the advantage of two in series?

• Why not have two relief valves (diaphragms) in series?

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In some cases, relief and diaphragm are used in series – WHY?

Why is the pressure indicator provided?

If the pressure increases, the disk has a leak and should be replaced.

Is it local or remotely displayed? Why?

The display is local to reduce cost, because we do not have to respond immediately to a failed disk - the situation is not hazardous.

• What is the advantage of two in series?

The disc protects the valve from corrosive or sticky material. The valve closes when the pressure returns below the set value.

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Vents required to control or direct vapour/dust explosion effect

Structure vent closed

Structure

explosion

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Materials from relief must be process or dispose safely

From relief

To environment Vent steam, air

Holding for later processing Waste water treating

Recycle to process Fuel gas, fuel oil, solvent

Recover part to process

Immediate neutralization Flare, toxic materials

5. Containment

Use to moderate the impact of spill or an escape

Example Bund containment for storage tanks Location of relief valves and vents diversion to temporary storage /drain system (following breakage

of rupture disk) Safety management in containment areas. Containment building (if applicable)

6. Emergency Response Management

Also used to moderate impact on incidents

All plants should ERP (emergency response plan) Assembly, head-counts, evacuation etc…

Summary

ALARMS

SIS

RELIEF

CONTAINMENT

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

BPCS

1. Inherent design starts at project conceptualization

2. Three main strategy• Substitution• Intensification• Attenuation

3. Six Layers of Protection

Safety Aspects in Gas Operation

Introduction to 42

Daftar Pustaka

In Jumanda

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Pitowarno, Endra, 2005. Serial Buku Robotik: Teknik Disain. Surabaya

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Surabaya: PENS-ITS.

OMRON, 1990.User’s Manual for C20 Programmable Controller.Jakarta:Kerjasama CEVEST dan JICA.

OMRON, 1991.Training Manual for Mini H-type Programmable Logic Controllers.Singapura: May Edition.

OMRON, 1993.Operation Manual for Mini HType Programmable Logic Controllers.

Japan: Revised Edition.

OMRON, 1997.Training Manual for CPMI Programmable Logic Controllers.

Jakarta: Omron Indonesia Representative Office.

Siswo Cahyono, Ir dan Tresna Umar Syamsuri, Drs, 1996. Petunjuk Praktikum SistemKontrol Pneumatik. Bandung: PPPP Dirjen Dikti Depdikbud.