Post on 22-Mar-2020
1
An hermeneutic interpretation of Volkswagen’s public response to the diesel emissions crisis of late 2015, in terms of attribution, crisis management and
information orientation
A study submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Information Systems MSc
at
THE UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD
by
Christopher Andrew Painter
September 2016
2
TableofContentsTableofContents..............................................................................................................................2
Abstract...............................................................................................................................................4Background............................................................................................................................................4Aim.........................................................................................................................................................4Methods................................................................................................................................................4Results...................................................................................................................................................4Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................4
Acknowledgement............................................................................................................................6
Tableoffigures..................................................................................................................................7
Chapter1:Introduction....................................................................................................................81.1Background......................................................................................................................................81.2Researchaim...................................................................................................................................81.3Objectives........................................................................................................................................91.4Originalityofresearch.....................................................................................................................91.5Structureofdissertation................................................................................................................10
Chapter2:LiteratureReview.........................................................................................................112.1Attributiontheories.......................................................................................................................11
2.1.1Internalandexternalattribution............................................................................................122.1.2Kelley’scovariationmodel......................................................................................................132.1.3Weiner’sattributiontheoryandAttribution–Responsibility–Actionmodel........................13
2.2Crisismanagement........................................................................................................................142.2.1Coombes’situationalcrisiscommunicationtheory(SCCT).....................................................152.2.2BenoitImageRestorationdiscoursetheory............................................................................152.2.3Crisismanagementandlitigation...........................................................................................16
2.3InformationOrientation................................................................................................................172.3.1Informationtechnologypractices(ITP)...................................................................................172.3.2Informationmanagementpractices(IMP).............................................................................182.3.3Informationbehavioursandvalues(IBV)................................................................................18
2.4Summary........................................................................................................................................18
Chapter3:Researchmethodology...............................................................................................203.1Ontologyofsocialresearch...........................................................................................................20
3.1.1Objectivismversussubjectivism..............................................................................................203.1.2Positivismversusinterpretivism..............................................................................................20
3.2TheHermeneuticsmethod............................................................................................................213.3Hermeneuticsinmyresearch........................................................................................................23
3.3.1Heuristiccoding......................................................................................................................233.3.2Thedataset............................................................................................................................243.3.3Chronologyofdata.................................................................................................................253.3.4Datareferencing.....................................................................................................................25
3.4Ethicalissues..................................................................................................................................25
3
Chapter4:ResearchFindings........................................................................................................264.1Introduction...................................................................................................................................264.2Attribution.....................................................................................................................................27
4.2.1Internalandexternalattributions...........................................................................................274.2.2Kelley’scovariationmodel......................................................................................................294.2.3Weiner’sattributiontheoryandAttribution–Responsibility–Actionmodel........................30
4.3Crisismanagementandimagerestoration....................................................................................304.3.1Mortification...........................................................................................................................314.3.2Reductionofoffensiveness.....................................................................................................314.3.3Correction...............................................................................................................................324.3.4Differentiation........................................................................................................................33
4.4Informationorientation.................................................................................................................354.4.1Informationmanagementpractises.......................................................................................364.4.2Informationbehaviourandvalues..........................................................................................37
4.5Summary........................................................................................................................................39
Chapter5:DiscussionofFindings.................................................................................................415.1Attribution.....................................................................................................................................415.2Crisismanagementandimagerestoration....................................................................................425.3Informationorientation.................................................................................................................445.4Summary........................................................................................................................................45
Chapter6:Conclusion.....................................................................................................................46
References........................................................................................................................................48
AppendixA:Datalist......................................................................................................................57
AppendixB:Timelineofsignificantevents.................................................................................59
AppendixC:Codinggrid.................................................................................................................61
AppendixD:Attributionanalysis..................................................................................................62
AppendixE:Crisismanagementstrategiesanalysis..................................................................65
AppendixF:Informationorientationanalysis............................................................................72
4
Abstract
BackgroundThediscoveryinSeptember2015ofdieselemissionssoftwarecheattechnologyinVolkswagen
carsinitiatedaprocessofcrisismanagementanddamagelimitationbyVW,reflectedin
contemporaneouspublicstatementsissuedbythecompany.Thesewereexaminedinthe
contextofattribution,crisismanagementandimagerestorationandinformationorientation,
usingspecificframeworksfromtheliteraturetoinformtheanalyticalprocess.
AimTheresearchprojectinvestigatestherelevanceofattributionframeworkstocompany’sown
viewsofattribution,thecrisismanagementstrategieswhichwereemployedandtheinfluence
ofinformationorientationonthecompany’sresponse.
MethodsAninterpretivist,hermeneuticapproachwasusedtocarryoutcontentanalysisonselected
statementsissuedbyVW,usingacodingsystemtorelatespecificwordingtoselected
frameworksfromtheliteraturereview.Allstatementsanalysedwereavailableinthepublic
domain,aspressreleases,statementstoshareholdersandinvestors,ortranscriptsoforal
evidence.
ResultsTherewasaclearassociationbetweentheselectedframeworksandstatementsmadebythe
companyinthethreeareasofattribution,crisismanagementandimagerestorationand
informationorientation.Therewasaconnectionbetweenstatementsrelatingtoattribution
andstatementsrelatingtoinformationorientation,atthetimeofthecrisisandasitwas
envisagedforthefuture.Prioritiesforactionalsoformedpartoftheoverallcrisismanagement
andimagerestorationapproach.Proposedchangesininformationorientationformedakey
partofthecompany’spublicresponsetomitigatetheoffensivenessofthecrisis.
ConclusionItwasdemonstratedthattheoreticalframeworksofattribution,crisismanagementandimage
restorationandinformationorientationhavedirectrelevancetothewayVWresponded
publiclytothecrisis;thattherewasaninter-relationbetweenattributionsandcrisis
managementstrategies;thatattributionsandcrisismanagementandimagerestoration
5
strategiesrelatedtoaspectsofinformationorientationasbothcomponentsandconsequences
ofthecrisis.
6
Acknowledgement
Mysincerestthanksgotomydissertationtutor,DrJorgeTiagoMartins,forgivinguphisvaluabletimetoinstructme.
Iwouldliketothankmyacademicmentor,JayneTulip,forhelpingmetoplanandorganisemydayssothatIcouldsubmitmydissertationontime.
IwouldliketothanktheInformationSchoolstafffortheirexcellentteaching,andIwouldliketoextendmythankstoeverybodyattheUniversityofSheffieldformakingmytimeheresospecial.
7
TableoffiguresFigure1:apiecharttoshowthedifferentcrisismanagementstrategiesusedbyVW34
Figure2:agraphtoshowthecrisismanagementstrategiesemployedineachdocument....................................................................................................................35
8
Chapter1:Introduction1.1BackgroundOn18thSeptember2015,theGermanautomotivecompanyVolkswagenAG(VW)
receivedanoticeofviolationoftheCleanAirActfromtheUnitedStates
EnvironmentalProtectionAgency.Ithadbeenfoundthatcertaindieselenginesin
carsmanufacturedbyVWcontainedapieceofsoftware(a“defeatdevice”)thatmeant
certainemissioncontrolswereonlyactivatedduringlaboratorytesting("Volkswagen
AG,2016).Theresultofthisisthatinrealworldconditions,someengineswere
exceedingUSemissionlimits“byafactorof15to35”(CenterforAlternativeFuels,
EnginesandEmissions,2014).VWadmittedthat,unbeknowntothegeneralpublic,
about11millioncarsworldwidewerefittedwiththedevice("VolkswagenAG,2015).
Seegeretal(2003)defineorganisationalcrisesas“specific,unexpected,andnon-
routineeventsorseriesofeventsthat[create]highlevelsofuncertaintyandthreator
perceivedthreattoanorganisation’shighprioritygoals”.Coombs(2007)statesthata
crisiscancreatethreethreats:publicsafetyissues;financialloss;andreputationloss.
BoththesedefinitionsshowVWtobeinadeepcrisis.Financiallossisshownasthe
companysetaside€16.2bntodealwiththeemissionscrisis.ThisledtoVWmakingan
annuallossin2015of€4.1bn–itsfirstannuallossinover20years("Volkswagen
GroupVolkswagenReportsRobustOperationsinFiscalYear2015",2016).Reputation
lossisshownas,byDecember2015,salesofVWbrandedcarshaddroppedby20%
(SocietyofMotorManufacturersandTraders,2015).MatthiasMuller,CEOofVW,
describesthesituationas“thegreatestchallengeinthehistoryof[the]Company”
(VolkswagenAG,2016,p.7).
Onthe12thDecember2015,VolkswagencommissionedcommerciallawfirmJones
Daytorunanexternalinvestigationintowhathappenedatthecompanythatledto
thecrisis.Atthetimeofwriting,thisinvestigationisongoing.
1.2ResearchaimThisresearchprojectaimstoexaminetherelevanceofattributionframeworksin
evaluatingcorporateandindividualliabilityandcrisismanagementstrategies,and
determinewhetherthepresenceofinformationorientationcompetencieshasa
significantimpactonthecompany’scrisisresponse.
9
1.3ObjectivesInordertoachievetheresearchaims,thefollowingobjectiveswillbeaddressed:
• Exploreattributionsmadebythecompanyusingselectedattribution
frameworks
• Examinethekeyelementsofcrisismanagementanddamagelimitation
strategiesemployedbyrelatingthemtorelevanttheoreticalframeworks
• Investigatewaysinwhichattributionsinformtheprocesscrisismanagement
process
• Investigateaspectsofinformationorientationwithinthecompany,asrevealed
intheirownstatements
• Considerhowtheperceivedlevelofinformationorientationchallengesor
enhancescorporateresponsibilityandthecompany’scrisisresponse
1.4OriginalityofresearchTherehavebeenstudiesevaluatingmultinationalcorporations’crisismanagement
strategiesduringandafterlarge-scalecrises.DeWolf&Mejri(2013)investigatedthe2010
BPDeepwaterHorizonoilspill.Likethisstudy,theydidacontentanalysis,butinsteadused
secondarydatafromsourcesotherthanBP.Thisresultedintheexposureofmultiple
failuresbyBP.ThisstudyusesVWasitsonlysource,whichallowsfordirectinterpretation
ofwhatprioritiesVWwouldlikeitsaudiencetothinkithas.
Thatcheretal.(2015)performedacontentanalysisonfourreportsofthe2011Fukushima
nucleardisaster,lookingattheimpactinformationbehaviourhasoninformationfailure.
Thisdissertationalsotriestoexaminethisrelationship.ButThatcheretal’sstudydoesnot
concernitselfwiththecompany’scrisismanagementstrategy.
Thisdissertationintendstomergetheaimsofbothstudiesbyfocussingonbothcrisis
managementandinformationbehaviour,usingasimilarcontentanalysismethodologyto
bothoftheabovestudies.Itisimportantfororganisationstorecogniseresearchintocrisis
management.Accordingtoa2014surveyof375largeandsmallorganisations,29%of
organisationswaittoexperienceacrisisbeforeconstructingaresponsestrategy
(Steelhenge,2014).Crisismanagementresearchlikethisstudycaninformorganisations’
strategies.
10
1.5StructureofdissertationThisdissertationisstructuredintochaptersasfollows:
Chapter1–Introduction:BackgroundtotheVolkswagendieselemissionscaseandareviewoftheproject.
Chapter2–LiteraturereviewReviewofsomeofthekeyliteratureinthefield,includinganexplorationanddiscussionofthedifferentframeworksandtheirrelevanceforthepresentproject.
Chapter3–MethodologyAnoverviewofthechoiceandtypeofsourcematerial.Anexpositionofresearchphilosophytogetherwithanexplanationofthehermeneuticapproachandqualitativeanalyticaltechniquesused.
Chapter4–ResearchfindingApresentationofdetailfromthecontentanalysis,relatingdatatoframeworksofattributionandcrisismanagementandimagerestoration.Detailedanalysisoflinksbetweenattributionandcrisismanagementandinformationorientation.
Chapter5–DiscussionAnevaluationofresearchfindings,todeterminetrends,connectionsandmissinglinks.
Chapter6–ConclusionAsummaryoffindingsandevaluationofsuccessintermsofresearchaimsandobjectives.Recommendationsforfurtherresearch.
11
Chapter2:LiteratureReview
Thissectionisaliteraturereviewoftheframeworksandtheoriesthatwillbeusedas
lensestoanalysetheVWcase.Thefirstoftheseisagroupofattributiontheories,
whichareconcernedwithidentifyingthecauseofeventsandderivingresponsibility.
Attributionresearchisimportantforthestudybecauseitshowshowanindividual(or
inthiscase,acompany)arrivesatacausalinferenceandwhattheconsequencesof
suchaninferencemaybe.
Second,crisismanagementtheorieswillbeemployedasalenstoexaminehowVW
conducteditselfinthewakeofthecrisisinordertodealwiththethreeeffectsofa
crisis:publicsafety;financialloss;andreputationloss(Coombes,2007),aswellas
legalconcerns.
Thesetwogroupsarehighlycomplementary.Thisisbecause“peopleinterpret
behaviourintermsofitscausesandtheseinterpretationsplayanimportantrolein
determiningreactionstothebehaviour”(Kelley&Michela,1980,p.458).Ascrisis
managementstrategiesareatypeofreaction(althoughsomemightbepre-emptive)
itfollowsthatoneshouldfirstformattributionsinordertoimplementappropriate
crisismanagementstrategies.Coombesfollowedthislineofreasoningindeveloping
hissituationalcrisiscommunicationtheory,byexplainingtherelationshipbetweena
situationandcommunicationstrategies(CoombesandHolladay,1996).
Finally,itwillbeseenwhetherthesecrisismanagementstrategiesgiveanyindication
astowhataspects(ifany)ofinformationorientationtheoryhavebeenprioritised.
ThetheorywasdevisedbyMarchand,KettingerandRollins(2001)asametricofhow
effectivecompaniesuseandmanageinformation.Itisnotwithintheremitsofthe
researchtodiscoverwhetherVWhadahighlevelofinformationorientationbefore,
duringorafterthecrisis.Rather,itwillexaminewhetherVWseektochangeanyof
theaspectsofinformationorientationasaresultofthecrisis.
2.1AttributiontheoriesDifferentattributiontheoriesareusedtocomplementmymainframeworkof
informationorientation.Attributiontheorieswillallowadifferentperspectiveofthe
VWcrisis.Theystemfromthesocialpsychologicalconceptofattribution,whichis
theprocessbywhichindividualsexplainthecauseofbehaviour.Thishassincebeen
12
appliedtothestudyofanorganisation’sbehaviourorevent,asopposedtomerely
thatofanindividual.Attributiontheoriescanhelpexplainwhysomethinghas
happenedinacompanyororganisation.Inmycase,theywillinformmy
understandingofthecrisismanagementstrategiesusedbyVWtomitigatetheeffects
oftheemissionsscandalintermsofcustomerresponseandlegalliability.
Kelleyetal.definetheterm“attribution”asmeaning“inferenceofcause”(Kelleyet
al.,1980,p.458).Attributiontheoriesdescribetheprocessofattributiontomakesense
ofevents.Forexample,ifsomebodywhoisanervousdriverhasacrash,itismore
likelythatwewouldreachoutfortheexplanationthatitwastheirowndriving
conductwhichcausedthecollision,ratherthanconsiderthepossibilitythatthey
weretheinnocentvictimofdangerousdriver,orsimplybadluck.
2.1.1InternalandexternalattributionHeider(1958)saidthattherearetwotypesofattribution.Thefirstisexternal
attribution,wherebehaviourisinterpretedashavingbeencausedbysituational
factors.Forexample,perhapsanemployeegotapromotionbecausetheyarehaving
anaffairwiththemanager.Internalattribution,ontheotherhand,iswherea
behaviourissaidtobecausedbyinternalcharacteristicsordisposition.Forexample,
thesameemployeecouldhavegotapromotionthroughhardworkand
determination.Ineithercase,Heiderdevelopedtheideathatthe“conditionwillbe
heldresponsibleforaneffectwhichispresentwhentheeffectispresentandabsent
whentheeffectisabsent”(Heider,1958,p152).
JonesandNisbett(1971)evolvedtheideaofactor-observerasymmetry,statingthat
whenseekingexplanationsfortheactionsofothers,individualsaremorelikelyto
attributecausetothedispositionoftheactorthantosituationalfactors.Anumberof
frameworkshavebeendevisedwhichfocusontheattributionofdispositionasa
causalfactorforevents,includingKelley’scovariationtheory(seebelow).Inthis
context,dispositionrelatestofactorswhichrelatetotheactor,suchascharacteristics
orinclination.
JonesandNisbett(1971)noticedthatpeopletendtopaymoreattentiontointentional
behaviour.Theyidentifiedthat“strongandconfidentdispositionalinferencesare
drawnaboutapersonwhenweseehimorheractunderconditionsofhighchoice”.
13
Attributiontheoriescaneasilybeappliedtothefieldofinformationmanagementto
helpusunderstandthewayorganisationsoperate.Ifmanagersareabletounderstand
thecausesoftheiremployeesbehaviour,theywillhaveagreaterunderstandingof
howtheirbusinessworksandcanemployfuturedecisionsaccordingly.Forinstance,
theywouldgainthecapacitytomanipulateworkingconditionsinsuchawaythat
employeemotivationisincreased,leadingtoahappierworkforceandanincreasein
performance.
Ifanorganisationalunderstandsitsinternalandexternalenvironments,itismore
inclinedtoactpurposefully(Gronhaug&Falkenberg,1994).Itiseasytoseehowthis
fitsthecontextofacrisis.Ifthepeopleinanorganisationhaveaperceptionofcause
ofacrisis,theycanmakemoreaccuratejudgmentsofsuitablecrisismanagement
actions.
2.1.2Kelley’scovariationmodelKelley(1967)developedthecovariationmodelofattribution,identifyingthreedistinct
variableswhichhaveaneffectonattribution.Theseare:distinctiveness,meaningthe
uniquenessofaneventasdistinctfromtheactor’strackrecord;consistency,meaning
thedegreetowhichtheeventdemonstratedtheactorrunningtruetotype;
consensus,meaningthedegreetowhichtheactorbehavedasotherswouldhaveor
havealreadydoneinsimilarcircumstances.
Hefoundthatwhendistinctivenessislowandconsistencyishigh,aneventismore
likelytobeattributedtotheactor’sinternaldisposition.HewstoneandJaspars(2006)
addedtheideaofconsensusasadeterminantofcausalattribution,notingthatwhen
consensusislow,anactismorelikelytobeattributedtotheactor’sdisposition.
ItisnoteworthythatKelley’scovariationtheoryrelatestoattribution,butdoesnot
exploretheconnectionbetweenattributionandresponsibility.Itisusefultherefore
onlyinsofarasitillustrateshowpeoplelookforcausesofeventsbyattributingthem
totheactor’sdispositionandtowhatdegreethatdispositionaccordswiththeactor’s
history.Kelley’stheorydoesnotdiscussanyimplicationsofcausalattribution.
2.1.3Weiner’sattributiontheoryandAttribution–Responsibility–ActionmodelWeiner’sattributiontheory(1995)isusedasanadditionalframeworkbecause,as
YumandJeong(2014)found,itisusefulinexaminingwhyacrisishashappenedafter
14
ithashappened.Itisalsousefulindecidingwhetheritisacrisisthatislikelyto
happenagain.
Weiner’sattributiontheoryassumesthatindividualstryanddeterminethecausesof
otherpeople’sbehaviours.Apersonmightattributeanumberofcausestoanother
one’saction.
Weinerthoughttheprocessofattributioncouldbebrokendownintothreestages.
First,abehaviourmustbeobservedbyaperson.Second,thepersonmustbelievethat
thatthebehaviourwasperformedintentionally.Last,thepersonmustdecidewhether
thebehaviourwasaresultofcoercion,inwhichcaseonewouldassumeanexternal
cause,orfreewill,inwhichonewouldassumeaninternalcauseintheindividual.
("AttributionTheory",2016).
Inthe“attribution–responsibility–action”model,Weinersuggestedthatpeople’s
attributionsofcauseguidetheirfutureactionssuchaspunishmentorpreventative
measures.Weineridentifiedthetwomotivationsforpunishmentasutilityand
retribution.Retributionisthebalancingoutofthewrongorjustice,andutilityrelates
tothepreventionoftheevent’srecurrence.Itisthoughtthatretributionisincreased
wherecausesofthefailureareperceivedtobecontrollable.Incorporatecases,
punitiveoptionsmaybecarriedoutbyindividualsandhaveabehaviouralnature,
suchasboycottingofconsumerproducts;punitiveoptionsmayalsobelegalin
nature,suchasprosecutionbythestateorregulatoryauthority.Weinerdoesnot
explorerestorativejustice:thisiswherethepunishmentservestorestorethedebt
causedbythewrongdoing.
OneofthecrucialdifferencesbetweentheconceptofWeiner’soriginalattribution
theoryandmyapplicationofit,willbethefactthatorganisationsconsistof
individuals,alloperatingwiththeirownattributionmodels,andasasumoftheir
parts,operatingasone.WillWeiner’sattributiontheorywillbeabletoaccountforan
actionthathasbeenperformedbyacollective,ratherthananindividual?
2.2CrisismanagementAttributiontheoriescaninformcrisismanagementtheory,becauseresponse
strategiestendtobebasedonthenatureofthecauseofthecrisis.Aprimeexampleof
thisisCoombs’situationalcrisiscommunicationtheory(SCCT).
15
2.2.1Coombes’situationalcrisiscommunicationtheory(SCCT)Situationalcrisiscommunicationtheory(SCCT)wasdevelopedbyCoombes(2006)as
anapplicationofKelley’scovariationattributionmodeltocorporatecrisis
communication.Itfocusesonconsistencyanddistinctivenessasdimensionsof
attributionandlooksattheseintermsofcrisishistoryandrelationshiphistory.Crisis
historyreferstowhethertheactorhasanyhistoryofsimilarinstancesinthepast;
relationshiphistoryreferstohowtheactorhasperformedwithrespecttoother
stakeholdersinothercontexts.Bothfactorsaresignificantininfluencingpublic
opinionafteracorporatecrisis.SCCTdoesnot,however,examinetheconsensus
dimensionofattribution.
CoombesandHolladay(2002)saidthatdifferentcriseswouldnecessitatedifferent
communicationstrategiesinordertomanagethemeffectively.Theydiscussedthree
significanttypesofcrisis.In“humanbreakdownproductrecall”,aproductisrecalled
becauseofhumanerror.TheexampleisusedofahamburgerrecallbyHudsonFoods
afterthebeefwascontaminatedwithEcoliasaresultofplantemployeesmistakenly
puttingcontaminatedbeefbackintotheprocessingmachinery.Thesecondtypeof
crisisidentifiedis“organisationalmisdeedswithnoinjuries”Inthiscase,stakeholders
areknowinglydeceivedbymanagement,withoutcausingactualharm.Theexample
isusedwhereChryslerknowinglymanipulatedmileageclocksonnewcarstoobscure
thefactthattheyhadbeendrivenformilesduringtests.Thethirdtypeofcrisisis
“organisationalmisdeedmanagementmisconduct”,whereinfringementsoflawsor
regulationsareknowinglymadebymanagement.Anexampleofthiswouldbefailing
toadheretoequalopportunitiesstatutoryrequirements.
2.2.2BenoitImageRestorationdiscoursetheoryInordertoevaluateacorporation’scourseofactiontomanageacrisis,itisnecessary
topayattentiontothewayitmanagesriskasitpertainstoitscorporateimage.The
preservationofcorporateimage,orrestorationofadamagedimage,iscentraltoan
organisation’sresponsetothreat.
WilliamLBenoit(1997)developedatheoryofimagerestorationdiscourse,lookingat
waysinwhichcorporatebodiesusecommunicationstrategiestominimisedamage
andrestoreconfidenceinthecorporateimage.Itisassumedthattheactor
(corporation)isheldresponsibleforanactionandthattheactionisconsidered
offensive.Theresponsibilityorfaultmayberealoronlyperceived,butwhereitexists,
16
thecompany’simageisatrisk.Itisessentialforcompaniestoidentifytherelevant
audience(audiences)whenusingcommunicationstrategiestorestoretheirimage.
Benoitidentifiesfiveimagerestorationtechniqueswhichare:denialorshiftingof
blame;evasionofresponsibility(duetoprovocation,lackofinformation,accidentor
misplacedgoodintentions);reductionofoffensiveness(bybolsteringapositive
image,downplayingthenatureofthedamage,differentiationfromworseinstances;
underminingtheaccusers,offeringcompensation,ortranscendenceofmotive);
correctiveactiontorestoreoriginalconditionandpreventrecurrence;mortification,
offeringapologiesandremorse.
Thesetechniqueshavebeenappliedtocasestudiesofcrisesbefore.Benoitand
Czerwinski(1997)appliedthetheorytoUSAir'sresponsetomediacoverageafterits
aircraftcrashedin1994.IthasalsobeenusedtoshowthatExxon’sheavily
downplayeddamageafterthe1989oilspill(BenoitandCzerwinski,1997);andthat
bothcorrectiveactionandmortificationwereheavilyusedbyAT&Tafteroneoftheir
majortelephonelinesfailedin1973(BenoitandCzerwinski,1997).
Itshouldbenotedthattherecouldbeaconflictofinterestsbetweenimage
restorationstrategiesandtheneedtoavoidfuturelawsuits.Benoitalsoobservesthat
makingassertionsthatarelaterfoundouttobefalsewouldbecounterproductivein
anyimagerepairstrategy.
2.2.3CrisismanagementandlitigationIntheframeworksdescribedabove,itwillbeseenhowthereisalinkbetween
attributionmodelsandcrisismanagementstrategy,whichisinturnlinkedtoimage
restorationstrategy.Ithasalsobeennotedthatsomecrisismanagementstrategies,
particularlyimagerestorationstrategies,mayconflictwiththeneedtoavoidor
minimizelegalconsequences,whetherthesebecivillawsuitsorprosecutionsbrought
inrespectofoffencesagainstthestateorotherregulatorybodies.Unlikecivilsuits,
corporatefailuresorviolationswhichattractprosecutionbythestatecannotbe
writtenoffbycompensatoryaction,althoughcompensatoryactionandcontrition
couldbeheldasmitigatingfactors.
Thereislimitedliteratureontherelationshipbetweencrisismanagementand
litigationandthewaycorporationsaddressthesepotentiallyconflictingareas.In“A
Litigator’sLookatCrisisManagement”(2000),ShomperandSooydiscusstheneed
17
forcarefulrecordsmanagementandcommunicationstrategieswhenfacedwiththe
riskoflitigation.Theyalsodiscusstheimplicationsoflegalprivilegeasitrelatesto
differentcategoriesofinformationandcommunications.Itisnotedthatall
communications,otherthanthosebetweenthecorporationandcounsel,maybe
takenintoconsiderationincourtandthismayimpactonwhatstatementsthe
corporationchoosestoissueandtowhom.Inher1997paper”liabilitymeansnever
beingabletosayyou’resorry”,LisaTylersays,“concernsaboutliabilityconstrain
corporateexecutivesfromapologizingforcrisesforwhichthecorporationitselfbears
someresponsibility”.
2.3InformationOrientationThefirstoftheseframeworksis“informationorientation”(IO).Thiswasan
organisationalframeworkdevisedbyMarchandetal(2000).Thetheorywasbuilt
afterMarchandetalsurveyed1009seniormanagersfrom169businessteams;their
samplecontainedmanagersfromnumerousdifferentcompanies,nationsand
industries.Theobjectivewastounderstandhowtheinteractionofpeopleand
information,throughtheuseoftechnology,canaffectbusinessperformance,and
theyfoundinformationorientationtobetheoptimum“metricofinformationuse”
(Ke,2011).
Themetricconsistsofthreedifferentinformationcapabilities:information
technologypractices(ITP),informationmanagementpractices(IMP),and
informationbehavioursandvalues(IBV).Thesethreecapabilitiescontainfifteen
differentcompetencies.
2.3.1Informationtechnologypractices(ITP)ITPreferstothemannerinwhichacompanymanagestheirITapplicationsand
infrastructureinsupportoftheirbusinessdecisions.Forexample,acompanymay
decidetoupgradetheirclientdatabasesystemtosomethingmorecomplex.Ifthe
companygrowsfast,thiscouldbeagooddecisionsinceitcouldadequatelysuita
growingclientlistandanincreaseinoperationsforyearstocome.Ifthecompany
doesnotexpand,itmayprovetobeunnecessary,expensiveanddifficultforstaffto
trainforanduse.Acompanycanimprovetheirinformationorientationbyusinga
technologyinfrastructurethatsuitstheircurrentandfutureneeds.
18
2.3.2Informationmanagementpractices(IMP)IMPreferstothecapabilitiesthatmanageinformationsuccessfullyintermsof
informationcollection,processingandorganisation.Forexample,iftheinformationa
companycollectsispoorquality,duplicatedoroutofdate,errorsarelikelytobe
made.Repairingsucherrorsisacostlyandinefficientprocess.Acompanycan
increasetheirinformationorientationbyimprovingtheirmanagementof
information.
2.3.3Informationbehavioursandvalues(IBV)IBVdescribescapabilitiesthatencouragebehavioursandpromotevaluesinstafffor
successfulinformationuse.Forexample,staffcanbetrainedtounderstandthe
benefitsthateffectiveinformationmanagementhasontheircompany(efficiencyand
thereforefastergrowth)andtheirownwork-lives(makingtheirjobeasier).A
workforcethatunderstandsissuessurroundingprivacyandconfidentialityisless
likelytomakeerrorsthatcouldincurcostlylegalconsequences.
Informationorientationisa“people-centricviewofinformationuse”(Marchand&
Kettinger,n.d.).Itisconcernedwithhowpeoplecanadapttheirtechnologypractises,
managementpractisesandvaluestoincreaseperformance.Itsfocusonpeople,rather
thantechnology,meansitcanbeappliedtoanyorganisation,notjustIT-based
organisations.However,areviewofthecurrentliteraturesuggestsithasnotbeen
usedinthefieldofcrisismanagementbefore.
ItisnotmypurposetodetermineaquantitativemeasureofinformationuseforVW,
asthiswouldnotbepossiblewithoutaccesstoverifiableinformationaboutthe
informationorientationofthebusinessbefore,duringandafterthecrisis.Thisisnot
inthepublicdomain.However,asinformationorientationhelpsacompanyto
improvebusinessperformancebyexamininghowtheorganisationprocesses
informationacrossthethreecompetencies,itwillbeusefultolookforevidenceabout
certaindimensionsofinformationorientationaspartofmyanalysisoftheemissions
crisis.InlookingatVW,Iwillhavetodecidewhetherornotthecompanydisplayed
characteristicsofinformationorientationandhowtheseareprioritisedinitsstrategic
responsetothecrisis.
2.4SummaryThestatementsmadebyVWregardingtheemissionscrisiswillbeexaminedfor
evidenceofHeider’s(1958)internalandexternalattribution.Thedimensionsof
19
distinctiveness,consensusandconsistency,fromKelley’scovariationmodel(1967),
willbeusedtoexplorethecompany’sresponsesintermsofattribution.Weiner’s
“attribution-responsibility-actionmodel”(1995)isalsousefulbecauseitprovidesa
bridgebetweenstatementsaboutattributionandtheoutcomesfromit.Although
someoftheoutcomesareobviouslyimposedastheresultoflegalorregulatory
proceedings,thecompanysubsumesalloutcomesintoitscrisismanagementand
imagerestorationstrategies.Coombs’SCCTcanlinktwoofKelley’scovariation
componentstoacompany’scrisishistory,andBenoit’simagerestorationand
discoursetheory(1997)willbeusedtoanalysedifferentfacetsofthecompany’scrisis
managementandimagerestorationstrategies.
Statementsaboutinformationorientationwillthenbelookedfor,whichwillreveal
eitherdirectlyorbyimplicationthecompany’sself-evaluationofthewayituses
informationandtheprioritiesitidentifiesforthefuture.Giventhattheamountof
technicalinformationavailablefromthedocumentsinmydatasetissmall,thefocus
willbeontwoofthecompetenciesidentifiedbyMarchandetal(2001),namelythe
aspectsofinformationmanagementpracticesandinformationbehaviourandvalues.
ReferencestobothIMPandIBVwillprovidealinktobothstatementsofattribution
andstatementsregardingcrisismanagementandimagerestoration.
20
Chapter3:Researchmethodology3.1OntologyofsocialresearchTheresearchisconcernedwithVolkswagen’smanagementofinformationinthewake
oftheemissionscrisis:itconcernshowtheyusedinformationintheprocessof
attribution;howtheyhavehandledinformationtosuittheircorporateinterestsand
publicdutiesinthewakeofthecrisis;howtheyhavemanipulatedtheoutflowof
informationfromthecompanytorestoretheircompanyimage;andwhetherthese
actionsgiveanycluesastotheircompany’sinformationmanagementstrategyprior
tothecrisis.
Theseobjectivesconcernhumanbehaviour,andthisputsmystudyinthefieldof
socialresearch.Consequently,inunderstandingmychosenmethodology,weshould
remindourselvesoftwodebatesinsocialscientificresearch,andtheimplicationsof
researchinsuchafield.
3.1.1ObjectivismversussubjectivismThereisasignificantontologicaldebatebetweenobjectivistandsubjectivist
approachestosocialresearch.Objectivistsinsistthatrealityexistsindependentof
consciousness.Accordingtotheobjectivist,scientificresearchrequires“publicly
observable,replicablefacts”thatareavailable“onlyintheareaofovertbehaviour”
(Diesing,1966,p.1).Ontheotherhand,subjectivistswouldsaythatanysciencethat
ignoreshumanbehaviour’s“subjectivemeaningfulness”isnotasocialscience
(Diesing,1966,p.1).
Thispieceofresearch,giventheaboveobjectives’concernwithhumanbehaviour,is
clearlysubjectivist.Itaimstostresstheuniquenessofhumanbeings,andisnot
subjecttoany“impartialpublicverification”(Diesing,1966,p.1).
3.1.2PositivismversusinterpretivismThereisanothersignificantdiscussionwithinsocialresearchthatshouldbe
considered.Positivism,ontheonehand,istheapproachholdingthatknowledgecan
onlybeobtainedthroughsensoryexperience.Theseexperiences,orobservations,
lendthemselvestobeingquantifiedandstatisticallyanalysed.Fromapositivistview,
socialresearchisapproachednodifferentlytothenaturalsciences:explanationsare
madethroughexposingcausalrelationships.Thereisnohumaninvolvement,because
theobserverisindependentfromwhatisbeingobserved.Thisrendersthehuman
21
interestsoftheobservationirrelevant(Ramanathan,2009).Forpositivism,theaimof
researchistodescribeandexplainwhatisbeingobserved.Positivistscanmakestrong
predictionsbygeneralisingpatterns.However,criticswillsaythatthiscomesatthe
priceofdepthofunderstanding(Collins,2010).
Thecontrastingstanceofinterpretivismholdsthathumaninterestsshouldnotbe
ignored.Itismorethansimplyobserving,becauseinterpretivistsrejecttheideathat
meaningisindependentofconsciousness.Theydonotthinkitexistssolelyinthe
externalworld,butratherthemindoftheinterpreterisanecessaryfeatureof
meaningitself.Interpretivistsaimforunderstanding,ratherthansimplyexplanation.
Bothapproacheshaveadvantagesanddisadvantages.Interpretivistscanobtainwhat
theythinkisgreatdepthofunderstandingbecausetheirargumentsaccurately
describethebroadnessandrichnessofthephenomenaandbecausetheycan
“accuratelyaccountforarangeofbehavioursandbeliefs”(Lin,1998,p.163).However,
anycausalrelationshipsidentifiedtendtobeweak.
Thisresearchisinterpretivist,becausethedataisnot“value-free”.Rather,the
preconceptionsoftheresearcher“guidetheprocessofenquiry”(Walsham,1995).The
documentsarereadwiththeintentionoffindingmeaningsthatmaynotbeexplicit.
3.2TheHermeneuticsmethodThemethodologythatwillbeusedtoanalysethedataistheinterpretiveapproachof
“philosophicalhermeneutics”,definedasa“theoryoftheinterpretationofmeaning”
(Karppinen,2014).Thisdatasetlendsitselftohermeneuticinterpretationasamethod
ofanalysis,becauseoftherichnessofthematerial:itconsistsoflong,qualitative
accountsofbothfactandopinion.Inordertofindmeaningwithinthem,adetailed
andthoroughinterpretationofthetextisnecessary,“alternatingbetweenpartand
whole”ofthetext,andbringingabouta“progressivelydeeperunderstandingofboth”
(AlvessonandSkoldberg,2000,p.53).
Themainobjectiveofthehermeneuticmethodologyistogainanunderstandingof
whyVWmanagedtheirinformationinthemannerthattheydid.Aswithall
hermeneuticstudy,theinterpretationwillbeginwithmypre-understandingofthe
dataset,andtheprejudicesoftheresearcherwillformthe“foundationoftheresearch
process”(Karppinen,2014).Thestudywillreflect“thedialecticbetweenthe
understandingofthetextasawholeandtheinterpretationofitsparts”(Mingers&
Willcocks,2004).
22
Thetranscriptsoforalsubmissionsaredatasourcesthatmovefromthespeakerinto
thepublicdomainandfromoraltowrittenmediaand,assuch,acquirealifeand
purposebeyondtheirorigination.Onceinthepublicdomain,thetexttakesona
“fixed,finiteandexternalrepresentation”(Mingers&Willcocks,2004).Allthesources
inmydatasetaretextswheretheauthor(s)areaware,atthetimeoftheircreation
thattheywouldbegointothepublicdomain.Inthecaseofpressreleases,texthas
beengeneratedwiththeexpressintentionofbeingpubliclypublished.This
distanciation,evidencedbyallthesourcesinthedataset,meansthatthesequential
andpersonalisedmethodofhermeneuticanalysisisparticularlyappropriatein
helpingtogetbehindthepublicfaceofthetexttodiscovermeaningandpurpose.
HermeneuticanalysisinthefieldofISandISmanagementhasbeencarriedoutby
theUniversityofOulo(Karppinen,2014).Inthisstudy,open-endedresponsesfrom
participantswereanalysed.Ithinkthisisastrongindicatorthatsuchamethodology
canoperateinabroadlysimilarfield.Thereare,however,somecrucialdifferences
betweenKarppinen’sstudymodelandthisone.Intheformer,analyseswere
performedonopen-endedresponsestospecificquestions.Inthisstudy,noquestions
havebeenpositedandthereforethesearchforrelevantmeaningwillbeguidedonly
bytheanalysisoftextualcontent.Therewillnotbelookingforanswerstospecific
questions,althoughitisannecessaryandorganicpartoftheanalysisthatthe
researcherhasapointofviewwhichwillbecontinuallyrefinedaspartoftheanalytic
process.
Hermeneuticspermitsawiderangeofstrategiesforconductingactualtextual
analysis,whichcanincludediscourseanalysis,taxonomiesoropencodingusing
groundedtheory.Acontentanalysiscodingmethodhasbeenadoptedbasedon
criteriafromtheframeworksofinformationorientation(Marchandetal,2001),
attributionandcrisismanagementinordertoinvestigatetheinformationand
communicationstrategiesbeingdeployedbythecompanyinresponsetothe
emissionsviolationscrisis.Thisapproachisbothinductiveandsubjective,whichsuits
thehermeneuticalapproachinthatitinvolvestheresearcherasacomponentof
understanding.Hermeneuticshasbeensuccessfullyappliedinavarietyofsocial
researchcontextsand,giventhatthisinvestigationconcernsthefront-facing
communicationsofacorporateorganisation,thenitisappropriatetoincludethe
researcher’sresponseasavaliddimension.
23
3.3HermeneuticsinmyresearchAcontentanalysishasbeencarriedoutonselectedtextsproducedbyVW,usingpre-
knowledgebasedonareadingandanalysisofkeyframeworksinthefieldsof
attribution(Kelley1996,Coombs2006,Weiner1967),Benoit’scrisismanagementand
imagerestorationtheory(1997),andinformationorientation(Marchandetal,2001).
Aninitialreadingofallthetextrevealedtosomeaspectsofeachoftheframeworks
and,fromthis,anunderstandingofthedatasourceswasdevelopedthroughre-
readingandidentifyingkeypassagestoevidencetheframeworks.Inthisway,a
hermeneuticcycleofsequentialreadingswasbeingfollowed,withanalysisbeing
content-ledandinterpretedbytheresearcher.
Thefindingsgeneratedarebasedonmyinterpretationofeachofthetexts.However,
theresearcherhadnoinfluenceonthecontentofthetextsatthetimetheywere
generated.Thecontentanalysisischeckedandcorroboratedbyre-reading,butisnot
externallytriangulated.Becauseofthenatureofthistypeofanalysis,itisnotpossible
toverifyfactexternallyand,forthisreason,pointsoffacthavebeendeliberately
avoidedrelatingtothecircumstanceswithinthecompany,thetechnicaldebateand
thefindingsoftheJonesDayinternalinvestigation.Myresearchmethodis
appropriatetoanexaminationofhowthecompanywishedtobeseentorespondand
theissuestheychosetoaddressinthepublicdomain.
3.3.1HeuristiccodingThedatasetfortheresearchreportedinthisdissertationisnotquantitativebutitis
sometimesusefultoviewfromquantitativeperspectiveinformofstatistics.Inorder
togetmeaningfulanalysisoutofthedocuments,thecontentswerecoded.Codes
wereused“asaheuristic”(Saltana,2009):theyareusedasan“initialstep”(Saltana,
2009)thatactsasthefoundationforfurtheranalysis.Crucially,codingallowstolink
betweenideasthatareprevalentthroughoutthedataset.Itisimportantthatpatterns
canbeidentifiedsothathermeneuticanalysiscanbeusedtoextractmeaningfrom
thepatterns.
Techniquesfromattributionalcoding(Cassell&Symon,2016,p.228)areusedtoanalyse
andrecordattributionsinthedocumentsduringthehermeneuticcycle.Asimple
systemwasdevelopedsothat,onfurtherreading,referencesinthetextscouldbe
linkeddirectlytospecificframeworksandelementswithintheframeworks.Each
frameworkwasassignedaletter,andpartsofeachframeworkfurtherbrokendown
24
intonumbers.Instancesofcertainattributiveprocesses,crisismanagementstrategies
orinformationorientationcompetencieswerethenlabelledwiththecorresponding
code.ThissystemisshowninAppendixC.
3.3.2ThedatasetAppendixAisatableofthedifferentsourcesofqualitativedatathatwillbeanalysed.
Thedatasetincludesarangeofsourcesthathighlightdifferentperspectivesofthe
distributionofinformationregardingthediscoveryandinvestigationof‘defeat
devices’inVWcars.
Theitemshavebeenchosenfromthelargenumberofwrittentextsgeneratedbythe
companysincetheonsetoftheemission’scrisisinSeptember2015.Theuseof
historicaldocuments,ratherthangeneratingdataspecificallyforthisproject,gives
accesstoamuchwiderdatasetbutdoesrequiretheresearchertobeselective
(Cassell&Symon,2016,p.301).
Thedatacomesfromthreesources:
• Pressreleases,issuedbyVWanddesignedforconsumptionbythegeneral
public;
• Statementstoshareholdersandinvestors;
• TranscriptsofevidencepresentedtotheUKParliamentTransportSelect
Committee.
Havingarangeofsourcesiscrucialinordertogainanaccurateunderstandingofthe
wayinformationregardingthe‘defeatdevice’washandledatthecompany,andhow
informationwaspresentedtodifferentaudiences.
Theframeworksofcrisiscommunicationsmanagementemphasisetheimportanceof
organisationsidentifyingthesalientaudienceswhenpublishingpublicstatements.
Ontheotherhand,informationreleaseddirectlytotheUKHouseofCommons
TransportSelectcommitteecanreasonablybeexpectedtohaveadifferentagenda
andwillbothbemostlikelytobeconcernedwithcopingwiththecommittee’s
questions,whowillwishtoestablishfactsaboutwhathappenedandhowmuchwas
knownatseniormanagementlevelatVW("Role-TransportCommittee",2016).
25
3.3.3ChronologyofdataPleaserefertoAppendixBforatimelineofsignificantevents.Atthetimeofwriting,
theVWcaseisongoing,withnewinformationbeingreleasedintothepublicsphere
everyday.Itwasthereforenecessarytoestablishastartpointandendpointforthe
dataset.
Itbeginson18thSeptember2015,withapressreleaseadmittingthatthe
EnvironmentalProtectionAgencyhadfoundevidenceofemissionmanipulations.
TheoriginalintentionswerefortoendonthedaythattheJonesDayinvestigation’s
findingswerepublished,inlateApril2016.VWcommissionedthelawfirmJonesDay
toprovideanindependent,externalinvestigation.However,thepublicationofthe
findingswasdelayed.Inlightofthefactthat,atthetimeofwriting,theinvestigation
isstillongoing,Ihavechosentoendmydatasetatthistimenonetheless.
3.3.4DatareferencingInordertoidentifythesourceofquotationstakenfromthesourcedocuments,each
documentinthedatasetwasassignedanumberinchronologicalorder,from1to26
(seeAppendixA).Withineachdocument,eachoftheselectedstatementswas
numberedintheorderinofappearancewithinthetext.Hence,thereference[1:1]
referstothefirstquotedstatementfromthefirstdocumentinthelist.
3.4EthicalissuesTheInformationSchool’sResearchEthicsCommitteeconsideredtheprojectas
having“norisk”.Ihaveuseddatathatalreadyexists,bygatheringinformation
availableonpublicdatabases,suchastheUKParliamentwebsiteandVW’sown
website.Noneoftheinformationisconfidential.Ihavenotconductedanyinterviews
orsurveys,whichwouldrequireconsent.
26
Chapter4:ResearchFindings4.1IntroductionThepreviouschapteroffersanexplanationofhowthehermeneuticmethodcanbe
usedtoextracttruthandmeaningdatafromthedataset.Theheuristiccoding
mechanism(seeAppendixC)actsasausefultoolinsystematicallylabellingpartsof
datashowinginstancesofhighorlowlevelsofinformationorientation,attribution,
crisismanagement,andimagerestoration.Thesecodedinstanceswerethen
aggregatedintothreetablescorrespondingtoeachframework.Thetablesin
AppendixD,EandFshowdistributionsoftheseinstances.Thischapterpresentsthe
findingsdiscovereduponexaminationofthetables.
Thematerialanalysediseithertextwrittenbythecompanyforreleasetothemedia,
orstatementsfromcompanyrepresentativesinresponsetoquestionsfromregulators
ortheirrepresentatives.Acommonfeatureofvoluntarystatementsisthattheyare
nottriangulatedbyoutsideinvestigation.Thismakesthemthemostusefulin
showingwhattheyrevealaboutthatthecompany’spriorities,andhowitwishestobe
seen,ratherthanthefactsofthecase.However,itisimportanttorecognisethe
potentialtobemisledbysuchinformation.Volkswagen’sstatementsintendedfora
publicaudiencewillhavebeenmanipulatedforapublicaudience;theprioritiesthat
Volkswagenisshowntohave(implicitlyorexplicitly)intheirstatementsmaynot
necessarilybetheirtruepriorities.ThisdatasetcontainsonlyVolkswagen’sword.
Mostofthecontentofthedatasetconcentratesoncrisismanagementandimage
restorationstrategies.Thisisparticularlythefocusofallstatementsvolunteeredfor
publicconsumption,suchaspressreleases.Itisimportantformetoestablishthatthe
factsofhowandwhythesoftwaredeceitwasallowedarenotpartofthisdebate.They
wereeithernotknownatthepointthestatementswereissuedordeliberately
withheldbecauseoftheongoinginvestigation.
Forthegreaterpartthetextsseemtoavoidmakingattributions.Thereasonsforthis
arelikelytobetwofold:first,Volkswagenwasseekingtoavoidadmissionsofliability.
Second,theyneededtobecarefulnottoprejudgetheresultsoftheinvestigationby
JonesDay.Nevertheless,therearesomeattributionsmadeorimpliedinthe
Volkswagenmaterialthatgiveaninterestingperspectiveontheirapproachtothe
crisis.
27
TheinterimresultsoftheGroupAuditinvestigation("VolkswagenGroupVolkswagen
makinggoodprogresswithitsinvestigation,technicalsolutions,andGroup
realignment",2015)togetherwithevidencegiventotheUKTransportSelect
Committee,givesomebackgroundabouttheinformationorientationand
managementpracticesthatcontributedtothecrisis,andwaysinwhichtheycouldbe
improved.
Thelinkingfactoristhewaythecompanyseekstopreserveits“reputationalassets”
(Coombs,2006)throughout.
4.2AttributionThecompany’sfirstpublicresponsewastoissuestatementsrelatingtocrisis
managementanddamagelimitation.Nevertheless,theattributionsmadeorimplied
inthematerialanalysesclearlyunderlietheircrisisresponsestrategyandthisiswhy
attributionisexaminedfirst.Thetextsgivesomeinsightintotheattributionsmade
bythecompany.Inadditiontothis,someofthetextsindicateattributionswhichthe
companywouldliketobemade.Thesearenotnecessarilythesamething.Tosome
extenttheyareseekingtomanipulatetheexternalattributionsofdispositionwhich
areorwillbemadeaboutthescandalandthecompany’sresponsibilityforit.
InthedialoguewithTransportCommittee,someoftheattributionsaresuggestedby
thecommitteemembersandthenevaluatedbythecompanyrepresentatives.Thus,
PaulWillisreplies“Yes”tothequestion“DoyouthinkthatVolkswagenisanethical
company?”[20:48]andagain,whenasked“Doyouthinkitknowsthedifference
betweenrightandwrong?”
Fromsomeoftheearlieststatements,itissuggestedthedevelopmentand
implementationofdefeatsoftwareisattributedtoasmallnumberofindividualsora
groupratherthanthecompanyasacorporateentity.Itisassertedthat“responsible
partieswillbeidentifiedandheldaccountable”[7:15]andthereisreferencetothe
“misconductsandshortcomingsofindividuals”[18:10].Thisisaconsistenttheme
eitherexplicitlyorimplicitlythroughoutthematerialandwouldseemtoconstitute
partofVWscorporatedefence.
4.2.1InternalandexternalattributionsTherepeatedphrase“tworogueengineers”[8:23]becomesshorthandforattribution
toalimitednumberofindividualsandisborneoutasnineemployeesaresuspended.
28
Heider’stheory(1958)identifyingexternalandinternalattributionscanbeclearly
relatedtotheseattributionstatements.Theattributionsareinternalwhenconsidered
fromtheperspectiveofthecompanyasawhole.Forinstance,theattributionismade
to“agroupofengineers”[8:28].However,fortheindividualsconcerned(whomever
theyare),thecompanycultureitselfbecomesaformofexternalattribution.Itis
speculatedthatthemotivationwouldbeto“keepcostsdown”[20:40]orfindawayof
meetingthemorechallengingUSemissionsregulationswithinthetimeandbudget
constrainsplacedonthem,ratherthananinternaldispositionofthepersons
involved.
TheemphasisthatitisthesamegroupofengineerswhoworkedonsolutionsforEU
andUSandalsoonsoftwareupdates[20:37,20:38]seemstopresentafurtherexample
ofthecompanyattemptingtotetherresponsibilitytoindividualsratherthanthe
organisation.
TheformerCEOofVW,MartinWinterkorn,whoresignedattheendofSeptember
2015,istheonlyindividualnamedinthedocumentdataset.Thejuxtapositionofthe
statementthathewasinformedabouttheemissionscrisisandthenresignedsuggests
thatsomeresponsibilityisattributedtohim[21:15].
Someinternalattributionsdonotrelatetoindividualsbutarecorporate.Thereisstill
aninternalattributionofdisposition,ratherthanexternalsituationalfactorswhich
causedthecrisis.Thelackofqualityassuranceforthedevelopedsoftwareisadmitted
[20:13]andtherebyattributesresponsibilityforallowingdefeatdevicestogoforward.
Companyattitudessuchaspressuretomeetdeadlinesorkeepcostsdown[20:40]and
someacknowledged“deficiencies…inthereportingandmonitoringsystems”[18:18]
whichallowedthedeceittobedevelopedmayalsobeconsideredexternal,inthat
theyaresituationalfactorsaffectingthebehaviourofindividualemployees.
InthetextsoftheTransportSelectCommitteehearings,theVWrepresentativesdraw
onexternalattributionsrelatingtheeffectivenessofthetestingregimes.Forexample,
therearefrequentreferencestotheemissionsregime[inEU]being“outofdate”
[8:29]andthewiderregulationsrelatingtoairqualitywhich“needstochange”[sic]
[8:40].
Volkswagenrepeatedlyhighlightsthefactthatexistingtestingprotocolsdotestreal-
timedrivingconditions:theinevitablediscrepancybetweentestingsituationsand
29
“whathappensintherealworld”[8:39]isofferedasevidenceofthepresenttesting
regimefailure.
Costsarefurthermentionedasareasonforthedevelopmentofdefeatsoftware.These
maybeseenasanexternaloraninternalfactor,sincetheyrelatebothtocompany
cultureandtothewiderpressuresofbusinessandcompetition.
4.2.2Kelley’scovariationmodelManystatementsvalidateKelley’sco-variationprincipleandexaminethethree
aspectsofdistinctiveness,consistencyandconsensustohelpdetermineattribution.A
numberofstatementsemphasisethedistinctivenessoftheeventsofthescandalboth
intermsofitscontrarinesstothevalueshistoryofthecompanyanditsactions
history.Thescandalispresentedas“contrarytoVWcoreprinciples”[7:21].Theseare
describedinkeywordssuchas“solidity,reliability,credibility”[5:8].Thecompanysees
itselfas“ethical”[20:48]and“upstanding[20:31]”.Frequentreferencestothe“VW
brand”[5:8]actasremindersaboutenduringcoreprinciples,asdetailedabove,and
helptogivehistoricalcontext.
ThereisemphasisonVolkswagen’shistoryofpositiveenvironmentalactions
includingpreviousgreeninitiativesandreferencetothecompany“thathasinvested
inenvironmentalefforts”[7:24]andspent“billionsondevelopingpluginhybrid
vehicles”20:54].Unsurprisingly,thecompanyvolunteersnoinstancesoftheeventsof
theemissionsscandalbeingconsistentwithpreviousactions.Theassertionthatthis
is“notaone-timeactionbutaseriesoferrors”[18:31]ispresumedtorelateonlytothe
eventsleadinguptothediscoveryoftheemissionsscandal,nottopreviousinstances
ofcorporatewrongdoing.
Thereafewexamplesofconsensus,wherethecompanystatementsrefertosimilar
instancesinvolvingothercompanies,identifyingpracticeswhereitis“youareallowed
torecognisethetest”[20:46]and“comparablecasesinvolvingpassengervehicles”
[21:4].Inversely,PaulWillisdeniestotheUKTransportSelectCommitteethatheis
awareofcertainpracticesbeingprevalentintheindustry[8:31]andrefutesthatthe
wholeindustryisdoggedbysimilarproblems[20:30].Heseemstobeemployinga
reverseconsensusstrategy,bysuggestingthatifatypeofmalpracticeisunknownin
theindustry,itwouldbehighlyunlikelytobeoccurringVolkswageninthispoint.
30
4.2.3Weiner’sattributiontheoryandAttribution–Responsibility–ActionmodelWeiner’sattribution-responsibility-actionmodelproposesoutcomestopunish
attributedwrongdoing,orpreventitsrecurrence.Bothaspectscanbeseenfromthe
documentsstudied.
Punitiveactionsexactedonthecompanyfallintotwocategories:utilitarianand
retributive.Theutilitarianaspectschieflyrelatetoconsumersafeguardsand
restorativepractices.Theseincludefirstandforemostsoftwareandhardwarefixes,
paidforbythecompany,wherethe“vehicleswillbecorrected”[3:1]andbuy-backend
ofleasesschemesinUS[23:8].Asafurtherrestorativeoutcome,thecompanyhasalso
beenrequiredtopaytowardscostsofconsumerprotectiontrainingandenforcement
measures[23:17].
MeasuresagreedintheUSsettlementinclude$2.7billiontobepaidoverthreeyears
intoanenvironmentaltrust[23:15]and$2.0billionover10yearstodevelopzero
emissionsvehicles[23:16]maybeseenasbothrestorativeandretributive.Although
retributiveintheirfinancialscope,thesearealsorestorativemeasuresinthesense
thattheyaredesignedtomakepracticalcompensationfortheadverseimpactofthe
emissionsdeceitupontheenvironment.
Itisanticipatedthatfurtherretributivemeasuressuchasfines,legalcosts[18:29]and
potentialcriminalproceedingsagainstindividualsmayfollowbutthese,atthepoint
ofwriting,areunspecified.
Itisassumedthatspecificmeasuresdesignedtopreventrecurrencewillbeidentified
fromtheJonesDayreport.TheyarenotspecifiedintheUSsettlement,althoughthe
companyitselfoffersanumberofearlysuggestionstoimproveitspractices.Asthese
arevoluntarymeasures,itismoreappropriatetodiscussthemaspartofthe
company’scrisismanagementandimagerestorationstrategy.
Strategiestopreventrecurrencearediscussedindetailinthesectionbelowon
reductionofoffensivenessincrisismanagementandimagerestorationstrategies.
4.3CrisismanagementandimagerestorationInthecontextofCoombes’situationalcrisiscommunicationtheory(SCCT),theVW
emissionscrisismayfalleitherintothe“organisationalmisdeedsmanagement
misconduct”or“organisationalmisdeedsnoinjuries”categories.MuchofCoombes’
theoryrelatestothewaycrisismanagementreliesonconsistencyanddistinctiveness
31
andthisisarecurringthemethroughoutthedocuments.Addedtothis,thereis
evidenceofanumberofspecificimagerestorationstrategiesidentifiedbyBenoit.
Thesearechieflyintendedtoprotectthe“reputationalassets”(Coombs,2006)ofthe
company.
Theearlyresponsesfromthecompanyarealltargetedchieflytothepublicand
consumeraudience.Themostcommonresponsetargetedonreducingthe
offensivenessofwhathadhappened(seeFigure1).
4.3.1MortificationMoststatementsoverwhelminglyexpressmortification,intheformofvarious
apologies.Someoftheseapologiesarephrasedasifcomingfromtheindividual:“I
absolutelyapologisetoallofyouandtoourcustomers”[8:45].Othersinstances
involvethepersonificationofthecompany,particularlyinpressreleases:“VWdeeply
regretstheincidents”[21:2].
AnotherpersistentcaseofmortificationisVW’sapparentwillingnesstoaccept
responsibilityforthesituation.Emphasisisplacedonhowarepresentative
“volunteered”[7:1]tocomebeforetheUKTransportSelectCommittee,ratherthan
havingtobecoerced.“Fullresponsibility”[7:10]isiterated,asisthecompany’s
readinessto“accepttheconsequences”[7:12].
4.3.2ReductionofoffensivenessByfarthemostcommonresponsefromVWwastoreduceperceivedoffensivenessof
theiractionsbydownplayingthedamage.ThisisshownbythepiechartFig1.VW
maderepeatedreferencestohowthevehiclesstill“complywithlegalspecifications”
[5:15];emphasisingtherelativelysmalleffectoftheiractions[8:10];stressingthefact
thattheengines“remainsafeandlegaltodrive”[7:16];highlightingthelackofcostto
consumers[18:37]andconvenientrecallstrategy[8:54];andstatingthatthereisno
effectonbusinessanddealers.
Euphemisticlanguagewasemployedrepeatedlytoaccentuatetheperceptionthat
thereisnocrisisatall.Forinstance,VWtalkofhowtheengine“seems[tohave]
behaveddifferently”[8:20],usingtheartisticlanguagetoimplyboththatthe
irregularitieswereunexpected,andthattheyweresomewhatduetotheidiosyncratic
natureoftheengineratherthanhumandeed.Inadditiontothis,VWdeniedthat
32
thatthemechanismusedtoproducetheengineirregularitieswasadefeatdeviceat
all[20:59]andthatsuchlabellingisincorrect.
Inmanycases,thelanguageisdeliberatelyinformal,suggestingthattheirfocusison
keepingthepubliconside.Suchlanguagegivesoffthesuggestionthatthereisnot
actuallyalegalissuehereatall,whichisanotherexampleofdownplayingthe
damage.Thereareclearinstancesofresponsesbeingwordedtoavoidthesuggestion
oflegalresponsibility.Forexample,softwareissaidtobe“notadequatelydescribed”
[10:3],ratherthanhiddenormisrepresented.Defeatdevicesarereferredtoas
“irregularities”;perpetratorsarethoughttobe“afew”“rogueengineers”[8:23].Such
colloquialismsreplacecorrectterms,withthetoneinformalandsoftened.
AnothertechniqueVWemployedtoreducetheoffensivenesswastobolstertheir
positiveimage,makingtheproblemappearlesssignificantincomparison.VW
highlightedtheirethicalvaluessuchassayingthatthey“standforgoodandsecure
jobs”[5:19]andstatingthattheirbusinesshasnotbeennegativelyaffectedsince
customersare“returningtobuyvehicles”[20:45].Statementsbolsteringpositiveimage
arelikelytobetargetedattheshareholdersandworkforce,promotingavisionofthe
futurebeyondthecurrentcrisis,chieflyfocusedonthedevelopmentofnew
technologyandinvestmentintheworkforce.Thisisdoneinresponsetotheneedto
restorebusinessconfidenceaswellasconsumerconfidence.
4.3.3CorrectionCorrectionisalargepartofthecrisismanagementresponse(aswellaspartof
punitiveaction–seeAttribution).Itcanbedividedintoactionsdesignedtorestore
theoriginalconditions(inthiscase,legalconditionsinmakingthecarscompliant)
andactionsdesignedtopreventrecurrenceoftheincident.
Thereisemphasisonthewayinwhichcorrectiveactionswillbecarriedoutwith
respecttocustomers,whichisseenascrucialtotheimagerestorationprocess.Early
responsesspeakof“remedy”[7:26]andtheneedto“rebuild”[7:13]and“makethings
right”[7:20].Laterstatements,offeredtotheregulators,addressissuessuchas
compensatingtheVCA[20:75]andHMRCforcostsandlossoftaxrevenues[8:60].
Thereisalsodiscussionofnew,lowerbonusthresholdsfordealerswhomaystruggle
toachieveexistingsalestargetsbecauseofthescandal[8:58].
33
Forshareholdersandtheworkforceaudiences,correctivemeasurescentreon
organisationalchange,suchascompanyre-alignmentandbettersecurityprocesses
(e.g.“4-eyesprinciple”[20:11]).Detailsaresparse,probablybecausetheywill
ultimatelydependonspecificandasyetunknownrecommendationsfromtheJones
Dayinvestigation.
Therearefewstatementstothepublicaboutpreventingrecurrence.Responsestothe
regulatorsexpressintentionto“learntherightlessons”,makesureit“cannothappen
again”[7:18].Findingout“whatwentwrong”andavoidingfuture“misconduct”[11:5]
arepartoftheseresponses,buttheimpliedacceptanceofadegreeofwrongdoingis
evidentlynotsomethingVWwishtopromotetothepublicaudience.
Finally,statementsareusedtoexpressdifferentiationtoshowthatthisbehaviouris
exceptionalandnotcharacteristicofVWasacompany.VWstatethatthey“donot
tolerateanykindofviolationoflaws”[2:6]andthattheincidenthasgone“against
everythingtheGroupanditspeoplestandfor”[5:2].
4.3.4DifferentiationPositiveadjectivesusedtodescribecompanyethos“ethical”[20:48],“upstanding”
[20:31].HistoricalcontextemphasisestheVWbrandandvaluessuchas“solidity,
reliability,credibility”[5:8],“sustainability,responsibility”[5:20].Theiruseoflanguage
emphasisescontinuity.Forinstance,“continuetostandforgoodandsecurejobs”[5:5]
isalargelyunsubstantiatedassertion,althoughthereisreferenceto“billions”spent
ondevelopinghybridvehicles[20:54].Thesestatementsmayhaverelevancetoall
audiences,althoughparticularlythepublicandshareholders.
34
Figure1:apiecharttoshowthedifferentcrisismanagementstrategiesusedbyVW
Figure1showsthattheC3a“reductionofoffensiveness”strategywasusedtwiceas
muchasanyother.
19
22
63
8
15
31
12
23
CrisismanagementandimagerestoraXonstrategies
C1Mor^fica^on
C2Evasionofresponsibility
C3aReduc^onofoffensiveness:downplaydamageC3bReduc^onofoffensiveness:euphemis^clanguageC3cReduc^onofoffensiveness:bolsteringposi^veimageC4aCorrec^on:restoreoriginalcondi^onsC4bCorrec^on:preventrecurrence
35
Figure2:agraphtoshowthecrisismanagementstrategiesemployedineachdocument.ThecodesonthelegendontherightcorrespondtocrisisstrategieslistedinAppendixC.RefertoAppendixAfordocumenttype.
ThetwolargestspikesinFigure2correspondtothetwolargestdocuments:the
evidencesessionsgiventotheUKParliamentTransportSelectCommittee.Here,a
rangeofdifferenttechniquesisused,butveryfewinstancesofC3c“bolstering
positiveimage”.Intheotherdocuments,whichareshorter,C3a“bolsteringpublic
image”and“downplayingdamage”areusedalmostexclusively.
4.4InformationorientationChangestoIOareimpliedinmuchofwhatVWsaysinresponsetothecrisis.From
this,inferencesmaybemadeaboutthenatureofIOpriortotheemissionsscandal.
However,asthiscannotbecorroborated,thisresearchdoesnotattempttoevaluate
thelevelsofIObeforeoraftertheemissionscrisis.Instead,thescopeofthisreportis
toexaminethelinksevidencedinthecompany’sresponsebetweencrisis
management(andimagerestoration)andIO,byidentifyingtheperceivedissuesand
theproposedsolutions.
IhavelookedatIOundertwoofthecapabilitiesproposedbyMarchand(etal,2000):
informationmanagementpractices(IMP),andinformationbehaviourandvalues
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011121314151617181920212223242526
Crisism
anagmen
tstatemen
ts
Documentnumber(chronological)
CrisismanagmentstrategiesemployedoverXme
C5
C4b
C4a
C3c
C3b
C3a
C2
C1
36
(IBV).Thesehavethenbeenbrokendown,whereappropriate,todemonstrate
individualcompetencies.
4.4.1Informationmanagementpractises
4.4.1.1OrganisationalchangesThecompany’sinformationmanagementpracticeswereunderscrutiny,both
internallyandexternally,throughoutthecrisis.Thereisafocusontheneedtomake
organisationalchangestomanagementstructureandbrands.Oneofthecore
elementsoftheirresponseistolookat“newstructuresintheVWGroup”[13:6],andto
“fundamentallyrealignVW”with“leanerstructures”[11:6].Byimplication,the
managementstructureswerepreviouslytoocentralisedandshouldnowbe“managed
inamoredecentralizedfashion”[18:43]andtoocomplicated,requiringareductionin
“managerialcomplexity”[18:47].
EvidencefromtheUKManagingDirector,PaulWillis,highlightsstructural
weaknessesatboardlevel.Forinstance,Willisstatesthathehasnotechnicalremit,
sitsonnocontinentalorglobalexecutiveboardsandhaslimitedfacetoface
communicationwithhisGermansuperior.
“No[Idonotsitontheinternational,theEuropeanboardortheworldboard]”[20:79]
“IsitontheUKboard[…]communicatewith[…]thesupervisoryboardinGermany”
[20:80]
Thesestatementscouldsuggestadegreeofisolationwithoutautonomy.VWsuggest
thatthebenefitsofintroducingmoredevolvedmanagementstructurewouldbeto
makethecompany“moreagile”[18:45]andmakeiteasierto“preventbreachesof
regulations”[18:24].Thereareseveralreferencestogiving“moreindependencefor
brands”[13:8,18:44],althoughitisnoticeablethattheproposalisstilltoallowthe
boardto“focuson[…]cross-brandstrategies”[13:9].Theimplicationisthattheboard
willconcentrateoncommercialstrategies,withoperationalandtechnicalmatters
devolvedtothebrand.
4.4.1.2ImprovementsinprocessingcompetenciesAswellasorganisationalchanges,therearespecificreferencestoproposed
improvementsinprocessingcompetencies.Thereisadeclaredneed“investigate[…]
processes,reportingandmonitoringsystems”[18:3]andVWacknowledgethatthere
37
are“weaknessesinsomeprocesses”[18:8].Theprocessingissuescanbebrokendown
furtherintosystemsandresponsibilities.
Systemsthatarechallengedrelatespecificallyto“testandcertificationprocesses”
[18.11]andqualityassurance,ofwhich“therewasnonebefore”[20:13].
Withregardtoresponsibilitieswithinprocessing,itisacknowledgedthat
“responsibilitieswerenotsufficientlyclear”[18:19].Theseissuesareaddressedby
proposingthe“”4-eyes”principleinsoftwaredevelopment”[20:11]whichshouldhelp
by“streamliningdecision-makingprocesses”[18:46]andalsoacheckonquality
assurance.
4.4.2InformationbehaviourandvaluesThecentralthrustofVW’sresponseintermsofIOrelatestotheinformation
behaviourandvaluesdimension.ThecommentsmadeexhibitsixoftheIO
competencies:integrity,formality,control,transparency,sharingandproactiveness
(Marchand,Kettinger,&Rollins,2000)
4.4.2.1IntegrityIntegrityrelatesdirectlytocrisismanagementstrategiestoreduceoffensivenessoftheaction
bybolsteringthecompany’spositiveimage.VWalsouseittodifferentiatethecurrent
situationfromVW’spreviousbehaviourandattitude.Thelatteraspectiscrucialinevaluating
attribution,withVWrelyingheavilyonpromotingthedistinctivenessofthepresentcasefrom
thecompany’strackrecordandcorevalues.
Thereisanassumptionthatthecompany’scorevaluesaresoundandremainunchanged.This
isanimportantpartoftheirdefence,astheysaythat“commitmentandsocialresponsibility
[…]mustbemaintained”[13:12].Nevertheless,itissuggestedthatthereneedstobea
“realignmentoftheGroup’scultureandmanagementbehaviour”.
Integrityisalsorelevanttohowmistakesareviewed.Interestingly,somebreachesof
rulesseemedtobetolerated,butmistakeswerenot.VWarguethatthereisaneed
allowformistakes“asanopportunitytolearn”[18:54]–inotherwords,aspartofthe
creativeprocess.
4.4.2.2FormalityFormalityistobeincreasedbyhaving“sharplydefinedandbindingpowersand
responsibilities”[18:17]andprocesses“developedmorestrictlyinaccordancewiththe4-eyes
38
principle”[18:14].AccordingtoVW,“Foureyesmeansnobodycandoanythingontheirown”
[20:22].
4.4.2.3ControlThisalsodemonstratesincreasedlevelofcontroloverindividualsandprocedures.Itis
suggestedthatthiswillbeextendedfurtheroncethefindingsfromtheinternalinvestigation
arepublished,when“internalcompliancestructures”willbeputinplace“toaddressthose
findings”[19:2].Itisalsosuggestedthatthereisalsoenhancedcontrolfromexternal
agenciesas“publicationoffigures[…]mustmeetregulatorystandards”[8:65].
4.4.2.4TransparencyandsharingThesetwoarecloselyinterlinked.Referencestoacommitmentto“transparencyand
openness”[8:3]and“fulltransparency”[10:6]aremultiplethroughoutthedocumentdataset.
Thereisfurtherevidenceofthis,suchas”
“Obligationtobecometransparent,withtestingintherealworld”[20:35]
Thisintroducestheideaofgenuineopenness,withmorecompanyinformation
(particularlytestresults)putintopublicdomain,andnotlimitedtostatutory
requirements.Thisisreiteratedthroughoutthedataset,throughphrasessuchas“We
needtransparencyandopenness”[8:32]“Commitmenttofulltransparency”[10:6].
Referencestotransparencyalsopermeateresponsesrelatingtotheinvestigationitself,
althoughthecompanylineismoreguarded.Forexample:
“Wehavebeenastransparentaswecan”[20:64]
“Ifinditimplausiblethatifyouemployedindependentlawyersyouwouldeditthereport”[20:38]
Thesephrasesimplyadefensivetonewhentalkingabouttheinvestigationreportandthe
possibilitythatthecontentsmightbeeditedbeforegeneralpublication.
Therearealsoissuesrelatingtothesharingofinformationfromtheinvestigation
reportmaybealsoseentounderminethedeclaredresolveto“informthepublic”[4:7],
since“disclosure…wouldprejudicetherestoftheinvestigation”[22:2].
Thereismoreconfidenceinproposingmeasurestoimproveinformationsharing
withinthecompany,including“opendiscussions,closerco-operation”[18:53]and“co-
operationbetweenBoard…andtheWorksCouncil”[16:5].This“New,opencultureofco-
operation”[11:7]isenvisagedasextendingtoallstakeholdersandparticularlytheshareholders.
Therearemultiplereferencesaboutopennessandtransparencywithregardtoshareholders,
39
whoareobviouslyacriticaltargetforcrisismanagementanddamagelimitationstrategies.
Thus,thereisareaffirmationthat“VWwillreporttotheshareholders”[4:6],andact“Seeking
shareddecisionsintheinterestofthecompany,shareholdersandemployees”[16:6].
Crucially,VWintendstosharemorewithoutsideregulators,withexternal
verificationofemissionstests[18:26]
4.4.2.5ProactivenessThereisevidenceinthetextsofthecompany’sproactivenesscapabilitywithin
informationorientation.Unsurprisingly,thereisaresolveto“drawnupanactionplan”
[5:10],buttheproactiveresponsegoesfurtherthanaddressingtheimmediateaftermathofthe
crisis.Thereisafocusonlooking“beyondthecurrentsituationandcreatetheconditionsfor
VW’s[…]furtherdevelopment”[13:1],whichisfocusedinthe“TOGETHER-Strategy2025”[23:6]
Thethinkingbehindthisisbothstrategicwith“newalignment”which“affectsthinkingand
[…]strategicgoals”[18:42]andeconomic,therehavingbeenanavowedneedto“make
decisionsthatfactorineconomicsjustasmuchasemployment”[16:1].
Thereistheaddedimplicationthatthis“Clearmission”[18:58]willhaveapositiveeffecton
thecompany’sabilitytorecoverafterthecrisisandbecome“betterandstronger”[18:59].
Therearehintsofchangemanagementstrategiestobeemployed,with“renewalof
personnel”[18:49]atthetop,“co-operationbetweenBoardofManagementandWorks
Council”[16:5]and,again,inthelaunchof“Strategy2015”[23:6].
4.5SummaryFromthechosendataset,thereisaclearfocusonreducingtheoffensivenessofthe
actionbydownplayingthenegativeeffectsandstatementsrelatingtothisstrategy
significantlyoutnumberthoseonotherstrategies.
Thesecondmostprevalentstrategyreferredtointhedataisthatoncorrectionby
restoringoriginalcondition.Takenwithstatementtodownplaythedamage,there
seemstobeaconsensusthatthecompany’sprimaryfocuswastopresentasituation
whereeverythingis,orsoontobe,fineandsatisfactory.
Itisdifficult,withouthavingaccesstoeverydocumentorstatementeverissued,to
determineanydefiniteshiftsinthecompanyresponseovertime.However,itwould
seemthatthereisaslightmovementincrisismanagementemphasisfrom
mortificationintheearlystagestopreventionofrecurrencelateron.
40
Overall,amulti-facetedresponseismaintainedthroughout,althoughthereissome
differentiationbyaudience.Statementsdirectedtothepublicorconsumeraudience
areheavilyfocusedonmortification,downplayingthedamageandcorrectionto
restoreoriginalconditions.Statementsdirectedtotheregulatorsandshareholders
aremoreconcernedwithevasionofresponsibility,bolsteringthepositiveimageof
thecompanyandcorrectiontopreventrecurrence.Statementsaimedat
differentiatingthemistakesoftheemissionscrisisfromVW’spreviousbehavioursare
focusedstronglyontheregulatorsandemployees.
41
Chapter5:DiscussionofFindings5.1AttributionHeider’stheory(1958)describinginternalandexternalattributionwasusefulin
clarifyingstatementsrelatingtobothcorporateandindividualresponsibility.Itwas
interestingtodiscoverthat,whilstthecorporateculturecouldbeseenasanexternal
attributionfromthepointofviewofanindividualemployee,externalattributions
couldbemadeaboutthecorporatebodyitselfwasunderpressurefromoutside
agenciessuchasthetighteremissionscontrolsintheUSandscopeforvariation
withintheresultssubmittedunderdifferenttestingregimes.
Attributionsregardingtheoriginsofthesoftwaredeceitareforthemostpartinternal:
theyareeitherattributionstoindividualemployeesorattributionsofdispositionwith
respecttothecompanyitself.Oneofthemainthrustsofthecrisismanagement
strategyistoacknowledgeresponsibilityandreflectthispositivelyincontritionand
mortificationinthepublicsphere.
ThetreatmentofattributionbyVWisclearlyverycarefullyworded.Althoughthe
companyacknowledgesanelementofoverallresponsibility,thestatementsare
guardedwithregardtoattributionsaboutspecificareaswheretheycouldbefound
liable.Theattributionsthattheydomake(orwishthepublictomake)informtheir
useofcrisismanagementandimagerestorationstrategies.
ItisnotthepurposeofthisresearchtoevaluatethelegalresponsetoVW’semissions
deceit.Itwouldappear,frommanyofthestatementsrelatingtoattribution,thatthe
companyisbeingcarefultoavoidcommentsthatcouldtriggeranyfurtherlegal
liability.ThereisacarefuldistancebetweenreferencetotheJonesDayinternal
investigation,whose“findings[…]mustholdupincourt”[18:30]and“We[…]takefull
responsibilityforouractions”[7:10].
ApplyingKelley’sco-variationmodel(1967),thereareanumberofinstancesof
distinctivenessbeingusedtoreducetheattributionofdispositionwithrespecttothe
company.VWmakessimilarpointsofdifferentiationaspartofitscrisismanagement
andimagerestorationstrategy,tomitigatethenegativeeffectsofthescandalonits
corporateimage.
42
Itisnotindoubtthattheeventsoftheemissionsscandalwillbeattributedtothe
companytosomeextent,andthattherewillbebothpunitiveandutilitarianjudicial
consequences.ThesettlementagreementoftheUSFederalRegulators,Private
Plaintiffsand44USStates[26]requiresVWtomakelargefinancialcontributionsto
environmentalprotectiveandresearchinitiatives.Thisisbothpunitiveand
utilitarian,followingWeiner’smodel(1995),beingsimultaneouslyaretributiveanda
restorativemeasure.Asthelatter,itprovidesanelementofcorrection,whichthe
companyisabletoincludeaspartofitscrisismanagementstrategy,andaroute
towardseventualimagerestoration.
5.2CrisismanagementandimagerestorationVW’spublicacceptanceofresponsibilityandrepeatedapologiesforthesoftware
deceitgivesitanopportunitytodemonstratesomeofthepositivecorporatevalues
whichitverypubliclyclaimstoespouse.Themannerinwhichthecrisisismanaged
thereforebecomesanopportunityinitselftopromoteabettercompanyimage.This
isdevelopedfurtherinthemanyassertionsaboutthecompany’shistoryas“an
upstandingcompany”[20:31]“thathasinvestedinenvironmentalefforts…”[7:24].
Thesestatementsservetominimisetheeffectsofthecrisisbydifferentiatingitfrom
previousactions.
Thecoreofthecompany’scrisismanagementstrategyrestsinreducingthe
offensivenessoftheactionsthattookplace.Thisisconsistentlyaddressedby
downplayingthedamagecausedandstatementsrelatingtothisstrategysignificantly
outnumberthoseonallotherstrategies.Thisisfurtherenhancedbytheuseof
euphemisticlanguagetodescribethedetailsoftheoffence.Theuseofexamplesto
bolsterthepositiveimageofthecompany,withastrongforward-lookingfocuson
jobsandinvestments,givescontexttotheoffenceandservestoreduceitsoverall
significance.
Thesecondmostprevalentcrisismanagementandimagerestorationstrategyreferred
tointhedataisthatofcorrectionbyrestoringoriginalcondition.Takenwith
statementstodownplaythedamage,thereseemstobeaconsensusthatthe
company’sprimaryfocuswastopresentasituationwhereeverythingis,orsoontobe,
“alright”.Althoughtechnicalfixesontheaffectedvehiclesareobviouslythemost
immediatepriority,alargepartoftheemphasisoncorrectionrelatestorestoring
43
consumer(andinvestor)trustandthelatterisarguablythecompany’shighest
priorityovertime.
Thereisadeclaredintentiontopreventrecurrence,to“learntherightlessonsand
avoidsuchmisconductinfuture”[11:5].Theresolvetoachievethisisclearlypartof
thecompany’srehabilitationstrategyasfarasconsumersandinvestorsare
concerned.Muchofthedetailastohowthisistobeachievedrelatestoinformation
orientationandisdiscussedinthenextsection.
Itisdifficult,withouthavingaccesstoeverydocumentorstatementeverissued,to
determineanydefiniteshiftsinthecompanyresponseovertime,howeveritwould
seemthatthereisaslightmovementincrisismanagementemphasisfrom
mortificationintheearlystagestopreventionofrecurrencelateron.
Figure2showsapreferencefordownplayingdamageandslighttendencytobolster
positiveimageinthepressreleasesandannouncementstoshareholders.Theseare
theshortestdocuments.ThismightsuggestthatVWfavouredthesestrategieswhere
verbositywasnotsuitable.Onecouldthinkthatthisisbecausetheyperceivethemas
themostgenerallyeffectivestrategies.ButuponfurtherexaminationofFigure2,one
canseethatthe“bolsteringpositiveimage”strategywasnotemployedatallin
document8,andnotemployedmuchindocument20.ThesewerethetwoTransport
SelectCommitteeevidencesessions.Ifthiswasagenerallyeffectivestrategy,then
whywasitbarelyemployedduringthesetimes?Onereasonmaybebecausethey
werecateringforadifferentaudience:thistime,itwasapanelofregulatorsrather
thanthegeneralpublic(containingpotentialcustomers)orshareholders(already
investedinthecompany),whodonothaveanecessaryinterestinVWbeing
successful.
Overall,amulti-facetedresponseismaintainedthroughout,althoughthereissome
differentiationbyaudience.Statementsdirectedtothepublic/consumeraudienceare
heavilyfocusedonmortification,downplayingthedamageandcorrectiontorestore
originalconditions.Statementsdirectedtotheregulatorsandshareholdersaremore
concernedwithevasionofresponsibility,bolsteringthepositiveimageofthe
companyandcorrectiontopreventrecurrence.Statementsaimedatdifferentiating
themistakesoftheemissionscrisisfromVW’spreviousbehavioursarefocused
stronglyontheregulatorsandemployees.
44
5.3InformationorientationStatementsmadebyVWrepresentativestotheUKTransportCommittee,andalsoto
shareholders,areparticularlyrevealingaboutaspectsofinformationorientationin
thecompany.Whilstitisnotpossible,withinthescopeofthisproject,toquantify
levelsofinformationorientationinthecompanyeitherbeforethebeginningofthe
crisisorafterwards,thereismuchvaluableinsighttobegainedaboutperceivedissues
relatingtoinformationorientationandthestatusthiswillbegiveninthefuture,asa
resultoftheemissionscrisis.
Thecompanyacknowledgesanumberofweaknessesininformationorientationthat,
onthefaceofit,contradicttherobuststatementsmadeinotherpartsofthedataset
aboutVWvaluesandrelationshiphistorywithregardtoconsumersandthe
environment.
Manyoftheattributionsmadeaboutthecompany’sresponsibility,eithercorporately
orindividually,fortheemissionsdeceitcanbelinkeddirectlytostatementsabout
changesthatithasidentifiedasneededwithininformationorientation.
Itcanbeseenthat“DeficienciesinsomeareasofVW’sITinfrastructure”[18:21]links
tomultiplereferencestochangesincompanyorganisationthroughrestructuring,
decentralisationandrealignment.Similarly,thelackofinformationsharing(“Ifindit
implausiblethatseniorpeopleinthecompanywouldhaveknown”[8:62])leadsto
“ChangesarenecessaryinhowWVcommunicates”[13:12].Thestatementthatitwas
“clearthatsomeoftheworkprocessesneededtobeimproved”[20:44]isan
acknowledgementofinternalcorporateresponsibilityandleadsdirectlytoremarks
about“streamliningdecision-makingprocesses”[18:46]andtheintroductionofthe“
“four-eye”principleinsoftwaredevelopment”[20:11]
Giventhenatureofthedocumentsinthedataset,itisunderstandablethatthereis
notagreatdealoftechnicaldetailaboutchangestotheorganisationalandprocessing
competencieswithininformationorientation.Itis,however,possibletodetectaclear
emphasisoverallonchangestotheinformationbehaviourandvaluescapability,
particularlyinthecapabilitiesoftransparencyandsharing.Thisneatlycorroborates
thecompany’simplieddefencethattheemissionsdeceitwasperpetratedbyasmall
numberofindividualswithinonedepartmentandwithouttheknowledgeofsenior
management.
45
5.4SummaryTheprocessofcorporaterehabilitationafteracrisisisinitiatedinthepublicsphereby
pressreleasesandreflectedineverystatementpubliclymade,includingstatementsto
stakeholdersandevidencetoregulatorybodies.Thecompany’spublicattributions
regardingcausationofthecrisismustnecessarilybeconsistentwiththestrategiesit
usestomanagethecriticalsituationandtorestorecorporateimage.Inthecaseof
VW,issuesrelatingtodifferentaspectsofinformationorientationarepresentedas
partofattribution(causation)andalsopartofcrisismanagementandimage
restoration(consequence).Withoutspecificdetailofinformationmanagement
practicesorinformationbehaviourandvaluesinthecompanypriortothecrisis,or
subsequently,itisnotpossibletoquantifylevels,orchanges,ininformation
orientation;neverthelessitisclearthatthecompanyhasidentifiedininformation
orientationboththerootsofitsproblem.Theacknowledgementoftheproblemand
thedeclaredintentiontoaddressthoseissuesisacommonthreadinthecompany’s
publicstatements.Itcannotbedeterminedwhethertheviewsinternallywithinthe
companyalignaccordingly.
46
Chapter6:Conclusion
Thisstudyhasdemonstratedthattheoreticalframeworksofattribution,crisis
managementandimagerestorationandinformationorientationhavedirectrelevance
toVW’spublicresponsetothecrisis.Theselectedframeworkswerereflectedina
highproportionofstatementsmadebythecompanytodifferentaudiencesandat
differentstagesofthecrisis.
Byclassifyingthestatementsmadeaccordingtodifferentframeworks,itwaspossible
toidentifyattributionsmade,orimplied,byVWandgaininsightintothecompany’s
attitudetowardsitsownresponsibilitiesandliabilities.Thisinturnwasreflectedina
numberofthestrategiesemployedtomanagethecrisisandrestorecorporateimage.
Theuseofaclassificationsystemderivedfromframeworksofcrisismanagementand
imagerestorationfacilitatedtheidentificationofspecificstrategiesemployedbythe
companyandtheprioritiesarisingfromthosestrategies.
Aswellastheinter-relationbetweenattributionsandcrisismanagementstrategies,it
wasclearfromthestudyoftheseaspectsthatbothwerelinkedtoinformation
orientation,asapre-existingconditionbeforethecrisisandasapotentialmeansof
remedyafterwards.Anumberofattributionsweremadebyconcerninginformation
orientationwhichimpliedpre-existingproblemsinthisareaenabledtheemissions
deceittobeperpetratedandcontributedtothecrisisoverall.Manyofthecompany
statementsexplicitlyrefertoitsresolutiontomakechangestoandimprove
informationorientation,anditwasclearlyimportanttodemonstratethisintentionto
thepublicinordertominimisenegativeoutcomesbymakingcorrectionsandalsoto
bolsterconsumerandinvestorconfidenceforthefuture.
Althoughtheanalysisofcrisismanagementandimagerestorationstrategiesforms
thecentrepieceofthisresearchproject,informationorientationprovidesabridgeto
thefutureforthecompanyandfortheresearcher,bymakingalinkfromcausal
attributionstorestorativeandpreventativereparations.Whilstthepresentstudymay
provideanotherdimensioninthebodyofexistingresearchintocorporateattitudes
andcrisismanagementfollowingcriticalepisodessuchastheFukoshimanuclear
disasterandtheDeepwateroilspill,itwouldbeusefulforfutureresearchprojectsto
makefurtherinvestigationintochangesinthelevelofinformationorientationbefore
47
andafterthese,andsimilar,crises.Inthisway,itcouldbeseentowhatdegreethe
actuallevelofinformationorientationaccordedwithwhatwasperceivedorpublicly
acknowledged.
ThestudywasalsorestrictedbecauseoftheexclusiveuseofdatafromVWsources.
ThesesourceshavetheadvantageofrevealingtheprioritiesVWwouldlikeits
audiencetobelievethatithas.However,thereisastrongpossibilitythatthese
explicitorimplicitprioritiesareredherrings.Thereisnoguaranteethatthe
statementsVWgivearereflectiveoftheorganisationsactualbehavioursorambitions.
DeWolf&Mejri(2013)analysednewspapers,magazines,annualreportsandblogsin
theirresearchintotheDeepwaterHorizonoilspill.Byaddingthesesourcestothe
dataset,itwouldmeantheinferencescouldbetriangulatedandtheiraccuracy
verified.However,thesheervolumeofsuchdataavailableaboutacrisisthat,atthe
timeofwriting,isstilldeveloping,addsfurthercomplications,solutionstowhichare
beyondthecapabilitiesofthisdissertation.1
1ItshouldbenotedthattheobviousremedytothisissuewouldbetoexaminethependingJonesDayinvestigation.Theoriginalaimwastoexaminethereport’sinterimresults,duetobepublishedinApril2016.However,theresultsweredelayedatshortnotice.
48
References
Alvesson,M.&Sköldberg,K.(2000).Reflexivemethodology.London:SAGE.
Benoit,W.(1997).Imagerepairdiscourseandcrisiscommunication.PublicRelations
Review,23(2),177-186.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0363-8111(97)90023-0
Berkowitz,L.(1965).Advancesinexperimentalsocialpsychology(pp.219-266).New
York:AcademicPress.
Cassell,C.&Symon,G.(2016).EssentialGuidetoQualitativeMethodsin
OrganisationalResearch(1sted.,pp.192-239,301).London:SAGEPublications.
CenterforAlternativeFuels,EnginesandEmissions,WVU,.(2014).In-UseEmissions
TestingofLight-DutyDieselVehiclesintheUnitedStates.WestVirginia
University.Retrievedfrom
http://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/WVU_LDDV_in-
use_ICCT_Report_Final_may2014.pdf
Collins,H.(2010).Researchmethodsindesignmanagement.Lausanne:AVA
Academia.
Coombs,T.&Holladay,S.(1996).CommunicationandAttributionsinaCrisis:An
ExperimentalStudyinCrisisCommunication.ResearchGate.Retrieved30August
2016,from
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232958752_Communication_and_Attr
ibutions_in_a_Crisis_An_Experimental_Study_in_Crisis_Communication
Coombs,W.(2006).TheProtectivePowersofCrisisResponseStrategies.JournalOf
PromotionManagement,12(3-4),241-260.http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/j057v12n03_13
Coombs,W.(2007).AttributionTheoryasaguideforpost-crisiscommunication
research.PublicRelationsReview,33(2),135-139.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2006.11.016
Coombs,W.(2007).ProtectingOrganizationReputationsDuringaCrisis:The
DevelopmentandApplicationofSituationalCrisisCommunicationTheory.Corp
ReputationReview,10(3),163-176.http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.crr.1550049
Coombs,W.&Holladay,S.(2002).HelpingCrisisManagersProtectReputational
Assets:InitialTestsoftheSituationalCrisisCommunication
49
Theory.ManagementCommunicationQuarterly,16(2),165-186.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/089331802237233
DeWolf,D.&Mejri,M.(2013).Crisiscommunicationfailures:TheBPCase
Study.InternationalJournalOfAdvancesInManagementAndEconomics,2(2).
Retrievedfrom
http://www.managementjournal.info/download1.php?f=07022013.pdf
Diesing,P.(1966).Objectivismvs.SubjectivismintheSocialSciences.PhilosophyOf
Science,33(1/2),124-133.http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/288081
Ellman,L.(2015).LetterfromLouiseEllmantoPaulWillis(1).Parliament.uk.Retrieved
25August2016,fromhttps://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/transport/151207-Louise-Ellman-to-Paul-Willis-volkswagen-
emissions-violations.pdf
Ellman,L.(2015).LetterfromLouiseEllmantoPaulWillis(2).Parliament.uk.
Retrieved25August2016,from
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/transport/16-
Letter-from-Louise-Ellman-to-Paul-Willis-MD-Volkswagen-UK.pdf
Ellman,L.(2015).LetterfromLouiseEllmantotheSecretaryofState.Parliament.uk.
Retrieved25August2016,from
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/transport/15-
Letter-from-Louise-Ellman-to-the-Secretary-of-State-Volkswagen.pdf
Gailey,J.(2013).AttributionofResponsibilityforOrganizationalWrongdoing:A
PartialTestofanIntegratedModel.JournalOfCriminology,2013,1-10.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/920484
Gailey,J.&Lee,M.(2005).AnIntegratedModelofAttributionofResponsibilityfor
WrongdoinginOrganizations.SocialPsychologyQuarterly,68(4),338-358.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/019027250506800403
Gronhaug,K.&Falkenberg,J.(1994).SuccessAttributionswithinandacross
Organizations.JnlEuroIndustrialTraining,18(11),22-29.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03090599410073514
Heider,F.(1958).Thepsychologyofinterpersonalrelations.NewYork:Wiley.
Hewstone,M.&Jaspars,J.(1988).Implicitandexplicitconsensusasdeterminantsof
causalattribution:Twoexperimentalinvestigations.EuropeanJournalOfSocial
Psychology,18(1),93-98.http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420180108
50
Horn,M.(2016).TESTIMONYOFMICHAELHORN,PRESIDENTANDCEOOF
VOLKSWAGENGROUPOFAMERICA,INC.BEFORETHEHOUSECOMMITTEE
ONENERGYANDCOMMERCESUBCOMMITTEEONOVERSIGHTAND
INVESTIGATIONS:VolkswagenMediaCentre.VolkswagenMediaCentre.
Retrieved25August2016,fromhttp://media.vw.com/release/1087/
Hotten,R.(2015).Volkswagen:Thescandalexplained-BBCNews.BBCNews.
Retrieved25August2016,fromhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34324772
Interpretivism(interpretivist)ResearchPhilosophy.(2016).ResearchMethodology.
Retrieved11August2016,fromhttp://research-methodology.net/research-
philosophy/interpretivism/
Jones,E.(1979).Therockyroadfromactstodispositions.American
Psychologist,34(2),107-117.http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.34.2.107
Jones,E.&Davis,K.(1965).FromActsToDispositionsTheAttributionProcessIn
PersonPerception.AdvancesInExperimentalSocialPsychology,219-266.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60107-0
Jones,E.&Nisbitt,R.(1971).TheActorandtheObserver:DivergentPerceptionsofthe
CausesofBehaviour(1sted.).Harvard.Retrievedfrom
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic628923.files/D_jones_nisbett1971pp79-
94.pdf
Karppinen,P.&etal,.(2014).USINGHERMENEUTICSTOUNCOVERANOMALIES
FORNON-ADOPTIONOFBEHAVIORCHANGESUPPORT
SYSTEMS.AssociationForInformationSystems.Retrievedfrom
http://www.aissighealth.com/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/Karppinen_etal_2014.pdf
Kelley,H.(1967).ATTRIBUTIONTHEORYINSOCIALPSYCHOLOGY.Nebraska
SymposiumOnMotivation,15,192-238.Retrievedfrom
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1968-13540-001
Kelley,H.&Michela,J.(1980).Attributiontheoryandresearch.AnnualReviewOf
Psychology,31,457-501.Retrievedfrom
http://www.communicationcache.com/uploads/1/0/8/8/10887248/attribution_th
eory_and_research.pdf
Kroeze,J.&VanZyl,I.(2015).Thethemeofhermeneuticsinis-Theneedfora
structuredliteraturereview.AmericasConferenceonInformationSystems.
51
Labib,A.&Harris,M.(2015).Learninghowtolearnfromfailures:TheFukushima
nucleardisaster.EngineeringFailureAnalysis,47,117-128.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.engfailanal.2014.10.002
Lin,A.(1998).BridgingPositivistandInterpretivistApproachestoQualitative
Methods.PolicyStudiesJournal,26(1),162-180.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-
0072.1998.tb01931.x
Loseke,D.(2013).Methodologicalthinking.LosAngeles:SAGEPublications.
Marchand,D.&Kettinger,W.InformationOrientation(IO)HowEffectiveInformation
UseDrivesBusinessPerformance(1sted.).Sistemas.Retrievedfrom
http://52.0.140.184/typo43/fileadmin/Revista_120/Cuatro.pdf
Marchand,D.,Kettinger,W.,&Rollins,J.(2000).InformationOrientation:People,
TechnologyandtheBottomLine.MITSloanManagementReview.Retrieved25
August2016,fromhttp://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/information-orientation-
people-technology-and-the-bottom-line/
Marchand,D.,Kettinger,W.,&Rollins,J.(2001).Informationorientation.Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress.
McLoughlin,P.(2015).LetterfromSecretaryofStatetoLouiseEllman.Parliament.uk.
Retrieved25August2016,from
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/transport/151110-
Letter-from-Patrick-McLoughlin-to-Louise-Ellman-Volkswagen-emissions-
issue.pdf
Mingers,J.&Willcocks,L.(2004).Socialtheoryandphilosophyforinformation
systems(pp.103-128).Chichester,WestSussex,England:J.Wiley.
Muller,M.(2016).Speech1atAnnualMediaConference&InvestorConference.
Presentation,Wolfsburg.
Ramanathan,T.(2009).Theroleoforganisationalchangemanagementinoffshore
outsourcingofinformationtechnologyservices.BocaRaton,Fla.:
Dissertation.com.
Role-TransportCommittee.(2016).UKParliament.Retrieved1September2016,from
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/transport-committee/role/
Seeger,M.,Sellnow,T.,&Ulmer,R.(2003).Communicationandorganizationalcrisis.
Westport,Conn.:Praeger.
52
Seeger,M.,Sellnow,T.,&Ulmer,R.(2003).Communicationandorganizationalcrisis.
Westport,Conn.:Praeger.
Shomper,J.&Sooy,K.(2016).ALitigator'sLookatCrisisManagement(1sted.).
Crowell.Retrievedfromhttps://www.crowell.com/files/A-Litigators-Look-at-
Crisis-Management.pdf
SocietyofMotorManufacturersandTraders,.(2015).Newcarmarketstabilisesin
Octoberafterrecord43monthsofgrowth.SocietyofMotorManufacturers&
Traders.Retrieved31August2016,fromhttp://www.smmt.co.uk/2015/11/new-car-
market-stabilises-in-october-after-record-43-months-of-growth/
Steelhenge,.(2014).TheCrisisManagementSurvey2014(1sted.,p.2).Steelhenge.
Retrievedfrom
http://www.steelhenge.co.uk/images/CMC2014/Survey/Crisis%20Management%
20Survey%202014%20Report_secure.pdf
Thatcher,A.,Vasconcelos,A.,&Ellis,D.(2015).Aninvestigationintotheimpactof
informationbehaviouroninformationfailure:TheFukushimaDaiichinuclear
powerdisaster.InternationalJournalOfInformationManagement,35(1),57-63.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2014.10.002
TheVolkswagenGroupEmissionsScandal.(2016).Parliament.uk.Retrieved25August
2016,from
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmtrans/69/6905.
htm#_idTextAnchor015
Tyler,L.(1997).LiabilityMeansNeverbeingAbletoSayYou'reSorry:CorporateGuilt,
LegalConstraints,andDefensivenessinCorporateCommunication.Management
CommunicationQuarterly,11(1),51-73.http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0893318997111003
USAvsVWAGcourtcase.(2016).Justice.gov.Retrieved25August2016,from
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/809826/download
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupFederalMotorTransportAuthority(KBA)
decidesonrecallforaffectedEA189dieselvehicles.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved
25August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2015/10/V
W_KBA.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupFrankWitterappointedVolkswagenGroup
BoardMemberforFinance.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25August2016,from
53
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2015/10/Fr
ank_Witter.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupGroupBoardofManagementandWorks
Councilagreeonjointsteps.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2015/11/P
M_gemeinsame_Schritte.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupMatthiasMüller:"Wewillovercomethis
crisis".Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2015/10/M
atthias_Mueller.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupMatthiasMüllerunveilsnextstepsforthe
VolkswagenGroup.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/themes/2015/10/
next_steps.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupPrimeMinisterStephanWeilvisits
Volkswagen'smainplantinWolfsburg.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25August
2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/themes/2015/10/
Prime_Minister_Stephan_Weil.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupStatementfromtheExecutiveCommittee
ofVolkswagenAG'sSupervisoryBoardfollowingitsmeetingonSeptember30,
2015.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2015/10/A
R.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupStatementofProf.Dr.MartinWinterkorn,
CEOofVolkswagenAG:.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2015/09/st
atement_ceo_of_volkswagen_ag.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupStatementontheannouncementbythe
UnitedStatesEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA).Volkswagenag.com.
Retrieved25August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2015/11/Ste
llungnahme.html
54
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupTechnicalmeasuresfortheEA189diesel
enginesaffectedpresentedtotheGermanFederalMotorTransport
Authority.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/themes/2015/11/
KBA.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupVolkswagenAGannouncesactionplanto
refitdieselvehicleswithEA189EU5engines.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25
August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2015/09/V
W_Aktionsplan.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupVolkswagenAGhasissuedthefollowing
information:.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2015/09/V
olkswagen_AG_has_issued_the_following_information.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupVolkswagenconfirms:EU5-andEU6-
compliantEA288-enginesarenotaffected.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25
August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2015/10/E
A288_EU5.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupVolkswagenmakinggoodprogresswithits
investigation,technicalsolutions,andGrouprealignment.Volkswagenag.com.
Retrieved25August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2015/12/V
W_PK.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2015).VolkswagenGroupVolkswagenreaffirmsinvestmentsin
Chattanooga.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2015/10/V
W_USA.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2016).VolkswagenAGAnnualReport2015(p.7).Retrievedfrom
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/publications/201
6/04/Y_2015_e.bin.html/binarystorageitem/file/Y_2015_e.pdf
VolkswagenAG,.(2016).VolkswagenGroupStatementbyVolkswagenAGregarding
thestatusofthecomprehensiveinvestigationinconnectionwiththediesel
matter.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25August2016,from
55
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2016/04/J
D_VW.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2016).VolkswagenGroupVolkswagenReachesSettlement
AgreementswithU.S.FederalRegulators,PrivatePlaintiffsand44U.S.Stateson
TDIDieselEngineVehicles.Volkswagenag.com.Retrieved25August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2016/06/v
w_us.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2016).VolkswagenGroupVolkswagenReportsRobustOperationsin
FiscalYear2015.VolkswagenAG.Retrieved31August2016,from
http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2016/04/V
W_FYP.html
VolkswagenAG,.(2016).VolkswagenLightDutyDieselVehicleViolationsforModel
Years2009-2016.Epa.gov.Retrieved31August2016,fromhttps://www.epa.gov/vw
Walsham,G.(1995).TheEmergenceofInterpretivisminISResearch.Information
SystemsResearch,6(4),376-394.http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/isre.6.4.376
Weiner,B.(1995).Judgmentsofresponsibility.NewYork:GuilfordPress.
Weiner,B.(2000).EducationalPsychologyReview,12(1),1-14.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1009017532121
Weiner,B.(2005)."SocialMotivation,Justice,andtheMoralEmotions:An
AttributionalApproach".
Willis,P.(2016).LettertoLouiseEllmanfromPaulWillis.Parliament.uk.Retrieved25
August2016,fromhttp://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/transport/08c-Letter-from-Paul-Willis-to-Louise-Ellman-dated-21-
December-2015-Volkswagen-emissions.pdf
Witter,F.(2015).VolkswagenGroup-RegainingTrust.Presentation,Investor
Roadshow,London.
Witter,F.(2016).Speech2atAnnualMediaConference&InvestorConference2016.
Presentation,Wolfsburg.
Witter,F.(2016).Speech3atAnnualMediaConference&InvestorConference2016.
Presentation,Wolfsburg.
Witter,F.(2016).VolkswagenGroup-MovingAhead.Presentation,UniCreditKepler
CheuvreuxGermanCorporateConference,Frankfurt.
56
Yum,J.&Jeong,S.(2014).ExaminingthePublic'sResponsestoCrisisCommunication
FromthePerspectiveofThreeModelsofAttribution.JournalOfBusinessAnd
TechnicalCommunication,29(2),159-183.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1050651914560570
57
AppendixA:Datalist
DocNo.
Date Type Title
1 20.9.15 Pressrelease StatementofProf.Dr.MartinWinterkorn,CEOofVolkswagenAG
2 22.9.15 Pressrelease Volkswagenisworkingatfullspeedtoclarifyirregularitiesconcerningaparticularsoftwareusedindieselengines.
3 29.9.15 Pressrelease VolkswagenAGannouncesactionplantoupdatedieselvehicleswithEA189EU5engines
4 1.10.15 Pressrelease StatementfromtheExecutiveCommitteeofVolkswagenAG’sSupervisoryBoardfollowingitsmeetingonSeptember30,2015
5 6.10.15 Pressrelease MatthiasMuller:“Wewillovercomethiscrisis”
6 7.10.15 Pressrelease FrankWitterappointedVolkswagenGroupBoardMemberforFinance
7 8.10.15 Transcript TestimonyofMichaelHorn,PresidentandCEOofVolkswagenGroupofAmerica,Inc,beforetheHouseCommitteeonEnergyandCommerceSubcommitteeonOversightandInvestigations
8 12.10.15 Transcript UKTransportCommitteeoralevidence:VolkswagenGroupemissionsviolations,HC495
9 15.10.15 Pressrelease FederalMotorTransportAuthority(KBA)decidesonrecallforaffectedEA189dieselvehicles
10 21.10.15 Letter FromPaulWillis,ManagingDirector,VWGroupUK,toLouiseEllman,ChairofTransportCommittee
11 21.10.15 Pressrelease PrimeMinisterStephanWeilvisitsVolkswagen’smainplantinWolfsburg
12 22.10.15 Pressrelease Volkswagenconfirms:EA288enginesdesignedforEU5andEU6arenotaffected
13 28.10.15 Pressrelease MatthiasMullerunveilsnextstepsfortheVolkswagenGroup
14 29.10.15 Pressrelease VolkswagenreaffirmsinvestmentsinChattanooga
58
15 2.11.15 Pressrelease StatementontheannouncementbytheUnitedStatesEnvironmentalprotectionAgency(EPA)
16 9.11.15 Pressrelease GroupBoardofManagementandWorksCouncilagreeonjointsteps
17 25.11.15 Pressrelease TechnicalmeasuresfortheEA189dieselenginesaffectedpresentedtotheGermanFederalMotorTransportAgency
18 10.12.15 Pressrelease Volkswagenmakinggoodprogresswithitsinvestigation,technicalsolutionsandGrouprealignment
19 21.12.15 Letter FromPaulWillis,ManagingDirector,VWGroupUK,toLouiseEllman,ChairofTransportCommittee
20 25.1.16 Transcript UKTransportCommitteeoralevidence:VolkswagenGroupemissionsviolations,HC495
21 2.3.16 Pressrelease Volkswagenconsidersshareholderlawsuittobewithoutmerit
22 22.4.16 Pressrelease StatementbyVolkswagenAGregardingthestatusofthecomprehensiveinvestigationinconnectionwiththedieselmatter
23 28.4.16 Speech MatthiasMullerSpeechattheAnnualMediaandInvestorsConference,PartI
24 28.4.16 Speech FrankWitterSpeechattheAnnualMediaandInvestorsConference,PartII
25 28.4.16 Speech MatthiasMullerSpeechattheAnnualMediaandInvestorsConference,PartIII
26 28.6.16 Pressrelease VolkswagenReachesSettlementAgreementswithUSFederalRegulators,PrivatePlaintiffsand44USStatesonTDIDieselEngineVehicles
59
AppendixB:Timelineofsignificantevents
15.5.14 CenterforAlternativeFuels,Engines&Emissions(CAFEE)reportfindspooron-roademissionsforlight-dutydieselvehiclesinUS
2014-15 USEnvironmentalProtectionAgengy(EPA)contactsVWforexplanationofpooron-roademissionsforVWdieselcars
December2014 VWordersavoluntaryrecallofTDicars3.9.15 EPAthreatenstowithholdcertificationof2016diesels.
VWadmitscarsfittendwithsoftwareprogrammedtocheattesting18.9.15 EPAannouncesannouncesdiscoveryofcheatsoftwareand
recallfor2009-2015cars20.9.15 VWadmitsdeceptionandissuesapublicapology21.9.15 Euros15BnoffVWshareprice22.9.15 VWbudgetof$7.3Bntocovercosts;sharepricesdeclinerapidly23.9.15 CEOMartinWinterkornresigns25.9.15 MatthiasMuellerannouncedasnewCEO26.9.15 SwissbanonVWsales28.9.15 GermanprosecutorslaunchinvestigationintoMartinWinterkorn29.9.15 VWannouncesrefitofupto11millionaffectedvehicles30.9.15 VWagsupervisoryboardmeeting30.9.15 Morethan1:10VWdieselcarsinUKthoughttobeaffected2.10.15 JonesDayappointedbyVWtoruninternalinvestigation6.10.15 CEOaddressesemployees,Wolfsburg8.10.15 USCEOMichaelHorntestifiestoUSHouseCommitteeonEnergy
andCommerce8.10.15 PoliceraidVWGermanheadquartersinWolfsburg9.10.15 RecallofvehiclesannouncedinAustralia10.10.15 ConcernsraisedovervehiclesinChina12.10.15 VWGroupUKDirectorPaulWillistestifiestoUKTransport
Committee15.10.15 8.5millionvehiclesrecalledinEU20.10.15 Pollsays2outof3GermansstilltrustVW21.10.15 StateofLowerSaxonylodgescriminalcomplaintagainstVW28.10.15 VWEuros3.5Bn“inthered”2.11.15 LawsuitagainstPorchebroughtinUS6.11.15 VWannouncesitwillpayforextrataxesincurred10.11.15 Porcheprofitsdown50%25.11.15 GermanFederalMotorTransportAuthority(KBA)approvesfirst
fixesfordieselcarsinEurope26.11.16 RecallofvehiclesinSouthKoreaannounced2.12.15 VWtakesoutEuros20Bntocovercostsandprotectjobs10.12.15 VWpressconferencesummarisingprogress16.12.15 CustomersinEuropecontacted4.1.16 CivilcomplaintbroughtbyEPAinUSdistrictcourt25.1.16 PaulWillisandOliverSchmidttestifytoUKTransportCommittee2.2.16 Europeantechnicalfixesstart4.2.16 USJusticeDepartmentbringscaseagainstVW2.3.16 VWdismissesshareholderlawsuit
60
10.3.16 MichaelHornstepsdownasUSCEO29.3.16 USFederalTradeCommissionsuesVW21.4.16 USfix/buybackschemeannounced22.4.16 JonesDayreportdelayeduntilfourthquarterof20161.6.16 VWsaledown13%inUSduring2016
28.6.16 USsettlementagreedwithUSFederalRegulators,privateplaintiffsand44states
61
AppendixC:Codinggrid
DOCUMENTTYPE
pPressrelease/statement
eEvidence
AUDIENCE
CConsumers&public
WWorkforce&dealership
RRegulators
SShareholders
DIMENSION
AATTRIBUTION CCRISISMANAGEMENT
IINFORMATIONORIENTATION
1Internal2External3Distinctiveness4Consensus5Consistency6Punitiveactions
1aIndividual1bCorporate6aUtility6bRetribution
1Mortification2Evasionofresponsibility3Reductionofoffensiveness4Correction5Differentiation
3aDownplaydamage3bEuphemisticlanguage3cBolsteringpositiveimage4aRestoreoriginalconditions4bPreventionofrecurrence
1Informationtechnologypractices2Informationmanagementpractices3Informationbehaviourandvalues4Investigationprocess
62
AppendixD:Attributionanalysis
INTERNALATTRIBUTION(Heider)INDIVIDUALGeneralreferencestoindividualattribution“Responsiblepartieswillbeidentifiedandheldaccountable”[7:15]“Noideaifthereweretworogueengineers”[8:28]“Thoseresponsibleforwhathappenedmustfacesevereconsequences”[13:5]“Misconductsandshortcomingsofindividualemployees”[18:7]“Misconductonthepartofindividuals”[18:10][Reduce]“dependenceonindividuals”[18:23]“Over1500employees’deviceshavebeentakentobelookedat”[20:43]“Oneortwopeople-thatisconjecture…Itisverywidespread”[20:45]Situationalfactors“Icankeepcostsdown[incentive].Thatwouldbemyspeculation”[20:40]“PeoplewantedtomeettheAmericanemissionsregulationswiththetechnologyavailable”[20:41]“Individualswhohaveyettobequestionedcouldaligntheirstatements”[22:3]Specificreferencestoindividuals/departments/functions“Ifinditimplausiblethatseniorpeopleinthecompanywouldhaveknown”[8:62]“Ninemanagerswhomayhavebeeninvolved…weresuspended”[18:34]“Thereisonesetofengineers…itisnotseveralsets”[20:37]“Itisthesamegroupofengineers…forthelast10years”[20:38]“Nineemployeeshavebeensuspended”[20:36]“IndividualVWemployeesdiscussedthedieselissue”[21:12]“MrWinterkornwasinformedaccordingly”[21:15]
CORPORATEAcceptanceofcorporateresponsibility“We…takefullresponsibilityforouractions”[7:10]“Acceptingtheconsequences”[7:12]Denialofcorporateliability“WeakenVW;spositioninanyremainingproceedings”[22:4]“JeapardisethecreditVWmay…receiveintheeventofitsfullcooperationwiththeDepartmentofJustice”“Notanadmissionofliability”[23:7]Attributionsofdisposition(corporate)“AmindsetinsomeareasoftheCompanythattoleratedbreachesoftherules”[18:9]“Oneortwopeople-thatisconjecture…Itisverywidespread”[20:45]“Thequestionofdeceit”[20:48]Situationalfactors“DeficienciesinsomeareasofVW’sITinfrastructure”[18:21]“Testandcertificationprocesses…notsuited”[18.11]“Provesnottohavebeenaone-timeerror,butratherachainoferrors”[18:31]“Startingpoint..decisiontolaunchalarge-scalepromotionofdieselvehiclesintheUSin2005”[18:32]“TechnicalprocesstoreduceNOxemissions…notemployed…”[18:33]“Developedwithinengineering…putintoproduction”[20:14]“Clearthatsomeoftheworkprocessesneededtobeimproved”[20:44]“Startingpointwasthestrategicdecision…tostartamajordieselcampaignintheUS”[21:6]“Dieselmatter…didnot…receiveparticularattentionatthemanagementlevels”[21:8]
63
EXTERNALATTRIBUTION(Heider)TESTINGREGIME“Question…howstrongandhowfitforpurposethetestingregimeis”[8:16]“Emissionsregimeisveryoutofdate”[8:29]“Differencesbetween…testcycleandwhathappensintherealworld”[8:39]“Noquestionofanythinggoingonspecificallywiththetestingregime”[8:35][Testing]overlookedindependentlybyTUV,whichisacompletelyindependentcompany”[8:36][Theregulation]“needstochange”[8:40]“Hugeamountsofvariation…ruledoutonthetestcycle”[8:41]“Questionmarkovertheissueofregulationanditsapplication”[8:63]“ProvedimpossibletohavetheEA189enginemeetbylegalmeansthestricterNOxrequirementsintheUSwithinthetimeframeandbudget”[18:33]“ThemotivationwastomeetAmericalemissionsregulations”[20:39]DISTINCTIVENESS(Kelley/Coombes)CONTRARYTOVALUESHISTORY“Wedonotandwillnottolerateviolationsofanykindofourinternalrulesoroflaw”[1:5]“WentagainsteverythingtheGroupanditspeoplestandfor”[5:2]“ContrarytoVW’scoreprinciples”[7:21]“DonotreflectthecompanythatIknow”[7:22]“Inconsistent“[7:23]“Yes[VWisanethicalcompany]”[20:48]“Yes[itknowsthedifferencebetweenrightandwrong]”[20:49]
CONTRARYTOACTIONSHISTORY“Solidity,reliabilityandcredibilitybelongtotheessenceoftheVWbrand”[5:8]“Companythathasinvestedinenvironmentalefforts…”[7:24]“Highdegreeofsocialresponsibility”[18:52]“Wespendbillionsonthedevelopmentofplug-inhybridvehicles”[20:54]
CONSENSUS(Kelley)CONSENSUSWITHOTHERCOMPANIES“Youareallowedtorecognisethetest[nottamperwithemissions]”[20:46]“Comparablecasesinvolvingpassengervehicles”[21:4]“Violationsbyothermanufacturershadbeensanctionedbysettlements”[21:16]
NOCONSENSUSWITHOTHERCOMPANIES“Ihaveneverhearoforseenanythinglikethat[othermanufacturersdoingthingstoaffecttestresults]”[8:37]“Noevidencethatanyothermanufacturer…”[8:42]“Idonothaveanyevidencethatsuggeststhatanyothermanufacturer…hasundertakenthissortofactivity”[8:43]“Irefute[wholeindustrydoggedbysimilarproblems]”[20:30]
CONSISTENCY(Kelley/Coombes)“Provesnottohavebeenaone-timeerror,butratherachainoferrors”[18:31]PUNITIVEACTIONS(Weiner)UTILITY/RESTORATION RETRIBUTION
64
Technical“Buybackorterminatetheleasesofeligiblevehicles”[23:8]“Choosetohavetheirvehiclemodifiedfreeofcharge”[23:13]Customer“CashpaymentfromVW”[23:14].Socialandenvironmental“Payapprox.$583million…forconsumerprotectionoversight,trainingandenforcement”[23:17]“Reimbursementofcostsandexpenses”[23:19]“Singlefundingpool[tocoversettlementprogram]”[23:12]“$2.0billionover3yearsintoanenvironmentaltrust”[23:15]“$2.0billionover10yearsinzeroemissionsvehicle”[23:16]
Legal“Takeslegalresponsibilityintoaccount”[18:29]“Findings…mustholdupincourt”[18:30]Financial“$2.0billionover3yearsintoanenvironmentaltrust”[23:15]“$2.0billionover10yearsinzeroemissionsvehicle”[23:16]
65
AppendixE:Crisismanagementstrategiesanalysis
MORTIFICATION(Benoit)APOLOGY“Deeplysorry”[1:1]“Sincereapology”[7:5]“Iagainapologize”[7:25]“Apologisesincerelyandunreservedly”[8:1]“Iabsolutelyapologisetoallofyouandtoourcustomers”[8:45]“ApologyonbehalfoftheVWGroup”[10:1]“Sincereapologies”[10:8]“Thatiswhatweapologisefor”[20:19]“VWdeeplyregretstheincidents”[21:2]“VWexpresslyregrets…”[21:11]“Regretsthatitisnotabletopublishinterimresults”[22:6]
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTOFPROBLEM“Wehavebrokenthetrustofourcustomer,dealershipsandemployees,aswellasthepublicandregulators”[7:9]“Fallenshortofthestandardsexpected”[8:4]“Wehaveadutytothepublicandtoconsumers”[8:30]“Werecogniseourobligations”[20:55]
ACCEPTANCEOFRESPONSIBILITY“Ihavevolunteeredtocomebeforethiscommittee”[7:1]“We…takefullresponsibilityforouractions”[7:10]“Acceptingtheconsequences”[7:12]“Wemishandledthesituation”[8:17]
EVASIONOFRESPONSBILITY(Benoit)LACKOFINFORMATION“Nothadtheopportunitytoreviewallaspects”[7:3]“Testimony…basedonbestcurrentrecollection”[7:4]“InformationIhaveatthemoment”[8:9]“Ididnotknowtheywerefittedwithdefeatdevices”[8:11]“Ididnotknowwhichcarswereaffected”[8:12]“Ididnotknowwhichvehicleswereaffected”[8:13]“Iamnotanengineer”[8:15]“Ihavenoonetoadvisemeonthedetail”[8:22]“IcannotcommentonthemediaandIdon’tknow”[8:33]“Notpossibletogivefurtherinformationatthistime”[10:2]
DENIAL/SHIFTBLAME“Idonotseeanyhintofshoppingaround[fortypeapproval]”[20:58]“Irefuteyourallegationthatwemisrepresentedthevehiclesinanyway”[20:67]
DIFFICULTTOPROVE“Wouldbeverydifficulttoestablishhowmuchofanypricefallwasattributabletotheemissionsscandal”[20:71]“Notclearwhethertheparticipantsunderstood…thesoftwareviolatedUSenvironmentalregulations”[21:13]
66
“WehavetofindoutfromtheJonesDayinvestigationprecisely…”[20:20]“Iwasnotinpowertraindevelopment”[20:30]“Ihavenoknowledgeaboutwhodidit”[20:34]“Icannotremember[exactcostspentonlawyers]”[20:41]“Ididnotknowwhatadefeatdevicewas…andneitherdidmycolleagues”[20:46]“Wehavenothingtodowithenginedevelopment”[20:47]“Iamnotawarethatwehavesetanymoneyaside[forfines]”[20:72]
REDUCTIONOFOFFENSIVENESS(Benoit)DOWNPLAYDAMAGECompliance“Vehicles…withEU6dieselengines…comply”[2:1]“Presentingthetechnicalsolutionstotheresponsibleauthorities”[5:12]“EUdieselvehiclescomplywithlegalspecifications”[5:15]“KBAdoesnotregardtheuseofthistechnologyintheEUasproblematic”[10:5]“Thoseenginescomplywithlegalrequirements”[12:2]“No…defeatdeviceasdefinedinlawisinstalledinEA288EU5aswellasEU6engines”[12:1]“Nosoftware…installedinthe3-literV6…toalteremissions…inaforbiddenmanner”[15:1]“Thevehicleswillcomply”[17:3]“Technicalsolutionshavebeenapproved”[18:36]“WewerewithinthelegallimitsforNOxlevelsbeforeandafterwards”[20:4]“Yes[stillcompliantwithEuropeanregulations]”[20:39]“Europedoesnothavearegimewhereyouneedtodeclaresoftware”[20:57]
EUPHEMISTICLANGUAGE“Eliminatethesedeviations”[2:4]“Wemishandledthesituation”[8:17]“Itseems…theenginebehaveddifferently”[8:20]“Softwarefunction…notadequatelydescribed”[10:3]“SoftwareisnotdefinedasadefeatdeviceinEurope”[20:9]“Nothelpfultoourbrandimage”[20:44]“Thisisnotadefeatdevice”[20:59]“Itismostcertainlynotadefeatdevice”[20:83]
BOLSTERINGPOSITIVEIMAGE“Productioncancontinue”[5:16]“Continuestostandforgoodandsecurejobs”[5:19]“ClosetieslinkingtheStateofLowerSaxonywithVWanditsworkforce”[11:1]“Showingyoursupportfortheteam”[11:2]“VWcontinuestostandforinnovationandoutstandingtechnology”[11:3]“Reaffirmed…plannedinvestmentsattheChattanoogalocation”[14:1]“InvestUS$600millionintheStateofTennesseealone”[14.2]“ConfirmsourengagementinNorthAmerica”[14:3]“Confidenceinthelocalteam”[14:4]“Prioritizingforward-
67
“IntheUSthedescriptionofadefeatdeviceistotallydifferent”[20:84]
Smallnumber/littleeffect“Averysmallproportion”[8:10]“CurrentgenerationofEA288dieselengines…notaffected”[9:6]“Correctionmeasurehavebeenfixedforthemajorityofthevehicles”[17:1]“Inreal-worlddrivingthereisasmallimprovement”[20:6]“Versionsofthisengineonthestreettodayarenotaffected”[20:31]“Vehiclesonthestreetthatmeettheemissionswithoutthesoftware”[20:32]“Intherealworldandforrealcustomersthereisnoeffect”[20:33]
Technicallysafe“Allvehiclesaretechnicallysafeandroadworthy”[3:2][5:13]“Atnotimewasthesafetyofourcustomerscompromised”[5:14]“Remainsafeandlegaltodrive”[7:16]“Ourcarsaresafe”[8:31]“Notasafetyrelatedissue”[8:56]“Allvehicles…technicallysafeandroadworthy”[9:5]
Customerconvenienceandcost“Customers…informed…vehicleswouldbeupgraded”[5:11]Trytogetitcompletedbytheendof2016”[8:50]“Putthemright”[8:51]“Inconvenience…Wewillhavetoprovidealoancar”[8:54]“Continuedunrestricteduseofthevehicles”[9:1]“Nocosttoourcustomers”[9:3]“Toppriorityistosupportthe
lookingproductsandtechnologies”[16:3]“Safeguardingthefuturesuccessofourcompanyandemployment”[16:4]“Expandourworkforce”[20:43]“Customersarereturningtobuyourvehicles”[20:45]“[USsettlement}withinthescopeofourprovisions”[23:4]“FurtherclarityforourUDcustomersanddealersaswellasforourshareholders”[23:5]
68
customers”[13:2]“Maximumcustomer-friendliness”[17:2]“Timeneeded…asshortaspossible..forcustomers”[17:5]“Considerindividualcustomerneeds”[17:6]“Avoidanydisadvantages…curbingoftheirmobility”[17:7]“Appropriatereplacementmobilityoptionsfree”[17:8]“Customers…notbedisadvantagedbywaiting”[17:9]“Solutionswillbeimplementedfreeofcharge”[18:37]“Company…waivesstatuteoflimitationsforthetechnicalsolutions”[18:38]“Provideanappropriatereplacementvehicle”[18:39]“Noneofthisaffectedcustomersinanyway”[20:33]“Fixthecarswithoutanyinconvenience”[20:65]“Wedonotexpecttoseeanyreductioninvalues”[20:70]“100%ofeligiblecustomerchooseabuybackorleasetermination”[23:3]
Technicalperformance“Software…doesnotaffecthandling,consumptionoremissions”[2:2]“Forthemajorityoftheseengines,thesoftwaredoesnothaveanyeffect”[2:3]“Therecannotbeanychangeinthemilespergallon”[8:44]“Maintainthesameleveloffuelconsumption”[8:49]“Samemilespergallon”[8:52]“Withoutanyadverseeffectson…output,fuelconsumptionandperformance”[17:4]“Confirmedmeasuresdonothavenegativeimpactsupon…performance”[19:3]“Nodecreaseinmilespergallon”[20:7]
69
“Noimpactonfuelconsumption”[20:34]“Nodifferenceinthefuelconsumptionsothereisnoloss”[20:69]
Effectonbusinessanddealers“Idonotthinkconsumerconfidenceortrustisbroken”[8:38]“Doingeverything…tolimittheeffectthecurrentsituationhasonitsbusinessperformance”[18:57]“Givinganenormousamountofhelptodealerships”[20:1]“Idonotintendtomakeanyredundancies”[20:42]“Noindications…ofrelevance…tothestockprice”[21:3]CORRECTION(Benoit)RESTOREORIGINALCONDITIONSCo-operation“Co-operatefullywiththeresponsibleagencies”[1:2]“Commitmenttoco-operation”[7:2]“Workingwiththeagencies”[7:7]
Rebuildconsumertrust“Winbackthetrust”[5:9]“Determinedtomakethingsright”[7:11]“Restorethetrust…rebuildthereputation”[7:13]“Developaremedyforourcustomers”[7:14]“Makingthingsright”[7:20]“Remediesforourcustomers”[7:26]“Willtakeallnecessarystepstoregaintrust”[8:5]“Putthingsright”[8:7]“Regainingcustomertrust”[8:8]“Actionstoregainthetrustofourconsumers”[10:9]“Wewillre-establishtrustbyhavingasign-offfromtheKBA”[20:10]“Ourobjectiveistoregaintrust[20:74]
Technicalfixes“Vehicleswillbecorrected”[3:1]“Remedytheaffectedengines”[8:6]“Remedialactionsonthevehicleswillbegin”[9:2]“Removesthesoftwarethatrecognisedthedrive
PREVENTRECURRENCEInvestigation“Orderedandexternalinvestigation”[1:4]“Swiftandrelentlessclarification”[5:1]“Cannothappenagain”[7:18]“Neverhappenagain”[7:27]“Bettertobethoroughandgetitabsolutelyright”[8:47]
Implementchanges“Learntherightlessonsandavoidsuchmisconductinfuture”[11:5]“Testingpracticemustundergocomprehensivechanges”[18:25]“Wenowhavea“four-eye”principleinsoftwaredevelopment”[20:11]“Randomlyselectedreal-lifetests”[20:18]
70
trace”[20:5]“WeremovewhatiscurrentlyintheECU”[20:8]
Financialmeasures/compensation“Setaside…6.5billionEUR”[2:5]“Yourconstituentsshouldnotpayforit”[8:34]“Paycustomersatisfactionbonuses[todealers]”[8:57]“Changedbonusthresholds”[8:58]“TheBritishtaxpayershouldnotbeoutofpocket”[8.59]“Ifnecessary,wewillhaveameetingwithHMRC”[8:60]“HaddiscussionswiththeVCA[topayforretesting]”[20:75]“Vehiclescurrentlyinuseandeligibleforbuybacksandleaseterminationsoremissionsmodifications”[23:1]“Freeemissionsmodifications”[23:9]“Cashpayments…toaffectedcurrentandcertainformerownersandlessees”[23:10]
DIFFERENTIATION(Benoit)(Coombes)CONTRARYTOVWVALUES“Wedonotandwillnottolerateviolationsofanykindofourinternalrulesoroflaw”[1:5]“VWdoesnottolerateanykindofviolationoflaws”[2:6]“WentagainsteverythingtheGroupanditspeoplestandfor”[5:2]“EnsurethatVWcontinuestostandforgoodandsecurejobs”[5:5]“Abouttheverycoreofourcompanyandouridentity”[5:7]“DidnotthinkthatsomethinglikethiswaspossibleattheVWGroup”[7:8]“ContrarytoVW’scoreprinciples”[7:21]“DonotreflectthecompanythatIknow”[7:22]“Inconsistent“[7:23]“Yes[VWisanethicalcompany]”[20:48]“Yes[itknowsthedifferencebetweenrightandwrong]”[20:49]“VWisanupstandingcompany”[20:31]“Weareastraightforwardorganisation”[20:56]
CONTRARYTOCUSTOMERRELATIONSHIPHISTORY/ENVIRONMENTALRECORD“Groupwithastrongfoundation”[5:3]“Bestautomobileteam”[5:4]
“Solidity,reliabilityandcredibilitybelongtotheessenceoftheVWbrand”[5:8]“Groupanditsbrandsstandforsustainability,forresponsiblity,forcredibility”[5:20]“Companythathasinvestedinenvironmentalefforts…”[7:24]“Standardsexpectedofus”[10:7]“Buildontraditionalstrengths”[18:51]“Highdegreeofsocialresponsibility”[18:52]“Itcaresaboutitscustomers”[20:32]“Wespendbillionsonthedevelopmentofplug-inhybridvehicles”[20:54]
71
72
AppendixF:Informationorientationanalysis
INFORMATIONMANAGEMENTPRACTICESORGANISINGManagementstructure“MyroleintheUKisinsales,marketing,distributionandfinance”[8:26]“TechnicaldevelopmentinWolfsburg”[8:27]“FundamentallyrealignVW…leanerstructures”[11:6]“IntroducenewstructuresintheVWGroup”[13:6]“Groupmanagementwillbedecentralised”[13:7]“Bodiesresponsiblearebeingreorganized”[18:15]“DeficienciesinsomeareasofVW’sITinfrastructure”[18:21]“Structure…preventbreachesofregulations”[18:24]“Comprehensivenewalignment”[18:41]“Managedinamoredecentralizedfashion”[18:43]“Moreagile”[18:45]“Reducemanagerialcomplexity”[18:47]“Renewalofpersonnel”[18:49]“RealigningVWstrategicallyandtechnologically”[18:55]“Thebasesoftwareisdeployedinonedepartment”[20:51]“No[Idonotsitontheinternational,theEuropeanboardortheworldboard]”[20:79]“IsitontheUKboard…communicatewith…thesupervisoryboardinGermany”[20:80]“Ihavebeenincloseliaisonwithvariousseniorlevelsofthecompany”[20:81]“Ihavetalkedverythoroughlywithlevelsofthecompany”[20:82]
Brands“Moreindependenceforbrands”[13:8]“Board…willfocuson…cross-brandstrategies”[13:9]“Brandsandregions…grantedmoreindependence”[18:44]“Brandshavehadtheirtoppersonnelchanged”[18:50]
PROCESSINGSystems“Investigate…processes,reportingandmonitoringsystems”[18:3]“Weaknessesinsomeprocesses”[18:8]“Testandcertificationprocesses…notsuited”[18.11]“Structuringtheseprocessesmoretransparentlyandsystematically”[18:12]“Deficiencies…inthereportingandmonitoringsystems”[18:18]“OurQAchecksthesoftware”[20:12]“Therewasnone[QA]before”[20:13]“NoprocesswheretheQAlookedatthesourcecode”[20:15]“BetteruseofITtocheckprocesses”[20:16]“Itcouldnothavebeendetectedunderconformityofproduction”[20:35]“Clearthatsomeoftheworkprocessesneededtobeimproved”[20:44]
Responsibilities“Responsibilitieswerenotsufficientlyclear”[18:19]“Streamliningdecision-makingprocesses”[18:46]“Wenowhavea“four-eye”principleinsoftwaredevelopment”[20:11]“TheHeadofEngineeringandtheheadofQAsigneditoff”[20:21]“Itisthepeopleworkingforthem[whosignitoff]”[20:27]
INFORMATIONBEHAVIOURSANDVALUESINTEGRITY“SucceedHansDieterPotsch…FrankWitter”[4:8]“Examineourcompliance,
CONTROL“Publicationoffigures…mustmeetregulatorystandards”[8:65]“Pursuitofperfection…mustbe
SHARINGShareholders“VWwillreporttotheshareholders”
73
processesandstandards”[7:17]“Groupstrivesforaholisticsolutionforcomplyingwiththerespectivevalidstandards”[12:3]“RealignmentofGroup’scultureandmanagementbehaviour”“Commitmentandsocialresponsibility…mustbemaintained”[13:12]“IntegrityandLaw…representedasitsowndepartmentonthe…Board”[18:28]“Thequestionofdeceit”[20:48]
maintained”[13:11]“Internalcompliancestructures…toaddressthosefindings”[19:2]“Futureemissionstestswillbecheckingworkflows”[20:17]“Foureyesmeansnobodycandoanythingontheirown”[20:22]“Someone…completelyoutsidethedepartment…tocheck”[20:24]“Everymanufacturer…isforced…topublishtheirreal-worldmeasuringresults”[20:36]
[4:6]“Seekingshareddecisionsintheinterestofthecompany,shareholdersandemployees”[16:6]“Yes[responsibilitytoshareholdersaboutcosts]”20:40]
Public“Informthepublic”[4.7]“Anyadvertisement…hastocontaintheregulateddata”[8:64]“I’mnotsurethattheentirereportwillbegivenoutwherethereiscompetitivelysensitiveinformation”[20:37]“Disclosureofinterimresultsoftheinvestigation…wouldpresentunacceptablerisksforVW”[22:1]“Disclosure…wouldprejudicetherestoftheinvestigation”[22:2]“WeakenVW;spositioninanyremainingproceedings”
Internal“New,opencultureofco-operation”[11:7]“ChangesarenecessaryinhowWVcommunicates”[13:12]“Weneedacultureofopennessandco-operation”[13:14]“Attachgreatimportance
74
to…workscouncils”[16:2]“Co-operationbetweenBoard…andtheWorksCouncil”[16:5]“Seekingshareddecisionsintheinterestofthecompany,shareholdersandemployees”[16:6]“Opendiscussions,closerco-operation”[18:53]
Regulators“Emissionstestwillbeevaluatedexternallyandindependently”[18:26]
FORMALITY“Developedmorestrictlyinaccordancewiththe4-eyesprinciple”[18:14]“Sharplydefinedandbindingpowersandresponsibilities”[18:17]“ManagementboardfulfilleditsdisclosureobligationunderGermancapitalmarketslaw”[21:1]
TRANSPARENCY[Co-operate]“withtransparency”[1:3]“Opencommunicationwithourcustomer,dealers,employeesandthepublic”[7:19]“Weneedtransparencyandopenness”[8:32]“Commitmenttofulltransparency”[10:6]“ChangesarenecessaryinhowVW…handlesitsmistakes”[13:13]“Weneedacultureofopennessandco-operation”[13:14]“Structuringtheseprocessesmoretransparentlyandsystematically”[18:12]“Willingnesstoallowmistakes…asanopportunitytolearn”[18:54]“Obligationtobecometransparent,withtestingintherealworld”[20:35]“Ifinditimplausiblethatifyouemployedindependentlawyersyouwouldeditthereport”[20:38]“Wehavebeenastransparentaswecan”[20:64]
PROACTIVENESS“Drawnupanactionplan”[5:10]“Criticalreviewofplannedinvestments”[5:17]“Intensifyingtheefficiencyprogram”[5:18]“LookbeyondthecurrentsituationandcreatetheconditionsforVW’s…furtherdevelopment”[13:1]“Strategy2025”[13:15]“Makedecisionsthatfactorineconomicsjustasmuchasemployment”[16:1]“Newalignment…affectsthinkingand…strategicgoals”[18:42]“Clearmission”[18:58]“Betterand
75
stronger”[18:59]“TOGETHER-Strategy2025”[23:6]