December11th2017TO:TheCaliforniaAirResourcesBoardRE:CaliforniaEnvironmentalJusticeAllianceCommentsOnThe2017FinalClimateChangeScopingPlanOnbehalfoftheCaliforniaEnvironmentalJusticeAlliance(CEJA),werespectfullysubmitthesecommentsregardingtheCaliforniaAirResourcesBoard(CARB)’s2017FinalClimateChangeScopingPlan(ScopingPlan).CEJAisastatewidecoalitionoftencommunity-basedorganizationsrepresentingapproximately20,000residentsacrossthestate.Environmentaljustice(EJ)communitiesareonthefrontlinesofclimatechange.1Low-incomecommunitiesandcommunitiesofcoloraredisproportionatelylocatednearthestate’slargestsourcesofGHGemissions,includingbothindustrialfacilitiesandmajortransportationcorridors,2aswellasoilandgasinfrastructure.3ThecommunitieswhereCEJA’smembersandpartnersworkarealreadyfacingtheimpactsofclimatechange,fromsufferingmostacutelyduringtheimpactsfromextremeweathereventstobearingtheburdenofdrought.CARB’sScopingPlanpresentsauniqueopportunitytooutlineaboldvisionforCaliforniatoachieveourambitious2030greenhousegas(GHG)reductionstargets.TheScopingPlanshouldprovideacomprehensiveandoverarchingstrategicplanforCaliforniatoeffectivelyreduceourstate’sgreenhousegasemissionstomeetmandatorytargets,whileatthesametimeaddressingtheneedsofourmostimpactedandvulnerablecommunities.ThereisawellestablishedstatutoryrequirementforCARBtoprotectagainstanydisproportionateimpactsthatmayoccurasaresultofclimatechangeregulations.AB398requiresCARBto“[e]nsurethatactivitiesundertakentocomplywiththeregulationsdonotdisproportionatelyimpactlow-incomecommunities.”4SB32furtherrequiresCARBto“achievethestate’smoststringentgreenhousegasreductionsinamannerthatbenefitsthestate’smostdisadvantagedcommunities.”5

1SeeSB32,Section1(c)(2016)(describinghowdisadvantagedcommunities“areaffectedfirst,and,mostfrequently,bytheadverseimpactsofclimatechange”).2SeeL.Cushing,et.al,APreliminaryEnvironmentalEquityAssessmentofCalifornia’sCap-and-TradeProgram,pg.2,4,5(2016),https://dornsife.usc.edu/PERE/enviro-equity-CA-cap-trade;OEHHA,TrackingandEvaluationofBenefitsandImpactsofGreenhouseGasLimitsinDisadvantagedCommunities,pgs.15-17(Feb.2017).3SeeOEHHA,TrackingandEvaluationofBenefitsandImpactsofGreenhouseGasLimitsinDisadvantagedCommunities,pgs.15-17(Feb.2017).4Cal.Health&SafetyCode§38562(b)(2).Thisprovisionisnotlimitedtoeconomicimpacts,whichCARBanalyzesinAppendixE.Aswritten,itincludesallpotentialimpactsincludingenvironmentalimpacts.5SenateBill32,Section1(d)(Pavley,2016).

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WhileCARBhasincreasedprogrammaticattentionandstaffingdedicatedtowardsenvironmentaljusticeissues,itisdisappointingthatthecurrentversionoftheScopingPlandoesnotoutlineaclearcourseofactiontomeetCalifornia’s2030climatetargets.ItfurthercreatesnoclearplanforhowtheagencywillcomplywithAB398’s,SB32’s,andAB197’smandatestoprotectagainstdisproportionateimpactsinenvironmentaljusticecommunities.WeofferthefollowingdetailedanalysisonseveralkeyEJissuesintheScopingPlan,whichisbynomeansexhaustive.Insummary,ourconcernsare:

I. TheScopingPlandoesnotincludeaclearplantoensureclimateregulationsdonotnegativelyimpactEJcommunitiesandover-reliesonAB617toaddressairqualityconcerns.

II. TheScopingPlandoesnotcomplywithAB197becauseitfailstoprioritize,accuratelyaccountforandanalyzepotentialdirectemissionreductions.6

III. TheScopingPlan’sanalysisoftheCapandTradeprogramisinsufficientanddoesnotdemonstratehowtheprogramwillachievetheoutlinedemissionreductions.

IV. TheScopingPlan’stransportationanalysislackscleargoalsortargets,despitebeingthesectorwiththelargestsourceofgreenhousegasemissions.

I. TheScopingPlandoesnotincludeaclearplantoensureclimateregulationsdonot

negativelyimpactEJcommunitiesandover-reliesonAB617toaddressairqualityconcerns.

AstheScopingPlanclearlystates,“[a]nimportantconcernforenvironmentaljusticecommunitiesisforanyScopingPlantoprovideairqualityco-benefits.”7 CEJAandtheenvironmentaljusticecommunityhavelongadvocatedforpoliciesthatachievethetwingoalsofimprovingairqualityandreducingGHG’sinourmostvulnerablecommunities.TheEnvironmentalJusticeAdvisoryCommittee’s(EJAC)priorityScopingPlanrecommendationsrecentlyreiteratedtheEJcommunity’scommitmenttoachievingtheseoutcomes.8 TheScopingPlanhasaclearfocusonaddressingcriteriaandtoxicaircontaminantsthroughthenewly-createdAB617implementationprocess.9TheScopingPlanstates:

WeagreewiththeEJACthatmorecanandshouldbedonetoreduceemissionsofcriteriapollutantsandtoxicaircontaminants.Thesepollutantsposeairqualityandrelatedhealthissuestothecommunitiesadjacenttothesourcesofindustrialemissions.Further,manyofthesecommunitiesarealreadydisadvantagedandburdenedbyavarietyofotherenvironmentalstresses.AsdescribedinChapter3,however,thereisnotalwaysadirectcorrelationbetweenemissionsofGHGs,criteriapollutants,andtoxicair

6Asdescribedfurtherbelow,althoughCARBanalyzedmanydifferentprogramsbeforethepassageofAB398,itsanalysisafterAB398failstoevenanalyzemanyofthesamemeasuresitpreviouslyanalyzed.ScopingPlan,AppendixG.7ScopingPlan,pg.33.8ScopingPlan,AppendixA,pg.5,https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/2030sp_appa_ejac_final.pdf.9ScopingPlan,pg.ES6.

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contaminants.Also,relationshipsbetweenthesepollutantsarecomplexwithinandacrossindustrialsectors.Thesolution,therefore,isnottodoawaywithorchangetheregulationofGHGsthroughtheCap-and-TradeProgramtoaddresstheselegitimateconcerns;instead,consistentwiththedirectioninAB197andAB617,Stateandlocalagenciesmustevaluateandimplementadditionalmeasuresthatdirectlyregulateandreduceemissionsofcriteriaandtoxicairpollutantsthroughotherprograms.10

AB617hasindeedcreatednewpotentialtomonitorandachieveemissionsreductionsincommunitiesoverburdenedwithairpollution,andwelookforwardtoworkingwithCARBtoachievethesegoals.However,CARBisstillrequiredbylawtoensurethatimplementationofclimateregulations–includingcapandtrade–arenotdisproportionatelyimpactingdisadvantagedcommunities.ThisrequiresanongoingcommitmenttoanalyzetherelationshipbetweenGHGsandco-pollutants,aswellasactiontoaddressanynegativeimpactsthatmaybedocumented,outsideoftheAB617process.BelowweoutlineseveralspecificconcernsrelatedtotheScopingPlans’treatmentofairqualityandEJissues.

a. Thecorrelationbetweengreenhousegasemissionsandco-pollutants,andwhetherclimateregulationsandcapandtradeinparticularimpacttheseemissions,needscontinuedanddeeperanalysis.

InordertocomplywiththeprovisionsofAB398,ongoinganalysisandevaluationofthecorrelationbetweenGHGsandco-pollutantsisneeded.AB398requiresCARBto“[e]nsurethatactivitiesundertakenpursuanttotheregulationscomplement,anddonotinterferewith,effortstoachieveandmaintainfederalandstateambientairqualitystandardsandtoreducetoxicaircontaminantemissions.”11CARBdoesnotprovideanyanalysisorsetofproposedactivitiestoensurethatclimatepolicieswillnotinterferewithairqualityrequirements.12Similarly,theScopingPlanprovidesnoconcreteanalysisorprojectedemissiontrendsatfacilitiesorsectorsthathaverelatedtoxicaircontaminantemissions,thusprovidingnobasisforhow“activities”requiredintheScopingPlanwillimpacttoxicaircontaminantemissions.13TheScopingPlanusesanextremelylimitedreadingofthemajorexistingstudiesexaminingtherelationshipbetweengreenhousegasemissionsandco-pollutants.IndiscussingtheanalysiscompletedbytheOfficeofEnvironmentalHealthHazardAssessment(OEHHA),theScopingPlanstates:“therearecomplexitiesintryingtocorrelateGHGswithcriteriaandtoxicsemissionsacrossindustryandwithinsectors,althoughpreliminarydatareviewshowstheremaybesomepoortomoderatecorrelationsinspecificinstances.Lastly,thereportnoted,‘...theemissionsdataavailableatthistimedonotallowforaconclusiveanalysis.’”14Thislimitedreadingoverlooksotherfindings,whichshowacorrelationbetweenGHGsandcriteria 10ScopingPlan,pg.71.11Cal.Health&SafetyCode§38562(b)(4).12CARBonlycitesgenerallytoitsStateImplementationPlanwithoutanyanalysisordiscussion.ScopingPlan,pg.35.13CARB’sanalysisoftoxicaircontaminantsislimitedtodieselPM.See,e.g.,ScopingPlan,AppendixG.14ScopingPlan,pg.37.

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pollutants.Specifically,OEHHA’sreportfoundthat:

ThereweremoderatecorrelationsbetweenGHGemissionsandtheemissionsofcriteriaairpollutants.Thestrongestcorrelationwaswithfineparticulatematteremissions(PM2.5).TherewasalsomoderatecorrelationbetweenGHGandtoxicchemicalemissionsacrosstheentiresetofCap-and-Tradefacilitieswithcoveredemissions.SomeindividualindustrialsectorsshowedgreatercorrelationsbetweenemissionsofGHGsandtoxicco-pollutants.Refineriesoverallshowedastrongcorrelation,whilecementplantsshowedamoderatecorrelation.Oilandgasproductionfacilitiesalsoshowedamoderatecorrelation,dependingonthestatisticalmeasureused.Facilitiesincertainsectorswithbroadrangesinemissionslevels(e.g.electricitygenerationfacilities)showedincreasedcorrelationwithaspecificstatisticalanalysis(logarithmictransformation).15

WhileitiscertainlyaccuratethattheexactrelationshipbetweenGHGsandco-pollutantsiscomplexandvaries,itisclearthereisacorrelationthatmeritsconcern.Anotherstudyalsoaffirmsthisbasicrelationship,butitismischaracterizedintheScopingPlan.16InSeptemberof2016,LaraJ.Cushing,MadelineWander,RachelMorello-Frosch,ManuelPastor,AllenZhu,andJamesSaddofUCBerkeley,UniversityofSouthernCaliforniaandOccidentalCollegepublished“APreliminaryEnvironmentalEquityAssessmentofCalifornia’sCapandTradeProgram,”17whichiserroneouslyreferredtoas“aCaliforniaEnvironmentalJusticeAlliancereport,”18insteadofattributingthecorrectacademics.Unfortunately,theScopingPlanfailstoincludetheactualresultsofthereport,whichareasfollows:

PreliminaryanalysisoftheequityimplicationsofCalifornia’scap-and-tradeprogram indicatesthatregulatedGHG-emittingfacilitiestendtobelocatedinneighborhoodswithhigherproportionsofresidentsofcolorandresidentslivinginpoverty.ThereisacorrelationbetweenemissionsofGHGsandPM10,andfacilitiesthatemitthehighestlevelsofbothGHGsandPM10aresimilarlymorelikelytobelocatedincommunitieswithhigherproportionsofresidentsofcolorandresidentslivinginpoverty.Thissuggeststhatthepublichealthandenvironmentalequityco-benefitsofCalifornia’scap-and-tradeprogramcouldbeenhancedifthereweremoreemissionsreductionsamongthelargeremittingfacilitiesthatarelocatedindisadvantagedcommunities.Currently,thereislittleinthedesignofcap-and-tradetoensurethissetoflocalizedresults.Indeed,whilethecap-and-tradeprogramhasbeenineffectforarelativelyshorttimeperiod,preliminaryevidencesuggeststhatin-stateGHGemissionsfromregulatedcompanies

15OEHHA,TrackingandEvaluationofBenefitsandImpactsofGreenhouseGasLimitsinDisadvantagedCommunities,https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/environmental-justice/report/oehhaab32report020217.pdfpageix16SeeScopingPlan,pg.37.17L.Cushing,et.al,APreliminaryEnvironmentalEquityAssessmentofCalifornia’s Cap-and-Trade Program,(2016),http://dornsife.usc.edu/PERE/enviro-equity-CA-cap-trade18L.Cushing,et.al,APreliminaryEnvironmentalEquityAssessmentofCalifornia’s Cap-and-Trade Program,(2016),http://dornsife.usc.edu/PERE/enviro-equity-CA-cap-trade

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haveincreasedonaverageforseveralindustrysectorsandthatmanyemissionsreductionsassociatedwiththeprogramwerelinkedtooffsetprojectslocatedoutsideofCalifornia.LargeGHGemittersthatmightbeofmostpublichealthconcernwerethemostlikelytouseoffsetprojectstomeettheirobligationsunderthecap-and-tradeprogram.19

TheScopingPlan’sefforttoquantifyco-pollutantreductionsassociatedwithclimateregulationssimplyincludesroughapproximationsofco-pollutantreductionsassociatedwithpotentialmeasures,andthemajorityoftheseapproximationshavenotbeenupdatedsincethepassageofAB398.20ThisroughapproximationlimitstheabilityofCARBtofullyanalyzelocalizedimpactsofitsregulationsanddevelopanyneededmitigations.Giventhedocumentationprovidedinexistingindependentstudies,aswellastherequirementsofAB398,AB197,andSB32,CARBshouldclearlyoutlineplanstoanalyzetheseissuesandcreateactionplanstoaddressanynegativeairqualityimpacts,shouldtheyarise.

b. OverrelianceonAB617toaddressairqualityconcerns.DespitetheseparaterequirementsofAB197,SB32,andAB398relatedtoairquality,theScopingPlanlimitsaddressingairqualityissuestotheAB617process.TheScopingPlanstatesthat:

WhilethereportsdonotprovideevidencethatimplementationoftheCap-and-TradeProgramiscontributingtoincreasedlocalairpollution,theydounderscoretheneedtouseallofthetools(e.g.,enhancedenforcement,newregulations,tighterpermitlimits)availabletotheStateandlocalagenciestoachievefurtheremissionsreductionsoftoxicandcriteriapollutantsthatareimpactingcommunityhealth.Importantly,AB617providesanewframeworkandtoolsforCARB,incollaborationwithlocalairdistricts,todeployfocusedmonitoringandensurecriteriaandtoxicsemissionsreductionsattheState’slargestGHGemitters.21

Whilewesupporttheefforttouseothertoolstoachieveco-pollutantbenefitsandlookforwardtoworkingthroughtheAB617processtoaccomplishthesegoals,thereremainexistingclimateandairqualityconcernsthatarerequiredbylawtobeconsidered,andthatAB617willnotaddress.Initially,AB617willnotanalyzeorassesswhethergreenhousegaslimitsimplementedbyCARB,suchascapandtrade,aredisproportionatelyimpactinglow-incomecommunities.Itwillnotlookattherelationshipbetweenclimateregulationsandhowtheyimpactairquality.While 19L.Cushing,et.al,APreliminaryEnvironmentalEquityAssessmentofCalifornia’s Cap-and-Trade Program,pg.10(2016),http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/docs/Climate_Equity_Brief_CA_Cap_and_Trade_Sept2016_FINAL2.pdf.20SeeScopingPlan,AppendixG,Section2.SeeinfraSectionIIformoreanalysisonthelimitationsofthisanalysis.21ScopingPlan,pg37

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theserelationshipsmaybecomplex,thisisallthemorereasonwhytheissuedeservesongoinganalysisandattentionfromCARB.Inaddition,theAB617processisextremelynewandunderdevelopment.Manyofitskeyprogramshavenotbeendefined.Thus,itisunreliableasthesoleandprimaryvehicletoaddressenvironmentaljusticeissues,eventhoughitmayhavepotentialtoaddressmoreEJissuesinthefuture.Furthermore,ascurrentlyproposed,AB617’simpactswillbelimitedtoaselect,andasofyetundetermined,numberofcommunities.RelegatingmanagementofairqualityissuestoAB617wouldthusleavemanycommunities,whocouldbenefitfromstatewideaction,withoutrecourse.CARBhasfocusedsignificantlyintheScopingPlanonincreasedcoordinationanddeepenedrelationshipswithlocalairdistricts,whichisindeedcritical.ButAB617itselfdoesnotclearlyoutlineenforcementprotocolsintheeventthattheAB617processorlocalairdistrictsfailtodeliveremissionreductionsfromlargesourcesofbothGHGsandco-pollutants.ItisalsounclearwhetherCARBwillincludeenforcementmeasuresaspartofAB617implementation.CARBshouldcontinueanalyzingairqualityandEJissuesspecificallyastheyrelatetoimplementationofclimateregulations–inadditiontoandoutsideoftheAB617process-andcreateaclearsetofproposedactionstomitigateagainstanypotentialdisproportionateimpacts,asisrequiredunderAB197,SB32,andAB398.

II. TheScopingPlandoesnotcomplywithAB197becauseitfailstoprioritize,accuratelyaccountforandanalyzepotentialdirectemissionreductions.

AstheAugust24,2016AssemblyFloorAnalysissummarizes,AB197“requiresARBtoprioritizeregulationsthatresultindirectemissionreductionsatlargestationary,mobileandothersources.”22Itsproperimplementationiscriticaltoenvironmentaljusticecommunities.TheScopingPlan’supdatedAB197analysislistsfiveoverarchingprograms:theRenewablePortfolioStandard,MobileSourcesCTFandFreight,18percentCarbonIntensityReductionTargetforLCFS-LiquidBiofuels,Short-LivedClimatePollutantStrategy,2xadditionalachievableenergyefficiencyinthe2015IntegratedEnergyPolicyReport(IEPR),andcapandtrade,andthenprovidesassociatedestimatedemissionreductionswitheachforNOx,VOCs,PM2.5,anddieselPM.23Unfortunately,theScopingPlandoesnotadequatelyprovidetherequiredanalysisofgreenhousegasemissionsmeasuresandtheirpotentialemissionreductions,nordoesit

22AB197,August24,2016AssemblyFloorAnalysis,availableathttps://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB197.23ScopingPlan,pg.37.TheScopingPlan’sUpdatedAnalysisdoesnotincludealltheprogramsevaluatedbeforepassageofAB398.ScopingPlan,AppendixG.

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prioritizeanyemissionreductions.Itdoesnotincludeanydirectreductionstrategiesatstationaryormobilesources,outsideofthebroadprogramsoutlined.a. CARBfailstoactuallyprioritizeanydirectemissionreductions,pertherequirementsofAB

197.TheScopingPlandoesnotprovidetheprioritizationofmeasures.Itdoesnotidentifypotentialmeasuresbysectorandindustrythatcouldhelpensurethatthemostimpactedcommunitiesareprotected.Forexample,alargescaleemissionscutsimilartowhatCARBhadearlierproposedfortherefinerysector24shouldbeexploredforothersectorsthathaveadisproportionateimpactondisadvantagedcommunities,suchasthetransportationsector,orothersectorswhereGHGemissiontrendsshowincreases. b. TheAB197analysisdoesnotincludeallpotentialdirectemissionreductionmeasureswithin

eachprogram,orupdatepreviousanalysesformeasuresthatwereidentifiedpre-AB398.ThefiveprogramslistedintheScopingPlan’supdatedAB197analysisarebroadprograms,ratherthanspecificmeasuresasrequiredundertheAB197statute.25SeveralofthefiveprogramslistedintheScopingPlanareactuallycomprisedofmultiplecomplimentarypolicies,butnoneofthesearelistedoutorevaluated.PreviousiterationsoftheScopingPlanincludedafarlargerrangeofmeasures,suchasevaluatingthepotentialforreductionsfromavarietyofenergysectorprograms,includingdemandresponseandcombinedheatandpower.26TheScopingPlandoesnotevenprovideupdatesoranalysisforalltheemissionreductionmeasuresthatwereanalyzedbeforethepassageofAB398.27CARB’sanalysisalsofailstoincludespecificemissionreductionmeasuresthattheCaliforniaLegislaturehasenacted,suchaslegislationrelatedtoelectricityresourcesandtheirpotentialtoreduceairemissions.28c. CARBfailstoanalyzemeasuresspecificallylistedinAB398asauthorizedwaystoreduce

emissionsfromtheoilandrefinerysector.

Section38592.5providesthatnothinginAB398limitsCARB’sabilityto“adopt,maintainorrevise”emissionreductionmeasuresincluding:

(A)Measuresgoverningmethaneandfugitiveemissionsatrefineriesandoilandgasfacilities.

24CARB’searlierversionoftheScopingMemoproposeda20%directreductionofrefineryemissions.SeeScopingPlan,pg.43.25Cal.Health&SafetyCode§38562.526See,e.g.,CARBScopingPlanUpdate,pgs.43-45(2013),availableathttps://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/2013_update/first_update_climate_change_scoping_plan.pdf.27ScopingPlan,AppendixG,Section2.28See,e.g.,SB350(DeLeon,2015)(relatedtotheenergysystemincludingdistributedenergyandenergyplanning);AB797(Irwin,2017)(relatedtosolarthermalsystems);AB2868(Gatto,2016)(relatedtoenergystorage).

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(B)Advancedcleancarsprogramadoptedbythestateboard.(C)Low-CarbonFuelStandardregulations(Subarticle7(commencingwithSection95480)ofArticle4ofSubchapter10ofChapter1ofDivision3ofTitle17oftheCaliforniaCodeofRegulations).(D)Regulationsaddressingshort-livedclimatepollutants.

AfterthepassageofAB398,theScopingPlanfailstoevaluatethesemeasureswiththespecificityrequiredunderAB197.TheScopingPlanincludesnoanalysisonthedirectemissionreductionpotentialfortheadvancedcleancarprogramandmeasuresrelatedtomethaneandfugitiveemissionsatrefineriesandoilandgasfacilities,whichcouldpotentiallyachieveairqualityandGHGimprovementsindisadvantagedcommunities.AlthoughtheScopingPlandiscussesthelow-carbonfuelstandardandregulationsforshort-livedclimatepollutantsinrelationtoAB197,itsanalysisfailstoevaluatehowdifferentmeasuresunderthesebroadcategoriescouldimpactemissions.d. TheScopingPlan’sAB197analysisoftheemissionsreductionsassociatedwitheachofthe

fiveprogramsisopaqueandpotentiallyinaccurate.

TheScopingPlandoesnotprovidearobustanalysisfortheexpectedrangeofairpollutionfromemissionsreductionmeasuresandhowalternativecomplianceandincentivemechanismsarelikelytoimpactthisanalysis.RecentdatacallstheunderlyingassumptionsandvaluesfortheestimatesinTable5:RangesofEstimatedAirPollutionReductionsByPolicyOrMeasureIn2030intoquestion.Forexample,althoughAppendixGstatesthattheassumptionsrelatedtotheRenewablePortfolioStandard(RPS)wereupdatedafterthepassageofAB398,29arecentanalysisoftheRPSbytheCaliforniaPublicUtilitiesCommission(CPUC)showsthatharmfulairpollutionislikelytoincreaseintheenergysectoreveniftheRPSismet.AccordingtotheCPUC’sanalysis,theCPUC’sproposed2030scenarioshowsthattheelectricitysectorisprojectedtoincreaseharmfulairpollutionoffineparticulatematter(PM2.5)andnitrousoxides(NOx)emissionsintheState.30ThisincreaseofairpollutionispredictedtooccurdespitethefactthatthescenarioprojectsGHGsfromtheelectricalsectortodeclineto42MMTandmeettheRPSrequirement.31Consequently,theCPUC’sanalysisillustratesthattheRPSrequirementalonecouldincrease,ratherthandecrease,airpollutionfrompowerplantsincommunities.Table5notonlyincludespotentialdatainaccuracies,itassumesthatgreenhousegasemissionsandairpollutionarerelatedona1:1ratio.32Thisassumptionislikelytobewrongandunderestimateairpollution.Facilitiesoftencanemitmorepollutionwhenstarting,stopping,andoperatingatpartialloadthanduringsteady-stateoperation.Forexample,powerplantfacilitiesthatarespinningandoperatingatpartialloadgenerallyemitmorepollutantsper 29SeeScopingPlan,AppendixG,pg.13.30SeeCal.PublicUtilityCommission,R.16-02-007,September19,2017ALJRuling,AttachmentA,pp.86-87(summarizingtheStaff’sresults),availableathttp://cpuc.ca.gov/irp/proposedrsp/.31SeeCal.PublicUtilityCommission,R.16-02-007,September19,2017ALJRuling(describingtheproposedreferencecase).32ScopingPlan,pg.37.

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megawatthourthanunitsoperatingatfullcapacity.33Inadditiontoincreasedemissionsfromstartupsandshutdowns,naturalgasfacilitiesalsoemitmorewhenoperatingatpartialload;theCaliforniaIndependentSystemOperator’sSB350studiesestimatedthatNOxemissionincreases“maybearound30percent”ascomparedtosteadystateoperation.34Increasedemissionsfromstartup,shutdown,andpartialloadisnotconsideredinCARB’sassumptionofa1:1ratiobetweengreenhousegasandairpollution.ThesearejustafewexamplesthatcallintoquestionCARB’sassumptionsregardingthe1:1ratioofGHGsandco-pollutants.Asaresult,CARBlikelyunderestimatestheairpollutionthatcanbeattributedtothemeasuresdescribedintheScopingPlan.Indoingso,CARBfailstoprovideadequateanalysisorasetofactionitemstoensurethatitsproposedactivitiesarenotdisproportionatelyimpactingdisadvantagedcommunities.

III. TheScopingPlan’sanalysisoftheCapandTradeprogramisinsufficientanddoesnotdemonstratehowtheprogramwillachievetheoutlinedemissionreductions.

WhileCEJAhaslongexpressedconcernswiththecapandtradeprogramoverall,themarketdesignquestionsthatCARBmustnowgrapplewitharemoreimportantthanever.PreviousversionsoftheScopingPlanprojectedthecapandtradeprogramwillonlyneedtodrive28percentofthetotalemissionsreductionstoachieveourstatewide2030goal.InthecurrentScopingPlan,CARBprojectsthatcapandtradewillhavetoachieve43percentofthetotalreductionsneededtoachievethe2030target.Theincreased“work”thecapandtrademarketmustdoiscombinedwithnewprescriptionsontheprogramenactedwithinAB398,suchasanincreaseinIndustrialAssistanceFactorsandlimitationsonCARB’sregulatoryauthoritytomandatereductionsintheoilandgassectors.Allofthismeansincreasedpressureontheactualcapandtrademarketitself.TheScopingPlandoesnotprovideaclearanalysistoshowhowthecapandtrademarketwillachievetheadditionalreductions,hownewprescriptionsmayormaynotnecessitatechangesinmarketdesign,norwhatothermeasuresmightbeneededifthemarketcannotachievetheemissionsoutlined.Indeed,CARBfindsthatevenunderitsroughanalysis,thereductionsfromcap-and-tradecouldrangefrom76to144MMTCO2.35ThissignificantdifferentialisnotevaluatedoranalyzedeventhoughthisdifferentialwillimpactwhetherCaliforniacanmeetitsSB32requirements.Ratherthanconductadetailedanalysis,CARBsimplynotesthatinlate2017,CARBbeganaprocesstoevaluateprogramdesignfeaturesfor2020,andthatchangeswillbepartofafuturerulemakingthatwouldtakeeffectbyJanuary1,2021.36 33SeeCAISOSB350Studies,Volume9,pgs.98-101,availableathttps://www.caiso.com/Documents/SB350Study-Volume9EnvironmentalStudy.pdf.34CAISOSB350Studies,Volume9,pg.99,availableathttps://www.caiso.com/Documents/SB350Study-Volume9EnvironmentalStudy.pdf(citingNREL).35ScopingPlan,AppendixG,pg.27.36ScopingPlan,pg.27.

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ThemarketdesignquestionsareafundamentalpieceofwhetherCaliforniaactuallyachievesour2030emissiontargets.OurmainconcernisthatthecurrentcapandtradestructurecouldallowactualemissionstoexceedtheSB32targetsin2030,evenwhilethecapandtradeprogramismeetingitsgoalsnominally.Thisisprimarilybecauseoftheprevalenceofallowancesbankedorheldinreserve-ofwhichthereiscurrentlyamassiveoversupply–aswellastheuseofoffsets,andtheseissuesarenotadequatelyanalyzedintheScopingPlan.AnalysisbytheSenateEnvironmentalQualityCommitteehasraisedseriousquestionsaboutwhetherreductionswilloccurunderAB398’scapandtradeparadigm.TheSenateEnvironmentalQualityAnalysiscommitteestated:

Allowingforanoverrelianceonallowancesandoffsetsresultsindelaysoftrueemissionreductions.IfARBfocusesoncumulativereductionsintheScopingPlanandcap-and-tradedesignprocesses,oversupplyandbankingwillleadtodelaysincontrolmeasuresbeingadopted,ultimatelyresultinginstatewideemissionsbeingsubstantiallyabovethetargetin2030.37

WhetherCaliforniaactuallyachievesourGHGemissionreductionsisacriticalissueforEJcommunities.Ashasbeenwelldocumented,California’slargestsourcesofGHGemittersareindisadvantagedcommunities.Ifthesesourcesarenotreducingtheiractualemissionsbecauseofcapandtradedesignfeaturessuchasanoversupplyofallowances,allowancebanking,andoffsets,itdirectlyimpactsdisadvantagedcommunities.Inlimitingourprogresstomitigateclimatechange,italsoperpetuatesthedisproportionateexposuretoclimatechangeimpactsthatmanyvulnerablecommunitiesaresusceptibletoo.Unfortunately,neitherintheScopingPlannormaterialsprovidedatthefirstcapandtradeworkshop,hasCARBoutlinedanyplanstomodelactualemissiontrajectoriesbysector,usingvariousscenariostomodeloutthebestpathtoachievingtheSB32targets.Thisissueisofparticularconcerninlightofdataanalyzingemissiontrendsbysectorundercapandtrade.The2016Cushinget.alreporthighlightedpreliminaryfindingsthatshowedemissionincreasesincertainsectorsunderthecapandtradeprogram.38Therecentlyreleased2016capandtradecompliancedataalsoshowedsimilarpatterns:certainsectors,suchasrefineries,haveactuallyincreasedemissions.39Inaddition,themajorityofCalifornia’semissionreductionsthusfarhavecomefromtheelectricitysector,andthesereductionswillonlybecomehardertoachieveinthefuture,meaningthatcapandtradewillneedtodrivemorereductionsinothersectors.Furthermore,recentmodelingsuggeststhattheelectricitysector’spollutionispredictedtoincreaseasitreducesGHGsinsteadofdecrease,asoutlinedinsectionII(d)ofthisletter. 37July12,2017AB398,AnalysisfromtheSenateEnvironmentalQualityCommittee,availableathttps://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB398.38L.Cushing,et.al,APreliminaryEnvironmentalEquityAssessmentofCalifornia’s Cap-and-TradeProgram(2016).39https://calmatters.org/articles/californias-emissions-dip-climate-policies-get-less-credit-weather/?utm_source=CALmatters+Newsletter&utm_campaign=fdcb7a06db-RSS_WEELKY_SUB_EMAIL&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_faa7be558d-fdcb7a06db-150198313

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Inshort,whetherCaliforniaactuallyachievesourGHGreductiongoals,andwherethosereductionstakeplace,isacriticalenvironmentalandclimatejusticeissuethathasnotbeenfullyaddressedintheScopingPlan.Oneareaofparticularconcernistheissueofoverallocation.AB398requiresCARBtoevaluateoverallocationofallowances,providingthatCARBmust:“[e]valuateandaddressconcernsrelatedtooverallocationinthestateboard’sdeterminationofthenumberofavailableallowancesforyears2021to2030,inclusive,asappropriate.”40TheLegislativeAnalyst’sOfficehasconductedananalysisonthepotentialimpactsoftheoversupplyofallowancesinthecurrentmarket.InJune2017,inalettertoAssemblyMemberCGarcia,theLAOfoundthat“thecumulativeoversupplyofallowancesinCalifornia’scapandtradeprogramthrough2020couldrangefrom100millionto300millionallowances,withitmostlikelybeingroughlyinthemiddleofthatrange.”41Thiscouldendupbeingasignificantportionofourstate’spost-2020reductions.TheScopingPlandoesnotmakeanymentionofthissignificantmarketissue,despiteitsclearrelevancetoCalifornia’sabilitytomeetthe2030GHGreductiongoals.FailuretoactonoverallocationwouldhaveseriousimpactsontheabilityofCaliforniatomeetour2030goalsintermsofactualemissionreductions.

IV. TheScopingPlan’stransportationanalysislacksanycleargoalsortargets,despitebeingthelargestsourceofgreenhousegasemissions.

TransportationisthelargestsourceofGHGemissionsinCalifornia,equalingnearly40percentofallGHGemissionsstatewide.Airpollutionfromtailpipeemissionscontributestodiseaseandearlydeath,withdisproportionateimpactsonlowincomecommunitiesandcommunitiesofcolor.ReducingGHGemissionsfromthetransportationsectoriscriticaltoachievingCalifornia’soverallclimategoals.Forbothenvironmentaljusticecommunitiesandouroverallclimatechangegoals,itiscriticalthatCARBsupportandaccelerateprogressontransitioningtoazerocarbontransportationsystem,whileensuringvehiclemilestravelledareactuallyreduced.Unfortunately,thetransportationsectionoftheScopingPlanlacksclearandspecifictargetsforbothfreightandnon-freightvehicleemissions.CARBhasalreadyidentifiedtheneedfora25percentreductioninGHGemissionsby2035throughtheregionalSB375targets.TheScopingPlanmustcreatecommensurate,aggressivetransportationsectorrelatedgoalsforemissionreductions.Conclusion

40Cal.Health&SafetyCode§38562(c)(2)(D).41SeeJuly12,2017AB398Analysis,SenateEnvironmentalQualityCommittee(citingletter).

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CARB’sScopingPlanclearlyoutlinesthemanyalreadyexistingimpactsofclimatechange,theneedforCaliforniato“continuetotakestepstoreduceGHGemissionsinordertoavoidtheworstoftheprojectedimpactsofclimatechange,”42aswellasreachthe2050statewideGHGtarget(80percentbelow1990levels).43TheScopingPlanconsistentlyrecognizestheneedtodecarbonizeCaliforniatoachievethesegoals.Unfortunately,nowhereintheScopingPlandoesCARBoutlineeffortstoactivelyexploretheunderlyingneedtomakeamanagedandequitabletransitionofffossilfuels.Withoutengaginginaclearprocesstorealizetheclimatebenefitsofphasingoutoffossilfuelproductioninathoughtfulandcarefullymanagedway,wewillcontinuetofailourmostvulnerablecommunitiesandlimitourglobalclimateleadership.Finally,CEJAwouldliketoliftupandechotheimportantrolethattheEnvironmentalJusticeAdvisoryCommitteehasplayedoverthepastyear.WestronglysupportthepriorityrecommendationsthatEJACdevelopedinregardstothefinalScopingPlan,manyofwhicharerelatedtotheissuesoutlinedinthisletter.ItisourhopethatCARBwilltakeactionontherangeofissueswehaveoutlined,eitherthroughtheScopingPlanprocessorthroughadditionalactivities.WerecognizeandappreciatetheongoingattentiontoenvironmentaljusticeissuesatCARB,andareencouragedtohearthatCARBwillbeinitiatingapublicprocesstodevelop“anewstrategicplanforfurtherinstitutionalizingenvironmentaljusticeandsocialequity.”44WelookforwardtoworkingwiththeCARBstaffinachievingoursharedgoalsofenvironmentaljustice,improvedairquality,andmeetingourclimatechangegoals.Sincerely,

AmyVanderwarkerCEJASeniorPolicyStrategist

42ScopingPlan,pg.943ScopingPlanpg.1844ScopingPlan,pg.96