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A Financial Examination of Intercity Passenger Rail in the United States
UP256 Transportation Economics, Finance, and Policy
Spring 2015
Professor Wachs
Ryan Sclar
June 5, 2015
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Introduction
Passenger intercity railroad service has existed in the United States for nearly 200 years.
During this time, the country has undergone several technological, economical, and social
changes and the role of rail has adjusted as a result. The status of passenger service has been
greatly influenced by its financial successes and pitfalls, especially as these economic matters
become intertwined with politics. This study offers an examination of the financial history of
American intercity passenger rail service and analyzes its current state of affairs.
The Goals of Amtrak
Determining the appropriate objectives for America’s passenger rail system is the
subject of considerable debate. The National Railroad Passenger Rail Corporation, commonly
known as Amtrak, manages basically all intercity passenger rail service in the United States.
Some policy advocates believe Amtrak should be treated like a business, with the primary goal
of maximizing profits. Others argue that Amtrak is a public service, serving a vital public interest
and adding redundancy to the transportation system. Outspoken libertarian Randal O’Toole has
published several reports and articles through the CATO Institute, advocating for the
privatization of Amtrak and the end to government subsidies (O’Toole, 2008, 2012, and 2013).
According to his research, the per passenger subsidies are several times higher for railroads
than for air travel and roads (9 and 20 times higher respectively) and offer no advantages over
alternatives. Elliot Sclar, a notable opponent of privatizing Amtrak, argues that it is perfectly
acceptable for Amtrak to run at a financial loss, because of the indirect benefits it provides to
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the economy. Amtrak literature states that the railroad provides an annual economic benefit of
$12.2 billion, far surpassing their $1.3 billion federal subsidy. Amtrak also claims they more
than repay their subsidy through the 116,500 jobs they support, which contribute $1.6 billion in
taxes each year (Amtrak Budget and Business Plan, 2015). The derivation and validity of these
figures, however, is highly debated by O’Toole and other critics. There is little consensus on the
best philosophical aim of Amtrak.
In light of these debates, Amtrak balances two often contradictory objectives –
providing equitable service and providing efficient service (Puentes, Adie, and Joseph, 2013).
Amtrak’s officially states its goals as, “safety and security, customer focus, and financial
excellence” (Amtrak Annual Report, 2013; Amtrak Budget and Business Plan, 2015). Promises of
“customer focus” allude to attempts to make Amtrak more accessible to more people, and
“financial excellence” speaks to maximizing efficiency. Since accessibility and equity are far
more subjective than economic efficiency, this study mainly focuses on what characteristics
make Amtrak routes cost effective.
History of Intercity Railroad Finance in the United States
The Pre-Amtrak Era
Intercity railroads played a significant role in shaping American history. The introduction
of railroads in the early 19th century rapidly changed the transportation spectrum. Trains could
carry people in a fraction of the time and at 60% less cost than previous carriage trips (“Early
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American Railroads”). Spurred by
government lending and aggressive land
incentives, private American railroad
companies quickly expanded their
networks. In 1835 the country had 1,000
miles of track. By 1865 the national rail
system grew to over 30,000 track miles,
exploding to 100,000 before the end of
the century (Slotman, 2012). Tracks were
laid all over the east as well as the west, meeting in Promontory, Utah in 1869 to form the first
dependable transcontinental link across the country (Slotman, 2012). The treacherous and time
consuming voyages on covered wagon were replaced by relatively quick and reliable train rides.
Railroads provided more destinations with more accessibility, bolstering connections between
cities and dramatically opening up the American frontier (“Early American Railroads”). Towns
sprouted around stations in the countryside, and urban centers industrialized around railroad
lines. By the 1890’s rail travel accounted for 95% of all intercity passenger traffic (Morrison,
1990). Trains played a prominent role in the evolution of transportation and the empowerment
of the American physique.
With the proliferation of automobile and airplane travel in the early 20th century,
passenger rail struggled. Track miles of service peaked in 1916 with passenger miles peaking in
1920 (Puentes et. al, 2013). The 1920’s witnessed a dramatic decrease in ridership, with
passenger miles plunging to a third of their 1920 level by the end of the decade (Morisson,
Image 1: Railroad construction in the 1860’s Source: Alfred A. Hart, www.railroad.lindahall.org/
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1990). Railroad travel did dramatically increase during World War II; however the postwar
expansion of air infrastructure and the interstate road network brought rail ridership back to
all-time lows.
The private railroad companies, who were required by federal law to maintain
passenger service, often found it difficult to stay in business. In recognition of these fiscal
challenges, congress passed the Transportation Act of 1958, providing $500 million in loans to
railroads and loosening their passenger service requirements. As a result, most American
railroad companies shifted their resources to the more profitable freight industry, and steered
away from passenger service. In the 13 years following the Transportation Act of 1958, 75% of
all passenger train mileage in the United States disappeared (Puentes et. al, 2013).
The Creation of Amtrak
With private railroads struggling to finance passenger rail service, congress passed the
Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970. This act established the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (most commonly known as Amtrak) to operate the entire intercity passenger rail
network in the country (“Amtrak’s History”). Private railroads were no longer obligated to
provide any passenger services, but were required to give Amtrak priority over freight trains on
their tracks (Puentes et. al, 2013). This act led to essentially zero private passenger rail services,
as Amtrak took over the duties of roughly two dozen railroads (“Amtrak’s History”).
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The funding for Amtrak has been, since its inception, very political. Amtrak originally
planned routes based on their profitability and ridership, with a system centering on the
population centers
of the country
(Puentes et. al,
2013).
Congressional
approval, however,
required placating
the wishes of its
members. Since
members of
congress represented a broad geographic range, Amtrak was only politically feasible after the
addition and extension to several of the planned routes. On May 1, 1971 Amtrak began service
with 21 routes serving 43 states (“Amtrak’s History”).
The Amtrak Era
The political feasibility of creating Amtrak came at the expense of its economic
feasibility. Despite being established as a for-profit corporation, Amtrak never operated at a
profit (Amtrak Annual Report, 2013). In the years after its inception, many prominent
politicians, including President Ronald Regan, repeatedly proposed defunding the system
Image 2: Amtrak service map on first day of operation Source: National Association of Rail Road Passengers
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(Puentes et. al, 2013). After record financial losses and crumbling ridership in the 1990’s,
Congress passed the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act in 1997. This act required Amtrak to
be operationally self-sufficient within five years, and allowed for more discretion in rerouting
certain train lines. After the five-year period elapsed, the Amtrak Reform Council concluded,
“Amtrak is no closer to self-sufficiency today than it was in 1997.” While Amtrak did increase
ridership, it completely failed to meet the mandates outlined in the act. As a result, the council
proposed privatizing operations and dividing up Amtrak’s routes into different entities.
Although these suggestions represented a prudent economic decision, congress ignored the
recommendations for political reasons, stating it was against the intentions of the original Rail
Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Puentes et. al, 2013).
Congress again attempted to shore up Amtrak’s financial situation with the 2008
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA). This legislation gave states more
authority and responsibility in Amtrak, by calling for states to develop five year rail plans,
establish a central authority, and seek consultation from private authorities. PRIIA also raised
the amount of Amtrak funding supplied by the states and regional government entities. These
investments go directly into the local, short distance routes (less than 750 miles) which pass
through the state. Additionally, PRIIA established metrics and benchmarks that Amtrak is
required to meet, with the threat of withholding funds if not achieved. While divergent
opinions exist, PRIIA is generally viewed as a relative success by Amtrak policy makers (TRB1;
Puentes et. al, 2013). An extension of PRIIA was passed earlier this year by the US House of
1 Transportation Research Board
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Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, although its final approval is still
pending (TRB).
The Current State of Amtrak2
Intercity rail travel in the United States is presently a shell of its former self. Even
without adjusting for population growth, Amtrak carries less than a fifth of the passengers it did
during its peak in 1920 (Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013). Simply put, people rarely
travel by train in the United States. Each year, the average American flies 2,000 miles, travels on
interstates 3,000 miles, and rides Amtrak only 20 miles (O’Toole, 2012). In fact, the typical
American annually walks over 45 times farther than they travel by Amtrak (Parker-Pope, 2010).
A system which used to be run at a profit by private railroads now requires over one billion
dollars a year in government subsidies to stay afloat.
Despite intercity rail’s fall from grace, some believe current trends provide reasons for
optimism. By some measures, Amtrak is currently doing better than ever; however, other
indicators do not provide as much encouragement. Amtrak currently attracts 31.9 million
annual riders, a number which has steadily climbed for several years (Amtrak Comprehensive
Business Plan, 2013). In fact, Amtrak has posted ten ridership records in the past eleven years
(Amtrak Annual Report, 2013). Since 1997, these ridership increases have far surpassed
population growth (55.1% and 17.1% respectively) (Puentes et. al, 2013). Amtrak opponents,
however, point out that the numbers paint a much less cheerful picture if analyzed in a wider
2 All current facts and figure in this report are based on 2013 numbers, the latest year in which they are available.
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time frame. Ridership growth on Amtrak since 1991, for example, is only 8% (O’Toole, 2013).
Financially, Amtrak experienced their fifth consecutive year of revenue growth and their eighth
year of growth in the past nine (Amtrak Budget and Business Plan, 2015). Amtrak states that
they now cover 93% of operating costs. Opponents, however, criticize Amtrak’s
nonconventional definition of operating revenue, which include state funding as a “revenues”
and shifts routine maintenance to capital costs (O’Toole, 2013). Despite rising revenues and
recently cutting debt to less than half of 2004 levels, Amtrak fails to cover its total expenses and
currently requires a federal subsidy of $1.3 billion per year (Amtrak Annual Report, 2013).
Asymmetry and the Northeast Corridor
While system-wide statistics are informative, they must be considered with the
understanding that Amtrak’s ridership and revenue are incredibly asymmetrical. Amtrak
currently offers service in 46 states, with over 40 routes, but the majority of activity occurs on
just a small portion of this network (Puentes et. al, 2013). More than half of all ridership, 52%, is
carried on just four routes. These same four routes are also responsible for 30% of vehicle
100 Largest
Metropoli-tian Areas
64%
Other Regions
36%
Share of US Population
100 Largest
Metropoli-tian Areas
88%
Other Regions
12%
Share of Amtrak Ridership
Figure 1: Urban Bias in Amtrak Ridership Source: Puentes et. al, 2013
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revenue hours, 31% of vehicle revenue miles, and 57% of all total revenue (Appendix A)3.
Amtrak ridership is also disproportionately urban (Figure 1). Out of the 500 plus stations
serviced by Amtrak, the 77 located in the country’s 100 largest metropolitan areas account for
87.8% of total ridership. Furthermore, ten metropolitan areas account for almost two thirds of
all Amtrak passengers (Puentes et. al, 2013). As with many other public transit agencies, Amtrak
is imbalanced, with a few key routes accounting for the bulk of patronage and revenue.
When discussing Amtrak’s asymmetry, the North East Corridor (NEC) stands out above
all others as the most significant stretch of track in the national system. Spanning from Boston
to Washington DC via New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, the NEC links together the densest
and most
economically
productive mega-
region in the
country (Amtrak
Vision for NEC). The
NEC houses two
routes, the
Northeast Regional
and the limited stop express train, Acela. Between these two routes, the NEC carries
sustainably more passengers than any other line in the Amtrak system. The next busiest
3 These measurement metrics were chosen because they are commonly used by the National Transit Database to
analyze public transportation systems.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Northeast Corridor All Other Routes Combined
Rid
ers
hip
(M
illio
ns)
Amtrak Ridership
Figure 2: The Dominance of the NEC Source: Amtrak Annual Report, 2013
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corridor, connecting San Diego to Los Angeles and coastal Central California, carries less than
one forth the passengers of the NEC (Appendix A). People living in the northeast United States
take the train twice as much as the average American, and it is the only corridor in the country
where annual train passengers outnumber those who fly (although travel by automobile still
captures the bulk, 89%, of the market) (O’Toole, 2012). In the late 1990’s the NEC accounted for
over half of all Amtrak trips. While this proportion has since waned slightly, the NEC still
constitutes a substantial portion of national ridership (Figure 2).
The NEC is also unique within Amtrak for its ability to turn an operational profit. As
Figure 3 shows, only three Amtrak routes are able to operationally break even - the two NEC
routes, as well as the Carolinian, which operates a substantial portion of its service (32%) within
the NEC (Amtrak System Timetables). Not only do the Northeast Regional and Acela recoup
($100)
($50)
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$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
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ion
s)
Operating Profit (Black) or Subsidy (Red) per Route
Figure 3: Operating Profit or Subside per Route, Excluding State Support Source: Amtrak Annual Report, 2013
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their operational expenses, they are the only two lines which generate a substantial operational
surplus (combined $399 million). For perspective, this surplus is large enough to cover the
operational deficits of 27 other routes, and it almost doubles the revenue supplied to Amtrak
by every state combined ($125 million) (Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013). The NEC
is Amtrak’s proverbial 800 pound gorilla.
Capital Financing
Just as Amtrak’s ridership is skewed asymmetrically, so are its current and proposed
capital expenditures. The NEC has historically always received more money for rail
improvements than any other line. In 1965, six years before Amtrak ran its first train, congress
passed the High-Speed Ground Transportation Act, funding and advancing rail technology for
NEC passenger trains. This funding led to the introduction of the Metroliner, one of the fastest
and most sophisticated trains in the world at that time (“Amtrak’s History”). After decades of
incremental track improvement projects, the Acela express train was introduced in 2000
(Amtrak Budget and Business Plan, 2105). Currently, Amtrak is partnering with local
government agencies on a NEC Five-Year Capital Plan. This plan calls for incremental increases
in capital expenditure (reaching $4 billion by the 2020 fiscal year) to rebuild ageing tunnels and
bridges, and renovate several stations (Jaffe, 2015). Longer term plans envision upgrading Acela
to a next generation high speed rail, capable of operating at 220 miles per hour (Amtrak Vision
for NEC). There are many skeptics to this proposal; however, Amtrak insists that the density of
riders in the NEC will allow this upgrade to fully cover operational and capital costs and produce
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an operational surplus of $1.7 billion by 2040 (in 2011 dollars) - more than the entire existing
annual Amtrak subsidy. While few of these capital proposals are currently fully funded, the
historical precedence and the fact that over half of all Amtrak federal improvement funds go to
the NEC demonstrate the asymmetry in Amtrak’s capital funding.
Amtrak routes outside of the NEC have historically not received much capital spending,
but this may be changing. While the NEC is proposing the use of next generation high speed rail
cars, the most typical car currently in Amtrak’s non-NEC fleet was introduced more than 40
years ago, in 1974 (Amtrak Fleet Strategy). The NEC receives 52% of all capital funding, while
the most funded non-NEC route receives less than 4% (Amtrak Budget and Business Plan,
2015). Routes outside of the NEC clearly receive less capital support; however, this dynamic
may be shifting. Currently 8% of the current fleet of train cars is set to be replaced by the end of
the fiscal year (Amtrak Fleet Strategy). PRIIA 2008, and the pending PRIIA 2015, are geared
towards increasing the influence of states on their local Amtrak routes. While state money goes
mostly into covering operation costs, the PRIIA mandated state rail plans provide the
opportunity for local governments to think more critically about strategic rail improvement
projects they may want to support on their regional Amtrak routes (Puentes et. al, 2013).
Additionally, a lot of state interest was sparked by the 2009 American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act. While this act focused its $8 billion specifically towards high speed rail, many
of the projects received money for general rail infrastructure improvements, which benefit
existing Amtrak services. The future for major Amtrak capital projects outside of the NEC is yet
to be determined.
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Amtrak and Freight
The NEC is also unique because of its track ownership. In the early 1970’s, around the
inception of Amtrak, the federal government bought out struggling Penn Central
Transportation, a private railroad operating along the NEC. In its place, congress created a for-
profit freight entity, the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) (Puentes et. al, 2013). As part
of this deal, the federal government gained ownership to most of the tracks between Boston
and Washington. Although Conrail was eventually privatized, Amtrak continues to own the
tracks in the NEC. Besides from a 90 mile stretch of track near Chicago, the NEC corridor is the
only area Amtrak runs where it owns the majority of the right-of-way (Krier, 2014). Despite a
1973 law requiring freight trains on any track throughout the country to give Amtrak trains
priority, this law is subject to lackluster compliance. Krier (2014) found that, “individual freight
railroads had important effects on Amtrak delays” (p. 173). Since Amtrak owns the tracks on
the NEC, Acela and the Northeast Regional are able to avoid schedule conflicts with freight
trains. Trains on the NEC feature an on-time performance rate of 80%, while other Amtrak
trains are often on-time for less than 55% of their routes. The Sunset Limited, for example,
averages a 58 minute delay per train (Lowell and Seamonds, 2013).
The Role of Distance
In general, shorter routes attract more riders than longer routes. Figure 4 displays the
relationship between the distance traveled by the average rider on each route, and ridership
levels. The data suggest that shorter distance routes correlate with higher levels of ridership.
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This relationship is significant, with a relatively high R2 value of 0.57.4 In fact, the factors of
distance and ridership relate with a greater R2 value than any of the other variables analyzed in
this study. The ten busiest routes all feature average rider distances of less than 200 miles.
Additionally, routes with total end-to-end distances less than 400 miles account for 82.9% of
system ridership (Puentes et. al, 2013). Analysis of these routes using different measurements
of ridership and distance (such as trips per revenue hour and total route distance) also
corroborate these findings (Appendix B). It is clear that, on average, ridership levels are higher
on shorter routes and lower on longer routes.
4 R
2 levels are based on an analysis of linear, exponential, logarithmic, and power function trendlines to determine
the function of best fit.
Figure 4: Average Rider Distance vs Riders per Mile Source: Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013
R² = 0.57
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Un
linke
d P
asse
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ips
pe
r V
eh
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Re
ven
ue
Mile
Average Rider Distance (Miles)
Average Rider Distance vs Riders per Mile
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Not only do shorter Amtrak routes have more riders than long routes, they are also
increasing their share of new riders faster. Since Amtrak’s turbulence in the mid 1990’s, the gap
between ridership levels of short routes and long routes has widened. Out of Amtrak’s 55.1%
increase in ridership since 1997 (the year of the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act), 90.3%
is attributed to routes of less than 400 miles (Puentes et. al, 2013). Short routes are
accountable for almost all of the recent ridership growth in the system. This trend may be
partially explained by the dramatic decline in short and medium distance airline ridership in the
country since the 1990’s (Schwieterman et. al, 2014). In general, public intercity ground
transportation (trains as well as buses) has seen a noticeable uptick in recent years for short
routes, due to their savings over airfare. These savings, however, dramatically diminish for trips
over 250 miles, perhaps explaining the relative flatlining of ridership on the long distance lines.
The relationship between route distance and cost effectiveness is not absolutely clear.
Shorter routes
do tend to have
slightly higher
farebox
recovery ratios;
however this
association is
weak, with a
statically
R² = 0.04
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Fare
bo
x R
eco
very
Rat
io
Avererage Rider Distance
Average Rider Distance vs Cost Effectiveness
Figure 5: Average Rider Distance vs Cost Effectiveness Source: Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013
16
negligible R2 value (Figure 5). Nevertheless, most of the cost effective routes are the shortest
routes. Four out of the top five financially efficient routes carry passengers less than 200 miles,
as do seven of the top ten. For the shortest of trips there may be a small connection between
distance and economic efficiency, but this trend does not continue consistently throughout the
Amtrak network.
Shorter routes do present a noticeable cost advantage to Amtrak when one considers
state subsidies. Long distance routes (defined by Amtrak as over 750 miles) do not receive any
direct state support, but 20 out of the 26 short routes are subsidized by states. This nonfederal
aid ranges from $200,000 on the Northeast Regional, to $32.8 million on the San Joaquins.
These contributions are defined as revenue streams by Amtrak, and can constitute anywhere
from 0.03% to 69.09% of total revenue for a route. This can make a significant impact; there are
R² = 0.34
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Fare
bo
x R
eco
very
Rat
io
Avererage Rider Distance
Average Rider Distance vs Cost Effectiveness (Including State Funding)
Figure 6: Average Rider Distance vs Cost Effectiveness (Including State Funding) Source: Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013
17
five routes which receive more state revenue than actual ticket revenue. Figure 6 shows the
cost effectiveness of routes when these state subsidies are factored in to the farebox recovery
ratio. Route distances are over eight times more correlated with cost effectiveness under this
model than they were with Figure 5. Shorter routes are more financially successful from
Amtrak’s perspective, but the intrinsic ability for short routes to operate efficiently is
debatable.
Amtrak’s Two Divisions
Amtrak essentially runs two different services. Almost everyone agrees with this reality,
on both sides of the aisle, from O’Toole to Sclar. On one hand, there are the short routes, which
tend to capture the most riders, offer the most frequent service, and (to a greater or lesser
extent) operate the most economically. The second type of train service are the long hauls,
characterized by significantly less ridership, more subsidies, almost no local government
support, worse on-time performances, and low frequencies. These two groups are defined by
Amtrak as routes under and over 750 miles. Puentes et al. (2013) argues this division should be
closer to 400 miles, O’Toole believes the division is essentially the NEC versus everything else,
but one way or another, most policy advocates view Amtrak as providing two categories of
service.
Annual Ridership Operating Profit or Subsidies (Millions $)
Short Distance Trains
25,732,158 263.5
Long Distance Trains
4,789,684 (597)
Table 1: Short v Long Distance Trains Source: Amtrak Budget and Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013
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The importance of this second category, the long distance routes, raises the most
controversy. The data are clear that these routes attract the least amount of ridership and
account for a larger portion of the operating deficit. Sclar, and other advocates of Amtrak as a
public service, argue that these long routes are worthwhile because they make the system
more equitable. The task of defining equity is deserved of its own comprehensive study, and
exists outside the scope of this report. With this in mind, the amount of people within close
proximity to
stations is
often used as
a proxy for
equity (Sclar,
2003; NARP5).
Figure 7
shows that
distance
correlates
positively with
the amount of
people in a 25-mile service catchment area6. That being said, the five routes serving the highest
populations all travel less than 1500 miles, which is less than the long distance route average
5 National Association of Railroad Passengers
6 25 miles is commonly used by the National Association of Railroad Passengers in determining the appropriate
service catchment area.
R² = 0.44
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
Po
pu
lati
on
of
Serv
ice
wit
hin
25
Mile
s (M
illio
ns)
Route Distance
Route Distance vs Population in Service Area
Figure 7: Route Distance vs Population in Service Area Source: Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013
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(Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013). Critics also argue that intercity bus systems serve
larger coverage areas than Amtrak, and buses provide faster, more frequent, more convenient
service than Amtrak’s long routes (Lowell and Seamonds, 2013). There are roughly 500 Amtrak
station, compared to approximately 3800 stops served by Greyhound, America’s primary
intercity bus operator. Despite arguments over the utility of long distance Amtrak routes, these
lines are unlikely to be abandoned; congress has consistently rejected eliminating these trains
and the 1970 Passenger Service Act specifically requires long distance routes, spanning from
coast to coast and connecting north and south. Long distance Amtrak trains are likely to remain
in service due to the nature of congressional politics.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that intercity passenger trains used to play a crucial role in American
society. It is equally clear that trains now take a subservient position in the movement of
people in the United States. Amtrak’s current existence is the result of congressional political
will – the idea that the United States must have a national train system, even if operates at a
loss and does not generate substantial ridership. Given the political status-quo, it seems
unlikely that the federal government will abandon Amtrak anytime in the near future.
Nevertheless, officials should fully understand the asymmetrical characteristics of Amtrak if
they desire to make American trains more competitive with other modes of transportation.
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<http://history.amtrak.com/>. "Early American Railroads." Ushistory.org. Independence Hall Association of Philadelphia. Web.
25 May 2015. <http://www.ushistory.org/us/25b.asp>. "Intercity Rail Passenger Systems Update." Current Research and Development in Intercity Rail
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21
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22
Appendix A: Amtrak Data Chart Source: Amtrak Budget and Business Plan, 2013; NARP; Puentes et. al, 2013; Amtrak System Timetable
23
Appendix A (Continued): Amtrak Data Chart
24
Appendix A (Continued): Amtrak Data Chart
25
Appendix A (Continued): Amtrak Data Chart
26
Appendix B: Auxiliary Figures Source: Amtrak Budget and Business Plan, 2013; NARP; Puentes et. al, 2013; Amtrak System Timetable
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Four Busiest Routes All Other Routes Combined
Rid
ers
hip
(M
illio
ns)
Amtrak Ridership
0
5
10
15
20
25
Ten Busiest Routes All Other Routes Combined
Rid
ers
hip
(M
illio
ns)
Amtrak Ridership
27
Appendix B (Continued): Auxiliary Figures
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
An
nu
al R
ide
rsh
ip (
Mill
ion
s)
Average Speed (MPH)
Train Speed vs Ridership
0
50
100
150
200
250
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000Un
linke
d P
asse
nge
r Tr
ips
pe
r V
eh
icle
Re
ven
ue
Ho
ur
Route Distance (Miles)
Distance vs Riders per Hour
28
Appendix B (Continued): Auxiliary Figures
0
50
100
150
200
250
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Un
linke
d P
asse
nge
r Tr
ips
pe
r V
eh
icle
Re
ven
ue
Ho
ur
Average Rider Distance (Miles)
Average Rider Distance vs Riders per Hour
0
50
100
150
200
250
0 10 20 30 40 50
Un
linke
d P
asse
nge
r Tr
ips
pe
r V
eh
icle
Re
ven
ue
Ho
ur
Average Rider Population of Service within 25 Miles (Millons)
Population in Service Area vs Riders per Hour
29
Appendix B (Continued): Auxiliary Figures
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
0 10 20 30 40 50
Un
linke
d P
asse
nge
r Tr
ips
pe
r V
eh
icle
Re
ven
ue
Mile
Average Rider Population of Service within 25 Miles (Millons)
Population in Service Area vs Riders per Mile
0
50
100
150
200
250
35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70Un
linke
d P
asse
nge
r Tr
ips
pe
r V
eh
icle
Re
ven
ue
Ho
ur
Average Train Speed
Train Speed vs Riders per Hour
30
Appendix B (Continued): Auxiliary Figures
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Un
linke
d P
asse
nge
r Tr
ips
pe
r V
eh
icle
Re
ven
ue
Mile
Average Train Speed
Train Speed vs Riders per Mile
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
0 10 20 30 40 50
Fare
bo
x R
eco
very
Rat
io
Population of Service within 25 Miles (Millions)
Population in Service Area vs Cost Effectiveness
31
Appendix B (Continued): Auxiliary Figures
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Fare
bo
x R
eco
very
Rat
io
Average Train Speed (MPH)
Average Speed vs Cost Effectiveness
($100)
($50)
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
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Car
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ited
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ilder
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ifo
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Ze
ph
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An
nu
al O
pe
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on
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rofi
t/Su
bsi
dy
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ion
s)
Operating Profit (Black) or Subsidy (Red) per Route Including State Subsidies