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U.S . DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
REPORT OF THE RUBY RIDGE TASK FORCE
TO THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS
OF IMPROPER GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT IN THE INVESTIGATION,
APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF
RANDALL C. WEAVER AND KEVIN L. HARRIS
JUNE 10, 1994
REPORT
This document contains sensitive and
confidential material, including
information protected by Fed. R. Crim.
P. 6(e), and should be handled
accordingly.
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I. EXECUTIVESUMMARY
A. Overview
InFebruary1993,theOfficeofProfessionalResponsibility
("OPR")of theU.S.DepartmentofJustice(the"Department")was
informed
of
allegationsmade
by
defensecounsel
for
Randall
("Randy")WeaverandKevinHarrisin thecriminalcaseofUnited
Statesv.Weaverwhichwaspendingin thefederaldistrictcourt
inIdaho. Defensecounselallegedthatemployeesofseveral
componentsof theDepartmenthadengagedincriminaland
professionalmisconductduringtheinvestigation,apprehension
andprosecutionofRandyWeaverandKevinHarris. TheDepartment
decidedtodeferactiononthismatteruntilthecriminaltrial
wascompleted.
InJuly1993,ajuryacquittedWeaverandHarrisofcharges
stemmingfromthemurderof afederalofficer. Followingthe
acquittal,numerousadditionalallegationswereraised
by
defense
counsel
and
othersourcesagainst
the
Bureau
of
Alcohol,Tobacco
andFirearms ("BATF"),theU.S.MarshalsService("Marshals
Service"),
theFederalBureauofInvestigation("FBI" or
"Bureau")and theU.S.Attorney'sOfficefor theDistrictof
Idaho ("USAO"). Includedamongtheseallegationswereclaims
thatDepartmentemployees hadunlawfullycausedthedeathsof
SammyandVickiWeaver,hadtakenactionsthathadobstructed
justice,hadcommittedperjuryand hadengagedinothercriminal
andethicalmisconduct. InlateJuly1993,attorneysfromOPR
andtheCriminalDivisionof theDepartment,assistedby
inspectorsfromtheFBI,begananinvestigationofthese
allegations.
Thisreportdetails
the
results
of
thisinvestigation
and
traceschronologicallytheeventsthatoccurredin theWeaver
matter. Theearlysectionsof thereportfocusonWeaver'ssale
ofillegalfirearms
to aBATFinformant,BATF'sunsuccessful
attempttoenlistWeaveras aninformant,thesubsequent
governmentaldelayinseekinganindictmenton thefirearms
violations,andWeaver'sarrestonweaponschargesfollowedby
hissubsequentfailuretoappearfortrialonthosecharges.
Anotherareaofinvestigativeinquiryfocuseson theeffortsof
theMarshalsServicetoapprehendWeaver. Theseefforts
culminatedin theAugust21,1992 gunbattleatRubyRidgewhich
tookthelivesofDeputyMarshalWilliamDeganandWeaver'sson,
SammyWeaver. Next,thereportcontainsadiscussionof the
involvement
of the FBI in the
Weavermatter,including
its
initialintervention
in the
crisis,
its
responsibility
for the
deathofVickiWeaverandwoundingofKevinHarrisonAugust22,
1992,itshandlingof thecrisisincludingitsattemptsto end
theweek-longstandoff,itshandlingof thecrimescenesearches
anditssubsequentactivitiesinassistingtheUSAOinpreparing
theWeavercasefortrial. Finally,thelastsectionsof the
reportaddressthehandlingby theUSAOand theinvestigative
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agenciesoftheprosecutionofWeaverandHarrisincluding
representationsmadebytheU.S.Attorneytothecourtpriorto
thebeginningofHarris'preliminaryhearing,theconductofthe
AssistantU.S.Attorneybeforethegrandjuryandtheuntimely
disclosureofcriticalinformationtothedefense.
Wefoundthatmanyoftheallegationsofmisconductwerenot
supportedbytheevidence. However,wedidfindmeritinsomeof
themoreseriouscharges. Asaresult,wehaveaskedthatthe
appropriatecomponentoftheDepartmentexamineforprosecutive
merittheconductoftheFBIsniper/observerwhofiredtheshots
onAugust22,1992. Inaddition,becauseourinvestigation
indicatedthatAssistantU.S.AttorneyRonaldHowentookcertain
questionableactionsduringtheinvestigationandprosecutionof
theWeavercase,wehaverecommendedthattheExecutiveOffice
forUnitedStatesAttorneysexamineouranalysisofhisconduct
andtakewhateveradministrativeactionitdeemsappropriate.
Finally,wehaveformulatedaseriesofrecommendationsthat
addresstheproblemsthatwereviewedoruncoveredduringour
investigation.
B.SignificantFindings
InOctober1989,RandyWeaversoldillegalweaponstoaBATF
informant. WhenBATFagentslaterattemptedtoenlistWeaveras
aninformantintheirinvestigationoftheAryanNations,Weaver
refusedtocooperate. Sevenmonthslater,thegovernment
indictedWeaverfortheillegalweaponssales. Wehavefoundno
evidencetosupporttheclaimthatBATFtargetedWeaverbecause
ofhisreligiousorpoliticalbeliefs. Similarly,wefound
insufficientevidencetosustainthechargethatWeaverwas
illegallyentrappedintosellingtheweapons.
WhenWeaverwasarraignedontheweaponschargesinJanuary
1991,
hewastoldthathistrialwouldcommenceonFebruary19,
1991.
Twoweekslater,thecourtclerknotifiedthepartiesthat
thetrialdatehadbeenchangedtoFebruary20,1991. Shortly
thereafter,theU.S.ProbationOfficesentWeaveraletterwhich
incorrectlyreferencedhistrialdateasMarch20,1991. After
WeaverfailedtoappearfortrialonFebruary20,thecourt
issuedabenchwarrantforhisarrest. Threeweekslater,on
March14,afederalgrandjuryindictedWeaverforhisfailureto
appearfortrial. Wefoundthat:thegovernment,especiallythe
USAO,
wasunnecessarilyrigidinitsapproachtotheissues
createdbytheerroneousletter;thattheUSAOimprovidently
soughtanindictmentbeforeMarch20,1991;andthattheUSAO
erredinfailingtoinformthegrandjuryoftheerroneous
letter.
FromFebruary1991throughAugust1992,theMarshalsService
wasinvolvedineffortstoapprehendWeavertostandtrialfor
theweaponschargesandforhisfailuretoappearfortrial.
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TheseeffortsincludedgatheringinformationaboutWeaverand
developingaplantoarresthim. Basedoninformationthatit
collected,theMarshalsServicelearnedthatformanyyears
Weaverhadmadestatementsabouthisintenttoviolentlyconfront
federallawenforcementofficials. Asaresult,theMarshals
ServiceconcludedthatWeaverintendedtoresistviolently
governmentalattemptstoarresthim. Thereafter,theMarshals
Serviceinvestigatedandcarefullyconsideredalternativesthat
wouldenableittoarrestWeaverwithoutendangeringhisfamily
orlawenforcementpersonnel. Itconcludedthatanundercover
operationwouldbethemostprudentwaytoproceed.
InAugust1992,sixmarshalstravelledtoanareain
northernIdahoknownasRubyRidgetoconductsurveillanceofthe
Weaverresidence
in
preparationfortheundercoveroperation.
Duringthesurveillancemission,theWeaverdogdiscoveredthe
marshalsandbegantobark. Themarshalsretreatedwiththedog,
Harris,
RandyWeaverandhisson,SammyWeaver,andotherfamily
membersinpursuit. Atanareaknownasthe"Y,"agunbattle
occurredinwhichDeputyMarshalDeganandSammyWeaverwere
killed.
Weconcludethatthemarshalstookameasuredapproachin
developingaplantoapprehendWeaver. Throughoutthe18month
periodthatthemarshalswereresponsibleforapprehending
Weaver,theycarefullydevisedaplanintendedtoposetheleast
amountofrisktoWeaver,hisfamilyandthemarshals. Atno
timedidwefindthatitwastheintentofthemarshalstoforce
aconfrontationwithWeaverorhisfamily. Althoughsomemay
questiontheexpendituresofmanpowerandresourcesbythe
MarshalsServiceduringthis18monthperiod,webelievethat
institutionalpressurecreatedbytheexistenceofabench
warrantandanindictment,lefttheMarshalsServicewithlittle
choicebuttoproceedasitdid. Moreover,theUSAOdidlittle
toassisttheMarshalsServiceinthismatter. Indeed,during
thefirstpartofthisprocesstheUSAOthwartedtheeffortsof
theDirectoroftheMarshalsServicetofocusthecourtonthe
dangerinvolvedinmakingthearrestandincorrectlyterminated
effortsbytheMarshalsServicetonegotiatewithWeaverthrough
intermediaries.
Withregardtotheresponsibilityforthedeathsthat
occurredattheY,themarshalsassertthatHarrisinitiatedthe
firefightwhenheshotDeputyMarshalDeganwhileWeaverand
Harrisclaimthatthemarshalsfiredthefirstshots. Aftera
thoroughreviewofalloftheevidencemadeavailabletous,we
havebeenunabletodetermineconclusivelywhofiredthefirst
shotduringtheexchangeofgunfire. Althoughthereisevidence
thatoneofthemarshalsshotSammyWeaverduringtheexchangeof
gunfire,
wefoundnoproofthattheshootingoftheboywas
anythingotherthananaccident. Infact,theevidenceindicates
thatthemarshalsdidnotknowthatSammyWeaverhadbeenkilled
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orwoundeduntilhisbodywasdiscoveredbytheFBIinashed
outsidetheWeavercabintwodayslater. Nordidwediscoverany
evidenceindicatingthatthemarshalsattemptedtocoveruptheir
rolesintheincidentorthattheyexaggeratedtheeventsto
causeamoredrasticFBIresponsethanwasappropriate.
SoonafterlearningoftheAugust21incidentatRubyRidge,
theFBIofficialsinWashington,D.C.evaluatedtheinformation
madeavailabletothemanddecidedtodeployitsHostageRescue
Team("HRT")toIdahotodealwiththecrisis. HRTmembers
assumedtheirpositionsaroundtheWeavercompoundlateinthe
afternoonofAugust22,1992butbeforedoingsotheywere
instructedthattheirconductwastobegovernedbyspecially
formulatedRulesofEngagement("Rules"). TheseRulesinstructed
theHRTsnipersthatbeforeasurrenderannouncementwasmade
theycouldandshouldshootallarmedadultmalesappearing
outsidethecabin. OperatingundertheseRulesonAugust22,an
FBIsniper/observerfiredtwoshotsinquicksuccession. The
firstshotwasatanarmedadultmalewhomhebelievedwasabout
tofireataHRThelicopteronanobservationmission. Thefirst
shotwoundedRandyWeaverwhileinfrontofabuildingatthe
Weavercompoundknownasthebirthingshed. Thesecondshotwas
firedatHarriswhileHarriswasretreatingintotheWeaver
cabin.
ThesecondshotseriouslywoundedHarrisandkilledVicki
Weaverwhowasbehindthecabindoor.
FollowingthisshootingincidentFBIofficialsspentthe
nexteightdaysattemptingtoconvinceWeaverandHarristo
surrendertofederalauthorities. Finally,duelargelytothe
effortsofnongovernmentalnegotiators,HarrisandWeaver
surrenderedonAugust30andAugust31respectively. Thereafter,
theFBIcompleteditssearchesofthecabinandsurrounding
areas.
Duringthefollowingmonth,theFBIalsoconductedan
internalreviewoftheshootingincidenttodetermineifthe
sniperhadrespondedappropriately.
Ourreviewfoundnumerousproblemswiththeconductofthe
FBIatRubyRidge. Althoughweconcludedthatthedecisionto
deploytheHRTtoRubyRidgewasappropriateandconsistentwith
Departmentpolicy,wedonotbelievethattheFBI'sinitial
attemptsatintelligencegatheringatthesceneweresufficiently
thorough. Wealsofoundseriousproblemswiththetermsofthe
RulesofEngagementinforceatRubyRidge. Certainportionsof
theseRulesnotonlydepartedfromtheFBI'sstandarddeadly
forcepolicybutalsocontravenedtheConstitutionoftheUnited
States.
Inaddition,wefoundtheseRulestobeimpreciseand
believethattheymayhavecreatedanatmospherethatencouraged
theuseofdeadlyforcetherebyhavingtheeffectofcontributing
toanunintentionaldeath.
WithregardtothetwoshotsfiredonAugust22,we
concludedthatthefirstshotmetthestandardof"objective
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reasonableness"theConstitutionrequiresforthelegaluseof
deadlyforcebutthatthesecondshotdidnotsatisfythat
standard. Itisourconclusionthatthesniper/observerwhotook
thesecondshotintendedtoshootKevinHarrisbutaccidently
killedVickiWeaverwhomhedidnotseebehindthecurtained
door.
WealsofoundtheinternalFBIreviewoftheshooting
incidentwasnotsufficientlythoroughandreachedincorrect
conclusionsaboutthesecondshot.
Ourexaminationofthecommandandcontrolofthecrisisby
theFBI,foundnumerousshortcomings. Theseshortcomings
includedinitialinadequaciesinutilizingnegotiatingpersonnel,
communicatingwithFBIHeadquarters,documentingdecisionsand
securingthesite.
Duringandafterthecrisis,thecrimescenesweresearched
bymanylawenforcementofficialsunderthedirectsupervisionof
theFBI. WefoundtheFBI'shandlingofthecrimescenesearches
tobeinadequateincludingitsfailuretousebasiccrimescene
techniquesincollectingevidence. Furthermore,thegeneral
disorganizationandinexperienceofsomeoftheparticipants
coupledwithinaccuraciesinthesearchesadverselyaffectedthe
prosecutionandcontributedtothenegativeimpressionofthe
governmentgeneratedduringthetrial. Wefoundnoevidencethat
thesedeficiencieswereintentionalorthattheFBIstaged
evidencefortheprosecution'sbenefit.
Shortlyaftertheirarrest,separatepreliminaryhearings
wereheldforWeaverandHarris. Whilearguingthegovernment's
motionrequestingacontinuanceoftheHarrispreliminary
hearing,U.S.AttorneyEllsworthmadestatementsindicatingthat
thegovernmentwouldallowHarristohaveacompletepreliminary
hearinginreturnforconsentingtothecontinuance. Thereafter,
Harrisconsentedtothecontinuancewiththeunderstandingthat
hewouldhaveafullpreliminaryhearing. Anindictmentwas
returnedagainstHarriswhilehispreliminaryhearingwasin
progress. WehavefoundthattheU.S.Attorneydidnot
intentionallymisrepresentthegovernment'spositionbutthathe
failedtoappreciatetheimpactofhisstatementsandthathe
neglectedtopaysufficientattentiontotheinformationthathe
receivedconcerningtheprobablelengthofthepreliminary
hearing.
AfterthefirstindictmentswerereturnedagainstWeaverand
Harris,theAssistantU.S.Attorneycontinuedtopresentevidence
tothegrandjurywhichledtothereturnoftwosuperseding
indictments,
eachcontainingaconspiracycount. Wefoundthese
conspiracycountstobeoverlybroadandtocontainsomeovert
actsforwhichtherewasinsufficientevidence. Withregardto
theconductoftheAssistantU.S.Attorneybeforethegrandjury,
wefoundthatheactedimproperlyinanumberofinstances. On
certainoccasions,hemadeimpropercommentstothegrandjury
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thatborderedonunsworntestimonyandintroducedevidenceof
violentactsofracistgroupsthatwasatbestonlytangentially
relevanttothechargestobepresentedtothrgrandjuryagainst
Weaver. Finally,whenquestionedbythegrandjuryconcerning
itsjurisdictiontoinvestigatethedeathofVickiWeaver,the
AssistantU.S.Attorneymistakenlyadvisedthemthatthematter
wasnotwithintheirjurisdiction. Wefoundthathelaterfailed
tocorrectthiserror.
LatertheUSAOdecidedtoseekthedeathpenalty agsinst
WeaverandHarriseventhoughtheapplicablefederalappellate
courthadheldthattheoffensechargedcouldnot
constitutionallysupporttheimpositionofadeathsentence. We
haveconcludedthatthedecisiontoseekthedeathpenalty,
althoughmadeingoodfaith,gavetheappearancethatthe
governmentwasoverreaching.
FromthemomentthattheUSAObegantopreparethecasefor
trial,
itmetwithresistancefromtheFBI. Thisresistancetook
manyforms,allofwhichservedtomakepreparationofthecase
moredifficult. TheFBIcontinuouslyopposedactionsthe
prosecutorsrequestedtopreparethecasefortrial,rangingfrom
havingthecaseagentsconductout-ofstateinterviewsto
enlistingagentsfromotheragenciestohelppreparethecase.
TheFBI,whichwantedtobetheonlyagencyor,ataminimum,the
leadagencyonthecase,resistedworkingasacoequalmemberof
theprosecutionteam. Furthermore,whentheUSAOsoughtadvice
andassistancefromtheFBILaboratorytheymetwithunjustified
delaysandresistancethatcreateddiscordwithintheteamand
disruptedtrialpreparation. Theseproblemscontributedtothe
USAO'sdecisiontoretainprivateforensicexperts.
Inaddition,theFBIunjustifiablydelayedproducing
materialstotheUSAOthatwereneededfortrialpreparationand
thatwereclearlydiscoverableunderfederallawandthe
discoverystipulationsignedbytheparties. Thisaction
unreasonablydelayedtheavailabilityofthesematerialsfor
trialpreparationandfordiscovery. Particularlyatthe
headquarterslevel,wefoundthattheFBI'seffortstolocateand
producediscoverabledocumentstobedisorganizedandincomplete.
Thelateproductionduringtrialofmaterialassociatedwiththe
FBIShootingIncidentReportnegativelyaffectedthecourt'sand
thejury'sperceptionofthegovernmentandthegovernment's
case. Inaddition,thedelaysindiscoverycausedbythe
disorganizationofandmistakescommittedbytheFBILaboratory
contributedtothedelayofthetrialandtotheperceptionthat
thegovernmentwasuncooperativeandnotbeingtotally
forthcoming.
However,theFBIwasnotaloneinfailingtomaketimely
disclosureofcriticalinformationtothedefense. TheUSAOwas
alsoresponsiblefornotpromptlyrevealingcertainimportant
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informationtothedefense. Althoughinsomeinstanceswefound
thesetardydisclosurestobeunjustifiedornegligent,wedonot
believethattheywereimproperlymotivatedortaken
intentionallytoobstructtheWeavertrial.
C.SignificantRecommendations
Astheresultofourinvestigation,wehavemadesevenbroad
recommendations. First,werecommendthatallfederallaw
enforcementofficersbegovernedbyastandarddeadlyforce
policyandthattheDepartmentofJusticeberesponsiblefor
developingsuchapolicy. Inadditiontospecifyingclearlythe
circumstancesinwhichdeadlyforcemaybeused,thepolicy
shoulddefinetheoccasionsinwhichspecialRulesofEngagement
maybeimplementedandtheprocessbywhichsuchrulesshouldbe
approved.
Second,werecommendthatacrisisresponseteam,including
speciallytrainedcrisismanagers,beavailabletorespondto
crises. Inaddition,weendorsetheproposaltoinclude
speciallytrainedprosecutorstoprovidelegalsupportto
tacticalteamswhenneeded. Wealsoproposeperiodicjoint
trainingexercisesbythevariousfederalandlocallaw
enforcementagencieswhichareresponsibleforrespondingto
crisissituations.
Third,werecommendthatapanelcomprisedof
representativesfromfederallawenforcementagencies,including
anattorneyfromtheDepartmentofJustice,becreatedtoexamine
theinternalreviewsthatlawenforcementagenciesconductafter
shootingincidentsoccur. Thisexaminationwouldfocusofthe
thoroughnessandprosecutivemeritoftheinternalreview.
Fourth,werecommendstepsbetakentoimprovethe
coordinationbetweentheFBIandfederalprosecutorsin
respondingtodiscovery. Suchstepsshouldincludehavingthe
DepartmentofJusticedevelopapolicygoverningtheretention
andreleaseofFBImaterialincriminaldiscoveryandhavingthe
FBIdenominateaunittocoordinateandmonitordiscovery.
Fifth,werecommendthatFBIfieldofficesthatdonothave
ateaminplacetorecoverevidenceaftermajorhostage/barricade
criseslikeRubyRidgerequesttheassistanceoftheEvidence
ResponseTeamatFBIHeadquarters. Wefurtherrecommendthat
proceduresbeadoptedtoimprovethecoordinationbetweentheFBI
Laboratoryandthefederalprosecutorsandthatanexaminationbe
doneoftheFBIproceduresregardingthememorializingof
interviews.
Sixth,werecommendthatallU.S.Attorneys'Offices
instituteareviewprocessforindictments,atleastfor
significantcases.
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Finally,werecommendthatourfindingsconcerningthe
eventssurroundingtheshootingofVickiWeaveronAugust22,
1992bereferredtotheappropriatecomponentoftheDepartment
ofJusticetoassessprosecutivemerit. Inaddition,we
recommendthatouranalysisoftheconductofAssistantU.S.
AttorneyRonaldHowenbereferredtotheExecutiveOfficefor
UnitedStatesAttorneysforwhateveradministrativeactionit
deemsappropriate.
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II.
ORIGINSOFTHEINVESTIGATIONANDMETHODOLOGYEMPLOYED
InFebruary1993,theCriminalDivisionoftheUnitedStates
DepartmentofJustice(the"Department")informedtheOfficeof
ProfessionalResponsibility("OPR")ofallegationsof
professionalmisconductandcriminalwrongdoingbyagentsofthe
U.S.MarshalsService("MarshalsService"),theFederalBureauof
Investigation ("FBI"),theUnitedStatesAttorney'sOfficefor
theDistrictofIdaho ("USAO"),andtheBureauofAlcohol,
TobaccoandFirearms ("BATF"),stemmingfromtheirinvolvementin
theinvestigation,apprehension,andprosecutionofRandyWeaver
andKevinHarris. BecauseWeaverandHarriswereawaitingtrial,
OPR inconformitywithitsnormalpolicyofavoidinginterfering
withthecriminalprocess,postponeditsinquiry
until"the
litigationhadconcluded.
FollowingthejuryverdictinJuly1993,OPRbeganits
inquiry. OPRwasawareofnumerousallegationsofimpropriety,
someofwhichhadbeenraisedindefensepleadingsandmany
othersthataroseduringandimmediatelyaftertrial.
Allegationsbyvariouspeopleandgroups themedia,thetrial
court,
theUnitedStatesAttorney'sOffice,theFBI,andU.S.
SenatorLarryCraigofIdaho,aswellasthepublic suggested
thatpersonneloftheUnitedStatesgovernmenthadengagedin
willfulmisconduct,includingobstructionofjustice,perjury,
andothercriminalandethicalviolations. Asaresult,it
becameapparentthatthescopeofinquiryneededtobebroader
thanmerelyissuesthathadbeenraisedattrialbythedefense.
AttorneyGeneralJanetRenoannouncedthattheinquirywould
includeacompleteandthoroughreviewoftheWeavercasefrom
itsinceptiontotheconclusionofthecriminaltrial. OPRwas
toconductthisinquirywithinvestigativesupportfromtheFBI.
OnJuly26, 1993, MichaelE.Shaheen,Jr.,Counselinthe
OfficeofProfessionalResponsibilitydetailedtheroleofOPR
andtheFBIintheinquiryinalettertoDavidG.Binney,
AssistantDirectoroftheFBI'sInspectionDivision. Concerns
hadbeenraisedabouttheFBI'sabilitytobeobjectiveandto
investigateallegedmisconductbyitsownagents. Somewhohad
participated intheWeaverinvestigationandprosecutionandhad
experiencedadecidedlackofharmonyintheirworking
relationshipwiththeFBI,opposedtheBureau'sinvolvementin
theinvestigation. However,OPR'sexperiencewiththeFBIin
investigationsinwhichtheFBIwasthesubject includingan
investigationofitsownDirector demonstratedthattheBureau
couldbeobjectiveunderOPR'ssupervision. Furthermore,the
broadscopeoftheWeaverinquiryandtheneedforFBIexpertise
suggestedthattheBureaubeincludedintheinquiry.
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FromthebeginningoftheinvestigationOPRattorneys
establishedthattheywouldcontroltheinvestigation,analyze
theinformationgathered,andmakefindingsandrecommendations.
TheFBI'srolewaslimitedtoassistingingatheringfactsand
conducting interviews. TheFBIwasnottomakefindings,
conclusions,orrecommendations.
Duetotheexpansivescopeoftheinquiry,formerDeputy
AttorneyGeneralPhilipHeymannassignedfourattorneysfromthe
CriminalDivisionoftheDepartmentofJusticetoassistOPR. It
wasdecidedthatthereviewwouldcover:theconductofthe
MarshalsServiceinitsinvestigationofRandyWeaverfromits
inceptiontotheconclusionofthetrial;theactionsoftheFBI
HostageRescueTeam("HRT")duringthesiegeoftheWeaver
residence;thehandlingofevidencebytheFBILaboratoryandits
effectontheWeavertrial;andtheconductoftheU.S.
Attorney's"OfficeininvestigatingandprosecutingtheWeaver
case.
OPRcontactedtheDepartmentofTreasury ("DOT"),whichhad
alsoreceivedcomplaintsaboutBATF'sconductandagreedthatits
InspectorGeneral'sOfficewouldinvestigatethatmatter.
However,itwasunderstoodthatOPRwouldaddressthoseelements
oftheBATFinvestigationthataffectedtheWeavercaseand
involvedDepartmentofJusticeemployees. Tothatend,OPR
invitedDOTtoparticipateininterviewsrelevanttoits
investigationandtoreviewmaterial otherthangrandjury
testimony thatwouldassistitsinquiry. AlthoughDOTis
preparingareportofitsinvestigation,thisreportdiscusses
issuesinvolvingBATFthataffectedtheWeavermatter.
TheFBIinitiallyassigned15Inspectorsandtwo
administrativesupportpersonneltotheRubyRidgeInspection
TeamtoworkwiththefiveDOJattorneys. Duringthefirstphase
oftheinquiry,theteamdevelopedaninvestigativefocus,
establishedamanagementsystem,andattemptedtoidentify,
throughresearchandselectedinterviews,theissuestobe
addressed. ByAugust1993,theteamhaddeterminedthe
background interviewsthatneededtobeconductedandhad
identifieddocumentsthatneededtobereviewed,includingcase
filesandsupportingmaterialsfromtheMarshalsService,the
USAO,andtheFBI.
Initially,theinvestigatorsusedaresearchsystem
consistentwithatypicalFBIinvestigation. However,theysoon
realizedthatathoroughreviewoftheWeavermatterwould
benefitfromthesupportoftheFBI'sRapidStartteamofthe
InformationResourcesDivisionofFBIHeadquarters. RapidStart
isamobilegroupofFBIemployeeswhoprovideinformation
managementservicestomajorcases. TheRapidStartteam
developedanautomatedcasemanagementsystemtoassistthe
investigatorsincapturing,storing,andretrievinginformation.
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Theteamalsoassistedtheinvestigationintrackingleadsand
withdocumentcontrol.
AsPhaseIoftheinvestigationentereditsfinalstages,it
becameapparentthatthevolumeofmaterialtobereviewedand
thebroadscopeoftheinquirywouldrequiremorepersonneland
timethanhadoriginallybeencontemplated. Adecisionwasmade
toincreasethesizeoftheinvestigativeteam.
Thus,
whenPhase
IIoftheinvestigationbeganonSeptember21,1993,theRuby
RidgeInspectionTeamwasdoubledinsizetoincludetwo
full-
timeInspectors,26AssistantInspectors,and10support
personnel.
PhaseIIwastheinvestigativephaseoftheproject. The
inspectorsweredividedintothefourteams. Thefirstteamwas
responsibleforissuesinvolvingBATFandtheMarshalsService.
ThesecondandthirdteamsfocusedontheFBIroleinthecase
includingtheFBILaboratory,theFBI'shandlingofthecrime
scene,andtheactionsoftheFBIHRTanditsRulesof
Engagement. ThelastteamexaminedtheactionsoftheUSAO
throughoutitsinvolvementintheWeavermatter. Eachteamwas
comprisedofaDOJAttorney,aninspectionteamleader,andfive
orsixinspectors. Theinspectorswereencouragedtocoordinate
theirinquirywiththeDOJattorney. Manyinterviewsinvolved
witnesseswhohadknowledgeofissuesbeinginvestigatedbymore
thanoneteam. Inthoseinstances,inspectorsfromtheother
teamseitherattendedtheinterview,scheduledseparate
interviews,orsubmittedpreliminaryquestionstodetermine
whetheranadditionalinterviewwasnecessary.
TheFBIinspectorsandDOJattorneysconductedover370
interviewsofpersonsinvolvedintheRubyRidgeincident,
includingpersonneloflocal,state,andfederallawenforcement
agencies,theUSAO,theDepartmentofJustice,aswellasmembers
ofthefederaljudiciaryandnongovernmentalwitnesses.
1
The
interviewswereconductedthroughouttheUnitedStatesand,in
someinstances,supplementalinterviewswereconductedfor
clarification. Althoughthemajorityoftheinterviewswere
conductedbyFBIinspectors,virtuallyallsignificantinterviews
1
Thefollowinggroupsofpeoplewereinterviewed:52FBI
HRTmembers,60MarshalsServiceSpecialOperationsGroup
personnel,41FBISpecialWeaponsandTacticsTeammembers,three
BATFagents,eightMarshalsServicemanagementpersonnel,15
MarshalsServicepersonneldirectlyinvolvedintheRubyRidge
crisis,
tenFBIHeadquarterspersonnel,fourFBInegotiators,43
IdahoStatePolicemembers,26membersofotheragencies,31FBI
fieldofficepersonnel,17FBILaboratorypersonnel,and30other
personsinvolvedwiththeprosecution,includingpersonnelfrom
theU.S.ProbationOfficeandtheU.S.Attorney'sOffice.
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wereconductedjointlybyFBIinspectorsandDOJattorneys. In
addition,thousandsofpagesofrecordsandfileswerereviewed.
Beforetheinterviewprocessbegan,DOJandFBIpersonnel
developedawitnessnotificationformdescribingthescopeand
purposeoftheinquiry. Eachwitnessexecutedthisformbefore
beinginterviewed. Inaddition,witnesseswereaskedtoexecute
waiverformsbeforestatementsweretaken. Insomeinstances,
intervieweeswererepresentedbycounselordeclinedtovolunteer
information,insteadrelyingonearliersworntestimonyor
statements.
OnNovember8,1993,thenDeputyAttorneyGeneralPhilip
Heymannrespondedtorenewedobjectionstotheinvestigativerole
oftheFBIintheinquiry. Heymannreceivedtheassuranceofthe
attorneysinchargeoftheinquirythattheywouldaccommodate
intervieweeswhorequestedinterviewsoutsidethepresenceofthe
FBI.
TheattorneysassuredtheseintervieweesthattheFBIwas
assistingthemingatheringfactsbutthatthefinalreportand
itsconclusionsandrecommendationswouldoriginatefromtheDOJ
attorneys. However,theseintervieweeswereadvisedthata
recordoftheirinterviewswouldbegiventotheFBItoassist
itsinquiry. Inaddition,wecautionedallthoseinterviewed
thattheAttorneyGeneralmightreleaseaversionofourfinal
reporttothepublicand,therefore,wecouldnotassuretheir
confidentiality.
OnJanuary19,1994,theFBIinvestigatorssubmittedtheir
reportoffactualfindingstotheDOJattorneys. Followingthe
receiptoftheFBIreport,theDOJattorneyscompletedtheir
reviewofallpertinentmaterialsandwroteareportanalyzing
themanyallegations. Theoriginalteamoflawyerswasassisted
bytwoattorneysfromtheCriminalDivisionwhoprovided
additionalresearchandanalysis. Inaddition,anotherOPR
attorneyassistedinthefinalstagesofthepreparationofthis
report.
Thisreportwasstructuredtobereadinitsentiretyorin
isolatedsections. TheFactualSummary,Chronology,andthe
IdentificationofParticipantssectionsareintendedtoprovidea
generaloverviewofsignificantevents,whichwillassistthe
readerinunderstandingthedetaileddiscussionsthatfollow.
Specifictopicsaregenerallyarrangedinchronologicalorderand
containdetaileddiscussionsoftherelevantfacts,theissues
raisedandthefindingsmade. Finally,weconcludewitha
sectionwhichsetsforthrecommendations,mostofwhichare
designedtoanticipateandavoidthekindsofproblemssubjectto
thisinquiry. AnAppendixaccompaniesthisreport,but,because
ofthevolumeofsourcematerialusedinthisinquiry,it
includesonlythemostsignificantdocuments.
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III. FACTUALSUMMARY
A. TheU.S.MarshalsService
InJanuary1985,theU.S.SecretServiceinvestigated
allegationsthatRandyWeaverhadmadethreatsagainstthe
Presidentandothergovernmentandlawenforcementofficials.
TheSecretServicewastoldthatWeaverwasassociatedwiththe
AryanNations,awhitesupremacistgroup,andthathehadalarge
cacheofweaponsandammunition. Weaverhadspokenofthe
world'sendingintwoyears"when[his]homewillbeundersiege
andassaulted." SecretServiceagentsinterviewedWeaver,who
deniedtheallegations. Nochargeswerefiled.
InFebruary1985,Weaverandhiswife,Vicki,filedan
affidavitwiththecountyclerk,giving"legalandofficial
noticethat[he]believe[d][he]mayhavetodefend [him]selfand
[his]familyfromphysicalattackon[his]life"bytheFBI.
WeavercametotheattentionoftheBureauofAlcohol,
TobaccoandFirearms
("BATF")
inJuly1986,whenaBATFinformant
wasintroducedtohimataWorldAryanCongress. Theinformant
metWeaverseveraltimesoverthenextthreeyears. InJuly
1989,Weaverinvitedtheinformanttohishometodiscussforming
agrouptofightthe"ZionistOrganizedGovernment,"referringto
theU.S.Government. Threemonthslater,Weaversoldthe
informanttwo"sawed-off"shotguns.
InJune1990,BATFagentsapproachedWeavertopersuadehim
tobecomeaninformant. Weaverrefusedtobecomea"snitch,"and
hewasindictedformanufacturingandpossessinganunregistered
firearm. Awarrantwasissuedforhisarrest. BATFconcluded
thatitwouldbetoodangerousforthearrestingagentsandthe
WeaverchildrentoarrestWeaverathismountaintopresidence.
Instead,inJanuary1991,BATFagents,posingasstranded
motorists,surprisedWeaverandhiswifewhentheystoppedto
offerassistance. Weavertoldthearrestingagents"nicetrick;
you'llneverdothatagain."
Weaverwasarraignedandwasreleasedonapersonal
recognizancebond. AtrialdatewassetforFebruary19,1991.
Shortlythereafter,Weaver'swife,Vicki,senttheU.S.
Attorney'sOfficetwolettersaddressedtotheservantsofthe
QueenofBabylon,whichassertedthat"[t]hetyrantsbloodwill
flow"and"[w]hetherweliveorwhetherwedie,wewillnotbow
toyourevilcommandments."
AU.S.ProbationOfficersentWeaveraletterincorrectly
referringtoaMarch20trialdate. Weaverdidnotappearfor
theFebruarytrial,andabenchwarrantwasissuedforhis
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arrest. OnMarch14,1991,Weaverwasindictedforfailureto
appearfortrial.
ThematterwasreferredtotheU.S.MarshalsService,which
learnedthatWeaverhadattendedAryanWorldCongressesandthat
heandhisfamilywereconstantlyarmed. Weaversentaletterto
thelocalsheriff,statingthathewouldnotleavehiscabinand
thatlawenforcementofficerswouldhavetotakehimout. The
Weavers"feltasthoughtheend[was] near." Weaverwasquoted
asthreateningtoshootlawenforcementofficers,whocameto
arresthim. Weaverandhisfamilyremainedinacabin,atopan
isolatedmountain.
BetweenMarch1991andAugust1992,themarshalsundertooka
seriesofeffortstoconvinceWeavertosurrender. Theyalso
madeplanstoarrestWeaverwithoutharmtolawenforcement
officersortheWeaverfamily,particularlythechildren. The
marshalsexchangedmessageswithWeaverthroughintermediaries,
untiltheU.S.Attorneydirectedthatallcommunicationsgo
throughWeaver'sappointedcounsel (withwhomWeaverwouldnot
speak).
TeamsfromtheMarshalsServiceSpecialOperationsGroup
("SOG")conducted surveillanceoftheWeavers
1
mountaintop
propertytodevisemethodstotakeWeaverintocustodysafely.
Surveillancecameraswereinstalledandaerialphotographswere
takenoftheproperty. ThemarshalsobservedthatWeaverandhis
childrenrespondedtoapproachingpersonsandvehiclesbytaking
armedpositionsoverthedrivewayleadingtotheWeavercabin.
Duringthisperiod,Weavercontinuedtomakestatementsthathe
wouldnotsurrenderpeacefullyandthathisfamilywasprepared
todefendhim.
TheDirectoroftheMarshalsServiceorderedthatnoaction
betakenthatcouldendangertheWeaverchildren. IntheSpring
of1992,themarshalsdevelopedanundercoverplantoarrest
Weaverawayfromhiscabinandfamily.
Asurveillanceteamofsixmarshalswenttothemountainon
August21,1992tolookforplacestostationcoverteamsforthe
operation. Towardtheendofthesurveillancemission,oneof
theWeaver'sdogsbegantochasethreeofthemarshals. Marshals
stationedatanobservationpostsawKevinHarris,anassociate
ofRandyWeaver,Weaver,histhirteenyearoldson,Sammy,and
Weaver'sdaughters,followthedog. Allwerecarryingfirearms.
Themarshalsretreated. Astheyapproachedanintersection
oftrailsknownasthe"Y,"theysawRandyWeavercomingdownthe
trail.
Theyidentifiedthemselvesandtoldhimtohalt,buthe
turnedandranbackupthetrail. ThedogcaughtupwithDeputy
MarshalCooper. Heheldthedogatbaywithhisfirearm,butdid
notshootforfearofprovokingtheWeavers. Anexchangeof
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gunfireoccurredmomentslater,resultinginthedeathofDeputy
MarshalWilliamDegan,SammyWeaver,andthedog.
Accordingtothemarshals,thefirefightbeganwhenDegan
andDeputyMarshalCooperrosetoidentifythemselves. Kevin
HarriswheeledandfiredatDeganwitha30.06rifle. Cooper
returnedfireandthoughthehitHarris,thoughhehadnot.
CooperturnedhisweapontowardSammyWeaver,butdidnotfire.
DeputyMarshalRoderick,whowasfurtherdownthepath,
heardashotfromhisleft. Roderickcouldnotseeanyoneother
thanWeaver'sdog,whichwasheadinginthedirectionRandy
Weaverhadgone. Whenthefirstshotwasfired,thedogturned
itsheadtowardthemarshals. Roderickfearedthatthedogwould
turnandattackhimorleadWeaver,Harris,andtheotherstothe
marshals. Roderickfiredatthedog,killinghim.
SammyWeaverthenshotatRoderick,andRoderickdoveinto
thewoods. Rodericklaterfoundabulletholethroughhisshirt,
thoughhewasnotwounded. Cooperheardtheshotstohisright.
Heroseandfiredathree-roundbursttoprovidecoverfirefor
himselfsothathecouldgettoDegan,whohadcalledforhelp.
Followingthelastshots,CoopersawSammyWeaverrunoutofview
upthetrailtotheWeavercabin. Hedidnotthinkthathehad
hittheboy.
RandyWeaverandKevinHarrisclaimedthattheydidnotknow
whatthedogwaschasing,thoughthereisevidencetothe
contrary. Theysaidthattheythoughttheywerepursuingalarge
animal.
TheyassertedthatthefirstshotfiredattheYwas
Roderick'sattackonthedog,thatSammyfiredatRoderickin
retaliation,andthatDeganandCooperthenshotatSammy.
Harrismaintainedthatthemarshalsdidnotidentifythemselves
untiltheshootinghadendedandthatheshotDegantodefend
Sammy.
Soonaftertheshooting,thethreemarshals,whohadbeenat
theobservationpost,rantotheY. Theycameunderfirealong
theway. Onemarshal,amedic,treatedDegan,withoutsuccess.
Shortlythereafter,themarshalsheardabarrageofgunfire,
followedbyscreamingandcrying. Afterabrieftime,two
marshalsleftthehilltoseekhelp. Thethreesurviving
marshalsmaintainedtheirpositionsoutoffearthat,ifthey
moved,theywouldbeshotat. Theyalsorefusedtoleavewithout
thebodyoftheslainmarshal. Theydidnotreceiveadditional
fire,
thoughinthehoursthatfollowedtheyheardshotswhenan
airplaneflewoverhead.
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B.
FederalBureauofInvestigation-DeploymentofHostage
RescueTeam
AssoonastheU.S.MarshalsServicereceivedwordof
MarshalDegan'sdeathandtheongoingsituationatRubyRidge,
theysoughtandreceivedFBIassistance. TheFBIhadprimary
jurisdictionforassaultsonfederalofficers,anditsHostage
RescueTeam("HRT")isseenasuniquelyskilledforcrises. FBI
andMarshalsServiceHeadquartersimmediatelyactivatedcommand
centerstocoordinatecommunications. SpecialAgentEugeneGlenn
wasassignedthecommandandbegantoarrangeforthepersonnel
andequipmentrequiredforthecrisis. Concurrently,stateand
locallawenforcementandafewFBIagentswhowereinthe
immediateareacametothesceneandbegansecuringthearea.
Therescueofthemarshalswasdelayeduntilafterdark. A
teamledbytheIdahoStatePolicereachedthemarshalsat
approximately11:30p.m.,morethantwelvehoursafterthe
shooting. TherescueeffortwasongoingwhenGlennarrivedand
deployedFBISWATteamstosecurethecommandpost'sperimeter.
HeplannedtomaintainthestatusquountiltheHRThadarrived.
Locallawenforcementcontinuedtoguardtheaccessroadasa
crowdofsympathizersandonlookersgathered.
Themarshalsweresuccessfullyremovedfromthemountain
withoutadditionalgunfire. Oncerescued,theywereexaminedat
ahospitalandtransportedtoacommandpostwheretheywere
givenfoodandallowedtorest. FBIagentsinterviewedthe
marshals,startingthefollowingafternoon.
C. RulesofEngagementandtheDeathofVickiWeaveron
August22
Whiletherescueofthemarshalswasunderway,theHRT
advanceteamwasenroutetoIdahowiththeAssociateDirectorof
theMarshalsService,whobriefedthemaboutWeaver'sbackground,
hisfailuretoappearfortrial,theunderlyingweaponscharge,
andhisprofesseddesiretoconfrontthefederalgovernment.
Duringtheflight,HRTCommanderRogersandFBIAssociate
DirectorPottsdraftedspecialRulesofEngagementtoaddressthe
dangertheyperceived. WhentheHRTarrivedinIdaho,Rogers
briefedthemonthesituationandtheproposedRulesof
Engagement. Theyestablishedacommandsite,flewreconnaissance
missions,andbegantomakeplanstoaddressthecrisis.
Ontheafternoonoftheshooting,theU.S.Attorney'sOffice
obtainedasearchwarrantandcomplaintsforRandyWeaverand
KevinHarris'sarrestonchargesrelatingtothedeathofMarshal
Degan. AssistantU.S.AttorneyRonaldHowen,whowasassignedto
thecase,wenttothesite. HowenremaineduntilWeaverand
Harrissurrenderedaweeklater. Howentooknorolein
developingtheRulesofEngagementordraftingoperationsplans,
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buthedidparticipateincrimescenesearches,interviews,and
negotiations. TheBoundaryCountyprosecutorwasalsopresent
duringmostofthecrisisbutwasnotinvolvedintheoperations
planning.
AccordingtotheHRTplan,communicationwiththeoccupants
oftheWeavercabin,includingasurrenderdemand,wastotake
placeusingarmoredpersonnelcarriers,whichwoulddelivera
telephonetothecabinsite. TheHRTwasconcernedthatthe
Weaversorsympathizersmightbehidinginthewoodsandplanning
anambush. Therefore,teamsofHRTsniper/observerswere
stationedoverlookingthecabinbeforethecarrierdroveupthe
hill. AlthoughFBIheadquartershadnotapprovedatactical
operationsplan,permissionwasgrantedtobeginnegotiations
withtheWeaverswhenHRTagentsarrivedattheirpositions.
At3:30p.m.onAugust22,HRTsniper/observers,alongwith
membersoftheMarshalsServiceSOG,begantheirascenttothe
cabin. Beforetheirdeparture,theywerebriefedontheRulesof
Engagement,whichprovidedthat:
1. Ifanyadultmaleisobservedwithaweapon
priortotheannouncement,deadlyforcecan
andshouldbeemployed,iftheshotcanbe
takenwithoutendangeringanychildren.
2. Ifanyadultinthecompoundisobserved
withaweaponafterthesurrender
announcementismade,andisnotattempting
tosurrender,deadlyforcecanandshouldbe
employedtoneutralizetheindividual.
3. Ifcompromisedbyanyanimal,particularly
thedogs,thatanimalshouldbeeliminated.
4.
AnysubjectsotherthanRandallWeaver,
VickiWeaver,KevinHarris,presenting
threatsofdeathorgrievousbodilyharm,
theFBIrulesofdeadlyforceareineffect.
Deadlyforcecanbeutilizedtopreventthe
deathorgrievousbodilyinjurytooneself
orthatofanother.
Noshotshadbeenfiredsincethepreviousday,but,while
theHRTmembersweremovingtopositionsoverlookingthecabin,
otherobserversreportedtoFBIheadquartersthatthesubjects
wereoutsidethecabin. FBIHeadquartersremindedthefield
commanderthattheRulesofEngagementwouldapply. By5:45
p.m.,thesniper/observersreachedtheirpositions. Theengines
ofthepersonnelcarriersatthecommandpostbelowwereaudible.
Anunarmed,youngfemaleranfromthecabintoarocky
outcroppingandreturnedtothecabin. Withinaminute,an
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unarmedmalewasseenonthecabin'sbackdeck. Aboutten
minuteslater,ahelicoptercarryingHRTpersonnelbeganan
observationmission. Whenthehelicopter'senginewasstarted,
thefemaleseenearlierandtwomalesranfromthecabintothe
outcropping. Thelastpersontoemergewascarryingarifle.
Sniper/observerHoriuchiidentifiedhimasKevinHarris.
A fewsecondslaterHoriuchisawapersonhebelievedtobe
Harrisnearanoutbuildingknownasthe"birthingshed." Theman
appearedtobescanningaboveandbehindthesnipersforthe
helicopter. Horiuchibelievedthathewastryingtoposition
himselftoshootatthehelicopterfromthemoreprotectedside
oftheshed. Horiuchifiredoneshotasthemansuddenlymoved
alongthesideoftheshedoutofsight. WhenHoriuchifired,
theman'sbackwastowardHoriuchiandthehelicopter. Because
themanmovedunexpectedly,Horiuchiassumedhemissed. Theman
heaimedatwasnotHarris,butWeaver,whowasslightlywounded.
HarrisandWeaverhavemaintainedthattheyhadno
aggressivepurposeinleavingthecabinandthatWeaverwas
openingthedoortotheshedtolookatthebodyofhisson.
AftertenortwentysecondsHoriuchisawthetargetofhis
firstshotfollowingtheothertwopeopleastheyrantothe
cabin. Thefirsttwoenteredthecabinthroughanopendoor.
Horiuchifired,aimingslightlyinfrontofthelastrunningman.
Thebulletwentthroughthecurtainedwindowoftheopendoor,
fatallywoundingVickiWeaverandseriouslyinjuringKevin
Harris. ThesnipertestifiedthathedidnotknowthatVicki
Weaverwasstandingbehindthedoor.
WhenCommanderRogers,whohadbeenaboardtheHRT
helicopter,learnedoftheshootings,heandanFBInegotiator
wentinapersonnelcarriertothecabintomakeasurrender
announcementandtobeginnegotiationsbyleavingatelephone.
Therewasnoresponse. Afewhourslater,duetodeteriorating
weatherconditions,thesniperslefttheirpositionsandreturned
tothecommandpostwhereRogersdebriefedthem. Thenext
morningthesnipersreturnedtotheirpositions. Rogersonce
againwenttothecabinareaandissuedrepeatedsurrender
announcements,whichincludedwarningsthattheoutbuildings
wouldberemovedifWeaverfailedtocomply.
BySundayevening,therewasstillnoresponseorindication
thattheWeaversweregoingtosurrenderornegotiate,sothe
firstoutbuilding,thebirthingshed,wasmoved. SammyWeaver's
bodywasdiscoveredinthebirthingshed.
Negotiationeffortscontinuedfor
days,
butwere
unsuccessful. Noonefromthecabinpickedupthetelephone,
whichwasonanarmedrobotoutsidethecabin. Althoughthe
weaponontherobotwasnotloaded,Weaverreportedthathewas
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afraidthatanyonewhowentoutsidewouldbeshot. Attemptsto
interceptconversationsinsidethecabinwerenotsuccessful. By
Wednesday,noaggressiveactionhadoccurredfordays,andthe
eventswhichhadprecededtheconfrontationbegantoseemless
clear. TheFBIcommandreceivedevidenceinapparentconflict
withtheinitialimpressionsaboutWeaver'sbackgroundandthe
circumstancessurroundingtheshootout. Asaresult,theFBI
commanddecidedtowithdrawthespecialRulesofEngagementand
toinstatetheFBI'sstandardDeadlyForcePolicy.
OnWednesday,August26,Weavertoldanegotiatorthathe
wantedtotalkwithhissister. Whenshearrived,attemptsto
communicatewithWeaverwerefrustratedbyherinabilitytohear
Weaver. OnFridayevening,August28,Weaveragreedtospeak
withBo
Gritz,
whomWeavertoldthatthesniperhadkilledhis
wifeandinjuredHarrisandhimself. Twootherprivatecitizens
assistedGritzinresolvingthestandoff. GritzandaWeaver
familyfriendcarriedVickiWeaver'sbodyoutofthecabin. On
Sunday,August30,KevinHarrissurrendered. TheWeavers
surrenderedthefollowingday.
SearchesoftheYwereongoingduringthecrisis. Afterthe
surrender,thecabinandsurroundingareaweresearched. TheFBI
alsosentateamofinspectorstobeginaninternalinquiryinto
thesnipershootings.
D. TheProsecution
Aftertheirsurrender,HarrisandWeaverwereplacedunder
arrestandchargedwiththemurderofDeputyMarshalDegan.
Separatepreliminaryhearingstodetermineprobablecausefor
thesechargeswerebegun. Beforetheirpreliminaryhearings
concluded,agrandjuryindictedHarrisforassaultingand
murderingDeganandindictedWeaverforaidingandabettingin
Degan'sdeath. Thereafter,themagistratejudgesterminatedthe
preliminaryhearingsofWeaverandHarris. Bothdefendants
pleadednotguiltytoallcharges. OnOctober1,1992,agrand
juryreturnedasupersedingindictmentchargingWeaverandHarris
withnumerousoffensesincludingconspiracy.
2
OnNovember19,
1992aSecondSupersedingIndictmentwasreturnedchargingWeaver
andHarriswiththesameoffensesasthepreviousindictmentand
allegingadditionalovertacts.
InOctober1992theMarshalsServiceandBATFprovidedfour
agentstoassisttheU.S.Attorney'sOfficeinpreparingthecase
fortrial. Duringthecasepreparationprocesscontinuousissues
aroseregardingthecooperationoftheFBIinpreparingthecase
2
Theindictmentchargedviolationsof18U.S.C.2,3,111,
115,371,
933(g)(2),924(C)(1),
1071,1111,1114,
3146(a)(1),
3147,26USC5861(d)and(f).
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fortrial. Includedamongtheseproblemareaswasthelackof
cooperationbytheFBIinprovidingdiscoverymaterialstothe
prosecutionandthedefense.
OnJanuary8,1993,onmotionbythedefense,theFebruary2
trialdatewasextendedtoallowtimeforthedefensetoreview
evidenceandtheresultsofFBILaboratorytests. Thedefense
complainedaboutthegovernment'sfailuretoprovidetimely
accesstoevidenceanddocuments,andthetrialjudgeadmonished
theprosecutorstohavethelaboratoryexaminationcompleted
quickly.
The42dayjurytrialbeganonApril13,1993. Duringthe
trial,
thedefendantsbroughttothecourt'sattentionproblems
theyhadinobtainingdocumentsandinformationtowhichthey
believedtheywereentitledundereitherfederallawora
discoverystipulationwiththegovernment. Themostextreme
breachofthestipulationinvolvedthelateproductionofthe
underlyingmaterialsandnotesrelatedtotheFBIShooting
IncidentReportwhichhadbeenproducedastheresultofan
internalinquiryintothesnipershootings. Althoughthe
defendantshadreceivedthefinalShootingIncidentReportbefore
trial,duringtrialtheFBI,inresponsetoadefensesubpoena,
sentbyfourthclassmailmaterialsthatwerenotpartofthe
documentsthattheFBIhadproducedearlierindiscovery. These
materialsincludedadrawingHoriuchimadedaysafterthe
shooting. ThedrawingarrivedinIdahoafterHoriuchihad
completedhistestimony,thusrequiringhisreturnforadditional
testimony. Thecourtfinedthegovernmentfortheattorneysfees
incurredbythedefendantsforthelosttrialday.
Oneofthetwoprosecutorsbecameillanddidnot
participateinthefinalarguments. Afterdeliberatingfor20
days,
onJuly8,1993,thejuryacquittedWeaverandHarrisof
themurderofDeputyMarshalDegan,theconspiracycharge,and
thesignificantremainingcharges.Weaverwasconvictedon
chargesoffailuretoappearfortrialandcommittinganoffense
whileonrelease. OnOctober26,1993,Weaverwassentencedto
18monthsincarceration,threeyearsprobationanda$10,000
fine. ThecourtissuedanOrderfiningtheFBIandcriticizing
itforitsfailuretoproducediscoverymaterials,itsfailureto
obeyordersandadmonitionsofthecourt,anditsindifferenceto
therightsofthedefendantandtotheadministrationofjustice.
OnDecember18,1993,RandyWeaverwasreleasedfrom
i n c a r c e r a t i o n .
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IV. SPECIFICISSUESINVESTIGATED
A. InvestigationofWeaverbyBureauofAlcohol,Tobacco
andFirearms
1. Introduction
TheeventsthatledtothedeathofthreepersonsatRuby
Ridge,IdahoinAugust1992andtothesubsequentprosecutionof
Randall("Randy")WeaverandKevinHarrishadtheiroriginwith
aninvestigationbytheBureauofAlcohol,TobaccoandFirearms
("BATF"). Seriousallegationshavebeenmadeabouttheroleof
BATFintheWeavermatter. Includedamongtheseallegationsare
thataBATFinformantentrappedWeaverintosellingillegal
weapons;
thataBATFrewardsystem ceatedtheincentiveforthe
informanttoentrapWeaver;andthatBATFandtheinformanttried
toconcealthisfuturecompensationarrangmentfromthedefense,
thecourtandtheU.S.Attorney's Office.
3
Ithasalsobeen
allegedthatBATFexaggeratedtotheU.S.MarshalsService,the
U.S.Attorney'sOffice,andthecourttheextentofWeaver's
involvementwiththeAryanNations
and
theOrderandthatfederal
lawenforcementunconstitutionallytargetedRandyWeaverfor
prosecutionbecauseofhisreligiousviews.
4
2 . StatementofFacts
a. EarlyLawEnforcementContactsWithRandyWeaver
RandyWeaverfirstcametotheattentionoffederallaw
enforcementpersonnelin1985asaresultofallegedthreatshe
madeagainstPresidentReagan,IdahoGovernorJohnEvans,and
certainlawenforcementofficials.
5
TheU.S.SecretService
investigatedtheallegationsandinterviewedWeaver. Duringthis
3
Thecontroversythateruptedattrialconcerningthe
compensationarrangementbetweenBATFandtheinformantis
discussed inSectionIV(o)ofthisreport.
4
[
]LetterfromSenatorLarryE.CraigtoLloyd
Bentsen,SecretaryoftheTreasury,July22,1993;Letterfrom
SenatorLarryE.CraigtoJanetReno,AttorneyGeneral,July23,
1993. TheWeaversraisedasimilarissueduringthestandoff
withtheFBIinAugust1992. [
]
5
[]
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investigation,itwaslearnedthatWeaver[
was associatedwithmembersoftheAryan
Nations,awhite-supremacistgroup.
6
[
TheSecretServicewasalsotoldthatWeaverhadacacheof
weapons,includinganumberofsemiandfullyautomatichandguns
andrifles,
10
andthathehadaccesstoexplosivesandto"an
unlimitedamountof ammunition."
11
[
]BoundaryCountySheriffBruceWhittakerhas
beenquotedassaying. thatWeavertoldhimthat"therealJewsof
theBiblearewewhiteChristiansand ...thefalseJews ..
shouldbeeliminated." "StandoffwithPoliceEntersSecond
Year,"SanFranciscoExaminer,March27,1992.
9
[
10
[
11
[
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23
]Weaverhadspokenoftheworldending
intwoyears"whenmyhomewillbeundersiegeandassaulted."
15
SecretServiceagentsinterviewedWeaveronFebruary12,
1985.
Atthattime,hedeniedthreateningthePresident,the
Governor,orchurches. Healsodeniedhavinganyaffiliation
withtheAryanNationsoritsmembers.
16
Weaversaidthathe
had"notimeforAryanNation'spreachers"andthathisreligious
beliefswere"strictlybythebible."[
12
[
13
[
[]
15
[in
1983
ewspaper
interview,WeaverdiscussedhisplantomovetoNorthernIdahoto
liveinanisolatedhideaway "andsurvivethecoming'great
tribulation.'" ThearticlestatedthatWeaver,a"formerArmy
GreenBeret,[was]developingdefenseplansthatinclude[d]a300
yard'killzone'encirclingthecompound." "SurvivalistMakes
PlansforTimeof 'GreatTribulation,'"WaterlooCourier,January
9,1983,B-1.
16L
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19
]
OnFebruary28,1985,RaandyandVickiWeaverfileda
handwrittenaffidavitwiththeBoundaryCountyClerkclaiming
thatpersonsaroundDeepCreek,Idahowereconspiringtoendanger
theWeaverfamilyandtoprecipitateanattackonRandyWeaver;s
life.
TheaffidavitallegedthatWeaver's"accusers"hadmade
falsestatementsabouthisconnectionswiththeAryanNationsand
hisownershipofillegalweaponsandthattheyhadwrongfully
allegedthathehadthreatenedthePresidentandthePope. The
Weaversalsostatedthatthesefalsehoodsweredesignedto
provoketheFBIintostormingtheirhome. Weaverexpressed fear
thathewouldbekilledorarrestedforassaultofafederal
officer,ifhetriedtodefendhimself,andhegave"legaland
officialnoticethat[he]believe[d][he]mayhavetodefend
[him]selfand [his]family fromphysicalattackon[his]
life."
20
[ InMay 1985, [
] VICKIWeaversentalettertotheSpokaneField
OfficeoftheU.S.SecretServicedemandingawrittenapology
fromtheSecretService.
21
]Thefederalgovernmentneverfiled
]
19
[
20
AffidavitofRandy andVickiWeaver,February28,1935
[
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25
anychargesagainstWeaverfortheallegedthreatsmadeagainst
thePresident,theGovernor,orothers.
22
b. BATFContactWithWeaver
WeaverfirstcametotheattentionoftheBATFinJuly1986
duringitsinvestigationofaseriesofbombingsinCoeur
d'Alene,IdahoinwhichtheAryanNationswasbelievedtobe
involved. BATFaskedKennethFadeley,aconfidentialinformant,
toassistitsinvestigationbyobtaininginformationaboutpeople
attendinganupcomingWorldAryanCongresswhomightbeengaged
-inillegalactivities.
23
Thereafter,Fadeleyportrayedhimself
asaweaponsdealerwhocateredtomotorcyclegangsand,inthis
role,
managedtobeintroducedtohighlevelmembersoftheAryan
Nations inNorthern Idaho.
24
InJuly1986,FadeleyattendedtheWorldAryanCongressat
HaydenLake,Idaho. Duringthisassembly,Fadeleywasintroduced
toWeaver,whowasatthattimeofnoparticularinvestigative
significancetoBATF.
25
Sixmonthslater,inJanuary1987,Fadeleymet with[
,]whowassuspectedofsignificantfirearmstrafficking.
Fadeleyworeahiddentaperecordertothismeeting. Randy
Weaver accompanied[
]andalthoughWeaver'snamehadbeen
mentioned numeroustimes,FadeleyhadnotexpectedWeaveratthis
meeting.
26
InWeaver's presence,[ ] aftersuggestingthat
Fadeleywasagovernmentinformant,heldaguntoFadeley'shead
andrananelectronicstudfinderoverFadeley'sbodyto
22
[
]
]
]
26
TestimonyofHerbertG.ByerlyinUnitedStatesv.
No.
CR-92-080-N-EJL,April21,1993,at8-9 (hereinafter
citedas"Trial,Testimony").
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26
therecorder.
27
Atthismeeting,WeavergaveFadeleyno
indicationthathewaspredisposedtosellingillegalweapons,
28
[
]
AttheWorldAryanCongressinJuly1987,Fadeleyagainmet
Weaver,whowasaccompaniedbyhiswifeandchildren. Weaver
mentionedtoFadeleythatitwasa"struggle"toprovideforhis
family. Weaveralsodeclaredthathedidnottrusttheleaders
oftheAryanNationsandthathedidnotagreewiththeactions
ofRichardButler,leaderoftheAryanNations.
30
Afterthis
contact,
FadeleycontinuedtoviewWeaversimplyasoneofthe
manyattendeesattheWorldAryanCongress.
c. SaleofWeaponsbyWeavertoBATFInformant
FadeleyandWeavermetagainattheJuly1989WorldAryan
Congress,
whereWeaverwasoneofthespeakers.
31
Fadeleytold
Weaverthathisgun"business[was] busy." Inresponse,Weaver
didnotoffertosellFadeleyfirearms,buthedidinviteFadeley
toahousehewasrentingtodiscussformingagrouptofightthe
"ZionistOrganizedGovernment,"atermusedbyAryanNations
memberstorefertotheU.S.Government.
32
AccordingtoWeaver,
theproposedgroupwastoinclude [ ] and[
,]whohadbeenconvictedofanexplosivesviolationand
hadformedanAryanNationssplintergroupin
27
[
]
28
TrialTestimonyofKennethFadeley,April20,1993,at60
29
[]
30
FadeleyTrialTestimony,April20,1993,at60-69.
31
Intheinterim,Weaverhadrununsuccessfullyinthe
RepublicanprimaryforsheriffofBoundaryCounty. Duringhis
campaign,hepromisedtoenforceonlythoselawsthepeople
wanted,andhedistributedcardsthatsaid"getoutofjail
free." Weaverlosttheprimary,384votesto102. "Survivalist
RefusestoComeinFromCold,"TheOreqonian,October1,1991,
C8;"FedsHaveFugitive'UnderOurNose',"SpokesmanReview
(Spokane),
March1,1992,A19.
32
FadeleyTrialTestimony,April20,1993,at45,82-90.
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27
Montana,
33
was of "continuing investigative interest" to the
BATF. After learning of Weaver's plan to include [ ] in
this group, the BATF began to view Weaver as a possible point of
introduction to [ .
34
]
On September 8, 1989, at BATF's request, Fadeley telephoned
Weaver and arranged to meet him on October 11.
35
Fadeley did
not record his conversations with Weaver during the October 11
meeting. At the meeting, Weaver asked Fadeley how his business
was going. Fadeley replied that he was "extremely busy" and that
he had sold all his "product." Weaver explained that he would
like o ssist Fadeley and that ['
'
36
] Weaver tnen asked wnat the most popular itemswere,
ana Fadeley described the "street" weapons he thought he could
sell,including shotguns. In response, Weaver said that he could
supply four or five shotguns per week.[
]eaverdded
that there would be "no paper," that is, the weapons would not
have registration documents.
37
As the two men left the meeting, Fadeley walked to Weaver's
truck where Weaver showed Fadeley a shotgun and indicated a spot
on the barrel where he thought it could be cut. Fadeley pointed
to the weapon and said "abouthere"
38
[
33
Id.at 103, 112.
35
Fadeley Trial Testimony, April 20, 1993, at100-02.
36
[
] See Fadeley Trial Testimony, April 20,
38
Fadeley Trial Testimony, April 20, 1992, at 105.
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28
39
]
Followingthemeeting,SpecialAgentHerbertByerly,Fadeley's
BATFcontactagent,conductedvariousrecordscheckson
Weaver.
40
OnOctober13,1989,FadeleytelephonedWeaverfromaBATF
officeandrecordedtheconversationtoconfirmhisreportofthe
October11meeting. Duringthisdiscussion,FadeleyandWeaver
usedagreeduponcodewordsandreferredtoweaponss
41
]
OnOctober24,1989,WeavermetwithFadeley,whowas
wearingaminiaturetaperecorderandanelectronictransmitter.
Atthattime,WeavergaveFadeleytwoshotguns,onewitha13
inchbarrel,theotherwitha12-3/4inchbarrel. Weavertold
Fadeleythathehadcuttheshotgunbarrelshimself,"[s]itting
underashadetreewithaviseandahacksaw,"andaddedthat,
"whenIgetmyworkshopsetupIcandoabetter job."
42
FadeleypaidWeaver$300.00fortheweapons. WhenWeaver
requestedanadditional$150.00fortheweapons,Fadeleytoldhi:
thathewouldgivehimtheadditionalmoneyatthenext
purchase.
43
FadeleythenproceededtotellWeaverthat
"[t]hereismoneytobehad,anditlookslike [you]didareal
nicejob". HethenaskedWeaver,"Youfiguredfourcrfivea
39
[
40
ByerlyTrialTestimony,April1992at
41
[
]
42
[
]
section
5681of
Title
26ofthe
United
criminalizesthepossessionofunregisteredfirearmsandthe
alterationoffirearmsbyanyonenotinthebusinessof
manufacturing firearms. Section845(a)explainshattheterm
"firearms" includesshotgunswithbarrels
of
lesshan
18
inches
43 [ ] Byerly Trial
Testimony,April20,1993,at32-34[
]
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29
week?"towhichWeaverreplied,"yeah,ormore." Weaverrepeated
thattherewouldbenopapertrailontheweapons.
44
FadeleymetWeaveragainonNovember30,1989withthe
intentofarrangingatriptoMontanatomeet [ ] At this
time,
Weaverannouncedthathehadfiveadditionalsawed-off
shotgunsavailableforpurchase. WhenFadeleytoldhimthathe
hadnotbroughtenoughmoneytopayfor
them. [
]nddition,
weavertoldFadeleythathewasnotabletogotoMontanathat
day, [
]adeleyaidWeaver$100
towardthebalanceoftnepreviouspurchaseoftwosawed-off
shotguns.
45
Followingthismeeting,ByerlyinstructedFadeley
tohavenoadditionalcontactwithWeaver.
46
d.DelayinObtainingIndictmentandBATFEffortsto
EnlistWeaverasanInformant
[ On November24,1989,ByerlydiscussedtheWeavergunsale
with [ ]from theU.S.Attorney's
OfficeinBoise("USAO").[
47
]Fivemonthslater,on
May21,1990,Byerlysubmitted acasereporttotheUSAO
]Fadeley
TrialTestimony,t35.
45
[
46
ByerlyTrialTestimony,April0,1992at6.
47
[]
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30
recommendingthatWeaverbeprosecutedforthesaleofthesawed-
off
shotguns.
48
]
Onemonthlater,inJune1990,BATFAgents [ ]and
[]roveotheWeaverpropertytospeakwithWeaverto
determine ifhemightbewillingtocooperateintheir
investigationofAryanNationsmembers[
]neypproachedeaver,
identifiedthemselves,[
]explained toWeaver
thattheUSAOknewoftheillegalweaponssaleandthatWeaver
couldhelphimselfbyprovidinginformationtoBATFaboutthe
illegalactivitiesofAryanNationsmembers. HetoldWeaverthat
hisassistancewouldbebroughttotheU.S.Attorney's
attention.
50
Attheendoftheconversation,ByerlygaveWeaver
histelephonenumberandtoldhimthattheywouldwaitforWeaver
tocometotheBATFofficetodiscusscooperatingwiththem.
Weaverrespondedthathewouldnotbecomea"snitch."
51
50
[
51
[ ]
Vicki
Weaverdescribedthisencounterina
letter,
datedJune12,1990,addressed tothe"AryanNations&
allourbrethrenoftheAngloSaxonRace." Shewrote:
Wecannotmakedealswiththeenemy. This isa
waragainstthesonsofIsaac. Yahwehour
Yashua isourSaviorandKing ....Ifweare
notfreetoobeythelawsofYahweh,wemayas
wellbedead! Let Yah-Yashu's perfectwillbe
done. Ifitsourtime,we'llgohome. If itis
notwewillpraisehisSeparatedname!
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31
52
] OnDecember13,1990,seven
monthsafterBATFreferredthecasetotheUSAO,afederalgrand
juryintheDistrictofIdahoindictedWeaverformanufacturing
andpossessinganunregisteredfirearm.
e. ArrestandArraignmentofWeaveronWeapons
Charges
Aftertheissuanceofthearrestwarrant,BATFconductedan
evaluationofWeaverandconcludedthatitwouldbetoodangerous
tothearrestingagentsandtotheWeaverchildrenforBATFto
arrestWeaverathisresidence.
53
Therefore,BATFagents
decidedtocarryoutarusetoarrestWeaverbysurpriseaway
fromhishome. OnJanuary17,1991,twoagents,posingas
strandedmotorists,stoppedapickupcamperonabridgenearthe
Weavers'residence,raisedthehood,andpretendedtoexaminethe
engine. [ ] otherBATFAgents,and[
]idnthebackofthecamper. Shortlythereafter,
RandyandVickiWeaverstoppedtheirtruckandapproachedthe
camper. TheBATFagentsthensurprisedWeaverandplacedhim
underarrest. Intheprocess,Weaverattemptedtograboneof
theagent'ssidearms. Later,Weavertoldthearrestingagents
"nicetrick;you'llneverdothatagain."
54
Aftermakingthe
arrest,
thearrestingagentsdiscoveredthatWeaverhadapistol
inhisfrontpantspocketandVickiWeaverhadarevolverinher
purse,
whichshehadleftintheirpickuptruck.
55
]
53
[
]
55
SeePretrialServicesReport,UnitedStatesv.RandallC.
Weaver,January18,1991.[
]
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32
3. Discussion
IthasbeenallegedthatBATFsingledoutRandyWeaver
becausehesharedmanyofthepoliticalandreligiousbeliefs
associatedwiththeAryanNations,andthatBATFentrappedWeaver
inordertocoercehimtobecomeaninformant.
56
Wefound
insufficientevidencetosupporttheseclaims.
a. TheDecisionofBATFToTargetWeaver
ThisinvestigationfoundnoevidencethatBATFimproperly
targetedWeaverbecauseofhisreligiousorpoliticalbeliefs.
Instead,theevidenceindicatesthatBATFbecameinterestedin
Weavernotbecauseofhispersonalviewsbutratherbecausehe
wasacquaintedwithmembersoftheAryanNations,whowere
suspectedofbeinginvolvedinbombingsthathadoccurredin
NorthernIdaho. Indeed,BATF,whichknewofWeaver'sbeliefsfor
morethanthreeyearsbeforethesaleoftheshotgunsinOctober
1989,
hadtakennoactiontotargetWeaverforinvestigative
focusduringthat period.[
57
]WefindnothingimproperintheBATFplan.
]]
56
[
]
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33
[
59
]eccept
[ ] reasonsforseekingWeaver'scooperationandfind
nothingimproperabout[]decisiontoapproachWeaverasa
possiblesourceofinformationaboutillegalactscommittedby
membersoftheAryanNations.
b.
PossibleEntrapmentbytheBATFInformant
DefensecounselhavechargedthatWeaver"wasinducedby
federalauthorities"intosellingillegalweapons,thatis,the
governmententrappedWeaverintounlawful conduct.
60
To
establishthedefenseofentrapment,itmustbeshownthatthe
defendantwasnotpredisposedtocommitthecriminal
act.
61
A
principalfactorindeterminingwhetheradefendantwasentrapped
iswhetherthedefendantevidencedreluctancetocommitthe
offensebutwasovercomebyrepeatedgovernment persuasion.
62
[
]
Basedontheinformationavailabletous,thereisno
evidencethatWeaverproposedorwasinterestedinselling
weaponsbeforetheOctober1989meetingwithFadeley. Although
FadeleyhadseenWeaveronanumberofoccasionswithavariety
ofweapons,Weaverapparentlyhadneversaidthathewantedto
sell
guns.
NoristhereisanyindicationthatFadeley
repeatedlyproposedthatWeaversellweaponstohimandthat
Weaverrefused.
59
[]
60
MemoranduminSupportofDefendants'Motions,January6,
1993,
at2(hereinaftercitedas"Defendants'
Memorandum").
61
SeeHamptonv.UnitedStates,425U.S.484,488 (1976).
62
UnitedStatesv.Busbv,780F.2d804,805 (9thCir.
1986).
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34
.65]
However,FadeleyadmittedthathehadshownWeaverwhereto
cuttheshotguninresponsetoWeaver'ssaying,"Justtellme
what ...size [shotgun]andI'll supplywhatyouwant."
66
[
,
68
eannot
conclude,ontheevidencebeforeus,thatWeaverwascoercedor
undulyenticedintosellingweaponstoFadeley.
]
66
FadeleyTrialTestimony,April20,1993,at105[
]
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35
C. DelayinObtainingIndictment
IthasbeenallegedthatWeaver'sindictmentonweapons
chargeswasdelayedsoastogiveBATFanopportunityto"turn"
Weaver,thatis,tomakehimaBATFinformant. AlthoughBATFwas
interestedinsecuringWeaver'scooperation,wehavefoundno
evidencethattheindictmentwasdelayedtohelpthiseffort.
[
]
[
InearlyMay1990,Byerlysubmittedacasereporttothe
U.S.Attorney'sOfficerecommendingthatWeaverbeprosecutedfor
thesaleofthesawed-off shotguns.] ByerlyapproachedWeaverto
seekhiscooperationinJune 1990.[
.
70
]Sevenmonthslater,the
matterwaspresentedtoagrandjuryandanindictmentwas
returned inDecember1990.
Thisinvestigationhasuncoverednothingthatsuggests
misconduct inthespanbetweentheweaponssalein1989andthe
indictmentinDecember 1990.[
]andthereisno
evidencethatthechangewastreatedasanythingbutaroutine
matter.
4.
Conclusion
Itisourconclusionthattheinvestigationwhichledto
Weaver's indictmentfortheunlawfulsaleoftwosawed-off
shotguns,
andthedecisiontoindictwereproper. Wefoundno
evidencethatWeaverwasunfairlytargetedbyBATFattheoutset
orthatthedelayinindictinghimwas improper.[ Althoughweare
troubledbythesequenceofeventswhichimmediatelyprecededthe
saleoftheshotgunstotheconfidentialinformant,]wecannot
conclude,
basedontheevidencebeforeus,thatWeaverwas
coercedorundulyenticed intosellingthesawed-offshotguns.
69[
]
70[]
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36
B.
TheFailureofWeavertoAppearforTrial
1. Introduction
OnJanuary18,1991,RandyWeaverwasarraignedonthe
chargesthathemadeandpossessedillegalfirearms. Atthat
time,thecourtsetFebruary19,1991asthetrialdate. Several
weekslaterthecourtclerksentanoticetotheparties
informingthemthatthetrialdatehadbeenchangedfrom
February19toFebruary20. Twodayslater,U.S.Probation
OfficerKarlRichinssentalettertoWeaverinwhichhe
erroneouslyreferredtothetrialdateasMarch20,1991. When
WeaverdidnotappearincourtonFebruary20,thecourtissueda
benchwarrantforthehisarrest. Almostamonthlater,on
March14,1991,whilethebenchwarrantwasstilloutstanding,a
federalgrandjuryreturnedanindictmentagainstWeavercharging
himwithfailuretoappearfortrial.
Anumberofissueshavebeenraisedwithregardtothe
conductofthegovernmentinhandlingthisstageoftheWeaver
matter. Theseissuesinclude:whethergovernmentofficials,
particularlytheU.S.Attorney'sOffice,knewabouttheerroneous
RichinsletterbeforethecourtissuedtheFebruary20bench
warrant;whetherthegovernmentrespondedappropriatelytothe
issuescreatedbytheRichinsletter;whethertheU.S.Attorney's
Officeerredinpresentingtheindictmenttothegrandjury
beforeMarch20;andwhethertheAssistantU.S.Attorneyacted
improperlybynotdisclosingtheRichinslettertothegrand
jury.
2.
StatementofFacts
a. January18,1991Arraignment
OnDecember13,1990,afederalgrandjuryindictedRandy
Weaverformakingandpossessingillegalfirearms.
71
BATFAgent
[
]arrested
WeaveronJanuary17,1991and
transportedhimtoCoeurD'Alene,Idahoforarraignment.On
January18, [ ] informedAssistantU.S. Attorney [ ]that
Weaverhadbeenarrested,thatWeaverhadresistedarrest,that
Weaverhadsaidwhenarrested,"nicetrick;you'llneverdothat
again"
andthatWeaverappearedtobeassociatedwiththeAryan
Nation.[
72
]
71
See26U.S.C.5861(d)and(f).
72
[]
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37
Weaverappearedincourtforhisarraignmentthefollowing
daybeforeU.S.MagistrateJudgeStephenAyers. Noonewas
presentforthegovernmentatthearraignmentnorwasWeaver
representedbycounsel.
73
Atthearraignment,JudgeAyersdiscussedtheappointmentof
counselwithWeaver. Weaverconsentedtotheappointmentof
EverettHofmeister,whohadpreviouslyrepresentedhimonan
unrelatedcivilmatter. Thereafter, JudgeAyersenteredanot
guiltypleaforWeaverandinformedhimthatthetrialwasset
forFebruary19,1991inMoscow,Idaho.
74
JudgeAyersthen
addressedtheissueofpretrialreleaseanddecidedtorelease
Weaveroncertainconditionsincludingthathe"appearforall
proceedingsbeforethisCourt. Andthenextscheduledcourt
appearanceis,asIsaidearlier,yourtrialinMoscow,onthe
19thofFebruary."
75
Inaddition,JudgeAyersrequiredWeaver
toexecuteanunsecuredbondintheamountof$10,000. Judge
AyersexplainedtoWeaverthatifhefailedtoabidebyanyof
theconditionsofrelease,includingtheobligationtoappearfor
trial,
theUnitedStatescouldexecutethebondbyseizingand
sellinghisrealproperty.
76
BeforereleasingWeaver,JudgeAyersinstructedhimthathe
wasrequiredtoreportonaregularbasistoKarlRichins,the
PretrialServiceOfficer,inBoiseandthathisfirstcontactwas
tobeonJanuary 22.
77
Later,JudgeAyers,inordertoavoid
anymisunderstanding,addedRichins'nameandphonenumbertothe
ordersettingforththereleaseconditions.
78
JudgeAyerstold
Weaverthatitwouldbeacriminaloffenseifhefailedto
appear. Weaversaidthatheunderstoodthepenaltiesfor
violatingthereleaseconditionsandthatheagreedtoabideby
73
[]Accord,Trial
TestimonyofStephenAyers,April21,1993at26-27.
74
ArraignmentTranscriptinUnitedStatesv.Weaver,No.
90-092-N-HLR,onJanuary 18,1991,at6 (hereinaftercitedas
"ArraignmentTranscript").
75
Id.at10.
76
Id.
77
Id.at12.
78
Id.at18.
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38
thoseconditions. Thereafter,hesignedandreceivedacopyof
thereleaseconditions.
79
Weaveralsosignedabondandthe
courtexplainedthatthebondcouldbeexecutedifhefailedto
appearfortrial.
80
Beforeterminatingtheproceeding,Judge
AyershadWeaverconfirmthathismailingaddresswasBox103in
Naples,Idaho.
81
b. EventsOccurringFromtheArraignmentThrough
February20.1991
(1) CommunicationsWithWeaver
OnJanuary22,1991,fourdaysafterthearraignment,Judge
AyerssentalettertoEverettHofmeisterinforminghimthathe
hadbeenappointedasdefensecounselforWeaver,thatWeaver
couldbecontactedat"POBox103,Naples,Idaho
83847"
andthat
thetrialdatewassetforFebruary19,1991. Acopyofthis
letterwassenttoWeaver. Onthatsameday,Weavertelephoned
KarlRichins,theU.S.ProbationOfficer,andinformedRichins
thathehadbeenorderedtocallRichinsonthatdate. Richins
toldWeaverthathehadnotreceivedthepaperworkonhiscase
and,
thus,
couldnotadvisehimaboutthereleaseconditions.
RichinsaskedWeavertoleavehisnameandphonenumbersothat
Richinscouldcallhimwhenhereceivedthecasefile. According
toRichins,Weavernevergavehimaphonenumberwherehecould
becontactednorcouldRichinsrecallwhatunderstandingthe
partieshadastohowRichinswouldcontactWeaverinthe
future.
82
Afterthisconversation,Richinsneverheardfrom
Weaveragain.
83
OnJanuary29,1991,defensecounselHofmeistersenta
lettertothetwoaddresseshehadforWeaver,requestingWeaver
tocontacthim. HofmeistersentsimilarletterstoWeaverat
theseaddressesonJanuary31andFebruary5. AroundFebruary5,
79
Id.at15. TheOrdersettingforththeconditionsof
releasereiteratedthatthenextcourtappearancewasonFebruary
19,
1991andthatWeaverhadtocontactRichinsonJanuary22,
1991.
Condition7(g)requiredWeaverto"refrainfrompossessing
afirearm,destructivedevice,orotherdangerousweapon." Order
SettingConditionsofReleaseinUnitedStatesv.Weaver,No.
90-
092-N-HLR,January18,1991,at2(Appendixat4 ) .
80
ArraignmentTranscript,at
16-17.
81Id.
at
17-18.
82
SeeTrialTestimonyofKarlRichins,April22,1993,at
27-30.
83
Id.at
31-32.
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39
HofmeistercontactedindividualswhoknewWeaverandrequested
thattheyinstructWeavertocontactHofmeisterimmediately.
84
Meanwhile,inearlyFebruary,thecourtlearnedthatthe
Weavertrial,whichhadbeenscheduledforFebruary19,would
havetobechangedtogivetheparticipantssufficienttravel
timefollowingafederalholidayontheprecedingMonday. On
February5,thecourtclerksentanoticetotheparties
informingthemthatthetrialwasrescheduledforFebruary20,
1991. AlthoughthisnoticewasnotsentdirectlytoWeaver,a
copywassenttoandreceivedbyHofmeister.
85
Twodayslater,onFebruary7,1991,probationofficer
RichinssentalettertoWeaverathisNaplesaddress. Richins
wrote:
OnJanuary18,1991,youwerereleasedon
PretrialSupervisionpendingyourtrialsetfor
March20,1991. YoucontactedourofficeandI
advisedyouwewouldbegettingbackwithyouas
soonaswereceivedthepaperworkfrom
MagistrateAyers. Ihavelongagoreceivedthe
paperworkbuthavebeenunabletolocatea
telephonenumberwhere1couldcontactyou.
Accordingly,withthisletter,Iare[sic]
requestingyoutocontactmeat 334-163 0assoon
aspossible. Youmaycallcollectifyou
choose.
86
(Emphasisadded.)
AccordingtoRichins,hewrotetheletterbecauseheneeded
toestablishpretrialsupervisionofWeaverandhadnotheard
fromWeaversincetheirJanuary22phoneconversation.
87
The
onlyexplanationthatRichinscouldprovidefortheerroneous
trialdatewasthatitwasatypographicalerror. Attrial,
Richinsexpressedregretfortheerrorandtestifiedthathe
84
HearingTranscriptinUnitedStatesv.Weaver.No.90
092-N-HLRonFebruary20,1991,at2-5 (hereinaftercitedas
"HearingTranscript").
85
SeeNoticedatedFebruary5m1991,inUnitedStatesv.
Weaver,No.90-092-N-HLR (Appendixat7 ) .
86
SeeLetterfromKarlL.RichinstoRandyWeaver,February
7,1991(Appendixat 8 ) . Thereisnoindicationontheletter
thatProbationsentcopiestoanyotherparty.