Post on 13-Apr-2020
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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE LITTLE INDIA RIOT
ON 8 DECEMBER 2013
ANNEXES
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Annex A: List of Witnesses at the Public Hearing A-2
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Annex A
List of Witnesses at the Public Hearing
S/N Name Occupation Role
1. Dr Michael Tay Ming
Kiong
Forensic scientist Fatal traffic accident
reconstruction expert
2. Dr Marian Wang Forensic pathologist Prepared autopsy
report
3. Dr Yao Yi Ju Toxi-analyst Prepared toxicology
report
4. Wong Geck Woon Bus coordinator Bus coordinator/
“timekeeper”
5. Lee Kim Huat Bus Driver Driver of bus
CB6978T
6. DCP T Raja Kumar Deputy
Commissioner of
Police
Ag Commissioner of
Police on 8
December 2013
7. Ganesan Thanaraj Welder Foreign worker /
passenger on bus
8. Nathan Chandra Sekaran Auxiliary Police
Officer
Auxiliary Police
Officer at scene
9. Raymond Murugiasu Auxiliary Police
Officer
Auxiliary Police
Officer at scene
10. Srisivasangkar A/L
Subramaniam
Auxiliary Police
Officer
Auxiliary Police
Officer at scene
11. ASP Jonathan Tang
Wenhao
Police officer Police Officer at
scene / initial SPF
ground commander
12. SSSgt Mydeen s/o Sahul
Hameed
Police officer First Police Officer at
scene
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Annex A: List of Witnesses at the Public Hearing A-3
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S/N Name Occupation Role
13. SSgt Mak Chung Kit Police officer First Police Officer at
scene
14. SSgt Chandru Sivadass Police officer Combined
Operations Room
officer
15. SSI Neo Chee Cheng Police officer Duty OC, Division
Operations Team
16. SSgt Yang Yan Ching Police officer Kampong Java
Neighbourhood
Police Centre (NPC)
Counter Duty Officer
17. SC/Sgt Abdul Aziz Bin
Abdul Khalid
Police officer Police Officer at
scene
18. ASP Yong Wen Wei
Edwin
Police officer Police Officer at
scene
19. SC/Cpl Arshard Bin Abdul
Murad
Police officer Police Officer at
scene
20. Mahmood Bin Masdar Auxiliary Police
Officer
Auxiliary Police
Officer / CISCO
supervisor at scene
21. SSgt Azmi Bin Mohamed
Hamzah
Police officer Police Officer at
scene
22. SSI(2) Akhbar Bin Hj Ali Police officer Police Officer at
scene
23. SSgt Kamisah Binte
Hanafi
Police officer Police Officer at
scene
24. SI Muhammad Adil Bin
Lawi
Traffic police officer Traffic Police Officer
at scene
25. Sgt Fadli Shaifuddin Bin
Mohamed Sani
Traffic police officer Traffic Police Officer
at scene
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Annex A: List of Witnesses at the Public Hearing A-4
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S/N Name Occupation Role
26. LTA Neo Mei Shan
Tiffany
SCDF Officer ROTA Commander /
initial SCDF ground
commander
27. LTC Daniel Seet Commander, First
SCDF Division
Commander, First
SCDF Division
28. DC Lim Jew Sai Jackson Deputy
Commissioner of
SCDF
Review of the actions
of SCDF
29. DAC Lu Yeow Lim Commander, Tanglin
Police Division
SPF Ground
Commander /
Incident Manager
30. DAC Koh Wei Keong 2 Deputy Director,
SPF Operations
Department
Acting Director,
Operations on 8
December 2013
31. DAC David Scott Arul Deputy Commander
Special Operations
Command (SOC)
Police Tactical
Commander at scene
32. Kannadasan Murugan Police Officer SOC Intelligence
33. DSP Lim Sin Bin Police Officer
OC Troop KA,
SOC
34. Jennie Yeo Kha Keaw Deputy Executive
Secretary, Building
Construction and
Timber Industries
Employees’ Union
Union representative
35. Bernard Menon Executive Director,
Migrant Workers’
Centre
NGO Representative
36. Kannadasan Murugan Construction worker
Foreign worker at
scene
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Annex A: List of Witnesses at the Public Hearing A-5
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S/N Name Occupation Role
37. Seenuvasan Selvaraja Excavator operator
Foreign worker at
scene
38. M. Govindaraju Singapore Tamil
Community
Representative
NGO Representative
39. Panjacharam Raveentheran Singapore Tamil
Community
Representative
NGO Representative
40. Kannadasan Murugan Site Supervisor
Foreign worker at
scene
41. Kannadasan Murugan Construction worker Foreign worker at
scene
42. Kannadasan Murugan Construction worker Foreign worker at
scene
43. Russell Heng President, Transient
Workers Count Too
NGO Representative
44. Lim Jit Say Executive Director,
Singapore
Contractors
Association Limited
Representative from
Singapore
Contractors
Association Limited
45. Kannadasan Murugan Construction worker
Foreign worker at
scene
46. Kannadasan Murugan Construction worker Foreign worker at
scene
47. Chakravarthy Rintu Project Director,
Lum Chang Building
Contractors Pte Ltd
Representative of
foreign worker
employer
48. Pereira C Martin Air Traffic
Controller
Chairman, Tekka
Residents’
Committee
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Annex A: List of Witnesses at the Public Hearing A-6
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S/N Name Occupation Role
49. Seet Hing Long Engineer Resident, Chander
Road
50. Braema Mathi President, MARUAH NGO Representative
51. K Vataramathi Ramanatha
Kurukkal
Self-Employed,
Wedding Planner
Member of public
52. Fajar Priyanto Employed in IT
industry
Resident, Buffalo
Road
53. Tan Huilinn Housewife Resident, Buffalo
Road
54. Rungnapa Kitiarsa Representative,
Friends of Thai
Workers Association
NGO Representative
55. Supaluk Balcer Representative,
Friends of Thai
Workers Association
NGO Representative
56. Wichai
Sumanatkhajonkulu
Representative,
Friends of Thai
Workers Association
NGO Representative
57. Ho Kin Hong Retiree Resident, Buffalo
Road
58. Lim Choon Kiang Hawker Resident, Buffalo
Road
59. Junaidi Lim Operations Manager Resident, Chander
Road
60. Vincent Wijeysingha Representative,
Workfair Singapore
NGO Representative
61. Kannadasan Murugan Little India restaurant
manager
Little India restaurant
manager
62. Ahamad Abdul Jabbar Chief Chef, Song of
India Restaurant
Little India restaurant
worker
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Annex A: List of Witnesses at the Public Hearing A-7
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S/N Name Occupation Role
63. Lim Herh Kim Chairman, Rowell
Court Residents’
Committee
Chairman, Rowell
Court Residents’
Committee
64. Kannadasan Murugan Little India shop-
owner
Little India shop-
owner
65. Gwee Nyuk Liang Cashier Resident, Buffalo
Road
66. Suresh Kumar Kumaresan Director Director of liquor
shop in Little India
67. Kannadasan Murugan Little India restaurant
owner
Little India restaurant
owner
68. Wong Ann Lin Bus operator Chairman, Singapore
Schools Transport
Association (SSTA)
69. Tan Jwee Tuan Bus co-ordinator Supervisor of SSTA
time-keepers at Little
India
70. S. Rajagopal Vice-President, Little
India Shopkeepers
and Heritage
Association (LISHA)
Vice-President, Little
India Shopkeepers
and Heritage
Association (LISHA)
71. Shahul Hameed Syed
Yoosufsha
Owner, Y. Shahul
Hameed Glass &
Frame Makers
Little India shop-
owner
72. Kannadasan Murugan Little India restaurant
manager
Little India restaurant
manager
73. Kannadasan Murugan Little India restaurant
worker
Little India restaurant
worker
74. Shriniwas Rai Lawyer Member of Public
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Annex A: List of Witnesses at the Public Hearing A-8
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S/N Name Occupation Role
75. Tan Jun How Michael Private bus operator Singapore School
and Private-Hire Bus
Owners’ Association
(S7) Representative
76. Yeo Teck Guan Group Director,
Public Transport
Group, Land
Transport Authority
LTA Representative
77. Lin Shunzhong Auxiliary Police
Officer
Most senior
Auxiliary Police
Officer at scene
78. Malini Naidu a/p
Janarthana Naidu
Auxiliary Police
Officer
Auxiliary Police
Officer involved in
Foreign Worker
Management
79. Kevin Teoh Divisional Director,
Foreign Manpower
Management
Division, Ministry of
Manpower (MOM)
MOM / IMC
representative
80. Yaacob Bin Khamis SCDF paramedic SCDF Paramedic at
scene
81. Ler Seng Ann Group Director
(Conservation &
Development
Services), Urban
Redevelopment
Authority
Little India Task
Force representative
82. SUPT Victor Ho Assistant Director,
Ops Management,
SPF
Assistant Director,
Ops Management,
SPF
83. Hisham Bin Alias Manager of Avery
Lodge
Manager of foreign
worker dormitory
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Annex A: List of Witnesses at the Public Hearing A-9
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S/N Name Occupation Role
84. Saffarullah S/O Abdullah Security Manager of
Penjuru Dormitory
Security Manager of
Penjuru Dormitory
85. DSP Ho See Ying Commanding
Officer, Rochor NPC
Commanding
Officer, Rochor NPC
86. DAC Daniel Tan Sin Heng Commander, Central
Police Division
Senior SPF
Commander at scene
87. Willy Ng Dormitory Operator Dormitory owner
88. AC Jessica Kwok Director, Police
Licensing and
Regulatory
Department
Director, Police
Licensing and
Regulatory
Department
89. Dr Majeed Khader Senior Consultant
Psychologist, Home
Team Academy
Director, Home
Team Behavioural
Sciences Centre
Prepared behavioural
analysis report
90. SDS Khoo Boon Hui Senior Deputy
Secretary, Ministry
of Home Affairs
Policing Expert
(MHA)
91. Kannadasan Murugan Director Director of shop in
Little India
92. CP Ng Joo Hee Commissioner of
Police
Commissioner of
Police
93. Adam Fashe Huddin CNB Officer Investigating Officer
The names of witnesses who have requested that their names not be published
have been redacted.
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Annex B: Summary of Evidence Led at the Public Hearing B-10
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Annex B
Summary of Evidence Led at the Public Hearing
Witnesses and Exhibits
1. At the close of the public hearing, the Committee of Inquiry (‘COI’) had,
over the span of 5 weeks, heard from 131 witnesses. Of these, 93 material
witnesses appeared before the COI to testify. The evidence of the
remaining 38 witnesses was adduced through conditioned statements.
2. In the course of the public hearing, a number of witnesses also provided
reports and presentations in support of their oral evidence. These
materials have been tendered and marked as exhibits.
3. What is set out below is a summary of the salient points of the witnesses’
evidence given at the public hearing. The COI may not have accepted all
of the evidence as accurate or relevant.
Summary of Evidence of Individual Witnesses
4. Salient points from the evidence of the following individual witnesses are
summarized below:
(a) Dr Michael Tay Ming Kiong (‘Dr Tay’);
(b) Dr Marian Wang (‘Dr Wang’);
(c) Ms Wong Geck Woon (‘Ms Wong’);
(d) Mr Lee Kim Huat (‘Mr Lee’);
(e) Mr Ganesan Thanaraj (‘Mr Ganesan’);
(f) ASP Jonathan Tang (‘ASP Tang’);
(g) LTA Tiffany Neo (‘LTA Neo’);
(h) DAC Lu Yeow Lim (‘DAC Lu’);
(i) Deputy Commissioner of Police T Raja Kumar (‘DC Raja
Kumar’);
(j) Commissioner of Police Ng Joo Hee (‘CP Ng’);
(k) Dr Majeed Khader (‘Dr Majeed’); and
(l) Senior Deputy Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs, Khoo Boon
Hui (‘Mr Khoo’).
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Annex B: Summary of Evidence Led at the Public Hearing B-11
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(a) Evidence of Dr Michael Tay
5. Dr Tay, a Senior Consultant Forensic Scientist with ‘The Forensic Experts
Group’, possesses 24 years of experience in the field of forensic science,
with a special interest in the field of traffic accident reconstruction. He
was commissioned by the Traffic Police to conduct a forensic
examination and scientific reconstruction of the fatal accident on 8
December 2013, involving the bus bearing license plate number
CB6978T (‘the Bus’) and Sakthivel Kumaravelu (‘the Deceased’). Dr
Tay’s findings were presented to the COI in the Traffic Accident
Reconstruction Report.
6. In his evidence, Dr Tay made numerous references to closed-circuit
television video footage (‘CCTV’) obtained from four cameras mounted
on the bus – namely, one front-facing camera, one camera capturing the
interior of the Bus and one camera on either wing mirror of the Bus (the
Bus also had a fifth camera facing out the back of the Bus, but it was not
activated at the time of the accident as it only activates when the reverse
gear is engaged).
7. Dr Tay testified that, from an analysis of the video footage, the Bus had
moved a short distance from its initial stationary position at the bend
along Tekka Lane, before filtering to the right lane in order to overtake
two stationary buses on its left. The Bus then filtered back into the left
lane and slowed down as it approached the junction of Tekka Lane and
Race Course Road, before making a left turn onto Race Course Road. Dr
Tay testified that the Bus was travelling at an average speed of between
5.6 km/h to 5.7 km/h as it moved along Tekka Lane. It then accelerated to
about 10.8 km/h as the driver executed the turn onto Race Course Road,
before coming to a halt after the accident.
8. Dr Tay also testified that CCTV footage from the left-wing camera
showed the Deceased in the lead-up to the accident. CCTV footage
played during the public hearing showed the Deceased initially walking
alongside the door of the Bus as it began moving. The Deceased then fell
behind as the Bus begins accelerating along Tekka Lane. He however
appeared alongside the Bus when it began to slow down as it approaches
the junction of Tekka Lane and Race Course Road. The video footage
showed the Deceased running as he placed his right palm on the left side
of the Bus, near the door.
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Annex B: Summary of Evidence Led at the Public Hearing B-12
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9. According to Dr Tay, the Deceased began to fall forward some 1.16
seconds after his right palm came into contact with the Bus. 0.6 seconds
later, the Deceased fell face forward onto the road, about 33cm in front of
the Bus and directly into the path of its front left tyre. Dr Tay further
testified that the left front tyre of the Bus ran over the right side of the
Deceased’s chest and thereafter the right side of his neck before finally
running over his head. The collision was observed to have occurred at
21:07:35 hours according to the time stamp on the said video footage.
This timing translates to approximately 9.20pm, Singapore Standard Time
(‘SST’), taking into account a 13-minute discrepancy between the time
stamp on the CCTV footage and SST.
10. Dr Tay also shed some light on the field of view the driver would have
had at the time of the accident. The COI’s key concern arose out of
whether the driver would have or ought to have seen the Deceased
alongside the Bus in the lead-up to the accident. Dr Tay explained that the
driver would have had 3 possible means of detecting the Deceased. First,
through the transparent panels on the door of the Bus. Second, through
the left-wing mirror. Third, through footage captured by the camera
mounted on the left-wing mirror and displayed on the screen in front of
the driver (it was, however, revealed in later testimony that the driver did
not have the screen switched on, on the night of the accident).
11. Dr Tay testified that the Deceased would only have been visible in
footage from the camera mounted on the left-wing mirror in the 4 seconds
just prior to the accident. Elaborating, he categorically stated that during
this critical interval, the Deceased would not have been visible to the
driver through the left-wing mirror itself or through the front door –
A: So the visibility and the detection of the deceased in the left mirror
and through the bus door, I already have mentioned. Here is a summary.
The highest probability for detection was from 07.08 to 07.18, when the
deceased was walking alongside the door of the bus. So the driver could
have, during this time interval, seen part of the head as well as upper
chest of the deceased. This recognition also would be contingent on the
external lighting conditions. The deceased was not visible to the bus
driver in the left mirror [or] through the front door during the critical
period at the T-junction from 07.30 to 07.34, just before the deceased
fell on the roadway.
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Annex B: Summary of Evidence Led at the Public Hearing B-13
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12. On the likely reasons as to why the Deceased had fallen, Dr Tay testified
that it was likely a combination of at least some of the following factors:
i. The road surface was wet, resulting in a higher probability of the
Deceased slipping;
ii. The Deceased had been running, which made it harder for him to
maintain, as well as to regain, balance;
iii. The Deceased’s left hand was at his waist holding a long umbrella,
which affected his stability while running after the bus;
iv. The Deceased’s right palm was pressed against the left side of the
bus, thereby coupling his running speed to the speed of the running
bus and reducing his stability;
v. The Deceased was following the curved path of the bus and was
not running in a straight line, thus complicating his movement; and
vi. The Deceased’s cognitive abilities, judgment and motor skills were
impaired by alcohol intoxication.
13. Dr Tay also assessed the cognitive workload (viz. the visual and motor
tasks) of the driver – both in the lead-up to, and at the time of, the
accident. Having analyzed CCTV footage which provided an insight into
the prevailing conditions at the time of the accident, he testified that there
were buses parked along Tekka Lane as well as vehicles travelling from
the driver’s right to left along Race Course Road. Additionally, there were
also an estimated “20 to 30” pedestrians in the immediate vicinity of the
Bus as it travelled along Tekka Lane towards Race Course Road. He
explained that many of these pedestrians crossed a few metres in front of
the moving Bus. Others, he said, were walking along the centerline of the
road. Dr Tay further testified that at the junction of Tekka Lane and Race
Course Road, the driver would, in preparing to merge with oncoming
traffic, have focused on finding a suitable gap in the ebb and flow of
traffic. It was thus possible that the driver had not paid enough attention
to pedestrians on either side of the Bus. Dr Tay stressed that these tasks
and assessments (of vehicular and pedestrian traffic) would have been
performed under low light and low contrast conditions as the incident
occurred at night.
(b) Evidence of Dr Marian Wang
14. Dr Wang, a Forensic Pathologist with the Health Sciences Authority,
performed an autopsy on the Deceased on 9 December 2013. She
presented the COI with an Autopsy Report detailing her findings.
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Annex B: Summary of Evidence Led at the Public Hearing B-14
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15. Dr Wang testified that the autopsy revealed the cause of death to be
multiple injuries, comprising – (a) severe head injury with extensive skull
fractures and lacerated brain matter which mostly extruded from the
cranial vault; (b) fractures of the voice box; (c) multiple rib fractures with
a rupture of the right lung; (d) rupture of the right lobe of liver; and (e) a
fracture of the right shoulder blade. Dr Wang further testified that the
pattern and nature of the injuries were in keeping with that of an
individual who had been run over by the tire(s) of a motor vehicle on the
right side of the chest, right side of the neck and over the head. She
maintained this upon being shown the video footage of the accident.
16. She also testified that based on the extensive head injuries suffered by the
Deceased, death would have been instantaneous; “the injuries [were]
immediately fatal”. Flowing from this, she explained that it would not
have been possible for the Deceased to have cried out for help after he
was run over.
17. Commenting on toxicology results, Dr Wang testified that ethanol was
present in the Deceased’s post-mortem sample of blood at a concentration
of 217mg of per 100ml of blood. She explained that at this level, an
average individual could be expected to be moderately to severely
intoxicated. She elaborated that a moderately intoxicated individual
would experience impaired motor-skills (viz. loss of coordination, balance
and slower reflexes) and impaired judgment (viz. increased risk-taking
behaviour).
(c) Evidence of Ms Wong Geck Woon (Timekeeper)
18. Ms Wong was the timekeeper assigned to the Bus on the night in
question. Her evidence centered primarily on her interaction with the
Deceased on 8 December 2013.
19. In recounting her first encounter with the Deceased at the boarding area
along Tekka Lane near Lamp Post 74R3, Ms Wong testified that some
workers informed her that the Deceased had boarded an already crowded
bus by jumping the queue. Unhappy, the workers further informed her
that the Deceased was drunk. She added that the bus driver, Mr Lee, then
informed her that the Deceased had pulled his trousers down on board the
Bus. Acting on this information, Ms Wong sought the assistance of
another foreign worker “to go up and take a look whether the person had
indeed pulled down his pants.” When the worker confirmed the aforesaid,
Ms Wong boarded the Bus and asked the Deceased “to put on his pants.”
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Annex B: Summary of Evidence Led at the Public Hearing B-15
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She then remained on the Bus waiting for him to alight as instructed.
After some initial hesitation, she testified that the Deceased disembarked
voluntarily. She maintained that she had not pushed him or touched him
in any way as he alighted.
20. After alighting, the Deceased walked away in the direction of Race
Course Road. Having reached full capacity, the Bus began to move off.
Ms Wong, who was by then at the boarding area along Tekka Lane,
turned her attention to the second bus which had just arrived. As
passengers were boarding this second bus, a worker approached her and
informed her that someone had been run over by the first Bus. Ms Wong
proceeded to the scene immediately.
21. When she reached, a crowd had already gathered around the Bus. She
recounted being struck on the back of her head as she attempted to peer at
the body beneath the Bus. She testified that she was advised to board the
Bus and seek refuge inside as the situation became more “chaotic” and
individuals began “hitting the bus” and taking photographs of her and the
driver. Sensing that the crowd was angry because “an Indian man had
died”, Ms Wong testified that she attempted to engage them in English by
telling “these people not to be so angry”.
22. Heeding the advice of yet to be unidentified Good Samaritan, Ms Wong
sought refuge in the Bus together with the driver. She testified that beer
bottles were thrown into the Bus. She crouched and covered herself with
a raincoat in a bid to shield herself from the projectiles. She recounted
being assaulted by two workers who had climbed into the Bus looking for
the driver. Ms Wong was eventually rescued by SCDF and police officers
who escorted her to an ambulance.
23. In the course of questioning, Ms Wong agreed that both she and the driver
were the target of the crowd’s anger on the night in question. As seen in
the exchange reproduced below, she denied however, being rude to the
workers and talking to them in a derogatory manner –
CHAIRMAN: I have a few questions for you. The first question is
basically a repetition of what had already been said. A good number of
people have told me that there is a long history of you being rude to the
workers, humiliating them and then calling them all kinds of names and
in fact complaints were made against you. Are you aware of that?
A: I don’t know.
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Annex B: Summary of Evidence Led at the Public Hearing B-16
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CHAIRMAN: Some of the remarks you make towards them are in a
very derogatory manner, relating to their race.
A: I did not.
...
CHAIRMAN: All right. But if what you say is true, why would they go
for you after the accident? I can understand them going against the bus
driver, but why you?
A: I don’t know.
24. Ms Wong conceded however, that she had in the past, raised her voice at
the workers. She explained that this was necessary to ensure that they
complied with her instructions –
A: Sometimes I became hot tempered in the course of my work, so
sometimes I raised my voice at them.
Q1: I see, sometimes you raised your voice at them. I see. So is that why
you think they were angry at you?
A: Yes.
…
Q: Yes. So in performing your job, how would you do it? Would they
always follow your instructions?
A: Some of them would comply with my instructions. Some would not.
Q: Were you strict with them?
A: Yes, to some.
Q: Do you use vulgarities at them sometimes?
A: No.
…
Q: How would you deal with those unreasonable ones?
A: I would raise my voice. I would shout at them.
1 Unless otherwise stated, ‘Q:’ refers to statements made by the State Counsel.
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Q: Would they then comply with your instructions?
A: Yes.
Q: I’m going to ask you specifically, Ms Wong, did you, in the course
of your work, use words like “stupid”, “idiot”, when directing the
workers at the boarding area? Did you use words like this to them?
A: No.
Q: Did you have to push them to get in line?
A: No.
25. Apart from her evidence vis-à-vis events on 8 December 2013, Ms Wong
also testified that she would typically observe more drunk workers at
Tekka Lane on the first two weekends of each month. She attributed this
to the fact that workers would receive their salary at the start of the
month. It was also her evidence that the bus drivers had agreed not to
ferry drunken workers on their buses, as there had been previous
instances where these workers had vomited or urinated on the bus. She
explained that as a result of this agreement, drunken workers would not
be permitted to board the buses.
(d) Evidence of Mr Lee Kim Huat (Bus Driver)
26. Mr Lee was the driver of the Bus on the night in question. Like Ms Wong,
he gave an account of the events that transpired on 8 December 2013.
27. Mr Lee said that he had been ferrying workers to and from Little India to
their dormitories every Sunday for the past 12 years. He testified that the
Bus was equipped with 5 video cameras, the images of which were
displayed on a monitor the size of an iPad mini, located “around mouth
level” to the left of the driver. The cameras were meant to aid the driver
in operating the Bus, as they provided a view of the front, rear, left and
right sides of the Bus as well as its interior. Critically, Mr Lee testified
that he had not turned on the monitor on the night in question as he found
the glare distracting.
28. Focusing on the events that unfolded on 8 December 2013, Mr Lee
testified that the Deceased’s unsteady gait as he approached the Bus and
boarded, suggested that he was drunk. He recalled the Deceased
complying with Ms Wong’s direction to disembark. He corroborated Ms
Wong’s assertion that the Deceased alighted voluntarily without anyone
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Annex B: Summary of Evidence Led at the Public Hearing B-18
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pushing him or touching him.
29. Mr Lee recounted thereafter waiting for a few minutes as the Bus filled to
full capacity. He then closed the doors to the Bus and began driving along
Tekka Lane. When the Bus was about two bus lengths from Race Course
Road, he testified noticing (through the transparent glass doors) the
Deceased alongside the door to the Bus. He waved at Mr Lee in what
appeared to be a signal for the latter to stop and allow him onboard. Mr
Lee however, continued driving down Tekka Lane after signaling that the
Bus was full. He testified that his attention was on the road ahead of him
as there were many pedestrians. He was also paying attention to vehicular
traffic on his left, and as he approached the intersection of Tekka Lane
and Race Course Road, his attention turned to oncoming vehicular traffic
from his right. In the midst of making the left turn onto Race Course
Road, Mr Lee testified that he felt a “bump or jerk as if I was crossing a
hump.” He stopped the Bus immediately and alighted to ascertain what
had happened.
30. Mr Lee saw an “Indian man lying under the Bus, in front of the left rear
wheel.” A huge crowd had begun forming around the Bus. Mr Lee
testified that he did not move the Bus as he was “very scared”. He
explained that he thought that he was not supposed to move anything
after a collision. Further, he assumed that the individual under the Bus
had died –
A: To my mind, since the big vehicle went over him, he must have been
dead.
…
Q: Because you also felt the hump, right? You went over a hump and
then you came down and you saw a man pinned underneath your bus,
right?
A: Yes.
Q: And your bus is such a huge vehicle.
A: Yes.
Q: And to your mind, this person had passed away?
A: Yes.
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31. Mr Lee eventually boarded the Bus, seeking refuge within it, when he
realized that both he and Ms Wong were being targeted by the
increasingly aggressive and agitated crowd of individuals around the Bus.
32. Once inside, Mr Lee recalled the Bus being pelted by projectiles. He
eventually hid beneath a dustbin which had been thrown into the Bus. In
the midst of hiding, he recounted overhearing some men asking Ms Wong
“where is the uncle?” He testified that Ms Wong was assaulted by the
men when she told them she did not know where he was. When queried,
Mr Lee agreed that the men were actually looking for him.
33. Mr Lee recounted being rescued by SCDF officers. He testified that
SCDF and Police officers formed a cordon around him as they escorted
him to an ambulance. He was later conveyed to Tan Tock Seng Hospital
for medical treatment.
34. When queried on the level of drunkenness he had observed in Little India
on Sundays, Mr Lee testified that he had not encountered any unruly or
rowdy incidents in the course of his work over the past 5 years. He
however corroborated Ms Wong’s evidence that the bus drivers had
agreed not to ferry drunken workers on their buses.
(e) Evidence of Ganesan Thanaraj (Bus Passenger)
35. Mr Ganesan was a passenger aboard the Bus on 8 December 2013. His
evidence centered on two areas - (1) the events on 8 December 2013, and
(2) his experience as a foreign worker in Singapore.
36. According to Mr Ganesan, he first encountered the Deceased at the
boarding area along Tekka Lane while they were waiting to board the
Bus. He testified that the Deceased appeared to have consumed alcohol.
This impression was based on “his manner of speech … and [the fact
that] he also staggered a little.” Mr Ganesan told the public hearing that
the Deceased made unpleasant remarks about Bangladeshi workers as he
“kept asking if the Bangladeshi workers were better than Indian
workers.”
37. When the Bus arrived, Mr Ganesan shared that the Deceased cut the
queue and boarded ahead of those who had been in front of him. He
recounted that the Deceased eventually disembarked after being asked to
do so by the timekeeper. He was unable to comment on whether the
Deceased had lowered his pants whilst on the Bus, as he “did not see”
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this. Pertinently, Mr Ganesan corroborated Ms Wong and Mr Lee’s
assertion that the Deceased alighted voluntarily – “no one had pushed
him. He came down on his own accord.”
38. As the Bus eventually departed, Mr Ganesan observed the Deceased
running towards the vehicle as it turned. He then felt a bump and
concluded that the Deceased had been run over. Mr Ganesan disembarked
and saw a body pinned beneath the Bus. He left the scene of the accident
and returned to the bus boarding area at Tekka Lane, and boarded another
bus to return to his dormitory.
39. In the course of his testimony, Mr Ganesan stated that he had not met the
Deceased prior to the incident on 8 December 2013, and that he did not
know any of the other passengers on the Bus on the night in question.
40. In respect of his experience as a foreign worker in Singapore, Mr
Ganesan testified that he had been working in Singapore since 2003. He
had gone back to India on several occasions upon the completion of his
contract, only to return to work again. Mr Ganesan told the COI that he
liked working in Singapore as “the country is good. It is clean. They
maintain rules and the law. Everything is proper.” When queried on his
satisfaction with working conditions, he stated that the “conditions are
very acceptable. I have no issues with the conditions. That’s why I
continued working in Singapore.”
41. When asked if there was anything he would like to change, Mr Ganesan
highlighted that agency fees were a problem that needed to be addressed.
He explained that high fees had to be paid to agents in India.
42. In explaining the allure of Little India, Mr Ganesan shared that “Little
India serves as a nice place for all foreign workers to meet”. He shared
that he patronized Little India to meet his friends and visit the temple.
43. When asked for his opinion on the cause of the riot, Mr Ganesan
commented that “there was an accident and an Indian worker had been
killed. It was an emotional outburst because of that death.”
(f) Evidence of ASP Jonathan Tang
44. ASP Tang, a Team Leader at Kampong Java NPC, was the first ground
commander at the scene, and oversaw the SPF response in the first phase
of the riot.
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45. ASP Tang testified that he first received information about a road traffic
accident along Race Course Road at about 9.27 pm on 8 December 2013.
As he knew the area tended to be “chaotic” on Sunday evenings, he
decided to respond to the accident personally and proceeded to the scene
with his partner.
46. ASP Tang arrived at the scene at about 9.40 pm. Upon arriving, he
noticed a large crowd of approximately 200 people gathered around the
Bus – “my estimate was that there was 100 persons directly in front of
me. On the other side of the bus, there were at least another 100. This
group was also trying to get very close to the bus. As he neared the Bus,
he saw that it was damaged. The windscreen was shattered and the
windows were either shattered or broken. He heard the sound of glass
shattering and realized that various objects such as glass bottles were
being thrown at Bus. It was at this juncture that ASP Tang noticed SCDF
officers attempting to extricate the Deceased from beneath the Bus.
47. He also observed a Chinese lady (later determined to be Ms Wong)
standing inside the Bus, screaming for help in Mandarin. ASP Tang
sensed that the crowd was angry with her –
A: I noticed that there were – tend to be a larger number of items being
thrown towards the part of the bus where she was standing. On top of
that, I also noticed that whenever she was pointing – she was pointing
towards the crowd and she was shouting loudly, and every time she
pointed, when she shouted, there would be a very distinct response from
the crowd. They seemed to be either jeering at her or cheering
something.
…
A: So I noticed this correlation between when she shouts, the crowd will
respond; when she shouts, the crowd will respond. So I figured that they
are reacting to her and they’re angry because of her.
48. Recognizing the gravity of the situation, ASP Tang radioed for backup
and quickly assessed that his first mission was to assist SCDF officers
who were attempting to extricate the Deceased’s body as they were being
harassed and hindered by the crowd. ASP Tang thus gathered his
available resources – 2 SPF Officers and 4 CISCO officers – and directed
them to form a human barrier/cordon between the crowd and SCDF
personnel –
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A: When I arrived, civil defence was already doing their extrication of
this person from under the bus … the problem was that they were being
harassed by the crowd, so my mission was to give them that space and
enough time that they need so that they can extricate the body.
…
A: The crowd I noticed, they were very emotional. Some of them were
saying things like, “That is my friend, that is my friend, my countryman.
Why did this happen?” so they were trying to get closer and closer to the
bus. They were trying to get access to the person who was pinned under
the bus.
…
A: So I told CISCO you have to form this human barrier between the
crowd and the SCDF officers so the civil defence officers have enough
space they need to work, because they have all the equipment, all the
heavy equipment and everything.
49. ASP Tang felt that he and his officers were significantly outnumbered –
Q: So just to give us a sense of the situation you had that night. You had
four CISCO officers and two police officers versus a rowdy and
increasingly boisterous crowd of around, you say, 200 people around the
bus?
A: Yes, that is correct.
Q: Would you agree that you were grossly outnumbered at this point?
A: Yes.
50. In a bid to assess the crowd, ASP Tang traversed the ground. As he did so,
he observed that the crowd, which had continued to swell as SCDF
extrication operations were underway, now numbered approximately 400
people. Of these, he determined 50 to 80 of them to be curious bystanders
whilst 100 to 200 of them were actively contributing to the mayhem –
A: … I would put the estimate at around 400.
…
Q: How many of these 400-odd people would constitute this group of
curious bystanders?
A: These would be the ones closest to the bus, probably 50 to 80 of
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them.
…
A: The remaining – I would estimate about 100 to 200, they were lining
this Race Course Road along the sides, under the shop houses, and there
were a few here, further back. These were actually throwing things at
the bus, throwing things at the accident site …
Q: So in your estimation you had about 150 individuals whom you
believed were active participants in creating the mayhem?
A: Yes.
Q: And by ‘active’, you mean they were pelting the bus with projectiles?
A: Yes.
Q: They were shouting?
A: Correct.
Q: Whistling?
A: Yes.
Q: And other forms of encouragement?
A: Yes.
…
Q: … are you sure its 150, ASP Jonathan, and not 20 to 25 or even 30
active rioters?
A: I’m quite sure it is 150 – definitely not 20 or 25.
Q: You say “definitely not”?
A: Definitely not 20 or 25.
Q: There’s a big difference between 25 and 30 as opposed to 150.
A: Yes.
Q: So you are certain that it was 150 active rioters?
A: Yes.
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51. Although the violence was still targeted at the Bus and its occupants at
this stage, ASP Tang assessed that the situation had the propensity to
develop into a major public order incident. He thus contacted ‘E’
Division’s Operations Room (‘E DOR’) and sought approval for the
activation of Special Operations Command (‘SOC’) troops.
52. Queried on why he had not deemed it appropriate to engage the crowd
with a view to dispersing them, ASP Tang explained that it was simply
not feasible to do so at that juncture, given the limited resources he had at
his disposal –
A: The barrier helped in what I want to accomplish. If there is no
barrier, there wouldn’t have been an extrication, the body could still
have been there… what I did was I formed the human barrier. I said this
is our number one mission. We help SCDF conduct their extrication.
Number two, we get the female Chinese out of the bus to safety. Those
people who are throwing the stones and the rocks and glass bottles, we
will deal with them later. It’s not like we don’t want to deal with this
fellow, you know. But in order to deal with them, I need to split my
manpower. I only have so many people at that point of time. So I assess
that with this amount of people, the best thing we can do is form the
human barrier around the left side of the bus.
…
Q: let me ask you this question then. Did you have enough officers to do
two things; both arrest and form a human shield –
A: No.
…
Q: So at that point, you wanted to effect arrests, but the manpower
constraints you faced forced you to prioritize the protection of human
life over the effects of arrests. Am I correct?
A: Yes, that is correct.
53. Having requested SOC assistance, ASP Tang directed two of his officers
to retrieve a shield and rescue rope from their patrol car. He intended to
use the rope as a cordon to keep the crowd away from the Bus and SCDF
officers.
54. At about 9.45 pm, the SCDF officer-in-charge, LTA Neo, informed him
that the Deceased’s body had been successfully extricated. She sought his
assistance in conveying the body to an ambulance. ASP Tang agreed as it
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would have been “very disrespectful of us to just leave the body there.”
ASP Tang testified that the crowd’s anger and agitation intensified when
the Deceased was placed on a stretcher and covered in a white sheet. He
thus directed a group of 9 SPF Officers and 4 CISCO officers to form a
human shield around the SCDF officers as they sought to evacuate Ms
Wong and Mr Lee from the Bus.
55. Having overseen the successful extrication of the Deceased and thereafter
the successful evacuation of Ms Wong and Mr Lee, ASP Tang traversed
the ground yet again in search of scattered or injured officers. It was in
the midst of this search that he was struck by a rock on his temple. The
impact caused a gash that began bleeding. Not seeing any other officers
in sight, ASP Tang joined a group of 10 officers taking cover between the
fire engine and the ambulance. At about 10.18 pm, he attempted to update
E DOR of his location and obtain an update on the number of resources at
the scene. He was, however, unable to reach E DOR as too many officers
were trying to communicate over a single channel, thereby overloading it
and jamming the airwaves.
56. As he stood with his group of officers, ASP Tang realized that they had
become targets for rioters who were now throwing an increasing number
of projectiles at the group. ASP Tang thus determined that he had to re-
group and re-organize his officers so that they could strategize and
outflank the rioters. With this end in mind, he directed them into the
ambulance.
57. ASP Tang said that he and his men had not retreated into ambulance out
of fear –
Q: Did you enter the ambulance because you were afraid, ASP Jonathan
Tang?
A: No.
Q: Am I correct in saying that you went inside the ambulance together
with your officers because at that point in time, as you have told us,
your aim was to regroup your officers?
A: Yes.
Q: And the aim of regrouping was so that you could formulate a new
tactic as to how to handle the riotous crowd?
A: Yes, correct.
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58. Upon boarding, ASP Tang directed the ambulance driver to proceed to the
junction of Race Course Road and Bukit Timah Road. Once there, he
directed his officers to form a line at Bukit Timah Road in order to
contain the riot within the confines of Race Course Road. ASP Tang
testified that he remained at Bukit Timah Road until the SOC arrived,
whereupon he and the other officers with him assisted SOC troops in the
dispersal of the rioters.
(g) Evidence of LTA Tiffany Neo
59. LTA Neo was the SCDF officer who oversaw the extrication and rescue
efforts in the immediate aftermath of the fatal accident in question.
60. LTA Neo testified that an SCDF Red Rhino was the first SCDF response
vehicle at the scene, arriving within the 8 minute target response time.
She explained that upon arrival, she observed a large crowd of between
300 to 400 people, with about 100 individuals surrounding the immediate
vicinity of the Bus. She gave evidence that the Red Rhino crew had
already begun extrication efforts with the aid of a hydraulic spreader by
the time she arrived.
61. LTA Neo testified that she proceeded to the rear of the Bus where the
Deceased lay pinned. Recounting what she saw, LTA Neo stated that it
was obvious that the Deceased had already died from his injuries –
A: … I proceeded to the location, I used my torchlight to shine under the
bus and what I saw was a man’s head crushed almost like half, almost
half, and I saw brain matter as well. So this is quite obviously a dead
person.
Q: Brain matter had spilled out?
A: Yes, sir.
62. As the Deceased’s legs were pinned under the rear left wheel of the bus,
LTA Neo assessed that her immediate mission was to free the body. With
the aid of a 10-tonne jack and twp hydraulic spreads, SCDF personnel
managed to lift the Bus, and placed two airbags underneath the wheel to
keep it off the ground.
63. When queried, LTA Neo stated that she had not asked Mr Lee to reverse
the Bus. She explained that moving the vehicle was not standard protocol
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– “usually, we will use our equipment to make space around the casualty
rather than to move the vehicle itself… because we may not know by
moving the vehicle will we be causing more damage to the body or to the
person itself. So usually we will make space around the casualty.”
64. Having freed the Deceased’s body, LTA Neo testified that ASP Tang had
agreed to it being removed from the scene. She testified that though it
was not standard protocol to remove a body from the scene of an
accident, the present situation demanded that the Deceased be moved to a
more secure location. She also testified that she instructed her officers to
cover the body with a blanket while it was being removed from the scene
– “the state of the body wasn’t very nice, so – I mean, in terms of
responders, we are quite used to this kind of scene. However, if we were
to just pull the body out like that, members of the public who see this
might be – might get even more emotional … so that’s why I felt we
should at least cover the body and not let them see the state of the body
itself… and also I think to respect, you know, the body.”
65. LTA Neo testified that projectiles were thrown at SCDF officers as they
conveyed the body to an ambulance. At the ambulance, she decided,
against protocol, to house the body in the ambulance, as she wanted to
secure it.
66. Recounting what transpired thereafter, LTA Neo stated that she returned
to the Bus with her officers to rescue the persons trapped within. She
testified that she climbed into the Bus before escorting Mr Lee and Ms
Wong out. As projectiles were being thrown into the Bus, LTA Neo used
her body to shield Mr Lee. With the assistance of the police officers, LTA
Neo escorted Ms Wong and Mr Lee to safety in a nearby ambulance.
67. Having accomplished her mission objectives, LTA Neo then assessed that
the situation was too dangerous for her officers to remain. She thus
ordered them to withdraw from the scene.
(h) Evidence of DAC Lu Yeow Lim
68. Arriving in the second phase of the riot, DAC Lu, Commander of ‘E’
Division, was the primary Incident Manager at the scene.
69. It was DAC Lu’s evidence that he received a call at 9.55 pm on the night
in question, informing him that a mob of 400 people were attacking the
driver of a bus that had been involved in a fatal road traffic accident along
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Race Course Road. He was also informed that a few responding officers
had been injured. Given the situation, DAC Lu directed that two SOC
troops be activated. He then left his house at 9.57 pm and proceeded to
the scene.
70. He arrived at about 10.06 pm, dressed in plainclothes, and made his way
to the junction of Hampshire Road and Race Course Road, where he saw
two police officers –
A: … When I arrived, probably between 10.06 and 10.10 pm, I parked
my car, I saw two officers, two of my officers Amos and Jason, running
to their patrol car, opening the boot and taking out shields, helmet. I
went to them, first question, “How many officers have we got?” Second
question, “How many are injured?” The objective is of course to
establish the size of the fighting force I have at the scene. They told me,
“Sorry sir, I don’t know how many officers we have, it is very chaotic.”
I said, “How many are injured?” “As I understand it, probably 3 or 4”. I
said, “Where are they?” They said, “I do not know.” As we were
conversing, projectiles were starting to come in. Projectiles were coming
from two sides.
71. DAC Lu testified that he assessed the situation from where he stood at the
junction of Hampshire Road and Race Course Road. He observed two
broad groups of people. One group of approximately 50 rioters was
standing along Hampshire Road, behind him. This cluster of individuals
was throwing bricks, bottles and stones at DAC Lu and his team. The
second group of individuals, assessed to have been “in the hundreds”,
was standing near the junction of Race Course Road and Kerbau Road.
Recognizing that he and his team of 8 officers were significantly
outnumbered and faced with a violent crowd, DAC Lu decided to hold
his position until the arrival of SOC troops –
A: So that night, I was basically pinned down by two groups of people
who were pelting us with projectiles. The moment we try to leave the
protection of the shield, they will come at us with all means of
projectiles. So it was difficult for us to move, but I decided that we will
hold this position, because we were now at the perimeter of the riot. We
were here, and I was going to stand my ground there.
72. DAC Lu explained that, due to a breakdown in the police
communications sets, he was unable to ascertain how many officers were
on the ground–
A: So, having arrived, and the next thing is to try and determine the size
of the force since the two officers could not tell me. I tried to reach my
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operations room. The lines were jammed. I tried to get through the air,
the airways were congested. So I was limited in terms of the comms. All
that I could gather was based on people who were up close and personal,
who I could interview and ask, and based on what I can see in the
immediate vicinity. I did not have comms with people here, here, or here
(indicating). Those were my realities that night.
73. DAC Lu elaborated on his thought process that night –
A: Meanwhile, I was also gathering information on my adversary, as in,
trying to size up their number and basically to understand their
intention. Now, with the benefit of hindsight we knew exactly what
happened, but that night I didn’t have that information. I only knew a
foreign worker had been killed in a fatal accident, and that sparked off
an incident. Top of my mind, the higher order, big picture priority then
was how not to make it worse. We have an accident resulting in a
fatality, an Indian worker, a foreign worker was killed, and that sparked
off an incident. If we had opened fire, for example, and shot or killed
one or more of them, my rationale was that it probably would have
inflamed the sentiments even more and we don’t know what the foreign
workers would do.
…
A: So my guiding principle that night was, where possible, do not
escalate the situation, do not use deadly force unless you have no
choice. Do not do anything that might necessitate or to precipitate the
discharge of a firearm because anybody could have been shot, it could
have been innocent bystanders – even if we were legally right in
shooting somebody, what is the implication for that night. So those were
the considerations that the commander was thinking.
74. To keep SPF Headquarters apprised of the situation, DAC Lu contacted
Deputy Commissioner of Police, T Raja Kumar (Acting Commissioner,
that night) at about 10.27 pm, and provided him with an update. After
ending the call, DAC Lu learnt that a police vehicle had been overturned
and burnt by rioters. Given the limited police resources at his disposal,
DAC Lu assessed that it would be more prudent to hold the ground and
await the arrival of SOC troops.
75. At about 10.45 pm, a column of SOC troops arrived at DAC Lu’s
location, and he instructed its Commanding Officer, DSP Lim Sin Bin, to
clear Hampshire Road of human and vehicular traffic. At about 10.50 pm,
DAC Lu met with DAC Daniel Tan, Commander of ‘A’ Division, and
DAC David Scott Arul, Deputy Commander of the SOC troops (Acting
Commander that night). The 3 Commanders formed a dispersal plan with
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a view to dispersing the rioters in the direction of Serangoon Road.
76. Queried on why he had failed to don his uniform and how this affected
his ability to command his men, DAC Lu asserted that time was precious
and he had prioritized reaching the scene sooner rather than later –
A: My priority upon receiving the call was to get to the scene to be with
my officers. I think it is important for the commander to be at the scene
as soon as possible. So I left immediately my house, in my jeans, t-shirt
and a jacket.
Q: Don’t you think that you not being in uniform, that would affect the
command and control at the scene at that time?
A: No, sir. Not being in uniform did not hamper my ability to assume
command and control. My officers, they all recognized me. When I
arrived, they all gravitated to me to seek instructions, and as far as the
rioters are concerned, whether I was in uniform or otherwise would not
make any difference.
…
Q: Yes. But there are also other officers from the other divisions who
were there, like ‘A’ Division, Traffic Police, APOs, they were also
there. Don’t you think that not wearing your uniform may have affected
your command and control at the scene?
A: Unlikely, sir, because they saw me giving instructions to my officers,
and because my officers were all in uniform, they were probably asked
who is this guy, and my officers would have told him, that’s the
Commander of Tanglin Police Division.
…
MR TEE: How many minutes do you take to change into your uniform?
A: A few minutes. But in a riot scenario, a few minutes do make a
difference. It is a trade-off, I accept that. The issue is, I had to prioritize
as commander. Do I want to spend a few minutes changing into
uniform, or spend a few minutes getting to the scene as quickly as
possible? So second point. I was the overall manager … so I as the
incident manager, control resources, but I did not have to lead charges
on my own because I had Commander A with me, I had deputy
commander SOC with me, I had head of operations with me, and other
senior officers at the scene who I could delegate, and to do various
things. And they all knew who I was. So there was never any question
that because I was not in uniform, it somehow hampered my ability to
control the situation. But the facts speak for themselves. If you look at
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how the riot evolved, everything was in accordance with my instruction,
there is no issue therefore that because I was not in uniform, somehow it
prevented me from doing my job.
77. Responding to criticism that he was not fully apprised of what was
transpiring along the length of Race Course Road despite being the
Incident Manager, DAC Lu responded–
A: While I was here, if you remember, the bus, the accident, the Red
Rhino was in the accident position, the bus, which is actually quite tall,
and the Red Rhino was blocking my position, I did not have sight of
what was behind here. And because I was pinned down, I could not
move out to have a look. Comms was difficult, as I had explained
earlier, and my men had difficulty getting those information to me. So at
that time, I did not know that all these things were happening there. It
was only after the fact, in the investigation report, then I realized, okay,
concurrently when I was there, these things were happening. It is a fact.
Those are the realities. I did not know that at that point of time.
…
A: My reality on the ground was based on what I saw. My reality on that
night is based on what I perceived.
78. DAC Lu maintained that he had not adopted a cavalier attitude to the riot
–
A: So as you can see, as I was there holding my position, there were a whole
series of activities going on, and I had also to think through what my options
were that night, what I could do, what could I not do, that night. And then
those various options come with attendant risks. I had to evaluate those risks.
If I do this, these are the risks; if I had done this, these are the risks. So as you
can see, it was concurrent activities going on, and the conditions then were not
like this. We are now sitting in an air-conditioned environment having a
conversation, but on that night, it was noisy, there were hundreds of people
milling around, we were under attack constantly, it was like an artillery –
things were coming in, so those were the conditions that forced the
commander to really hunker down and say, “Look, these are the resources”,
four people at that time, what do you do?”
…
A: If you think that [I was] standing there doing nothing, or according to the
committee, doing nothing, is without risk, suggesting we are risk-averse,
nothing could be further from the truth.
79. Responding to queries on why he chose not to engage the rioters with a
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view to quelling the violence, DAC Lu explained that he it would have
been fool-hardy to effect arrests with insufficient forces–
A: So I turned the corner, I saw the car on fire. Two of my officers
instinctively went forward to want to engage. We had eight people: the
intention was if you want to engage, we will move in, we will have to
arrest. I wanted to do that, but we had eight officers. Plus me, HOT
Julius and my OO of Kampong Java NPC, a woman officer by the name
of Huiwen. There were 11 of us. If we had gone in to engage, we would
have to arrest. Every time I arrest a rioter, I would have to allocate two
officers to secure because there is no point in arresting somebody if you
can’t secure him. He can run away.
…
A: How many arrests could I have made before I depleted all the 8
officers? Looking at the size of the crowd, 50 easily and in the hundreds
over there. What would have happened if I want to engage?
…
A: Looking at the level of violence, they pelted uniformed officers with
a hailstorm of stones and bricks and bottles. They overturned police
vehicles and set them on fire. I had every reason to believe that they
would turn hostile, intent on hurting police officers. I had every reason
to believe they would do that. So tactically, it is unsound for me to turn
my limited forces of 8 and turn right and engage the crowd and run the
risk of turning your back on the second group of rioters. It is tactically
unsound to turn your back. You do not take your eyes of your enemy.
80. DAC Lu said that his decision to hold the ground in view of insufficient
forces, was in keeping with SPF doctrine –
A: So you have line of sight issues, you can’t see because the bus was
blocking. Comms was a problem, I could not get to my officers. So
therefore, as a commander, you do what you can based on the resources
you have. Every doctrine I learned in the SPF says, you hold your
position until you amass sufficient forces to deal with them decisively.
That’s what we did.
81. DAC Lu then sought to explain that his response would have been
markedly different if he knew SOC troops were not en-route –
Q: Now, let me ask you a question. What would you have done if the
SOC didn’t come? Are you going to wait and wait and wait for the SOC
to come? That is the point that the committee wants to know. You are
just waiting?
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A: I can understand where the question is coming from. If I knew for a
fact that the SOC was not coming, then I do not have an alternative.
Holding the position would not be tenable, because reinforcement is not
coming. I would have to go in and engage with firearm if necessary. My
justification would be that no backup force is coming. I’m on my own,
therefore I have to use whatever I had with me to deal with them. That
situation would be forced upon me.
82. DAC Lu also stressed that it was not possible to decisively distinguish
between passive onlookers and active rioters –
A: One of the points which I think has not been made, which I would
like to clarify here, was that it was very difficult that night to distinguish
a passive onlooker from a rioter. They could be carrying plastic bags
and appear to be shoppers, or they could be taking their phone, taking
pictures, taking video, and the next moment, they would pick up a stone
and they would throw at you.
83. On his decision not to fire at the rioters, DAC Lu stated that he did not
think this option feasible as there was no clear target –
A: But the issue is this. They attacked us by pelting because there was
an advantage. They had a stand-off distance that they could hide
because projectiles can be thrown 20, 30, 40 metres. Now, if they had
come face-to-face, that would have been a totally different proposition.
They chose, for their own safety, to pelt us from a distance. That means
in most instances, you couldn’t see who was pelting you. Because there
is this crowd … and things were flying from the back … with people in
front of them, they were throwing stones over their head to hit us. This
is not a case where you had two standard armies squaring off, where you
can clearly see, these are my adversaries and these are my forces. It was
not like that. It was almost like fighting an insurgency. They were
embedded within the civilian population, you don’t have a clear target,
you don’t have a clear line of sight or open fire. Even if you are
justified, my officers, when I asked them later … have you considered
shooting? The answer was equivocal: shoot who? Stones were coming
from behind people, you don’t have a clear line of sight on who is
attacking you. If you had just wildly opened fire into the crowd, you run
the risk of killing innocent people, people who were just curious, or you
could have shot a police officer for that matter. What would have
happened? It would be a totally different COI today, asking very
different questions.
84. DAC Lu testified that SPF doctrine prevented a commander from straying
into the heat of battle –
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CHAIRMAN: If you had gone there, then you would have realized there
were other men, and you could have assembled them and taken some
action –
A: If I may be allowed to respond, sir –
CHAIRMAN: -- because you stayed where it was a very protected place
for you, that these things were allowed to go on.
A: If I may be allowed to respond, sir?
CHAIRMAN: Yes.
A: The incident manager cannot be in the heat of battle. This is our
doctrine. It is not just our doctrine, it is the doctrine used by all other –
…
A: … the SPF doctrine does not allow the commander to go to the heat
of battle for a very good reason. If you are fighting the battle yourself,
getting into a tangle, you can’t command because you will have lost
sight of all the resources. Your focus will be fighting the individual in
front of you. No police unit, no military unit asks their manager,
commander or whatever you call it, to go into the heat of battle. We
don’t do that. It is for obvious reasons.
…
CHAIRMAN: You did not know, because you chose not to know.
A: That is not correct, sir.
CHAIRMAN: Yes.
A: If I had gone in, say, as suggested, maybe the few of us just gone in
and take a walk, perhaps and try to venture in, think about this. I was
there. If I had decided to go in and take a walk, my officers would have
to follow me.
CHAIRMAN: No.
A: They would be walking into a crowd with another bunch of people
behind us. So if you think about the tactics, for the commander to lead
his only reserve, walk into a crowd to find out what was happening and
run the risk of getting surrounded.
…
A: My assumption, after being struck twice, was that they knew who I
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was and they were targeting me. That’s one. Two, the problem is that if
the incident manager or the commander goes in and he is taken out by a
rock or a brick, and your commander is knocked out of action before
SOC officers can arrive, then you have a serious command gap here. So
that’s why it is part of SPF doctrine, the incident manager or the
commander does not get into the heat of battle. Because if you are
fighting hand to legs, you cannot command. So there is a significant risk
for the commander to enter alone into an area you do not have good
intel on, and try to establish numbers when the alternative would have
been to wait for the officers to come to you and give you the
information.
(i) Evidence of DC T Raja Kumar
85. DC Raja Kumar, who was Acting Commissioner on 8 December 2013,
was the first SPF witness to testify at the public hearing. He presented the
COI with a Report detailing the SPF response to the riot.
86. Delving into the chronology of events, the Report canvassed the
following components of the SPF response on the night in question –
i. The receipt of information about the accident at Race Course Road
by SPF;
ii. ASP Tang’s management of the riot in its initial stages and prior to
the arrival of DAC Lu;
iii. The subsequent activation of SOC;
iv. DAC Lu’s command and control of the riot from 10.06 pm, after
taking over as Incident Manager;
v. The police officers’ experience of the rioters’ aggression towards
them;
vi. The arrival of SOC and the formulation of the dispersal plan by the
commanders; and
vii. The process of dispersing the riot and securing Little India.
87. Addressing queries as to the type of resources routinely dispatched to
respond to ‘999’ calls for assistance, DC Raja Kumar explained that the
‘999’ call received by the Combined Operations Room at 9.23 pm on 8
December 2013 had informed them of a road traffic accident, so SCDF
personnel and Traffic Police officers were dispatched to the scene. He
explained that no Divisional officers were dispatched at this juncture as
the report had not indicated any law and order issues. He highlighted that
police officers from ‘E’ Division (led by ASP Tang) were dispatched to
the scene once it became apparent that a law and order situation was fast
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developing.
88. In the course of his evidence, DC Raja Kumar also sought to account for
the delay in the arrival of SOC troops at the scene. There were two
reasons - (i) delay in activation; and (ii) delay caused by traffic
congestion.
89. DC Raja Kumar took the COI through the SOC activation protocol in
place at the time of the riot, explaining that the activation of SOC troops
required the concurrence of the Head of Operations and Training (‘HOT’)
at a Divisional level before the matter was referred to the Director of
Operations for his concurrence. The rationale for such a protocol,
stemmed from the “fact that the Special Operations Command resources
are limited and there’s a signature, a high signature that is associated
with its activation and deployment and the Director of Operations is privy
to information that the Land Divisions may not have and he has to then
make an assessment as to whether to deploy a troop or not.” Elaborating,
he shared that the multi-layer approach was intended to act as “a sieve to
make sure that … there is a proper assessment done before the resources
are then committed.”
90. With reference to SOC activation on the night in question, DC Raja
Kumar explained that, in keeping with protocol, ASP Tang’s request for
SOC troops was first approved by ‘E’ Division’s HOT. Upon securing
this concurrence, approval was sought from covering Director of
Operations DAC Koh Wei Keong. As DAC Koh wanted to know more
about the situation, he sought more information before finally approving
the request at 10.03 pm. SOC troops were officially activated at 10.04
pm, 19 minutes after ASP Tang’s initial request.
91. Agreeing that the activation protocol took too long, DC Raja Kumar
informed the COI that it had since been reviewed to shorten the process.
92. DC Raja Kumar then explained that the troop had been on the verge of
entering Race Course Road from Bukit Timah Road, when it was directed
to enter instead via Hampshire Road, where DAC Lu was stationed.
93. Upon re-diverting, the troops were caught in traffic congestion stretching
down Kampong Java Road and Hampshire Road. The lead troop
remained at Hampshire Road whilst the remaining 3 troops resorted to
returning to enter Race Course Road from Bukit Timah Road.
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94. DC Raja Kumar testified that the riot was dispersed by the SOC within 50
minutes of their arrival –
A: As events turned out, when SOC arrived there was clearly
effectiveness because the crowd then started backing off and the officers
were then able to successfully clean that whole area and bring the riot
under control in about 50 minutes to an hour.
95. In the course of his evidence, DC Raja Kumar also addressed concerns
pertaining to the policing of Little India prior to the riot. The COI heard
that SOC troops had been deployed in Little India for anti-crime patrols
on 16 occasions in 2013. Troops had also been forward-stationed ahead of
planned events like Thaipusam. The COI was told that, due to a scarcity
of resources, SOC troops could not be stationed at Little India every
weekend.
96. Nevertheless, DC Raja Kumar assured the COI that other measures,
specific to Little India, had been implemented prior to the riot –
A: the reality is that given the scarcity of resources, we have had to
prioritize the deployment of our officers. The threat assessment, in terms
of looking at the situation in Little India, suggested that such over-
deployment was not necessary … Firstly, the crime situation at Little
India has been improving over the years … in terms of major offences,
going down by slightly more than 32 per cent, whereas if you look at the
national figure, the crime rate had actually come down by about 19 per
cent. So you are talking about a lower crime and better crime situation at
Little India, number one. The second thing is that we have also made it a
point to enhance our actions taken on the ground… the number of
summonses increased quite substantially, which means that more
enforcement action is being taken … so that gives you an idea that a lot
of attention was actually paid on Little India in terms of enforcement on
the ground. There are some other things that happened as well. We set
up an NPC, Rochor NPC. It is located in Little India itself, at the
junction near Kampong Kapor. There is an NPC there which is serving
that community and as part of our policing strategy and system, we have
actually increased the strength of the NPC and we formed a crime strike
force with additional personnel given to the NPC to tackle crime-related
issues in that area … so in other words, the crime situation has
improved. Our experience also with the foreign workers at Little India
has been that, by and large, they have been a compliant lot and have not
caused major problems, definitely not on a major riot situation … the
number of Auxiliary Police officers and the number of security officers
that have been deployed has also increased substantially over the years.
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97. Moving forward, DC informed the COI that SPF intended to learn from
the incident on 8 December 2013, implement measures to address and
counter issues that have arisen, and, in all, “improve and emerge a better
force.”
(j) Evidence of Commissioner of Police, Mr Ng Joo Hee
98. CP Ng was the last SPF officer to testify at the public hearing. CP Ng’s
evidence focused primarily on his assessment and review of the decisions
and conduct of his officers on the ground on 8 December 2013.
99. Acknowledging certain shortcomings, CP Ng assured the COI that the
police were undertaking a thorough review of the incident to identify
problems and find solutions.
100. Recognizing that communications and “sense-making” were key failings
on 8 December 2013, CP Ng first gave evidence on the measures
implemented by the SPF in the immediate aftermath of the riot –
i. Restrictions on the sale and consumption of alcohol;
ii. Enhanced police presence in Little India;
iii. Installation of 29 new cameras and temporary flood lights to light
up back lanes and congregation spots;
iv. Installation of a new command and control system that should
address many of the issues faced during the riot;
v. Implementation of body-worn and in-vehicle cameras for frontline
officers; and
vi. Installation of police cameras in public housing blocks nationwide.
101. In his evidence, CP Ng also provided an assessment of the adequacy of
SPF’s response to the situation. He noted that the patrol officers who
arrived on the scene had thought they were responding to a road traffic
accident. He highlighted that “police first responders are neither trained
nor equipped to fight a riot” and were thus out of their depth in
suppressing a rioting crowd of any significant size. He said that the 50
first responders were spread out over an area the length of 3 football
fields.
102. As to the number of officers at the scene, CP Ng testified that there had
been only 54 uniformed police officers present “that were actively facing
the riots.” The remaining officers, he explained, were 62 CISCO officers,
Traffic Police officers tasked with controlling traffic, 16 plainclothes
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officers and 3 SOC intelligence officers. He also disclosed that there were
7 injured officers at the scene.
103. On the issue of DAC Lu’s decision to await the arrival of SOC troops
before engaging the crowd, CP Ng testified that he felt DAC Lu had been
right to restrain his officers –
A: Unless and until we can dominate, we will not charge mindlessly at a
raging mob. This was the posture that police riot troops took on New
Year’s Day in 1985 as they held ground, and this was also the posture
that our first responders took three months ago at Little India. Sir, I
think in strategy when you are outnumbered, your must have three
things. You must have A, better stealth; B, better deception; or C, better
technology or training. On Race Course Road, I think stealth and
deception were irrelevant and better technology and training was on the
way in the form of the PTT troops that had already been summoned.
…
A: I agree that the police must show force. But what is unfortunate at
Race Course Road on 8 December is that we were the smaller force and
therefore we cannot – I think the last thing you want to do when you are
outnumbered, is to advertise the fact that you are outnumbered, and I
don’t think we were in a position to show force at that particular point.
We have to wait for force to come before we show it.
…
So in my view, sir, I think the right and the sensible thing to do when we
are outnumbered and find ourselves outmaneuvered, is to hold our
position and wait for reinforcements to arrive.
104. Though disagreeing with the COI’s view that the police ought to have
engaged with the crowd at an early stage, CP Ng agreed that the 18
minutes taken to activate the SOC troop was “excessive” and “the
decision-making ought to have been faster.” The COI heard that arising
out of this experience, CP Ng has instructed that the authority to activate
an SOC troop be devolved to Division Commanders.
105. On the issue of intoxication and the number of liquor licences issued to
businesses in Little India, CP Ng noted that whilst he could not say that
excessive drinking was the cause or even a primary cause of the riot,
“inebriation was the norm amongst rioters on 8 December and that it
had fuelled the violence” that ensued, adding that “beer and whiskey
bottles were the projectiles of choice that night.” Presenting a table
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disclosing the number and types of liquor licences granted to addressees
in Little India, CP Ng testified that “it is clear that the number of liquor
licenses operating in Little India have been remarkably stable over the
last five years without any large increases or decreases. So it is certainly
not the case that a large recent or deliberate loosening of alcohol sales in
the area precipitated the violence that was witnessed on 8 December as
some reports suggested.”
106. CP Ng testified that the number of liquor licences in Little India had been
declining in the last 3 years. CP Ng also disclosed that Little India did not
have the highest concentration of liquor shops within Singapore. He
asserted that the problem was not the availability of alcohol per se, but
rather, the excessive consumption of it. In order to reduce consumption,
he said that curbs were needed to target the time and the space within
which alcohol may be consumed – “this means A, restricting the hours
that intoxicating beverages can be sold, and B, confining the places
where it can be imbibed to licensed premises.”
107. Next, addressing the issue of crime in Little India, CP Ng testified that
there was no “tangible indication right up to 8 December to suggest that
law and order in Little India was deteriorating. There was also no
indication to suggest that conditions in Little India [were] conspiring to
an inevitable breakdown of public order, and certainly we had no hint
that there was a riot of the ferocity that we saw on 8 December about to
erupt.”
108. In the course of his evidence, CP Ng also commented on policing
problems and efforts undertaken in Geylang, another migrant worker
enclave –
A: Policing Geylang, for us, is challenging. Very challenging. We pay a
lot of attention to Geylang and we devote a disproportionate amount of
police resources to keeping it orderly and relatively crime free. Unlike
Little India, all the indications of potential trouble are there in Geylang.
Crime numbers are high and disproportionately so and crimes of
particular concern like robbery, rioting, affray remain persistent and
always threaten to run away. Perhaps most worryingly… there is an
overt hostility and antagonism towards the Police in Geylang.
…
A: There is nowhere else in Singapore which is more policed or policed
more intensely than the 20-odd lorongs either side of Geylang road. We
do this because there are clear indications that the Geylang area in
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contrast to Little India, is a potential powder keg.
109. Regarding the number of police officers in Singapore, CP Ng said –
A: To project a truly visible police presence on the streets of Little India
and in the lorongs of Geylang, will require, in my own estimation, an
additional 100 to 150 police officers in each of these localities on the
weekends … the deployment of another 300 pairs of boots on the
ground should bring noticeable police visibility to both locations.
…
A: I want to conclude my presentation with some facts and figures on
how we police Singapore in general … works out to one regular police
officer for every 614 persons. This is an exceedingly low ratio, no
matter how you slice it.
…
A: If you look more closely at one of our police divisions, say Ang Mo
Kio or Bedok or Jurong, you will see how thinly policed Singapore is…
so at any one time if you do the math, its one police to 4000 people at
any one time in Singapore. These are very low numbers.
…
A: The Singapore population is now 58 per cent larger than 20 years
ago, but the number of police officers has increased by less than 16 per
cent in the same period. As a consequence, the ratio of police officers
per 100,000 population has reduced by 27 per cent.
110. In closing, CP Ng made a plea for more manpower to better police
Singapore –
A: I want to close my testimony with a plea, a plea not for more money
but for more bodies. Allow me, sir, to A, raise an extra standby PTT
troop. B, put significantly more boots in Little India, in Geylang and in
other hot spots. And C, beef up our first responder resources that ply our
streets and patrol our estates. Sir, in all, I ask for another 1000 more
police officers so that the police can acquire a much needed strategic
depth, so that we can police Little India and Geylang better, so that we
can reinforce our thin lines in the neighborhoods and communities in the
rest of the country, so that we may continue to keep Singapore safe.
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(k) Evidence of Dr Majeed Khader
111. Dr Majeed is a Senior Consultant Psychologist with the Home Team
Academy and the Director of the Home Team Science Centre.
Approached by the COI Investigation Team to conduct a behavioural
analysis and a crowd psychology analysis, Dr Majeed formed a
Behavioural Analysis Group consisting of senior psychologists. Dr
Majeed and his team prepared two reports: a behavioural analysis report
dated 21st February 2014 (‘the Initial Report’) and a supplementary
behavioural analysis report dated 18 March 2014 (the ‘Supplementary
Report’).
Initial Report
112. The Initial Report aimed to provide psychological insight into the
incident on 8 December 2013. Both classical and modern theories of
crowds were considered and analyzed. The Initial Report concludes that
the riot was “fuelled by a misperception” by the workers that the
responding forces were against them, and perhaps that the officers were
more interested in attending to the locals on the bus rather than the
deceased Indian national underneath it. The Initial Report also pointed to
alcohol consumption as a possible factor aggravating the situation.
Supplementary Report and Oral Evidence
113. The methodology behind the team’s work was explained in detail in both
the Supplementary Report and Dr Majeed’s evidence on the stand. The
team analyzed a variety of secondary sources, such as available scientific
literature, transcripts of interviews with the deported foreign workers,
videos footage and photographs. In addition, the team also spoke with
first responders and various other subjects of interest, conducted
observational visits, and engaged in an “expert critique session” with
professionals and experts from various fields to “stress-test” their ideas.
114. Dr Majeed testified that crowds are not mindless, not anonymous and not
irrational. They know what they are doing and accordingly, there was a
need to understand their purpose and their goals. This, he testified, was a
critical factor that would impact the ability to deal with the crowd.
115. Dr Majeed identified five probable factors that contributed to the riot on 8
December 2013: (1) a sense of perceived injustice; (2) a sense of street
retributive justice; (3) the use of alcohol; (4) overcrowding and
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congestion; and (5) the lack of familiarity with the ‘Singaporean way of
life’. Dr Majeed highlighted however, that his team was of the view that
the riot could not be attributed to a sole or major contributing factor.
Instead, he testified that it was likely the result of a confluence of factors
on the night in question.
116. A summary of Dr Majeed’s responses to questions framed by the
Investigation Team:
i. Why did rioters target the bus driver and timekeeper initially, only
to thereafter turn their attention to the police: Dr Majeed testified
that in the initial stages of the riot, the crowd likely vented their
anger at the bus driver and timekeeper as they believed the two
were responsible for the death of the Deceased, their countryman.
The crowd’s anger then shifted to the first responders when they
were perceived to be taking sides with the bus driver and
timekeeper (by evacuating them from the bus).
ii. Why did the crowd attack police officers who were in groups more
than individual police officers: Dr Majeed testified that the crowd
may have perceived groups of police officers as a greater threat
than individuals. Police officers in uniforms and groups were more
easily identified by the rioters as an “outgroup” sent to thwart their
actions, emphasizing the two groups’ different identities, e.g.
foreign workers versus locals, or authorities versus workers. The
rioters thus formed an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mindset which could have
fueled their anger.
iii. Why did the crowd attack police officers who were geared-up, but
not attack those without gear: flowing from the above, Dr Majeed
testified that police officers in gear may have appeared to be
preparing to use violence against the rioters, thus fuelling the
unhappiness that was already simmering. Dr Majeed further
highlighted that the presence of a weapon increases an individual’s
aggression.
iv. Why SCDF rescue vehicles and ambulances were attacked: Dr
Majeed concluded that this could have occurred when foreign
workers formed the misperception that the SCDF first responders
chose first to tend to the distressed timekeeper instead of the
Deceased beneath the Bus – “the foreign worker then sensed that
the SCDF was taking the side of the locals and aren’t sympathetic
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towards their countryman. Therefore, they got frustrated and angry
with the SCDF … the crowd, who was aggressive, may have seen
the SCDF and the police as one united group against them.”
v. Why property was destroyed and why they set fire to police
vehicles and ambulances: Dr Majeed explained that the destruction
and burning of property was not an unusual occurrence during a
riot. Dr Majeed explained that the rioters’ target choices were not
irrational and random, but deliberate. Dr Majeed noted that arson
was an easy act with a high rate of success. He testified that the
rioters may have targeted the vehicles of those whom they
perceived as ‘perpetrators’ (first the bus, and then the emergency
vehicles). Burning or destroying these vehicles was symbolic as it
provided them a means of expressing their anger and frustration at
perceived injustice or wrongdoing.
vi. Why rioters dispersed and reassembled subsequently: Dr Majeed
found it difficult to comment on this issue as his team did not
possess good behavioural evidence to confirm this.
vii. Whether alcohol influenced the riotous behaviour: With the caveat
that the team’s assessment was based on indirect evidence, Dr
Majeed testified that the rioters could have been experiencing what
he termed “alcohol myopia” and “tunnel vision” which in turn
contributed to a fixation on their frustrations. Additionally, Dr
Majeed testified that some of the foreign workers under the
influence of alcohol could have been acting on a sense of
misplaced ‘veeram’, an Indian cultural term similar to ‘bravado’.
viii. Whether the Indian workers were maltreated: Dr Majeed informed
the COI that he did not think there was a case for maltreatment.
ix. Whether the police action of “holding their position” emboldened
the rioters: in the absence of good behavioural evidence, Dr
Majeed addressed the issue on a theoretical level – should you
intervene or should you hold a position? He testified that “this
issue can go both ways.” On one view, holding the line and not
intervening would embolden the rioters as they would perceive
limited consequences to their actions. However, if the police took
action, but ineffective action, this could likewise embolden the
rioters. Dr Majeed explained that when exercised, the manner of
intervention was equally critical – “it is not just what you do, but
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it’s the way in which you do it.”
117. Finally, having researched best practices worldwide, Dr Majeed identified
4 principles when attempting to quell a riot - (1) differentiating between
different groups in the crowd; (2) obtaining information about the crowd;
(3) facilitating the legitimate goals of the crowd; and (4) responding with
a graded hierarchy of tactics. Dr Majeed also drew the COI’s attention to
the Swedish model of “dialogue police”, and suggested that it was a
resource that may have some value in the Singapore context.
(l) Evidence of Senior Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Mr Khoo Boon Hui
118. Mr Khoo Boon Hui is the current Senior Deputy Secretary of the Ministry
of Home Affairs. A former Commissioner of Police, Mr Khoo was also
the President of Interpol from 2008 to 2012. Mr Khoo gave evidence
about the riot control doctrine in Singapore and its evolution over the
years. Mr Khoo also commented on various issues, such as the ability of
frontline officers to confront riots, SPF’s use of force doctrine, the
effectiveness of warning shots and other challenges that the police faced
in riot control.
119. On the issue of patrol officers confronting riots, Mr Khoo’s evidence was
that there are limits as to how far frontline officers may intervene to
prevent or control a riot:
A: I think front-line officers, they have a lot of ingenuity. Because they deal
with these things every day, they are well trained and well experienced in
intervening, but only at that level where they can try to de-escalate certain
things… they can do immediate things like saving lives, but only to a limited
extent, and when the riot happens, they have to change their mode of
operation.
120. This is because the handling of large-scale riots requires specially trained
and equipped officers that are able to act with “precision and discipline”
when they engage the crowd. Otherwise, rioters would not be deterred by
what they perceive as an “ad hoc group of policemen”.
121. Therefore, in his opinion, frontline officers should contain the unrest
within the incident site as they wait for the specially trained officers to
arrive. The risk in intervening before the arrival of such officers is that it
may lead to the riot spreading, thus requiring more of such specially
trained officers to be brought onto the scene before the situation can be
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brought under control.
122. Mr Khoo said that the wait for specialized troops to arrive can be quite
challenging:
CHAIRMAN: To use a common expression, you must nip it in the bud.
A: Yes, yes, you must nip that – well, of course, if you nip it in the bud by
even preventing the riot from occurring, that’s – but faced with a riot, you
have to contain it and wait for specialized troops to come.
CHAIRMAN: Sure.
A: Of course, that is the most difficult time for the people of the ground, when
you are waiting for reinforcements and you have to deal with the things that
are going on, because you will be challenged, you will be seeing things that
are happening and you have a lot of decisions to make.”
123. On the use of force, Mr Khoo’s said that it is not an easy decision for a
ground commander to make:
A: There’s a lot of controversy about this. But my sense is that it must be
commensurate with the level of public order threat, fair and even-handed. Of
course, we all know that it must be governed by the laws and doctrines. I make
this point also: insufficient force or standing by can embolden the crowd. At
the same time, excessive force can inflame the situation and raise ways to
spread. So it’s a dilemma. Every incident manager, police HQ commander
must realise this.
124. Mr Khoo agreed with the Chairman that firing a warning shot may not be
effective. Therefore, the decision to do so should not be taken lightly:
CHAIRMAN: Firing a warning shot in a big congregation is a real problem.
A: Yes. Because the people in front may know what is happening but the
people behind don’t know. So some may be running back, some may be
surging forward, you know, you have all sorts of –
CHAIRMAN: The other psychology is: if you are going to kill me and I’m
going to die, I might as well die fighting you.
A: Yes, of course. There are some people who will react that way. But there is
a place for warning shots if the situation is clear then that could be an option.
But every police officer has to think through all these things before he acts.
125. Mr Khoo said that making arrests in a riot is not straightforward matter –
large numbers of police officers are necessary in order to be effective.
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Otherwise, evidence may be lost in the process.
126. Finally, when asked for his views on DAC Lu’s decision to hold a
position at Hampshire Road and Race Course Road while waiting for the
SOC troops to arrive, Mr Khoo said –
A: Again I will preface my comments by saying I was not there and benefit of
behind hindsight, of course, we can say a lot of things. We don’t know what
the situation was, whether there was actually any awareness of what was
happening, but in any riot situation it is very chaotic. If you only see one part
of it, you may assess it in one way. Of course, as an Incident Manager, you
would like to find out from as many of your officers what is happening and if
you cannot get through to them then find some way, maybe you send someone
to call them.
A: So yes, assessment is important. Now whether you move in or not then of
course you must find out, people who are walking through, is it okay? Should
you go in plain clothes? Should you go in uniform? Should you send a bigger
force? These are all very difficult decisions to make and I don’t know how
much time there was, because every Incident Manager also needs to worry
about many other things, you know, like sending information… upwards to
the police command because they may need a different assessment, what to
do. They may be concerned about officers who are being injured, they may be
concerned about safety of their officers. Should I go and risk the lives of my
officers?
A: As I mentioned earlier, are there other means of doing things? Do I know
how many other units have come in and can they help? But whatever it is,
there’s this overall strategy of how you do it, and things may be very messy,
things may have gone out of control in certain things, but in the end, you
know, you make the best of the situation.
Summary of Evidence of Groups of Witnesses
127. This section summarises the evidence of the following groups of
witnesses:
(a) Non-Government Organizations (‘NGOs’);
(b) Foreign workers;
(c) Residents;
(d) Shop-keepers and business owners;
(e) Government Representatives;
(f) Dormitory Operators; and
(g) Transport Operators
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(a) Evidence of NGOs, Unions & Associations
128. At the public hearing, the COI heard from representatives of the Migrant
Workers’ Centre (‘MWC’), the Building Construction and Timber
Industries Employees’ Union (‘BATU’), Transient Workers Count Too,
(‘TWC2’), MARUAH, WorkFair Singapore (‘Workfair’), Friends of Thai
Workers Association, and the Singapore Tamil Community (‘STC’).
Apart from testifying, these groups also tendered submissions detailing
their views and recommendations to the COI.
129. As none of the representatives or members of these groups had been
present in Little India on 8 December 2013, much of their evidence
centered on their observations of the general issues faced by foreign
workers in Singapore.
130. Representatives from BATU and MWC discounted dissatisfaction with
living and working conditions as a precipitating factor for the riot –
BATU
Q: Did you get the sense, having spoken to them, that the riot was as a
result of frustrations about living conditions?
A: Not at all. Mostly they are happy with their working conditions over
here.
Q: How about living conditions?
A: For living conditions, mostly they are living in those dormitories
provided by the company; they are quite satisfied.
Q: Just so we understand you correctly, none of these workers that you
spoke to attributed the riot to poor living or working conditions?
A: Yes, none of them have said that … they are happy working here.
MWC
Q: … is there a high level of dissatisfaction with working and living
conditions in Singapore amongst migrant workers?
…
A: … we have outreached to almost 400,000 migrant workers, and our
common sensing from all our interaction with migrant workers is that
generally they are happy. They may have disputes, but that doesn’t
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change the fact that they feel Singapore is a good destination to work,
that there’s security and safety for them here, that generally employers
treat their workers well, there are good prospects, there’s an ability to
earn good money, which they can sent home to their families. So
generally that is the sentiment that we get. Of course, the closest
interaction we have is with those who have problems, and even among
those workers, I think the sensing is still they are not – they don’t regret
coming to Singapore, especially when they know that they have a
problem and there is someone there and a process is in place to help
them seek recourse. That only goes further to establish, you know,
Singapore to them as a good place to come and work, where their rights
will be protected … so my general observation is that there is no latest
frustration or tension building.
131. Queried on likely precipitators for the riot, Dr Russell Heng, a
representative from TWC2, testified that, while the enforcement of labour
laws could be improved, “by and large, workers coming to Singapore are
okay with Singapore’s society.”
132. Responding to a question on how Singapore compared to other migrant
worker host countries, Mr Bernard Menon, a representative from MWC,
testified “that a good yardstick would be the number of other countries
that have a similar high reliance on migrant workers, coming to
Singapore to study the way we manage our migrant population. When I
say “coming to study”, I don’t mean coming to study, you know, to put us
down or anything, but I mean coming to study to look for gems of
knowledge that they can go back and implement in their own countries.
133. On foreign worker attitudes towards authority (both regular SPF officers
and Auxiliary Police Officers (‘APOs’)), the COI heard that workers
were, in general, respectful of authority –
TWC2
A: over the years, the foreign workers we deal with, we have found
them to be generally respectful of authority figures in Singapore,
probably even more so than Singaporeans are respectful of authority …
they basically don’t have a problem with the police.
MARUAH
Q: … there needs to be an examination into why the foreign workers
were keen to set alight police vehicles, ambulances and to pelt officers.
Can you elaborate on what that means? Is this reflective of some
underlying resentment towards authority or are there possible other
reasons for this?
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A: … is it all because … they do not like police officers, et cetera? I
think we will be very hard pushed to make that direct correlation.
134. Despite the above, Dr Heng and Dr Vincent Wijeysingha pointed to the
treatment of workers by APOs as a potential source of tension.
Recounting a specific incident, Dr Heng shared an instance where a
volunteer with TWC2 witnessed a worker being unfairly issued with a
summons for littering. His experience resonated with Dr Wijeysingha
who had likewise witnessed similar tensions between foreign workers and
APOs.
135. Dr Wijeysingha said he had heard of instances where bus drivers and
time-keepers had behaved in a high-handed manner towards workers.
With the caveat that he “cannot make a definitive diagnosis”, Dr
Wijeysingha also suggested that the authorities’ handling of the fatal
accident on 8 December 2013 could have inflamed emotions that led to a
riot.
136. In this vein, Dr Heng recommended that individuals who frequently
interacted with foreign workers should receive more training –
A: So our recommendation is that for people who need to interact with
foreign workers in Little India in a crowded situation – law enforcement
people, bus drivers, conductors on buses – that in their training, we
might want to sensitize them to a greater awareness of the people they
are dealing with, the foreign workers … their training and their
education should cover cultural awareness, language awareness and an
appreciation of the role migrant workers have in Singapore. By
language awareness, we are not asking that everybody should be fluent
in Bengali or Tamil or other Indian dialects, but an ability to interact
using simple English, sign language, a few key words in these
languages, like Tamil or Bengali, or sometimes learning how to smile
and empathize, and that the police should be seen by foreign workers as
not just law enforcement people but that they should be seen as sources
of information, support and assistance. I think that would greatly
improve the kind of climate we have and would help to prevent the kind
of violent outbreak we have seen.
137. The groups gave different views on the role of alcohol in the violence that
ensued on 8 December 2013. While Ms Yeow, BATU representative,
testified that she thought alcohol had played a role in the riot, Dr
Wijeysingha claimed that “there was no forensic evidence that there were
great amounts of alcohol drunk”. He further decried the “alcohol thesis”
as an attempt to exonerate the Government’s policy on migrant workers.
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Representatives from the Singapore Tamil Community likewise asserted
that “the fact that they were drunk, they had taken drinks, … [is] not the
right reason for this riot.”
138. TWC2’s Dr Heng refrained from pinpointing alcohol as the sole
precipitating factor and testified that the riot was likely the result of a
confluence of factors –
A: In broad terms, I think we would say that a riot is a complex thing. A
hundred or more people were involved, therefore it cannot be shrunk to one
factor like alcohol caused it or anger with the Singapore system caused it … so
my feeling is that that night probably was a confluence of all these factors –
some people were drunk and maybe some people may have been angry with
how they were treated in Singapore and then an incident happened that was an
accident, one of their countrymen got killed, and it led to a kind of mentality
where violence broke out.
139. The witnesses listed common grievances faced by foreign workers in
Singapore: high agency fees in source countries, difficulties encountered
in changing employers and dissatisfaction with the enforcement of
Labour Court orders. They acknowledged, however, that there was no
concrete evidence to suggest that these issues precipitated the riot.
140. The witnesses also spoke about how many of the foreign workers they
interacted with decried the actions of the rioters as shameful and wrong.
Mr Menon of MWC said that, in his conversations with foreign workers
since the riot -
A: I think the reaction that I got most was unhappiness, amongst the
workers that we spoke to, with the chaps that were involved in the
riots… I think they felt that the rioters were being a little bit selfish, in
that the ramifications of their actions would affect a far larger group and
that they didn’t consider their – what they were doing, and that now
everybody as a whole has to suffer the consequences of what they did.
141. Ms Braema Mathi of MARUAH likewise shared that “the overriding
emotion that came across was being very ashamed of what had happened.
The second part that came across is that it should not have happened.”
(b) Evidence of Foreign Workers
142. In the course of the public hearing, the COI heard from 8 South Asian
foreign workers. Their evidence centered on their experience in
Singapore, working and living conditions here, and their views on what
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caused the riot.
143. In general, the workers testified that they were happy and satisfied
working in Singapore. Save for minor complaints, such as wanting better
bathing facilities in some dorms, they expressed general satisfaction with
the living conditions in their dormitories -
Foreign Worker 1
Q: So how do you find Singapore?
A: I like working in Singapore.
Q: Why?
A: Sir, the country is good. It is clean. They maintain rules and the law.
Everything is proper.
CHAIRMAN: What about your working conditions?
A: Sir, conditions are very acceptable. I have no issues with the
conditions. That’s why I continued working in Singapore.
Foreign Worker 2
A: Sir, staying in Singapore is like staying with your own family back
in India. You can’t do this elsewhere … I have been here for 15 years
now, and I’ve had no problem. I found everything good.
Foreign Worker 3
A: Singapore ranks first for working purposes, for safety purposes and
there are facilities for you to upgrade yourself in education. The
company renews --- does a renewal on your behalf. The company takes
care of your transportation as well as your accommodation. The fact is
we just need to do our work. The rest is taken care of by the company.
Foreign Worker 4
A: I have been here for the past 14 years and Singapore now feels like
my own country. It is peaceful and I like working here because I get
paid a good salary.
Foreign Worker 5
A: I chose to work in Singapore because there are good facilities. I was
told that the dormitories are good. I also have relatives working here.
My work permit expires in July 2014. I hope to extend it because I am
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happy working here because I am able to send money back to my
family in India.
144. When asked to rank Singapore as a destination for employment, the
workers unanimously agreed that Singapore placed first. For instance, on
why he ranked Singapore first, Foreign Worker 5 explained that “you get
good salary here and you get good facilities here. From what I have
heard from others, the other countries do not offer that much.” Foreign
Worker 6 similarly testified that he chose to work in Singapore because
his salary here was higher than that offered in Dubai and Malaysia.
145. The workers testified that they had sought employment n Singapore on
the recommendation of friends and family members who had worked here
before –
Foreign Worker 2
Q: … You first came to Singapore 15 years ago, can you tell us why you
chose Singapore over other countries?
A: My elder brother told me that Singapore was a good country … he said that
the law and order was good in Singapore. No problems in making a good
living, nice place to make money.
Foreign Worker 4
A: My brother said Singapore was like our own country and working here was
good, no problems.
CHAIRMAN: What do you say?
A: I say the same.
146. The workers rejected the notion that the riot was triggered by a general
unhappiness and dissatisfaction with working and living conditions. A
number of other reasons were instead proffered. Some suggested that
workers rioted after perceiving that the police and paramedics were more
concerned with the safety of the bus driver instead of the Deceased.
147. Others identified alcohol as a key factor in the riot –
Foreign Worker 6
A: I believe that the riot occurred because many of the foreign workers
involved were drunk. On my weekly visits to Little India I would
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always see some foreign workers creating trouble after they had drunk
alcohol. For instance, they would sit along the pavement and refuse to
move even if they were obstructing the way. They would also throw
their beer bottles on the ground. I know they are drunk because they are
unable to walk.
Foreign Worker 3
A: I believe the riot occurred because many of the foreign workers
involved were drunk. If they were sober they would have thought about
their family and would not have behaved in this way.
Foreign Worker 5
Q: Can you tell us what gave you the impression that some of the rioters
were under the influence of alcohol?
A: Because I have seen and in India also I have seen many times.
CHAIRMAN: seen what?
A: Fighting like this. Even in India they do this, drink and fight, and
they also destroy the cars, damage the cars by hitting the cars.
…
A: If there’s a problem between the bus driver and bus conductor,
they’ll do it there. They’ll stop the bus and start hitting the persons. If
an auto meets with an accident with a bus, the bus driver and the auto
driver will fight with each other.
Foreign Worker 4
A: I believe this incident escalated because the rioters were under the
influence of alcohol and that is why they behaved in this manner.
148. Foreign Worker 7 said that pent-up angst and unhappiness with the time-
keeper and bus driver might have contributed to the riot –
A: In the past, my friends have told me that the bus time keepers on the
$2 bus were very rude to Indian foreign workers. I am told that they use
Hokkien vulgarities and scold the workers whilst they are boarding. I
have not encountered this personally, as I do not take the $2 bus
because it is always too crowded. I was told that the crowd’s hatred for
the bus driver and time keeper could have contributed to the incident
escalating to the level that it did.
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149. Foreign Worker 8 however, provided a different view of the timekeeper’s
(Ms Wong’s) behaviour –
A: I also learnt of the female bus assistant involved in the incident. I
know her as I travel on that bus whenever I visit Little India. She is very
strict but very helpful. She brings discipline and order to the queue of
the foreign workers waiting to board the bus. When she is on duty, the
workers queue in an orderly manner. When she is not there, drunk
foreign workers cut the queue and board the bus.
150. The workers expressed regret for the riot and unanimously condemned
the actions of the rioters. This shared sentiment was best expressed by
Foreign Worker 5 –
A: I am saddened by the events of 8 December 2013 because Singapore
is a good country. I am also upset because people will forget our
contributions and think that all Indians are trouble makers.
(c) Evidence of Residents in Little India
151. 7 residents of Little India testified at the public hearing. The COI also
heard from the Chairmen of Tekka and Rowell Court Residents’
Committees.
152. Their testimonies centered on, first, the social disamenities caused by the
migrant workers gathering in residential areas within Little India on
Sundays, and second, the efficacy of post-riot measures.
153. Presenting the views of his residents, Mr Pereira C Martin, Chairman of
Tekka Residents Committee, highlighted an array of disamenities caused
by foreign workers congregating in Little India on Sundays –
A: In Little India itself, which has 10 blocks under my charge, we do
have major problems with foreign workers congregating in areas which
residents would like to use for themselves, for example, the void decks,
the playgrounds and various other areas.
…
A: One of the main things that they do which really irks residents is that
… they sit down on the floor, they have their picnics, they have drinks –
which was a very big issue for the residents before this incident– and
they sleep, and they raise their legs on the wall and they lean on the
wall and they stain the walls and stuff like that. I’m sure, if you go
down to any of the blocks in Little India, you can see signs of this. So
the residents are very uncomfortable with that, especially the ladies. I
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mean, if they are sleeping in the passageway on the floor, lying flat, and
you’re wearing a skirt and you’re walking by them, it would make
someone feel really uncomfortable, and that’s what the lady folks tell us
all the time.
…
A: We do have reports from our residents that when there is a large
foreign worker congregation under our void decks, we do have ladies
who come and accost them. Okay? And I have Indian resident
committee members who tell me that these Indian ladies are not just the
normal ladies. That’s one. Two, we also have heard of activities such as
hundi activities, money lending activities that go on below the void
deck from foreign worker to foreign worker … we also observe that
when foreign workers do congregate below the void decks, especially in
the area of Buffalo Road, we do have things like fortune-telling
activities as well and we do not know whether these fortune-tellers are
IIs or whether they are locals or whether they are foreigners who are
here on a social visit pass. So you have a hive of activity when you
allow congregation below the void decks and that is what the residents
find totally unacceptable.
…
A: The people who stay there feel uncomfortable about what they are
doing. Lying down on the floor, drinking alcohol in a public area,
sitting down on the floor in a void deck, leaving your litter after you
have finished eating, you know, sitting there and having a conversation
and having things like women and men of dubious character
approaching you, hundi activities which I have spoken about earlier,
fortune-telling activities, these are not activities which Singaporean
indulge in their HDB estates, do they?
…
A: It is a problem for the residents because they do want to have the
same kind of environment which other HDB estates have.
…
A: To the person who doesn’t stay in the area, it will be an – it will
seem an inconvenience and a disamenity … for the people staying
there, it’s a real problem, it’s a real issue. How would you feel if you
were staying in your estate and you can’t go down on the weekend …
or how would you feel if you had kids, small children and they go down
to the play ground and you see men there gathering having a drink? I
mean, it wouldn’t be something that you feel is a disamenity or an
inconvenience; you would feel it is an invasion of your privacy,
actually.
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…
A: To put it very bluntly, I understand where the NGOs are coming
from – but it’s very difficult for me to sympathize with their cause
because they don’t stay here. They don’t. They don’t stay in Little
India. So when you don’t stay in Little India and you don’t face the
problems on a weekly basis, I mean, I do not think you will understand
the feeling, the true feelings of the residents who stay there.
154. Not all of the residents who testified shared Mr Martin’s views. Ms Tan
Huilinn, a resident of Block 661 Buffalo Road, testified that the presence
of workers congregating in residential areas did not bother her –
A: To be honest, I don’t feel it affects me, because it’s only once a week
and it’s not even like a full Sunday, it’s only from 5 pm onwards and
the crowd comes in slowly, so it only peaks like I think from 7 pm
onwards. So just avoid going out or downstairs during these hours.
…
[Referring to common areas such as playgrounds and void decks]
A: I don’t see them hogging it. I don’t see the workers hogging it, even
on Sundays, no. I mean, yes, they do hang out in the void decks. They
do hang out in the walkways. Is it a bother? If you are walking through
the crowd, yes, it’s a bother, but if you’re not then its fine. It’s just one
time a week. I can put up with that.
155. Ms Tan said that she felt the workers added to Little India’s atmosphere–
A: I think to a certain extent the workers do bring about some of the
liveliness there, for me, and it’s – yes, its nice, when, you know, there
are festivals like Pongal and all that and you have the workers attending
the concerts and they are cheering and whistling and shouting and, you
know. You know, there is happiness in the air… to a certain extent, they
bring a certain atmosphere to Little India.
156. The COI also heard residents’ views on the bus boarding area in Little
India. Some residents testified that the boarding area, pre-riot, was
extremely disorderly. Ms Tan described it as an “accident waiting to
happen” with large crowds attempting to board buses within a relatively
small, cramped boarding area. Ms Tan also shared that she had previously
seen workers attempting to board a moving bus.
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157. On the whole, residents were happy with measures undertaken by the
authorities following the riot, with most indicating that they had seen
improvements to the public order situation in Little India – “there is an
improvement, because by 10 o’clock now the place is quite peaceful,
there’s not so much crowd around you see … before the riot, the condition
in the place there is very chaotic. There are cars blaring the horn, the
noise pollution, you see. So currently by 9 o’clock, it feels very peaceful,
not much noise there now.”
158. In relation to recommendations for the COI’s consideration, the residents
asked for increased police presence in the area. They also supported the
post-riot measures imposed to restrict the sale and consumption of
alcohol within Little India. While not all the residents believed a total
alcohol ban necessary, most agreed that the previous situation, where
even vegetable shops were selling alcohol, was not tenable.
(d) Evidence of Shopkeepers and Business Owners
159. The COI heard from a number of shopkeepers and business owners. Their
evidence centered on their interactions and observations of foreign
workers in Little India both pre and post riot.
160. Various shopkeepers and business owners gave evidence on the
disamenities caused by foreign workers congregating in Little India on
Sundays. A manager of a restaurant in Little India testified that the
corridor in front of his shop would be in a mess every Monday morning –
A: Monday morning we open the restaurant. In front of the – corridor
they vomit and they are leaving all the food in the corridor because they
sit and drink – after closing the restaurant, they sit in the corridor and
drink and they leave food behind, and the early morning when we come
there and sweep all the things …
CHAIRMAN: Do they leave the bottles there also?
A: Yes, bottles, all the food, whatever they consume and sometimes
they vomit, so we wash in the morning.
161. Mr Ahmad Abdul Jabbar, Chief Chef at Song of India Restaurant, gave
similar testimony –
A: They are crowding the place, they are eating on the street, they just
buy the food, they just sit together, they just put everything on the
street, they just litter, they just throw everything on the street, all the –
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they just litter there. Like, all – if you see on the – late night on Sundays
you will see the place everywhere there’s a mess. Completely the place
is dirty. All the place you will see the food thrown, this one, everything,
whatever they do, whatever they eat, whatever they drink, they just
throw everything there only.
162. An owner of another restaurant in Little India echoed this –
Q: Do the foreign workers mess up the area around your restaurant?
A: Yes, you are correct.
Q: What kind of mess do they create?
A: They will leave behind the food packets, the balance of the food
packets, they will not throw away their rubbish, they will leave behind
cigarette butts. They will vomit in the area.
CHAIRMAN: And beer bottles.
A: Yes.
163. He also said that he had, on occasion, seen workers fighting amongst
themselves and hitting one another with beer bottles.
164. In contrast, Mr Suresh Kumar Kumaresan and another business owner
who sold alcohol in Little India claimed that they had not seen workers
causing problems.
165. A number of shopkeepers testified that many of the rioters had been
drunk –
Little India restaurant manager
A: The riot took place on a Sunday and those foreign workers were
simply following the actions of a few main rioters. As their brains do
not work properly when they are drunk, these Indian foreign workers
probably did not realize that the situation would turn out this badly.
Jagwinder Singh Nerwal
A: In my opinion, the riot can be attributed to the effects of alcohol and
the social behaviour of the Indian workers.
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166. The shopkeepers testified that they had seen a discernible drop in
business in the immediate aftermath of the riot. Mr Kumaresan, owner of
a provision shop along Race Course Road which sold beer and liquor,
testified that 80% of his profits had come from the sale of alcohol. He
also shared that 80% of his customers were Indian workers. In the course
of his testimony, Mr Kumaresan shared that his monthly sales had
dropped drastically since the alcohol restrictions came into force – “prior
to the incident, my per month sales itself went up to S$135,000 to
S$140,000. Now after the incident, my sales is $32,000 to $35,000 only.”
167. Another business owner selling alcohol similarly testified that his
business had been affected since the riot, with an 80% drop in sales every
month.
168. The witnesses said that, although workers still frequented Little India on
Sundays, drunkenness was less of a problem. They attributed this to the
post-riot restrictions on the sale and consumption of alcohol that are now
in force.
169. Mr S Rajagopal, Vice-Chairman of the Little India Shopkeepers and
Heritage Association, went further to assert that the alcohol ban should be
enforced nationwide –
A: The current measures, all these notices have been put up but it only
spells out Saturdays and Sundays. Come Monday to Tuesday, there’s all
public drinking there. It goes back to the norm … if there is a complete
ban on public drinking, it will be very fruitful sir.
170. A witness who was born and raised in India but now lived and worked in
Singapore drew from his experience growing up in India –
A: My personal feeling is that the riot on that night, that unfortunate incident
that happened that night, was purely a mob reaction to a sudden death that
occurred. So there is this huge wave of sympathy towards a fellow brother or
a comrade, and whether the other people know him or don't know him or
whether the reason what went wrong, it becomes immaterial and then there is
this mob angst that comes up and that's the reaction that showed up over the
night. I do not think or do not feel that it was premeditated or planned or is a
result of any worker inequality or injustice or suffering of that sort.
...
A: It can happen in any political rally, it can happen in any college gathering.
It could happen in a street where -- in a street culture in India, a pedestrian
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crossing the road wrongly, if hit by a scooter the mob would attack the
scooter. If the scooter is in the wrong lane or direction and hit by a car, the
mob would attack the car. If the car is hit by a bus, the mob would attack the
bus. It goes by this hierarchy. So it is the law of the underdog.
(e) Evidence from Government Representatives
171. Representatives from the Urban Redevelopment Agency (‘URA’), the
Ministry of Manpower (‘MOM’), and SPF gave evidence on government
policies on the management of Little India and foreign workers.
172. Group Director of Conservation and Development Services of URA, Mr
Ler Seng Ann, told the COI about the work of the Little India Task Force,
a multi-agency committee set-up in October 2006 to improve the physical
environment of Little India. He tendered a Report detailing the
improvements recommended and implemented to date.
173. The COI also heard from Mr Kevin Teoh, Divisional Director of the
Foreign Manpower Management Division of MOM. Mr Teoh testified
that there were 1.1 million non-domestic foreign workers in Singapore.
Of these, 330,000 were Employment Pass and S-Pass holders, and
770,000 were Work Permit holders. Employment Passes were given to
professionals earning a minimum of $3,300. S-Passes were given to mid-
skilled workers earning a minimum of $2,200. Work Permit holders were
general workers earning a salary below $2,200. Of the 770,000 work
permit holders, 400,000 were non-Malaysians from the construction,
marine and process industry, and most came from South Asia.
174. Mr Teoh told the COI about Singapore’s laws protecting the rights of
workers – “these laws look at prompt salary payment, ensuring proper
accommodation, the provision for upkeep maintenance, medical, a safe
and healthy work environment and in the event that the worker is injured,
we have work injury compensation framework. Collectively, these laws
help to protect the rights of the worker.”
175. Mr Teoh told the COI there are 49 purpose-built dormitories which
collectively housed just over 200,000 foreign workers. The remaining
workers were housed in factory-converted dormitories, temporary
quarters situated on work sites, and in rented HDB or private residences.
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176. Mr Teoh said that MOM was keenly involved in ensuring that workers
were provided with good accommodation and amenities. To this end,
MOM was considering building more recreational centers for the
workers, equipped with amenities and services.
177. Mr Teoh explained that MOM adopted a two-pronged approach to
educating workers on their rights. First, while in their home country and
prior to their arrival in Singapore, workers are given pre-departure
materials in their native language2 detailing their entitlements, benefits,
salary and employment rights. Upon arriving in Singapore, workers are
again given further materials in their native language informing them of
local laws and social norms. These materials also contain various contact
information for MOM, and NGOs like TWC2 and MWC.
178. Mr Teoh said that MOM most often received employment-related
complaints (e.g. salary disputes, injury claims) and complaints about poor
working and living conditions. While the employer bore the first
responsibility to provide for the workers’ basic needs while investigations
into the complaints were going on, if an employer refused to do so, “this
is where the government is then prepared to provide such facilities.”
Where necessary, MOM would refer some workers to an NGO – “we
have our own provisions. We make space available if the worker requires
it. That’s number one. Number two, we can also work with various NGOs
who are willing to take these workers.”
179. To MARUAH’s question whether workers awaiting the resolution of a
complaint, were allowed to work, Mr Teoh said that MOM had
implemented a ‘Temporary Job Scheme’ under which workers who have
lodged complaints are allowed to continue working if they wished to do
so –
Q: So it’s not true that the workers are not allowed to work or that
there’s a blanket rule prohibiting foreign workers from working whilst
their claims are being investigated?
A: It is not true. There is the Temporary Job Scheme.
180. Mr Teoh also disagreed with Dr Wijeysingha’s claim that workers could
be forcibly repatriated before their claims were resolved – “as part of the
education process, we have provided the employment rights and
obligations, in there we also state with respect to forced repatriation. The
2 English, Tamil, Malay, Bangladeshi, Thai, Bengali, Mandarin.
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last checkpoint that the worker has available to him will be at the
immigration counter where he gets his passport stamped for the exit. At
that point, if he chooses to raise any employment-related matters, he can
inform the officer.” Mr Teoh informed the COI that in 2013, there had
been 23 such cases, where workers had informed ICA counter personnel
about an outstanding employment matter. MOM then investigated each
case.
181. On the issue of fees paid by workers to agents, Mr Teoh said that MOM
regulated local agency fees through the Employment Agencies Act – “we
limit the amount of agency fees that the Singapore licence employment
agency can charge to the worker. We limit, we cap it to one month of
salary per year, maximum two months, per worker.”
182. Finally, Mr Teoh testified that MOM did not believe there was
widespread mistreatment of workers in Singapore. Explaining why, he
said – “we say this because of the amount of work that we have done, is
number one. Number two, when we engage the foreign workers
themselves, when we visit the dormitories in our inspections, we ask
questions pertaining to their well-being and whether they want to raise
anything. So plus with the various assistance and the avenues that is
available to them, it will have been brought up. So we don’t believe there
is widespread mistreatment. Secondly, where there are cases of
mistreatment, we are prepared to take action and we have done so. The
situation, we think, from MOM’s perspective, is that generally workers
are treated decently.
183. In a 2011 survey of 3000 foreign workers, Mr Teoh said that slightly over
90% of these workers said that were happy and satisfied with working
conditions in Singapore. 80% indicated that they wished to come back
and continue working. 70% of those surveyed had worked in Singapore
for more than 2 years; of these, 60% had worked in Singapore for more
than 6 years. These, Mr Teoh added, “are indications that I take comfort
in, in that workers do find that Singapore is a place that they wish to
work in and that they are fairly treated, they know where to go to and
therefore they want to continue their employment in Singapore.”
184. Assistant Commissioner Jessica Kwok (‘AC Kwok’), Director of the
Police Licensing and Regulatory Department, SPF testified on the issuing
of liquor licenses. AC Kwok told the COI that the Liquor Licensing
Board was tasked with issuing, transferring, suspending and canceling all
classes of liquor licenses as well as stipulating conditions and restrictions
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on the issuance of licences.
185. AC Kwok said that SPF would screen each applicant and proposed venue
for each liquor license applied for. If there are no issues at this stage, the
application would then be routed to the Compliance Management Unit of
the relevant SPF Land Division where an assessment of the terrain and a
site inspection would be made. The crime situation and any other law and
order issues in the area would also be considered. If there are no
concerns, the licence would then be approved after verifying the
applicant’s documents.
186. AC Kwok told the COI that there were 8 types of licences. Each licence
was valid for 2 years. The licenses state whether alcohol may only be
consumed on-site, or also off-site. Where applicable, licenses may also
stipulate certain conditions.
187. AC Kwok testified that the number of liquor licenses in Little India had
“remained stable over the years.” As of 19 March 2014, 331 licences had
been issued to Little India venues, with 20% of these licenses being
issued in 2013. The remaining licences had been issued or renewed in
2012. AC Kwok added that, compared to Chinatown, Geylang and Joo
Chiat, “the number of liquor licenses in Little India is not the highest per
land area.”
188. To the question of why vegetable sellers were permitted to sell liquor, AC
Kwok said that these sellers possessed a ‘shop-use’ permit entitling them
to conduct retail sales. As the permit did not place any restrictions on the
type of goods they were allowed to sell, the shops were permitted to sell
alcohol.
189. Unlike Clarke Quay and Boat Quay, AC Kwok testified that no special
restrictions had been placed on liquor licences in Little India “given the
stable number of liquor licences … and the improving public order and
security situation” in the area.
190. The COI also heard from Superintendent Victor Ho (‘Supt Ho’), DAC
Daniel Tan (‘DAC Tan’) and DSP Ho See Ying (‘DSP Ho’). These
witnesses gave evidence on SPF’s approach to managing foreign workers
at known foreign-worker enclaves, such as Little India, Golden Mile
Complex and Peninsular Plaza. As Director of Operations, Supt Ho
explained that APOs were engaged to perform foreign worker
management duties. This entailed projecting a uniformed presence at
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selected areas, engaging and advising foreign workers against unlawful
and anti-social behaviour and conducting enforcement patrols for
regulatory offences, on behalf of the National Environment Agency. In
addition, he clarified that APOs were deployed to deal with social
disamenities and not to deal with public security incidents.
191. DAC Tan and DSP Ho gave evidence on the general policing strategies
employed in areas where foreign workers regularly congregate. DSP Ho
described the additional efforts taken by SPF to police Little India. This
included the deployment of 2 additional Fast Response Cars and the
creation of a community unit which specifically addressed security and
safety issues within the district. SOC troops had also been deployed to
Little India on 16 occasions in 2013, to project a stronger uniformed
presence. DSP Ho also testified that crime in Little India had been on a
downward trend in the years preceding the riot.
192. In her evidence, DSP Ho also touched on the deployment of APOs in
Little India. To previous witnesses’ claims regarding APOs’ treatment of
foreign workers, DSP Ho testified that there had only been 2
substantiated complaints of rudeness by APOs over the past 5 years. She
said that it was possible that foreign workers may dislike APOs because
they issue the workers with summonses, and not necessarily because of
rude or derogatory behaviour.
193. DAC Tan described the additional post-riot measures and deployments
made by SPF in Little India. He testified that additional officers had
regularly been deployed to the area, and that additional lighting and
cameras had been installed to deter crime.
(f) Evidence of Dormitory Operators
194. The COI heard from a number of dormitory representatives.
195. Dormitory operator Mr Willy Ng, testified that living conditions in
dormitories in Singapore “surpass” international standards set by the
International Finance Corporation of the World Bank “in terms of living
conditions, in terms of living space, in terms of amenities.” When asked
how Singapore compared to other countries, he said –
A: By all measures, even way back more than ten years ago when
dormitories started in Singapore, Singapore has always been – has
always maintained a higher standard in terms of living conditions.
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…
A: I’d like to say, you know dormitories in other areas peg their
standards to Singapore’s levels of standards.
…
A: In terms of living standards because Singapore – the government, the
stat boards assert certain standards on us operators to maintain. And the
enforcement on the operators is very – is much better than other
countries. So because of that, Singapore standards, basically, from
where I stand and experienced, is the best – that I know of.
196. When asked how the Government ensured that dormitories comply with
these requirements, Mr Ng explained that the Government, as the
landlord, sets out the standards in the land tender document. Further, to
obtain 30 year lease renewals on the land, dormitory operators had to
constantly ensure that new and updated requirements stipulated by the
Government were complied with.
197. Mr Ng testified that he did not think that dormitory conditions in
Singapore were a source of discontent amongst the foreign workers –
CHAIRMAN: Would you say that dormitory conditions in Singapore a
not a source of any discontent or dissatisfaction on the part of the
foreign workers?
A: Definitely not. To most of the workers, the dormitories here are
actually better than where they were living in their – from where they
come from. So it’s – dormitories here are actually a step up in terms of
their living conditions.
198. The COI also heard from the Mr Saffarulah s/o Abdullah, the Dormitory
Manager of Penjuru Dormitory. Mr Saffarulah responded to specific
allegations published in a Hong Kong tabloid newspaper which had
described his dormitory as being “like a prison”. Mr Saffarulah clarified
that, contrary to the tabloid report, there was no barbed wire along the
perimeter of the dormitory, or for that matter, anyway within its
compound - “sirs, our dormitory – there’s no barbed wires, only we have
fencing … gate also don’t have any barbed wire, sir. The whole dormitory
don’t have any barbed wires … The fencing only about 2 metre high, the
requirement by the BCA for the perimeter, perimeter protection.”
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199. Mr Saffarulah further testified that all CCTV cameras present in the
dormitory faced the perimeter of the fence “to see any intruders come
into the dormitory” and to monitor activity outside the perimeter –
contrary to the tabloid’s claim that the CCTVs were there to monitor the
workers. He also said that workers were free to leave the premises at will,
24 hours a day, and that there were no restrictions on their movement in
and out of the dormitory.
(g) Transport Operators and Associations
200. The COI heard evidence from representatives of the two bus associations
– the Singapore School Transport Association (‘SSTA’) and the Singapore
School and Private Hire Bus-Owners’ Association (‘S7’) – whose
members operate the private bus services ferrying foreign workers to and
from the Little India area. Mr Yeo Teck Guan, Group Director (Public
Transport) at the Land Transport Authority (‘LTA’) also testified at the
public hearing.
201. The witnesses provided the COI with insights into the general crowd and
traffic situation at the bus boarding areas at Tekka Lane (operated by
SSTA) and Hampshire Road (operated by S7), prior to the Riot. It was
commonly agreed that both locations experienced large crowds waiting
for the buses back to the dormitories. Mr Wong Ann Lin, chairman of the
SSTA, stated that the largest the crowd could get at any one point in time
at the Tekka Lane site was an estimated “200… to 400” passengers. Mr
Tan Jwee Tuan, supervisor of the SSTA timekeepers at Tekka Lane, put
the figure as at “least 500” after 8.00 p.m.. Mr Michael Tan Jun How, the
S7 representative, however testified that the crowd could swell to “one or
two thousand” at the Hampshire Road location.
202. By comparison, only a handful of staff members (comprising supervisors,
timekeepers and traffic controllers) were deployed by the bus associations
to manage the boarding area and co-ordinate the arrival and departure of
the buses. Both associations also stated that these staff members did not
receive any training in crowd control or on dealing with the foreign
nationals who comprised the passengers using the bus services.
203. These witnesses highlighted the difficulties faced by the bus associations
in managing the large crowds waiting for the buses -
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Wong Ann Lin
Q: Has there been any feedback from the staff on the ground about
difficulties in managing the large number of people there?
…
A: Yes, we have been told that although there may be few hundred
passengers waiting for buses, but only one bus would come at any one
time, so it's not enough buses to accommodate all these people.
Michael Tan Jun How
A: Now, I think manpower-wise, we don't have the capability to control
the crowd, because we are talking about thousands and thousands of
people.
204. The representatives from both bus associations recommended an increase
in police presence at the bus boarding areas, saying that this would make
it easier to manage the crowds.
205. Mr Tan Jwee Tuan explained what was required of the timekeepers
deployed on the ground -
A: ...So under such circumstances, the workers and passengers would
keep on increasing, the number of passengers would keep on increasing
and some of the workers will stand in the middle of the road and
obstruct our buses from coming in. So in such a situation, sometimes
when the timekeeper they raise their voice to ask them to have to move
aside so that our buses could come in. So they're actually trying to
maintain order. Just now you said that our timekeepers have to be of a
rugged personality. I can only say that if you were to -- I can only say
that if you were to employ a female staff who is quite weak, it would be
a big problem.
Q: Mr Tan, are you saying that you need to have a certain firmness or
strictness in the way you deal with the passengers in order to manage
the challenges of a large crowd?
A: Yes, that is correct, yes.
206. Specifically regarding Ms Wong, Mr Tan Jwee Tuan stated that while she
“speaks louder than most people”, she was “effective” at her job and he
had not noticed her using any “rough language” towards the foreign
workers. Mr Tan Jun How Michael and Mr Wong Ann Lin also testified
that they were not aware of any of their staff members using vulgarities
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or racial epithets against the foreign workers.
207. The representatives from both bus associations also recounted that, prior
to the riot, the foreign workers tended not to queue while waiting for the
buses, instead rushing towards the buses as they neared. Mr Wong Ann
Lin recalled one occasion prior to 8 December 2013 when an accident
involving a foreign worker and a bus occurred as a result of this
disorganisation. There were also instances where the workers would
chase after moving buses.
208. The witnesses testified that the bus drivers were most concerned with
drunken passengers vomiting on board their buses. Mr Tan Jun How
Michael stated that the decision whether to allow drunken passengers to
board the buses was left to the driver’s discretion. However, Mr Wong
Ann Lin testified that SSTA had given instructions to their timekeepers
not to allow passengers who were very drunk to board the buses, “for the
safety of the passengers and bus drivers”.
209. The representatives from the two bus associations welcomed the post-riot
measures implemented at the bus boarding areas, consisting mainly of the
introduction of barricades and setting up of queuing areas, and were in
general agreement that both locations were now safer and better-
managed.
210. Mr Tan Jwee Tuan, however, expressed his concern that the earlier cut-off
time for the bus services (9.00 pm, as compared to 11.00 pm pre-riot),
coupled with a reduction in the number of buses allowed to operate on the
routes, could lead to a situation where large numbers of foreign workers
find themselves without means of transport back to their dormitories. Mr
Tan estimated that after 9.00 pm, the number of foreign workers
remaining at Tekka Lane ranged between “500 to 800” people, which
could lead to problems if the available buses were not able to
accommodate these workers:
A: ... If you don't ferry these 800 people home, if they get angry then it
may give rise to another riot.
...
A: At present, you know, it's an anxious time for us because we don't
know whether there will be buses coming to ferry these people. So, to
us, if the acute shortage of buses to ferry these people back, I have this
feeling that when we are working there actually we feel threatened,
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because if we don't ferry them back we feel threatened.
211. Mr Yeo Teck Guan testified that, since the riot, LTA had been meeting
regularly with the bus associations and reviewing the operations at the
bus boarding areas. He also explained the adjustments made by LTA in
response to the concerns raised by the bus associations, which included
increasing the number of buses allowed to operate during certain peak
periods –
A: Yes, in the sense that when we first started, we took a decision to --
when we lifted the suspension on the Little India bus service, we went
back to 50 per cent of capacity. So, of course, we were all on the ground
to monitor and after discussion with operators, the week after we
decided that to ease the operation, we added 14 another -- if I'm not
wrong, it was 16 buses. So from50 per cent we went to 56 per cent.
Then subsequently in February, because of the return trips, you know,
some -- because of the peak period -- the peak Sunday effect, what we
did was also warn the operators to add another 12 buses. So these are
the incremental things we did and, of course, as we go along, I
acknowledge that more foreign workers may be coming back to Little
India, so I think at the end of February we also worked with our -- with
the associations to add another 20 buses. So now, on a normal Sunday
there will be 166 buses on the return trip and there will be additional 12
buses.
212. Mr Yeo also testified that he was informed that on the weekend prior to
his taking the stand, the queues were cleared by 9.15 pm. In this regard,
Mr Michael Tan Jun How also stated that the numbers remaining at
Hampshire Road after the cut-off time was “manageable” and that the
buses would be able to transport away these workers within 45 minutes
on average.
213. Mr Yeo Teck Guan also outlined additional measures that LTA intended to
implement at the bus boarding areas in the future, including the
introduction of permanent structures, shelters and facilities to “make the
waiting more tolerable” for the foreign workers.