REMEDI3S-TLD: Reputation Metrics Design to Improve ... · Design to Improve Intermediary Incentives...

Post on 27-May-2020

9 views 0 download

Transcript of REMEDI3S-TLD: Reputation Metrics Design to Improve ... · Design to Improve Intermediary Incentives...

REMEDI3S-TLD: Reputation Metrics Design to Improve Intermediary Incentives for Security of TLDs

A project in collaboration with SIDN and NCSC

Maciej Korczyński Delft University of Technology Contact: maciej.korczynski@tudelft.nl ICANN 54 Techday 19 October 2015, Dublin

REMEDI3S-TLD

REMEDI3S-TLD

REMEDI3S-TLD

REMEDI3S-TLD

Agenda

•  Types of security metrics

•  Security metrics for TLDs

•  Security metrics for hosting providers

•  Discussion

Types of security metrics

•  Different layers of security metrics:

•  Top Level Domains (TLDs)

• Market players related to the TLD (infrastructure providers): registrars, hosting providers, DNS service providers

•  Network resources managed by each of the players, such as resolvers, name servers

Security metrics for TLDs

Security metrics for TLDs

•  Type of reputation metrics

•  Concentration of malicious content:

a)  Number of unique domains b)  Number of FQDN c)  Number of URLs

Security metrics for TLDs

•  Type of reputation metrics

•  Concentration of malicious content:

a)  Number of unique domains b)  Number of FQDN c)  Number of URLs

•  Size matters!

•  Type of reputation metrics (example)

Security metrics for TLDs

•  Type of reputation metrics

•  Up-times of maliciously registered/compromised domains

Security metrics for TLDs

Security metrics for hosting providers

Security metrics for hosting providers

1.  Count badness per AS across different data sources

2.  Normalize for the size of the AS (in 3 ways)

Abuse  Feeds  

p-­‐DNS  /  IP  Rou3ng  

•  Shadow  Server  Compromise  •  Shadow  Server  Sandbox  URL  •  Zeustracker  C&Cs  •  MLAT  requests  •  APWG  •  StopBadware  •  …  

 

#  Advertised  IPs  #  IPs  in  p-­‐DNS  #  Domains  Hosted  

Abuse  Mapping  

Size  Mapping  

•  Farsight  Security  p-­‐DNS  Data  •  Internet  IP  RouLng  Data  

 

#  Unique  Abuse  /  AS  

Abuse  Maps  PhishTank  AS#1  ß  à    100    AS#2  ß  à    200  

MLAT  AS#1  ß  à    50  AS#2  ß  à    73  

Size  Maps  AdverLsed  IPs  AS#1  ß  à    256  AS#2  ß  à    1024  

 Domains  Hosted  AS#1  ß  à    23  AS#2  ß  à    1232  

Normaliza3on  

Normalized  Abuse  

PhishTank  /  Advrt.  IPs  AS#1  ß  à    0.39  AS#2  ß  à    0.19  

PhishTank  /  Domains  Hosted  AS#1  ß  à    4.34  AS#2  ß  à    0.16  

MLAT  /  Advrt.  IPs  AS#1  ß  à    0.19  AS#2  ß  à    0.07  

MLAT  /  Domains  Hosted  AS#1  ß  à    2.17  AS#2  ß  à    0.05  

•  #  Abuse  /  Size  

3.  Rank ASes on amount of badness

4.  Aggregate rankings

5.  Identify ASes with consistently high concentrations of badness

Rank  

Abuse  Ranking  

PhishTank  Ranking  1  AS#1  ß  à    834  AS#2  ß  à    833  

PhishTank  Ranking  2  AS#1  ß  à    834  AS#2  ß  à    833  

MLAT  Ranking  1  AS#1  ß  à    235  AS#2  ß  à    234  

MLAT  Ranking  2  AS#1  ß  à    235  AS#2  ß  à    234  

Combine  Ranks  

Sort  Rank    High  à  Low   Borda  Count  

Overall  Ranking  Borda  Count  Ranking  AS#1  ß  à    2354  AS#2  ß  à    1834  AS#3  ß  à    1542  AS#4  ß  à    1322  

Normalized  Abuse  

PhishTank  /  Advrt.  IPs  AS#1  ß  à    0.39  AS#2  ß  à    0.19  

PhishTank  /  Domains  Hosted  AS#1  ß  à    4.34  AS#2  ß  à    0.16  

MLAT  /  Advrt.  IPs  AS#1  ß  à    0.19  AS#2  ß  à    0.07  

MLAT  /  Domains  Hosted  AS#1  ß  à    2.17  AS#2  ß  à    0.05  

Security metrics for hosting providers

Practical application

•  “Clean Netherlands”: Enhance self cleansing ability of the Dutch hosting market by

• promoting best practices and awareness

• pressuring the rotten apples

Discussion

•  Compare your TLD against the market

•  Driving factors (why the attackers are more interested in certain types of domains?)

•  Let us know about policy changes, pricing

Discussion

•  Limitations: metrics for smaller TLDs are more sensitive to individual security incidents

•  Abuse handling initiatives

Discussion

•  Limited access to:

•  Domain WHOIS (classifier between maliciously registered and legitimate domains, metrics for registrars)

•  Datasets, e.g. shadow server reports

•  Feedback

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research leading to these results was funded by SIDN (www.sidn.nl) Many thanks to: Cristian Hesselman (SIDN Labs), Paul Vixie (Farsight Security), and Thorsten Kraft (Cyscon)

Contact information: Maciej Korczyński Delft University of Technology maciej.korczynski@tudelft.nl

•  Type of reputation metrics

Security metrics for TLDs