https://helda.helsinki.fi

Rancière and Schmitt

Minkkinen, Panu

Routledge

2017

Minkkinen , P 2017 , Rancière and Schmitt : Sons of Ares? in M Lopez Lerma & J Etxabe

(eds) , Rancière and Law . Nomikoi Critical Legal Thinkers , Routledge , Abingdon , pp.

129-149 .

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RancièreandSchmitt:SonsofAres?

PanuMinkkinen

UniversityofHelsinki,Finland

Introduction:Schmitt'sformalism?

Inhiswell-known‘Notes’onCarlSchmitt’sessayTheConceptofthePolitical(Schmitt2007a),theyoungLeoStraussreflectsontheenthusiasmwithwhichhereceiveditspublication.HereSchmitthadfirstpresentedhisdefinitionofpoliticsastheconflictualtensionthatarisesfromthefriend/enemydistinction.Asafellowcriticofliberalism,Straussimmediatelyrecognizedakindredspirit.ButStrauss’sadmirationdidnotcomewithoutreservations.Inhiseyes,Schmitt’scriticismdidnot,perhaps,gofarenough.Straussnotes:

Hewhoaffirmsthepoliticalassuchrespectsallwhowanttofight;heisjustastolerantas

theliberals—butwiththeoppositeintention:whereastheliberalrespectsandtoleratesall‘honest’convictionssolongastheymerelyacknowledgethelegalorder,peace,assacrosanct,hewhoaffirmsthepoliticalassuchrespectsandtoleratesall‘serious’convictions,thatis,alldecisionsorientedtotherealpossibilityofwar.Thustheaffirmationofthepoliticalassuchprovestobealiberalismwiththeoppositepolarity.(StraussinMeier1995:117)1

StraussaccusesSchmittoffallingpreytothesamerelativismthatheistryingtocriticize

byreducingpoliticstoconflictandstruggle.Itwouldseem,then,thatitnolongermatterswhatoneisfightingfor.Thestruggleforliberalinstitutionssuchashumanrightsandtheruleoflawwouldbejustas‘political’asthestrugglefornon-liberalalternatives.Thedistinctionis,then,formalirrespectiveofsubstance.ThisargumentaboutSchmitt’s‘formalism’andtherelativismthatallegedlyfollowshassincebeenrepeatedbymorecontemporarycritics,aswell.Despiteseeminglycloseaffinities(seee.g.Arditi2008),JacquesRancièredistanceshimselffromSchmittbylimitinghimselftoafewvaguedismissiveremarks(asinRancière-Nash1996)andscantindirectreferences(e.g.Rancière2009c:65-66commentingonAgamben).IntheonlyexplicitconfrontationdirectlywithSchmittthatI’mawareof,Rancièreclaimsthat:

Idonotreducepoliticstoamereagonisticschemawherethe‘content’isirrelevant.Iam

farawayfromtheSchmittianformalizationofantagonism.Politics,Iargue,hasitsownuniversal,itsownmeasurethatisequality.(Rancière2011:4)

1TheEnglish‘enlargededition’ofSchmitt’sessayalsoincludesStrauss’s1932‘Notes’as

anannex(Schmitt2007a:97-122;seealsoKeedus2015:79-80).

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SoRancière’scriticism,atleastasitispresentedhere,touchesuponthesameformalismthatseemedtobotherStrauss,aswell.Schmitt’sconceptofthepoliticalis,thisargumentwouldimply,aformaldistinctionthatqualifiesallactionaspoliticalsolongasitincludesanantagonisticelementthat,inSchmitt’scase,isintroducedbythefriend/enemydistinction.HereRancièresuggeststhatforhim,unlikeforSchmitt,thatantagonisticelementassuchisneverenough.InordertoqualifyaspoliticsinRancière’smeaningoftheterm,the’struggle’mustconcernaparticularcontent,namelyequality(onRancière’sunderstandingof’active’equality,seeMay2008:38-77).WithoutitwewouldnotbetalkingaboutpoliticsinRancière’smeaningoftheterm.

Yetinbroaderterms,bothRancièreandSchmittbelongtothesame‘agonistic’tradition;bothare‘sonsofAres’.2WhileChantalMouffe,totakeanotherprominentrepresentativeinthistradition,managestoworkherSchmittianpremisesintoatheoryofradicaldemocracy(seeMouffe2005),RancièreisclearlymorereluctanttodiscusshispossibleaffiliationswiththeGermanconservativerevolutionary(ontheGermanconservativerevolutionarymovementingeneral,seee.g.Woods1996).Butwhy?ArethegroundsforRancière’sreluctancesound?IstheresomethinginSchmitt’sintellectualschemethatwouldmakeitincompatiblewithRancière’sattemptstodiscernpolitics?OristhisjustanechoofthemoregeneraldisinclinationofleftistFrenchacademiatoengagewithSchmitt,the’convincedNazi’(Arendt1994:339,fn65)?

InhisnativeFrance,Rancièrewill,nodoubt,wishtodistancehimselffromtheradicalconservativeNouvelleDroitemovementthatdrawsheavilyonSchmitt(e.g.Benoist2003).ButSchmittappearsinotherlineagesinFrance,aswell.Atleastthreecanbeidentified.OnehasitsoriginsinRaymondAronandtheliberalmovement(e.g.Aron2003;Raynaud2014),whileanotheriscuriouslysituatedbetweentheliberalsandtheright(e.g.Freund2003;Freund1995;Steinmetz-Jenkins2016).Finally,athirdlineagecaneventraceitsintellectualancestrytotheHegelianphaseofAlexandreKojèveandGeorgesBataille(e.g.Geroulanos2011).3Sotakingintoaccountthisrathercomplicatedrelationshipbetweenthe’CrownJuristoftheThirdReich’andtheFrench,whatis,ifany,Rancière’saffinitywithSchmitt?

MyargumentinthisessayisthatSchmitt’s‘concept’,ashechoosestocallhisdelineationofthepolitical,isnotquiteas’conceptually’formalasitfirstseemsandasRancièreinhisbriefremarkwouldhaveusbelieve.Schmitt’spoliticalsubstanceis,forsure,veilednotwithstandingfacileconclusionsdrawnfromhispersonalpoliticalescapades(e.g.Gross2007).ButasubstanceisintroducedbywayofwhatIwouldcallthe‘metapoliticalnecessity’ofhistheory.ThenecessityappliestoboththepoliticalasaconceptasSchmittseesitandtoSchmitt’snotionoftheconstitutionthatIwillexaminemorecloselytoillustratemypoint.

2Ares,sonofZeus,theGreekgodofwar:’YouaremosthatedtomeoftheGodswho

inhabitOlympos.Alwaysdeartoyouarestrifeandwarandbattles’(Homer2013:157[Book5,lines900-902]).

3OfparticularinterestinthisrespectisthecorrespondencethatprecededKojève’s1957seminarvisittoDüsseldorfatSchmitt’sinvitation(Kojève-Schmitt2001;seealsoKojève2000:134-135).

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Anditisatthismetapoliticallevelwhere,Iwouldsuggest,RancièrealignshimselfwithSchmitt.ThisdespiteRancière’sexplicitcriticismoftheterm.Inthefinalpartoftheessay,IwillattempttoshowhowRancièrehimselfmayenduppresentinghisnotionofpoliticsin’metapolitical’terms,aswell,butunderstoodmoreinthewayasitispresentedbyAlainBadiou(Badiou2011).

Inordertodevelopmyargument,IwillreadadetailextractedfromSchmitt’sTheConceptofthePoliticalagainsthis1928monographConstitutionalTheory(Schmitt2008a)inordertodemonstratehowhismetapoliticalpositionarises.Thehistoricalproximityofthesetwotextsisworthnoting.ConstitutionalTheory,Schmitt’sfirst—andsomemightclaimonly—majormonograph,waspublishedonlyayearafterthefirsteditionoftheessay,thesameyearthatSchmitthimselfmovedfromBonntotheHandelshochschuleinBerlin(Bendersky1983:41-103;Kennedy2004:137).TheWeimarRepublicwasjustdescending—again—intogovernmentalparalysisandtheeconomicrecessionthatwouldeventuallyusherHitlertopower.Againstthissetting,myaimistoshedlightonthequestionofthepoliticalnatureofconstitutionalphenomena,betheyWeimarianorotherwise,or,conversely,toshowhowfocusingonconstitutionalphenomenamayilluminateSchmitt’snotionofthepolitical.Whatisapoliticalconstitution?TowhatextentcanweclaimthatagivenconstitutionliketheWeimarConstitutionof1919isa‘political’charterinSchmitt’ssenseoftheword?Istheconstitutionnot,then,merelythelexlegumastheKelsen-inspiredlegaltraditionwouldimply(seealsoMinkkinen2013)?

AfterIhavedevelopedtheseSchmittianthemessomewhatindependently,IwillreturntoRancièreinthefinalpartsoftheessay.

Schmitt:thepoliticalasenmity

ThecentralargumentthatSchmittputsforwardinTheConceptofthePoliticalisfairlyfamiliarterritory,soitmaybeunnecessarytodwellonitindetail.Butbriefly,Schmittcriticizespreviousattemptstodefinethepoliticalforeitherlackofclarityorforusingthetermantitheticallybywayofdistinguishingit’negatively’fromwhatitisnot,primarilyfromthemoral,theaesthetic,andtheeconomic(Schmitt2007a:20).Instead,Schmittclaims,thecharacteristicsandcategoriesthatarespecifictothepoliticalshouldbe’positively’defined.Iftheultimatedistinctionsthatallowustodefinethemoralaregoodandevil,theaestheticbeautifulandugly,andtheeconomicprofitableandunprofitable,then,forSchmitt,thepoliticalcanbedefinedbywayofanantitheticalfriend/enemydistinction(Schmitt2007a:25-27).4Furthermore,thedistinctionintroducesapolemicalelementintothepolitical:

allpoliticalconcepts,images,andtermshaveapolemicalmeaning.Theyarefocusedona

specificconflictandareboundtoaconcretesituation;theresult(whichmanifestsitselfinwarorrevolution)isafriend-enemygrouping,andtheyturnintoemptyandghostlike

4SchmittfurtherelaboratedonthedistinctionmuchlaterinhisTheoryofthePartisan(Schmitt2007b),‘radicalizedandproperlyuprooted’,asJacquesDerridawouldapprovinglysay(Derrida1997:146).

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abstractionswhenthissituationdisappears.Wordssuchasstate,republic,society,class,aswellassovereignty,constitutionalstate,absolutism,dictatorship,economicplanning,neutralortotalstate,andsoon,areincomprehensibleifonedoesnotknowexactlywhoistobeaffected,combated,refuted,ornegatedbysuchaterm.(Schmitt2007a:30-31)

TherearetwothingsthatIwouldliketoemphasizeinthisquoteandthat,inmymind,

alleviate—ifnoteradicate—anyaccusationsaboutSchmitt’s’formalism’.Firstly,‘concepts,images,andterms’.SowhatSchmittmeansby‘thepolitical’doesnotonlyconcernconceptsastheoreticalcategories(onSchmitt’sconceptualism,seePankakoski2010).Italsoreferstotheimageryandless-than-conceptualexpressionsthathavebeenusedin,forexample,theactofconstitutingastate.Thinkof,forexample,theperformativecomplexityofthephrase‘wethepeople’(e.g.Derrida2002).Secondly,withoutthepolemicalfrictionwithinthefriend/enemygroupings,supposedlypolitical’concepts,imagesandterms’aremerely’emptyandghostlikeabstractions’,perhaps’formal’intheverymeaningthatRancière’scriticismsuggests.Consequently,aconstitution,forinstance,isnevermerelyacollectionofconceptuallyformalizednormsthatwoulddefineanddelimitthecompetencesofthestate’spoliticalandlegalinstitutions.Initsnecessarilypolemicalcharacter—forwithoutitits’concepts,imagesandterms’wouldbe’emptyandghostlikeabstractions’—aconstitutionwillalwaysincludewithinitselfan‘existential’dimension(seee.g.Marder2010)thatSchmitt,inhisConstitutionalTheory,elaborateswiththehelpofthenotionofan‘absoluteconcept’.Theexistentialdimensionis,inotherwords,Schmitt’swayofaddressingthepitfallsof’formalization’or’emptyandghostlikeabstractions’,andthisdimensionisintroducedbywayofapolemicalconfrontationwithsomething’tobeaffected,combated,refuted,ornegated’.

Sowhatwouldan‘absoluteconceptoftheconstitution’imply?ForSchmitt,the‘relative’conceptoftheconstitutionreferstothemultitudeoflegalnorms

thathavebeenlegislatedasconstitutionalnorms.Assuchamultitude,thesenormslackthe‘unity’orthe‘oneness’(Einheit)thatdefinestheconstitutionasanabsoluteconcept(seeSchmitt2008a:67-74).The‘absoluteconcept’is,then,Schmitt’sreferencetotheconcretewayinwhichconstitutionalnormscometogethertoformapoliticalunity.SoSchmittseemstoassumethatunityas‘oneness’isspecificallypoliticalbynature,or,tobemoreexact,itisthe‘politicalunityofthepeople’(Schmitt2008a:59),a‘peculiarformofexistence…determinedthroughtheactofconstitutionmaking’(Schmitt2008a:76).Individualizedexistenceasaunityis,inotherwords,politicalexistencethattheunifiedabsoluteconceptoftheconstitutionrepresents.AlthoughthereareconsiderabledifferenceshereinrelationtothewayinwhichRancièreunderstandstherelationshipbetweenthedemosandtheochlos,itisworthnotingthatSchmitt’s’politicalunityofthepeople’isnotaonenessthatis’constituted’bysomecharterbut,rather,theunitythat,forexample,thePreambleofthe1919WeimarConstitution(’TheGermanpeople,unitedinitstribes…’)presumes:someformofunity,acontingent’politicalmaturity’,howeverindeterminateandfragileitmaybe,isthefactualprerequisitefortheestablishmentofanypoliticalorder.Wereasonbackwards.Ifwecan

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claimthatapoliticalorderexists,thenwemustalsopresupposethatsome’unity’orotherisresponsibleforitsexistence.Rancière,ontheotherhand,maintainsthat:

Democracyisneithertheconsensualself-regulationofthepluralpassionsofthemultitude

ofindividualsnorthereignofacollectivityunifiedbylawundertheshadowofDeclarationsofRights.Democracyexistsinasocietytothedegreethatthedemosexistsasthepowertodividetheochlos.Thispowerofdivisionisenactedthroughacontingenthistoricalsystemofevents,discoursesandpracticeswherebyanymultitudeaffirmsandmanifestsitselfassuch,simultaneouslyrefusingbothitsincorporationintotheOneofacollectivitythatassignsranksandidentitiesandthepureabandonmentofindividualfocusesofpossessionandterror.(Rancière2007:32)

ButSchmitt’s’unifiedpeople’isnotaunitythatcouldonlyexistbywayof,say,a

constitution.Itis,rather,thetraceofamultitudethatoncecametogethersuccessfullywiththedeterminationtoestablishtheinstitutionsrequiredforitspoliticalexistenceofchoice.Andregardlessofitssubsequentinstitutionalexistenceas,forinstance,thedemocraticelectorate’undertheshadowofDeclarationsofRights’,itcanalwaysre-emergeasthatmultitudetoundowhatitmayhavedone,aswewilllatersee.Inthissense,evenSchmitt’sdemosretainsacertain’powerofdivision’.

Nevertheless,atthispointSchmitt’smorespecificmeaningoftheword‘political’isstillrelativelyformal,andtheonlyhintseemstobetheunitarycharacterofthewhole:thefactualabilitytoactasaunityiswhatmakesawholepolitical.LaterSchmittfurtherelaboratesthatthisunityiscloselyrelatedtowhathecallsthe‘principleofidentity’,thatis,thepossibilityofapeopletorecognizeitselfasapoliticalunityinsofaras‘byvirtueofitsownpoliticalconsciousnessandnationalwill,ithasthecapacitytodistinguishfriendandenemy’(Schmitt2008a:247;seealsoBjörk2016)or,inotherwords,toidentifyits’constitutiveoutside’.5Inotherwords,theidentificationofanenemyenhancestheidentitythatenablesapeopletoseeitselfasapoliticalentity.Sothefriend/enemydistinctionalsohasconcreteconstitutionalrelevance.

Schmittrecognizesthreedimensionsintheabsoluteconceptoftheconstitution.Firstly,initsabsolutesense,theconstitutioncanberegardedastheconcreteand

collectivepreconditionofthepoliticalunityandthesocialorderofagivenstate.Itis‘someprincipleofunityandorder,somedecision-makingauthoritythatisdefinitiveincriticalcasesofconflictsofinterestandpower’(Schmitt2008a:59).Thisfirstdimensionis,inotherwords,areferencetohowsovereignpowerisorganizedandexercisedinthestate.AlthoughSchmittdoesnotspecificallymentionBodininthisinstance(seehoweverSchmitt2008a:101),theideaisveryclosetothelatter’snotionofsovereigntyastheabsolutepowerthatunifiesthepluralityofhouseholdsintoone(seeBodin1992).

5’[A]ntagonismisthe”constitutiveoutside”thataccompaniestheaffirmationofall

identity…’(Laclau1990:183).

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ForSchmitt,theconstitutionmayalsorefertoaparticularpoliticalorsocialorderor,inotherwords,toaspecificwayofgoverningandsubjectionthatisindistinguishablefromthepoliticalexistenceofthestate.Inthissecondabsolutemeaning,theconstitutionwillbeidenticalwith,forexample,formsofgovernmentsuchasmonarchy,oligarchyordemocracyasthestate’s‘formofforms’(Schmitt2008a:60).Schmitt’sreferencetotheformofthestateas‘formaformarum’maywellbeofThomisticoriginandespeciallyanallusiontothefamousclaimmadebytheGermanRenaissancescholarNicholasofCusa(1401-1464)aboutGodasthe‘formofallforms[formaomniumformarum/dieFormallerForm]’(Cusa2013:20/21).

Finally,thethirdmeaningoftheabsoluteconceptoftheconstitutionemphasizestheprincipleofthedynamicdevelopmentofallpoliticalunitiesandtheforceandenergythatenablesthis.ForSchmittnopoliticalunitycanremainstaticastheetymologicaloriginofthewords‘state’and‘constitution’asstatusseemstofalselyimply(from’stare’and’statuere’,’tostand’,’tosetstanding’).Allunitiesmustregeneratethemselvescontinuously:

Politicalunitymustformitselfdailyoutofvariousopposinginterests,opinions,and

aspirations.…Theconstitutionistheactiveprincipleofadynamicprocessofeffectiveenergies,anelementofthebecoming…(Schmitt2008a:61)

Soevenifthestateis’sheerstatus’,6itisalive.Withthisthirddimension,Schmittbetrays

thevitalisticundertowofhistheory(seealsoBraun2012).This,inturn,suggestsakinshipwithNietzscheancontemporariessuchasMaxSchelerandMaxWeber(seeSchmitt1996;Ulmen1985),7andcertainlywiththeaforementionedLeoStrauss.

Schmittnotesthattheabsoluteconceptoftheconstitutioncould,ofcourse,alsoreferto‘fundamentallegalregulation’or,inotherwords,totheclosedsystemofthehierarchicallyultimatelegalnormsasawhole,totheconstitutionasthe‘normofnorms’(Schmitt2008a:62)orasortof‘normanormansnonnormata’,’thenormofnormsthatcannotbenormed’.8ButSchmitt’scriticismagainstthiskindofpurenormativismis,firstly,thatitproducesdistorted’apocryphal’accountsofsovereignty,and,secondlyandconsequently,thataconstitutionwouldberegardedasvalidmerelybecauseithasbeencorrectlyinferredfromaformalcompetence.ForSchmitt,aconstitutioncanbevalidonlyif,inadditiontoanyformalcriteria,ithasbeenbackedbyafactualabilitytoconstituteor,inotherwords,byafactualpowerorauthoritythatmakestheactofconstitutingpossibletobeginwith.ThisisthedecisionsistelementinSchmitt’sconstitutionaltheory.Theconstitutioniscreatedbythewill

6Thispassageidentifyingthestateas’derStatusschlechthin’(Schmitt1991:20)thathasreceivedmuchattention(e.g.Derrida1997:109;Vries2002:355)hasbeenomittedfromtheEnglishedition.Schmittlaterintroducesatensionbetweenstatusandkinesis(’movement’)asthetwinsidesofstasisinthe’Postscript’ofhisfinal1970bookPoliticalTheologyII(Schmitt2008b:123).

7Schmitt’srelationshiptoNietzscheisclearlyanunderstudiedtheme(seehoweverMcCormick1997:83-117;Aydin2008).

8ThisLatinexpressioniscentralintheever-continuingtheologicaldisputesabouttherelationshipbetweenScriptureandinterpretation(e.g.'DeiVerbum'2014).

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ofa‘constitution-makingpower’,andtheword‘will’is,foritspart,anindicationofafactuallyexistingpowerasthesourceofacommand:‘Thewillisexistentiallypresent;itspowerorauthorityliesinitsbeing’(Schmitt2008a:64).Understoodpolitically,lawis‘concretewillandcommandandanactofsovereignty’(Schmitt2008a:187).Inamonarchytheking’swillisthelaw,inademocracythepeople’swill.Inordertoremaininternallycoherent,thenormativistconceptofthelawoftheRechtsstaatmustremainsilentaboutthepoliticalwillthatcanactualizealegalnormintoavalidcommand:

Theconstitutioninthepositivesenseoriginatesfromanactoftheconstitution-making

power.Theactofestablishingaconstitutionassuchinvolvesnotseparatesetsofnorms.Instead,itdeterminestheentiretyofthepoliticalunityinregardtoitspeculiarformofexistencethroughasingleinstanceofdecision.Thisactconstitutestheformandtypeofthepoliticalunity,theexistenceofwhichispresupposed.(Schmitt2008a:75)

Intermsoftheseparationofpowers,theGermanexpressionforlegislativepoweris

gesetzgebendeGewalt.Toremainconsistenthimself,SchmittmustrefertoverfassunggebendeGewaltasconstitution-makingpowerinordertoemphasizethatwearedealingwithapowermore‘fundamental’thanlegislativepower.Morefundamentaldespitethefactthatconstitutionalnormsareformally‘legislated’insimilarwaysasconventionallaws.Schmitt’stermisliterallytranslatedratherclumsy,butitcanbeclarifiedwiththehelpofthedistinctionbetweenconstituentandconstitutedpower.ForSchmitt,a‘separated’legislativepowerisclearlyanexpressionofconstitutedpower,apowerthatthelegislatorexerciseswithinitsconstitutionalcompetence.Constitution-makingpower,ontheotherhand,isaconstituentpowerexercisedinademocracybythepeople,anditcannotbeframedwithinpre-existingcompetences,notevenlogically(onthedistinction,seeSieyès2003;Loughlin-Walker2007).InGerman,theexpressionverfassunggebendeGewaltis,infact,oftenusedasasynonymforSieyès’spouvoirconstituant.

AlreadyintheseconceptualpreliminariesthatframethejuridicalanalysesinConstitutionalTheory,onecanrathereasilydetectthepolemicalconfrontationthatSchmittisseekingwiththepositivistictraditionofpubliclaw(withHansKelseninparticular,seee.g.Vinx2015).Aconstitutionis,inotherwords,notsimplythe‘charter’ofaRechtsstaatthatlimitsitsownpowersthroughconstitutionalcompetencesasthistraditionwouldhaveit.Itistheoutcomeofaconstitution-makingpowerthroughwhichtheconstituentsubject—inthiscasethepeople—bothestablishestheinstitutionsandpracticesthatareessentialforitspoliticalexistenceasaunified‘one’andsecuresthemagainstpotentialthreats.Constitutionalinstitutionsandpracticesare,then,‘constituted’fortheveryreasonthattheyarepotentiallyunderthreatfrom‘enemies’,anditisthethreatofsuch‘enemies’thatalsomakesconstitutionspoliticalinSchmitt’smeaningoftheword.

Butthesubjectoftheconstitution-makingpowerdoesnotexercisethatpoweronlyattheinitialmomentwhenitestablishestheinstitutionsandpracticesofitspoliticalexistence.Asaconstituentpower,itcanneverexhaustitselfintotheinstitutionsthatithasconstituted.So,

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forexample,apeoplethatusesitsconstitution-makingpowertoestablisharepresentativedemocracydoesnotbysodoingreduceitselftoaconstitutedelectoratedespitethefactthattheestablishedinstitutionsmaybefunctioningnormally.Or,inSchmittterms,apeople’anteriortoandabove’theconstitution,thatis,thepresupposedpeoplebehindeverydemocracy,canneverquitereduceitselfintoapeople’within’theconstitution,thatis,intothepeoplethattheconstitutionidentifiesandrecognizesasaninstitution(Schmitt2008a:268).Aconstituentresiduewill,namely,alwaysremaindormantintheinstitutionsthatthepeoplemayhaveconstituted,anditwillre-emergeandactivateitselfifitspoliticalexistencebecomesthreatened.WecanuseBruceAckerman’swell-knownexpression‘constitutionalmoments’(Ackerman1991)orJasonFrank’s’constituentmoments’(Frank2010)todepictsuchpointsofre-emergenceeveniftheemphasisinbothisslightlydifferent.Butwecouldequallywellcallthem‘constitutionalcrises’.9FromSchmitt’spointofviewitis,however,worthnotingthatsuch‘moments’or‘crises’arenotpathologiesbut,rather,expressionsofthestate’spoliticalvitality,measuresinwhich‘thesuperiorityoftheexistentialelementoverthemerelynormativeonerevealsitself’(Schmitt2008a:154).10

Rancière:politicsasdisagreement

IfSchmitt’sfriend/enemydistinctioniswell-knowntothepointofbecominganalyticallyalmostredundant,thenthesamecan,perhaps,besaidofRancière’sattemptstodistinguishpoliticsproperfromthemoreconventionalpracticesofgovernmentthathefamouslyterms‘police’(foragoodintroduction,seee.g.May2010:1-28).Thereis,however,atwisthere.ForRancière’spoliceisneitheranallusiontotheforcedcomplianceexecutedbywhathecallsthe‘pettypolice’noranamalgamforthevariouscoerciveoperationsofthestateapparatus(cf.Foucault1995:213).Itis,rather,aparticulardistributionofplacesandrolesthatmayarisefromtheregularitiesofsocialrelationsjustaswellaswithinstatepractices.Itisthe‘implicitlaw’thatdefinesashareoritslackinaconfigurationofwhatcanbeperceived.Policeis,then,‘anorderofbodiesthatdefinestheallocationofwaysofdoing,waysofbeing,andwaysofsaying,andseesthatthosebodiesareassignedbynametoaparticularplaceandtask;itisanorderofthevisibleandthesayablethatseesthataparticularactivityisvisibleandanotherisnot,thatthisspeechisunderstoodasdiscourseandanotherasnoise’(Rancière1998:29).11

Rancière’snotionofpolicewithitsemphasisonanorderoftheperceptible—whatisvisible,audible,orunderstandable,andhow—is,ofcourse,farfromSchmitt’sstate-centric

9LevinsonandBalkindistinguisha‘constitutionalcrisis’froman‘emergency’bywayoftheformer’srelevancetoconflictsaboutthelegitimateuseofpower.Soa‘crisis’isnotsomuchaboutthepossibleemergencyathandbutcomesabout‘becausethereisadisputebetweenconstitutionalactorsaboutthenatureoftheemergencyandthelegitimatewaytorespondtoit’(Levinson-Balkin2009:717).

10Afittingexampleofsuch‘moments’istheelectionsceneintheopeningchaptersofJoséSaramago’ssatiricalnovelSeeing(Saramago2006:1-16;alsoMinkkinen2016).

11TheetymologicaloriginsofRancière’s‘police’wouldmeritfurtherinvestigationasitisnotentirelyself-evidentthatitshouldbeassociatedwithlaw-enforcementinanyway(one.g.theetymologicalaffinitiesof’police’and’civilization’,seeStarobinski1993:1-35).

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viewoftheworldinwhichpoliticsisrelevant.Thestatemaywellcontributetotheorderofthepolice,anditspracticesmayevenbecentraltothewayinwhichsomethingisperceived.Butnoequationmarkscanbewrittenbetweenthetwo.Thereare,however,othersimilaritiesanddifferencesthatwouldjustifyacomparison.Schmitt’sstarting-point,his’police’,ifyouwill,isanorderlyviewoftheworldaswell,anorderthatcannotbereducedtoanytypeoflegalordereveniflegalnormsplayanimportantroleinit.Itis,rather,anexistentialorderinwhichindividualsandinstitutionswillhaverelativelystableassignedroles.ForSchmitt,suchanexistentialordercanbecomeconciliatedinto’partypolitics’iftheoriginalantagonismsessentialforanypoliticalexistenceandmadepublicthroughthefriend/enemydistinctionhavebeenlost(Schmitt2007a:29-30).Inotherwords,oneofthemotivationsforSchmitt’sessayistorecognizeandtore-articulatetheantagonismsthatarenecessaryforthepoliticalaftertheyhavebeenpacifiedorevenneutralizedin’partypolitics’.Schmitt’slineofargumentationruns,then,fromanantagonisticpoliticalontologytowardsagradualdepoliticizationofallsocialrelations.Andthisdepoliticizedworldis,ifyouwill,bothSchmitt’s’police’andthe’enemy’thathewishestoconfront.

InasimilaragonisticveinasSchmitt,Rancièrereservestheword‘politics’for‘dissensual’disagreement,forratherexceptionalinterventionsthatareextremely’antagonistictopolicing’(Rancière1998:29)andthatdisrupttheeverydayroutinesofgovernment:

Politicsisbynomeansarealitythatmightbededucedfromthenecessitiesleadingpeople

togatherincommunities.Politicsisanexceptioninrelationtotheprinciplesaccordingtowhichthisgatheringoccurs.(Rancière2009b:35)

ButRancière’s’exceptionalpolitics’doesnotoperateasa’constitutiveoutside’.His

argumentproceedsinadifferentway.IfforSchmitttheantagonisticnatureofpoliticsishisstartingpointasapoliticalontologyfromwhichadepoliticizedexistencemaypotentiallyfollow,Rancière’sontology,ifheevenhasone,onlyextendstothesocialorderofpoliceintowhichpoliticsintervenesasrareandsingularintrusions.AlthoughRancière’spoliticshasalogic,itis,rather,anti-ontological:politicsthrowstheontologyofpoliceintodisarray.AsSamuelChambersnotes,’onthisparticularpoint—therefusaltoontologize,therejectionofallontology—Rancière’sapproachtopoliticsmaymarkhimnotjustasdistinct,butperhapsevenasunique’(Chambers2013:20;alsoDeranty2003).Sodisregardingalltheothermorenuanceddifferences,themaindifferencebetweenthetwopoliticalthinkersisatthis’ontological’level.Theargumentsmoveinparallelbutoppositedirections:forSchmitt,anantagonisticpoliticalontologyhasmadewayforthepacifiedsocialorderofliberalism(andsoneedstobereinvigorated),whereasforRancièreallpoliticalontologiesarepoliceregimesintowhichantagonisticpoliticsmayoccasionallyintervene.

Thisappliestothestate’sconstitutedarrangementsàlaSchmitt,aswell:politicscannotbeidentifiedwiththemodelofcommunicativeaction.Thismodel

presupposespartnersthatarealreadypre-constitutedassuchanddiscursiveformsthat

10

entailaspeechcommunity,theconstraintofwhichisalwaysexplicable.Now,thespecificityofpoliticaldissensusisthatitspartnersarenomoreconstitutedthanistheobjectorstageofdiscussionitself.Thosewhomakevisiblethefactthattheybelongtoasharedworldthatothersdonotsee—andcannottakeadvantageof—istheimplicitlogicofanypragmaticsofcommunication.(Rancière2009b:38;seealsoRancière1998:72-74;onRancière,SchmittandArendt,seeSchaap2011).

Seenfromthisperspective,anyconstitutedexchangebetween,forexample,branchesof

governmentwouldinRancière’stermsbepoliceasopposedtopoliticsproper.If,forexample,thejudiciaryexercisesitsconstitutionalcompetenceto‘check’thepowersoftheelectedbranches,itwouldengageinpoliceregardlessofhow‘strong’or‘weak’(Tushnet2008)theconstitutionalframeworkforitsinterventionmaybe.Instableliberaldemocracies,governmentwillbyconventiongravitatetowardsconsensualoutcomesevenifitmeansacceptinginterpretationsthatoneortheotherbranchwasoriginallyindisagreementabout.AndonecouldwellarguethatRancière’spolice,justlikeFoucault’sapparatusesofsecurityandgovernment(Foucault2007:1-27;alsoMay2008:41-42;Baiocchi-Connor2013),isnotunequivocallya‘negative’phenomenon.

ButoccasionallyacivilizeddisagreementmaygrowfromsimplegovernmentintoaconfrontationthatcouldhavethepotentialofqualifyingaspoliticseveninRancière’sspecificmeaning.Anexampleofthismightbetheso-calledBelmarsh9case(AvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDept[2004]UKHL56)wheretheHouseofLords,theUKcourtoflastresortatthetime,heldunderSection4oftheHumanRightsAct1998(HRA)thattheindefinitedetentionofforeignprisonersinBelmarshprisonwithouttrial(Section23oftheAnti-terrorism,CrimeandSecurityAct2001)wasincompatiblewithArticle14oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights.WhiletheUKgovernmentacknowledgedthecourt’sdeclarationofincompatibilitybyamendingthesituationwithnewlegislation(PreventionofTerrorismAct2005)—andthiswouldbeanexampleofhowdisagreementstendtodefusethemselvesandtobereincorporatedbackintotheconsensualorderofpolice—italsotriggeredaheateddiscussionaboutwhetherthepowersofthecourtshadgrownbeyondwhatwasconceivedasconstitutionallyacceptable(seeMalleson2007).Foronething,thecasedealtspecificallywiththeinequalitybetweenterrorismsuspectsbasedonnationalitythatthe2001legislationhadintroducedeventhoughanallusionheretoRancière’snotionofequalitywouldbeabitofastretch.Butmoreimportantly,theinterventionofthejudiciaryadvocatingtheConventionrightsofthose’miscounted’as’foreignterrorismsuspects’—andnotasequalparticipantsinsociallife—disruptedtheestablishedorderinwhichthecourtswereexpectedtosimplyaccepttheirrestrainedroleinliberaldemocracy.Thesamediscussionconcerningtheroleofthejudiciarycontinuesafterthe2015electionswhentheconservativegovernmentreaffirmeditsintentiontorepealtheHRAandtodistancetheBritishconstitutionfromEuropeanhumanrightsmechanisms(ontheplans,seeHorne-Miller2015;foranalysis,seeDimelow-Young2015).Andafterthe2016referendumthesituationis,ofcourse,evenmorevolatile.

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ManyofRancière’sexampleswouldseemtoimplythat‘dissensual’politicalactioncanonlycomeaboutinrareandextraordinarycircumstances,andtheillustrationsthatheusesareoften‘heroic’innature(e.g.thecaseofAugusteBlanqui,Rancière1998:37-38).AsSamuelChambersasks:’IfallwetakefromRancièrearerareandbeautifulpoliticalmoments,whichareeasilyboileddowntorevolutionarymoments,thenhowdoweorientthinkingoractionwithintherealmofpoliceordersthatareourlives?’(Chambers2011:21;alsoChambers2013:65-87)Itmaywellbethatallpoliticscandoisreveal,forapassingephemeralmoment,thetruenatureoftheorderunderwhichwealllive.Thispositionis,ofcourse,verydifferenttoSchmitt’spoliticalontology.Eveniftheessentiallyantagonisticnatureofpoliticallifehasbeenpacifiedinliberalism,forSchmitttheindividualeventsthatinterruptthemonotonyofgovernmentassovereignandexceptionalgesturesserveasabruptremindersofthatontology.InConstitutionalTheorySchmittusesthemoreorlessplausibleexampleofahead-of-statewhoprematurelydissolvesasquabblingandinefficientparliamentandcallsfornewelectionseveninsituationswhentheconstitutiondoesnotrecognizesuchpowers(Schmitt2008a:148).Schmitt’smoreconcreteexampleofLouis-NapoléonBonaparte’s‘exception’duringthe1851coupd’étatis,perhaps,notasinnocentashewouldhaveusbelieve(e.g.Halsted1972),butthepoliticalexistencethattheseexceptionalmeasuresaremeanttoprotectcansubstantivelyevenbe‘democratic’(e.g.Varol2012).Ifanyentrenchedpoliticalexistence,beitdemocraticorundemocratic,canbeprotectedinthisway,thenSchmitt’sschemedoes,indeed,comeacrossas’formalistic’inthewayinwhichRancière’scriticismsuggests.Nietzschewhoisusuallyregardedasaslashandburncriticofliberalismcanalsoarguethatevenliberalinstitutionspromotefreedom.Solongastheyarebeing‘foughtfor’,theseinstitutionshaveentirelydifferenteffectsthanwhattheywouldnormallyhaveand,consequently,theypromotefreedomratherthanhinderit:‘itisthewarthatproducestheseeffects,thewarforliberalinstitutionswhich,beingawar,keepsilliberalinstitutionsinplace’(Nietzsche2005:213).

InSchmittianterms,thistypeofstruggleforliberalismisareferencetotheactualizedthreatofapotentialenemy.ForSchmitt,thepolemicalconfrontationwiththeenemyneednotactualize.Thethreatofsuchaconfrontationisenough.Inotherwords,government—orsomeversionofRancière’spolice—willforSchmittremainantagonisticallypoliticalsolongasthepotentialthreatexists.InMichaelMarder’sview:

thereisnosuchthingasanactualpoliticalspherebecauseeverysphereispotentially

politicalorpoliticizableduetoapossibleincreaseintheintensitiesofassociationanddissociationstructuringit.Thefactofpoliticizationwillberetrievedonlyretrospectively,aposteriori,aftertheinterpretivedecisiononthesphere’stransfigurationhasbeenmade.Thatiswhynoliberalde-politicizationcandoawayentirelywiththepolitical,whichisnotadomainamenabletobeingsupplanted,buttheoverarchingprincipleofdisplacementand,hence,thedynamicgoverningde-politicizationaswell.(Marder2010:65)

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PerhapsonewouldnotbetoofaroffthemarktosuggestthatevenRancière’swayofdistinguishingbetweentherelativepermanenceofthepoliceorderandtheoccasional—indeed,rare—interventionsofpoliticscouldalsobeseenthroughasimilarschemeofpotentialityandactuality.Insuchascheme,politicsisapossiblewayinwhich,forexample,thedemocraticshortcomingsofthepoliceorderarechallengedandpossiblyevenrectified,atleastforthatbriefmomentoftheinterventionitself.

Conclusion:themetapoliticalnecessity

TofinallyreturntotheSchmittianargument,whatisapoliticalconstitution?Whatmakesaconstitutionpolitical?Thereplyisfairlyself-evident:everyconstitutionispoliticalinSchmitt’smeaningoftheword.Thepoliticalcharacteristicsofaconstitutionrevealthemselvesintwodifferentways.

Firstly,initsconstitutionoritsbasiclaw,thesubjectoftheconstitution-makingpower—inourcase‘wethepeople’—definesitsownenemiesbyprovidingheightenedprotectiontotheinstitutionsandpracticesthatareessentialforitspoliticalexistenceofchoice.Initssimplestform,suchheightenedprotectionisprovidedbyentrenchmentclausesthateitherpreventamendmentstotheseinstitutionsandpracticesorotherwiseprotectthemfromchange.Heightenedprotectionfromlegislativeamendmentsisdeemednecessaryfortheveryreasonthatthestabilityandcontinuityoftheseinstitutionsandpracticesisalwaysatleastpotentiallythreatenedby‘enemies’.Constitutionalprotectionisalwaysanindicationofathreatbecausewithoutathreatnoentrenchmentwouldevenbenecessary.12Rancière’scounterpointisdifficulttofathombecausehedoesnotdwellonthepossibledesiredfeaturesofonepoliceorderoranother.Butmostlikelywewouldbetalkingaboutsomekindof’distributionofthesensible’thathasdevelopedtoprotectoneformofdemocraticexistenceoranotherfromthethreatsthatmaypotentiallyarise(e.g.Rancière2004:16).ForRancière,allsucharrangementsprotectingtheinstitutionsofpoliticalexistencearepoliceregimesregardlessofwhattheirperceived’democratic’advantagesmaybe.ThisistheproblemthatSamuelChambersreferstointhepassagequotedabove.Areallpoliceregimes’undemocratic’?Oraretheyalloneasundemocraticastheotherregardlessof,forexample,howwellorpoorlytheydistributewealthinsociety?Isallpoliticsnecessarilyrevolutionarypolitics,and,conversely,doesallrevolutionaryactionqualifyaspoliticsregardlessofthenatureofthepoliceorderfromwhichtheyariseandintowhichtheyintervene?

Secondly,fromtimetotimethethreats,sofaracknowledgedasonlypotential,willmaterializeandbecomeactual.Insuchcasesthesubjectofconstitution-makingpower—orevenabranchofgovernmentactingatleastnominallyonitsbehalfastheexampleofthejudiciaryabovewasintendedtoillustrate—mayrevealitselfandexceptionallyevenviolatesomeindividualnormoftheconstitutioninordertosecurethecontinuityofthepolitical

12Thisinitialdecisionistmomentatwhichapeopleconstitutestheinstitutionsandpracticesofitsownpoliticalexistenceoperatesinasimilarfounding-myth-likefashion(seealsoSalter2012)astheclaimmadeintheopeningchapterofTheNomosoftheEarthaboutthefirstappropriationoflandasthe‘primevalact’(Ur-Akt)oflaw(Schmitt2003:42-49).

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existenceenshrinedinit.Itisimportanttonotethatthisisnotaconstitutedinstitutionalsubjectsuchasthe’people’asdefinedinaconstitutionalframeworkbut,rather,apresupposedsubject,thepeople’beforeandabove’theconstitution,thatcanonlybeidentifiedafterthefact:whoeverorwhateverfactuallyrisestothetask.Theconstitutionisviolatedagainstatthoseindividualmomentsofdangerwhentheresidueofconstituentpowerthatisdormantintheconstitutedinstitutionsandpracticesithascreatedawakestoprotectthem.TherearelimitationstofindingaparallelinRancière’sworkevenifsomesecondaryliteraturecomesclose.13ForeventhemostexceptionalofSchmitt’sconstitutionalviolationsaim,intheend,tonormalizeagivensituationandtoreturntotheorderedpoliticalexistencethatwasdeemedworthyofprotectiontobeginwith.TheexceptionalinterruptionstothepoliceorderthatRancièrequalifiesaspoliticsseeminglyhavebutoneaim:torevealandtooverturntheverylogiconwhichanypoliceorder,democraticorundemocratic,isbuilt.Schmitt’sconservatismincludesnopossibilitiesforsuchrevolutionaryambitions.

ButSchmitt’snotionofapoliticalconstitutionincludesathirddimension,onethatisseldommentionedandonethat,Iwouldclaim,alignshimcloserwithRancièrethanthelatterwouldwanttoadmit.SchmittnamelycontinuesthepassagefromTheConceptofthePoliticalquotedearlierinthefollowingway:

Aboveallthepolemicalcharacterdeterminestheuseofthewordpoliticalregardlessof

whethertheadversaryisdesignatedasnonpolitical(inthesenseofharmless),orviceversaifonewantstodisqualifyordenouncehimaspoliticalinordertoportrayoneselfasnonpolitical(inthesenseofpurelyscientific,purelymoral,purelyjuristic,purelyaesthetic,purelyeconomic,oronthebasisofsimilarpurities)andtherebysuperior.(Schmitt2007a:31-32)

If,asSchmitthereclaims,thepolemicalcharacterofpolitics(cf.Fried2000)concerns

academicdebatesaswell,or,inotherwords,ifthepropertyof’purelyscientific’ismerelyanattempttofindanappropriatedetouraroundtheinevitablypoliticalnatureofallacademicdebates,thenthatsamepolemicswillbynecessityinformSchmitt’sownacademicmusingsaswell,includingtheallegedly‘conceptual’distinctionbetweenfriendandenemythathehereputsforward.Thereare,then,twolevelsatwhichSchmittexerciseshisowndecisionistpolemics.Firstly,thisparticular’conceptual’distinctionispresentedinordertoconfrontsomeotherconceptualdefinitionsofpoliticsthatSchmittseesasthreats.Theultimatethreatis,ofcourse,atotallydepoliticizedworld(e.g.Schmitt’s1929essay’TheAgeofNeutralizationsandDepolitizations’,publishedinSchmitt2007a:80-96).Soanydefinitionsofthepoliticaladvancingsuchanexistencearehis’enemies’.Secondly,inorderforthedistinctiontoperformitspolemicaltask,friendmustfirstbeconceptuallydiscernedfromandsetagainstenemy.Thedistinctiondoesnotcomeaboutitself.Itcannotbeextractedfrom

13In,e.g.,GabrielRockhill’s’Glossary’,the’people’are’thepoliticalsubjectsofdemocracy

thatsupplementthepoliceaccountofthepopulationanddisplacetheestablishedcategoriesofidentification’(Rancière2004:88).Thiscouldwellgoforonedefinitionofthe’constituentresidue’.

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somepre-existingschemeofsignifyingbinariesorinferredthroughthedetachedobservationofsocialandculturalphenomena.Itis,asDerridanotes,anEntscheidung,notmerelyadecision,buta’determinedopposition’ora’discrimination’(Derrida1997:85).Inotherwords,Schmittmusthimselfmakethedistinctionbysettingfriendagainstenemybeforehecanpresentitasacriterionforthepolitical.Makingsuchadistinctionis,inRancière’s’methodological’terms,a‘polemicalintervention’(seeRancière2009a;onSchmitt’s’method’ofthe’prescriptiveandconstructivefunctionofconcepts’,seeMüller1999)intotheworldthatSchmittwantstoprotectfromthedangersofdepoliticization.Bymakingthedistinctionasa‘polemicalintervention’,TheConceptofthePoliticalalsoconfirmstheidentityofitsownenemies.AndespeciallyintermsofSchmitt’sconstitutionaltheory,thoseenemiesarerathereasytoidentify.ToparaphraseSchmitthimself,thenotionofa‘politicalconstitution’wouldbeincomprehensibleunlessoneknowswhoitistargetedat.

TheConceptofthePoliticalis,namely,ametapoliticaltheory,apoliticaltheoryofthepoliticalinthesamewayasRancière’spoliticaltheory.ThiswillrequiresomejustificationasRancièreusestheterm’metapolitics’tospecificallydistancehimselffromaparticulartraditioninpoliticalphilosophy,atraditiontypicallyexemplifiedbyMarxism(Rancière1998:61-93;alsoBosteels2010;Bosteels2011:20-25).ForRancière,metapoliticsisanapproachtopoliticalphenomenathatperformsadouble-sleigh-of-hand,ifyouwill.Ontheonehand,ittakesexistingpoliticalpracticesforillusionsthatmerelyservetoobscureapolitical’truth’as,forexample,theinstitutionsofliberaldemocracydototherelationsofproductionintheMarxistaccountofcapitalisteconomies.Andyet,atthesametime,this’truth’willalwaysremainbeyondpolitics,aninoperablecomplementtothestrugglesthatitismeanttostandfor.ThisiswhatRancièremeansbymetapolitics.Bycontrast,AlainBadiouusesthetermtoequatepoliticsandthinkinginthat’everyphilosophyisconditionedbyarealpolitics’(Badiou2011:16)and,conversely,that’politicsitselfis,initsbeing,initsdoing,athought’(Badiou2011:24).ItisinthislattersenseattributedtoBadiouthatIusetheterm’metapoliticalnecessity’here.

Whenmakingitscentralclaims,Schmitt’stheorymustitselfmakeasimilardistinctionbetweenfriendandenemyasitclaimsallthingspoliticaltorequire(seealsoSchmitt2008a:112-113).Suchadistinctionisalwaysentwinedintheactof‘distincting’,of‘discerning’inthesenseofkrineinandkrisis,oftheHeideggeriannotionof‘de-ciding’or‘ent-scheiden’(seeHeidegger2012:69-81).14Thesame’metapoliticalnecessity’informsSchmitt’sconstitutionaltheory,aswell:itisapoliticaltheoryaboutapoliticalphenomenon.Itsenemiesare,inthefirstinstance,itspositivisticpubliclawcounterparts(generally,seeStolleis2004),notbecausetheyare‘wrong’insomeepistemologicalmeaningoftheword,butbecausetheirblanchedorevennonexistentpolemicalbinariesareathreattoallpoliticalexistence:

Nobodycanvaluatewithoutdevaluating,revaluating,andservingone’sinterests.

Whoeversetsavalue,takespositionagainstadisvaluebythatveryaction.Theboundless

14OneofthetranslatorsofthefirstEnglisheditionoftheBeiträgeprovidesadetailedreadingofthisdifficultpassage(Maly2008:58-65).

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toleranceandtheneutralityofthestandpointsandviewpointsturnthemselvesveryquicklyintotheiropposite,intoenmity,assoonastheenforcementiscarriedoutinearnest.Thevaluationpressureofthevalueisirresistible,andtheconflictofthevaluator,devaluator,revaluator,andimplementor,inevitable.(Schmitt1996:23)

Inasimilarway,Rancière’sdistinctionbetweenpoliticsandpoliceisinitself‘always

already’politicalbecauseitcanonlycomeaboutthrougha‘polemicalintervention’thatmustprecedethedistinctionitself.Thedistinctionor,rather,theinterventionthroughwhichthedistinctionhasbeenintroducedintotheworldmimicsthesameintrusionsthatcharacterizethe‘heroic’examplesofRancière’spolitics.Rancière’sreluctancetodefinehisownworkaspoliticalphilosophyorpoliticaltheory,hisownevasive’rationalityofdisagreement’,willalsoallowhimtoresistthis’metapoliticalnecessity’.Butonlytoacertainpoint.Itwould,namely,befairlysimpletoshowhowtheinterrelatedlogicsofpoliceandpoliticsruntheriskoffallingintothesamemetapoliticaltrapthatRancièreidentifiedinMarxism,oratleastintoa’quasi-metapoliticalsuprapolitics’touseSuhailMalik’ssomewhatcomplexexpression(Malik-Phillips2011:122).Butmyclaimhereis,rather,thatRancière’sexposition,justlikeSchmitt’s,ismetapoliticalinBadiou’smeaningoftheterm.ThepositionfromwhichRancièreobservesandanalyzestheworldofpolitics,bethatpositionphilosophical,theoretical,oranyother’named’positionthathehimselfhaseitherendorsedorrefuted,isnecessarilyinterwovenintothepoliticalphenomenathatarebeingobserved,analyzedandexplained.Thepoliticalactorthatidentifieshimselfas’Rancière’ispoliticallyembeddedintheworldthathe’thinks’.

Rancière’scriticismofSchmitt’s‘formalism’is,then,notentirelygenuine.SchmittmaywellattempttocloakhispolemicsintotheseeminglyformallanguageofGermanpubliclawconceptualism,butintheendthatformalismismostlyusedasameanstoidentifyandtoengagewithaveryspecificenemy,thatis,aparticulartraditionofpubliclawscholarship.Formalismis,inotherwords,thecommongroundthatSchmittneedsinordertoconfronthisenemytête-à-tête.ButSchmitt’smetapoliticsisinnowayintendedtostopatmereforms.Hehasaclearconservativeagendathathesubsequentlyfurthersbypolemicallyidentifyinghisenemy.Rancière’s‘polemicalinterventions’,ontheotherhand,identifyaverydifferentenemy,buttheyidentifyonenonetheless:

Forme,thefundamentalquestionistoexplorethepossibilityofmaintainingspacesof

play.Todiscoverhowtoproduceformsforthepresentationofobjects,formsfortheorganizationofspaces,thatthwartexpectations.Themainenemyofartisticcreativityaswellasofpoliticalcreativityisconsensus—thatis,inscriptionwithingivenroles,possibilities,andcompetences.(RancièreinCarnevale-Kelsey2007:263)

IfSchmittisseekinga’polemicalintervention’withthelegalpositivismoftheRechtsstaat,

thenperhapswecanshorthandthedifferentexpressionsthatRancière’susesforhisenemyas’politicalphilosophy’.Whatiscommontothetwoenemies,Schmitt’sandRancière’s,isthattheybothrepresentanattemptto’scandalously’expungethepoliticalfromtheseemingly

16

politicalphenomenathattheyclaimtobeexplaining.Similarly,despitealltheirdifferencesatamorenuancedlevel,bothSchmittandRancièreinterveneinordertorestorethepoliticalorsomepartofitbypresentingadistinctionthatwillallowustoseealeveledplayingfield—basically,politicalliberalism—throughanantagonisticscheme.

SoRancière’sbeefwithSchmittis,Iwouldconclude,substantiveorevenprescriptiveratherthanacriticismofformalismperse.Asathinker,Rancièreisnormativelycommittedtoaparticularbrandofrevolutionarypolitics,apoliticsthatisincompatiblewithSchmitt’sradicalconservatism.Butbothidentifytheircommitmentsthroughan’enemy’.PerhapsRancièredoesseeSchmittmerelyastheintellectualheraldoftheNouvelleDroitedespitethealternativeFrenchlineagesandwishestokeephisdistanceaccordingly.Thiswouldexplainwhy,asSamuelChamberscorrectlynotes,Mouffe’sdemocratic‘mobilization’ofSchmittprovidesamuchbettercomparisonwithRancièrethanSchmitthimselfeverwould(Chambers2013:174,n.17).Butas‘sonsofAres’,bothSchmittandRancièreinterveneintoaworldwheretheantagonisticrelationsthatarenecessaryforpoliticsareindangerofcollapsing.Bothdosowitha’polemicalintervention’thatdiscernsthedistinctionthateachrespectivelythenusestoidentifyanenemy.

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