Post on 15-Jan-2016
RE-BALANCE TO ASIA:PROSPECTS FOR MARITIME
SECURITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
6 March 2013
Prof. K. L. Nankivellnankivellk@apcss.org
1
AGENDA
1. Strategic Overview: Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific
2. What does an increased role for the United States look like?
3. Challenges & Opportunities in S&T engagement
2
65% of World’s Navies Over $100B committed until
2015 for new submarines Up to 21 Large Deck units in
build or planned2 Large Deck12 Subs
3 + 7 Subs?
6 Subs2 Subs
4 Large Deck12 Subs
3 Large Deck15 Subs
48 Subs 2 Large Deck
NAVAL UNITS RECENT AND PLANNED
8 Subs?
2 Subs
2 Subs
2 + 6 Subs?
30 Subs3 Large Deck
4 Large Deck?
3 Large Deck
33 subs?
6 Subs
1 Sub
Proliferation of Blue-Water Middle Powers
Asian Dominance of Trade
Asian Dominance of Trade
6
52%
22%
20%6%
World Seaborne Trade,value, 2010, %
Containers
Tankers
General Cargo
Dry Bulk
Lloyd’s Maritime Intelligence Unit, 2010
Asian Dominance of Trade
High trade volume, low trade density
Asian Dominance of Trade
1 Shanghai, China 29.07 31.74
2 Singapore, Singapore 28.43 29.94
3 Hong Kong, China 23.70 24.384 Shenzhen, China 22.51 22.575 Busan, South Korea 14.18 16.17
6 Ningbo-Zhoushan, China 13.14 14.72
7 Guangzhou Harbor, China 12.55 14.26
8 Qingdao, China 12.01 13.02
9 Jebel Ali, Dubai 11.60 13.01
10 Rotterdam 11.14 11.88
11 Tianjin, China 10.08 11.59
12 Kaohsiung, Taiwan 9.18 9.64
13 Port Kelang, Malaysia 8.87 9.60
14 Hamburg, Germany 7.91 9.04
15 Antwerp, Belgium 8.47 8.66
16 Los Angeles, U.S.A. 7.83 7.94
17 Keihin Ports, Japan* 7.48 7.64
18 Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia 6.47 7.50
19 Xiamen, China 5.82 6.47
20 Dalian, China 5.24 6.40
Sourc
e:
ww
w.w
orl
dsh
ippin
g.o
rg, ja
n 2
01
3
Port
s,
by T
EU
han
dle
d (
million
s)
2010
2011
1 Shanghai, China 29.07 31.74
2 Singapore, Singapore 28.43 29.94
3 Hong Kong, China 23.70 24.384 Shenzhen, China 22.51 22.575 Busan, South Korea 14.18 16.17
6 Ningbo-Zhoushan, China 13.14 14.72
7 Guangzhou Harbor, China 12.55 14.26
8 Qingdao, Chin 12.01 13.02
9 Jebel Ali, Dubai 11.60 13.01
10 Rotterdam 11.14 11.88
11 Tianjin, China 10.08 11.59
12 Kaohsiung, Taiwan 9.18 9.64
13 Port Kelang, Malaysia 8.87 9.60
14 Hamburg, Germany 7.91 9.04
15 Antwerp, Belgium 8.47 8.66
16 Los Angeles, U.S.A. 7.83 7.94
17 Keihin Ports, Japan* 7.48 7.64
18 Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia 6.47 7.50
19 Xiamen, China 5.82 6.47
20 Dalian, China 5.24 6.40
Port
s,
by T
EU
han
dle
d (
million
s)
2010
2011
Sourc
e:
ww
w.w
orl
dsh
ippin
g.o
rg, ja
n 2
01
3
NWP 1-14M, U.S. Navy
Contested Concept of the Commons
Taiwan
Macclesfield Bank(PRC, Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan)
Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute(Japan, PRC, Taiwan)
Take-shima/Dokdo Issue(Japan, ROK)
Northern 4 Isls Issue(Japan, Russia)
SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES IN
EAST ASIA
Spratly Isls(Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei,Philippines, Taiwan, PRC)
Paracel Isls(PRC, Vietnam, Taiwan)
‘International Boundary’ announced by China
EEZ Line (Japan)
Map source: the University of Texas at Austin
Northern Limit Line (UN)
Thai-Cambodia Dispute
1. Who owns the land features?
2. Where are the boundaries of EEZs and int’l waters?
3. What rights and responsibilities does jurisdiction confer? (What activities are legal)?
1. Territorial2. Maritime3. Jurisdictional
12
Contested Concept of the Commons:
The SCS Disputes
13
What Does an Increased Role for the United States look
like?
Underwriting the Status Quo:
PresencePersistence
Partners & AlliesParameters
Building partner capacity without remaking the partner
Preparing for asymmetry of adversaries
Resourcing the Back-Office for the long run
Building partner capacity without remaking the partner
Focus on shared interests, share-able technologies, easy-access platforms (real & virtual)
Gray Hulls White Hulls
14
Challenges & Opportunities:S&T Engagement
THE QUEST FOR RESOURCES
17
19
Ladd Reef,Vietnam OccupiedSpratly Islands2007
20Mischief Reef, 2007PRC Occupied
22
TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES
UNCLOS has no provisions on how to resolve disputes over which State has sovereignty over off-shore islands
Territorial sovereignty disputes governed by principles of customary international law
No dispute on territorial sovereignty can be referred to a Court or Tribunal without the CONSENT of all the parties to the dispute
23
CHINA’S CURRENT POSITION ? ?
Three-Pronged Argument ? Sovereignty over all features (not just islands) and their
adjacent territorial sea Sovereign Rights and Jurisdiction in the EEZ and
Continental Shelf measured from the features Historical Rights and Jurisdiction (and control) over the
natural resources in and under the waters within the 9-dased line, even within the EEZ of the coastal States
24
- In relation to EEZ movements by military and scientific vessels
- The following are not clear on their legal position – or require consent for military uses in the EEZ:
- India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Maldives, Philippines, Portugal, Uruguay, Malaysia, Vietnam, Kenya, (Thailand)…and others
25
SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES IN SOUTH ASIA
As adjudicated by ITLOS
14 Mar 2012
Unfriendly Neighbors:Beaufort Sea
27