Post on 05-Jun-2018
Potatoes or Politics? The Great Irish Famine
Mackenzie Laney
HIS 2800: Writing in History
Dr. White
November 16, 2016
Laney 1
The Irish Potato Famine of 1845-1851, also known as the Great Famine, decimated the
Irish population. The population dropped from 8.4 million in 1844 to 6.6 million by the end of
the famine in 1851.1 The famine itself was caused by successive potato blights, a crop the Irish
people, especially the lower classes, relied on heavily as a food supply. Repeated unsuccessful
harvests left the rural poor to starve, with no other food source available. Many starved to death
and the Irish Diaspora was spurred, most emigrants leaving for the Northern United States. Over
one million deaths can be attributed directly to the Famine along with the emigration of over a
million more people. Starvation and disease was widespread, with some parishes losing over
fifty percent of their population.2 County Mayo was considered the worst hit county in Ireland,
losing 60 per 1,000 people each year.3
Ireland suffered many other potato blights during the nineteenth century, but none as
damaging as The Great Famine. Reasons behind the high mortality rate and destructive power of
this particular famine have been debated in the historiography since. Some historians take an
extreme interpretation of the famine, called the “Mitchelite” interpretation, in which the famine
is likened to a genocide committed by the British government. In 1860 John Mitchel published
The Last Conquest of Ireland (perhaps) and accused the British government of genocide against
the Irish. He argued that Britain had the means to end the Famine and withheld these resources
for malicious reasons. His argument is a contemptuous accusation which has held as an
1 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Great Famine.”
2 William J. Smyth, “The story of the Great Irish Famine 1845-1852: A geological perspective,”
in Atlas of the Great Irish Famine, ed. John Crowley, William J. Smyth, and Mike Murphy,
(New York: New York University Press, 2012), 4-13.
3 Cormac O’ Grada, “Morality and the Great Famine,” in Atlas of the Great Irish Famine, ed.
John Crowley, William J. Smyth, and Mike Murphy, (New York: New York University Press,
2012), 170-179.
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interpretation of the Famine since, despite Mitchel’s omission of evidence that contradicted his
theory. This evidence included the fact that the exported food was still not enough to feed the
starving Irish people.4
Other interpretations of the Famine range from this extreme accusation to a simple
explanation of the potato blights, unsuccessful harvests, and an inadequate food supply. Recent
writing on the Famine highlights the “Mitchelite” analysis, including Christine Kinealy’s
argument in The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology and Rebellion. Kinealy aims to prove that
Ireland was producing enough food to feed itself, but that this was being exported to Britain. She
concludes that the British government transformed a simple potato blight into a devastating
famine, therefore placing the majority of the blame on the British.5 Kinealy, however, is
considered an anti-revisionist and nationalist by other Famine historians, such as James
Donnelly.6
There is ample reasoning behind arguments that meet in the middle of these two
interpretations. The relief programs and efforts put in place by the British government were
mostly ineffective, but to label them as malicious is a matter of extreme opinion. The harsh
conditions of the Public Works programs and workhouses often added to the mortality rate and
the extension of the Poor Law into Ireland was detrimental.7 Britain did also continue exporting
4 James Donnelly, Great Irish Potato Famine (Stroud: The History Press, 2002).
5 Christine Kinealy, The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology and Rebellion (London: Palgrave,
2002), 110-116.
6 Donnelly, Great Irish Potato Famine.
7 Peter Gray, “British relief measures,” in Atlas of the Great Irish Famine, ed. John Crowley,
William J. Smyth, and Mike Murphy, (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 75-86.
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food out of the starving nation, as Kinealy points out, and perhaps contributed to Ireland’s strict
dependence on the potato in the first place.8 The policies put into effect in Ireland by the British
government in response to the Famine exacerbated the potato blight, in part creating a
devastating Famine that transformed Ireland.
There were two different British governments in office during the Famine, one
conservative and one liberal. Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel’s conservative party was in office
from 1841 through June of 1846. This office was considered to be somewhat generous towards
and considerate of the victims of the Famine. However, Peel was only in office until June of
1846, before the worst of the Famine. Peel repealed the Corn Laws, one of the last remaining
barriers to free trade, in 1846 in an attempt to replace the dependence on the potato with grains.
In a speech to the House in February of 1846, Peel argues for the repeal of the Corn Laws. He
read letters detailing the horrors of the famine, warned of the impending danger to both Ireland
and England, and played to the morals of the men. Peel asks, “Was it not our duty to the country,
aye, our duty to the party that supported us, to avert the odious charge of indifference and neglect
of timely precautions? It is absolutely necessary… that you should understand this Irish case.”9
While Peel claims his insistence on repeal is directly tied to increasing Ireland’s food supply,
some historians, and his opposition in government at the time, believed he had other reasons.
Throughout Peel’s administration, he was working towards complete free trade. The Corn Laws,
which regulated imports of wheat, were an obstacle to this goal. Evidence to support this claim
8 Kinealy, The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology and Rebellion, 116.
9 Robert Peel, “Sir Robert Peel's speech on the Second Reading of the Bill for the Repeal of the
Corn Laws (16 February 1846),” in English Historical Documents Volume IX 1833-1874, ed.
G.M. Young and W.D. Handcock (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge).
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includes the fact Peel planned to remove the bills gradually, over a span of three years, instead of
immediately to provide the needed food supply.10
Despite the questions that remain in Peel’s motivations, he also established a Relief
Commission and secretly purchased a large amount of maize to be distributed by this
Commission, not to directly feed the people, but to regulate the price of grain. These actions
earned Peel criticism from the British of being too generous. The opposition to Peel claimed that
he was exaggerating the Famine in order to further his free trade agenda. A London newspaper
referred the Famine as “Sir Robert Peel’s Famine” and asserted “There is not a potato in all
Ireland half so rotten as ‘awful calamity’ is likely to turn out.”11 Resistance to Peel’s corn policy
argued that he was lying about the Famine to play to Parliament’s emotions when he discussed
Ireland as he campaigned for the abolition of the Corn Laws. After the laws were abolished, a
London newspaper called it a “feeble performance”. That same article also included a denial of
increased suffering in Ireland, “In fact, his picture of Irish destitution…was simply a picture of
the past, present, and future condition of Ireland.”12 A view of the Famine as a political ploy
would be detrimental in latter pleas to the British for relief and government assistance.
Opposition to Peel also arose from Irish Catholics as Peel wished to implement a strict coercion
bill to deal with agrarian rebellion resulting from increasing levels of starvation.13 In Peel’s
absence, the Whigs, a fragile and liberal minority government, stepped in.
10 Kinealy, The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology and Rebellion, 94.
11 “SIR ROBERT'S Irish Famine is tottering to its fall,” John Bull, March 28, 1846.
12 “The Corn Law Abolition Bill has at length passed through committee,” John Bull, May 9,
1846.
13 Gray, “British relief measures”, 75-86.
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The second government in office during the Famine was the administration of Lord John
Russell. From the Whig party rather than the conservatives, Russell was at first popular among
Catholics, as tolerance from Protestant England was promised. This would change however , as
described by historian Peter Gray,
What the Famine revealed was the severe limitations of the reformist Whig position on
Ireland, and the strength of countervailing ideological and political imperatives- a
providentialist theodicy and a moralist obsession with self-help, Smithian liberal political
economy, and the ascendancy of British middle-class pressures for budgetary restraint
and transferring the fiscal and moral responsibility for the Famine back to the Irish
countryside.14
This pushing of moral responsibility back to the Irish poor is further investigated by Mohamed
Salah Harzallah in his article “The Great Irish Famine: Public Works Relief During the Liberal
Administration”. The current economic ideology of the time, Political Economy “…discouraged
all forms of governmental intervention whether in the economy or in the field of public
charity.”15 This ideology aimed to shape and better the character of the poor and even considered
governmental assistance to have damaging effects.16 This ideology unfortunately fit well with
prejudices and stereotypes about the Irish being ignorant and in consistent poverty. The pressures
of this school of thought combined with pressure from lobbyists to repeal the criticized policies
Peel previously put in place fell to Russell’s shoulders. Some of this pressure came from corn
and grain market lobbyists, including British corn merchants, who argued against state corn
14 Gray, “British relief measures”, 75.
15 Mohamed Salah Harzallah, “The Great Irish Famine: Public Works Relief During the Liberal
Administration,” Nordic Irish Studies 8, (2009): 83-96.
16 Ibid.
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purchases and any interfering in the markets. In response, Russell put the Relief Commission
under stricter Treasury Control.17
By the summer of 1846 grain prices were escalating, reaching more than double the
average by early 1847, the worst year of the Famine and the state corn purchase was gone.
Russell’s response to heightening issues was the 1846 Labour Act which reinvigorated the public
works. From October of 1846 to March of 1847 the number of people served by public works
increased by about 600,000. Public works projects included road construction and workhouses
where harsh conditions, particularly during the Irish winters, led to a higher mortality rate. The
combination of the poor’s malnourished bodies and crowded conditions created the perfection
conditions for epidemics of fevers, such as typhus.18 Based on Irish medical accounts submitted
in an 1848 questionnaire in the Dublin Quarterly Journal of Medical Science, historian Larry
Geary quantifies the death caused by disease during the Famine. He reports that in the Schull
district alone about 2,000 people died of fever and dysentery by the end of 1846 and that a local
medical practitioner estimated 35 people were dying a day in the same district by February of
1847.19
The overcrowding and insufficient wages of the public works programs led to violence
within the workhouses. Laborers in Tipperary attacked their engineer, and Board of Works
17 Gray, “British relief measures”, 75-86.
18 Ibid.
19 Larry Geary, “Medical relief and the Great Famine: ‘Report on the recent epidemic fever in
Ireland’: the evidence from County Cork,” in Atlas of the Great Irish Famine, ed. John Crowley,
William J. Smyth, and Mike Murphy, (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 209- 213.
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officials received death threats from laborers.20 The Bradford Observer reported on Famine riots
in Tipperary and Clonmel in 1846. The rioters were focused on stealing food products, and the
article refers to them as “starving creatures” numbering in the thousands, even claiming five
thousand at one time. Targets allegedly included “Flour mills, bakers’ shops, meal wagons, and
in short everything and place which contained meal or bread, which the crowds could come
at…”21 Dissatisfaction with the government policies spread and the conditions of the
workhouses, the high mortality rate, and publicized suffering of the Irish poor inspired charity
from multiple sources including the British Association, the Vatican, American philanthropists,
and Quakers. These donations quickly dried up however, as such giving and charity was
somewhat of a fad and other causes overshadowed the Famine.22
The public works programs were revealed to be insufficient and ineffective as the Famine
worsened. After public shaming of the British government, the programs were abandoned in
favor of a soup kitchen program, as a Temporary Relief Commission. The soup kitchens aimed
to provide direct food aid, similar to that of Robert Peel’s Relief Commission. The public works
programs were closed about three months before the soup kitchens were fully operational
however, and from March through May people were without relief. Workhouses closed, leaving
people to live in the streets, without work. Once operational, the mortality rates did fall with
more than three million rations distributed at the peak of the program in July of 1847. A British
newspaper article from the summer of 1847 details the rations distributed by the Relief
20 Harzallah, “The Great Irish Famine: Public Works Relief During the Liberal Administration”,
83-96.
21 “Ireland- Famine Riots” Bradford Observer, April 23, 1846.
22 Gray, “British relief measures”, 75-86.
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Commissioners. According to the Third Monthly Report of the Commission, “Of the 2,409
electoral divisions of Ireland, 1,677 are now under the act, and are distributing 1,923,361 rations
per day…”23 The soup kitchens turned out to be much cheaper than the public works programs,
but despite their success the soup kitchens were abandoned in September of 1847 in favor of an
extended Poor Law.24 Some law-makers claimed the soup kitchens had been so successful that
they had cured Ireland of famine. In their final report the relief commissioners concluded that
there was no doubt the program was successful and that “The absolute starvation that was spread
over the land has been greatly arrested…”25
Peter gray attributes this change to the “…growing conviction in Britain that ‘Irish
property must pay for Irish poverty’”.26 This abandonment of the successful soup kitchens is
further proof for Harzallah that the British government chose political and economic ideology
over the lives of the poor. As evidence to this claim Harzallah mentions that Lord John Russell,
Charles Wood, and Charles Trevelyan, all of whom were important politicians and figures in
Britain at the time, believed the Famine was God’s will, and that Ireland’s suffering would
change its population for the better.27 Many people in Britain also still believed the Famine was
23 “Ireland”, Bury and Norwich Post, July 7, 1847, issue 3393.
24 Gray, “British relief measures”, 75-86.
25 Patrick Hickey, “Mortality and emigration in six parishes in the Union of Skibbereen, West
Cork, 1846-47,” in Atlas of the Great Irish Famine, ed. John Crowley, William J. Smyth, and
Mike Murphy, (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 371-379.
26 Gray, “British relief measures”, 83.
27 Harzallah, “The Great Irish Famine: Public Works Relief During the Liberal Administration”,
83-96.
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being exaggerated by the Irish, perhaps a reason behind ineffective relief. Russell explained why
the death rate could not be believed in this speech to Parliament in 1847,
For instance, a man found dead in the fields would probably be mentioned in the police
returns as having died of starvation; and in many cases the constabulary were guided in
the reports they made by what they had heard rumoured among the people, rather than by
any positive knowledge which they possessed of the precise facts.28
Based on this same reasoning, Russell refused to have a death estimate at the height of the
Famine in the House of Commons. 29 Refusal to admit the death rate and claims that it was
untrue inspired more denial from the British people, as descriptions of the Famine were
considered to be possibly fabricated.
Many newspapers also often claimed the Famine was not as horrific as declared. A
common explanation was that this suffering and poverty was no worse that of ‘usual’ Ireland. A
London newspaper John Bull wrote “To what extent does the destitution of 1846 exceed that of
former periods- we might say, exceed the ordinary destitution?”30 In Newcastle Guardian and
Tyne Mercury, a relief administer blames the Famine on the laziness of the Irish people. He says,
“…I can feel but little pleasure in administering relief to such a people. It can do them no good-
only, perhaps, lengthen out, for a few more days or weeks, their miserable existence, when,
unless the alms continue to be poured in upon them, they must inevitably perish.”31 This denial
28 John Russell, “Deaths: Ireland,” March 9, 1847, Hansard, Official Report of debates in
Parliament. 29 O’ Grada, “Morality and the Great Famine,” 170-179.
30 “Week passes after week…,” John Bull, March 21, 1846.
31 “The Famine in Ireland,” Newcastle Guardian and Tyne Mercury, April 3, 1847.
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and reduction in severity of the Famine is similar to that of the denial, previously discussed,
which increased opposition to Peel’ administration.
As a replacement of relief, the Poor Law was extended and a separate Poor Law
Commission for Ireland was established for Ireland. The Poor Law placed responsibility for the
poor and the Famine onto Irish tax payers and landowners. This responsibility is evident in the
wording of the Act. Irish landowners are referred to as ‘guardians’. The portion of the Act
designating this reads, “That the guardians of the poor in every union in Ireland shall make
provision for the due relief of all such destitute poor persons as are permanently disabled from
labour…”32
Also accomplished by the Act, the number of workhouses and their capacities were
expanded and infirmaries were now included in the workhouses. Ireland was divided into 130
Poor Law Unions, with a workhouse in each union. The workhouses were designed to be dull
buildings with monotonous, harsh work and strict discipline. For these reasons the extension of
the Poor Law “…introduced a penal element to the public works…” according to Peter Gray.33
The language of the workhouse records emphasized this penal element, as people inside were
32 “Act to make further provision for the relief of the poor in Ireland,” in English Historical
Documents Volume IX 1833-1874, ed. G.M. Young and W.D. Handcock (Abingdon-on-Thames:
Routledge).
33 Gray, “British relief measures”, 75-86.
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referred to as ‘inmates’ or ‘paupers’.34 The legislation also allowed a small amount of outside
relief, but it was clear direct governmental relief was at an end.35
Another extension of the Poor Law was the requirement of all land occupiers to pay aid
rates based on the number of tenants, meaning a landowner with subdivided land paid higher
rates. This legislation urged landowners to evict small tenants. In response, evictions rose,
reaching 100,000 in 1850. 36 Protestant tax payers in the north also objected to this tax, as they
were paying for poor relief elsewhere in the country. In response to this opposition Russell
imposed a limit on the rates in 1850. In a speech to the Committee in December of 1849, Russell
explains, stating, “…occupiers of land in Ireland, instead of considering the burden of pauperism
a reason for their giving greater employment, have, on the contrary, taken alarm at the extent of
the burden imposed on them, and have rather diminished than increased the number of their
laborers.”37
Both prime ministers of Britain during the Irish Potato Famine instituted relief programs
that were largely ineffective. The political and economic ideologies that influenced Peel and
Russell, such as free trade and Political Economy, outshone the need of the Irish people in relief
34 William J. Smyth, “Classify, confine, discipline and punish- the Roscrea Union: A
microgeography of the workhouse system during the Famine,” in Atlas of the Great Irish
Famine, ed. John Crowley, William J. Smyth, and Mike Murphy, (New York: New York
University Press, 2012), 128-144.
35 Christine Kinealy, “The operation of the Poor Law during the Famine,” in Atlas of the Great
Irish Famine, ed. John Crowley, William J. Smyth, and Mike Murphy, (New York: New York
University Press, 2012), 87-95.
36 Kinealy, The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology and Rebellion,141.
37 John Russell, “Poor Relief: Ireland,” April 26, 1849, Hansard, Official Report of debates in
Parliament.
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policies. Things such as workhouses and the extension of the Poor Law increased the death rate,
perhaps prolonging the Famine. The politics of both Peel and Russell in turn worsened a Famine
originally caused by a potato blight. The devastation of the potato blight itself however, can be
attributed to the dependence of the rural Irish poor on the potato as a food supply.
The potato was first introduced to Ireland in 1588 and by the early eighteenth century the
potato was the dietary staple for two-thirds of Ireland’s population. The diet of Ireland’s lower
class consisted of mostly potatoes, combined with milk and some oats and vegetables. According
to William J. Smyth in “Variations in Vulnerability”, “of the… 8.2 million in the population,
around three million were classified as agricultural labourers…The annual consumption of
potatoes by this class constituted 57% of the island’s annual human consumption of potatoes in
the early 1840s.”38 Little land was needed to cultivate a crop of potatoes and that land did not
need to be of high quality.39 The primary system of land organization in Ireland prior to the
Famine was called ‘rundale’. This Celtic system operated based on shared ownership of land,
communal growing land, and a group distribution of crops. British colonialism combined with
this system, with British landowners instituting rents and further subdividing the land as the
population grew, or in other areas abolishing the system and replacing it with a British one. The
potato allowed this subdivision, as it required one-fourth of the land wheat did. This led to a
greater concentration of population and more dependence on the potato.40
38 William J. Smyth, “‘Variations in Vulnerability’: understanding where and why the people
died,” in Atlas of the Great Irish Famine, ed. John Crowley, William J. Smyth, and Mike
Murphy, (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 180-198.
39 Kinealy, The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology and Rebellion, 110-116.
40 Dean M. Braa, “The Great Potato Famine and the Transformation of Irish Peasant Society,”
Science & Society 61, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 193-215.
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This population growth that developed alongside the growing reliance on the potato can
be explained multiple ways. Some historians liken it to a ‘Malthusian crunch’, an inevitable
effect of natural population growth. Thomas Malthus viewed famine as population check and in
his 1798 book An Essay on the Principle of Population he wrote, “Famine seems to be the last,
the most dreadful resource of nature. The power of population is so superior to the power of the
earth to produce subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape or other visit the
human race.”41 Other historians, such as Dean Braa, assign a portion of blame to British
colonialism. As the British landlord class subdivided their land, increasing the number of tenants
paying rent, the population grew more concentrated and contingent on the potato.42 Whether the
dependence on the potato was caused by British colonial practices of subdividing land, or a
natural and inevitable population growth, it led to a devastating Famine.
Potatoes were not the only crop grown in Ireland, despite the people’s dependence. In the
years before the Famine, Ireland was considered the ‘breadbasket’ of England, producing a large
corn crop. This is illustrated in quote from a London newspaper, published in 1837; “Last week
the supply of oats from Ireland amounted to 20,782 quarters, while those of English growth were
only 2,027 quarters, and from Scotland 4, 979.”43 Many other food products were exported out of
Ireland to England, including vegetables, dairy products, cattle, poultry, and fish.44 These exports
continued throughout the Famine, an issue Irish Nationalists have used as the basis of their
41 Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (London: J. Johnson, 1798), 61.
42 Braa, “The Great Potato Famine and the Transformation of Irish Peasant Society”, 193-215.
43 “Irish Imports,” The Champion, January 1, 1837, issue 16.
44 Kinealy, The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology and Rebellion, 110-116.
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genocide accusations. These claims are most often exaggerated and the role of food exports
overstressed when discussing the cause of the Famine.45 Many have attempted to prove that
Ireland was producing enough food to feed itself throughout the Famine years. This is the thesis
of Christine Kinealy’s book, The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology and Rebellion. While the
severity of this claim and the relevance of it to the actual starvation experienced by the Irish
people are highly debated, it cannot be ignored in a study of the effect of British politics on the
Famine.
Kinealy provides compelling evidence in support of her argument, including the
following statistics. In the first nine months of 1847, the worst year of the Famine, 3,435 poultry
were exported to Liverpool and another 2,375 to Bristol. In April of 1847, twenty tons of
potatoes were exported from Portaferry to Liverpool. From 1846 to 1847, 936,200,000 pounds of
grains were exported out of Ireland. According to the British government’s allowance of one
pound of corn per adult per day, this could have fed two million people for sixteen months.46
This continuation of Britain importing food products from Ireland during the Famine is
not only supported by scholars such as Kinealy. British newspapers recorded the amounts and
origins of imports into cities. An article published on June 28, 1947, at the height of the famine,
describes Irish imports into London. “The Irish imports of wheat, flour &c., were also heavy,
viz.:- 290 tons of wheat…1,217 barrels of flour…1,160 loads of oatmeal, 164 bags of Indian
corn, 200 bushels of peas…63 tons of beans, 48 barrels of biscuits, 194 bags of rice, 67 tons of
barley…”47 The same newspaper which lists imports from Ireland warns against Irish poor
45 Donnelly, Great Irish Potato Famine.
46 Kinealy, The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology and Rebellion, 110-116.
47 “Importations into Liverpool,” John Bull, June 28, 1847.
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arriving on the same ships carrying infectious disease, the only hint there is something dubious
about Irish imported goods.48 Kinealy concludes that “The Irish poor did not starve because there
was an inadequate supply of food within the country, they starved because political, commercial
and individual greed was given priority over saving lives in one part of the United Kingdom.”49
In contrast to Kinealy’s argument, Peter Gray contends that these local food products,
including grains and livestock may have ended up being too expensive for the rural poor, even
when produced in Ireland.50 James Donnelly reminds readers that while this image is horrifying,
it is “… seriously inadequate and badly distorts the real story of what happened to the food
supply in Ireland during the Famine years.”51 The issue of Irish imports to Britain is the key issue
in nationalist accusations of genocide. In contrast to this argument, an export embargo would
likely have been impossible due to resistance from large farmers. Even if this had been instituted,
according to historian Cormac O’Grada, an export embargo on grain would have only filled one
seventh of the food supply needed to make up for the Famine.52 Accusations of genocide and
purposeful withholding of resources are far-fetched and extreme, but the fact remains Ireland
was exporting food while it starved. Donnelly, despite his criticisms of this argument, maintains
48 “Sanatory Condition of the City,” John Bull, May 29, 1847.
49 Kinealy, The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology and Rebellion, 116.
50 Gray, “British relief measures”, 75-86.
51 Donnelly, Great Irish Potato Famine.
52 Ibid.
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that “…a million people should not have died in the backyard of what was then the world’s
richest nation…”53
The effect on Ireland of the Famine was absolute. Population loss alone transformed the
country’s dynamics. The rates of emigration matched the rates of death, both around 9% between
1841 and 1851. Almost two million people would leave Ireland from 1846 to 1852, ending up
overseas or in the slums of British cities such as Liverpool and Glasgow.54 A London newspaper
in early 1847 acknowledged this mass exodus, expecting 300,000 people to leave Ireland for the
United States of America by the end of the year. The newspaper also hoped the United States
will accept these people “quietly” and predicts it will be beneficial to the country.55
While the majority of Irish immigrants ended up the northeastern United States, some
traveled a shorter distance. An archaeological excavation of the cemetery of the Catholic mission
of St. Mary, and St. Michael in London, completed by the Museum of London Archaeology in
2005 and 2006, discovered evidence of Famine victims in London. The burial ground was closed
after a decade of use in 1854, during which time it quickly became a mass grave in an Irish
Catholic area of London.56 The health and osteological evidence supports the previously
unsupported claim that these were recent immigrants and victims of the Famine. Abnormally
53 Ibid.
54 William J. Smyth, “Exodus from Ireland- patterns of emigration,” in Atlas of the Great Irish
Famine, ed. John Crowley, William J. Smyth, and Mike Murphy, (New York: New York
University Press, 2012), 494-503.
55 “Emigration,” Bell’s Life in London and Sporting Chronicle, March 7, 1847.
56 Michael Henderson, Natasha Powers, and Don Walker, “Archaeological evidence of Irish
migration? Rickets in the Irish community of London’s East End, 1843-54,” in Atlas of the Great
Irish Famine, ed. John Crowley, William J. Smyth, and Mike Murphy, (New York: New York
University Press, 2012), 521-524.
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high levels of rickets in the buried children are evidence of poor nutrition, crowded living
conditions, and ill health.57
Other effects of the Great Famine included later land reform and a loss of language and
heritage. After the mass evictions during the Famine and loss of landed peasantry, land reform in
Ireland was popular issue in Britain. Justice for Ireland was a promise made by the Liberal Party,
elected in 1868. The Landlord and Tenant Act of 1870 attempted to protect peasants and tenants.
The Act offered compensation for improvements to the land and compensation for “disturbance”,
or eviction. The Act was extremely restrictive however, and less than 1,000 tenants applied for
compensation. There were six more Land Acts enacted in Ireland from 1870 to 1925. The
majority of these acts focused on providing protections for the tenant and peasantry class of
Ireland. Landlordism in Ireland greatly declined, and a new land system replaced it. Land reform
redistributed land and transferred ownership, all of which was controlled by the British state.
While much of the land reform was aimed at social justice, unfortunately the agricultural
laborers did not benefit much.58
Another effect of the Famine, and any massive loss of population, was a decline in the
native language. Irish was already in decline before the Famine, but the event sped the process
excessively. This decline most likely began when English was established as national system of
education in Ireland in 1831. School was taught entirely in English, despite many children only
speaking Irish. Children were encouraged to learn English and speaking Irish was seen as a
57 Ibid.
58 Willie Nolan, “Land reform in post-Famine Ireland,” in Atlas of the Great Irish Famine, ed.
John Crowley, William J. Smyth, and Mike Murphy, (New York: New York University Press,
2012), 570-579.
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hindrance to education and viewed as the language of the peasantry. Considering the peasant
class was affected the greatest by the Famine, many Irish speakers were lost. In 1851, of thirty-
one counties surveyed, only seven had a population with more than 50% Irish speakers. The Irish
language’s association with ignorance and poverty increased with the Famine. The loss and
shame of a native language is argued to be able change a country’s cultural worldview, as people
interpret their world through language. The loss of a native language also contributes to a loss of
heritage, for example folklore traditions which were most likely recorded in Irish.59
The Irish Potato Famine devastated Ireland in a multitude of ways, and is not always
blamed solitarily on the potato blight. Britain’s politics of the time period exacerbated the Irish
Potato Famine. By placing financial responsibility onto the Irish, delivering inadequate relief
when provided, continuing to export food products out of Ireland, and arguably at times
punishing the Irish paupers, British politics and policies worsened the suffering and starvation
caused by the unsuccessful harvests and potato blight. This is not to say the British are to blame
for Irish deaths, that the exacerbating of the issues was intentional nor malicious, or that the
British government committed genocide. The Famine was caused by a single event, the potato
blight, but was consistently aggravated by the British government in the following years.
59 Mairead Nic Craith, “Legacy and loss: the Great Silence and it’s aftermath,” in Atlas of the
Great Irish Famine, ed. John Crowley, William J. Smyth, and Mike Murphy, (New York: New
York University Press, 2012), 580-588.
Laney 19
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