Post on 29-Jan-2016
description
PolicyAnalysisandInstitutionsofGovernance:Analyzing….what?
December2015PositionPaper
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AcknowledgementsThispaperhasbenefitedfromcriticalandencouragingcommentsfromtheparticipantsandorganizersatthefollowingeventswherethekeypointsofthepaperhavebeenpresented:
• ExpertGroupMeetingon“InnovatingPublicServiceDeliverytoImplementthePost-2015DevelopmentAgenda”,organizedbyUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,Medellin,Colombia,22-26July,2015.
• ExpertGroupMeetingon“Governance,PublicAdministrationandInformation&CommunicationTechnologiesforPost2015Development”,organizedbyUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,Geneva,3-5July,2013.
• WageningenInternationalWorkshop“ScrutinizingSuccessandFailureinDevelopment:InstitutionalChange,CapacityDevelopment,andTheoriesofChange”,heldinWageningen(theNetherlands)onDecember6-7,2007.
• TheMaxwellSchoolofGovernment,SyracuseUniversity,NewYork,October14,2007• TheGraduateSchoolofArchitecture,Planning,andPreservation,ColumbiaUniversity,NewYork,October18,2007
• TheESRCGenomicsPolicyandResearchForumworkshop,“NewGovernanceToolsforNewTechnologies?”,heldatUniversityofEdinburgh,ScotlandonJune8,2005
• TheInstituteforEnvironmentalStudies“ScaleWorkshop”,heldatVrijeUniversity,Amsterdam,onJanuary24,2005
ThispaperhasalsobenefitedfromnumerousdiscussionsovertheyearswithSaurabhArora,AnthonyArundel,TommasoCiarli,SeemaHafeez,RichardNelson,AstaOlesen,MariaSavona,andSmitaSrinivas.
AuthorSaeedParto
AboutAPPRO-EuropeAPPRO-EuropewasfoundedinMarch2015tocarryoutappliedresearch,trainingandmentoring,monitoringandevaluations,knowledgedissemination,andpolicyadvocacytoinforminternationaldevelopment.APPRO-Europe(ASBL)isregisteredinBelgiumandFrance.APPRO-Europe’smissionistofacilitatecriticaldialogueondevelopmentaideffectivenessandpolicymaking.Thismissionhastwocomponents.Thefirstcomponentistomeasuredevelopmentprogressagainststrategicdevelopmentobjectivestoinformpolicy.Thesecondcomponentistotrainandmentorcivilsocietyorganizationsinevidence-basedadvocacyandgovernmentsinevidence-basedpolicymaking.APPRO-Europeoperatesthroughfundsprovidedbynationalandinternationaldevelopmentaidorganizations.Withtheexceptionofevaluationreports,allresearchfindingsaredisseminatedaspublications,downloadablefreeofchargefromAPPRO-Europe’swebsiteat:www.appro-europe.netContact:mail@appro-europe.netCoverImage:Collagebasedonphotographsfrom:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_topologyTheauthortakesfullresponsibilityforallomissionsanderrorsinthispaper.©2015.APPRO-Europe(ASBL).Thispublicationmaybestoredinaretrievalsystemortransmittedonlyfornon-commercialpurposesandwithwrittencredittotheauthorandAPPRO-Europewithalinktowww.appro-europe.net.Anyotheruseofthispublicationrequirespriorwrittenpermissionwhichmaybeobtainedbywritingto:mail@appro-europe.net.
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AbstractPolicyoutcomesoftenfallshortofpolicyintentions.Despiteglobalizationandregionalization,inmanycasesnationalproblems,policies,andpoliticsemergeandtraversethroughvaryingmodesoflocallyevolvedgovernancemechanismscharacterizedbyarangeofclearlydiscernibleformalandinformalinstitutions.Effortstooperationalizesupra-nationalorglobalpoliciesorvisionssuchastheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalscontinuetobesimultaneouslysupportedandcurtailedatthelocal/nationalscalebytheinstitutionsthroughwhichgovernanceisexercisedindifferentcontexts.Drawingonnumerousstudiesonthediscrepancybetweenpolicyoutcomesandpolicyobjectives,thispaperarticulatesaframeworkforconductinggovernance-oriented,institutionallyinformedpolicyanalysisinpoliticallyandsocio-economicallyheterogeneousenvironments.Keywords:Governance,PolicyAnalysis,InstitutionalAnalysis
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TableofContents
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 4
PolicyAnalysis ........................................................................................................................ 5
Governance ............................................................................................................................ 9
Institutions ........................................................................................................................... 14
InstitutionsandGovernance................................................................................................. 19
InstitutionalPolicyAnalysis:AFramework ........................................................................... 22
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 24
References............................................................................................................................ 28
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Introduction
Thepolicyprocessisalmostalwayscharacterizedbydiscrepancies,andsometimesquitesignificant
discrepancies,betweenpolicyoutcomesandpolicyobjectives.Thediscrepanciesareespecially
pronouncedwhenthesamepolicyintentionsaretriedoutinheterogeneousandhighlydiversified
contextsasrepresentedbythe191countriesthatsigneduptotheUnitedNationsMillennium
DevelopmentGoals(MDGs)inSeptember2000,forexample.Thesignatoriesmadeformal
commitmentstocombatpoverty,hunger,disease,illiteracy,environmentaldegradation,and
discriminationagainstwomen.IncludedamongthesignatoriestoMDGsarewealthyindustrialized
countrieswithverylargeeconomiesandstableanddemocraticmodesofgovernanceandpoororless
developedcountrieswithlessthandemocraticgovernments.Everyoneofthesignatorieshasadistinct
history,culture,institutionallandscape,andeconomicpositioning.Thisdiversityisamajorsourceof
conflictingperspectivesandcompetingagendasoftheactorsformallycommittedtomeetingMDGs.The
governanceoftheeffortsbythesigneestoMDGshasthusfarbeenfirmlybasedonabeliefinminimal
top-downgoverningand/orcoercion,relianceonlessformalnetworks,and“self-organization”.
TounderstandwhyendeavorssimilartoMDGshavehistoricallycomeupshortinfullymeetingtheir
goalsandobjectives,itisnecessarytoreviewandreassesssomeoftheunderlyingassumptionsabout
theroleofgovernments,networks,andinstitutionssystematicallycountedontocarrythroughpolicy
objectives.1Thereisrenewedurgencyandasignificantdegreeofripenessforaninstitutionalisttakeon
policyanalysis,giventhelessthansatisfactoryoutcomesofpoliciesintendedtomeetuniversalgoalson
eliminatingpoverty,protectingtheenvironment,orensuringequalrightsforwomen.Thepremiseof
thispaperisthatthereassessmentofsuchpoliciesandgoalswoulddowelltodrawandbuildonthe
pioneeringworksofSabatier(togetherwithMazmanianinthelate1970sandthe1980s),Sabatierand
Jenkins-Smith(inthe1990s),Ostrom(late1980s,1990s,and2000s),andKingdon(1980s).
Oftheseauthors,Ostrom’sexpansivebodyofworkstandsoutasincreasinglyfocusedonissuesof
governanceanditsinstitutionsinpolicyprocesses.Themainargumentinthispaperwillrunparallelto
Ostrom’sapproach,whichholdsthatonecannotdomeaningfulpolicyanalysiswithoutaddressing
1Thispaperusesthesigningbythe191countriesoftheMDGsasanillustrativecaseexample.Theframeofanalysisproposedinthispapercanbeappliedequallytopoliciesatdifferentscalesofgovernanceandindifferentcontexts,however.
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issuesofpoweringovernancearrangementsandwithoutaccountingfortheroleofinstitutionsthrough
whichgovernanceisexercisedatdifferentscales,fromglobaltonationalandlocal.Tomakethis
argument,thispaperstartswithprovidingabriefoverviewofpolicyanalysistoestablishthelinkages
betweenpolicymaking,governance,andtheinstitutionsofgovernance.
Governanceisdiscussedretrospectivelyandprospectively,withparticularattentiontothecurrent
discourseon“goodgovernance”.Alinkisthenestablishedbetweengovernanceandinstitutions,
followedbyaseparatesectiononinstitutionstooutlinehowinstitutionalistpolicyanalysismaybe
conductedinagovernancecontext.Duetospacelimitationsthecasestudiesonwhichthispaperis
basedarenotbedescribedindetailandserveonlyasreferencepoints.2
Thispaperarguesthatonlythroughadetailedcomparisonofthefullrangeofinstitutions(fromthevery
informalandintangibletotheveryformalandtangible)incomparablepolicyarenascanonegetafull
senseofwhythesamepolicyimplementedindifferentarenas(andatdifferentscalesofgovernance)
producesdifferentpolicyoutcomes.Takingstockofthefullrangeofinstitutionsasproposedinthis
papercanalsorevealtheentrypointsforpolicyimplementerstoinitiateprocessesthatcanfacilitate
institutionalchangeasintendedbypolicy.
PolicyAnalysis
Policyistheoutcomeofaseriesofdecisionsonwhatconstitutesaproblem,whatthepossiblesolutions
are,andhowthepreferredsolutionsmaybeimplemented(Adgeretal.2002),giventheresource
constraintsofthecommunity,thephysicalandmaterialconditions,andthemodeofgovernance
(Ostrom1999).3Initsmostcompleteform,policymakingrequiresissuedefinitionandtheidentification
oftheissuecontext,optionsorsolutions,assessmentofoptions,selectionofthemostsuitable
option(s),monitoringandassessmentofimplementation,learningforfuturepolicymakingendeavors,
andhopefullyattainingincreasedefficiency,effectivenessandlegitimacy.
2Fordetailsofthecasestudies,see“GovernanceandPolicyAnalysis:WhatofInstitutions?”Availablefrom:http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:e0ac3f43-2d3e-426d-be64-845eaa4cf818/datastreams/ASSET1/content
3SeeHajer,M.(2003a:181)foraconciseoverviewofvariousdefinitionsforpolicyanalysis.
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Thatsaid,itisdifficulttocomeupwithaprecisedefinitionofpolicyanalysisbecauseofits“garbage
can”characteristics,complexity,andunpredictability.4Varyingemphaseshavebeenplacedonthe
differentelementsinprocessofpolicymakingdependingonthepractitionersandthecontext(Taitand
Lyall2004).Theseelementsincludeconstraintsattheorganizationscale(MarchandOlsen1979,1984),
interactioncharacteristicsofactors,oractants,toborrowfromBrunoLatour,indecisionmaking
domainsandnetworks(Burt1992,Coleman1990),andtheeffectivenessofpolicyimplementationat
multiplescalesofgovernance(MazmanianandSabatier1981,1983).Thesevariouselementsofthe
policyprocessmayberepresentedasFigure1.
Figure1:ElementsofthePolicyProcess
AdaptedfromOstrom(1999)
Attemptstoaccountforinstitutionsinthebroadestdefinitionofterm,capturingtheveryinformaland
intangiblesuchasvaluesystemsandcustomsandtheveryformalandtangiblesuchasrulesand
regulations,inpolicyanalysishavebeenlimitedwiththenotableexceptionofElinorOstrom’sworkin
the1990sand2000s.Itwillbeillustratedlaterinthispaperthatthisshortcomingispartlyduetothe
difficultyindoinginstitutionalanalysiswithoutasharedconceptualizationoftheterm“institution”.This
4SeeKingdon,J.(1984).
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difficultyhasbeencompoundedoverthelasttwoorsodecadesbywhathascometobeknownas“the
movefromgovernmenttogovernance”(Jessop1999,PierreandPeters2000)anda“hollowingout”of
thenationalstateasfarasitsclassicfunctionsandtheincreasinglysignificantroleplayedbynon-state
actorsindeliveringstatefunctions.(SeeGovernance,below).
Fromagovernanceperspective,Hajer(2003a:181-8)offersthreedefiningelementsforthepolitical
contextofpolicyanalysis:polity,knowledge,andintervention.Interpretedasastablepoliticalorder,
polityorthepoliticalsettingofpolicymakinghaschangedconsiderablysincetheSecondWorldWar.
Whereasbeforethecriticalpolicyanalyststroveto“speaktruthtopower”concentratedinthe
governmentofthenationstate,therearenownumerousothercontendersforpowerwhonotonly
wanttospeaktheirversionoftruthtopower,butalsowanttheirshareofpower.Theseinclude
transnationalormultinationalcorporationsandnetworks,non-governmentandcivilsociety
organizations,andthemediawhich,whileusedextensivelyandstrategicallybyallcontenders,are
themselvessometimescontendersforpowerthroughagendasettinginthepolicyprocess.
Thenewlandscapeofgovernanceasithasevolvedsincethe1970sismarkedbyadeparturefrom
territoriallydefinedspacesofthepost-warnationstatesandtheemergenceofanetworked(Castells
1996)orembeddedsociety(GranovetterandSwedberg2001)thattranscendsthenationstate.
Governanceinthisnewlandscapeisincreasinglyhavingtorelyonformalandinformal,supra-andsub-
nationalformsandstructures(Jessop1999,Hajer2003a).Undergovernance,policymakingisnolonger
afunctionfulfilledbyexpertsortechnocratswhosesoleroleistodevisepolicysolutionstoservevarious
identifiedneeds:thereisnowrecognitionandspaceforaplethoraofactorsandfactorsthatcollectively
governpolicyanditsmaking.
AaronWildavsky(1979),whocoinedthephrase“speakingtruthtopower”asthekeyroleforpolicy
analystsinthepolicyprocess,describespolicyanalysisintermsofdialogue,equitablebalancingof
prioritiesbetweentheempoweredandthedisempoweredamidtensionsrelatingtoresourcesand
otherconstraints,trustandmistrust,andideologiesanddogmas.Wildavsky’sapproachisechoedinthe
worksofmorerecentpolicyprocessscholars(Ostrom1999,SabatieradJenkins-Smith1993,1999,and
Kingdon1984)andpractitioners(Reich1988)whounderlinetheimportanceofcontextandthemoral
responsibilityofpolicymakersandpolicyanalysts,andthustheinstitutionallandscapeinthepolicy
process.Intheseworkssystemicattentionisbeingdrawntothegovernanceorpowerrelationalaspects
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ofpolicymaking,suggestingpolicyanalysisasbeingconcernedwithatleastthreesetsofdynamicsas
follows:
• ProblemIdentification:Establishingthemannerinwhichtheproblemforwhichpolicyisrequiredis
definedrevealsthemainfactorsandactors,ortheproblem-policy-politicsmixaccordingtoKingdon
(1984).
• PolicyDevelopment:Establishingtheinclusiveness,orexclusiveness,oftheprocesstofindsolutions
forthepolicyproblemindicatesthepolicy-makingstyle,thearena(Ostrom1999),orthe“coalitions”
(SabatierandJenkins-Smith1993,1999),andthereforethemodeofgovernance(Kooiman1993,
1999,2003)forpolicymaking.
• PolicyImplementation:Establishinghowwellthepolicyobjectivesarebeingmetinpracticethrough
ongoingmonitoring,periodicevaluations,andcontinuouslearningindicatesthedegreetowhich
policyisviewedbyitsimplementersasasystemicandcircular,asopposedtolinear,process.
Thecontemporarypolicyanalystmustthusstrivetoanswertwokeyquestions:
1. Onthebasisofwhattypeofinformationcanbetterpolicydecisionsbemade?And,
2. Whatandwhostructurethepolicydiscourse?
Answeringthefirstquestionrequiresadiscussionontheadequacyandappropriateuseofthecurrently
in-usemonitoringindicators.Whileafulldiscussionofindicatorsisbeyondthescopeandpurposeof
thispaper,itwillbearguedthatinformingpolicytomeetitsobjectivesrequiresasetofinclusiveand
practicableinstitutionalindicatorstosupplementthecurrentlyin-useindicatorsonefficiency,
effectiveness,andimpact.
Answeringthesecondquestionrequiresin-depthunderstandingofthe“modeofgovernance”orthe
mannerinwhichacommunityofinterdependentactorsmakesdecisionstoorganizeitself–oris
organized–basedontheavailableresources(materialandphysicalconditions),therulesinuse
(attributesofthecommunity),anddistributionofpoweramongdecisionmakers(systemofgovernance)
asindicatedinFigure1.Theremainderofthispaperfocusesonansweringthesecondquestion.
Intheknowledge-based,networksocietythecombinedpressuresofsimultaneousglobalizationand
individualizationprocessesalongwithadominantroleofmediahavesignificantlyerodedthebasisfor
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trustinandthelegitimacyofgovernment,makingthejobofproblemidentification,solutionfinding,
andmaintainingauthoritylessdependentontechnicalexpertiseandmoredependentontheabilityto
engagemultiplestakeholders(Reich1988,TaitandLyall2004).Policymakingunderthesenew
conditionshasbecome“amatterofdefininganagreeduponpackageofactionstobetakenbyavariety
ofstakeholders,oftensupportedby‘softlaw’suchascovenantsoragreementsthatareperhapsbacked
upbyregulatoryframeworks”(Hajer2003a:187).InHajer’s(2003a,2003b)andReich’s(1988)view,
theseconditionsdemanddeliberationinpolicyanalysis,andanappreciationforpoliticalactionsbased
onmutualinteraction,toensurelegitimacyandimprovecollectivequalityoflifeforallconcerned.
Legitimatepoliticalactionsandthenatureoftheagreedupon“rulesofthegame”inpolicymakingare
productsofthemodeofgovernance,discussedinthenextsection.
Governance
Duringthelastthreeorsodecades,theclassicfunctionsofthepost-industrialstateshavemoved
upwardstosupra-nationalbodies,downwardstoregionalorlocalstates,andoutwardstorelatively
autonomouscross-nationalalliancesamonglocalmetropolitanorregionalstateswithcomplementary
interests(Jessop1999,PierreandPeters2000,Hajer2003a).Theoutcomeofthesedevelopmentshas
beenaweakeningofthestate’sauthoritythroughthediffusionofresponsibilitiesaccompaniedwith
newformsofcivicorganizationinawidergovernancecontext.Theweakeningofthestatehasrendered
theclassical-modernist(nationalandformal)institutionsofgovernmentinadequateorlesscapableof
providingtherulesofthegameforinterdependentactorsfacewithcomplexandmulti-facetedsocietal
issuesinrapidlychangingenvironments.
ThenewapproachtopolicyanalysisincorporateswhatHajer(2003a)hascalled“thegameof‘scale
jumping’,ortheartofputtingeachinterventionattheappropriatelevel”(pages176-9),whichmay
includeformal,informal,government,andnon-governmentstakeholdersandtheinstitutionsincluding
rulesandvaluesthroughwhichthesestakeholdersorganizethemselvesorareorganized.Anoperational
considerationforthemodernpolicyanalystshouldbetodeterminewhichstakeholdersareinvolvedin
thepolicyprocessandthroughwhatstructuresorinstitutionstheirinteractionsaregoverned.
Ifgovernmentisaboutthearbitrationofhowscarcesocietalresourcesareallocated,governanceis
aboutthecontestationsaroundhowresourcesareactuallyallocated.Kooiman(2003:4)distinguishes
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between“governing”as“thetotalityofinteractions,inwhichpublicandprivateactorsparticipate,
aimedatsolvingsocietalproblemsorcreatingsocietalopportunities”andgovernanceas“thetotalityof
theoreticalconceptionsofgoverning”.Thusgoverningmaybedefinedastheprocessthroughwhichthe
contestationsandinteractionsamongthecompetingactorsaresettled.Whilegovernancedenotesa
significantdegreeofself-organizingneutrality,governingdenotesintention,preference,andagenda(s).
However,thecommonlyacceptedinterpretationofgovernanceisinfactwhatKooimanhasdefinedas
governing.5
Undertheumbrellaofgovernancetherehavebeennumerousdiscussionssincetheearly1980samong
policymakersandsocialscientistsalikeoncollaboration,inclusion,cooperation,andcoordinationon
theaccountofincreasedinterdependenciesamongactorsinmarkets,networks,andhierarchies.The
discussionsonthechangingmodeofgovernancemaybegroupedintotwomaincamps.First,thereare
thosewhoviewtheemphasisoncollaboration,cooperation,private-publicpartnerships,andsoforthas
aproductofanideologicalshifttowardneo-liberalismandamoveawayfromtheconceptionofthe
stateastheproviderofwelfareandtheconvenerresponsibleforsocialcohesion.Second,thereisthe
viewthatthedispersionandinformalizationofformalstatefunctionssignifyamovetowardamode
of"co-governance"whereinactorsincivilsocietyareabletoengagemoreinmattersofpublicpolicy
thantheydidduringtheperiodimmediatelyfollowingtheSecondWorldWaranduntiltheearly1980s.
Thefirstcampviewsthemovefromgovernmenttogovernanceasanindicationofthestateabdicating
itscentralroleandresponsibilitieswhilethesecondcampseesthismoveasofferingapotentialfor
moreinclusiveanddemocraticparticipationandcivilengagementinmattersofpolicyandsocial
development.
TheproponentsofthefirstcampareanumberofmainlyBritishscholarswhosincethelate1980shave
pointedtoamovefromformalgovernmenttothelessformalgovernance(Jessop1997,1999,2001,
Macleod1996,1999,Jones1997a,1997b,1999).ThoughatfirstspecifictoBritainunderThatcherism,
thisconceptionofgovernancehasbeengeneralizedbyothersincludingAmin(1999),AminandThrift
(1994),Cox(2001,2002),EdenandHampson(1997),GoodwinandPainter(1997),Hajer(1995,2003a,
2003b),Kooiman(1993,1999,2003),Scott,A.J.(1998),Storper(1997),Swyngedouw(2000),
Swyngedouwetal.(2002),andahostofotherstocapturethesignificantchangesthathavebeentaking
placeinthesocio-politicalandeconomiclandscapeofthepost-Fordistera.Jessop(1999)andPierreand
5SeealsoKooiman(2003)forafulldiscussionofthedifferencesbetweenthetwoterms.
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Peters(2000)refertoa“hollowingout”ofthenationalstatethroughthedelegationofstatefunctions
tonon-stateorquasi-stateentities.Jessop(1999)alsomakesclearthatthedelegationofgovernment
functionstoquasi-ornon-governmentalbodiesdoesnotequateasurrenderofpoliticalpowerbythe
statetonon-stateactors.
IncontrasttothefirstcampandfocusingonaEuropeanscale,theproponentsofthesecondcamp,
exemplifiedbyHajer(2003b),interprettheshiftfromgovernmenttogovernanceasamovefromliberal
democracyto“expansivedemocracy”characterizedby“increasedparticipation,eitherbymeansof
small-scaledirectdemocracyorthroughstronglinkagesbetweencitizensandbroad-scale[formal]
institutions,bypushingdemocracybeyondtraditionalpoliticalspheres,andbyrelatingdecision-making
tothepersonswhoareaffected”(p.3).Hajer(2003a,2003b)andKooiman(1993,2003)pointoutthat
classical-modernistinstitutionscharacterizedandmaintainedbycodified,well-establishedpatternsof
behavior,arenolongersufficientforgoverningeffectivelyinthechangedcontextofgovernance.The
formalinstitutionsofgovernanceareincreasinglyhavingtocompetewith“open-ended,oftenunusual,
adhocarrangementsthatdemonstrateremarkableproblem-solvingcapacityandopenupopportunities
forlearningandchangeinexactlythosecircumstanceswhereclassical-modernistinstitutionshavefailed
todeliver”(Hajer2003b:3).
TheoptimismoftheperspectiveongovernancesharedbyHajerandKooimanisremarkableinits
contrasttotheviewoftheBritisheconomicgeographersandpoliticalscientistswhosemainobservation
aboutthemovetogovernanceishowanti-democraticithasbeen,atleastintheUK.6Whetherthe
influenceofthenationalstatehasshrunkremainsamatterofdebateamongeconomicgeographers,
sociologistsandpoliticalscientists.Whatisclearinthisdebateisthatgovernanceisviewedbyallas
highlyscale-andcontext-specific.
Inthepolicymakingdiscourse,governanceisoftendescribedastheexerciseofauthorityandcontrolby
amultiplicityofpublicandprivateinterests.Thisviewofgovernanceisprevalentinmostofficial
definitionsoftheterm.Forexample,acursorylookatthemoreformaldefinitionsofgovernanceyields
aseriesofkeywordsandphrases(Table1)thatpointtogovernanceashowactorsorganizethemselves.
6SeeMacLeod(1996,1999)andJones(1997a,1997b,1999)forspecificexamplesandcasestudies.
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Table1:KeyWordsandPhrasesinDefinitionsof“Governance”• Leadership;ExerciseofAuthorityandControl,Power,Coordination• Managing;DecisionMaking• Influence;Behaviour;Conduct• Interdependence;Transaction;Interaction• Social,Ecological,andPoliticalSystems• Social,Political,andEconomicActors• Society;Hierarchy;Private,Public,andCivicOrganizations• Traditions;Rules;FormalandInformalInstitutions• Structures;Culture;Processes• Conflicts;Negotiation;DisputeResolution;Coercion;Influencing;Constituting;• Knowledge;Devices;Policies• Networks,Associations,andAlliances• Issuestackledthroughgovernanceinclude:Stability
Source:Multiple(2012)
ThekeywordsinTable1aretakenfromofficialstatementsbytheEuropeanCommission,government
ministriesandagencies,foreigndevelopmentagencies,academicinstitutions,internationalcorporations
andagencies,andworksbynumerousscholarsincludingStoker(1998),Kooiman(1993,1999,2003),
WeimerandVining(1999),DiMaggioandPowell(1983),HollingsworthandBoyer(1997),andahostof
others.Aswillbeillustratedbelow,clarityanddefinitionalagreementfortheterms“governance”and
“institution”remainfarfromresolved.
Toillustrate,theEuropeanCommissionusestheterm“GoodGovernance”torefertoamodeof
governingwhoseintentionsareconsistentwiththecommongoodoftheMemberStatesandthe
EuropeanCommunityasawhole.TheCommission’svisionisbasedonthefivepoliticalprinciplesof
openness,participation,accountability,effectiveness,andcoherence.Furthermore,theseprinciplesare
tobemaintainedthroughthe“institutions”oftheEuropeanUnion’sgovernancesystem(Table2).
Table2:EuropeanCommission’sPrinciplesof“GoodGovernance”Openness:TheInstitutionsshouldworkinamoreopenmanner…Participation:…ImprovedparticipationislikelytocreatemoreconfidenceintheendresultandintheInstitutionsthatdeliverpolicies.….Accountability:…EachoftheEUInstitutionsmustexplainandtakeresponsibilityforwhatitdoesinEurope.…Effectiveness:Policiesmustbeeffectiveandtimely,deliveringwhatisneededonthebasisofclearobjectives,anevaluationoffutureimpactand,whereavailable,ofpastexperience.…Coherence:…CoherencerequirespoliticalleadershipandastrongresponsibilityonthepartoftheInstitutionstoensureaconsistentapproachwithinacomplexsystem.
Source:CEC(2001:10),emphasisadded.
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WhatismoststrikingintheCommission’sdefinitionofgoodgovernanceistheemphasisontheroleof
institutionsasentitiesthatarelargelyviewedasbeing“upthere”and,atleastcurrently,insufficiently
withinthereachofordinarycitizens.Assuch,thisviewofgovernanceseemsconcernedprimarilywith
minimizingbureaucratizationandhierarchyoftheorganizationswithkeyrolesintheEUsystemof
governance.ThustheintentoftheWhitePaperonEuropeanGovernance(CEC2001)istomakethese
formalorganizations–withkeyinstitutionalfunctionsandwhosesizeandnumbersareincreasing–
moreaccessible,accountable,andrelevanttothegeneralpopulaceandtoretainahigherdegreeof
relevancy,credibility,andlegitimacyintheaverageperson’smind.TheWhitePaper’snecessarybut
exclusivefocusonwhatareatbestformalinstitutionsoverlookstheimportantroleplayedbyother,less
formalortangible,institutionsinEuropeangovernance,particularlyinpolicyformationand
implementation.Tofullyappreciatetheroleofinstitutions,theymustbeviewedasmorethanlarge
bureaucraticorganizations.
Thereareotherdefinitionsofgood,ordemocratic,governancethatpointimplicitlytotheimportanceof
informalinstitutions.Table3highlightsthekeywordsinsomeofsuchdefinitionsofgoodgovernance.
Table3:KeyWordsandPhrasesinDefinitionsofGoodGovernance
• ServingtheCommonGood• Monitoringofauthority• Democraticallyelected,Representative,andParticipatorygovernments• Accountability;Responsiveness;Transparency;Efficiency• RuleofLawandEqualJusticeunderthelaw• GovernmentCapacitytomanageresourcesandimplementsoundpolicies• GovernmentAbilitytomaintainsocialpeace,lawandorder,economicgrowth,andaminimumlevelof
socialsecurity• GovernmentAbilitytoreformstructuresandprocesses• GovernmentAbilitytoimplementpolicyeffectively• RespectofCitizensandthestatefortheinstitutionsthatgoverneconomicandsocialinteractions• Interactionbetweenacademicsandpolicymakers• Learning;ProblemReformulation• ActorsincludebutarenotlimitedtothePrivateSector,CivilSociety,andthestate
Source:Multiple(2012)
AnillustrativeexampleisprovidedbyUNDP,whichdefinesgovernanceas:
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…theexerciseofeconomic,politicalandadministrativeauthoritytomanageacountry'saffairsatall
levels.Itcomprisesthemechanisms,processesandinstitutionsthroughwhichcitizensandgroups
articulatetheirinterests,exercisetheirlegalrights,meettheirobligationsandmediatetheirdifferences.7
Otherinternationalorganizations,e.g.,theWorldBank,UnitedStatesAgencyforInternational
Development(USAID),offersimilardefinitionsofgovernanceemphasizingtheroleofhigherformal
authorityforthecommongood(Table3).
Ifwesimplifythenotionofgovernancetomean‘thewayhumancommunities(i.e.,organizations,
polities,andcross-polityregions)organizethemselves’,itfollowsthatanalysesofmodesofgovernance
needtoincludeadiversityofactorswhohavetorelatetooneanotherduetointerdependency,and
whoallcontendforordefendapieceoftheproverbialpie,action,orpower.Wemayconclude,
therefore,thattherehasbeengovernanceaslongastherehasbeenhumansociety,characterized
aboveallbyinterdependency–itistheformthatchangesovertimeandduetovaryingresource
constraintsandopportunitiesandthestructuresthatwedeviseadaptivelytogovernourselves.The
intricateconstellationoftheformalandinformalstructuresthatweusetogovernourselvesisoften
referredtoas“theinstitutions”.But,thisbegsthequestion:whatpreciselyaretheseinstitutionsand
wherearetheymanifest?Thenextsectionoffersaperspectiveforansweringthisfundamental
question.
Institutions
Whiletheinterestininstitutionsofgovernancebyeconomistsandpoliticalscientistssomewhatfadedin
themid-20thCentury,itremainedcontinuouslypresentinSociologyandisreflectedinworksbyCooley,
Durkheim,SpencerandSumneraroundtheturnofthe19thCentury,toWeber(1924),Parsons(1990),
Hughes(1939),Davis(1949),DiMaggioandPowell(1983),Jessop(2001),andScott,W.R.(2001)among
numerousothers.Mostofthesewritershavebeeninfluencedby,orfoughtagainst,theideasput
forwardbyKarlMarxwhoiscreditedwithsignificantcontributionstothethreedisciplinesofSociology,
PoliticalScienceandEconomics.Thediversityofconceptualizationsofinstitutionsoriginatingfromthese
threedisciplineshasgeneratedaliteratureoninstitutionsthatisrichandextensiveyetintimidatingly
difficulttooperationalizeforanalyticalpurposes.
7 TakenfromadefinitionofgovernancebyUNDP,availableat:http://magnet.undp.org/policy/default.htm.
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Toillustrate,acloseexaminationofsomeofthekeydefinitionsofinstitutionsrevealsthatinstitutions
areviewedasinformalandintangible(e.g.,norms,habits,andcustoms),semi-formal(e.g.,mental
constructsandmodels,rulesofthegame,conventions),andformal(e.g.,family,prescriptions,
proscriptions,corporations,tradeunions,thestate)phenomena(Table4).Surprisingly,few
institutionalistsappearalertedtothisdiversityofmeaningsandtheneedformanageable
conceptualizationofinstitutions.Mucheffortisdedicatedtofindthemostperfect,singulardefinitionof
institutionsinstead.8
Table4:WhatareInstitutions?1. Habitsofagrouporthecustomsofapeople(Hamilton1932)2. Settledhabitsofthoughtcommontothegeneralityofmen(Veblen1919)3. Convenienttermforthemoreimportantamongthewidelyprevalent,highlystandardizedsocialhabits
(Mitchell1950)4. Howthegameisplayed(NelsonandSampat2001)5. Normsthatregulaterelationsamongindividuals(Parsons1990)6. Conventions,rulesofaction,embeddedinsocialstructure,locallyspecific(Krätke1999)7. Setsofrulesofthegameorcodesofconductdefiningsocialpractices(Young1994)8. Mentalconstructs(Neale1987)9. Rulesofthegame(North1990)10. MentalModels(North1994)11. Collectiveactionexercisedbydifferenttypesoforganization(family,corporation,tradeunion,state)in
controlofindividualaction(Commons1924)12. Formalorganizations,patternsofbehaviour,negativenormsandconstraints(CoriatandDosi1998)13. Asetofsociallyprescribedpatternsofcorrelatedbehaviour(Bush1986)14. Prescribedorproscribedpatternsofcorrelatedbehaviour(Tool1993)15. Constitutionalrulesystemsforsociety,collectivechoicerulesgoverningdifferentkindsoforganization,
operationalrulesoforganizations(Ostrom1999)Source:Parto(2005a)
Thefirststeptowardreconceptualizinginstitutionsistotakestockofhowinstitutionshavebeen
definedbythosewhohaveseeninstitutionsascrucialtounderstandinghumanbehaviour.Table4is
onesuchattempt.Table4illustratesthedifficultyofdefininginstitutionsandconductinginstitutional
analysissincethereisnoonedefinitionheretocapturethemultiplicityofmeaningsortheextentto
whichinstitutionscollectivelyorganizehumaninteractioninmultipledimensions.Tomakecoherent
senseofthesedefinitionswemayattempttoveryroughlygroupthembasedonthetypeofinstitutions
towhichtheyreferasfollows:8See,forexample,Hodgson(2006),whereduringaninterviewwitharguableoneofthegiantsofinstitutionalisminEconomics(DouglasNorth),noattemptismadetoreconceptualizethenotionofinstitutionstocapturetheirimportanceandplaceininteractionsatdifferentlevelsofinter-relation,scalesofgovernance,orspheresofhumanactivity.
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• Definitions1,2,3,4and5suggestrelativepermanencyandpointtoinformalinstitutions(norms,
habitsandcustoms,howthegameisplayed)
• Definitions6,7,8,9and10alludetosemi-formalinstitutions(rulesofthegame,conventions,
mentalconstructs,mentalmodels)andinformalinstitutions(rulesofaction,codesofconduct,
socialpractices)
• Definition11referstomainlyformalinstitutions(family,corporation,tradeunions,thestate)
• Definition12referstoformalorganizationsandinformalstructures(patternsofbehaviourand
norms)
• Definitions13and14refertomoreformalinstitutions(prescriptions,proscriptions)
• Definition15referstoformalinstitutions(constitutionalrulesystems,collectivechoicerules,
operationalrules)
Thegroupingofdefinitionsintheabovemannerrevealsthreeimportantdistinguishingfeaturesof
institutions.First,somedefinitionsunderlinetheterritorialscaleofgovernance(Krätke1999,Ostrom
1999,Young1994,2002).Second,anumberofthesedefinitionsrefertoinstitutionsasbeingmanifestin
individualbehaviourinsocietyatlarge(Hamilton1932,Parsons1990,Krätke1999,Veblen1919),
individualbehaviorwithinorganizations(Commons1924,MarchandOlsen1984,CoriatandDosi1998),
interactionsamongorganizations(Ostrom1999),andinteractionsamongnations(Young1994,2002).
Finally,onecandetectvaryingemphasesonthesocial,economic,andpoliticalaspectsofinstitutions.
Whatshouldcomethroughthisgroupingofthedefinitionsofinstitutionsisthatinstitutionscanbe
moreorlessformal/tangiblephenomenathatstructureinteractionsamongindividualsatdifferent
levels,interactionsamonggroupsofindividualsatdifferentterritorialscales,andinteractionsof
individualsandgroupsindifferentspheres(toparaphraseMaxWeber)ofhumanactivity.Viewedinthis
multi-dimensional/multi-layeredfashion,thetaskofunpackingthecomplexitythatthediverse
definitionsofinstitutionsattempttocapturebecomesmoremanageable.Asummaryoftheworking
definitionsforlevels,scales,andspheresisprovidedinTable5.
“Levelofinter-relation”isborrowedfromSociologyandreferstointer-relationsattheindividual,
organizational,andsocietallevels.“Scaleofgovernance”isborrowedfromSociology,PoliticalScience,
andAdministrativeStudiesandcapturestheterritorialdimensionofgovernance.“Sphere”isanotion
borrowedfromstudiesofSystemsDynamicsandSociology(MaxWeberinparticular)andisusedto
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bringinterconnectednessofeconomic,social,andpoliticalarenasintoperspectivesofgovernanceat
differentscales.Thenotionofsphereisparticularlyusefulindealingwithcomplexandmulti-faceted
policyissueswhichrequireconcertedeffortstointegrateandaddresssocial,economic,andpolitical
concernssimultaneouslyandatmultiplescalesofgovernance.
Table5:Levels,Scales,andSystems
Levelsofinter-relation
Individual:Amongindividualsatlargebasedoninterpersonalinterdependencewheremanyactorsareinvolved.Organizational:Withinorganizationstosecureinternalcohesionandamongorganizationstomaximizeadaptabilityofindividualorganizationssoastomakecompatiblerespectiveoperationalunitiesandindependencewithdefactomaterialandsocialinterdependenceonotherorganizations.Societal:Amongoperationallyautonomous(or“closed”)functionalsystemseachwithitsownautopoieticcodes,programmes,institutionallogicsandinterestsinself-reproduction(adaptedfromJessop1997).
(Territorial)ScalesofGovernance
Local(subnational),national,international(betweennationallyconstituted,functionallydifferentiatedinstitutionalorders),transnational(passingthroughnationalboundaries),andglobal(coveringtheglobeasawhole).
Spheres Societymaybedefinedintermsofitssocial,economic,political,andecologicalspheresorsystems.Asubsystemcontainspartsofallsystems.
Source:Parto(2005a)
Likeallcategorizations,thetermslevels,scales,andsystems(orspheres)areconstructedandemployed
tocometotermswiththecomplexityofthisfundamentalquestion:howdoweaccountforinstitutions
inanalysesofpolicyaimedateffectingsocietalchange?Answeringthisquestionhasimportant
implicationsforfurtherresearchandpolicy.Inresearch,carefulcategorizationofinstitutionsbasedon
levels,scales,andsystemsenablesustoinvestigatethesameproblemorresearchquestionindifferent
contexts,expectdifferentfindingsduetocontext-specificinstitutionallandscapes,andidentifythe
factorsandactorsmostrelevanttochangemakingeffortsinagivencontext.Inpolicymakingand
implementation,anin-depthandmulti-dimensionalappreciationofthecollectiveroleofinstitutionsis
likelytominimizethepossibilityofsettingunrealisticpolicyobjectivesandincreaseourunderstanding
ofwhyinsomecontextssomepoliciessucceedmorethanothersinmeetingtheirobjectives.
Theseresearchandpolicyimplicationsareparticularlyrelevanttopolicymakingatregional,e.g.,
EuropeanUnion,orglobalscalesofgovernanceonsuchissuesasclimatechange,forexample.The
categorizationsinTable5provideausefulbasisforoperationalizationofamulti-dimensionalnotionof
“institutions”.Applyingthelevels-scales-systemsperspectivetoinstitutionsyieldsaloosebutnecessary
typologyofinstitutionsasdepictedinFigure2.
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Figure2.ATypologyofInstitutions
BehaviouralInstitutions:Institutionsasstandardized(recognizable)socialhabits–manifestindeeplyingrainedmodesofbehaviourinindividualsandgroupsasreflectionsofsocialnormsCognitiveInstitutions:Institutionsasmentalmodelsandconstructsordefinitions,basedonvaluesandembeddedinculture–(tobe)aspiredtobyindividualsandgroupsAssociativeInstitutions:Institutionsasmechanismsfacilitatingprescribedorprivilegedinteractionamongdifferentprivateandpublicinterests–manifestinactivitiesofgroupsofindividualsRegulativeInstitutions:Institutionsasprescriptionsandproscriptions–manifestastheimmediateboundariesofactionbyindividualsandgroupsConstitutiveInstitutions:Institutionsasprescriptionsandproscriptionssettingtheboundsofsocialrelations–manifestastheultimateboundariesofactionbyindividualsandgroups
Source:Parto(2008)
Asimportantasthisdisaggregationandarrangementofinstitutionsareinidentifyingthem,more
importantistherangeoftangibility/formalityandscopethatitdepicts,particularlywhenweview
institutionsasphenomenathatbindtogetherandstabilizeinter-relationsatdifferentlevels,governance
atdifferentscales,andsystemsindifferentconfigurations.9
Institutionalanalysistoinformpolicyinamodeofgovernancecommittedtofundamentalsocietal
change,e.g.,toaddressclimatechange,shouldbeginwiththespecificationofthecontextinwhichthe9 SeeParto(2005a)foramoreelaboratediscussionofinstitutionsatdifferentlevels,scales,andsystems.
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institutionsaretobestudied.Further,itrequiresdifferentiatingbetweentangibleandintangible
institutionssincedifferentlevelsofformalityandscopeofinstitutionsrequiredifferentmethods,or
mixesofmethods,ofanalysisandpolicyapproach.Thenextsectionsketchesouthowthetypologyin
Figure2maybeappliedtostudygovernanceforsustainabledevelopmenttowardmeetingMDGsatthe
EuropeanUnionscaleofgovernance.
InstitutionsandGovernance
WithoutadoubtthepoliticalwillattheEUscaleofgovernanceisbeginningtoshowsignsof
institutionalizationattheformalpolicylevel,atleastinsofarastheenvironmentalaspectofsustainable
developmentisconcerned.10However,theinformationavailablethroughconventionalsocial,economic,
andenvironmentalindicatorssuggeststhatinpracticetheEuropeanCommunityasawholeisless
sustainablenowthantwoorthreedecadesago.Thismismatchbetweenpolicyobjectivesandpolicy
outcomesisinpartaproductoftheinterplaybetweenthepolicyprocess,themodeofgovernance,and
theinstitutionsthroughwhichgovernanceforsustainabledevelopment/environmentalprotectionis
exercised.Insufficientattentiontoinstitutions,particularlythelesstangibleandinformalinstitutions,
hasledtosettingunrealisticorambitiouspolicyobjectives.
Toillustrate,themostwidelyusedschematicofsustainabledevelopmentshowsthesocial,economic,
andenvironmentalspheresasthreeoverlappingcircles(systems).11Sustainabledevelopmentis
depictedasoccurringintheareawherethethreecirclesoverlap.Anotherpopularapproachis“pillar-
based”which,accordingtoGibsonetal.(2005:9),
…distinguishesbetweeneconomicandsocialneeds,inparttoemphasizethatmaterialgainsarenotsufficientmeasuresorpreserversofhumanwell-being.Similarlytheadditionofparticularattentiontoculturalandpoliticalcomponents,mostcommonininternationaldevelopmentapplications,ismeanttostresstheimportanceofthesefactorsinbuildingchangethatmaybeviableoverthelonghaul.
Policyformationonsustainabledevelopmentislikelytorelyoninformationprovidedthroughcurrently
in-usesocial,economic,andenvironmentalindicators.Aninstitutionalistapproachtopolicymakingfor
10TheformalizationofEUpolicyonsustainabledevelopment,therenewedfocusonaddressingclimatechangewiththeCOP21conferencein2015,andthesteadyincreaseintheamountofavailablefundingforresearchintosustainability-relatedareasthroughsuccessiveEuropeanFrameworkProgrammesarebutsomeindicationsofthisinstitutionalizationprocess.
11ForacomprehensivereviewofdefinitionsforsustainabledevelopmentseeGibson(2001).Foranofficialexample,seeUNDP,Availableat:http://magnet.undp.org/policy/default.htm,accessedDecember12,2004.
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sustainabledevelopmentwoulddeviseacomplementarysetofinstitutionalindicatorstohelpexplain
theunderlyingcausesforpoorperformanceinmeetingsustainabledevelopmentpolicyobjectivesinthe
social,economic,andenvironmentalarenas.OnewaytoconceptualizethisistocombineWeber’s
notionofspheresandthetypologyofinstitutionsinFigure2.TheresultispresentedinFigure3,whose
mainpurposeistocapturetheroleandplaceofinstitutionsinvariousspheresofhumanactivity.
Figure3.InstitutionsandGovernanceforSustainableDevelopment
Source:Parto(2005b)
Toillustrate,howdowechangeunsustainablebehaviour,suchasnotrecycling,over-consuming,or
usingresourceswithoutrecognizingscarcityoradverseecologicalimpact?Somehowweneedto
capturewhysomepeoplerecyclewhileothersdonot,andwhysomecountriesorregionsaremore
sustainableincertainrespectsthanothers.ThecentralfeatureofFigure3isthatinstitutionsarepresent
asstructuringphenomenaatdifferentlevelsofinter-relationandscalesofgovernance,bindingtogether
themainspheresofsustainabledevelopment.Thedegreeofformalityandthescopeofinstitutions
increaseaswemovefrom“Behavioural”upwardsto“Constitutive”institutions.Ithastobenotedthat
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thistypologyisveryfluidandthereisconstantinterplayandtransformationbetweenthedifferenttypes
ofinstitution.
IfwearetoexploretherelationshipbetweengovernancemodesandmeetingMDGswithaviewto
identifythepolicymakingstylesandinstitutionsthatcanbestfostermovingtowardsustainable
developmentattheglobalscale,weneedrathermorethanthecurrentlyin-usesocial,economic,
environmental,and(formal)institutionalindicatorsortheircomposites.
Forexample,theWorldBank’sWorldwideGovernanceIndicatorsdefinesgovernanceas“thetraditions
andinstitutionsbywhichauthorityinacountryisexercised”andoffersixcompositeindicatorsto
“measure”governancein199countriesatfourtimeperiodsbetween1996and2002.Theindicators
are:VoiceandAccountability,PoliticalStabilityandLackofViolence,GovernmentEffectiveness,
RegulatoryQuality,RuleofLaw,andControlofCorruption.Todeveloptheseindicatorstheauthorsuse
25separatedatasourcesfrom18differentorganizations,includingtheWorldBank,Gallup
International,theEconomistIntelligenceUnit,IMD,DRI/McGraw-Hill,ColumbiaUniversity,Freedom
House,Afrobarometer,Latinobarometro,theWorldEconomicForum,andReportersWithoutBorders.12
Theindicatorsareintendedtoserveasbenchmarksforpolicymakers,donoragencies,civilsocietyand
developmentexperts.
Withoutadoubtthereisvaluetosuchbenchmarks.However,nomatterhowinclusiveorcarefully
developedcompositeindicatorsorindicesare,theyareoutput-basedandonlyrevealstaticallythestate
ofaffairsatgivenpointsintimeandafterconsiderabletimelapse.Manyoftheelementsthatmakeup
theseindicatorsareprocessvariableswithhighprobabilityofchangeintheshortterm.Theseindicators
onlytellus‘how’thingsareorwereatagivenpointintime,leavingustospeculateasto‘why’things
haveturnedoutthewaytheyhave.
Governanceforanything,inthiscasetomeetMDGs,requiresconsciousandconscientiouseffortto
steerdevelopmentbyinterventionthroughgovernmentalandnon-governmentalactionalong
preconceivedtrajectoriesbased,toalargeextent,onlearningbydoingintheinstitutionalcontext.
Kaufmannetal.’s(2015)indicatorswouldbeoffarmorevaluetopolicymakersifaccompaniedwith
12ForadditionaldetailsontheWorldBanksGovernanceIndicators,see:http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
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context-specificnarrativestoexplainwhytherehasbeenadeteriorationorimprovementinthemode
ofgovernanceandwhatoptionsthereareforfurtherimprovementthroughpolicyinterventiontoeffect
institutionalchange.
InstitutionalPolicyAnalysis:AFramework
Inlightofthediscussionintheprecedingsections,wecanrevisitthenotionsofgovernanceand
institutionstomakethefollowingstatementsasworkingdefinitionsandguidepostsforconducting
institutionalpolicyanalysis:
• Themodeofgovernanceisthemannerinwhichacommunityofinterdependentactorsorganizes
itselfatthelowestscaleandisorganizedfromthehighestscale
• Governanceisintimatelyrelatedtoamultiplicityofinstitutions,asdepictedinFigure2,through
whichitisexercised
• Governanceforeffectingsocietalchangehastopayparticularattentiontoformalandinformaland
tangibleandintangibleinstitutionsandtheirfunctionsinfacilitatingandcurtailingchange
• Toaccountfortheroleofinstitutionsweneedto:
• Identifytheproblems,events,actors,andotherfactorsthatcollectivelyactascatalystsfor
processesthatprecedetheemergenceofinstitutionsintheircurrentforms(Ostrom1999,
Kingdon1984,andSabatierandJenkins-Smith1993,1999)
• Establishthecontrollabilityofthesecatalystsandusetheinformationinselectingpolicy
measuresthatutilizethecatalysts
• Setinmotioninstitutionalizationprocessesthatneutralizeundesirable/unsustainable
institutionsandreinforcedesirable/sustainableinstitutionsalreadypresent,and
• Identifywhatcomplementarycatalystsmaybeinitiatedthroughpolicyorotherintervention
tosteerchange.
Institutionalchangethroughpolicyinterventionismorelikelytooccurifintroducedthroughweaker
entrypointsonthebehavioural-constitutivecontinuumdepictedinFigure2.Amajorpolicyimplication
ofthisperspectiveoninstitutionsofgovernanceisthatmanagingsocietalchangerequiresGovernment
interventionthroughpolicymeasuresasamaincatalystofinstitutingchange.Sincegovernment
interventiondoesnotoccurinavacuumandisoftenshapedbyotherinstitutions,weareledtoask:
howdoweidentifytheinstitutionsandtheircatalystsintheirentiretyinagivenareaofstudy?Or,more
specifically,whatmethodologycanbeemployedforthispurpose?
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Themethodologicalapproachneedstobe“postdisciplinary”(Sayer2001),“eclectic”(Swedberg1990),
“Lamarchian”(NelsonandWinter1982),and“adhoc”(Hodgson1988)sincethestudyofinstitutionsof
governancespansatleastthreedisciplinesandoveraCentury’sworthofthoughtanddebate.Weneed
todrawonasmanydisciplines,metaphors,andfieldsofstudyasnecessarytoprovideanarrativethat
captureswhatnoonedisciplinecan.Themethodologywillthusneedtoincludethefollowing
components:
• Historicalreviewofsecondarydatatodocumenttheevolutionofthearena13orsubsystemunder
study,e.g.,howtheTransportationortheEnergysubsystemsandtheircontextsdeveloped,and
why.Thisrequiresmappingdifferenttypesofinstitutions,theirinter-relations,andevolutionover
time.
• Re-interpretationofworkalreadycarriedoutoncultural,social,andhumancapitaltogather
contextualdetailsandidentifyinformalinstitutions.
• Interviewswithkeyinformantstosupplementreadilyavailabledatafromsecondarysources.The
interviewsalsoservetovalidatefindingsandintuitionsderivedfromsecondarydatareviewsand
mappingexercises.
• Re-interviewstoverifythefindingswiththekeyinformants.
• Aboveall,theinstitutionalistapproachrequiresasignificanttimecommitmentinanembedded
fashiontocapturethelesstangibleinstitutions.
Thesuggestedmethodologycanbeusedtoidentifythevariables(decisions,situations,andother
factors)thatmayhaveplayedkeyrolesineffectingatransitionfromone“stable”statetoanotherinthe
subsystemunderstudy.Byweightingandrankingtheidentifiedvariableswecanidentifythemost
importantvariablesofthesubsystem,trackchangesinthepropertiesofthesevariablesovertime,and
assessthemforcontrollability.Thenextstepistomakeeducatedguessesaboutthemixofvariables
likelytofacilitateatransitionfromthecurrentstateofaffairstoamoredesirablestablestate,e.g.,from
unsustainabletosustainableeconomicdevelopment.
13Arenasreferto“thesocialspacewhereindividualsinteract,exchangegoodsandservices,solveproblems,dominateoneanother,orfight”(Ostrom1999:42).SabatierandJenkins-Smith(1993,1999)provideasimilardescriptionfortheirnotionofsubsystemswhileKingdon(1984)uses“policystreams”.
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Theinstitutionalistperspectivedoesnotrelegatetheroleofinstitutionstoaboxlocatedamongthe
differentcomponentsofthepolicyprocess,ortreatinstitutionsasacollective“filter”thatshapesthe
patternsofinteractions.Instead,institutionsareviewedasthebindingagentinhumaninteractionsand
manifestatalllevelsofinter-relation,scalesofgovernance,andthroughdifferentspheresofhuman
activityinagivensituation.Viewedinthismanner,Figure2canbeusedtoinventoryandcategorizethe
fullrangeofinstitutionsinagivenpolicyarena.Thefinalstepinthisproposedapproachistodevelop
andplayoutpolicyscenarioswhilemakingallowancesthatsomeofthehistoricalcausalitiesmaynot
holdduetochangedconditions.Cautionhastobetakentodealwiththepotentialconsequencesof
policyexperimentationfailures.
Policyanalysisalongtheabovelinesmayappearadauntingtask.However,mostofthedatarequired
forthistypeofanalysisarealreadybeingcollectedandthemethodologyproposedherecanberefined
continuallybasedontheavailabilityofdatafromthesesecondarysources.Amajordifferencebetween
theproposedmethodologyandconventionalsurveyworkistheemphasisoftheformeronqualitative
analysisofqualitativedatawhilerecognizingthevalueofquantitativeanalysis.Animportantpointto
emphasizeisthattoapplytheproposedmethodologyusefullyandconcretely,thearena/subsystem
needstobemanageableinsizeandclearlydelineatedforitsboundaries.Thatis,weneedtofocuson
specificissuessuch,e.g.,wastemanagement,energyconsumptionandprovision,ortransportation
ratherthanlargeall-encompassingquestionssuchas“sustainabledevelopment”or“goodgovernance”
–yet,withoutlosingsightofthelargerpictureandbyfullyaccountingformulti-dimensional
interdependenciesandinterconnectedness.
Conclusion
Ifpolicy-makingisvalueladen(Tait1992,SabatierandJenkins-Smith1993,1999,TaitandLyall2004)
andthatduetointensifiedinterdependenciesandinterconnectedness,thereisgreaterneedforpolicy
integrationanddeliberativepolicyanalysis(Hajer2003a,TaitandLyall2004),whitherpolicyanalysisfor
meetingglobalormulti-nationalgoalssuchasMDGs?Theanswertothisquestionisfarfromdecided.
TaitandLyall(2004:17)suggestthatfromapoliticalperspectivelackofintegrationinsomecasescould
beviewedaspragmatic,useful,andperhapsevenessentialsincefullclarificationmayclarifythingsthat
arebestleftasambiguous.InstitutionalpolicyanalysisasimpliedbyTaitandLyall(2004)recognizesthat
linkingideasofgovernanceandintegrationmaybeusefulorproblematic,dependingonhoweachterm
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isused,“bywhom,andinwhatpolicycontext”.Inotherwords,legitimacyofpolicypositionsinsome
arenascannotbetreatedasagiven.
WorkontheEUpolicymakingprocessbyLyallandTait(2005)indifferentarenassuggeststhat
integrationisdesirableinsomearenassuchasenvironmentalpolicy,butperhapsnototherssuchas
tradeingeneticallymodifiedorganisms(GMOs)wheretheprivilegeof“speakingtruthtopower”needs
tobefullyexercisedbecauseofthewidedivergenceofopinionsontheissue.Asimilarargumentmaybe
madeinrelationtoothertechnologiessuchasnuclearpowergenerationandwastetoenergy
incineration.LyallandTait(2004)distinguishbetweenhorizontalandverticalpolicyintegrationbut
perceptivelymaintainthatthedesirabilityofeithertypeisdependentonthearenainwhichthepolicyis
formedorassessed.
MeetingpolicyobjectivesforMDGsarguablyrequireseffectivecommunicationandlineofcommand
acrossandthroughdifferentscalesofgovernance,withthehighestscaledefiningtherulesofthegame.
However,inmorecomplexarenaswithconsiderablymoresignificantsocietalrisks,e.g.,tradeinGMOs
ortherelianceonnuclearpowerasa“sustainable”energysource,itmaybejustaswellthatthereis
fundamentaldisagreementpreventingintegration(andunanimity)atthenational,EUorthe
internationalscalesofgovernance.
Jordan’s(2000)indepthreviewofenvironmentalpolicydevelopmentfroma“departmental
perspective”intheperiod1970-2000offersarangeofformalinstitutionalexplanationsastowhythe
UnitedKingdomhascontinuouslyunderperformedinenvironmentalprotectionwhencomparedtothe
Netherlands.ImplicitinJordan’saccountaretheproblems,policiesand,perhapsmostimportantlyfrom
agovernanceperspective,thepoliticsofenvironmentalpolicy-makingandperformanceintheUK.
ApplyingthetypologyofinstitutionsassuggestedinthispapertoJordan’smeticulousaccountof
departmentalevolutioncoulddeciphernotonlythepolicystreamsalaKingdon(1984)butalsoalarge
numberofinstitutionsthroughwhichgovernanceoftheenvironmentalarenahasbeenexercised.Akey
contributionofsuchanapplicationwillbetheidentificationofthelessformal/tangibleinstitutions,and
arguablythosetypicallyleftoutofmoststudiesofgovernanceoranalysesofpoliciesthroughthelensof
publicadministrationstudies.
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ElsewhereJordanandothers(Jordanet.al2003,SchoutandJordan2003)comeclosertounderlining
theimportanceofthelessformalinstitutionsin(EU)governanceinrelationtoenvironmentalpolicy.In
theirlistof“complicatingfactors”SchoutandJordan(2003:20)includeintra-Commissionrelations,the
needtoexertsimultaneoushorizontalandverticalpressure,theneedtocombineadministrative
capacitiesofMemberStatesintoacoordinatedEuropeannetwork,thedifficultiesingainingan
overviewofthecapacitiesatMemberStatelevel,andthesensitiveproblemofhowbesttoidentify
weaknessesatthenationallevel.
SchoutandJordan(2003)warnagainsttheexpectationthatEuropeanUnionnetworksself-organizeina
constructivemannerintheirresponsestocoordinationchallengesandrecommendthattheEuropean
Commissionshouldtaketheleadinproposingalternativeactionsthroughpolicyandregulatory
measures.IfindeedthisisthecourseofactiontobefollowedonsuchCommunitychallengesaswaste
management,transportation,energyconsumptionandprovision,immigration,andpoverty–tocitebut
afewexamples–thenitisofutmostimportancethatpolicymakersatallscalesofgovernancewithin
theEuropeanUnionareawareofandsensitivetotheroleofallmannerofinstitutionsinthepolicy
process.
Thislineofreasoningcanbeusefullyappliedtothecommitmentby191countriestoimplement
programmestomeetMDGs.Deliberativepolicymaking,whilepath-dependentatthenationalscaleand
difficulttoadoptwhereitisnotalreadypracticed,hasahigherprobabilityofsuccessatasupra-national
scalesuchasthatrepresentedbytheUnitedNations.FortheUNtoincreaseitschancesofsuccessin
effortstomainstreamMDGs,ithastorecognize,asasupra-nationalbody,theimportantroleofformal
andinformalinstitutionsthatprovidethestructuresthroughwhichgovernanceisexercisedatdifferent
scalesofjurisdiction,indifferentspheres,andatdifferentlevelsofinteraction(Figures2and3).
Onlythroughadetailedcomparisonofthefullrangeofinstitutionsindifferentcontextsandatdifferent
scalesarewelikelytogetasenseofwhycontexts,subjectedtocomparablepolicies,generatedifferent
outcomes.Applyingthemethodologyarticulatedintheprecedingparagraphsrequiresgoingbeyond
lookingatinstitutionsfromadepartmentalorpublicadministrationperspective.Usingthetypologyof
institutionstotakestockofthestructuresthroughwhichgovernanceisexercisedislikelytorevealsome
ofthemainopportunitiesforandimpedimentstoeffectingchangeinagivenpolicyarena.Inthefinal
analysis,thecentralquestionforthepolicymakerandthepolicyanalystisnothow“good”apolicyora
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modeofgovernanceisintheabstractbuthowcloselythepolicyresonateswith,andiscapableof
changing,thepre-existingconditionsandtheinstitutionsthroughwhichapolicy-targetedsubsystemis
governed.
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