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description
Physically Unclonable FunctionsPhysically Unclonable FunctionsIn a M2M Authentication contextAtos Worldlinedd-mm-yyyyAtos Worldline
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
Transactional services. Powering progress
SummarySummary
ADS+ Consortium
Project definitionj
Physically Unclonable FunctionsPhysically Unclonable Functions
Hardware Layer
Applicative LayerApplicative Layer
Project status & Conclusion
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team2
SummarySummary
Context : ADS+ Consortium
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team3
ADS+ Consortium
▶ Bank & Industry
ADS+ Consortium
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
ADS+ Consortium
▶ Bank & Industry
ADS+ Consortium
▶ S&M Industries▶ S&M Industries
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
ADS+ Consortium
▶ Bank & Industry
ADS+ Consortium
▶ S&M Industries▶ S&M Industries
▶ Labs
▶ Funding Agency
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
ADS+ Consortium
▶ Bank & Industry
ADS+ Consortium
▶ S&M Industries▶ S&M Industries
▶ Labs
▶ Funding Agency
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
ADS+ Consortium
▶ Bank & Industry
ADS+ Consortium
▶ S&M Industries▶ S&M Industries
▶ Labs
▶ Funding Agency
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
ADS+ Consortium
▶ Bank & Industry
ADS+ Consortium
▶ S&M Industries▶ S&M Industries
▶ Labs
▶ Funding Agency
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
SummarySummary
ADS+ Consortium
Project definitionj
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team10
Context of ProjectContext of Project
Needs and requirements bound to the payment card are heavierManagement becomes more and more complex and expensiveManagement becomes more and more complex and expensive
to design and validate a new open and standard POI (Point of Infrastructure) Architecture for the Distribution of
secure Servicessecure Services standardizationproposals(EPAS, ISO)
A Web architecture - a thin client POI
- A server of infrastructure- Some ADS+ services
Major scientific and industrial impacts
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
KinematicsKinematics
merchant
secure channel
establishmentMerchant
Authentication
Infrastructure
ADS+ services
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
ADS+ services
Kinematics10/10/2010
ConfidentialKinematics
merchant
Confidential
Infrastructure
Customer
ADS+ services
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
ADS+ services
Technical innovation on the POITechnical innovation on the POI
Replace the certificats x.509 in POI Composants Authentication
PUF Technology
Low costLow cost
less complex than PKIless complex than PKI
No private key to protect
No private key to protect
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
SummarySummary
ADS+ Consortium
Project definitionj
Physically Unclonable FunctionsPhysically Unclonable Functions
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team15
PUF Concepts
Introduced by Pappu (cf Physical One Way Functions 2001)
PUF Concepts
Introduced by Pappu (cf. Physical One-Way Functions, 2001)
The observation :
Component manufacturing processes induce minor differences between two objects yet being made under the same conditions
The idea :
To exploit these minor differences to generate a secret
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
How to generate a secret ?g
Application challenge ResponseBlack Box
Error detection and correction Noisyo detect o a d co ect o
SRAM PUFHardware
SRAM PUF, Optical PUF Coating PUFArbiter PUF
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
Categories of PUFsg
t-Strong PUF vs Weak PUF
« a Strong t-PUF has a sufficient number of Challenge-response pairs such that it is difficult for an Attackers, who obtained some challenge-response pairs during a time t, to predict a response from a challenge
C ll d PUF U ll d PUF
p p g , p p gwith a high probability »
Source : Rührmair, Sölter, Selmke On the foundation of Physical Unclonable Functions (2009)
Controlled PUF vs Uncontrolled PUF
Black
Controlled PUF
Challenge ResponseBlack box
Can forbid Can encrypt and hash
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
Can forbid Can encrypt and hash
SummarySummary
ADS+ Consortium
Project definitionj
Physically Unclonable FunctionsPhysically Unclonable Functions
Hardware Layer
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team19
Optical PUFOptical PUF
Transparent with randomscatterers
Response
Challengege
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team20
Coating PUFCoating PUF
random dielectric particles
ChallengeR
C a e ge(voltage of a certain frequency and amplitude)
Response(a randomcapacitance
Metal sensorsceValue)
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team21
Arbiter PUFArbiter PUF
C1 C2 CN
1
0
1
0
1
0
0 0 0
1 1 1
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team22
SRAM PUFSRAM PUF
0 0 0 0 0 101C1C1 0 0 0 0 0 10
1
1
0100100
C1
C2
C1
C2REPONSE
0 1 0 0 0 100
0 1 0 1 1 011CHALLENGEREPONSE
1 1 0 0 0 010Cn
Cn
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team23
SummarySummary
ADS+ Consortium
Project definitionj
Physically Unclonable FunctionsPhysically Unclonable Functions
Hardware Layer
Applicative LayerApplicative Layer
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team24
The PUF response as session keyp y
Enrollment phase
PUF 1 c1 r1
cm rm
1
DB
PUF n c1 r1n
cm rm
Session key establishment
c1 r1idId
Session Key r1
c1
c1 r1
cm rm
id
DBId
Black box
PUFr1
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
The PUF response for Authenticationp
Enrollment phase < gk> a groupR = gri where r is a PUF response to challenge c
PUF 1 c1 R1
cm Rm
1
Ri = gri where ri is a PUF response to challenge ci
BD
PUF n c1 R1n
cm Rm
PUF authentication
cc1 R1id
BDIdPUF
cm m
c1cm Rm
BD Black boxr1
Zero–Knowledge proof
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
Keith B. Frikken, Marina Blanton, Mikhail J. Atallah Robust Authentication using physically unclonable functions (2009) .
The PUFs to create a secure channel
- PUF uses in key exchange protocolPUF uses in key exchange protocol
Data base attacks Impersonate the PUF
- PUF uses in a authentication protocol
No shared secret No session KeyNo shared secret No session Key
- A secure channel : authentication + session keyA secure channel : authentication + session key
A new protocol has been developed : DHZKP protocol
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
SummarySummary
ADS+ Consortium
Project definitionj
Physically Unclonable FunctionsPhysically Unclonable Functions
Hardware Layer
Applicative LayerApplicative Layer
Project status & Conclusion
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team28
ConclusionConclusion
▶ Physically Unclonable Function– Use Physical characteristic to extract unique pattern– Less expensive than a secure element– Use cases : Anti-Counterfeit, M2M authentication
▶ ADS+▶ ADS+– M2M context– Replace PKI by a disruptive technology– Our PUF can be considered strong as we are in a Tamper Resistant Deviceg p
▶ Protocol Layer : Our DHZKP– Scientific Papier about the DHZKP protocol (We are making the security proof)– RFC about the TLS extension by DHZKP– Tests in a real situation (POI / server)– Open source
| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team29
ThanksThanks
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| 16-11-2011| Cauchie StéphaneO&D-R&D Team
Transactional services. Powering progress
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