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On the De-Naturalization of EpistemologyAuthor(s): András KertészSource: Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2002), pp. 269-288Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25171234
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ON THE DE-NATURALIZATION OF EPISTEMOLOGY
ANDR?S KERT?SZ
SUMMARY. Starting from an overview of approaches to naturalized epistemology, the
paper shows, firstly, that Quine's programme yieldsa
sceptical paradox. This means that
Quine's attempt to defeat scepticism itself yieldsa rather strong argument for scepticism
and thus against his own programme of naturalized epistemology. Secondly, it is shown that
this paradox can be solved by anapproach called reflexive-heuristic naturalism. Finally,
the paper also raises some fundamental problems which the solution proposed has to leave
open.
Key words: hermeneutics, heuristics, naturalized epistemology, normativity
1. INTRODUCTION1
Although contemporary epistemological thought has been largely charac
terized by the rapid emergence of naturalized epistemology, it is very far
from being clear what relation the latter bears to traditional epistemology,
what its possibilities are, how far it can go in striving to 'replace' the latter,
what new questions it can raise, what its relationship to 'empirical science'
is etc. Thus, the present paper focuses on the following problem:
(P) What are the possibilities and limits of naturalized epistemology?
As an answer to this question the following thesis will be proposed:
(T) (a) Naturalized epistemology is susceptible to serious difficulties.
(b) These difficulties can be partly avoided if naturalized approachesare not conceived of as theories per se, but rather, as manifesta
tions of heuristics.
(c) Such heuristics reveal a new level ofepistemological thought,which is distinct both from traditional epistemology and current
approaches to naturalized epistemology.
Since the literature concerning naturalized epistemology is character
ized by the use of a very vague terminology, in this paper it will not be
^MJournal for General Philosophy of Science 33: 269-288, 2002.
^r^ ? 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in theNetherlands.
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270 ANDR?S KERT?SZ
possible to explicate the basic concepts in a satisfactory manner, either.
Therefore, it is important to note that throughout this paper all terms will
be used in a preexplicative sense unless stated otherwise.2
2. FOUR VERSIONS OF NATURALISM
So as to provide a suitable starting point for the discussion of (T), let me
put forward some very simple background assumptions. One can make
sense of the problem (P) only if the main differences between traditional
and naturalized epistemology are first outlined:
(1) Traditional epistemology, which up to the last two or three decades
had dominated epistemological thought, can be characterized by the
following properties:
(a) It is a philosophical discipline.
(b) The way it reflects on 'scientific' inquiry presupposes certain a
priori assumptions concerning the nature of the criteria of ration
ality.
(c) It is normative, because on the basis of these criteria it evaluates
scientific knowledge as true or false, rational or irrational, justified
or not.
(d) It claims to be the only approach (i.e. 'first philosophy') which is
entitled to deal with the foundations of scientific knowledge.
(2) The main tenets of naturalized epistemologyare these:3
(a) Epistemology must not be aphilosophical discipline, but it should
apply 'scientific' methods.
(b) Accordingly, epistemology should proceed in an a posteriori man
ner.
(c) Epistemology is not a normative enterprise and its task is not to
evaluate the results of scientific inquiry but rather, it should strive
to describe and/or explain them.4
As a first approximation, the relationship between (1) and (2) can be statedas follows:
(3) (a) Naturalized epistemology claims to solve or to eliminate the prob
lems which traditional epistemology tackled on the basis of its
philosophical, normative, a priori foundations, by using the a pos
teriori, non-normative methods of 'science' itself,
(b) Accordingly, traditional epistemology should be 'replaced9 by nat
uralized
epistemology.
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ON THEDE-NATURALIZATION F EPISTEMOLOGY 271
Nevertheless, so as to avoid misrepresenting the situation, this very sim
plified picture should be exposed to an at least twofold differentiation. On
the one hand we should ask the question as to what ismeant by 'science'in (3)(a) that is, what should replace traditional epistemology. On the other
hand, it is anything but clear what itmeans to say that 'science', whatever it
may be, should 'replace' traditional epistemology as formulated in (3)(b).
Quine, in his seminal paper (Quine 1969a), seems to hold the view that
'science' should be interpreted in the sense of natural science:
"[...] epistemology,or
something like it, simply falls into placeas a
chapter of psychology
and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., aphysical human
subject." (Quine 1969a: 82-83; emphasis added.)
Accordingly, we obtain the following explication of (3)(a):
(4) (a) Naturalized epistemology claims to solve or to eliminate the prob
lems which traditional epistemology tackled on the basis of its
philosophical, normative, a priori foundations, by using the a pos
teriori, non-normative methods of natural science.
However, as Haack (1993) showed, Quine is inclined to allow a con
siderably weaker interpretion as well according to which 'science' must
not be restricted to 'natural science' but should involve any kind of inquiry
such as the social sciences, history, linguistics or even mathematics. See
for example the following illustrative quotation:
"What reality is like is the business of scientists, in the broadest sense, painstakingly to
surmise; and what there is, what is real, is part of that question. [...] The last arbiter is
so-called scientific method, however amorphous [...]. (Quine 1960: 22)
Haack denotes this secondintrepretation by
SCIENCE(Haack
1993:
339) which I shall adopt.5 Thus we receive the second explication of (3)(a)
(5) (a) Naturalized epistemology claims to solve or to eliminate the prob
lems which traditional epistemology tackled on the basis of its
philosophical, normative, a priori foundations, by using the a pos
teriori, non-normative methods of SCIENCE.
I shall label the viewrepresented by (4)(a) 'strong
naturalism' and the
one put in (5)(a) 'weak naturalism'.
What possibilities are there to render the term 'replace' in (3)(b)? The
answer that presents itself first is that traditional epistemology should be
eliminated completely. In this way Quine's famous claim according to
which "epistemology is only science self-applied" (Quine 1969b: 293)
means that traditional epistemology should be radically discarded and its
tasks should be carried out completely by 'science' (whatever the latter
means).Thus we obtain the
following explicationof
(3)(b):
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272 ANDR?S KERT?SZ
(6) (b) Traditional epistemology should be replaced completely.
However, Quine's writings are ambiguous with respect to the replace
ment of traditional epistemology as well: in particular, he also assumes
the continuity of 'science' (in whatever sense) and philosophy (see also
Haack 1993). Accordingly, the second interpretation of 'replace' is the
following:
(7) (b) Traditional epistemology should not be replaced completely.
Consequently, we obtain two versions of strong naturalism depending
on whether (4)(a) is combined with (6)(b) or (7)(b). Let me call stronginaturalism the set of theses {(4)(a), (6)(b)} and strong2 naturalism the set
{(4)(a), (7)(b)}.The two versions of weak naturalism present themselves in an analog
ous manner. If we combine (5)(a) with (6)(b), we get weak\ naturalism',
and ifwe combine (5)(a) with (7)(b), the result is 'weak2 naturalism'. This
very simple typologycan be summarized in Figure 1.
Versions of Parameter 1 : Paramater 2:
naturalism natural science as the only source complete replacement of
of naturalized epistemology traditional epistemology
strongi +
strong2 +
weakj-
+
weak2
Figure 1
Now, many arguments have been put forward against the assumptions
which we have just labelled strong naturalism and thus characterized. Due
to these well-known arguments, there seems to be considerable agreementon the untenability of strong naturalism.6 Their main effect is that they
question the plausibility of the value "+" of parameter 1 in Figure 1. Ac
cordingly, in the light of the literature, it is plausible to discard both strong
versions7 regardless of the value of parameter 2.
Since the arguments mentioned undermine value "+" of parameter 1,
they do not apply toweak naturalism. Accordingly, at present it seems to be
the case that the two weak versions of naturalism can be maintained. That
is, one of the main properties of naturalism is that it is SCIENTIFIC the
ories which may be the sources of the methods to be applied on the meta
scientific level for analyzing the nature of scientific knowledge. Therefore,
what ismissing is a careful evaluation of weak naturalism.
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ON THE DE-NATURALIZATION F EPISTEMOLOGY273
In order to carry out this task, in the next section I shall try to show that
weaki naturalism leads to a difficulty whose consequences are not less
destructive than those of the strong versions and that the only remainingalternative isweaki naturalism. Accordingly, the following considerations
will focus on the value of parameter 2: I shall discuss the consequences
of the claim that traditional epistemology should be replaced by SCI
ENTIFIC approaches completely. As we have seen, the arguments which
Quine puts forward in favour of the complete replacement of traditional
epistemology and which result in the "+" value of parameter 2 apply-
due to the ambiguity of his use of the term 'science'-
both to strong i and
weaki naturalism. However, we have already discarded both strong ver
sions; that is, strongi naturalism as well. Thus it follows that, although our
conclusions will have to be inferred from the premises Quine formulated,
they should be relativized to weaki naturalism in spite of the fact that they
apply to the strongi version as well.
3. THE PARADOX OF NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY
Quine's starting point is that
"Epistemology is concerned with the foundations of science." (Quine 1969a: 69; emphasis
added)
Accordingly, the central task of traditional epistemology is to show how
the certainity of the foundations of scientific knowledge can be maintained.
This means that the traditional epistemologist has to face the sceptic. Scep
tical arguments do not aim at showing that scientific claims are false but
they try to prove that one cannot know with certainty that they are not false.
Thus it is the rejection of sceptical arguments and the maintenance of the
certainty of scientific knowledge which traditional epistemology should be
primarily concerned with.
However, inQuine's view traditional epistemology failed exactly in this
respect: it could not refute the sceptic and will never be able to do so. He
supports this conclusion by referring to Hume's problem of induction:
'What then of [...] the justification of our knowledge of truths about nature? Here, Hume
despaired. [...] I do not see that we are farther along today than where Hume left us. The
Humean predicament is the human predicament." (Quine 1969a: 72; emphasis added)
What follows from this "desperate" situation is, according to Quine,
the untenability of traditional epistemology: the impossibility of justifica
tion of scientific knowledge, the impossibility of a "first philosophy", the
hopelessness of any attempt to validate the methods of scientific inquiry
on a philosophical basis. Consequently, even if epistemology is not to
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274 ANDR?S KERT?SZ
be given up entirely, it should be given up as a philosophical enterprise.
Traditional epistemology should, therefore, be 'replaced' by 'science' and
its task must not be justification, but rather, explanation of the nature and
origin of what is considered to be scientific knowledge by using 'scientific'
methods.
However, the argument which Quine puts forward in order to prove this
conclusion is of exactly the same philosophical nature which character
izes both scepticism and traditional epistemology. In particular, it rests on
the premise that Hume's thesis is basically correct and that accordingly,
induction cannot be justified. But Hume's thesis can neither be proved nor
falsified by 'scientific' means: the problem of induction is the paradigmatic
example of a philosophical quandary which is rooted in the assumption
that the justification of claims which one obtains making use of a certain
method, like induction, is important for our understanding of scientific
knowledge. Quine did not analyze this premise by 'scientific' means -
rather, he analyzed it philosophically. He didn't refer to any empirical
evidence which could support the claim that the consequences of Hume's
thesis can be avoided if epistemology is naturalized. As D. Shatz put it in a
very compelling way, his argument is simply "the argument from despair"
(Shatz 1993: 117). This means that Quine argues for the replacement of tra
ditional epistemology in the same way inwhich traditional epistemology is
used to argue. Consequently, his conclusion that traditional epistemology
should be discarded is valid exactly as long as traditional epistemology
exists. As can be easily seen, this boils down to a fundamental problem
which I shall call the paradox of naturalized epistemology'}
(8) Traditional epistemology can be 'replaced' by 'science' if the former
cannot be 'replaced' by the latter.
The construction of paradoxes is atypical sceptical strategy. Therefore,
Quine's attempt to defeat scepticism itself yieldsa rather strong argument
for scepticism and thus against his own programme of naturalized epistem
ology. The consequences of this paradox are, of course, fatal, for it renders
the elaboration of those versions of naturalized epistemology impossible
which presuppose the complete 'replacement' of traditional epistemology:
thus weaki naturalism as well. Therefore, what we have to show now is
how weak2 naturalism may provide a solution for the paradox.9
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ON THEDE-NATURALIZATION F EPISTEMOLOGY 275
4. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE PARADOX
4.1. The Heuristics of Reflexive Naturalism
The solution may rest on an observation of the way classic paradoxes
have been resolved. Tarski's and Russell's paradoxes and also others were
solved by the application of a two-step process. In the first step the domain
of the paradox which at the time of its formulation seemed to be unified
and undifferentiated was subdivided according to reasonable criteria into
certain subdomains: for instance, in the case of Tarski's paradox 'language'
was subdivided intoobject-
andmetalanguage,
and Russell introduced a
differentiation between sets of certain types. Then, in a second step, itwas
decided under what circumstances certain problematic categories which
wereoriginally responsible for the paradox at issue could be mapped onto
these subdomains, and in which cases such amapping is blocked. Accord
ingly, Tarski suggested that the category 'truth' must not appear in the
objectlanguage but rather, must be part of the metalanguage; and Russell
maintained that sets must not be their own elements or elements of sets of a
lower type. This mechanism consists in first making some differentiations,and then blocking certain mappings onto some of the subdomains differ
entiated in this way. The fact that such a techniquewas successfully used
for the resolution of classic paradoxes suggests that we should proceed in
an analogous way.10
The domain in which the paradox of naturalized epistemology arose is
'scientific' knowledge. Thus the first question to be answered is, according
to what criteria this domain may be subdivided. The simplest answer is to
suggest a vertical and a horizontal subdivision. Vertically we obtain at least
two levels, namely that of objectscientific knowledge and of metascientific
knowledge. Since any kind of 'scientific' knowledge is usually manifested
in theories,11 a horizontal subdivision will yield a series of theories on both
levels, i.e. objectscientific and metascientific theories.
All this may seem trivial; but if we go on to carry out the second step,
we may arrive at less trivial conclusions.
In particular, there may be many different relations between the the
ories we thus received. However, there seem to be three main groups of
relations which are relevant. They are rooted in Quine's idea of "science
self-applied" (Quine 1969b: 293) which I shall reconstruct here as the
thesis of reflexivity:
(9) The thesis of reflexivity: An approach to naturalized epistemology is
a theory developed on the objectscientific level which has been trans
ferred to the metascientific one so as to describe and/or explain ob
jectscientifictheories.
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276 ANDR?S KERT?SZ
I shall call the results of this procedure metatheories. Now, how can, on
the background of this basic thesis, the three groups of relations mentioned
be characterized and which mappings between them are to be blocked inwhich cases?
The first class includes relations between certain objectscientific the
ories and the very metatheories which we obtain by projecting the former
on the metascientific level. For example, from an objectscientific theory
Oi we get a metascientific theory MOi, that is, Oi->MOi; analogously,
02->M02 or 03->M03, and in general, On-^MOn. This class of rela
tions, whose elements will be denoted by "-V, I shall call the class of
naturalization-relations, because they exhibit the very idea according to
which naturalized theories of 'scientific' knowledge come into being. Of
course, not every objectscientific theory Oi can be transformed into a
metascientific theory MOi; for example, as recent debates show, there
are serious doubts whether computational approaches to 'scientific' know
ledge which are rooted in AI-research are workable.12 Therefore, it is
important to reveal under what circumstances the relation "->" is allowed
and under what conditions it has to be blocked.
The second class of relations rests on the fact that ametascientific the
ory established on the basis of the naturalization-relation serves to analyze
objectscientific knowledge. That is, it has to be applied to the investigation
of objectscientific theories, and the expected result of such anapplica
tion is the description and/or explanation of the way in which a particular
objectscientific theory works. Therefore, the class of relations between a
metascientific theory MOn and its object of investigation, which is an ob
jectscientific theory Oi,will be called the
application-relationand denoted
by MOn=tOi. There are many possible elements of this class imaginable;
for example, itmay be defined as A={MOi=tOi, MOi=t02, MOi=?03,
M03=}03, M03=40i, M03=t02 etc.}. When is the application-relation
blocked? Let us assume, for example, that Oi and O2 are objectscientific
theories. Let us also assume that Oi and O2 contradict each other along the
lines of Quine's thesis of the underdetermination of empirical theories by
evidence. Then, surely, though naturalization-relations like Oi-*MOi and
O2?^M02are
possible, neither of the application-relations MOi=302 andM02=?Oi is permitted, because both the meta- and the objecttheory make
empirical claims, and since they are incompatible they cannot do this sim
ultaneously without rendering the metascientific enterprise inconsistent.
As opposed to this, it is possible to apply MOi to Oi. Indeed, this kind of
self-application realizes one of the main aspects of naturalism: naturalized
epistemology is what Quine labelled as "science self-applied".
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ON THEDE-NATURALIZATION F EPISTEMOLOGY 277
Finally, the third class of relations results from the fact that a certain
problem Pi raised in a theory Oi belonging to a subdiscipline Di may be
solved by using information borrowed from a theory O2 belonging to a sub
discipline D2.1 shall call this relation between Oi and O2 constructivity:
O2 is constructive with respect to Oi because it contributes to the construc
tion of somethingnew in Oi, i.e the solution of problems. However, if we
transfer theories to the metascientific level according to the naturalization
relation, we get a special and very interesting subclass of constructivity
relations: since a metatheory MOn may investigate an objecttheory Om, a
constructive interaction is possible not only between theories belonging to
the same level, but also between those of different levels that is between
MOn and Om. Accordingly,ametatheory may be constructive with respect
to an objecttheory and this means that metascientific reflexion may con
tribute to the solution of objectscientific problems. In general the class of
the constructivity-relations may be illustrated as follows: K={{Oi?>02,
02?*03, Oi^03}, {MOi?*M03}, {MOi-MDi, MOi-M32, MO1-O3,
M03-^03, M03-^02, M03-^Oi}} where the symbol "?>" stands for
any kind of
level-preserving constructivity irrespective
of its direction and
"-^" denotes metascientific constructivity with respect to objectscientific
problem solutions. The crucial question is, of course, when the constructiv
ity relation is blocked. For example, it is straightforward that the relation
"?^" is blocked whenever the relation "=3" is blocked: if Oi and O2 are
incompatible and therefore MOi=K)2 and M02=*Oi are not permitted,
then also MOi^02 and M02-^Oi are blocked.
Thus we have carried out both steps mentioned above: we delimited
certain subareas of 'scientific'knowledge by inferring these
three classes
from the basic properties of naturalized epistemology and we illustrated
by the help of examples in which cases the relations discussed may be
blocked. At first sight, it seems to be the case that this really leads to the
resolution of the paradox of naturalized epistemology. Namely, due to the
fact that all the relations enumerated may be blocked in certain cases and,
as the examples mentioned show, they even must be blocked sometimes,
there is no metatheory MO\ which has the right to claim general validity.
The scope of any naturalized metatheory is necessarily restricted: somemetatheories will serve this purpose and others that purpose. This leads to a
very liberal rendering of the 'replacement' thesis: traditional epistemology
may be 'replaced' by some theory On whenever the relations On-+MOn,
MOn=iOn, MOn-^On are not blocked. But when they are blocked, tradi
tional epistemology may be retained and applied. Thus, neither naturalized
nor traditional epistemology are exclusive. If we give up the exclusiveness
of naturalized epistemology, the paradox does not arise.
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278 ANDR?S KERT?SZ
Superficially, this seems to be a straightforward solution of the paradox,
indeed. But is it really a solution? Unfortunately, the answer is: no.
It is easy to see why. We have, in order to capture the relations men
tioned and to reveal which of them are blocked in which cases, outlined a
set of statements about the relationship between object- and metatheories.
This relationship can, of course, be grasped only if this set of statements is
available, which, in turn, is nothing but ametametatheory itself- therefore,
there is no avoiding the same infinite regress which we have met earlier.
Consequently, the adoption of the technique used for the resolution of
classic paradoxes does not work with respect to the paradox of naturalized
epistemology.
The reason for the failure is obviously the fact that what we have been
after so far were metatheories-
as long as we want to develop theories
of 'scientific' knowledge, the very same difficulty will present itself. For
this reason we should look for something else-
something which does not
require the multiplication of levels on which the descriptions and explan
ations of the phenomena investigated are accessible. There exists such a
thing: namely,
heuristics. What are heuristics and how can
they
avoid the
infinite regress?
As a first approximation, heuristics are sets of very simple rules of
thumb which are used tofind the solution to problems. As is well-known,
algorithms also serve the same purpose. However, there is an essential dif
ference between heuristics and algorithms: whereas algorithms lead to the
solution of the given problem with certainty, heuristics do not guarantee
that the solution isfound. The only thing heuristics can do is to provide
provisionally a strategy, a toolor
a trickor an
idea or anything like thatwhich, among local conditions, possibly but not necessarily may result in
a solution.
Our claim is that if we aim at developing metascientific heuristics in
stead of looking for aparticular metascientific theory, then no infinite
regress emerges and also the paradox of naturalized epistemology can be
avoided. This claim is justified by the fact that heuristics, as just men
tioned, consist of rules. Rule following is, however, a practice. This means
that rules, unlike theories or sets of statements, work even ifwe are not in a
position to describe and/or explain them on the metalevel. Of course, they
may be described or explained; but this is no precondition for their applic
ation. We know this property of rules from the way language works: it is
only natural that one can use the rules of a language perfectly well without
being able to describe these rules. Therefore, if we identify naturalized
epistemology not with a particular metatheory but handle it as heuristics,
then we are not forced tomultiply the levels of description.
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ON THEDE-NATURALIZATION F EPISTEMOLOGY 279
Consequently, in addition to carrying out the two steps exemplified by
the resolution of classic paradoxes we have to develop metascientific heur
istics. This boils down straightforwardly to the fact that the three classesof relations we delimited above correspond to the steps of a metascientific
heuristics. I shall call this the heuristics of reflexive naturalism (which
will be referred to as (HRN)): these heuristics are both naturalistic and
reflexive, because they realize the idea of "science self-applied". So we
get the following simple heuristics:
(HRN) (a) Rule 1 (naturalization): An objectscientific theory Oi is trans
ferred to the metascientific level, the result of which is a 'nat
uralized' metascientific theory MOi. In which cases a given
objectscientific theory can be transferred in this way, and in
which cases it cannot, is a question which needs careful ana
lysis. On the basis of this analysis, one should decide whether,
and if so, to what extent the naturalization relation is to be
blocked.
(b) Rule 2 (application): As a result of the successful realization
of rule 1, the properties ofan
objectscientific theory On maybe described and/or explained by using MOi. On may but need
not be identical with Oi. Here again it is important to clarify
under what conditions MOi may be applied to a given On and
in the case of which On the application is blocked.13
(c) Rule 3 (constructivity): The successful realization of rule 2
yields metascientific knowledge of the nature of the object
scientific theory investigated (e.g. of On). This knowledge may
be used for the improvement of objectscientific research car
ried out within the frames of On itself. Just as in the case of
the first two rules, also here it is crucial to reveal the criteria
according to which MOi may contribute to the improvement
of research conducted inOn. For example, if (b) is blocked for
whatever reason, then (c) is blocked as well.
Accordingly, it seems to be the case that the main thing one has to do
to avoid theparadox
of naturalizedepistemology
isfollowing
the rules of
(HRN). Unfortunately, however, the situation is not as simple as it seems
tobe.
4.2. Realizations of (HRN)
Although (HRN) appears to have resolved the paradox, in this form it
is still too weak to serve as a workable tool for revealing the nature of
'scientific' inquiry. We have seen above that the reason why the heuristics
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280 ANDR?S KERT?SZ
proved to be useful in avoiding the fatal consequences of an infinite regress
was that it consisted of rules', however, from another point of view the
fact that the solution rests on such rules is responsible for its weakness.
In particular, no rule can exist per se; rules have a virtual existence and
therefore they are always coupled with some kind of manifestation. Again,
by analogy, we may say that justas rules of language are manifested in ut
terances, also (HRN) cannot exist without being realized somehow. Since
scientific heuristics normally manifest themselves in scientific theories, it
is straightforward to assume that metascientific theories are manifestations
of(HRN).
Thisis,
ofcourse,
not tosay
that(HRN)
should beidentified
with
a metascientific theory, just as we must not think that rules of language are
identical with the utterances they govern. The only thing we have to admit
is that (HRN) cannot work per se, rather, itmust be supplemented by the
very metascientific theories which itmanifests itself in.
Another point results from Quine's thesis of the underdetermination
of theories by evidence (see e.g Quine 1975). In a simplified manner, the
thesis says that on the basis of the sameempirical evidence, it will always
be possible to develop different theories capturing this evidence but incom
patible with each other. Consequently, the decision between these theories
cannot rest onempirical data themselves. If naturalized metatheories are
nothing but empirical theories transferred to the metascientific level, then
the metatheories which come into being in this way are underdetermined
by experience to the same extent as the objectscientific theories which they
are rooted in. The result is that we have to do with a plurality of metathe
ories which (i)may be generated by (HRN), (ii)may be incompatiblewith
each other, (iii) may capture the same evidence, i.e. certain data concerning
the nature of scientific inquiry.14
Accordingly, the task which one has to carry out is this:
(a) Firstly, one should find a set of objectscientific theories which, in the
sense of (HRN)(a) can be transferred to the metascientific level; according
to (HRN)(b) are capable of being applied to the description and/or explan
ation of certain aspects of scientific knowledge; and, due to (HRN)(c), may
contribute to the furthering of objectscientific inquiry-
in sum, which are
possible realizations of the heuristics of reflexive naturalism.15
(b) Secondly, if such a set of metatheories is given which may be in
compatible with each other but which are compatible with (HRN), one has
to look for further considerations so as to select the very metatheory which
is suitable for the solution of the particular metascientific problems which
have been raised. Which one chooses is, therefore, not amatter of general
decisions, but depends solelyon the particular tasks and purposes which a
given metatheory has to serve.16
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ON THEDE-NATURALIZATION F EPISTEMOLOGY 281
5. CONCLUSIONS
Our task has been to put forward a possible solution to (P) by arguing forthe thesis (T). Our preliminary result is this:
(T)(a). A brief analysis of the state of the art led to a very simple sys
tematization of current approaches to naturalized epistemology. The two
strong versions which were defined turned out to be untenable right at the
outset. Therefore, the question was: which of the two remaining versions,
namely, weaki and weak2, should be accepted?
Quine's thesis according to which traditional epistemology ought to be
given up completely applies to weaki naturalism as well. Since this thesis
was motivated by the problem of scepticism, first we had to find out to
what extent weaki naturalism could avoid those traps which traditional
epistemology was not able to. The result was definitively negative, because
we showed that Quine's antisceptical argumentation itself yielded a scep
tical paradox which we called the paradox of naturalized epistemology.
Thus we could not avoid drawing the conclusion that itwas not only the
two strong versions that had to be discarded but also weaki naturalism that
led to a problem without whose solution the programme of naturalized
epistemology seemed to be unrealistic. In this way we have shown the
plausibility of(T)(a).
(T)(b). Thus our next task was to find a possible solution to the paradox
mentioned. As astarting point, we tried tomake use of a pattern accord
ing to which certain classic paradoxes had been solved, but this attempt
was not successful. In particular, it turned out that as long as we want to
construct 'theories' on the metascientific level, the
argumention
will result
in an infinite regress. However, it is possible to avoid this regress if we do
not aim at developing naturalized theories of scientific inquiry, but rather,
a kind of heuristics which we called the heuristics of reflexive naturalism.
The reason why the regress did not necessarily arise was that heuristics are
rules, and that rules need not be captured on a higher meta-level in order
to be followed. Consequently, (T)(b) has been shown.
(T)(c). The argumentation which yielded (T)(b) rested on two theses.
The first one was the thesis of reflexivity (see (9)) which summarized thebasic idea of any approach to naturalized epistemology. The second thesis
was an assumption specific to our solution of the paradox; it can be stated
in this way:
(10) The thesis of heuristics: A naturalized metatheory is the realization of
the heuristics of reflexive naturalism.
In what follows, I shall call the approach which accepts (9) and (10)
reflexive-heuristicnaturalism.
Now,the
questionarises as to which extent
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282 ANDR?S KERT?SZ
these two main theses of our approach lead to the maintenance of the
intended weak2 version of naturalized epistemology.
(i) Since,as we have
seen,heuristics do not solve
necessarilythe
problems which they tackle, the application of metascientific heuristics does not
necessarily result in the development of metatheories which are capable
of working in the expected way. Therefore, one central feature of our ap
proach is itsfallibilism according towhich the uncertainly, the local nature
and the restricted scope of any metatheory compatible with the heuristics
of reflexive naturalism has to be acknowledged.
(ii) From the fact that our approach to naturalized epistemology is con
ceived of as a special kind of heuristics it follows, as we have seen inthe preceding section as well, that it can manifest itself inmany different
metatheories which are incompatible with each other. Thus this approach
is inherently pluralistic.
(iii) Last but not least our approach is relativistic, because we have
emphasized that one may choose from among the metatheories compatible
with the heuristics of reflexive-naturalism on the basis of the problems,
aims, conditions etc. given.
These three properties of our approach are compatible with weak2 na
turalism.17 In particular, they inevitably lead to the conclusion that tradi
tional epistemology and 'SCIENCE self-applied' within the scope of the
heuristics of reflexive naturalism may coexist. However, this coexistence
can be interpreted only in a way which says that, although traditional
epistemology remains, its scope will be changed in at least two respects.
Firstly, itwill be narrowed, because certain tasks which it carried out in the
past will be tackled by the 'naturalized' metatheories which the heuristics
of reflexive naturalism generates. Secondly, in accordance with this, tradi
tional epistemology is not located on the meta-level immediately following
objectscientific inquiry, but rather, one lever higher. In between there is
a new level: in particular, that of reflexive-heuristic naturalism.18 So, the
following hypothesis presents itself:
(11) There is a level of metascientific reflexion
(a) which is located between objectscientific inquiry and traditional
epistemology, and
(b) which can be identified with reflexive-heuristic naturalism.
Thus, (T)(c) seems to be plausible as well. However, the far-reaching
consequences of (11) cannot be overlooked. Therefore, let me indicate
briefly some of the unsolved problems itmay give rise to.
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ON THEDE-NATURALIZATION F EPISTEMOLOGY 283
6. OPEN QUESTIONS
6.1. Normativity
One of the central problems of naturalized epistemology is the question as
to what extent it can dispense with the normative aspect of metascientific
reflexion. Although this question has been widely discussed and there is
an immense literature devoted to it, the main tendency seems to be clear:
Quine's intention of elaborating a non-normative approach to epistemo
logy (see also (2)(c)) is untenable, and there is noepistemology without a
normativecomponent.
However, if this is so, the next question is, in what sense reflexive
heuristic naturalism may be normative. As an answer, the following argu
mentation presents itself (see also Itkonen 1999):
(a) The solution of the paradox of naturalized epistemology rests on the
constitutive properties of heuristics.
(b) By definition, heuristics consist of rules.
(c) By definition, these rules are normative.
Therefore:
(d) Heuristics are normative
Therefore:
(e) Our solution of the paradox is normative as well.
Accordingly, the really interesting question is not whether reflexive
heuristric naturalism is normative, because it goes without saying that it is.
The really interesting problem is the relationship between (i) this kind of
normativity resulting from the nature of heuristics, (ii) the normativity of
traditional epistemology and (ii) the possible normativity of the very meta
theories which the heuristics manifests itself in within the mechanisms of
reflexive-heuristic naturalism. This is a problem which, on the one hand,
needs careful consideration, but on the other hand shows once again that
the original tenets of naturalism are anything but straightforward.
6.2. Hermeneutics
An extremely problematic consequence of the present states of affairs con
cerning naturalism is connected to hermeneutics. Let us turn to Quine,
again:
"Naturalism does not repudiate epistemology, but assimilates it to empirical psychology.
Science itself tells us that our information about the world is limited to irritations of our
surfaces, and then the epistemological question is in turn a question within science [...]".
(Quine1981:
72; emphasis added)
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284 ANDR?S KERT?SZ
The quotation focuses on two aspects. According to the first, the main
source of metascientific theories is empirical psychology. The second says
that psychology is part of natural science and that, consequently, metascience should be treated as a natural science as well. However, the inter
esting thing is that though Quine's idea of naturalizing epistemology gave
rise to remarkable new developments, these developments differ consider
ably from what Quine had presumably inmind. Firstly, as we have already
seen, it is not only the natural sciences that may be used for the construc
tion of 'naturalized' metatheories. Secondly, and this is what we have to
discuss now, in fact it was not empirical, behaviouristic psychology, but
rather, cognitive psychology in particular and cognitive science in gen
eral which to a considerable extent, though not exclusively, are expected
to yield approaches to naturalized epistemology.19 As a result, the idea
of a 'cognitive science of science' emerges as the possible manifestation
of the programme of naturalized epistemology. Downes (1993: 453-454)
characterizes this situaton as follows:
"Much recent naturalized philosophy of science can be characterized ascognitive sci
ence of science. Cognitive scientists of science apply techniques from the cognitive sci
ences to issues previously examined by the philosophy of science, for example, theory
change, theory evaluation, the nature of scientific theories, and scientific discovery. In
general, cognitive-science-of-science researchers set their work apart from more tradi
tional approaches to philosophy of science such aslogical empiricism. They are naturalists
who hold that empirical results from current sciences, particularly, the cognitive sciences,
should inform and constrain philosophical theories. Some further suggest thatphilosophyshould be abandoned and replaced by
aparticular science, or some suggest that cognitive
science of science should replace philosophy of science."20
This state of affairs affects reflexive-heuristic naturalism aswell,
be
cause cognitive science is one of the major sources of possible metatheor
ies which reflexive-heuristic naturalism may manifest itself in.21 However,
cognitive science is an extremely heterogeneous set of approaches.22 As
an extreme case, certain cognitive scientists, for example, even go as far as
tomaintain that the whole of cognitive science is a basically hermeneutic
enterprise:
"[...] cognitive science is itselfa human interpretative science (that is, a hermeneutic
science) so that what we have said about hermeneutics should apply to it also." (Arbib
& Hesse 1986: 182; emphasis added, A.K.))
"[...] we would argue for a continuity between natural and hermeneutic science based on
the fact that they both have the same domain of objects (namely, bodies, including persons'
bodies) carrying their properties around in space and time." (Arbib & Hesse 1986: 183;
emphasis added, A.K.)
The potential hermeneutic nature of cognitive science doesn't result
from its
diversity,
and the
properties
of its
subject
matter
only,
but also
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ON THEDE-NATURALIZATION F EPISTEMOLOGY 285
from its constitutive reflexivity which defines it as a possible source of
metatheories connected to reflexive-heuristic naturalism right at the outset:
"[...] cognitive science is essentially self-reflective; that is, itmust subject its own method
ologyto its own critique. In the course of doing this, cognitive science has broken with the
notion of 'scientific method' aspurely empiricist and positivist. For example,
we look at the
contributions of Piaget [...] and Freud [...] to the understanding of the cognitive, and also
find parallels within cognitive science for the theory of interpretation,or hermeneutics."
(Arbib& Hesse 1986: 12; emphasis added)
The perspective that cognitive science, as one of the main possible
manifestations of reflexive-heuristic naturalism, may definitively be con
ceived of as a hermeneutic activity raises the problem whether it is possibleat all to consider those metascientific investigations which it yields as -
in
whatever sense - a posteriori. Namely, if (a) cognitive science may be of
a hermeneutic nature; (b) hermeneutic disciplines are, by definition, not a
posteriori; and (c) the subtheories of cognitive science may also be seen as
potential manifestations of the heuristics of reflexive naturalism; then the
answer is explicitly 'no'. Therefore, there is no avoiding the question what
it is that remains from the programme of naturalism.
7. SUMMARY
Our task has been to solve the problem (P) by arguing for thesis (T). In
doing so we put forward an approach which we called reflexive-heuristic
naturalism. This approach, however, presupposed the assumption that two
main aspects of Quine's naturalism (namely, the complete replacement of
traditional epistemology and its replacement by natural science) had to be
given up. As a result, we maintained that reflexive-heuristic naturalism and
traditional epistemology can coexist in a specific way indicated in (11).
Reflexive-heuristic naturalism, however, is, as the examples mentioned
in section 6 have witnessed, still susceptible to serious unsolved prob
lems concerning basic concepts and assumptions. Therefore, there is no
avoiding the conclusion that, on the one hand, the elaboration of reflexive
heuristic naturalism itselfgrew
out of thenecessity
ofde-naturalising epi
stemology; but on the other hand, the problems it leaves open seem to
strengthen this need decisevely. Whether reflexive-heuristic naturalism is
an idea which may be conceived of as a workable attempt to reconcile
the seemingly antagonistic processes of naturalising and de-naturalising
epistemology, is a question that must be asked but cannot be answered at
this point.
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286 ANDR?S KERT?SZ
NOTES
1
My researchwhich thepresent paperrests on
has been supported byOTKA
T34662.2To indicate this I shall put relevant terms used in a preexplicative way within single
quotation marks.
3 It is questionable whether it is justified to characterize naturalized epistemology by a
well-defined set of theses. Althought the situation is very complicated and there have been
many attempts to classify current trends, for the sake of argument in this paper we shall
draw a simplified picture. For more sophisticated discussions of current naturalized epi
stemology see e.g. Almeder (1990),Maffie (1990,1995), Kornblith (1985), Kitcher (1992),
Koppelberg (1996) etc. Moreover, the list of theses characterizing naturalized epistemology
doesn't contain (2)(d) which would decide whether naturalized epistemology is pluralisticor not. However, in section 4.2. we shall give
aspecific
answer to this question.4
See also section 6.1. for a short discussion of the problem of normativity.5
In what follows SCIENCE will stand for this sense, science for natural science and
'science' will indicate that the term is used in anunspecified way.
6These arguments apply predominantly to the scientism, dogmatism and one-sidednes of
naturalized epistemologyas discussed e.g. in Davidson and Hintikka (1969), Hahn and
Shilp (1986), Haack (1993), Maffie (1995) etc.7
For lack of space it is not possible to review these arguments here in detail.
8The term 'paradox' is not meant in a
strictly logical sense (that is A if and only ifnot-A),
but rather, in a wider epistemological sense according to which it is a problem leading to
inconsistent consequences.9
Let us remember that the versions weakj and strongj share the property of fixing the
parameter 2 at the value '+'. Since we have already rejected both strong versions on the
basis of arguments concerning the value of parameter 1, in the present context it is sufficient
to interpret (8) as the refutation of weak i naturalism although the argument just put forward
applies to strongi naturalism as well.
10The argument that follows rests on an
analogical inference of the following type:
Premisses:
(1) The paradox of naturalized epistemology is similar to classic paradoxes.
(2) Classic paradoxes can be solved by firstly, subdividing the domain in which the para
dox arose into subdomains and secondly, blocking certain relations between these
subdomains.
Conclusion:
The paradox of naturalized epistemologycan be solved by firstly, subdividing the
domain in which the paradox arose into subdomains and secondly, blocking certain
relations between these subdomains.
Nevertheless, the analogy indicated in premise (1) is a weak one: while the paradoxes of
Tarski and Russell have the logical structure 'A if and only if not-A', the paradox of nat
uralism, as already mentioned, has the structure 'A ifnot-A'. Accordingly, the probability
of the truth of the conclusion is smaller than if the two paradoxes had the same logical
structure. This may be one of the reasonswhy
- as we shall see-
in our case the pattern of
classic solutions to paradoxes will not work.
11But not only in theories, of course. It would be more
appropriate to handle the results
of the horizontal subdivision asunspecified 'units' which may be theories, or models, or
explanations,or methods and the like.
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ON THEDE-NATURALIZATION F EPISTEMOLOGY 287
12See, for example, thedebate inSocial Studies of Science 19(1989)-22(1992) andKert?sz
(1993) as an evaluation of thisdebate.13For example, Kert?sz (1991) and (1995) tried to develop approaches to the cognitivescience of science. In Kert?sz (1995) it has been shown that in the course of rule 2 a
'modular' metatheory must not be applied to the description and/or explanation of objects
cientific theories belonging to the 'holistic' tradition and vice versa.
14Again, the analogy to the rules of language presents itself. Itmay be, of course, the case
that the same rules underly utterances which areincompatible with each other but which
refer to the same states of affairs.
15This means thaton the one hand (HRN) is so general that itmay bemanifested inmany
different metatheories, even if these are inconsistent with each other. On the other hand, it
is so restrictive that it allows only those metatheoretical approaches which are conceived
of as its possible manifestations.16
See also footnote 3.
17These three properties of reflexive-heuristic naturalism are highly problematic, of course,
because they may yield far-reaching epistemological consequences. However, the question
as to what extent and in what way their scope may be restrected can be answered only with
respect to the particular metatheories which the heuristics manifests itself in. Therefore,
amajor task will be the relativization of this problem to the metatheories at issue and
the exploration of particular ways to its solution which may differ from metatheory to
metatheory.18
I amgrateful
toMarta Feh?r forcalling my
attention to thisinsight.19
With respect to the current state of affairs in the general philosophy of science, another
candidate is the sociology of knowledge. The problem whether cognitive and sociological
approachesare
antagonistic and, if not, to what extent their integration within the pro
gramme of naturalism is possible is one of the central issues being discussed. See e.g.
Kert?sz (1993) for an analysis of their relationship.20
A careful distinction between naturalized epistemology and naturalized philosophy of
science would be beside the point in the present context.
21For case studies supporting this assumption
see Kert?sz (1995).22
See Eckardt (1993) on the question whether and if so to what extent cognitive science
may be called adiscipline.
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University of Debrecen
Pf.47
H-4010 Debrecen
(akertesz @ fox.klte.hu)