Post on 06-Jul-2018
Mood-congruent perceptions of success depend on
self-other framing
Brian Detweiler-Bedell and Jerusha B. Detweiler-Bedell
Lewis and Clark College, Portland, OR, USA
Peter Salovey
Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Research on self-other framing suggests that self-judgements typically neglectinformation about others and instead use an ambiguous intrapersonal standard,making these judgements susceptible to the influence of mood as predicted by theaffect infusion model (Forgas, 1995). Two experiments tested the hypothesis thatmood-congruent judgements of personal success occur when these judgements areframed to maintain self-focus but are eliminated when participants first focus onother individuals. In Experiment 1, self-other framing moderated the influence ofmood on perceived success for an ambiguous object identification task. Happyparticipants reported greater perceived success, compared to sad participants, afterjudging their own success relative to others (self-focused frame) but not after directlyjudging the success of others (other-focused frame). Experiment 2 replicated theseresults with students' perceptions of their academic success. These findings suggestthat the open, constructive processing accompanyingmost self-judgements is criticalin producing mood-congruent perceptions of personal success.
Mood-congruent judgement is a pervasive, robust phenomenon. More often than
not, self-perceptions and social thinking reflect the valence of a person's mood
(for reviews, see Bower & Forgas, 2000; Forgas & Vargas, 2000; Sedikides,
1992). Positive moods tend to bring about more optimistic thinking and per-
ceptions, whereas negative moods occasion pessimism. Research suggests that
the emotions of everyday life continuously shape our thinking and behaviour,
Correspondence should be addressed to Brian Detweiler-Bedell, Lewis and Clark College,
Department of Psychology, Campus Box 16, 0615 SW Palatine Hill Road, Portland, Oregon 97219,
USA; e-mail: bedell@lclark.edu
This research was part of the first author's doctoral dissertation and was supported by a Yale
University dissertation fellowship. We would like to thank David Pizarro, Diana Cordova, David
Armor, Geoffrey Cohen, Paul Bloom, Michael Barnes, and the members of Peter Salovey's Health,
Emotion, and Behavior Laboratory for their contribution to this research and comments on earlier
drafts.
# 2006 Psychology Press Ltd
http://www.psypress.com/cogemotion DOI:10.1080/02699930500294996
COGNITION AND EMOTION
2006, 20 (2), 196±216
often in ways that are subtle and go unnoticed. Sunshine bolsters ratings of life
satisfaction (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and is associated with higher daily stock
returns (Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003); finding a dime in a payphone leads
individuals to be more helpful to a stranger (Isen & Levin, 1972); and simply
holding a pen with one's teeth, which activates the musculature of a smile, is
enough to make a cartoon seem more amusing (Strack, Martin, & Stepper,
1988).
Contemporary theories of emotion offer many compelling accounts of mood-
congruent judgement. According to the ``affect-as-information'' view, emotion
serves as direct experiential feedback (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988). For
instance, a positive mood is experienced as success, which produces more
optimistic judgements even when the source of the mood is unrelated to the
judgement. Alternatively, the cognitive priming view suggests that emotion first
brings similarly valenced memories and concepts to mind; the increased salience
of this one-sided emotional information then shapes the outcome of a judgement
(Bower, 1981; Bower & Forgas, 2000). For instance, a positive mood might
prime memories of one's past accomplishments, leading to more favourable
self-perceptions. Forgas (1995, 2002a) has reconciled the affect-as-information
and priming views with his ``affect infusion model'' (AIM). The AIM proposes
that mood-congruent judgement depends on open, constructive information
processing and occurs through two distinct pathways: through the use of affect
as experiential feedback when information processing is heuristic, and through
cognitive priming when information processing is more substantive. That is,
mood serves alternatively as a simple decision-rule for relatively snap judge-
ments or as a powerful prime of related cognitions for judgements requiring
more effortful processing.
Forgas' synthesis of the affect-as-information and cognitive priming views
illustrates the field's current, more nuanced understanding of mood-congruent
judgement. Still, Forgas (2002b) acknowledges that the field is quite young and,
as a result, most theories of emotion tend to be ``rather nonspecific about the
precise psychological mechanisms responsible for affect congruence'' (p. 92).
To inform our understanding of these mechanisms, it is important to know when
mood-congruent judgement occurs and to have a clear sense of its boundary
conditions. Mayer and colleagues have demonstrated that mood-congruent
judgement generalises across a large variety of natural mood states, judgement
tasks, and participant characteristics (Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans,
1992). They conclude that mood-congruence has few, if any, boundary condi-
tions and appears to result from a pervading, low level cognitive process.
However, Forgas' AIM specifies one clear requirement of mood-congruent
judgement: It should occur only when judgements are open (i.e., ambiguous) and
information processing is therefore constructive (Forgas, 1995, 2002a). What
boundary conditions does this requirement impose on mood-congruent
judgement? This question guided our current research.
MOOD EFFECTS DEPEND ON SELF-OTHER FRAMING 197
A recent review by Sedikides and Green (2001) pursued a similar question
concerning mood-congruent judgement and qualifications of the effect implied
by the AIM. Previously, Sedikides (1992) conducted a review emphasising,
along with Mayer et al. (1992), the robust, general nature of mood-congruent
judgement. However, research after 1992 suggests that mood-congruent jud-
gement is qualified in a number of important ways. For example, mood-
congruent self-perceptions appear to be limited to peripheral traits, which are
held with less certainty than central traits (Sedikides, 1995), and they are
observed most reliably among individuals with low self-esteem, who are less
certain of themselves and have less stable self-perceptions (Brown & Man-
kowski, 1993; Smith & Petty, 1995). In other words, the extent to which self-
perceptions are subject to affect infusion depends on the ambiguity of the par-
ticular self-conceptions as well as the ambiguity of the person's overall self-
concept. These qualifications are consistent with the AIM's contention that
mood-congruence will be observed only when examining open, constructive
judgements (Forgas, 1995, 2002a).
Our research further examines the influence of mood on judgements of one's
own efforts and prospects. Following Sedikides (1992), we emphasise the effect
of mood on self-perceptions because these effects can have a significant impact
on the individual's functioning and well-being. For example, negative moods
decrease expectancies for future success, apparently because negative moods
raise personal performance standards, making the prospect of a satisfying out-
come less likely (Cervone, Kopp, Schaumann, & Scott, 1994; Wright & Mis-
chel, 1982). Such a finding is of critical importance because perceptions and
expectancies of success have emerged as key factors in determining future
achievement; in fact, they may be more predictive of future success than
objective measures of past achievement insofar as expectancies mediate the
relationship between past and future efforts (Bandura, 1982; McAuley, Wraith,
& Duncan, 1991; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000).
To understand better the conditions under which mood is likely to influence
evaluations of the self, we found it helpful to consider more general findings
concerning biases in self-judgements. These findings suggest that self-
judgements may be more constructive, and therefore more susceptible to affect
infusion, when they are framed in a manner that maintains a focus on the self.
Biases in self-judgements
Individuals tend to be overly optimistic about their own prospects compared to
the prospects of others (Weinstein, 1980), and they generally believe that their
abilities and traits are above average (e.g., Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak,
& Vredenburg, 1995). These positivity biases are explained, in part, by a
motivation for self-enhancementÐpeople have a vested interest in protecting
and boosting their self-esteem (Brown & Taylor, 1986; Kunda, 1990). Still,
198 DETWEILER-BEDELL, DETWEILER-BEDELL, SALOVEY
motivated reasoning is only one source of bias in self-judgements. Cognitive
factors also play a role. In particular, information processing is limited and
inherently egocentric (see Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). In making judge-
ments about one's own abilities compared to the abilities of others, individuals
rely disproportionately (at times, almost exclusively) on self-relevant informa-
tion and thoughts about the self (e.g., Eiser, Pahl, & Prins, 2001; Kruger, 1999).
This is not surprising. The self corresponds to a much more elaborate and salient
knowledge structure than ``other people,'' and self-relevant information is
processed extremely efficiently (Markus & Sentis, 1982; Ross & Sicoly, 1979).
Still, the increased salience of the self can have intriguing consequences. For
example, egocentrism appears to be self-favouring only in less challenging
domains (Kruger, 1999). When a task is relatively easy, individuals apparently
focus on their own abilities and fail to consider that other individuals are likely
to share the same strengths. This leads to a perception of the self as above
average. In contrast, egocentrism works against self-enhancement in domains
considered to be universally difficult, such as playing chess, computer pro-
gramming, or juggling. When self-relevant information within a domain centres
on personal difficulties, individuals appear to focus on their failings without
recognising that others share these same weaknesses. In these cases, Kruger
(1999) has demonstrated a reliable ``below-average effect''.
How do individuals make comparative judgements between the self and
others if they rely almost exclusively on self-relevant information? What do they
use as a standard of comparison for these judgements? The answer to this puzzle
suggests a means through which mood may be able to shape self-perceptions.
When asked to compare the self to others, individuals appear to sidestep a true
comparison with others by adopting an intrapersonal standard for the judgement
(Eiser et al., 2001; Kruger, 1999). Lacking a normative standard (i.e., a clear
reference point provided by an explicit representation of a ``typical other''), the
comparative judgement becomes more open and ambiguous. The individual
must construct a subjective neutral point and then generate evidence relative to
this personal standard. This opens the judgement to sources of potential bias. For
example, the individual's subjective neutral point can be distorted by counter-
factual thinking (e.g., ``I could have done much worse''; Eiser et al., 2001).
Moreover, when individuals reflect on the distribution of their own positive and
negative experiences within a domain, they typically generate more evidence of
success, especially in domains that are less challenging or that are sufficiently
broad that they can be redefined to suit the individual's strengths (e.g., Alicke,
Vredenburg, Hiatt, & Govorun, 2001; Klein & Kunda, 1993; Kruger, 1999;
Parducci, 1984).
Using an ambiguous intrapersonal standard to make a comparative judgement
between the self and others enables positivity biases to colour the outcome of the
judgement. However, as Kruger's work (1999) has shown, self-favouring is not
guaranteedÐthe direction in which a comparative judgement is distorted
MOOD EFFECTS DEPEND ON SELF-OTHER FRAMING 199
depends on characteristics of the judgement (e.g., the difficulty of the domain in
question). This implies that comparative judgements are open and, therefore,
constructive judgements that can be biased either in favour or against the self.
As a consequence, these judgements also should be subject to affect infusion
according to Forgas' AIM. That is, perceptions of one's own efforts and pro-
spects should be more positive when a person is happy and more negative when
a person is sad. However, this prediction of mood-congruence comes with a
natural boundary condition. It should hold true only if the judgement permits the
individual to use an intrapersonal standard rather than a more concrete, inter-
personal standard. Can a judgement be framed in a manner that shifts focus
away from the self, forcing the individual to assess the self in the context of an
interpersonal standard (i.e., an explicit representation of a typical other)?
Research on self-other framing has illustrated a method of doing this, and this
method should provide another boundary condition for mood-congruent
judgements of the self.
Self-other framing
Eiser and colleagues (2001) have demonstrated that positivity biases occur
when making self-judgements in the context of a self-focused frame (e.g., by
asking ``How did you do relative to others?''). However, such biases are
reduced or eliminated when individuals first consider the performance of oth-
ers (e.g., ``How did others do relative to you?'' ± an other-focused frame)
before returning to a self-judgement. The simple task of having to judge and,
therefore, form an explicit representation of a ``typical other'' appears to
eliminate the ambiguity typically associated with comparative judgements,
causing individuals to ground self-judgements relative to a more concrete nor-
mative standard. Additional research has found that people see themselves as
more distinct from others when judgements are prompted with a self-focused
frame compared to an other-focused frame, and that participants provide more
spontaneous positive statements about themselves under self-focused framing
compared to other-focused framing (Pahl & Eiser, in press). Taken as a
whole, this research illustrates the powerful impact of framing comparative
judgements relative to either the self or other individuals (Karylowski, 1990;
Rogers, 1981).
In the context of this research, we wondered what would happen to mood
effects if individuals were led to ground self-judgements relative to a more
concrete, normative standard. The work on self-other framing, joined with the
logic of the AIM, suggests that the ambiguity associated with using an intra-
personal standard to make self-judgements is necessary for mood-congruent
self-perceptions to occur. In the absence of this ambiguity, mood should no
longer play a central role in informing judgement. Specifically, we argue that
mood-congruent self-perceptions should depend on ``self-other framing'', that
200 DETWEILER-BEDELL, DETWEILER-BEDELL, SALOVEY
is, whether a judgement is framed in a manner that maintains self-focus or in a
manner that shifts focus away from the self and toward other individuals. Mood-
congruent self-perceptions should be observed when a self-judgement is framed
to maintain self-focus. In contrast, having an explicit reference point in making a
self-judgement (e.g., through an other-focused frame) should reduce or eliminate
any ambiguity, leading to a judgement that is less constructive and therefore less
susceptible to affect infusion.
In the current paper, we investigate the joint influence of mood and decision
frame (i.e., focus on the self or on other individuals) on perceived success.
Specifically, we hypothesise that the effects of mood on perceived success
depend on whether the individual's attention is focused on the self or on other
individuals, with mood-congruent judgements resulting only when the decision
frame is self-focusing. That is, we hypothesise that self-focused frames (i.e.,
initially asking individuals to think of their own success compared to the success
of others) will trigger mood-congruent perceptions of personal success at an
achievement task. However, other-focused frames (i.e., initially asking indivi-
duals to think of the success of other individuals independent of their own
success) should eliminate the effect of mood on perceived success. Two
experiments were conducted to test this hypothesis.
EXPERIMENT 1
The purpose of our first study was to provide an initial test, in a controlled
laboratory setting, of whether self-other framing moderates the influence of
mood on judgements of personal success. Participants arrived at the lab and
were told they would be completing two unrelated studies. They first completed
a task in which they were asked to identify, as quickly and as accurately as
possible, four-sided objects embedded in a large selection of variously shaped
objects. Then, while the identification task was ostensibly scored, participants
completed an autobiographical mood-induction procedure. Finally, participants
completed a questionnaire regarding the timed identification task. The first two
items of this questionnaire asked participants to consider either their own
expected performance relative to other individuals on the achievement task
(self-focused framing) or the likely performance of others on the achievement
task (other-focused framing). Following this experimental manipulation, a series
of questions assessed participants' perceived success at the task. This resulted in
a 2 (happy mood, sad mood) 6 2 (self-focused frame, other-focused frame)
between-subjects design. It was hypothesised that mood-congruent perceptions
of success would be observed under conditions of self-focus but that these
perceptions would be reduced or eliminated when the decision frame led par-
ticipants to focus on the performance of others, supporting our argument that the
open, constructive processing that accompanies self-focus plays an important
role in producing mood-congruent perceptions of success.
MOOD EFFECTS DEPEND ON SELF-OTHER FRAMING 201
Method
Participants
A total of 60 undergraduate students were recruited using advertisements
placed around the Yale University campus. The students (65% male, 35%
female; mean age of 19.4 years old) received $5 in exchange for their partici-
pation in this 20 minute study.
Procedure
Participants were told that they would be completing two brief studies. In the
first study they would be taking a timed test of cognitive and visuospatial
abilities. Then, while the experimenter scored this test, they would be asked to
complete a second study concerning social memories. Finally, they would be
asked to complete a questionnaire about the ability test prior to receiving their
scores. Although these instructions suggested that the social memories task was
a separate study, it served as the experimental manipulation of mood prior to the
follow-up questionnaire.
Achievement task. Participants were seated and asked to read the
instructions for a timed ``object identification task'' (adapted from Freitas &
Higgins, 2002), which the study's consent form had described as a test of
cognitive and visuospatial abilities. This task required participants to scan
through several pages of geometric objects and cross out those with four sides.
Before beginning the task, participants were asked to report their age and sex,
and they rated how well they expected to do on the identification task on a 7-
point scale ranging from not well at all to extremely well. Subsequently, they
were given 2 minutes to identify as many of the four-sided objects as possible
while leaving other objects unmarked. This task was designed to be a plausible
but ambiguous performance task. Accordingly, most participants (82%) believed
their performance at least ``somewhat'' reflected their abilities. However,
participants' perceptions of their performance were unrelated to the actual
number of objects they had identified, all rs (60) < .15, ns.
Mood induction. Following the object identification task, and while the test
ostensibly was scored, the experimenter led participants to another room and
asked them to complete a second ``social memories'' study (adapted from
Forgas, 1995, 1999) that was designed to induce a happy or sad mood. Under the
cover story that the experimenter was compiling an inventory of memorable life
events, half of the participants were randomly assigned to recall an episode of
their lives that had made them feel happy and continued to make them happy
even today, whereas half of the participants were asked to recall a sad episode.
In both conditions, participants were instructed to ``. . .imagine this episode as
202 DETWEILER-BEDELL, DETWEILER-BEDELL, SALOVEY
vividly as you can. Recall the events happening to you. Recall your surroundings
as clearly as possible. Picture the people or objects involved. Try to think the
same thoughts. Try to feel the same feelings''. Below these instructions,
participants were provided with 36 blank lines on which to list words describing
the autobiographical event. This request reinforced the cover story that the
experimenter was compiling an inventory of social memories. Moreover, it was
expected that these words would be emotionally valenced and strengthen the
mood induction in a manner consistent with the use of valenced self-referential
statements in Velten mood-induction procedures (e.g., Brown & Mankowski,
1993; Velten, 1968). Autobiographical recollections and self-generated imagery
have been used extensively in previous research to induce transient moods (e.g.,
Forgas, 1995; Gendolla, Abele, & Kruesken, 2001; Goodwin & Williams, 1982;
Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993; Salovey & Rodin, 1985; Wright
& Mischel, 1982), and these procedures have proved effective particularly when
a plausible cover story, such as compiling an inventory of social memories,
justifies the task (Salovey, 1992; Thompson, Cowan, & Rosenhan, 1980).
After 5 minutes, participants were instructed to complete a second page of the
social memories survey, consisting of a mood manipulation check. Four items
asked participants to indicate their current feelings along 7-point bipolar scales
(i.e., unpleasant-pleasant, happy-sad, tired-alert, and tense-relaxed).
Self-other framing. After completing the mood-induction procedure,
participants received a follow-up questionnaire about the object identification
task. The questionnaire's instructions informed participants that performance on
the ability test was a function of the speed and accuracy with which they had
identified the geometric objects, and they were asked to complete the
questionnaire, keeping these factors in mind, prior to receiving their scores.
The first two items of the follow-up questionnaire served as the study's
experimental manipulation of decision frame. Half of the participants were
randomly assigned to the self-focused framing condition, in which they were
asked judge their own performance on the identification task relative to the
performance of other individuals they knew and of students similar to them-
selves. Specifically, they were asked: ``Think for a moment about yourself. How
do you suppose you did on the object identification task compared to people you
know (including your peers, friends, and family)?'' and ``Again, think for a
moment about yourself. How do you suppose you did on this task compared to
other students like you?'' In contrast, half of the participants were assigned to
the other-focused framing condition, in which they were asked to judge the
performance of other individuals directly without making a self-other compar-
ison. Specifically, they were asked: ``Think for a moment about people you
know (including your peers, friends, and family). How do you suppose they
would do on the object identification task?'' and ``Think for a moment about
other students like you. How do you suppose they would do on this task?''
MOOD EFFECTS DEPEND ON SELF-OTHER FRAMING 203
Measures
Except for the first two items of the follow-up questionnaire, all participants
completed a common set of outcome measures.
Attributions of performance. Four items asked participants to rate the extent
to which various factors (ability, task difficulty, effort, luck) influenced their
performance on the identification task. Ratings for these items were made using
7-point scales ranging from not at all to extremely.
Perceived success. Participants then were asked to rate their performance
on the identification task without knowing their scores. Three items were
included in an index of participants' perceived success at the task. Participants
were asked how they felt they had performed on the task (assessed on a 7-point
scale ranging from not well at all to extremely well) and how well they thought
they had performed compared to other people who had taken the test (assessed
on an 11-point percentile scale ranging from 0% or worse than all others to
100% or better than all others). Also included in the index was a measure of
how challenging participants found the identification task, assessed using a 4-
point scale ranging from not at all to extremely. Task challenge warranted
inclusion in the index of perceived success because task challenge was strongly,
negatively associated with the other performance judgements [corrected item-
total r(60) = 7.49, p < .001].1 After transforming these items into z-scores, they
were combined into a standardised index of participants' perceived success (a =
.80.)
Additional measures. One additional measure asked participants to decide
with whom they would be most interested in comparing their score on the
identification task (assessed on a 7-point scale ranging from someone who got
the lowest score to someone who got the highest score). This social comparison
measure was included because of the potential relationship between social
comparison processes and the study's manipulation of self-other framing.
Although no specific hypotheses related to this measure were specified in
advance, participants generally said they would prefer to compare their scores to
someone with an above average score on the identification task, M = 5.59, SD =
1.60, t(58) = 7.66, p < .001. This is consistent with past research showing that
1 Participants also were asked how much they enjoyed the identification task, but enjoyment was
not associated with the two primary indicators of perceived success: corrected item-total r(60) = .14,
ns. Another item asked participants how confident they were about their performance on the task, but
this item was discarded because some participants instead used it to indicate confidence in their
preceding performance ratings (e.g., some participants who felt they had performed poorly indicated
a relatively high level of confidence in having done so).
204 DETWEILER-BEDELL, DETWEILER-BEDELL, SALOVEY
individuals generally choose to compare their performance with others who
perform well for many reasons (e.g., Bandura, 1986, Festinger, 1954; Suls,
1986; Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Wheeler, 1991). Beyond this, however, the social
comparison measure did not produce any significant findings, so it will not be
discussed further.
After participants completed the follow-up questionnaire, they were informed
that the identification test was not a valid test of ability. Instead, it had been
designed as an ambiguous task to investigate participants' perceptions of their
own performance. The task was not scored until after the study, and subjects
never received any feedback about their actual performance. Participants then
were debriefed about the study's mood induction and the hypotheses of the
study. After debriefing, participants were thanked and paid, asked if they had
any questions, and then dismissed.
Results and discussion
A common analytic strategy was adopted for the two studies presented in this
article. First, the mood manipulation check was examined to confirm that the
mood-induction procedure had the intended effect. Second, relationships among
each study's background questions and outcome measures were examined to
identify potential covariates that might be used in evaluating the influence of
mood and self-other framing on perceived success. This included examination of
both pre-experimental measures (e.g., age, sex) and post-experimental measures,
including participants' post-experimental attributions of their performance to
ability, task difficulty, effort, and luck. After identifying these potential cov-
ariates, a preliminary ANCOVA modelling perceived success was conducted.
All of the covariates were examined in the context of a full model to determine
whether any should be removed for failing to explain unique variance in per-
ceived success (using a cautious criterion for pooling error terms, p > .25).
Redundant covariates were removed one at a time until a final model was
attained, and a multivariate procedure was used to check and confirm the
assumption of homogeneous regression slopes across groups. It is this final
ANCOVA model that is reported and interpreted for each study.
Mood manipulation check. Participants in the happy mood condition
reported feeling more pleasant (M = 5.60, SD = 1.07) than participants in the sad
mood condition (M = 3.70, SD = 1.37), t(58) = 5.99, p < .001, as well as less sad
(M = 2.83, SD = 1.32 vs. M = 4.53, SD = 1.33), t(58) = 74.97, p < .001. When
ratings for the two arousal items were combined (i.e., tired-alert, tense-relaxed),
it appeared that participants in the happy mood condition may have felt
somewhat more aroused than participants in the sad mood condition (M = 3.95,
SD = 1.07 vs.M = 3.50, SD = 0.82, respectively), t(58) = 1.82, p < .08. However,
this effect was only marginally significant and appears to have been an artifact
MOOD EFFECTS DEPEND ON SELF-OTHER FRAMING 205
of the overlap between the valence and arousal items (i.e., happy participants
reported being significantly more alert but somewhat less tense).
Statistical covariates. Participants' initial ratings of how well they expected
to do on the identification task were significantly related to their perceived
success at the task, r(60) = .36, p < .01. (In contrast, there was no relationship
between perceived success and the actual number of objects identified by
participants, r = .13, p = .34. For this reason, actual performance was not used as
a covariate in evaluating perceived success.) Additionally, men reported greater
success at the task than did women (M = 0.26, SD = 0.99 vs. M = 70.49, SD =
0.84), t(58) = 2.97, p < .01, and older students were more likely to report greater
success, r(60) = .25, p < .06. Analysis of participants' performance attributions
also revealed a significant negative relationship between perceived success and
participants' attributions of their performance to luck, r(60) = 7.33, p < .02, but
the mood by self-other framing interaction failed to influence these attributions,
F(1, 55) < 1.0, ns. Thus, this strategy identified four potential covariates, all of
which were retained based on preliminary modelling of perceived success.
Perceived success. A two-way ANCOVA, controlling for the covariates
identified above, was conducted to assess the influence of mood and self-other
framing on perceived success at the object identification task. Although there
was no main effect of self-other framing, F(1, 52) < 1.0, ns, there was a
significant main effect of mood; happy participants indicated greater perceived
success (M = 0.25) compared to sad participants (M = 70.25), F(1, 52) = 5.43, p
< .05, r = .31. However, this effect was qualified by the predicted interaction of
mood and self-other framing, F(1, 52) = 3.65, p = .06, r = .26, as displayed in
Figure 1. Inspection of this interaction revealed a strong, simple effect of mood
among self-focused participants, with happy participants indicating greater
perceived success at the identification task (M = 0.50, SD = 0.21) compared to
sad participants (M = 70.42, SD = 0.21), F(1, 52) = 9.42, p < .01, r = .39. In
contrast, mood did not influence the personal performance judgements of
participants in the other-focused framing condition (happy M = 0.01, SD = 0.22
vs. sad M = 70.08, SD = 0.21), F(1, 52) = 0.07, ns. A planned contrast testing
our hypothesis that mood-congruent perceptions of success would be observed
only under conditions of self-focus was reliable, F(1, 54) = 9.71, p < .01, r = .39,
and accounted for 98% of the variance in perceived success explained by our
experimental manipulations of mood and self-other framing.
Discussion. Results of this experiment confirm that self-other framing can
moderate the influence of mood on perceptions of personal success. When
participants were initially prompted to evaluate their own performance relative
to others, positive mood increased perceptions of success whereas negative
mood decreased perceptions of success. In contrast, mood failed to influence the
206 DETWEILER-BEDELL, DETWEILER-BEDELL, SALOVEY
personal performance judgements of participants who were initially prompted to
think about the performance of other individuals. These findings suggests that
self-focus may play a critical role in producing mood-congruent perceptions of
personal success. Focusing on other individuals appears to eliminate this effect.
EXPERIMENT 2
The achievement task used in the first study was ideal because it relied on a
highly ambiguous performance task, thus providing a particularly good context
for observing the subjective consequences of mood and self-other framing.
However, its use raises possible criticisms concerning the contrived nature of the
object identification task and, in turn, the generalisability of the findings of the
experiment. Experiment 2 sought to replicate these findings using a more
familiar and compelling domain, students' expected academic performance for
the current semester. Because it was assumed that students would have a rela-
tively clear sense of their current academic standing and performance, particular
attention was paid to controlling for pre-existing differences in academic ability
and expectations so that the subjective consequences of mood and self-other
framing might be observed. Otherwise, the components of the study's survey
paralleled those of Experiment 1. The experiment again took the form of a 2
(happy mood, sad mood) 6 2 (self-focused frame, other-focused frame)
between-subjects design in which it was expected that mood-congruent per-
Figure 1. Perceived success at the identification task as a function of mood and self-other framing,
Experiment 1. (Means are adjusted for initial expectations, sex, age, and performance attributions to
luck.)
MOOD EFFECTS DEPEND ON SELF-OTHER FRAMING 207
ceptions of success would be observed under conditions of self-focus but that
these perceptions would be reduced or eliminated when the decision frame led
participants to focus on other individuals.
Method
Participants
A total of 72 undergraduate students were recruited in the dining halls of Yale
University, 10 weeks into the university's 16 week spring semester. The students
(44% male, 56% female; mean age of 19.4 years) received a candy bar in
exchange for their participation in a brief survey concerning judgements of
academic performance.
Procedure
Participants received a three-page survey containing a few background
questions, the social memories mood-induction procedure, and a final ques-
tionnaire about their expected academic performance for the current semester.
Background questions. The first page of the survey included general
instructions and asked participants to report their age and sex. In addition,
participants answered four questions pertaining to their academic ability and
expectations. These items solicited the student's overall score on the Scholastic
Achievement Test (SAT; assessed on a 6-point scale ranging from less than
1000 to 1500 or greater), cumulative grade point average prior to the current
semester (assessed on a 5-point scale ranging from less than 2.0 to 3.5 or
greater), expected academic performance for the current semester compared to
the student's previous performance at the university (assessed on a 5-point scale
ranging from far below my average performance to far above my average
performance), and perceived academic standing compared to other students at
the university (assessed on an 11-point percentile scale ranging from 0% or
worse than all others to 100% or better than all others).
Mood induction. On the second page of the survey, participants completed
the ``social memories'' mood-induction procedure described in Experiment 1.
This was followed by an abbreviated two-item mood manipulation check
assessing the valence of participants' current feelings (i.e., unpleasant-pleasant
and happy-sad).
Self-other framing. On the final page of the survey, participants completed
a questionnaire about their expected academic performance for the current
semester. Again, the first two items of this questionnaire served as the study's
experimental manipulation of self-other framing. Half of the participants were
208 DETWEILER-BEDELL, DETWEILER-BEDELL, SALOVEY
randomly assigned to the self-focused framing condition, in which they were
asked to think momentarily about their academic performance for the current
semester relative to the performance of other students they knew and of students
similar to themselves. Specifically, they were asked: ``Think for a moment about
yourself. How do you suppose you will perform academically this semester
compared to other students you know at Yale?'' and ``Again, think for a
moment about yourself. How do you suppose you will perform academically this
semester compared to other students like you?'' In contrast, half of the
participants were assigned to the other-focused framing condition, in which their
attention was directed momentarily to the academic performance of other
students without calling for a comparison between their own performance and
the performance of other students. The other-focused manipulation included the
following two items: ``Think for a moment about other students you know at
Yale. How do you suppose they will perform academically this semester?'' and
``Think for a moment about other students like you. How do you suppose they
will perform academically this semester?''
Measures
Except for the first two items of the final questionnaire, participants com-
pleted a common set of outcome measures.
Expected grades for the current semester. Participants were asked to predict
their letter grades for the current semester. For each of their courses, they were
asked to give their best estimate of the grade they expected to receive along with
the lowest and highest grades they might possibly receive. Responses were
coded using a 13-point scale ranging from 0 (i.e., a letter of F) to 12 (i.e., a letter
grade of A+) and then averaged to produce three measures: average expected
grade, average lowest possible grade, and average highest possible grade.
Although the results of Experiment 1 suggested that mood and self-other
framing might influence only subjective perceptions of academic success, not
these more objective measures of academic performance, these measures were
included after the experimental manipulations to rule out the possibility of such
an effect.
Perceived success. Participants were then asked to rate their expected
academic success for the current semester. Three items were included in an
index of participants' perceived academic success. Participants were asked how
well they thought they would perform academically this semester (assessed on a
7-point scale ranging from not well at all to extremely well), how well they
thought they would perform compared to other Yale students (assessed on an 11-
point percentile scale ranging from 0% or worse than all others to 100% or
better than all others), and how much they enjoyed the semester academically
MOOD EFFECTS DEPEND ON SELF-OTHER FRAMING 209
(assessed using a 4-point scale ranging from not at all to extremely). After
transforming these items into z-scores, they were combined into a standardised
index of participants' perceived success (a = .61).
After completing the follow-up questionnaire, participants were instructed to
return the survey and were debriefed about the study's mood induction and the
hypotheses of the study. They were then thanked, compensated, and dismissed.
Results and discussion
Mood manipulation check. Once again, the social memories procedure
successfully influenced participants' feelings. Participants in the happy mood
condition reported feeling more pleasant (M = 5.61, SD = 1.27) than participants
in the sad mood condition (M = 4.08, SD = 1.20), t(70) = 5.24, p < .001, and they
also reported feeling less sad (M = 2.75, SD = 1.32 vs. M = 4.14, SD = 1.31),
t(70) = 74.48, p < .001.
Statistical covariates. Prior grade point average was significantly related to
perceived success for the current semester, r(72) = .32, p < .01. Additionally,
pre-experimental expectations for the current semester and perceived academic
standing were significantly related to post-experimental perceived success for
the current semester, r(72) = .24, p < .05 and r(72) = .65, p < .001, respectively.
Analysis of the post-experimental measures of expected grades revealed that
average lowest possible grade and average highest possible grade were
significantly related to perceived success, r(72) = .38, p < .01 and r(72) =
.51, p < .001, respectively. Interestingly, average expected grade was not related
to these measures or to the index of perceived success, all rs (72) < .10, ns.
Importantly, none of the post-experimental measures of expected grades was
influenced by the interaction of mood and self-other framing, all Fs (1, 66) <
2.03, ns, which justified the use of average lowest grade and average highest
grade as covariates in evaluating the effects of mood and self-other framing on
perceived success.
These initial analyses identified five potential covariates: prior grade point
average, expectations for the current semester, perceived academic standing, and
the postexperimental measures of average lowest and highest possible grades for
the current semester. However, preliminary modelling revealed that prior grade
point average failed to explain any unique variance in perceived academic
success for the current semester (p = .80) so this variable was eliminated from
the analyses presented below.
Perceived success. A two-way ANCOVA, controlling for the covariates
identified above, was conducted to assess the influence of mood and self-other
framing on perceived academic success for the current semester. Neither mood
nor self-other framing significantly influenced perceived success, Fs (1, 64) =
210 DETWEILER-BEDELL, DETWEILER-BEDELL, SALOVEY
2.33 and 0.58, respectively, ns. However, the predicted interaction of mood and
self-other framing was observed, F(1, 64) = 4.58, p < .04, r = .26, as displayed in
Figure 2. The pattern of this interaction again revealed a reliable simple effect of
mood among self-focused participants. Self-focused participants who were in a
happy mood anticipated greater academic success for the current semester (M =
0.35, SD = 0.16) than did those in a sad mood (M = 70.23, SD = 0.16), F(1, 64)
= 6.51, p < .02, r = .30. In contrast, mood did not influence the perceived success
of other-focused participants in happy (M = 70.11, SD = 0.15) vs. sad (M =
70.01, SD = 0.15) moods, F(1, 64) = 0.19, ns. Likewise, a planned contrast
testing our hypothesis that mood-congruent perceptions of success would be
observed only under conditions of self-focus again was reliable, F(1, 66) = 6.53,
p < .02, r = .30, and accounted for 86% of the variance in perceived success
explained by our experimental manipulations of mood and self-other framing.
Discussion
The results of this experiment provide evidence that, in moderating the influence
of mood, the influence of self-other framing extends to everyday perceptions of
personal success. In this experiment, the effect was observed for students'
perceptions of their academic success, and the same effect was observed in
Experiment 1 for perceived success at a relatively inconsequential object
Figure 2. Perceived academic success for the current semester as a function of mood and self-other
framing, Experiment 2. (Means are adjusted for initial expectations, perceived academic standing,
and the postexperimental measures of average lowest and average highest possible grades.)
MOOD EFFECTS DEPEND ON SELF-OTHER FRAMING 211
identification task. In each case, self-focused framing appeared to be necessary
to produce mood-congruent perceptions of personal success; a frame leading
participants to focus on the performance of other individuals eliminated the
influence of mood.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our research evaluated the role of self-other framing in moderating the influence
of mood on self-perceptions of success. Forgas' AIM (1995, 2002a) holds that
affect infusion occurs only when judgements are ambiguous and information
processing is constructive. This requirement should impose a number of
boundary conditions on mood-congruent self-perceptions (Sedikides & Green,
2001). Egocentric accounts of self-favouring biases suggest that self-judgements
are prone to distortion because they typically lack an explicit, normative stan-
dard (Eiser et al., 2001; Kruger, 1999), which led us to hypothesise that mood-
congruent perceptions of success would be eliminated in the context of an other-
focused framing manipulation. Specifically, we predicted that asking partici-
pants to form an explicit representation of the performance of a ``typical other''
would give self-judgements a concrete point of comparison, making them less
ambiguous and, therefore, less susceptible to affect infusion according to the
AIM. This would imply that the open, constructive processing that typically
accompanies self-judgements is critical in producing mood-congruent percep-
tions of personal success.
Two experiments were conducted to determine whether self-focused framing
would result in mood-congruent perceptions of personal success, whereas other-
focused framing would eliminate this effect. Results from these experiments
were consistent in their support of our hypothesis; the influence of mood on
perceived success depended on whether participants were exposed to self-
focused or other-focused decision frames. Mood-congruent judgements of suc-
cess were observed only when participants were self-focused, with happy par-
ticipants anticipating greater success compared to sad participants. In contrast,
this effect was eliminated after participants made an explicit judgement about
the performance of other individuals. This interaction between mood and self-
other framing was observed in the context of a simple object identification task,
and it generalised to students' perceptions of their academic success. The con-
sistency of these findings provides compelling evidence that self-other framing
moderates the influence of mood on perceived success. Other-focused decision
frames appear to decrease subjectivity and diminish the influence of mood on
self-judgements as information processing becomes less open and constructive
(Forgas, 1995, 2002a).
The current research used two types of achievement tasks, but the meth-
odologies of the two experiments otherwise were quite similar. Given the
methodological similarities, there are some possible limitations of the research.
212 DETWEILER-BEDELL, DETWEILER-BEDELL, SALOVEY
First, both of the experiments used a common autobiographical mood-induction
procedure. This is not a serious concern insofar as self-referential experiences
are a primary source of naturally occurring moods. However, past research has
found that different mood-induction procedures can lead to different outcomes
(e.g., Rosenhan, Salovey, & Hargis, 1981; Wood, Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990).
Moreover, autobiographical recollections would seem to be particularly self-
focusing, which raises some concern over their use in conjunction with a
manipulation of self-other framing. Future studies using other manipulations of
mood (e.g., music or video clips) would add to the strength and generality of the
current findings. Still, self-focus is likely to accompany moods originating from
other sources (Salovey, 1992). More importantly, our finding that an other-
focused decision frame appears to remove the egocentrism typically associated
with self-judgements, even after experiencing a particularly self-focusing
autobiographical mood induction, argues that the effect of such frames is quite
powerful and that other-focused frames easily disrupt the influence of mood on
self-perceptions. This is compelling evidence of another boundary condition of
mood-congruent self-perceptions.
A second limitation of our investigation is that it did not include a neutral
mood condition, so the effect of the happy and sad mood conditions only can be
judged relative to one another. The observed influence of mood might reflect a
comparable, symmetrical effect of happiness vs. sadness, as we argue based on
the AIM and its assumption that positive and negative moods will distort
judgements in opposite directions. Alternatively, our findings could be attributed
to the influence of either happiness or sadness alone. Although our studies
cannot rule out the possibility of an asymmetry between the happy and sad mood
conditions (for a discussion of this concern, see Rusting, 1998), careful con-
sideration of our data suggests that they reflect a symmetrical effect of positive
vs. negative moods. In both studies, the other-focused manipulation clearly
eliminated the effect of mood on perceptions of success. As a result, these
conditions provide a reasonable proxy of a neutral mood control, compared to
which we observed a symmetrical effect of mood in the self-focused framing
conditions. Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that mood-congruent
judgement consistently produces symmetrical effects, whereas mood-congruent
memory produces asymmetrical effects (Blaney, 1986; Mayer et al., 1992;
Rusting, 1998). The reason for this difference between mood-congruent
judgement and mood-congruent memory remains unclear (Rusting, 1998) and is
outside the scope of our current research. However, it is important to char-
acterise our research as pertaining only to mood-congruent judgement (for a
review of mood-congruent memory, see Blaney, 1986).
Finally, there is a possibility that a match, or lack thereof, between the self-
other framing manipulation and the subsequent judgement task contributed to
our findings. Specifically, participants in the self-focused framing conditions of
both studies were asked to focus on themselves (for the manipulation) and to rate
MOOD EFFECTS DEPEND ON SELF-OTHER FRAMING 213
their own performance (for the outcome measure). Those in the other-focused
framing conditions were asked to focus on other people (manipulation) and to
rate their own performance (outcome). We have argued and demonstrated that
mood-congruent self-perceptions occur when a judgement focuses on the self
rather than on others. We based this prediction on the AIM, implying that other-
focused framing leads to less constructive information processing, in general.
However, given the design of our study, it is possible that mood-congruent
judgement occurs when the target of the judgement task (self vs. other) matches
the focus of the decision frame (self-focus vs. other-focus, respectively). We did
not include sufficient outcome measures asking participants to rate the perfor-
mance of others, so we cannot speak directly to this possibility. However,
research showing that mood-congruent biases are sometimes found when
making judgements concerning others (e.g., Forgas & Bower, 1987), suggests
that this matching-hypothesis should be tested in future studies.
Despite these possible concerns, the current research provides initial evidence
that self-other framing can play a significant role in moderating the influence of
mood on perceptions of personal success. More broadly, these findings suggest
that the open, constructive processing accompanying most self-judgements is
critical in producing mood-congruent perceptions of personal success, high-
lighting another boundary condition of mood-congruent judgement. In future
work, we will apply similar methods to judgements that go beyond achievement.
By doing so, we hope to gain further insight into how emotion and cognition
function interdependently and how people subjectively interpret themselves,
others, and the situations they experience.
Manuscript received 2 December 2004
Revised manuscript received 28 July 2005
REFERENCES
Alicke, M. D., Klotz, M. L., Breitenbecher, D. L., Yurak, T. J., & Vredenburg, D. S. (1995). Personal
contact, individuation, and the better-than-average effect. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 68, 804±825.
Alicke, M. D., Vredenburg, D. S., Hiatt, M., & Govorun, O. (2001). The ``better than myself effect.''
Motivation and Emotion, 25, 7±22.
Bandura, A. (1982). Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency. American Psychologist, 37,
122±147.
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Blaney, P. H. (1986). Affect and memory: A review. Psychological Bulletin, 99, 229±246.
Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36, 129±148.
Bower, G. H., & Forgas, J. P. (2000). Mood and social memory. In J. Forgas (Ed.), The handbook of
affect and social cognition (pp. 95±120). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Brown J. D., & Mankowski, T. A. (1993). Self-esteem, mood, and self-evaluation: Changes in mood
and the way you see you. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 421±430.
Brown, J. D., & Taylor, S. E. (1986). Affect and the processing of personal information: Evidence for
mood-activated self-schemata. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 436±452.
214 DETWEILER-BEDELL, DETWEILER-BEDELL, SALOVEY
Cervone, D., Kopp, D. A., Schaumann, L., & Scott, W. D. (1994). Mood, self-efficacy, and per-
formance standards: Lower moods induce higher standards for performance. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 67, 499±512.
Chambers, J. R., & Windschitl, P. D. (2004). Biases in social comparative judgments: The role of
nonmotivated factors in above-average and comparative-optimism effects. Psychological Bul-
letin, 130, 813±838.
Eiser, J. R., Pahl, S., & Prins, Y. R. A. (2001). Optimism, pessimism, and the direction of self-other
comparisons. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 77±84.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117±140.
Forgas, J. P. (1995). Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model (AIM). Psychological Bulletin,
117, 39±66.
Forgas, J. P. (1999). On feeling good and being rude: Affective influences on language use and
request formulations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 928±939.
Forgas, J. P. (2002a). Feeling and doing: Affective influences on interpersonal behavior. Psycho-
logical Inquiry, 13, 1±28.
Forgas, J. P. (2002b). Toward understanding the role of affect in social thinking and behavior.
Psychological Inquiry, 13, 90±102.
Forgas, J. P., & Bower, G. H. (1987). Mood effects on person-perception judgments. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 53±60.
Forgas, J. P., & Vargas, P. T. (2000). The effects of moods on social judgment and reasoning. In M.
Lewis, & J. M. Haviland (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (2nd ed., pp. 350±367). New York:
Guilford Press.
Freitas, A. L., & Higgins, E. T. (2002). Enjoying goal-directed action: The role of regulatory fit.
Psychological Science, 13, 1±6.
Gendolla, G. H. E., Abele, A. E., & Kruesken, J. (2001). The informational impact of mood on effort
mobilization: A study of cardiovascular and electrodermal responses. Emotion, 1, 12±24.
Goodwin, A. M., & Williams, J. M. G. (1982). Mood-induction research: Its implications for clinical
depression. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 20, 373±382.
Hirshleifer, D. A., & Shumway, T. G. (2003). Good day sunshine: Stock returns and the weather.
Journal of Finance, 58, 1009±1032.
Isen, A. M., & Levin, P. F. (1972). Effect of feeling good on helping: Cookies and kindness. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 21, 384±388.
Karylowski, J. J. (1990). Social reference points and accessibility of trait-related information in self-
other similarity judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 975±983.
Klein, W. M., & Kunda, Z. (1993). Maintaining self-serving social comparisons: Biased recon-
struction of one's past behaviors. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 732±739.
Kruger, J. (1999). Lake Wobegon be gone! The ``below-average effect'' and the egocentric nature of
comparative ability judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 221±232.
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 480±498.
Markus, H., & Sentis, K. (1982). The self in social information processing. In J. Suls (Ed.), Psy-
chological perspectives on the self (Vol. 1, pp. 41±70). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Mayer, J. D., Gaschke , Y. N., Braverman, D. L., & Evans, T. W. (1992). Mood-congruent judgment
is a general effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 119±132.
McAuley, E., Wraith, S. C., & Duncan, T. E. (1991). Self-efficacy, perceptions of success and
intrinsic motivation for exercise. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 21, 139±155.
Pahl, S., & Eiser, J. R. (in press). The focus effect and self-positivity in ratings of self-other similarity
and difference. British Journal of Social Psychology.
Parducci, A. (1984). Value judgments: Toward a relational theory of happiness. In J. R. Eiser (Ed.),
Attitudinal measurement (pp. 3±21). New York: Springer.
Petty, R. E., Schumann, D. W., Richman, S. A., & Strathman, A. (1993). Positive mood and
persuasion: Different roles for affect under high and low elaboration conditions. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 5±20.
MOOD EFFECTS DEPEND ON SELF-OTHER FRAMING 215
Rogers, T. B. (1981). A model of the self as an aspect of the human information processing system.
In N. Cantor & J. F. Kihlstrom (Eds.), Cognition, social interaction and personality (pp. 193±
214). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Rosenhan, D. L., Salovey, P., & Hargis, K. (1981). The joys of helping: Focus of attention mediates the
impact of positive affect on altruism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 899±905.
Ross, M., & Sicoly, F. (1979). Egocentric biases in availability and attribution. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 37, 322±337.
Rusting, C. L. (1998). Personality, mood, and cognitive processing of emotional information: Three
conceptual frameworks. Psychological Bulletin, 124, 165±196.
Salovey, P. (1992). Mood-induced self-focused attention. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 62, 699±707.
Salovey, P., & Rodin, J. (1985). Cognitions about the self: Connecting feeling states to social
behavior. Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 6, 143±166.
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative
and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45,
513±523.
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1988). How do I feel about it? The informative function of affective
states. In K. Fiedler & J. P. Forgas (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and social behavior (pp. 44±62).
Toronto: Hogrefe.
Sedikides, C. (1992). Changes in the valence of the self as a function of mood. Review of Personality
and Social Psychology, 14, 271±311.
Sedikides, C. (1995). Central and peripheral self-conceptions are differentially influenced by mood:
Tests of the differential sensitivity hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69,
759±777.
Sedikides, C., & Green, J. D. (2001). Affective influences on the self-concept: Qualifying the mood
congruency principle. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), The handbook of affect and social cognition (pp. 145±
160). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Smith, S. M., & Petty, R. E. (1995). Personality moderators of mood congruency effects on cog-
nition: The role of self-esteem and negative mood regulation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 68, 1092±1107.
Strack, F., Martin, L. L., & Stepper, S. (1988). Inhibiting and facilitating conditions of the human
smile: A nonobtrusive test of the facial feedback hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 54, 768±777.
Suls, J. M. (1986). Notes on the occasion of social comparison theory's thirtieth birthday. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12, 289±296.
Taylor, S. E., & Lobel, M. (1989). Social comparison activity under threat: Downward evaluation
and upward contacts. Psychological Review, 96, 569±575.
Thompson, W. C., Cowan, C. L., & Rosenhan, D. L. (1980). Focus of attention mediates the impact
of negative affect on altruism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 291±302.
Velten, E. (1968). A laboratory task for induction of mood states. Behavior Research and Therapy, 6,
473±482.
Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 39, 806±820.
Wheeler, L. (1991). A brief history of social comparison theory. In J. Suls & T. A. Wells (Eds.),
Social comparison: Contemporary theory and research (pp. 3±21). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (2000). Expectancy-value theory of achievement motivation. Con-
temporary Educational Psychology, 25, 68±81.
Wood, J. V., Saltzberg, J. A., & Goldsamt, L. A. (1990). Does affect induce self-focused attention?
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 899±908.
Wright, J., & Mischel, W. (1982). Influence of affect on cognitive social learning person variables.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 901±914.
216 DETWEILER-BEDELL, DETWEILER-BEDELL, SALOVEY