Post on 19-Dec-2015
Models of Evolutionary Dynamics:An Integrative Perspective
Ulf DieckmannEvolution and Ecology Program
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Laxenburg, Austria
Mechanisms of Adaptation
Natural selection survival of the fittest
Increasing cognitive demand
Imitation copy successful behavior
Learning iteratively refine behavior
Deduction derive optimal behavior
Theories of Adaptation
Populationgenetics
1930
Quantitativegenetics
1950
Adaptivedynamics
1990
Evolutionarygametheory
1970
Overview
Models of Adaptive Dynamics
Connections with…
Optimization Models
Pairwise Invasibility Plots
Quantitative Genetics
Matrix Games
Models ofAdaptive Dynamics
Four Models of Adaptive Dynamics
PSPS MSMS MDMD PDPD
These models describe… either polymorphic or monomorphic populations either stochastic or deterministic dynamics
Death Birthwithoutmutation
Birthwithmutation
Environment:density andfrequencydependence
. . .
Species 1 Species N Coevolutionarycommunity
Dieckmann (1994)Individual-based EvolutionPolymorphic and Stochastic
Illustration of Individual-based Evolution
Trait 1
Trai
t 2
Viability region
Evolutionary trajectories
Global evolutionary attractor
Effect of Mutation Probability
Small: 0.1%Mutation-limited evolution
“Steps on a staircase”
Evolutionary time
Large: 10%Mutation-selection equilibrium
“Moving cloud”
Evolutionary time
Trai
t
Mutation
Invasion
Fixation
Populationdynamics
Branchingprocess theory
Invasionimplies fixation
{ Survival probability of rare mutant
Fitness advantage Death rate
f+ / (f + d)
d f
Invasion probabilities based on the Moran process, on diffusion approximations,or on graph topologies are readily incorporated.
Evolutionary Random WalksMonomorphic and Stochastic Dieckmann & Law (1996)
Trait 1
Trai
t 2
Illustration of Evolutionary Random Walks
Bundles ofevolutionary trajectories
Initial condition
Illustration of Averaged Random Walks
Trait 1
Trai
t 2 Meanevolutionary trajectories
Gradient-Ascent on Fitness LandscapesMonomorphic and Deterministic
Canonical equation of adaptive dynamics
* 21( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
2 i ii i i i i i i i x x
i
dx x n x x f x x
dt x
evolutionaryrate in species i
equilibriumpopulation
size mutationalvariance-covariance
invasionfitness
mutationprobability
localselectiongradient
Dieckmann & Law (1996)
Trait 1
Trai
t 2
Illustration of Deterministic Trajectories
Evolutionary isoclines
Evolutionary fixed point
Reaction-Diffusion DynamicsPolymorphic and Deterministic
Kimura limit2
22
1( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
2i i i i i i i i i i i i i ii
dp x f x p p x x x b x p p x
dt x
Finite-size correctionsAdditional percapita death rateresults incompact support
xi
pi
Kimura (1965)Dieckmann (unpublished)
Summary of Derivations
PSPS MSMS
large population sizesmall mutation probability
MDMD
small mutation variance
PDPD
large population sizelarge mutation probability
OptimizationModels
Evolutionary Optimization
Fitness
Phenotype
Envisaging evolution as a hill-climbing process on a static fitness landscapeis attractively simple, but essentially wrong for most systems.
Frequency-Dependent Selection
Fitness
Phenotype
Generically, fitness landscapes change in dependence on a population’s current composition.
Evolutionary Branching
Convergence to a fitness minimum
Metz et al. (1992)
Fitness
Phenotype
Branching point
Time
Phen
otyp
e
Evolutionary Branching
Directional selection Disruptive selection
Pairwise Invasibility Plots
Invasion Fitness
DefinitionInitial per capita growth rate of a smallmutant population within a resident population at ecological equilibrium.
Popu
latio
n si
ze
Time
+–
Metz et al. (1992)
Pairwise Invasibility Plots
+ +–
–Resident trait
Mut
ant t
rait
+–
Invasion of the mutantinto the resident populationpossible
Invasion impossible
One trait substitution
Singular phenotype
Geritz et al. (1997)
Recursion relations
Current state
Nex
t sta
te
Size of vertical steps deterministic
Trait substitutions
Resident trait
Mut
ant t
rait
Size of vertical steps stochastic
+ +–
–
Reading PIPs:Comparison with Recursions
Reading PIPs:Four Independent Properties
Evolutionary Stability
Convergence Stability
Invasion Potential
Mutual Invasibility
Geritz et al. (1997)
Mut
ant t
rait
Resident trait
Pairwise Invasibility Plot
Classification Scheme(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Evolutionary instability, (2) Convergence stability, (3) Invasion potential, (4) Mutual invasibility.
Evol
utio
nary
bifu
rcat
ions
Geritz et al. (1997)
Reading PIPs:Eightfold Classification
Two Especially Interesting Types of PIP
Garden of Eden Branching Point
+
+
–
–Resident trait
Mut
ant t
rait +
+
–
–Resident trait
Mut
ant t
rait
Evolutionarily stable,but not convergence stable
Convergence stable,but not evolutionarily stable
Quantitative Genetics
An Alternative Limit
PSPS MSMS MDMD PDPD
large population sizesmall mutation probability small mutation variance
large population sizelarge mutation probability
given moments
Infinite Moment Hierarchy
0th moments: Total population densities
2σdidtx n x
2σdidtn n x
2 2σ σdidt
n x
1st moments: Mean traits
2nd moments: Trait variances and covariances
skewness
Quantitative Genetics: Lande’s Equation
Lande (1976, 1979) & Iwasa et al. (1991)
rate of mean traitin species i
current populationvariance-covariance
fitnesslocalselectiongradient
2 2σ ( , , ,σ )i i
i i i i x xi
dx f x x n
dt x
Population densities, variances, and covariances are all assumed to be fixed.Note that evolutionary rates here are not proportional to population densities.
Game Theory: Strategy Dynamics
Brown and Vincent (1987 et seq.)
2 2σ ( , , ,σ )i i i
di i i idt x x xx f x x n
2( , , ,σ )di i i idtn n f x x n
2σd idt
Variance-covariance matrices may be assumed to vanish, be fixed,or undergo their own dynamics.
Matrix Games
Replicator Equation: Definition
Assumption: The abundances ni of strategies i = A, B, … increase according to their average payoffs:
( )i i
dn Wn
dt
Their relative frequencies pi then follow thereplicator equation:
( )i i
dp Wp p Wp
dt
Average payoffin entire population
Replicator Equation: Limitations
Since the replicator equation cannot include innovative mutations, it describes short-term, rather than long-term, evolution.
The replicator equation for frequencies naturally arises as a transformation of arbitrary density dynamics.
Owing to the focus on frequencies, the replicator equation cannot capture density-dependent selection.
Interpreted as an equation for densities, the replicator equation assumes a very specific kind of density regulation. Other regulations will have altogether different evolutionary implications.
Bilinear payoff functions based on matrix games imply additional limitations…
Bilinear Payoff Functions
Mixed strategies in matrix games have bilinear payoff functions,
( , )W p p p Wp and an invasion fitness that is linear in the variant’s trait,
( , )f p p p Wp p Wp
,
.
For example, for the hawk-dove game, we have12( , ) ( )( )f p p p p V pC .
Meszéna et al. (2001)Dieckmann & Metz (2006)
– +
Degenerate PIPs
The PIPs implied by a matrix game are thus highly degenerate:
+–+
– + –
+ – – +
This degeneracy is the basis for the Bishop-Cannings theorem: All pure strategies, and all their mixtures, participating in an ESS mixed strategy have equal fitness.
Meszéna et al. (2001)Dieckmann & Metz (2006)
Example:Fluctuating Rewards
If we assume rewards in the hawk-dove game to fluctuate between rounds (taking one of two similar values with equal probability), the PIP’s degeneracy immediately vanishes:
+ –
– + Accordingly, the structurally unstable neutrality of
invasions at the ESS is overcome.
This resolves the ambiguity between population-level and individual-level mixed strategies.
Dieckmann & Metz (2006)
Two-Dimensional Unfoldingof Degeneracy
Game-theoretical case straddles two bifurcation
curves and thus acts as the
organizing centre of a rich
bifurcation structure.
Dieckmann & Metz (2006)
Mixtures ofMixed Strategies
Evolutionary outcomes can now be more subtle:
++
One mixedstrategy
++
Two purestrategies
++
A pure and a mixedstrategy
++
Two mixedstrategies
The interplay between population-level polymorphisms and individual-level probabilistic strategy mixing thus becomes amenable to evolutionary analysis.
Dieckmann & Metz (2006)
Summary
Models of adaptive dynamics offer a flexible toolbox for studying phenotypic evolution: Simplified models are systematically deduced from a common individual-based underpinning, providing an integrative perspective.
The resultant models are particularly helpful for investigating the evolutionary implications of complex ecological settings: Frequency-dependent selection is essential for understanding the evolutionary formation and loss of biological diversity.