Post on 26-Mar-2015
Land Reform Policies, The Sources of Violent Conflict and Implications for Deforestation in
the Brazilian Amazon
Lee J. AlstonUniversity of Illinois
NBER
Gary D. LibecapUniversity of Arizona
NBER
Bernardo MuellerUniversidade de Brasilia
I - Purpose of the Paper
• Develop and Test a Theoretical Framework for Land Conflict in the Brazilian Amazon.
II - Importance:
1. Lives Lost – Over the past two decades more than 500 people killed in disputes over land in the Amazon.
2. Violence – by weakening property rights may reduce investment and thereby economic growth.
3. Dissipation of Resources through Offensive and Defensive Strategies – Deforestation.
PeoplePeople
Population of Pará
Source: Ministério do Desenvolvimento AgrárioMinistério do Desenvolvimento Agrário , Balanço das Ações no Sul e Sudeste do Pará, Balanço das Ações no Sul e Sudeste do Pará. .
17.823
983.507
17.268
944.644
22.801
1.123.273
41.386
1.538.193
112.362
2.167.018
364.292
3.403.498
829.292
4.950.060
1.041.986
5.510.849
1.185.065
6.188.685
0
1.000.000
2.000.000
3.000.000
4.000.000
5.000.000
6.000.000
7.000.000
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Southeast Pará Pará
Number of Families Settled in Pará (stock)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
up to 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
se
ttle
d f
am
ilie
s (
10
00
)
Land Reform Settlements in Pará
Source: Ministério do Desenvolvimento AgrárioMinistério do Desenvolvimento Agrário , Balanço das Ações no Sul e Sudeste do Pará, Balanço das Ações no Sul e Sudeste do Pará. .
Year Credit for Installation (R$)
Credit for Infrastructure (R$)
1996 3,207,3003,207,300
563,362563,362
1997 11,536,70011,536,700
14,924,85114,924,851
1998 24,788,92524,788,925
21,898,42021,898,420
1999 17,499,80017,499,800
15,889,42615,889,426
2000 19,383,00019,383,000
12,160,00012,160,000
Total 76,415,72576,415,725
65,436,05965,436,059
Land Reform Credit in Pará
Source: Ministério do Desenvolvimento AgrárioMinistério do Desenvolvimento Agrário , Balanço das Ações no Sul e Sudeste do Pará, Balanço das Ações no Sul e Sudeste do Pará. .
29
17
108
7
3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Land Invasions in Pará
Source: Ministério do Desenvolvimento AgrárioMinistério do Desenvolvimento Agrário , Balanço das Ações no Sul e Sudeste do Pará, Balanço das Ações no Sul e Sudeste do Pará. .
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20010
20
40
60
80
100
120
Families Settled
Numer of Families Settled - Brazil
Source: INCRA, 2001, Balanço da Reforma Agrária.
0
200
400
600
800
Con
flict
s
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Year
Land Conflicts in Brazil
Source: INCRA, 2001, Balanço da Reforma Agrária.
15
58 9
2 29
1612
29
18
39
25
37
6873
110
96
134
180
122
161
110
67
75
4652
4741
54
30
47
27
10
0
5949
38
Fonte: 1964 a 1999 - CPT - Comissão Pastoral da Terra 2000 e 2001 - Ouvidoria Agrária Nacional
Assassination of Rural Workers – Brazil 1964-2001
Gross Deforestation (sq. km) 1978 - 1998Brazilian Amazon
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
Source: INPE, Monitoramento da Floresta Amazônica Brasileira por Satélite.
0.48%
0.30%
0.37%0.40%
0.81%
0.51%
037%
0.54%
0.48%
0.37%
Percentages are mean rates of gross deforestation (%year) relative to remaining forest.
Arch of DeforestationIncrements of Deforestation Observed in 1998
Source: INPE, Monitoramento da Floresta Amazônica Brasileira por Satélite.
Source: INPE, Monitoramento da Floresta Amazônica Brasileira por Satélite.
Source: INPE, Monitoramento da Floresta Amazônica Brasileira por Satélite.
Distribution of Mean Rate of Deforestationby size of deforested plot
III - Competing Property Rights: Titleholders versus Squatters
1. Property Rights of Titleholders- Statutory Law (upheld by local courts).
III - Competing Property Rights: Titleholders versus Squatters
2. Property Rights of Squatters – Constitution (upheld by INCRA).
i. Expropriation of land titled land if it is not in “socially beneficial use”.
ii. Right to occupy “unproductive” land.
iii. If occupancy is not contested after five years, the right to a title.
iv. Payment for Improvements
III - Competing Property Rights: Titleholders versus Squatters
3. No Respected Legal Hierarchy of Rights.
III - Competing Property Rights: Titleholders versus Squatters
4. Conflict not ubiquitous:i. much titled land is put into productive use.
ii. property rights are not worth enforcing privately on much titled land.
iii. titleholders pay squatters for improvements and leave when asked to leave.
IV - Institutional Environment: INCRA and the Courts
1. Courts:i. Local Courts issue eviction notices based
on Civil Code.
ii. Federal Courts rule on legality and value of expropriated land based on interpretation of “socially beneficial use.”
IV - Institutional Environment: INCRA and the Courts
2. INCRA: authority to expropriate land that is not fulfilling the “socially beneficial use” criterion. Probability of INCRA expropriating land determined by:
i. s, the amount of violence by squatters (+)
ii. P, the quality of property rights on occupied land (-)
iii. G, the President’s Commitment to land reform (+)
V - A Model of Rural Conflicts in the Amazon
1. Players: Titleholders and Squatters decide on how much effort (violence) to exert so as to maximize the payoff- the expected value of land.
V - A Model of Rural Conflicts in the Amazon
2. Value of Land depends on the outcome:i. Squatters evicted and farmer retains the
land.
ii. Squatters not evicted but the land is not expropriated (stalemate).
iii. Land is expropriated.
V - A Model of Rural Conflicts in the Amazon
3. Squatter and Farmers Objective Functions: land values in each outcome are weighted by the probability of that outcome minus the costs of violence. The usual maximization, i.e., MB=MC.
V - A Model of Rural Conflicts in the Amazon
4. Joint Solution of optimizations – simultaneous optimization of v* (effort of titleholder) and s* (effort of squatters).
s
v
squatter’sreactionfunction
titleholder’sreactionfunction
v*
s*
V - A Model of Rural Conflicts in the Amazon
4. v* and s* will vary with: v. quality of property rights; v* (-), s* ()
vi. position of the courts; v* (), s* (+)
vii. federal government’s will to expropriate; v* (), s* (+)
viii. value of land; v* (+), s* ()
ix. squatter’s cost; ; v* (-), s* (-)
x. farmer’s cost; v* (-), s* (+)
VI - Estimation of the Determinants of Conflict
• Conflictsi (1991-1994) = B0 + B1Settlementsi + B2
Squattingi + B3 Clearingi + B4 Concentrationi +
B5 Valuei + B6 Establishmentsi + e
Data: at the município (county) level for the state of Pará.Estimation: Tobit with 83 observations.
VI - Estimation of the Determinants of Conflict
Constant -11.16** (-2.46)
Settlements 2.90** (3.27)
Squatting 9.66*(1.95)
Clear-6.92
(-1.45)
Concentration 6.01*(1.91)
Land Value 2.01**(2.23)
Sigma
4.887
Establishments -0.0001(-0.36)
Wald Chi-Square Stat. (2
6, 1% = 16.81)
51.36***
Variable Est. Coef.
Notes: Level of significance (Wald Chi-square statistic): 1% ***, 5% **, 10% *The coefficients presented are the regression (non-normalized) coefficients.Our estimation used instruments to estimate settlement in order to control of simultaneity.
Concluding Remarks
1. In their effort to promote land reform through expropriations and settlements the government is most likely increasing the number of land conflicts.
2. Using cleared land as a measure of “beneficial or productive use” leads to premature deforestation in an effort to solidify property rights.
Concluding Remarks
3. Underlying tension between efficiency gains from secure property rights and distributional objectives of land reform.
Concluding Remarks
4. Recent developments:i. Number of invasions falling.
ii. Pressure is now mainly for credit.
iii. Conflict prevention offices.
iv. Conflict hot-line.
v. Areas with more than 50% in forest are not susceptible to expropriation.
vi. Land Bank.