IOT SECURITY: CONSUMER DEVICES AND THE

EXTENDED CORPORATE NETWORK

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Speakers

Mark Stanislav

Senior Security ConsultantRapid7

Michael McNeil

Global Product Security & Services OfficerPhilips Healthcare

Tod Beardsley

Research ManagerRapid7

Hacking IoT Baby Monitors

Mark Stanislav, Sr. Security Consultant

What Does an Internet-Connected Monitor Offer?• “Connected” Features (via a Web Site and/or a Mobile Application)

• Viewing a live stream locally (the home’s Wi-Fi) or remotely (Internet)

• Controlling the camera’s position via pan, tilt, and zoom functionality

• Communicating audio through the monitor (i.e. two-way audio)

• Playing music or other recorded audio clips (i.e. bring your own lullabies)

• Manage device preferences such as the audio volume and “night vision”

• Share access and provide privileges to other people (e.g. family, friends)

• Access recordings for humidity, temperature, noise, and/or motion alerts

• Remote (e.g. SaaS, FTP) and local (e.g. Micro SD) DVR recordings

A Mess of Dependencies and Attack Surface• Many IoT baby monitors leverage third-party services, firmware, and software

• Some vendors put a lot of trust in their supply chain without testing security

• Implementation errors or failure to comply with best practices also occurs

• Complex ecosystems means that there are plenty of ways to screw up:

• Mobile applications, cloud services, backend services, web applications, firmware, hardware, network protocols, wireless protocols, & cryptography

• It’s difficult for a single IoT vendor to be proficient in security across all of it

• The frameworks, protocols, and design patterns of IoT are still very much in flux

SO, HOW DO WE HACK THESE THINGS?

Via Dumping Firmware

Pomona SOIC Clip + Bus Pirate flashrom to Dump Flash

binwalk to Extract Filesystems

Hash Cracking with cudaHashcat

Scouring Google for Useful Details

Via Brute Force of Various Means

JTagulator(or Bus Pirate, Shikra, etc.)

U-Boot Configuration

UART Scan & Connect

Via Serial Console (UART)

Via JTAG (e.g. Dumping Memory via GDB)

Not a baby monitor… but you get the idea!

Acquire Firmware with dex2jar + JD-GUI for Android

View API Calls with mitmproxy (esp. SSL/TLS)

Find API End-Points with Clutch + strings for iOS

Via Mobile Applications

View Protocol Details with wireshark

Uncover Network Services with nmap

Via Network Analysis

XSS on Camera Cloud Web Service

Hidden Administrative Web Interface

Via Web Applications

THE BABY MONITORS

A Variety of Vendors, Styles, Costs, & FeaturesVendor Model Price Amazon

Rank* / StarsTwo-Way

Audio Pan Tilt Zoom Wi-Fi Ethernet

Gynoii GCW-1010 $89.34 #56 / 3.8 ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗

iBaby M3S $169.95 #243 / 3.4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

iBaby M6 $199.95 #31 / 3.7 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗

Lens LL-BC01W $54.99 #149 / 2.8 ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓

Philips B120/37 $77.54 #N/A / 2.2 ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗

Summer 28630 $199.99 #64 / 3.1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗

TRENDnet TV-IP743SIC $69.99 #N/A / 3.5 ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗

WiFiBaby WFB2015 $259.99 #156 / 3.2 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓

Withings WBP01 $204.60 #101 / 2.9 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

* Amazon Ranking Based on Category “Baby > Safety > Monitors”, Which Includes Non-IoT Baby Monitors

THE FINDINGS

Withings WBP01 - $204.60

Disabled Doesn’t Quite Mean What it Used To

After a stream exists, “disabling” it via the app doesn’t actually stop it…

20 Minutes Later… The Stream Still Works!

When Obfuscation Goes Wrong, or, Not at All?

At first, this looks like a really poor attempt at an obfuscation method to “hide” the password for this web service account. On further review, however, the mchunk method simply returns at the start of the for loop, yielding the output from the input to be a concatenation of “ff” and the integer passed as a parameter. Was this obfuscation intended to be enabled? Did someone give up on their dream of confusing reverse engineers? The world may never know…

WiFi Baby WFB2015 - $259.99

Unauthenticated Log With Stream Details Hardcoded SSL Cert … That’s Not Even Used …

Nothing Makes Sense to Me Any More

UPnP RCE Bugs, CVE-2012-5958 & CVE-2012-5959

UPnP Bugs: Alive and Well in Baby Monitoring

Lens Peek-A-View (LL-BC01W) - $54.99

If You Needed Some Free Cloud Storage

An FTP Account Per Camera, Apparently Used for Configuration Backups

[redacted]

Backdoor Credentials Galore

Hidden Web Interface CredentialsCracking the Linux ‘admin’ Password

This account has functional ‘root’ privilege due to ugly permissions

The Live Stream Passes Credentials in URL over HTTP

Gynoii GCW-1010 - $89.34

Unencrypted Web Services - Local and Cloud

Local Administrative API Calls

Vendor Cloud API Calls

Hidden Device Web Interface

Third-Party Streaming Service

None of these services or APIs use any encryption and often pass sensitive credentials and keys

TRENDnet TV-IP743SIC - $69.99

2-for-1 — Unencrypted Web Service + XSS

Either MITM a User or Just BYOJS to their DOM:)

[redacted]

Telnet Available, Just Not Default

A Remote Shell Waiting to Happen…

Pro Tip: Remove Remote Access Services, Don’t Just Disable Them!

Username: root Password: admin

iBaby M3S - $169.95

Uncovering Backdoor Linux Accounts & Access

An nmap Scan Reveals Telnet :)

Password is “Protected” by UNIX Crypt

Username: admin Password: admin

* FYI, there is no ‘root’ on here, only ‘admin’

iBaby M3S - A Historical Look at Software?

✦ U-Boot: 1.1.3, released August 14th, 2005 ✦ OpenSSL: 0.9.8e, released February 23rd, 2007

✦ Linux Kernel: 2.6.21, released April 26th, 2007 ✦ BusyBox: 1.12.1, released September 28th, 2008

✦ UNIX Crypt: First appeared in 1979, limited to 8-character passwords

✦ Telnet: Developed in 1968 — SSH-1 came out in 1995…

Encryption! Just Not Great Choices For it :)

Stream Encryption… with XXTEA?

Encrypted Backups… with a Hardcoded Password?

iBaby M6 - $199.95

Cryptography? Naw, They Are Just Babies…

Unencrypted Web Service Login

Telnet & Unencrypted HTTP on DeviceUnencrypted Mobile API Calls

This is the iBaby Cloud Web Site Today…

Login for Camera Owners …and What is Now Returned on Login…

But a Few Months Ago, Direct Object Reference!<—Proper Account

“Attacker” Account—>

No Authorization/Privilege Given to Our “Attacker” Account

Full Access to All Audio & Motion Alert Videos

View Source -> Find AVI Filename -> Access Static CloudFront URL

“Attacker” Account—>

Don’t let the broken images fool you… there’s live data ready to be viewed!

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Unauthenticated Access to Unencrypted VideosExample AVI Thumbnail File

Video Downloads via Amazon CloudFront

✦ URLs are not requested via HTTPS

✦ No IAM credentials or signed URLs

Mobile API Call for Alert Video Retrieval

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

…and Some Weirdly Exposed Web Applications?

…But an Admin Site? Now That’s an Interesting Find!

Apparently There’s a Private Wiki. What For? No Clue.

Philips In.Sight B120/37

Everything Old is New Again…My IZON Research - 2013 My InSight Research - 2015

The question is…

Did security issues fixed by one camera manufacturer ever trickle into devices also leveraging the same firmware?

Shout out to Paul Price for his research into the In.Sight M100 which shares a few issues from my old Stem Innovation IZON research and subsequent research into the In.Sight B120. Check out his site detailing this and other research at ifc0nfig.com!

A Quick Look at “Old” Security Issues Still There

No SSL on Backend Web Service

Telnet Enabled by Default (Until Recently)Multiple Hardcoded Linux Accounts

Insecure Firmware Upgrade Process

A Few Newer Issues. But Wait, There’s More! :)

Multiple XSS on Web Service Portal

Backdoor Telnet Enablement Script

Predictable ‘admin’ Web Service Password

Username: root Password: b120root

Unauthenticated Administrative Camera Access

Camera

Home NetworkInternet

User

Web Service HTTP/80

Clear Text Clear Text Clear Text

HTTP Reverse Proxy

When a remote end user requests their camera’s stream, an HTTP reverse proxy is opened on a public host & port number, directly to the camera’s backend web service, allowing for a remote attacker to achieve the following:

✦ Unauthenticated and unencrypted video/audio stream access to the user’s camera

✦ Full administrative access to the camera’s powerful backend web service

✦ This includes manipulating camera configuration or even re-enabling Telnet

Finding Exposed Cameras on the InternetThe reverse proxy is setup by the stream provider, Yoics, and has a finite number of enumerable hostnames, each with about ~30,000 possible ports that may be utilized. While this may seem like a lot, an attacker could test this entire range every minute to look for exposed cameras with a simple script or perhaps something powerful like zmap.

Unencrypted, Unauthenticated Remote Camera Access

Now “Friends” Can Remotely Enable Telnet For You! :)

Take David Adrian’s Word For It :)

Summer Infant Baby Zoom (28630) - $199.99

Oh, Be Sure to Change Your Password…

Default New User Passwords == Last name (truncated to 8 characters) + Group ID This is not required to be changed on first login and could be enumerated if someoneknows that you have this device — simply iterate over group ID integers!

Adding a Privileged User to Any & All Cameras

Before… After!

This HTTP call could be ran against all possible IDs

Coordinated Disclosure TimelineInitial Vendor DisclosureJuly 4th, 2015 — Because America!

CERT DisclosureJuly 21st, 2015 — 17 Days After Vendor Disclosure Public DisclosureSeptember 2nd, 2015 — 60 Days After Vendor Disclosure

A Modest Baby Monitor Security ChecklistVendor Model Local API

HTTP SSLCloud API HTTP SSL

No Remote Shell

No Hidden Accounts

No Known Vulns

No UART Access

All Streams Encrypted

Gynoii GCW-1010 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗

iBaby M3S N/A ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓

iBaby M6 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗

Lens LL-BC01W ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗

Philips B120/37 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗

Summer 28630 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗

TRENDnet TV-IP743SIC ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗

WiFiBaby WFB2015 ✗ N/A ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗

Withings WBP01 N/A ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗

Scoring Baby Monitors for Overall SecuritySecurity Concern Description of Concern Penalty for

Missing

Local API HTTP SSL All local web service/API calls should be encrypted, regardless of being on a LAN. -20 Points

Cloud API HTTP SSL All Internet-facing web service/API calls should be encrypted, including registration. -30 Points

No Remote Shell The presence of a remote shell (e.g. Telnet, SSH) create additional attack surface. -50 Points

No Hidden Accounts All accounts, whether web services or shell access should be known to customers. -30 Points

No Known Vulns All portions of the camera’s supply chain should be free of serious vulnerabilities. -75 Points

No UART Access Devices should disable direct serial access and definitely not drop to a root shell. -10 Points

All Streams Encrypted All video/audio streams, whether live or recorded, should be encrypted end-to-end. -35 Points

All Cameras Start With 250 Points and Receive Deductions

Baby Monitor by Security Score & GradeVendor Model Price Amazon

Rank / Stars Score Grade*

Gynoii GCW-1010 $89.34 #56 / 3.8 75 F

iBaby M3S $169.95 #243 / 3.4 160 D

iBaby M6 $199.95 #31 / 3.7 0 F

Lens LL-BC01W $54.99 #149 / 2.8 125 F

Philips B120/37 $77.54 #N/A / 2.2 30 F

Summer 28630 $199.99 #64 / 3.1 100 F

TRENDnet TV-IP743SIC $69.99 #N/A / 3.5 50 F

WiFiBaby WFB2015 $259.99 #156 / 3.2 80 F

Withings WBP01 $204.60 #101 / 2.9 95 F

* Grading Scale Based on Points:F: < 150 (<60%) ; D: 150 - 174 (60-69%) ; C: 175 - 199 (70-79%) ; B: 200 - 224 (80-89%) ; A: 225 - 250 (90-100%)

Baby is Unsatisfied

…But Really?1. The iBaby M6, Summer, and Philips all had what I would consider “critical”

security issues that make them a deal breaker, despite their overall scoring.

2. Only the iBaby M3S had apparent encryption for all streaming of content and even then, it’s not exactly “industry standard” and has its own potential issues.

3. More vulnerabilities likely exist such as RCE, XSS, and CSRF in backend web applications — in addition to already noted backdoor credentials/interfaces.

4. Frankly? Nine devices were way too much and while I am satisfied in the issues that were found, there’s a lot I probably missed others may find!

Conclusions1. The status quo of security for “connected” baby monitors is deeply concerning.

2. Even the “best” cameras tested were well below what I’d consider “secure.”

3. Consumers are woefully unaware that camera security features such as end-to-end encryption of audio/video and well defined, secured access don’t exist.

4. It’s highly unlikely, based on the issues found, that any of these vendors have third-party security audits and/or a security-focused development program.

Parents and their children deserve better. Whether you paid $54.99 or $259.99, a minimum level of security should be expected, and achieved, for all baby monitors.

Not All Hope is Lost, However :)BuildItSecure.ly: Initiative targeted at sharing technical resources with IoT engineering teams and pairing IoT vendors with pro-bono security researchers.

OWASP IoT Top 10: Provides vendors a list of the top 10 areas of IoT security that should be focused on during development to ensure a secure ecosystem.

Cloud Security Alliance: Released a guidance document targeted at IoT engineering teams to ensure more security during design/development.

Google Projects: Brillo is a hardened, stripped-down version of Android for IoT, while secure Weave is a secure solution for inter-device communication.

Thanks! Questions?

Mark Stanislav mstanislav@rapid7.com @markstanislav