Post on 14-Jul-2020
1
IntermediaryLiability:BasicsandEmergingIssues
DaphneKellerDecember2019
Intermediary Liability
2
PresentationRoadmap
§ HighLevelOverview(Slides3to13)§ ReviewofSpecificLaws(Slides13- 22)§ DialsandKnobsforLawmakersAdjustingIntermediaryLiabilityLaws(Slides23-29)
§ EmergingQuestionsandIdeas(Slides31-42)
Intermediary Liability
3
IntermediaryLiabilityLaw
HighLevelOverview
Intermediary Liability
4
IntermediaryLiabilityLaw§ Definesintermediaries’legalresponsibilitiesforcontentpostedbyusers.
§ Longstandingissue:respondingtoillegal content.§ Often,butnotalways,“noticeandtakedown”
§ Emergingissue:respondingtolegal content§ Mightplatformsberequiredtocarrylawfulspeech,eveniftheydon’twantto?
§ Mightplatformsberequiredtoremovelawfulbutharmfulspeech?
Intermediary Liability
5
IntermediaryLiabilityLawsTradeOffBetweenThreeMajorGoals1.Harmprevention
§ ILlawscanreduceharmsrangingfrommoviepiracytochildpornography.Platformgatekeeperrolemakesthempowerfulenforcers.
2.Economicgrowthandinnovation§ ExpresspurposeofmanyILlaws.Attheextreme,badILlawswouldmakeplatformbusinessesimpossible.
3.Freedomofexpressionandinformation§ Platformsthatfearliabilitytakedownlegalspeechtobesafe.Investorsthatfearliabilitydon’tfundopenplatforms.
Intermediary Liability
6
IntermediaryLiability:IdealOutcome?
Platformstakedownbadcontent,andleaveupgoodcontent.
Intermediary Liability
7
IntermediaryLiability:IdealOutcome?
Platformstakedownbadcontent,andleaveupgoodcontent.§ Ifonlywecouldagreeonwhatisgoodandbad…§ Theanswermightvaryforasitedirectedtokids,arealestatesite,abusinessreviewsite,etc….
Intermediary Liability
8
IntermediaryLiability:IdealOutcome?
Platformstakedownbad illegal content,andleaveupgood legal content.
Intermediary Liability
9Presentation Name-Change in Slide Master 9
RatioofValidtoInvalidNotices– RighttoBeForgotten,perGoogle’sTransparencyReport
Intermediary Liability
10Presentation Name-Change in Slide Master 10
PotentiallyIllegalContent
The problem the law needs to solve is not: “What should platforms do with illegal content?” It is: “What should platforms do with this whole array of potentially illegal content?”
Intermediary Liability
11
PlatformMotivationsinNoticeandTakedownSystems§ Economicincentivetoover-remove.§ Multiplestudiesdocumentover-removal.See Urbanetal2016,myCISblogpostlistingotherstudies.*§ Notificationerrors§ Censorshipgoals:Ecuador,RetractionWatch§ Commercialgoals:takedownstargetingcompetitorsarevery,verycommon
§ “Wrongfulremoval”claimsagainstintermediariesareclosetoimpossibleinUS.Globally,afewsuchclaimssucceededbeginningin2018(Brazil,Germany,Poland).
*http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/empirical-evidence-over-removal-internet-companies-under-intermediary-liability-laws
Intermediary Liability
12
“Over-Removal”andFundamentalRights§ Expressionandinformationrights
§ Mostwidelydiscussedandaddressedincases/literature§ Privacyanddataprotectionrights
§ Particularlyin“monitoring”cases§ Fairtrialandremedyordueprocessrights§ Equalityandnon-discriminationrights
§ Disparateimpactofover-removalbecauseofhumanbias,machinebias,sloppiness,politicalpressure,etc.
Intermediary Liability
13
CaseLawonIntermediariesandRights§ EuropeanCtofHumanRights
§ Delfi,2015:OKtomakenewsforummonitorforhatespeech
§ MTE,2016:NOTOKtomakenewsforummonitorfordefamation/personalityrightsinfringement
§ CJEUSABAM andothercasesbrieflydiscussuserrights
§ BelenRodriguezv.Google,S.Ct.ofArgentina2014§ Nomonitoringobligation,becauseofthreattospeech§ Publicadjudication/orderstandardformanyremovals
§ ShreyaSinghal,S.Ct.ofIndia2015§ Publicadjudication/orderstandardforallremovals
§ OlderU.S.Cases§ RareInternetcases:Zeran,Cubby,CDTv.Pappert§ Pre-Internetcases:Smith,BantamBooks
Intermediary Liability
14
IntermediaryLiabilityLaw
ReviewofSpecificLaws
Intermediary Liability
15
IntermediaryLiabilityGlobally§ Manycountrieshavelawforjustoneaspect,i.e.justforcopyright(Chile)orjustforISPs(Japan)
§ Manyhavenospecificlaw,but– asinBelenRodriguezinArgentina - reasonfromgeneraltortandrightsprinciples.
§ Somerelyoncontroloflocalarchitecture(likeChina’s“GreatFirewall”)
§ Inpractice,law/politicsfromafewregionsshapeoutcomesfortherestoftheworld§ US– DMCAtakedowns,1st Am.DrivesculturalnormsofUSplatforms,etc.
§ EU– globalcompliancewithhatespeechcodeofconduct,e.g.§ China– increasinglyvisiblewithTiktok etc.
Intermediary Liability
16
EU:eCommerceDirective§ eCommerceDirective
§ Art12:Safeharborfor“mereconduit” informationtransmission.§ Art13:Safeharborforcaching,mustbe“automatic,intermediate,andtemporary”
§ Art14:Safeharborforhosting,providermustremoveuponobtainingknowledgeofillegality
§ Art15:“Nogeneralobligationtomonitor”§ NewsLawsandPendingChangesinclude:
§ AVMSD§ CopyrightDirective§ TerroristContentRegulation§ DigitalServicesAct
Intermediary Liability
17
USIntermediaryLiabilityLaw§ ThreeMajorComponents:
§ CDA230:completeimmunityforleavingmostcontentup,“goodSamaritan”immunityfortakingitdown
§ DMCA:highlyformalnoticeandtakedownforcopyright§ Gapsbetweenthetwo:non-©intellectualproperty,federalcrimes,prostitutionandtraffickingclaimsper2018amendment
§ Statuteslargelyoccupythefield.§ UScourtshavebarelyconsideredconstitutionalorfundamentalrightsissues,whilecourtsinmanyothercountrieshave.
Intermediary Liability
18
CommunicationsDecencyAct230§ ExtremelybroadimmunityforclaimsthatarenotIPorfederalcriminalclaims.§ Don’thavetotakecontentdownevenifknowntobeillegal.
§ Coversverybroadrangeoftechnologies.§ Aslongasdonotcontributetocreatingthecontent.
§ 1996lawwithexpresseconomicgoal(topromoteInternetdevelopment)andfreeexpressiongoal.
§ Ongoinglegislativeattacks,includingSESTA/FOSTAamendmentin2018.
Intermediary Liability
19
CommunicationsDecencyAct230§ Twoseparateimmunities:
§ Immunityforleavingupillegalcontent.(230)(c)(1)§ “GoodSamaritan”immunityfortakingdownlegalcontentbasedongoodfaithefforttoweedoutillegaloreven“objectionable”material.(230)(c)(2)
§ Pragmaticcalculationabout“moderator’sdilemma ”– perverseincentivenottomoderate.§ Underpriorlaw,platformsthatmoderatedusercontentriskedliabilityaseditors(withcontrol)orbasedonhavingknowledge ofunlawfulcontent.
§ Toencouragemoderation,Congressmadeplatformsimmuneregardlessofcontrolorknowledge.
Intermediary Liability
20
WhyChange230?Conflictingrationaleswouldleadtoverydifferentamendments…
§ Tomakeplatformstakedownmoreracist,bullying,andotherwiseuglyorharmfulspeech?§ PROBLEM:Muchofthatislegalspeech.230isnotthereasonit’sonline.But230ISthelawfreeingplatformstotakeitdown.
§ Tomakeplatformsstop(allegedly)silencingconservatives?§ PROBLEM:Thatrequiresagovtagencytodefinepoliticalneutrality.
§ Tostopopioidsales?§ PROBLEM:Federalcriminallawalreadyreachesplatforms.
§ Toreachbadactors(Backpage,e.g.)?§ Toshiftbusinessadvantagebetweenhotels/AirBnB,retailers/Amazon,newsmedia/newsaggregators?
Intermediary Liability
21
DigitalMillenniumCopyrightAct(DMCA)1. Servicemustbelistedin512(a)-(d)(roughly:
accessproviders,caching,hosting,andsearchengines).
2. Providermustsatisfysomesimple,logisticalprerequisites(likeregisteringanagent).
3. MostprovidersmustproperlyrespondtovalidDMCAnotices.
4. Providermustnotrunafoulofsomeknown,andfiercelylitigated,DMCAhotissues(likehaving“redflagknowledge”).
Intermediary Liability
22
DMCAHighlyDetailedTakedownProcess§ Noticemustprovidespecifiedinfofrom512(c)(3)
§ Inadequatenoticecannotcreateknowledgeandliability.(c)(3)(B)(i).
§ Inadequatenoticecantriggerdutytocoach,orcanbeignored,see(c)(3)(B)(ii).
§ Intermediarymustremove“expeditiously.”§ Counternotice:host“takesreasonablestepspromptlytonotify”theaccused,whomaysubmitcounternoticeasspecifiedin512(g).§ Hostisnotrequired todoso,butgetsadditionalimmunities.§ 10-14daysafterreceiptofcounternotice,hostreinstatescontentunlesscomplainantnotifieshostthatitissuingtheaccused.
Intermediary Liability
23
IntermediaryLiabilityLaw
DialsandKnobs
Intermediary Liability
24
MajorLegalDialsandKnobs1. Protectbroaderornarrowersetoftechnologies
orbusinessmodels2. Permitgreaterorlesserdegreeofplatform
control overcontent3. Defineculpable“knowledge”broadlyornarrowly4. Providemoreorlessdetailedproceduralrulesfor
noticeandtakedown
Intermediary Liability
25
1.ProtectingMoreorFewerIntermediaries§ Byfunction:enumeratetechnologies(likecaching,hosting,etc.)versusbroadlyprotectingunforeseentechnologies.§ Differencesheremaybeparticularlyconsequentialforinnovation.§ Differentrulesfordifferentnetworklayersoftenmakesense.
§ Bysize:definemorestringentrulesforlarger,better-resourcedplatforms.§ Ruleslikethesearehardtodefine.(WhathappenstoWikipedia?Perverseincentivesforgrowth/corporatestructure?)Butintheirabsencelawmakersmaysetrulesthatmakecompetitionbysmallplatformsclosetoimpossible.
Intermediary Liability
26
2.PermittingMoreorLess“Control”§ Ineveryintermediaryliabilitysystem,platformscanloseimmunitybyexercisingtoomuchcontrol.§ Thisisneededatminimumasadefinitionallinebetweenplatformsandcontentcreators.
§ Somesystemsuseconceptslike“passivity”or“neutrality”.§ Defining“control”canbeextremelydifficult
§ Canplatformshaverankingorsearchfunctionalityatall?§ Cantheyprohibitlawfulbutharmfulcontentatall?§ Foreseeabilityissues- doinnovatorsandinvestorsknowwhattoolsareimmunized?
Intermediary Liability
27
3.DefiningCulpable“Knowledge”§ Inmostintermediaryliabilitysystems,platformsloseimmunityforillegalcontentthey“know”about.
§ Law’sdefinition(orlackofdefinition)hasgreatconsequences.Doesplatformremovewhenit…§ Knowsthatthecontentexists?§ Knowsthatsomeoneallegeditwasillegal?§ Knowsthatsomeoneallegeditwasillegalinformalnotice,subjecttopenaltiesformisrepresentation,possibilityoflegalappeal,etc.?
§ Knowsbecausenon-lawyerscanrecognizeitasillegal?§ Knowsbecauselawyersrecognizeitasillegalafterresearchingthelaw?Musttheyseekoutadditionalfacts?Defensesfromtheaccused?
§ Knowsbecauseacourt/publicauthorityhashelditillegal?(ThisisConstitutionallymandatedstandardforsomeclaims/countries)
Intermediary Liability
28
4.ProceduralSafeguards§ Formalitiesforaccuser.
§ Formalrequirementsforinformationincludedinnotice.§ Penaltiesforbadfaithnotice.
§ Opportunityforaccusedspeakertoprovide“counter-notice”defendingspeech.§ Aspartofprivateprocesscarriedoutbyplatform.Note:datasuggeststhishasn’tdonemuchgoodsofar.
§ Aspartofpublicopportunitybeforecourtorregulator.§ Transparencyforindependentreview.
§ LikeLumenDatabase.
Intermediary Liability
29
OtherLegalDialsandKnobs§ Bright-linerulesversusfuzzystandards§ Privateversuspublicusercommunications§ DifferentrulesforinfrastructurelayersofInternet§ Duediligenceordutyofcareversuspenalizingcontrolandknowledge
§ Public/researchtransparency§ Differentrulesfordifferentclaims(childabusevs.defamation,e.g.)
§ LegalconsequencesotherthantakedownmandatesForalotmoredetail,seemyDesignPrinciplesforIntermediaryLiabilityLawspiecewithJorisvanHobokenorBuildYourOwnIntermediaryLiability pieceonBalkinology
Intermediary Liability
30
IntermediaryLiabilityLaw
EmergingQuestionsandIdeas
Intermediary Liability
31
SomeBigQuestions1. Limitsonstatepowertopressureplatformsfor
“voluntary”removalunderTermsofService(TOS)?2. Limitsonplatform powertoremovelawfulexpression
underTOS?3. Limitsonnationalcourtscompellingglobal
removal/delisting?4. Limitsoncompellingintermediariestoactivelypolice,
monitor,orfilterusers’activitiesandexpression?5. Whichregulatorsownplatformcontentissues?(Media
regulators?DPAs?Someoneelse?)6. Ifneitherplatformsnorcourtsareviabledecision-
makers,whatisleft?
Intermediary Liability
32
1.Statesrelyingonplatforms’TOSforcontentremoval§ Byformalagreement:HateSpeechCodeofConduct§ Bystatepractice:InternetReferralUnits§ Humanrightsexpertsandacademicsask:
§ Doesencouragingprivate agreementsthateffectivelyrestrictInternetusers’rights(respeech,surveillance,etc.)violatethestate’s positiveobligationstoprotectfundamentalrights?
§ Arestatesabdicatingtheirowndutytosetrulessubjecttojudicialreviewtoprotectfundamentalrights?
Intermediary Liability
33
2.LimitsonplatformTOSpower(1/2)§ Canusersassertrightstosharelawfulexpressiononprivateplatforms(aka“must-carry”claims)?§ AfewlowercourtsinBrazil(speechrights),Germany(Drittwirkung),andPolandsayYES
§ 30-ishUScasessayNO(seemyWhoDoYouSue paper)§ Competitionandplatformdominancematters.SeeKavanaughanalysisinHalleck,USTA,andPepper(ormyWhoDoYouSue? paper)
Intermediary Liability
34
2.LimitsonplatformTOSpower2/2§ Canusersassertrightstofairandtransparentprocess forplatformTOSenforcement?§ SantaClaraPrinciples:clearlystatedrules,consistentenforcement,appeals,transparencyreports.
§ SomeEUauthoritieshavesaidYES,asamatterofconsumerprotectionlaw.
§ SomeUSproposalswouldvestsimilarpowersinFTC.§ Howwouldtheseprinciplesapplytorankingorrecommendationsystems?
Intermediary Liability
35
3.GlobalRemoval§ Equustek:S.Ct.ofCanadaordersGoogletode-listresultsgloballybasedontradesecretclaim,seesnofreeexpressionconflict
§ CNIL:CJEUsaysFrancecan’trequireglobalGooglede-listingforall RighttoBeForgottenclaims,butcanforsome
§ Glawischnig-Piesczek:CJEUsaysAustrianlawcanrequireglobalFacebooktakedowninsomecasesfordefamation
§ HappeningNow:globalremovalrulingsfromIndia,etc.
Intermediary Liability
36
4.Filtering– PracticalandPolicyIssues1/4
§ Filterscan’treliablydetectcontextofre-usedmaterial§ ISISrecruitmentvideousedbyreportersorincounter-speech
§ Comparechildsexabusecontent,whichhasnolawfulcontext
§ Errorsmayfalldisproportionatelyonspeakersbasedonlanguage,race,nationalorigin,religion§ Sapetal2019
§ Filterscanbeveryexpensivetoimplement(YouTubeContentID$100millionatlastreport)
Intermediary Liability
37
4.Filtering– Legislation2/4
§ EcommerceDirectiveArt.15saysno“general”monitoringduty
§ CopyrightDirectiveArt17§ DraftTerroristContentRegulationmayhavefilteringrequirementbasedonpolice notice(Commission&Councilvs.Parliamentdrafts)
§ EUDigitalServicesAct§ UKOnlineHarmsWhitePaper(referencesmonitoring)
Intermediary Liability
38
4.Filtering- HumanRightsCaseLaw3/4§ CJEU2012SABAM cases:monitoringburdensusers’rightstoprivacyandfreeexpression,host’srighttoconductbusiness
§ ECtHRDelfi andMTErulings:Makinganewssitemonitorusercommentsfordefamation violatesusers’info/expressionrights.Makingitmonitorforhatespeechdoesn’t.
§ CJEU2019Glawischnig-Piesczek case:approvedfilteringforcourt-specifiedcontentunderArticle15§ Withoutdiscussingfundamentalrights§ Seeminglyprecludeshumanreviewoffilters’work
Intermediary Liability
39
4.Filtering- HumanRightsFactors4/4Whatquestionswouldacourtaskintrulyreviewingafilterforfundamentalrightscompliance?§ Accuracyanderrorrateindetectingtechnicalduplicates anddiscerningnewcontext
§ Resultingbenefitstoclaimantorsociety§ ResultingharmstootherInternetusers
§ Qualitative:Whatistheharm– expression,information,dataprotection,privacy,non-discrimination,fairtrial?
§ Quantitative:Howmanypeopleareharmed?A.1%errorratecanaffectmillionsofpeopleaweek.
§ Alternatives toachievesamebenefitwithlessharm
Intermediary Liability
40
5.WhoArethePlatformRegulators?§ Mediaregulatorsarethenaturalownersifyouthinkplatformsarelikebroadcasters.§ Existingmodelbarring“harmfulbutlegal”speech§ UKOnlineHarmsWhitePaper§ AudioVisualMediaServicesDirective§ CoversYouTubeandothervideohosts
§ DataProtectionAuthoritiesalreadyoverseeintermediaryliabilityissuesfor“RighttoBeForgotten”
§ InUS– FTC?FCC?
Intermediary Liability
41
7.AFacebookSupremeCourtforEveryone?§ Problem:Everyoneisbadatcontentmoderationatscale
§ Platforms messupallthetime.Evena99.99%perfectjobleavesglaringerrors.
§ Courts/regulatorsdon’thavetheresources,Iftheyusedplatform-styleadjudicationshortcuts,itwouldviolatedueprocessguarantees.
§ FacebookOversightBoardaka“FBSupremeCourt”willatbestsolveatinyportionofthisproblem(whichIamhopefulfor.)Atworst,itwillbeapoliticized,mistrustedfailure.Weneedtimetowatchthisexperimentplayoutbeforebuildingonthismodel!
§ Noonehasevertriedtoregulatethismuch(previouslyephemeral)humanbehavior.Itwasneverpossible.Ourlawsandphilosophyhavenorealmodelfordoingitatthisscale.
Intermediary Liability
42
WaysForward?(1/2)§ Bettertakedownprocesses
§ Clearlyneeded,low-hangingfruit§ Notenoughtocounteractover-removalincentives§ Maybehardforsmallplatforms,hurtcompetitiongoals
§ TwoemergingideasthatareimportantbutalsoIMOcurrentlyunder-researchedandunder-theorized.Weneedveryseriousanalysisandcross-fieldcollaboration.I’mnotsayingdon’tdothese,justthinkalotbeforeacting.§ “Must-carry”ruleslimitingplatformpowertotakecontentdownunderTOS.(SeeWhoDoYouSue paperlistingmodels)
§ Regulationofrankingandalgorithms.(Thisismynextbigresearchproject.Ibelievethisisincredibly,incrediblycomplicatedandeasytomessup.)
Intermediary Liability
43
WaysForward?(2/2)§ Meaningfulplatformtakedowntransparency(notjustaggregatedata)iskey.Lawmakersneedbetterinformationtoregulatewisely.
§ Considerplatforms’strengths(speed,financialresources,automation)versuspublicauthorities’(applyinglaw,protectingrights,democraticaccountability).Allocateresponsibilitiesaccordingly.
§ Vetproposalsagainst,atminimum:§ Threerecurringplayers:claimant,platform,accused.§ Threebiggoals:anti-harm,expression,innovation.
Intermediary Liability
44
ThankYou
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/daphne-keller@daphnehk