Post on 19-May-2015
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Intentionalism about Pain
Angela Mendelovici
Philosophy 4991F/9407The University of Western Ontario
November 18, 2010
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Outline
1 Intentionalism
2 The problem with pain
3 Bodily damage
4 Modes of presentation
5 Imperatives
6 General worries
7 Primitivism
8 Reductionism
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Outline
1 Intentionalism
2 The problem with pain
3 Bodily damage
4 Modes of presentation
5 Imperatives
6 General worries
7 Primitivism
8 Reductionism
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Two mental phenomena
Phenomenal consciousness
It’s “like something” to be in certain states (Nagel, 1974).
What it’s like is a state’s phenomenal character.
Mental representation
Some mental states display aboutness, ofness, or intentionality(Brentano, 1874).
Some mental states represent, or have content.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Two mental phenomena
Phenomenal consciousness
It’s “like something” to be in certain states (Nagel, 1974).
What it’s like is a state’s phenomenal character.
Mental representation
Some mental states display aboutness, ofness, or intentionality(Brentano, 1874).
Some mental states represent, or have content.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Two mental phenomena
Phenomenal consciousness
It’s “like something” to be in certain states (Nagel, 1974).
What it’s like is a state’s phenomenal character.
Mental representation
Some mental states display aboutness, ofness, or intentionality(Brentano, 1874).
Some mental states represent, or have content.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Two mental phenomena
Are these two mental features related?
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Two mental phenomena
Intentionalism
Phenomenal character is in some way determined byrepresentational content.
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Pure versus impure intentionalism
Pure intentionalism
Phenomenal character is determined by representationalcontent alone.
Impure intentionalism
Phenomenal character is determined by representationalcontent and certain non-representational features(e.g. functional role).
On impure intentionalism, but not on pure intentionalism, it ispossible to have two states alike in representational contentbut differing in phenomenal character.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Pure versus impure intentionalism
Pure intentionalism
Phenomenal character is determined by representationalcontent alone.
Impure intentionalism
Phenomenal character is determined by representationalcontent and certain non-representational features(e.g. functional role).
On impure intentionalism, but not on pure intentionalism, it ispossible to have two states alike in representational contentbut differing in phenomenal character.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Pure versus impure intentionalism
Pure intentionalism
Phenomenal character is determined by representationalcontent alone.
Impure intentionalism
Phenomenal character is determined by representationalcontent and certain non-representational features(e.g. functional role).
On impure intentionalism, but not on pure intentionalism, it ispossible to have two states alike in representational contentbut differing in phenomenal character.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Pure intentionalism is preferable
Transparency intuitions only properly motivate the relevanceof representational content to phenomenal character, not therelevance of other features.
If we want to include extra ingredients, they will have to beindependently motivated.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Pure intentionalism is preferable
Transparency intuitions only properly motivate the relevanceof representational content to phenomenal character, not therelevance of other features.
If we want to include extra ingredients, they will have to beindependently motivated.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Pure intentionalism is preferable
Transparency intuitions only properly motivate the relevanceof representational content to phenomenal character, not therelevance of other features.
If we want to include extra ingredients, they will have to beindependently motivated.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Outline
1 Intentionalism
2 The problem with pain
3 Bodily damage
4 Modes of presentation
5 Imperatives
6 General worries
7 Primitivism
8 Reductionism
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Unavailable contents
Sometimes it is easy to findrepresentational contents that “match” agiven phenomenal character.
But other times, there’s no goodcandidate content.
. . . as in the case of pain.
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Unavailable contents
Sometimes it is easy to findrepresentational contents that “match” agiven phenomenal character.
But other times, there’s no goodcandidate content.
. . . as in the case of pain.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Unavailable contents
Sometimes it is easy to findrepresentational contents that “match” agiven phenomenal character.
But other times, there’s no goodcandidate content.
. . . as in the case of pain.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Pain
The challenge with pain is to find therepresentational contents that account for thephenomenal character of pain-experience.
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Outline
1 Intentionalism
2 The problem with pain
3 Bodily damage
4 Modes of presentation
5 Imperatives
6 General worries
7 Primitivism
8 Reductionism
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Tye’s view
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage ata certain bodily location and of a certaintype. (Tye, 1995, 2000)
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Types of pain
Twinge of pain mild, brief bodily disturbance
Throbbing pain rapidly pulsing disturbance
Ache disorder inside the body withindeterminate boundaries
Stabbing pain sudden damage overwell-defined bodily region
Pricking pain damage with sudden beginningand ending, covering tiny area
Racking pain damage involving stretching ofinternal body parts
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Tye’s view
It does seem that when I’m in pain, I’mrepresenting a bodily location.
And it does seem that pain-experiences causebeliefs about bodily damage.
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Tye’s view
It does seem that when I’m in pain, I’mrepresenting a bodily location.
And it does seem that pain-experiences causebeliefs about bodily damage.
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Problem
Does this capture the phenomenology ofpain?
It leaves the painfulness of pain out.
And it lets in other contents that don’t doany work in determining thephenomenology.
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Problem
Does this capture the phenomenology ofpain?
It leaves the painfulness of pain out.
And it lets in other contents that don’t doany work in determining thephenomenology.
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Problem
Does this capture the phenomenology ofpain?
It leaves the painfulness of pain out.
And it lets in other contents that don’t doany work in determining thephenomenology.
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Possible response
Response: Pain-experiences represent bodilydamange non-conceptually.
First pass at non-conceptual content: Arepresentation R has non-conceptual contentC iff R’s content can be entertained even if asubject lacks a concept of C
A subject S has a concept of C iff S canrecognize instances of C on separateoccasions
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Possible response
Response: Pain-experiences represent bodilydamange non-conceptually.
First pass at non-conceptual content: Arepresentation R has non-conceptual contentC iff R’s content can be entertained even if asubject lacks a concept of C
A subject S has a concept of C iff S canrecognize instances of C on separateoccasions
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Possible response
Response: Pain-experiences represent bodilydamange non-conceptually.
First pass at non-conceptual content: Arepresentation R has non-conceptual contentC iff R’s content can be entertained even if asubject lacks a concept of C
A subject S has a concept of C iff S canrecognize instances of C on separateoccasions
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Problems with Tye’s response
1 This constrains what Tye can say in otherpossible cases where concepts do seem tomake a difference to phenomenal character
2 It seems arbitrary that whether or not I canrecognize a type of pain on separateoccasions has anything to do withphenomenal character
3 This is impure intentionalism
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Problems with Tye’s response
1 This constrains what Tye can say in otherpossible cases where concepts do seem tomake a difference to phenomenal character
2 It seems arbitrary that whether or not I canrecognize a type of pain on separateoccasions has anything to do withphenomenal character
3 This is impure intentionalism
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Problems with Tye’s response
1 This constrains what Tye can say in otherpossible cases where concepts do seem tomake a difference to phenomenal character
2 It seems arbitrary that whether or not I canrecognize a type of pain on separateoccasions has anything to do withphenomenal character
3 This is impure intentionalism
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Outline
1 Intentionalism
2 The problem with pain
3 Bodily damage
4 Modes of presentation
5 Imperatives
6 General worries
7 Primitivism
8 Reductionism
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Modes of presentation
Bain’s proposal
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage undera particular MoP (Bain, 2003).
To illustrate, compare:1 Feeling your damaged limb2 Seeing your damaged limb
What accounts for the phenomenal difference?
In (1), you experience your limb as manifestlyyour own, whereas in (2) you merely experienceit as your own
Manifestly representing your foot is representingit in a way that grounds first-person immunejudgments.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Modes of presentation
Bain’s proposal
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage undera particular MoP (Bain, 2003).
To illustrate, compare:1 Feeling your damaged limb2 Seeing your damaged limb
What accounts for the phenomenal difference?
In (1), you experience your limb as manifestlyyour own, whereas in (2) you merely experienceit as your own
Manifestly representing your foot is representingit in a way that grounds first-person immunejudgments.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Modes of presentation
Bain’s proposal
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage undera particular MoP (Bain, 2003).
To illustrate, compare:1 Feeling your damaged limb2 Seeing your damaged limb
What accounts for the phenomenal difference?
In (1), you experience your limb as manifestlyyour own, whereas in (2) you merely experienceit as your own
Manifestly representing your foot is representingit in a way that grounds first-person immunejudgments.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Modes of presentation
Bain’s proposal
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage undera particular MoP (Bain, 2003).
To illustrate, compare:1 Feeling your damaged limb2 Seeing your damaged limb
What accounts for the phenomenal difference?
In (1), you experience your limb as manifestlyyour own, whereas in (2) you merely experienceit as your own
Manifestly representing your foot is representingit in a way that grounds first-person immunejudgments.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Modes of presentation
Bain’s proposal
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage undera particular MoP (Bain, 2003).
To illustrate, compare:1 Feeling your damaged limb2 Seeing your damaged limb
What accounts for the phenomenal difference?
In (1), you experience your limb as manifestlyyour own, whereas in (2) you merely experienceit as your own
Manifestly representing your foot is representingit in a way that grounds first-person immunejudgments.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Modes of presentation
Bain’s proposal
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage undera particular MoP (Bain, 2003).
To illustrate, compare:1 Feeling your damaged limb2 Seeing your damaged limb
What accounts for the phenomenal difference?
In (1), you experience your limb as manifestlyyour own, whereas in (2) you merely experienceit as your own
Manifestly representing your foot is representingit in a way that grounds first-person immunejudgments.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Modes of presentation
Bain’s proposal
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage undera particular MoP (Bain, 2003).
To illustrate, compare:1 Feeling your damaged limb2 Seeing your damaged limb
What accounts for the phenomenal difference?
In (1), you experience your limb as manifestlyyour own, whereas in (2) you merely experienceit as your own
Manifestly representing your foot is representingit in a way that grounds first-person immunejudgments.
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First-person immunity
To illustrate, compare:1 Feeling your damaged limb2 Seeing your damaged limb
FP immunity is immunity to error throughmisidentification of oneself
On the basis of (1), I know it’s my foot andcan’t be mistaken about that
Given (2), I might still ask, “That foot issomeone’s foot, but is it my foot?”
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First-person immunity
To illustrate, compare:1 Feeling your damaged limb2 Seeing your damaged limb
FP immunity is immunity to error throughmisidentification of oneself
On the basis of (1), I know it’s my foot andcan’t be mistaken about that
Given (2), I might still ask, “That foot issomeone’s foot, but is it my foot?”
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
First-person immunity
To illustrate, compare:1 Feeling your damaged limb2 Seeing your damaged limb
FP immunity is immunity to error throughmisidentification of oneself
On the basis of (1), I know it’s my foot andcan’t be mistaken about that
Given (2), I might still ask, “That foot issomeone’s foot, but is it my foot?”
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
First-person immunity
To illustrate, compare:1 Feeling your damaged limb2 Seeing your damaged limb
FP immunity is immunity to error throughmisidentification of oneself
On the basis of (1), I know it’s my foot andcan’t be mistaken about that
Given (2), I might still ask, “That foot issomeone’s foot, but is it my foot?”
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Rubber hand illusion
In the rubber hand illusion, you mistakenlyexperience stimuli applied to rubber hand asapplied to your hand.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
TCQbygjG0RU&NR=1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
PsT-KZpkgrw
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Rubber hand illusion
In the rubber hand illusion, you mistakenlyexperience stimuli applied to rubber hand asapplied to your hand.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
TCQbygjG0RU&NR=1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
PsT-KZpkgrw
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Rubber hand illusion
Mistaken attribution of proprioceptiveexperiences
But also possibly mistaken attribution ofpain-experiences too:
In one study, Armel and Ramachandran(2003) bent the finger of the rubber handand only slightly lifted the finger of the realhand. Subjects anticipated pain. 2/120claimed they actually felt pain.
So, our pain-experiences are not FP immune.You can be mistaken that the object of thedamage is your hand.
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Rubber hand illusion
Mistaken attribution of proprioceptiveexperiences
But also possibly mistaken attribution ofpain-experiences too:
In one study, Armel and Ramachandran(2003) bent the finger of the rubber handand only slightly lifted the finger of the realhand. Subjects anticipated pain. 2/120claimed they actually felt pain.
So, our pain-experiences are not FP immune.You can be mistaken that the object of thedamage is your hand.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Rubber hand illusion
Mistaken attribution of proprioceptiveexperiences
But also possibly mistaken attribution ofpain-experiences too:
In one study, Armel and Ramachandran(2003) bent the finger of the rubber handand only slightly lifted the finger of the realhand. Subjects anticipated pain. 2/120claimed they actually felt pain.
So, our pain-experiences are not FP immune.You can be mistaken that the object of thedamage is your hand.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Rubber hand illusion
Mistaken attribution of proprioceptiveexperiences
But also possibly mistaken attribution ofpain-experiences too:
In one study, Armel and Ramachandran(2003) bent the finger of the rubber handand only slightly lifted the finger of the realhand. Subjects anticipated pain. 2/120claimed they actually felt pain.
So, our pain-experiences are not FP immune.You can be mistaken that the object of thedamage is your hand.
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What the idea has got to be
Forget FP immunity
Pain-experiences automatically represent you oryour body parts in every experience (veridicallyor not).
Visual experiences don’t automatically representyou or your body parts.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
What the idea has got to be
Forget FP immunity
Pain-experiences automatically represent you oryour body parts in every experience (veridicallyor not).
Visual experiences don’t automatically representyou or your body parts.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
What the idea has got to be
Forget FP immunity
Pain-experiences automatically represent you oryour body parts in every experience (veridicallyor not).
Visual experiences don’t automatically representyou or your body parts.
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Another option
In the pain-experience but not the visualexperience of a damaged foot, “I experiencedisorder as located within a boundary of whoseexterior I can have no similar awareness” (p. 523)
Inspired by Michael Martin
Basic idea: somatosensory experiences onlyrepresent what’s on or beneath the skin, butvision can represent things outside of the skintoo
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Another option
In the pain-experience but not the visualexperience of a damaged foot, “I experiencedisorder as located within a boundary of whoseexterior I can have no similar awareness” (p. 523)
Inspired by Michael Martin
Basic idea: somatosensory experiences onlyrepresent what’s on or beneath the skin, butvision can represent things outside of the skintoo
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Another option
In the pain-experience but not the visualexperience of a damaged foot, “I experiencedisorder as located within a boundary of whoseexterior I can have no similar awareness” (p. 523)
Inspired by Michael Martin
Basic idea: somatosensory experiences onlyrepresent what’s on or beneath the skin, butvision can represent things outside of the skintoo
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Problems
1 How does FP immunity, or manifest orautomatic representation of oneself or one’sbody, or being of a type of experience that canonly represent from the skin-in turn arepresentation of bodily damage into anexperience with the phenomenal character ofpain?
Story seems incomplete. How do the twofactors interact?And implausible.
2 Is this really a representational difference?
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Problems
1 How does FP immunity, or manifest orautomatic representation of oneself or one’sbody, or being of a type of experience that canonly represent from the skin-in turn arepresentation of bodily damage into anexperience with the phenomenal character ofpain?
Story seems incomplete. How do the twofactors interact?And implausible.
2 Is this really a representational difference?
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Problems
1 How does FP immunity, or manifest orautomatic representation of oneself or one’sbody, or being of a type of experience that canonly represent from the skin-in turn arepresentation of bodily damage into anexperience with the phenomenal character ofpain?
Story seems incomplete. How do the twofactors interact?And implausible.
2 Is this really a representational difference?
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Problems
1 How does FP immunity, or manifest orautomatic representation of oneself or one’sbody, or being of a type of experience that canonly represent from the skin-in turn arepresentation of bodily damage into anexperience with the phenomenal character ofpain?
Story seems incomplete. How do the twofactors interact?And implausible.
2 Is this really a representational difference?
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Modes of presentation
Problems1 The MoP is doing almost all the work (save the
part of phenomenology deriving fromrepresentation of bodily location).
2 MoPs are themselves representational. But whatdo they represent that accounts for the feltpainfulness of pain? We’re back where westarted.
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Modes of presentation
Problems1 The MoP is doing almost all the work (save the
part of phenomenology deriving fromrepresentation of bodily location).
2 MoPs are themselves representational. But whatdo they represent that accounts for the feltpainfulness of pain? We’re back where westarted.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Outline
1 Intentionalism
2 The problem with pain
3 Bodily damage
4 Modes of presentation
5 Imperatives
6 General worries
7 Primitivism
8 Reductionism
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Imperative content
Possible solution
Pain-experiences represent imperativecontents (Klein, 2007).
They don’t represent bodily damage at all.
They represent something like don’t step onthat foot!
Compare: Itches plausibly represent scratchhere!
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Imperative content
Possible solution
Pain-experiences represent imperativecontents (Klein, 2007).
They don’t represent bodily damage at all.
They represent something like don’t step onthat foot!
Compare: Itches plausibly represent scratchhere!
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Imperative content
Possible solution
Pain-experiences represent imperativecontents (Klein, 2007).
They don’t represent bodily damage at all.
They represent something like don’t step onthat foot!
Compare: Itches plausibly represent scratchhere!
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Imperative content
Possible solution
Pain-experiences represent imperativecontents (Klein, 2007).
They don’t represent bodily damage at all.
They represent something like don’t step onthat foot!
Compare: Itches plausibly represent scratchhere!
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Negative imperatives
Pain-experiences represent negativeimperatives, not positive imperatives.
They tell you what not to do, not what to do.
Don’t step on that foot!
What about withdrawing from a flame?
Don’t stay there or get closer!
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Negative imperatives
Pain-experiences represent negativeimperatives, not positive imperatives.
They tell you what not to do, not what to do.
Don’t step on that foot!
What about withdrawing from a flame?
Don’t stay there or get closer!
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Negative imperatives
Pain-experiences represent negativeimperatives, not positive imperatives.
They tell you what not to do, not what to do.
Don’t step on that foot!
What about withdrawing from a flame?
Don’t stay there or get closer!
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Negative imperatives
Pain-experiences represent negativeimperatives, not positive imperatives.
They tell you what not to do, not what to do.
Don’t step on that foot!
What about withdrawing from a flame?
Don’t stay there or get closer!
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Negative imperatives
Pain-experiences represent negativeimperatives, not positive imperatives.
They tell you what not to do, not what to do.
Don’t step on that foot!
What about withdrawing from a flame?
Don’t stay there or get closer!
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The biological function of pain
The biological function of pain is not to tellus about bodily damage, but rather to keepour bodies healthy and intact.
Klein’s proposal accommodates this nicely.
Pain-experiences tell us what to do to keepus safe, rather than reporting on bodilydamage and letting us choose what to dowith the reports.
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The biological function of pain
The biological function of pain is not to tellus about bodily damage, but rather to keepour bodies healthy and intact.
Klein’s proposal accommodates this nicely.
Pain-experiences tell us what to do to keepus safe, rather than reporting on bodilydamage and letting us choose what to dowith the reports.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
The biological function of pain
The biological function of pain is not to tellus about bodily damage, but rather to keepour bodies healthy and intact.
Klein’s proposal accommodates this nicely.
Pain-experiences tell us what to do to keepus safe, rather than reporting on bodilydamage and letting us choose what to dowith the reports.
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Morphine pain
On morphine, patients report that they stillfeel pain, but that it doesn’t bother themanymore.
Problem: Looks like such patients lack anyimperative content relating to their damagedlimbs, so should not feel pain, on Klein’stheory.
Klein: They still have the relevant negativeimperative contents, but they’re not trying todo anything, so there’s nothing forpain-experiences to stop them from doing.
Like a stop sign in a ghost town
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Morphine pain
On morphine, patients report that they stillfeel pain, but that it doesn’t bother themanymore.
Problem: Looks like such patients lack anyimperative content relating to their damagedlimbs, so should not feel pain, on Klein’stheory.
Klein: They still have the relevant negativeimperative contents, but they’re not trying todo anything, so there’s nothing forpain-experiences to stop them from doing.
Like a stop sign in a ghost town
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Morphine pain
On morphine, patients report that they stillfeel pain, but that it doesn’t bother themanymore.
Problem: Looks like such patients lack anyimperative content relating to their damagedlimbs, so should not feel pain, on Klein’stheory.
Klein: They still have the relevant negativeimperative contents, but they’re not trying todo anything, so there’s nothing forpain-experiences to stop them from doing.
Like a stop sign in a ghost town
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Morphine pain
On morphine, patients report that they stillfeel pain, but that it doesn’t bother themanymore.
Problem: Looks like such patients lack anyimperative content relating to their damagedlimbs, so should not feel pain, on Klein’stheory.
Klein: They still have the relevant negativeimperative contents, but they’re not trying todo anything, so there’s nothing forpain-experiences to stop them from doing.
Like a stop sign in a ghost town
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Problems
1 Is it plausible that pain-experiences representimperative content?
2 In all cases of pain? Headaches?
3 Is representing an imperative versusstatement a representational difference?
4 Does imperative content capture thephenomenal character of pain-experiences?Do pains feel like prohibitions againstactions?
5 Relatedly, how do we distinguish pain fromnausea? Does nausea represent Don’t moveor eat anything! ?
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Problems
1 Is it plausible that pain-experiences representimperative content?
2 In all cases of pain? Headaches?
3 Is representing an imperative versusstatement a representational difference?
4 Does imperative content capture thephenomenal character of pain-experiences?Do pains feel like prohibitions againstactions?
5 Relatedly, how do we distinguish pain fromnausea? Does nausea represent Don’t moveor eat anything! ?
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Problems
1 Is it plausible that pain-experiences representimperative content?
2 In all cases of pain? Headaches?
3 Is representing an imperative versusstatement a representational difference?
4 Does imperative content capture thephenomenal character of pain-experiences?Do pains feel like prohibitions againstactions?
5 Relatedly, how do we distinguish pain fromnausea? Does nausea represent Don’t moveor eat anything! ?
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Problems
1 Is it plausible that pain-experiences representimperative content?
2 In all cases of pain? Headaches?
3 Is representing an imperative versusstatement a representational difference?
4 Does imperative content capture thephenomenal character of pain-experiences?Do pains feel like prohibitions againstactions?
5 Relatedly, how do we distinguish pain fromnausea? Does nausea represent Don’t moveor eat anything! ?
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Problems
1 Is it plausible that pain-experiences representimperative content?
2 In all cases of pain? Headaches?
3 Is representing an imperative versusstatement a representational difference?
4 Does imperative content capture thephenomenal character of pain-experiences?Do pains feel like prohibitions againstactions?
5 Relatedly, how do we distinguish pain fromnausea? Does nausea represent Don’t moveor eat anything! ?
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Outline
1 Intentionalism
2 The problem with pain
3 Bodily damage
4 Modes of presentation
5 Imperatives
6 General worries
7 Primitivism
8 Reductionism
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General worries
In the case of experiences of triangularity,we could find an actually-instantiatedproperty that we plausibly represent thataccounts for their phenomenal character.
The challenge with the case of pain is tofind some represented contents thatcapture its phenomenal character.
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General worries
In the case of experiences of triangularity,we could find an actually-instantiatedproperty that we plausibly represent thataccounts for their phenomenal character.
The challenge with the case of pain is tofind some represented contents thatcapture its phenomenal character.
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General worries
We pick a content C that we plausiblythink pain-experiences might represent,but it doesn’t capture the feel.
So we cloak it with something else(non-conceptual/conceptual content,modes of presentation, a differentillocutionary force).
It’s unclear how this new ingredient willtransform C into pain-phenomenology.
And if it does, it looks like the newingredient does all the work, and therepresentational content falls out of thepicture or plays a diminished role.
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General worries
We pick a content C that we plausiblythink pain-experiences might represent,but it doesn’t capture the feel.
So we cloak it with something else(non-conceptual/conceptual content,modes of presentation, a differentillocutionary force).
It’s unclear how this new ingredient willtransform C into pain-phenomenology.
And if it does, it looks like the newingredient does all the work, and therepresentational content falls out of thepicture or plays a diminished role.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
General worries
We pick a content C that we plausiblythink pain-experiences might represent,but it doesn’t capture the feel.
So we cloak it with something else(non-conceptual/conceptual content,modes of presentation, a differentillocutionary force).
It’s unclear how this new ingredient willtransform C into pain-phenomenology.
And if it does, it looks like the newingredient does all the work, and therepresentational content falls out of thepicture or plays a diminished role.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
General worries
We pick a content C that we plausiblythink pain-experiences might represent,but it doesn’t capture the feel.
So we cloak it with something else(non-conceptual/conceptual content,modes of presentation, a differentillocutionary force).
It’s unclear how this new ingredient willtransform C into pain-phenomenology.
And if it does, it looks like the newingredient does all the work, and therepresentational content falls out of thepicture or plays a diminished role.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
General worries
We pick a content C that we plausiblythink pain-experiences might represent,but it doesn’t capture the feel.
So we cloak it with something else(non-conceptual/conceptual content,modes of presentation, a differentillocutionary force).
It’s unclear how this new ingredient willtransform C into pain-phenomenology.
And if it does, it looks like the newingredient does all the work, and therepresentational content falls out of thepicture or plays a diminished role.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
General worries
We pick a content C that we plausiblythink pain-experiences might represent,but it doesn’t capture the feel.
So we cloak it with something else(non-conceptual/conceptual content,modes of presentation, a differentillocutionary force).
It’s unclear how this new ingredient willtransform C into pain-phenomenology.
And if it does, it looks like the newingredient does all the work, and therepresentational content falls out of thepicture or plays a diminished role.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Suggestion
Take pain-experiences at face value.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Outline
1 Intentionalism
2 The problem with pain
3 Bodily damage
4 Modes of presentation
5 Imperatives
6 General worries
7 Primitivism
8 Reductionism
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Primitivism
Proposed solution
Pain-experiences represent bodilyparts/locations as having sui generis painproperties.
There are different kinds of painproperties: stingy-painful,throbbing-painful, etc.
Pain properties are exactly what theyappear to be (as opposed to somethingelse).
This is a version of pure intentionalism.
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Primitivism
Proposed solution
Pain-experiences represent bodilyparts/locations as having sui generis painproperties.
There are different kinds of painproperties: stingy-painful,throbbing-painful, etc.
Pain properties are exactly what theyappear to be (as opposed to somethingelse).
This is a version of pure intentionalism.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Primitivism
Proposed solution
Pain-experiences represent bodilyparts/locations as having sui generis painproperties.
There are different kinds of painproperties: stingy-painful,throbbing-painful, etc.
Pain properties are exactly what theyappear to be (as opposed to somethingelse).
This is a version of pure intentionalism.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Primitivism
Proposed solution
Pain-experiences represent bodilyparts/locations as having sui generis painproperties.
There are different kinds of painproperties: stingy-painful,throbbing-painful, etc.
Pain properties are exactly what theyappear to be (as opposed to somethingelse).
This is a version of pure intentionalism.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Primitivism
Proposed solution
Pain-experiences represent bodilyparts/locations as having sui generis painproperties.
There are different kinds of painproperties: stingy-painful,throbbing-painful, etc.
Pain properties are exactly what theyappear to be (as opposed to somethingelse).
This is a version of pure intentionalism.
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Uninstantiated pain properties
These properties are probably neverinstantiated.
We reliably misrepresent our body partsas being painful.
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Uninstantiated pain properties
These properties are probably neverinstantiated.
We reliably misrepresent our body partsas being painful.
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Reliable misrepresentation
A state reliably misrepresents when all ormost of its activations (or tokens) arenonveridical and occur in similarcircumstances.
Reliable misrepresentation arises when arepresentation represents one thing buttracks something else.
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Reliable misrepresentation
A state reliably misrepresents when all ormost of its activations (or tokens) arenonveridical and occur in similarcircumstances.
Reliable misrepresentation arises when arepresentation represents one thing buttracks something else.
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Reliable misrepresentation
A state reliably misrepresents when all ormost of its activations (or tokens) arenonveridical and occur in similarcircumstances.
Reliable misrepresentation arises when arepresentation represents one thing buttracks something else.
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Reliable misrepresentation
Objection
How can pain-experiences systematicallymisrepresent when they are so useful inhelping us survive?
Response
Reliable misrepresentation can be just asuseful as veridical perception.
Reliable misrepresentation allows us torespond differently to different situations.
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Reliable misrepresentation
Objection
How can pain-experiences systematicallymisrepresent when they are so useful inhelping us survive?
Response
Reliable misrepresentation can be just asuseful as veridical perception.
Reliable misrepresentation allows us torespond differently to different situations.
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Reliable misrepresentation
Objection
How can pain-experiences systematicallymisrepresent when they are so useful inhelping us survive?
Response
Reliable misrepresentation can be just asuseful as veridical perception.
Reliable misrepresentation allows us torespond differently to different situations.
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Reliable misrepresentation
Objection
How can pain-experiences systematicallymisrepresent when they are so useful inhelping us survive?
Response
Reliable misrepresentation can be just asuseful as veridical perception.
Reliable misrepresentation allows us torespond differently to different situations.
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Reliable misrepresentation
We might need to say the same thingabout color experiences.
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Reliable misrepresentation
We might need to say the same thingabout color experiences.
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Tracking theories of mental representation
This view is not open to the tracking theorist.
According to tracking theories, mentalrepresentation is a species of causal orcausally-mediated co-variation relation, atracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995).
We are just sophisticated thermometers.
This is related to a general problem of trackingviews in allowing for adaptive and reliablemisrepresentation.
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Tracking theories of mental representation
This view is not open to the tracking theorist.
According to tracking theories, mentalrepresentation is a species of causal orcausally-mediated co-variation relation, atracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995).
We are just sophisticated thermometers.
This is related to a general problem of trackingviews in allowing for adaptive and reliablemisrepresentation.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Tracking theories of mental representation
This view is not open to the tracking theorist.
According to tracking theories, mentalrepresentation is a species of causal orcausally-mediated co-variation relation, atracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995).
We are just sophisticated thermometers.
This is related to a general problem of trackingviews in allowing for adaptive and reliablemisrepresentation.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Tracking theories of mental representation
This view is not open to the tracking theorist.
According to tracking theories, mentalrepresentation is a species of causal orcausally-mediated co-variation relation, atracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995).
We are just sophisticated thermometers.
This is related to a general problem of trackingviews in allowing for adaptive and reliablemisrepresentation.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Tracking theories of mental representation
This view is not open to the tracking theorist.
According to tracking theories, mentalrepresentation is a species of causal orcausally-mediated co-variation relation, atracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995).
We are just sophisticated thermometers.
This is related to a general problem of trackingviews in allowing for adaptive and reliablemisrepresentation.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Summary
Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism.
Other examples:
Itches and other bodily sensationsSweetnessColorHotness and coldness
The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms ofreliable misrepresentation of body parts or locations as havingsui generis pain properties.
This strategy is not open to the tracking theorist.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Summary
Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism.
Other examples:
Itches and other bodily sensationsSweetnessColorHotness and coldness
The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms ofreliable misrepresentation of body parts or locations as havingsui generis pain properties.
This strategy is not open to the tracking theorist.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Summary
Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism.
Other examples:
Itches and other bodily sensationsSweetnessColorHotness and coldness
The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms ofreliable misrepresentation of body parts or locations as havingsui generis pain properties.
This strategy is not open to the tracking theorist.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Summary
Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism.
Other examples:
Itches and other bodily sensationsSweetnessColorHotness and coldness
The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms ofreliable misrepresentation of body parts or locations as havingsui generis pain properties.
This strategy is not open to the tracking theorist.
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Intentionalism The problem Bodily damage MoPs Imperatives General worries Primitivism Reductionism References
Outline
1 Intentionalism
2 The problem with pain
3 Bodily damage
4 Modes of presentation
5 Imperatives
6 General worries
7 Primitivism
8 Reductionism
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The reductive intentionalist program
Reductive intentionalists will complain that pureintentionalism, as I have described it, requires abandoning thisproject.
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The reductive intentionalist program
Reductive intentionalists will complain that pureintentionalism, as I have described it, requires abandoning thisproject.
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Reductionism
But their project fails anyway: If representation is justtracking, we can’t adequately deal with pain.
A failed reduction is not a reduction.
There may be reason to think we can’t account forrepresentation in terms of tracking either.
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Reductionism
But their project fails anyway: If representation is justtracking, we can’t adequately deal with pain.
A failed reduction is not a reduction.
There may be reason to think we can’t account forrepresentation in terms of tracking either.
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Reductionism
But their project fails anyway: If representation is justtracking, we can’t adequately deal with pain.
A failed reduction is not a reduction.
There may be reason to think we can’t account forrepresentation in terms of tracking either.
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The state of the debate so far
No one has a reductive theory.
You don’t get points just for trying.
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The state of the debate so far
No one has a reductive theory.
You don’t get points just for trying.
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Reductionism
But intentionalism is still well-motivated.1 Transparency intuitions2 A unified theory of mind
So it’s worth pursuing intentionalism independent of acommitment to reductionism.
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Reductionism
But intentionalism is still well-motivated.1 Transparency intuitions2 A unified theory of mind
So it’s worth pursuing intentionalism independent of acommitment to reductionism.
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Reductionism
But intentionalism is still well-motivated.1 Transparency intuitions2 A unified theory of mind
So it’s worth pursuing intentionalism independent of acommitment to reductionism.
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The End
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References
Armel, K. C. and Ramachandran, V. S. (2003). Projecting sensations toexternal objects: evidence from skin conductance response. Proc. R. Soc.Lond., 270:1499–1506.
Bain, D. (2003). Intentionalism and pain. Philosophical Quarterly, 53:502–552.Brentano, F. (1973/1874). Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge.Klein, C. (2007). An imperative theory of pain. The Journal of Philosophy,
104(10):517–532.Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review,
83(4):435–450.Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of
the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge.Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press, Cambridge.
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