Identity Management: Dealing with Disclosure

Latanya Sweeney, PhD

privacy.cs.cmu.edu latanya@privacy.cs.cmu.edu

“constructing identity management solutions that are provably appropriate for a particular context"

1.Privacy is here to stay.2.Computer scientist must help solve this problem.3.Selective Revelation4.Example: video surveillance5.Example: bio-terrorism surveillance6.Example: identity theft7.Example: distributed surveillance8.Example: privacy-preserving surveillance 9.Example: DNA privacy10.Example: Identity theft protections11.Example: k-Anonymity12.Example: Webcam surveillance13.Example: Text de-identification14.Example: Policy specification and enforcement15.Example: Scam Spam

Privacy Technology

privacy.cs.cmu.edu

1.Privacy is here to stay.2.Computer scientist must help solve this problem.3.Selective Revelation4.Example: video surveillance5.Example: bio-terrorism surveillance6.Example: identity theft7.Example: distributed surveillance8.Example: privacy-preserving surveillance 9.Example: DNA privacy10.Example: Identity theft protections11.Example: k-Anonymity12.Example: Webcam surveillance13.Example: Text de-identification14.Example: Policy specification and enforcement15.Example: Scam Spam

Privacy Technology

privacy.cs.cmu.edu

6. Example: Identity theft

10. Example: Identity theft protections

HandShot ID A Fast 3-D Imaging

System for Capturing

Fingerprints, Palm Prints and Hand Geometry

Latanya Sweeney, PhDSchool of Computer ScienceCarnegie Mellon Universitylatanya@cs.cmu.edu

Victor Weedn, MD, JDForensic Science ProgramDuquesne Universityweednv@duq.edu

Very Grateful to the U.S. Department of Justice for the opportunity to build HandShot and study the science of fingerprint matching.

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privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/handshot/index.html

How should policy makers think about drafting policy for RFID technologies?

Testimony European Union Commission

privacy.cs.cmu.edu

1. Cornerstones of privacy protection can be incorporated within many ubiquitous technology applications to provide privacy protection.

2. Focus policy at the general nature of ubiquitous technology and not on specific instances or uses of specific technologies.

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Acknowledgements

Special thanks to

Mike GurskiRichard OwensPasha Peroff

for inviting me to this outstanding conference. I am always extremely honored to be here.

Addressed in This Talk

privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/talks/CACR-05-11.html

This talk will examine the nature of identity management problems and examine roles biometrics can play along with accompanying policy or additional technology. An integrated solution (“identity phone”) will be presented as a working example.

1. Identity Management Problems2. Biometric Technologies3. Applying Biometrics to Problems4 Identity Phone Example

This Talk

privacy.cs.cmu.edu

1. Identity Management ProblemsExamine identity theft in terms of the

acquisition of fraudulent credit cards and related issues to the U.S. Social Security number. [Identity Angel* & SSNwatch Projects]

2. Biometric Technologies3. Applying Biometrics to Problems4. Identity Phone Example

This Talk

* Recently on CBS News

Historical Highlights of the SSN• 1935 Social Security Act SSNs only to be used for the social security program.

• 1943 Executive Order 9397 Required federal agencies to use SSNs in new record systems

• 1961 IRS began using SSN As taxpayer identification number

• 1974 Privacy Act Government agencies use of SSN required authorization and disclosures (exempt agencies already using SSN)

• 1976 Tax Reform Act Granted authority to State and local governments to use SSNs: state and local taxes, motor vehicle agencies

•Over 400 million different numbers have been issued. Source: Social Security Administration, http://www.ssa.gov/history/hfaq.html

Non-Government Uses of SSN•Corporate use of the SSN is not bound by the laws.

You can request an alternative number. You can refuse to provide, they can refuse service.

• Most common non-government use relates to credit bureaus and credit granting companies:

Recognition – to locate your credit history for sharing it with you or with others with whom you sought credit.

Linkage – to make sure new entries are added to your credit report.

•Common uses until recently are for corporate identificationExample: medical and school identification cards

Quality of the SSN Assignment

Ability to acquire the number and use it falsely grows as more copies of the number are stored for different purposes.

A Social Security number is almost always specific to one person and one person typically has a unique SSN. There are exceptions.

Unusual case of SSN 078-05-1120 Used by thousands of People!

In 1938, a wallet manufacturer provided a sample SSN card, inserted in each new wallet.

The company’s Vice President used the actual SSN of his secretary, Mrs. Hilda Schrader Whitcher.

The wallet was sold by Woolworth and other stores. It had "specimen" written across the face, but many purchasers of the wallet adopted the SSN as their own. SSA voided the number. (Mrs. Whitcher was given a new number.) In total, over 40,000 people reported this as their SSN. As late as 1977, 12 people were still using it.

Source: Social Security Administration, http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssn/misused.html

Social Security Number Summary

SSNs are used to represent a person:easy to replicate, easy to provide in-person and remotelyeasy to store and match

BUT not verifiable when presentedeasily forgedencoded, thereby leaking information

SSNwatch On-line SSN validation

system. Given the first 3 or 5 digits of an SSN, returns the state in which the SSN was issued along with an estimated age range of the person.

privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/ssnwatch/index.html

Sample uses:Job Applications Apartment Rentals Insurance Claims Student Applications

SSNwatch Results for SSN 078-05-

Geography New York Date of issuance Issued before 1993 Year of Birth (5-digit prefix)

64% born 1889 to 1910 98% born 1879 to 1921

If the person presenting the SSN is about age 20, then it is extremely unlikely that the provided SSN was issued to that person.

SSNwatch Results for SSN 078-05-

Geography New York Date of issuance Issued before 1993 Year of Birth (5-digit prefix)

64% born 1889 to 1910 98% born 1879 to 1921

If the person presenting the SSN fails to list or acknowledge New York as a prior residence, then it is extremely unlikely that the provided SSN was issued to that person.

What is Identity Theft?

Identity theftIdentity theft occurs when a person uses another person’s personally-identifying information such as name, Social Security number, credit card number or other explicitly identifying information, without permission to commit fraud or other crimes.

Source: Federal Trade Commission, http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/

Problems Posed by Identity Theft

Identity theft is a serious crime.

People whose identities have been stolen can spend months or years - and their hard-earned money - cleaning up the mess thieves have made of their good name and credit record.

Victims may lose job opportunities, be refused loans, education, housing or cars, or even get arrested for crimes they didn't commit.

Source: Federal Trade Commission, http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/

Federal Trade Commission Report: Overview of the Identity Theft Program, Oct 1998 – Sep 2003

Federal Trade Commission Report: Victim Complaint Data

Federal Trade Commission Report: Victim Complaint Data

More than 40% involve

credit card fraud!

Federal Trade Commission Report: Victim Complaint Data

Federal Trade Commission Report: Victim Complaint Data

More than half are young adults, who are mobile and active on the web!

Identity Angel Project

Is there sufficient information freely available on-line to obtain fraudulent credit cards?

Thousands of Americans are at risk to identity theft immediately!

Can be done with little technical knowledge!

Student application

Basic information and School Information

Basic Information Necessary For a Credit Card Application

• Name• Social Security number• Address• Date of birth• Mother’s maiden name

Strategy: if one can identify these fields for a person, they have the basic information needed to acquire a credit card in that person’s name.

Basic Information Necessary For a Credit Card Application

• Name• Social Security number• Address• Date of birth• Mother’s maiden name

Strategy: if one can identify these fields for a person, they have the basic information needed to acquire a credit card in that person’s name. Therefore, we need only demonstrate how this information can be obtained on-line.

Do these first.

One Approach is to Buy an SSN

There are websites that advertise SSNs for sale.

The California-based Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights said for $26 each it was able to purchase the Social Security numbers and home addresses for Tenet, Ashcroft and other top Bush administration officials, including Karl Rove, the president's chief political adviser. [Associated Press, “Social Security numbers sold on Web” 8/28/2003]

Google: resume ssn site:.edu 1

[DOC]RESUMEFile Format: Microsoft Word 2000 - View as HTMLRESUME. RICHARD ALLEN BROWN. Richard Allen Brown. PO Box 782. Kayenta, AZ 86033.Home Telephone-520-697-3513. NAU Telephone-520-523-4099. DOB: 03-10-77. SSN: 527-71 ... dana.ucc.nau.edu/~rab39/RAB%20Resume.doc

Many found. One is shown above. But the actual resumes are amidst lots of non-resume pages!

Google: resume ssn site:.edu 2

resume... 2843. DOB: 10-10-48 New Britain, CT 06050-4010. F: (860) 832-3753.SSN: 461-84-8245 H: (203) 740-7255 C: (203) 561-8674. Education. Ph. ... www.math.ccsu.edu/vaden-goad/resume.htm

A second example.

Google: resume ssn site:.edu 3

Scot Lytle's ResumeScot Patrick Lytle. Home: (301)-249-5330 2116 Blaz Court School: (410)-455-1662Upper Marlboro, MD 20772 SSN: 578-90-8915 OBJECTIVE. ... userpages.umbc.edu/~slytle1/resume.html

We emailed warnings to these people that this is not a good practice!

One claimed to have been the victim of a identity theft recently.

Job Banks are On-line with Resumes Listing {SSN, name, address}

... Welcome to Maryland's Job Bank! ... Are You Looking For Dream Job. ... Search for jobs nationwide,and by creating a resume, thousands of employers across the nation ... www.ajb.dni.us/md/ - 29k

NationalJobBank.com - Post your jobs or resume for FREE!... The National Job Bank is a web-site developed specifically for job seekers, employers ... Weencourage you to post your resume, post a job listing or contact ... www.nationaljobbank.com/ - 16k - Sep 9, 2003

Basic Information Necessary For a Credit Card Application

• Name• Social Security number• Address• Date of birth• Mother’s maiden name

Strategy: if one can identify these fields for a person, they have the basic information needed to acquire a credit card in that person’s name. Therefore, we need only demonstrate how this information can be obtained on-line.

Done.

Next...

Google: resume ssn site:.edu 1

[DOC]RESUMEFile Format: Microsoft Word 2000 - View as HTMLRESUME. RICHARD ALLEN BROWN. Richard Allen Brown. PO Box 782. Kayenta, AZ 86033.Home Telephone-520-697-3513. NAU Telephone-520-523-4099. DOB: 03-10-77. SSN: 527-71 ... dana.ucc.nau.edu/~rab39/RAB%20Resume.doc

This on-line resume, located earlier, actually listed date of birth too!

Google: resume ssn site:.edu 2

resume... 2843. DOB: 10-10-48 New Britain, CT 06050-4010. F: (860) 832-3753.SSN: 461-84-8245 H: (203) 740-7255 C: (203) 561-8674. Education. Ph. ... www.math.ccsu.edu/vaden-goad/resume.htm

This on-line resume, found earlier, also listed date of birth!

Google: resume ssn site:.edu 3

Scot Lytle's ResumeScot Patrick Lytle. Home: (301)-249-5330 2116 Blaz Court School: (410)-455-1662Upper Marlboro, MD 20772 SSN: 578-90-8915 OBJECTIVE. ... userpages.umbc.edu/~slytle1/resume.html

The third resume did not have his DOB listed.

anybirthday.com given a name, provides a

birthday

Had several hits matching name, but only one in his ZIP.

Finding Dates of Birth

Anybirthday.com tends to have information on people over the age of 30. Younger people are often not included.

Many other population registers can be used, such as voter lists. Anybirthday.com is not he only source!

Basic Information Necessary For a Credit Card Application

• Name• Social Security number• Address• Date of birth• Mother’s maiden name

Strategy: if one can identify these fields for a person, they have the basic information needed to acquire a credit card in that person’s name. Therefore, we need only demonstrate how this information can be obtained on-line.

Done.

Done.

Next...

Publicly Available Birth Records

Not all states, but many consider birth records, the kind of information included on a person’s birth certificate in the United States, as publicly available information.

A few states have gone further to provide this information on-line.

In the United States, birth certificate information tends to include the mother’s maiden name!

California on-line Birth Records

Results of search on ‘Jones’

Source: http://www.vitalsearch-ca.com/gen/_nonmembers/ca/_vitals/cabirths-nopsm.htm

Basic Information Necessary For a Credit Card Application

• Name• Social Security number• Address• Date of birth• Mother’s maiden name

Strategy: if one can identify these fields for a person, they have the basic information needed to acquire a credit card in that person’s name. Therefore, we need only demonstrate how this information can be obtained on-line.

Done.

Done.

Done.

Resulting Concern

• Name• Social Security number• Address• Date of birth• Mother’s maiden name

Thousands of people are at risk!

Even if this is not the current means accounting for the bulk of fraud related to new credit card accounts, this is clearly a very serious and growing threat!

Done.

Done.

Done.

Identity Angel –resumes

1. Locate on-line resumes (using Filtered Searching)

2. Extract sensitive values (using regular expressions)

3. Email subjects about their risks

L. Sweeney. AI Technologies to Defeat Identity Theft Vulnerabilities. AAAI Spring Symposium on AI Technologies for Homeland Security, 2005. (Updated version appearing in IEEE journal next month.) http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/idangel/index.html

Identity Angel –resume findings

1000 resume hits on Google using fliteredSearch, revealed 150 resumes, of which 140 (or 93%) had complete 9-digit SSNs.

10 resumes had partial, invalid, or some other country’s SSN.

L. Sweeney. AI Technologies to Defeat Identity Theft Vulnerabilities. AAAI Spring Symposium on AI Technologies for Homeland Security, 2005. http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/idangel/index.html

Identity Angel –resume findings

In terms of combinations: 104 (or 69%) resumes had {SSN, DOB};

105 (or 70%) had {SSN, email},

76 (or 51%) had {SSN, DOB, email}.

L. Sweeney. AI Technologies to Defeat Identity Theft Vulnerabilities. AAAI Spring Symposium on AI Technologies for Homeland Security, 2005. http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/idangel/index.html

Identity Angel –resume findings

A single email message was sent to each of the 105 people having {SSN, email} alerting them to the risk. Within a month, 42 (or 55% of all of DBB) no longer had the information publicly available.A year later, 102 (or 68% of all of DBA) no longer had the information available. ``

L. Sweeney. AI Technologies to Defeat Identity Theft Vulnerabilities. AAAI Spring Symposium on AI Technologies for Homeland Security, 2005. http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/idangel/index.html

Credit Card Transactions

At issuance, credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possession

Credit Card Transactions

At issuance, credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possession

Traditional: credit card application is issued, but the recipient may not be the correct person. The model assumes the recipient is the only person with knowledge of {name, address, SSN, DOB}

Credit Card Transactions

At issuance, credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possession

Traditional: credit card use over Web does not verify recipient. Assumes limited access to card number, expiration date, etc. Assumes address for receipt of goods.

Credit Card Transactions

At issuance, credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possession

Traditional: copies of relevant information for use can be copied and impersonated.

Credit Card Transactions

At issuance, credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possession

Traditional: assumes non-experts can easily identify signature forgeries. Attention to even pictures is weak.

Credit Card Transactions

At issuance, credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possession

Traditional: assumes card holder is in complete control of the card and its information.

Travel Documents

At issuance, credentials not verifiable

During secondary use,inadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possession

1.Identity Management Problems2. Biometric Technologies3. Applying Biometrics to Problems4. Identity Phone Example

This Talk

privacy.cs.cmu.edu

PL 107-56 SEC. 403 c)S. 1749 [Patriot Act]

The Attorney General and the Secretary of State jointly, through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), ….shall develop and certify a technology standard that can be used to verify the identity of persons applying for a US visa or such persons seeking to enter the US pursuant to a visa for the purposes of conducting background checks, confirming identity, and ensuring that a person has not received a visa under a different name…..

Biometrics

Primary goal of biometrics is usually authentication

Fingerprints

Iris scans

DNA

Voice

Palm print

Face

RFID Implant

Retinal scans

Hand geometry

Behavioral

Keyboard typing

SignatureA biometric is a measurement of the person that is specific to the person.

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Iris Scanning

Iris and retina scans are the most accurate of all biometric techniques and, currently, the most costly.

Iris scans analyze the features that exist in the colored tissue surrounding the pupil which has more than 200 points that can be used for comparison, including rings, furrows and freckles.

The scans use a regular video camera style and can be done from even 2 feet away.

Retinal Scanning

Retinal scanning analyses the blood vessels located at the back of the eye, reading its 400 unique points.

A person steps in front of a device, keeping head perfectly still. Takes about 12 seconds.

Disadvantage: retina can become diseased (cataracts), be fairly close to the machine

Hand Geometry

Hands are not so unique, but one can use finger length, thickness, and curvature for the purposes of verification but not for identification.

Lab last term! Measurements from traces.

Source: Arun Ross, Anil Jain and Sharat Pankanti, biometrics.cse.msu.edu/hand_proto.html

Vein Recognition in Hand

Verify a person’s identity by recognizing patterns of blood vessels in the palm.

Source: Fujitsu, http://vn.fujitsu.com/news/BioAuTech.pdf

RFID

• Radio-frequency ID• Passive RFID: device with no battery that

draws power from a radio-frequency field• Power drives a processor that can

communicate back to a reader• Used for product identification, payment

cards, animal tracking• First use: Identification friend or foe (IFF) in

WWII

Courtesy: Michael Shamos

Shoplifting Tag

No data is sent. Onlypresence is detected

Courtesy: Michael Shamos

How RFID Works• Tag enters RF field• RF signal powers tag• Tag transmits ID, plus data• Reader captures data• Reader sends data to

computer• Computer determines action• Computer instructs reader• Reader transmits data to tag

RFIDReader

Antenna

Computer

Tag

SOURCE: PHILIPS

Courtesy: Michael Shamos

Hitachi -chip

• 0.4 mm square• 128-bit storage• Range: 1 foot• Embedded antenna• Small enough to put in currency

Courtesy: Michael Shamos

Verichip Human Implant

Courtesy: Michael Shamos

Verichip RFID Human Implant

Replace Social Security

number with a unique

implanted personal

identifier.

In the more general case of identity management, implanted RFID works similar to naturally occurring biometrics.

Biometrics

Primary goal of biometrics is usually authentication

Fingerprints

Iris scans

DNA

Voice

Palm

Face

RFID Implant

Retinal scans

Hand geometry

Behavioral

Keyboard typing

SignatureA biometric is a measurement of the person that is specific to the person.

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Generally:-always carry -always on (except RFID)-not modify (except RFID)-uniquely associated

Consequences of Technologies Once Widely Deployed

Impact of large, autonomous biometric data collection

• Personal identified tracking (across computers, web browsing, auto use, etc.)

• No Fair Information Practices

• Impersonation possible, but no new fingers!

• Law enforcement use

1.Identity Management Problems2. Biometric Technologies3. Applying Biometrics to Problems4. Identity Phone Example

This Talk

privacy.cs.cmu.edu

Credit Card Transactions Using Biometrics

At issuance, credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possessionBiometric-based encryption or hash value

Solved, not a problem Problems remain

Credit Card Transactions Biometrics v. Traditional

At issuance, credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possessionBiometric-based encryption or hash value

Solved, not a problem Problems remain

Traditional: credit card application is issued, but the recipient may not be the correct person. The model assumes the recipient is the only person with knowledge of {name, address, SSN, DOB}

Biometric: requires the original registration of the biometric to be correct. Not so easy!

Credit Card Transactions Biometrics v. Traditional

At issuance, credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possessionBiometric-based encryption or hash value

Solved, not a problem Problems remain

Traditional: credit card use over Web does not verify recipient. Assumes limited access to card number, expiration date, etc. Assumes address for receipt of goods.

Biometric: only credit card information, not the biometric is used.

Credit Card Transactions Biometrics v. Traditional

At issuance, credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possessionBiometric-based encryption or hash value

Solved, not a problem Problems remain

Traditional: assumes non-experts can easily identify signature forgeries. Attention to even pictures is weak. Assumes card is in possession.

Biometric: far superior!

Travel Documents

At issuance, credentials not verifiable

During secondary use,inadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possessionBiometric-based encryption or hash value

Solved, not a problem Problems remain

1.Identity Management Problems2. Biometric Technologies3. Applying Biometrics to Problems4. Identity Phone Example

This Talk

privacy.cs.cmu.edu

Sweeney Identity Phone

Issued at birth and remains with a person until death. Special set of phone numbers that can be used like Social Security numbers.

A special mobile phone that includes:Phone capability to send/receive callsBiometric readers: fingerprint, cameraGPS (location)Recognition software: voice, fingerprint, face

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Sweeney Identity PhoneSample Sessions

• Issue phone number like SSN for matching and storing.

• Want to verify a person facing you, phone their # and check GPS location.

• Want to authenticate a person facing you, phone their #, check GPS location, and verify using fingerprint reader.

• Make a credit card purchase: merchant sends their phone# to credit card company, buyer authenticates and approves using buyer phone.

Biometric-based encryption or hash value (right)Sweeney Identity Phone (left) Solved, not a problem Problems remain

Credit Card Transactions Identity Phone v. BiometricsAt issuance,

credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possession

Biometric-based encryption or hash value (right)Sweeney Identity Phone (left) Solved, not a problem Problems remain

Credit Card Transactions Identity Phone v. BiometricsAt issuance,

credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possession

Biometric: requires the original registration of the biometric to be correct. Not so easy!

Identity Phone: registration is not at card issuance but at birth.(Of course, no forgiving or forgetting!)

Biometric-based encryption or hash value (right)Sweeney Identity Phone (left) Solved, not a problem Problems remain

Credit Card Transactions Identity Phone v. BiometricsAt issuance,

credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possession

Biometric: only credit card information, not the biometric is used.

Identity Phone: authenticates person and vendor! Vendor phones credit card company, which in turn calls customer for authorization of charge.

Biometric-based encryption or hash value (right)Sweeney Identity Phone (left) Solved, not a problem Problems remain

Credit Card Transactions Identity Phone v. BiometricsAt issuance,

credentials not verifiable

During use,not verifiable with remote useinadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possession

Biometric: far superior over traditional approach!

Identity Phone: same as biometric alone!

Travel DocumentsIdentity Phone v. BiometricsAt issuance,

credentials not verifiable

During secondary use,inadvertent copies of information

Person-specific criteria weak:signature (picture or other) matching card possessionBiometric-based encryption or hash value (right)

Sweeney Identity Phone (left) Solved, not a problem Problems remain

Identity Phone Summary

The purpose of the Identity Phone is not to sell phones but to show how combinations of biometrics, location information and authoritative issuance can work together to solve some key identity management problems.

Addressed in This Talk

privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/talks/CACR-05-11.html

This talk will examine the nature of identity management problems and examine roles biometrics can play along with accompanying policy or additional technology. An integrated solution (“identity phone”) will be presented as a working example.

1.Identity Management Problems2. Biometric Technologies3. Applying Biometrics to Problems4. Identity Phone Example

This Talk

privacy.cs.cmu.edu