Identity-based directed proxy ring signature scheme

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Identity-based directed proxy ringsignature schemeK. A. Ajmath a , P. Vasudeva Reddy b , B. Umaprasada Rao c & S. V.K. Varma aa Department of Mathematics , Sri Venkateswara University ,Tirupathi , A.P. , Indiab Department of Engg. Mathematics , Andhra University ,Visakhapatnam , A.P. , Indiac Department of Engg. Mathematics , Dr. L.B. College Engg. ForWomen , Visakhapatnam , A.P. , IndiaPublished online: 03 Jun 2013.

To cite this article: K. A. Ajmath , P. Vasudeva Reddy , B. Umaprasada Rao & S. V. K. Varma (2012)Identity-based directed proxy ring signature scheme, Journal of Discrete Mathematical Sciences andCryptography, 15:2-3, 181-192, DOI: 10.1080/09720529.2012.10698374

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* E-mail: ajjucrypto@yahoo.com† E-mail: vasucrypto@yahoo.com§ E-mail: umaprasadcrypto@yahoo.com¶ E-mail: svijayakumarvarma@yahoo.co.in

Identity-based directed proxy ring signature scheme

K. A. Ajmath 1, *

P. Vasudeva Reddy 2, †

B. Umaprasada Rao 3, §

S. V. K. Varma1, ¶

1 Department of MathematicsSri Venkateswara UniversityTirupathiA.P, India.2 Department of Engg. MathematicsAndhra UniversityVisakhapatnamA.P, India.3 Department of Engg. MathematicsDr. L.B. College Engg. For WomenVisakhapatnamA.P, India.

Abstract:Proxy ring signature scheme allows a proxy signer to sign messages on behalf of the

original signer while providing anonymity. In these schemes any verifi er can verify the proxy

signature and he can be sure that the message is indeed given out by the proxy signer group,

on the other hand, nobody can fi gure out who the proxy signer is. If the signed message is

sensitive to the signature receiver, the ordinary proxyring signature schemes seems to be not

suitable. To meet this requirement, in this paper, we proposed an ID-based directed proxy

ring signature scheme by combining the functionalities of directed signatures and proxy ring

signature scheme. This scheme is very useful in some applications where the anonymously

leaking information is sensitive to the signature receiver. We have discussed the security

requirements of the proposed scheme.

Keywords : Digital signatures, proxy signatures, ring signatures, directed signatures, bilinear Pairings.

Journal of Discrete Mathematical Sciences & CryptographyVol. 15 (2012), No. 2 & 3, pp. 181–192

182 K. A. AJMATH, P. V. REDDY, B. U. RAO AND S. V. K. VARMA

1. Introduction

A proxy signature scheme allows an entity, called original signer, to

delegate its signing capability to another entity, called proxy signer, to sign

messages on its behalf. The delegated proxy signer can compute a proxy

signature that can be verifi ed by anyone with access to the original sign-

er’s public key. Proxy signatures have found numerous practical appli-

cations, particularly in distributed computing where delegation of rights

is quite common; examples include e-cash system [12], mobile agents for

e-commerce [6], mobile communications [13], global distributed networks

[4] and distributed shared object systems [8].

Proxy ring signature schemes are proposed in the literature [10] to protect

the privacy of proxy signers. Proxy ring signature schemes can be viewed

as a combination of proxy signature and ring signature schemes, so these

schemes satisfi es all the requirements of general proxy signatures besides

the requirements of ring signatures. In these proxy ring schemes the origi-

nal signer delegates his signing power to many proxies, called proxy sign-

ers set (such as a public known directories). Then proxy signers can sign

messages on behalf of the original signer (while providing anonymity).

Any verifi er can verify the signature and can be sure that the secret is

indeed given out by the proxy signer group, on the other hand, nobody

can fi nd out who the proxy signer is. Proxy ring signature schemes have

been shown to be useful in various applications, such as electronic poling,

electronic payment, etc.

The fi rst proxy ring signature scheme was proposed by Zhang et al., [18] in 2003. Later, Lang et al., [5] proposed an improved ID-based proxy

ring signature scheme from bilinear pairings. In 2006, Li et al., [9] pre-

sented formally the defi nition and security model for proxy ring signa-

ture. Subsequently, they proposed a short proxy ring signature scheme,

with rigorous security proofs, which was assumed to be more eff icient

than the previous proxy signature schemes. In 2007 Amit et al., [1] pro-

posed another scheme based on Zhang et al., scheme. In 2009, Wu Lei et al., [7] proposed an eff icient ID-based proxy ring signature scheme. In 2010,

Jianyong Wang et al., [17] proposed a proxy ring signature scheme based

on bilinear pairings.

In the aforementioned signature schemes, any verifi er can verify the

validity of the proxy signature generated by a proxy signer on behalf of

the original signer. However consider the following situation: Suppose in

the above proxy ring signature schemes, if the signed message is sensi-

tive to the signature receiver and he/she wants to exclusively verify these

PROXY RING SIGNATURE SCHEME 183

signatures (messages), does not want to disclose the message, with others

knowing nothing about the message. With this verifi ability restriction the

aforementioned proxy ring signature schemes are not suitable.

To solve this problem, in this paper, we proposed a Directed Proxy

Ring Signature scheme in the identity based setting, which we call as

ID-based Directed Proxy Ring Signature (ID-DPRS) Scheme. This scheme

combines the properties of directed signature [11, 14, 15, 16] and proxy

ring signature schemes. In this scheme an entity (original signer) dele-

gates his signing power to a group of proxy signers. Any proxy signer

generates a proxy signature, to a designated verifi er, on behalf of the

original signer such that only the designated verifi er can directly verify

the signature and the designated verifi er can be sure that the secret is

indeed given out by the proxy signer group and he can’t fi gure out who

the proxy signer is. In case of necessary any other party can verify the

validity of the signature with the help of the aid provided proxy signer or

the designated verifi er.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefl y ex-

plains the bilinear pairings and some computational problems on which

our scheme is based. The syntax and security requirements of our ID-

DPRS scheme are given in Section3. We present our ID-DPRS scheme in

section 4. The correctness and security analysis of the proposed scheme

are given in Section 5. Section 6 concludes this paper.

2. Preliminaries

In this section, we will briefl y review the basic concepts on bilinear

pairings and some related mathematical problems.

2.1. Bilinear pairings

Bilinear pairing is an important cryptographic primitive and has been

widely adopted in many positive applications in cryptography.

Let G1 be a additive cyclic group generated by P, whose order is a

prime q, and G2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order. A bilin-

ear pairing is a map :e G G G1 1 2"#t with the following properties:

(1) Bilinear: :e G G G1 1 2"#t for all ,P Q G! 1 .

(2) Non –degenerate : There exists ,P Q G1! such that ,e P Q 1!t] g .

(3) Computable : There is an eff icient algorithm to compute

, , .e P Q P Q Gfor all 1!t] g

Such a pairing may be obtained by suitable modifi cation in the

weil-pairing or the Tate-pairing on an elliptic curve defi ned over a fi nite

fi eld [2].

2.2. Computational problems

Now, we give some computational problems, which will form the ba-

sis of security for our scheme.

• Decisional Diff ie-Hellman Problem (DDHP): For R, , ,a b c Z*q! given

, , ,P aP bP cP in ,G1 decide whether .modc ab q/

• Computational Diff ie-Hellman Problem (CDHP): For R, , ,a b c Z*q!

given , ,P aP bP in G1 compute abP.

• Bilinear Diff ie-Hellman Problem (BDHP) : For R, , ,a b c Z*q! given

, , ,P aP bP cP in G1 , compute ( , )e P P abct in G2 .

• Gap Diff ie-Hellman Problem : A class of problems, where DDHP can

be solved in polynomial time but no probabilistic algorithm exists

that can solve CDHP in polynomial time.

• Bilinear Pairing Inversion Problem (BPIP) : Given P G1! and

( , )e P Q G2!t , fi nd Q G1! .

As specifi ed in [1], the DDHP in G1 should be easy. The DDHP in

G2, the CDHP and DLP in both and should be hard. Also the BPIP should

be hard. The group with these conditions is called a Gap Diff ie-Hellman

(GDH) group.

3. Syntax and security requirements of ID-DPRS Scheme

The directed proxy ring signature scheme can be viewed as a

combination of a ring signature scheme and directed signature scheme.

Let O be the original signer with identity IDo and private key dIDo . He del-

egates his signing rights to many proxies, with identities of the proxy set

{ }, .L ID i n1i # #= The original signer IDo creates a warrant ~ , where

there is an explicit description of the delegation relation including the

identity of the original signer and the proxy signer, the message M to be

signed, the identity of the designated verifi er IDV , and so on.

Now we give a formal model for our ID-based Directed proxy ring

signature (ID-DPR) scheme. The ID-DPR scheme consists of the following

algorithms System Setup, Key Extraction, Proxy Delegation, Proxy Ring

Signature Generation, Proxy Ring Signature Direct Verifi cation, Proxy

Ring Signature Public Verifi cation.

– Setup : On input security parameter 1k , KGC creates and publishes

system parameters and keeps a master secret key which is known

only by KGC.

– Extract : Given an identity ID of any entity, the PKG computes the

public key and corresponding secret key and sends it to the corre-

sponding entity through a secure channel.

– Proxy Phase : (Proxy delegation : Proxy delegation algorithms D

and B are interactive algorithms owned by the original signer IDo

and the proxy signer IDi . The input of each algorithm includes for

the designator and the proxy signer respectively. D also takes as the

input secret key of the designator, a message warrant . B also takes

as input the secret key of the proxy signer.

As a result of the interaction, the proxy signer obtains a proxy signing

key Skp that he will use to sign message on behalf of the original signer .

– Proxy Ring Signature Generation : The proxy ring signature genera-

tion algorithm, that takes a proxy signing key Skp, the designated

verifi er identity , a message M, a warrant and a set of identities L as

input; and outputs a proxy signature Psig.

– Proxy Ring Signature Direct Verifi cation : The proxy ring signature

direct verifi cation algorithm, which takes the identity of the original

signer and a set of identities L, a message M a warrant and a proxy

signature as input; output “ accept” if the directed proxy signature

is valid, or “reject” otherwise.

– Proxy Ring Signature Public Verifi cation : The proxy ring signa-

ture public verifi cation algorithm, runs by any third party(other

than proxy signer and the designated verifi er), takes the identity of

the original signer , identity of proxy signer , identity of the desig-

nated verifi er , a message M, a warrant , an Aid which is provided

by either the proxy signer or the designated verifi er and a directed

proxy ring signature as input; outputs “ accept” if the directed proxy

signature is valid or “reject” otherwise.

Security requirements :A directed proxy ring signature scheme should provide the following

properties.

1. Unforgeability : A proxy signer can create a valid proxy ring signa-

ture for the original signer. But the original signer and other third

parties who are not authorized as a proxy signer can’t create it.

2. Signer ambiguity : given message M, its proxy ring signature, and

the set of ring members, it is infeasible to fi nd out who is the actual

signer.

3. Distinguishability : Everyone can distinguish proxy’s normal ring

signatures from his proxy ring signatures.

4. Non-deniability : Once a proxy signer creates a valid proxy ring

signature of an original signer, he can’t repudiate the signature cre-

ation.

4. Proposed ID-based Directed Proxy Ring Signature Scheme (ID-DPRS)

In this section, we propose our ID-based Directed Proxy Ring Sig-

nature Scheme using bilinear pairings. The proposed ID-DPRS scheme is

described as follows.

– System Setup : Let G1 be a GDH group of prime order q generated

by P, and 2G be a multiplicative cyclic group of same order q; and a

bilinear pairing :e G G G1 1 2"#t . PKG picks a random master secret

key x Z*q! and sets P xPpub = . PKG also chooses two hash functions

: ,H G0 1 *1"1 ! + and : ,H Z0 1 *

2*" q! + . PKG publishes the system pa-

rameters as , , , , , , , ,params G G q P P H H e 1 2 2pub$ $= 1t] g" , and keeps

the maser key x as secret.

– Key Extract : Given a unique identity ,ID 0 1 *! ! + , PKG computes

the public key Q H ID G1 1!=ID] g and the corresponding private key

as d xQID ID= .

The original signer and the proxy signer submits their identity infor-

mation ,ID ID s n1 , o s # # to the PKG. PKG computes public/private key

pairs and return them to the original signer and the proxy signer respec-

tively. In this way, the public and private keys of the original signer and

the proxy signer can be denoted as ( , )Q dID IDo o and ( , )Q dID IDs s .

– Proxy Delegation D : In order to delegate the signing power to the

user IDs , the original signer creates warrant and then computes

( )S H dID2 o~=~ . The original signer sends , S~ ~ to the proxies

group , , ......,L ID ID ID1 2 n= ! +.

P : Given S~ and ~ , the proxy signer ,ID s n1s # # , checks the

equation ( , )e S p =~t ( ( ) , )e H Q P2 ID pubo~t . If it holds, he computes the

proxy signing key as ( )d H d SID ID2s s~= + ~l .

– Proxyring signature generation : Assume that the proxy signer

ID Ls ! wants to from a directed ring signature scheme on a mes-

sage M on behalf of a set of n proxy signers (proxy members)

, , ........,L ID ID ID 1 2 n= ! +.

Given proxy signing key dIDsl , the proxy signer IDs signs a message

M, on behalf of a proxy group of the original signer, to a designated veri-

fi er IDV as follows. The proxy signer IDs does the following.

(1) Choose r Z*i q! and computes ,R r P Gi i 1!=

, , ........, \ .h H M L R i n s1 2 i i2 6< < != ^ h " !, +

(2) Choose r Z*s q! and computes

( )R r Q Qs s ID ID= +os

{ },R h Qi s

i ID- +!

, ,W e r Q ds s ID IDV s= t^ h

W r Qs ID= s .

(3) Computes

,h H M L R Ws s s2 < < <= ^ h

( ) ,P H Ppub2 ~=l

( ) .V r h d h Ss s ID ss= + - ~l

The directed proxy ring signature on message M is

{ { }, , , }R V W P i

– Proxy ring signature derect verifi cation : The verifi cation of an ID-

based directed proxy ring signature by the designated verifi er that

receives the tuple is as follows.

(1) IDV computes ( ( , )),h H M L R e d Ws i ID2 V< < <= t

{ , , ......, }i n1 2 6 !

(2) Check the equality ( , ( )) ( , )e P R h Q e P Vi i ID

lt t/ (1)

The designated verifi er accepts the signature as a valid proxy ring

signature iff the above equality holds. Otherwise he rejects the signature.

– Proxy ring signature public verifi cation : In case of trouble or if nec-

essary, any other party T can verify the validity of the proxy ring sig-

nature v with the help of the ( , ) ( , )Aid e d r Q e d WID s ID IDs V V= =t tprovided by either the proxy signer IDs or the designated verifi er

.IDV Now with this Aid, T computes ( )h H M L R Aidi i2 < < <= and

verifi es the equation (1). T accepts the signature iff equation (1)

holds. Otherwise he rejects the signature.

5. Analysis of the proposed ID-DPRS Scheme

In this section fi rst we show that the correctness and then we discuss

the security and performance analysis of the proposed ID-DPRS scheme.

5.1. Proof of correctness:

,e P R h QIDi

ii ilt ^c hm/

,e P R h Q R h Q, , ,

s ID ID

= + + +f

iis ilt ^ ^e h ho" ,

,e P r Q Q h Q= + + sID IDss IDo slt ^^^ h hh

,e P r h Q Q h Q= + + -s sID IDss IDo slt ^ ^^^ h h hh

,e P H r h d d h Ss~= + + - ~IDs IDs osolt ^ ^ ^^^ h h h hh

,e P r h d h Ss= + - ss IDs ~t ^^^ h hh

, .e P V= t^ h

So, if the directed proxy ring signature is generated by a valid mem-

ber in the ring, the verifi cation check is passed, our scheme is verifi able.

5.2. Security analysis

The proposed ID-DPRS scheme satisfi es the following security re-

quirements.

(1) Unforgeability. Because both original signer and proxy signer gen-

erates a signature on the warrant ~ based on the Chow et al., sig-

nature scheme [3], and Chow et al., signature scheme proved to be

secure. So that no adversary can forge the signature on the warrant

~ even he get ~ and S~ . Given the set , , ,L ID ID IDnf= 21" , of

all ring members, when an adversary attempts to generate a valid

proxy ring signature for message m, we can forge his identity ID j

and get a key pair j ,Q dID IDj^ h from the KGC. To get a valid proxy

key, the adversary has to ensure j( ) ( ),H ID H IDs= 11 it is impossible

because of the one-way property of a strong cryptographic hash

function.

Moreover, even the original signer can’t create a valid proxy ring

signature because the private key of the proxy signer dIDs is in-

volved in the proxy key dIDsl . So the proxy ring signature in our

scheme is unforgeable.

(2) Signer Anonymity : If v is a valid proxy ring signature, IDs is one

of the ring member. The probability that the signature v gener-

ated by IDs is computed to be /( )( ) ( )( ) .q q n q nq1 1 12 f- - + --

The probability is the same for all the ring members. In the signing

phase ( )R i s!i and rs are randomly and uniformly choosed, so hi

is uniformly distributed in Z*q . No matter which ring member is

the actually proxy signer, the probability of a valid proxy signature

generation is equal for all the ring members. So for any adversary,

except for the original signer, even with unbounded computing re-

sources, can only output the actual signature with a probability no

better than /n1 . That is, our scheme satisfi es the property of signer

anonymity.

(3) Non-Deniability : Once a proxy signer generates a valid proxy ring

signature, he cannot repudiate the fact to the original signer because

he has embedded his identity information is warrant ~ . (Thus once

a proxy signer creates a valid proxy ring signature of an original

signer, he can’t repudiation the signature creation).

(4) Distinguishability : Everyone can distinguish proxy’s normal ring

signatures from his proxy ring signatures, because the proxy signa-

ture key is diff erent from his own private key.

5. Conclusion

In this paper we proposed an ID based directed proxy ring signature

(IID-DPRS) scheme, which combines the properties of both proxy ring

signature and directed signature schemes. In this scheme an entity (origi-

nal signer) delegates his signing capability to a group of proxy signers.

Any proxy signer can generates a proxy signature, to a designated veri-

fi er, on behalf of the original signer such that only the designated verifi er

can directly verify the signature and the designated verifi er can be sure

that the secret is indeed given out by the proxy signer group and he can’t

fi gure out who the proxy signer is. In case of necessary any other party

can verify the validity of the signature with the help of the aid provided

proxy signer or the designated verifi er. The proposed scheme satisfi es un-

forgeability, signer anonymity, non-deniability, and distinguishable prop-

erties. The proposed ID-DPRS scheme plays a very important role in some

applications where the anonymously leaking information is sensitive to

the signature receiver.

References

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pairing”. Advance in CRYPTO’01, LNCS 2139, Springer-Verlag, 2001,

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Received November, 2011

Identity-based directed proxy ring signature scheme

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