Transcript of H OW NATIONAL GOVERNANCE FAILINGS ARE COMPROMISING M ADAGASCAR ’ S REDD+ POTENTIAL Andre Aquino...
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- H OW NATIONAL GOVERNANCE FAILINGS ARE COMPROMISING M ADAGASCAR
S REDD+ POTENTIAL Andre Aquino Robert Griffin March, 2014
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this presentation are those of
the authors and not of the World Bank
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- 2 REDD+ is a financial mechanism that gives land value 1.Carbon
Benefits: payments for emissions reductions 2.Non-Carbon Benefits:
Biodiversity, wildlife, training & education, opportunities for
women, opportunities for indigenous peoples, governance improvement
REDD+ is a good opportunity to clarify national-level policies that
address land use and deforestation (Ex. land tenure insecurity or
uncoordinated or even conflicting policies over land use) Who holds
claim to the value that REDD+ adds? In most cases, REDD+ is
designed to share benefits with local populations in developing
countries Through REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms local
populations and community groups receive funds that sponsor income
generating activities Therefore REDD+ is both a catalyst for
improving land governance and for alleviating poverty R ELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN REDD+ AND L AND & P OVERTY I SSUES ?
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- 3 But when it comes to developing REDD+ nationally, is REDD+
still the catalyst to governance, or is it the other way around?
Vertical Interplay chicken or the egg dilemma with REDD+
development under debate Architecture component of REDD+ governance
organizations, principles, norms, mechanisms, and decision making
procedures Difficult for researchers to answer question of vertical
interplay because most countries have followed the top down
approach The exception is Madagascar, where REDD+ evolved much
differently Q UESTION OF A PPROACH TO REDD+ D EVELOPMENT REDD+
Pilot Projects National Governance Framework Scale-up influence
Pass down influence NGOs argue Multilaterals argue Nested / Bottom
Up Approach Top Down Approach ?
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- 4 Quick Facts Amongst the 22 million inhabitants over 92% live
on less than 2$ a day (World Bank, 2013), with the most
impoverished in rural regions Madagascar has had a long history of
political and economic hardship dating back to the 1960s In March
of 2009 there was coup dtat and the economy has been more or less
in recession since The Importance of Conservation 80% of the fauna
and 90% of the flora are endemic Forestland estimated to cover
15.88% of the surface area of the country in 2009, is diminished
every year. Drivers of deforestation: slash-and-burn agriculture
wood collection from natural forests to provide firewood and
charcoal Madagascar considered good candidate For REDD+ Madagascar
was originally considered a good candidate for REDD+ (High poverty,
deforestation, co- benefits associated with biodiversity
protection) The threats facing this small island has attracted
attention from conservation organizations since the mid-1980s drew
in substantial amounts of funding for conservation B ACKGROUND ON M
ADAGASCAR
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- 5 Project level Early 2000s: 4 large sub-national projects Most
targeted the voluntary market and were implemented in the forest
corridors in the eastern humid forest ecosystems in Madagascar
Signed Emissions Reductions Purchase Agreements based on strong
transparency conditions Pilots Model- namely reduction of emissions
through the creation of large protected areas by the government
made up of a core protected area, user controlled areas and buffer
area, support for community management of forest resources, and
implementation of alternative activities to deforestation,
including agricultural intensification, agro- forestry and bushfire
control Projects were fairly sophisticated and contributed greatly
to how REDD+ can be achieved in the country This diverse array of
experience initially allowed Madagascar to become a leading global
REDD+ laboratory Example: Ankeniheny Zahamena Corridor (CAZ)
project CI/BioCF/DGF - 430,000 ERs over four years Established
local governance: Regional Directorates of Forests and Environment
(DREFTs) VOIs (Local Community Groups) E VOLUTION OF REDD+ IN M
ADAGASCAR
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- 6 CAZ P ROJECT B ENEFIT S HARING M ECHANISM
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- 7 National Level 2008 REDD+ readiness with the World Banks FCPF
carbon fund CT- REDD: a large multi-sector, multi-agency committee
that gives technical assistance to the national Ministry of
Environment and Forests Involved Government Players: key players
were established to handle carbon transactions 1.General Director
for Forests. 2.National Environment Office 3.General Director of
Environment Because of the high financial stakes from active NGO
pilots there was a jockeying of power for control of the carbon
funds these groups did not work or collaborate together well E
VOLUTION OF REDD+
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- 8 2009 political Crisis The political instability in the
country stalled R-PP development R-PP preparation was a necessary
step to obtain financing from the World Banks Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility (FCPF The CT-REDD, lost formal recognition
because it lacked high-level political support and strong internal
leadership The effects were devastating for pilot projects in
Madagascar Nearly all donors pulled out of their purchase
agreements citing lack of clarity over national regulations
governing the transactions Example: BioCarbon Fund Matinda Park
BioCF terminated a forest carbon purchase to acquire CDM credits
from a reforestation project This was significant as it was the
single most advanced CDM project in the country at this time Main
reason BioCF pulled out was the Government failed to appoint an
entity to manage the carbon credits of the project and lead
communication with the CDM board (which made it impossible for
credits to be created according to CDM rules) G OVERNANCE F
AILINGS
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- 9 Madagascar missed out on key income generating opportunity
from REDD+ It is likely that Madagascar will continue to lose out
on forest carbon market opportunities as along as it has a poor
national governance framework What does this example show us? Shows
how sensitive investors are to weaknesses governance frameworks
Shows our hypothesis that ultimately investors prefer projects in
countries with stronger governance capabilities and lower carbon
values over projects in countries with high carbon values and low
governance Shows us that not only do governance failures affect
relations with external stakeholders, but internally REDD+ also
suffers Weak governance structures make it difficult to pass on
benefits to local communities who support conservation initiatives
L OST O PPORTUNITY
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- 10 Thank you! Andre Aquino Email:
adeaquino@worldbank.orgadeaquino@worldbank.org Robert Griffin
Email: rgriffin@worldbank.orgrgriffin@worldbank.org