Post on 13-May-2020
Explaining British Nuclear Modernisation Today
“We have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs…we have got to have a bloody Union Jack on the top of it” (Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, 1946) Writer: Supervisor: KL Søren Nordby Dr. Gary Schaub Royal Danish Defence Academy Centre for Military Studies Master 2011-2012
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Abstract
This thesis examines how security concerns, status concerns and bureaucratic
interests interacted to affect the United Kingdom’s recent decision to replace its
nuclear deterrent. It argues that the interstate security environment has become
more benign since the end of the Cold War and therefore status and bureaucratic
concerns have become more important considerations in influencing such decisions.
The thesis supplements Classical Realist concerns of the perceived level of threat
with Scott Sagan’s two additional explanations for why states pursue and obtain
nuclear weapons. Reputational considerations and bureaucratic interests are posited
to be intervening variables in the British government’s security decisions. The thesis
applies these models to two cases in British nuclear history - firstly the decision to
obtain Polaris-class submarines and SLBMs in 1962, and secondly the British
Government’s recent decision to keep the nuclear deterrent and procure a ‘like for
like’ replacement for the current Vanguard Class Trident system. The thesis
concludes that the British Government has not taken such decisions based solely on
the perceived level of threat but that additional factors such as maintaining their
identity as a great power and the influence of the nuclear defence industry have also
played a part to varying degrees.
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Précis
In December 2006 the UK Government took the decision to replace its nuclear
deterrent, the Vanguard Class Submarine armed with ICBMs, with a ‘like for like’
system, yet to be designed and procured. This decision was taken within the
contextual backdrop of the end of the Cold War, the existence of the Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), continued pressure from anti-nuclear groups and the
worldwide economic recession. This begs the question –
What factors were behind the UK Government’s decision to spend substantial amounts of funds modernising its nuclear weapons when they are unlikely to be used (kinetically) in the current, and the likely future international security environment?
In looking at the factors determining the 2006 decision it was useful to examine the
factors which influenced the initial procurement of the strategic nuclear weapon
system, Polaris, in 1962 to analyse similarities and differences over the period.
Using the Realist concerns of the perceived level of threat combined with Scott
Sagan’s two additional explanations for why states pursue and obtain nuclear
weapons, the two cases (1962 and 2006) were analysed. Sagan’s models deal with
security concerns (Security Model), status concerns (Norms Model) and bureaucratic
interests (Domestic Politics Model), as an alternative to pure security model theory.
After completing the initial analysis on both periods the conclusions from each year
were then compared by model with the aim of establishing the relevance of each
factor in the final case of 2006, thereby answering the thesis main question. Security
Model factors were based on the theory of strong and weak states, the perceived
threat and the security dilemma in relation to proliferation. The Domestic Politics
Model provides 3 types of actors; namely the military, the nuclear / defence industry
and politicians, examples of which were found in both cases. Finally on analysing
the cases using the Norms Model the significant factors were the UK’s identity and
the ‘Special Relationship’ it has with the USA.
Both cases provided valid arguments in all three models but there are significant
differences to their underlying factors and relative importance in each case. In the
case of the security model the background security situation has undergone a radical
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transformation between the post war years and the present day, from a bipolar to
multipolar security threat. In terms of bureaucratic interests within the nuclear
industry, the comparison between the fledgling being it represented in 1962 with
today’s thriving commercial industry is vast. Wide ranging financial support for the
industry also serves to widen the net of interested parties which can produce a
number of influential actors within the Domestic Politics Model.
In terms of status, what seems to have undergone the least change is the role of the
nuclear deterrent in underpinning the UK’s self-perception of its own identity and
status. The idea of the nuclear deterrent as a status symbol, used to portray the
United Kingdom’s place on the international stage has perhaps diminished slightly in
the wake of increasing non-proliferation pressure but it is undoubtedly still strong in
the minds of those who make the final decisions.
The thesis concludes that the British Government has not taken such decisions
based solely on the perceived level of threat but that additional factors such as
maintaining their identity as a great power and the influence of the nuclear defence
industry have also played a part to varying degrees.
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TABLE OF CONTENT
Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………1
Précis …............................................................................................................2
TABLE OF CONTENT .............................................................................................3
1. INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………….6
1.1. Introduction to the Problem….…………………………………………………...6
1.2. The Problem …………………………………………………………6
1.3. Theoretical Choice and Justification ………………………………………….8
1.4. Theory ………………………………………………………………………….9
1.5. Operationalization ……………………………………………………………9
1.6. Application of the Theory …………………………………………………...10
1.6.1. Validity …………………………………………………………………...10
1.6.2. Reliability ………………………………………………………………....11
1.7. Delineation of the Thesis …………………………………………………...11
1.8. Thesis Design ………………………………………………………………..12
2. THEORY ……………………………………………………………………………13
2.1. The Security Model: The level of perceived threat. ……………………...13
2.2. The Domestic Politics Model: Bureaucratic interests. …………………..15
2.3. The Norms Model: Nuclear symbols and state identity …………………17
2.3.1. Identity …………………………………………………………………..17
2.3.2. The Nuclear Myth. ……………………………………………………..18
2.3.3. The Nuclear Taboo. ……………………………………………………18
2.3.4. The Non-Proliferation Treaty. …………………………………………19
3. CASE 1962 – DECISION TO ACQUIRE THE POLARIS SLBM. …………….21
3.1. Security Model. ………………………………………………………………22
3.1.1. The increasing threat to the UK. …………………………………....22
3.1.2. A credible delivery vehicle. …………………………………………….22
3.1.3. The Nassau Summit and the Polaris system. ………………………….24
3.2. Domestic Politics Model. ……………………………………………………..25
3.2.1. The military as an actor. ………………………………………………….25
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3.2.2. The nuclear industry ……………………………………………………..26
3.2.3. The Prime Minister as the political actor ……………………………..27
3.3. Norms Model ……………………………………………………………………30
3.3.1. The UK’s identity as a great power ……………………………………..30
3.3.2. The myth of the ‘Special Relationship’ ………………………………….31
3.3.3. The Nassau Summit ………………………………………………………32
3.3.4. Countering American bureaucracy ………………………………………34
3.4. Part conclusion of the 1962 decision …………………………………………36
4. CASE 2006 – DECISION TO MODERNISE THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT …..38
4.1. Security Model ………………………………………………………………..38
4.1.1. Other nuclear states ……………………………………………………..38
4.1.2. Asymmetrical attack and 9/11 ……………………………………………40
4.2. Domestic Politics Model ………………………………………………………41
4.2.1. The military as an actor ……………………………………………………41
4.2.2. The (Civil and Military) Nuclear Industry ………………………………42
4.2.2.1. Nuclear weapons as a business ……………………………….42
4.2.2.2. Impact if the modernisation of the nuclear weapon is scrapped .43
4.2.2.3. Mutual interdependence …………………………………………44
4.2.2.4. Key figures in government ……………………………………….44
4.2.2.5. The Prime Ministers version ……………………………………….46
4.3. Norms Model …………………………………………………………………..48
4.3.1. The UK’s identity ………………………………………………………….48
4.3.2. The UK’s identity and the myth of the special relationship ……………49
4.3.3. The Nuclear Taboo and the Non-Proliferation Treaty …………………50
4.4. Part conclusion of the 2006 decision ………………………………………..54
5. SYNTHESIS ……………………………………………………………………………56
5.1. Security Model …………………………………………………………………56
5.2. Domestic Politics Model ………………………………………………………56
5.3. Norms Model …………………………………………………………………..57
6. CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………….59
6.1. Implications for the future ……………………………………………………..64
7. LIST OF LITTERATURE …………………………………………………………….65
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction of the Problem. In October 2010 the Prime Minister of The United Kingdom, David Cameron,
presented the future plan for the UK Armed Forces to the Parliament in the form of a
National Security Strategy (NSS)1 and a Strategic Defence and Security Review
(SDSR)2
1.2. The Problem.
. The future plan for the UK Armed Forces was developed in a period
severely influenced by the impact of the economic recession which started in 2008.
This meant that the Government was facing big challenges on the state finances and
difficult priorities had to be made. The result of the SDSR was that the Armed
Forces will be required to make 17,000 military personnel redundant across the three
services. Furthermore whole capabilities were decommissioned such as the aircraft
carriers thus removing the UKs strike capability and severely limiting the UKs ability
to conduct amphibious operations. These capability reductions effectively limit the
UKs ability to act unilaterally. Despite public statements from the Prime Minister and
Defence Minister that all options were on the table in shaping the future British
Armed Forces the nuclear deterrent was never a part of the 2010 SDSR
contemplations. This can only mean that, despite the economic situation, it was
deliberately kept out of the SDSR and that the current Prime Minister was content
with the 2006 decision of renewing the nuclear deterrent.
The British Trident SSBN force is ageing and its useful service life is coming to an
end. The British Government estimates that it will cost £15-20 billion to acquire a
follow-on system and an estimated £750 million per annum to maintain3
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. The current
international security environment is such that great power conflicts of the type that
would require the threatened use of this nuclear capability are generally thought to
be very unlikely. Rather, low-intensity conflicts of the kind seen in Iraq and
Afghanistan will likely continue to dominate the security agenda. The British
http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191639.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=nationalsecuritystrategy 26/11/2011-1433 2http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf page 37 26/11/2011-1451 3 http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/ac00dd79-76d6-4fe3-91a1-6a56b03c092f/0/defencewhitepaper2006_cm6994.pdf page 7 26/11/2011-1651
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Government, like most European governments, is facing dire fiscal constraints for
the foreseeable future. The nuclear deterrent is, according to the statement in the
SDSR, only to be used against other nuclear weapon states, which is
contradictionary to the Government now also linking the nuclear deterrent to their
activist foreign policy. Additionally the Governments NSS state that the primary risk
to the UK’s security and economy is poised by non-state actors such as terrorists,
cyber-attack, natural hazards and also state actors in conventional military crisis.
These security risks cannot be solved with nuclear weapons. Additionally a nuclear
attack on the UK is only deemed to be a “tier two” risk. These statements raise the
question; when and where does the UK expect to use nuclear weapons? And is it
worth the cost?
An additional aspect of the replacement of the nuclear deterrent is that in the future
the costs will be taken out of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) budget as opposed to
earlier where it was taken out of the overall HM Treasury Budget4. This means that
when the UK needs to start replacing the nuclear deterrent there will have to be
additional cuts made to the conventional forces if the MOD budget is to stay the
same5
. This is an interesting aspect because the UKs self-perception is that it is,
and it should remain a conventional major player to ensure a stabile world based on
western values.
The future is uncertain by nature and scenarios where the UK would need its
conventional power to exercise its activist foreign policy are not unlikely. However
the UK Government are now using the threat of biological and chemical weapons to
forces on operations far from the UK territory to justify the possession of the nuclear
deterrent. However, building on the experiences of the past, it is very unlikely that
these conflicts will be solved using nuclear weapons – so again, why is the nuclear
weapon capability, so important to the UK when it seems limited in its use?
The intention for this thesis is not to bring fuel to the fire for campaigners against
nuclear weapons but solely to investigate what factors led to the United Kingdom’s
4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10812825 27/11/2011-1414 5 http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N4C4ED70C3F1F7 27/11/2011-1425
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decision to keep the nuclear deterrent in 2006. This lead to the main question of this
thesis:
What factors were behind the UK Government’s decision to spend substantial amounts of funds modernising its nuclear weapons when they are unlikely to be used (kinetically) in the current, and the likely future international security environment?
1.3. Theoretical Choice and Justification. The factors that affect the decision to acquire a nuclear deterrent are substantially
the same as the factors that affect the decision to keep a nuclear deterrent. The
understanding of why states acquire the nuclear deterrent provides many insights as
to why the UK wants to keep the nuclear deterrent. The major difference is, as the
thesis will show, that it is much easier for the politicians to argue a status quo
solution than to make a status changing decision.
Most studies of the nuclear weapon in international relations are situated within the
realist paradigm of international relations. These theories posit that states acquire
military capabilities in response to the level of threat perceived in the international
environment.6
These theories can provide a simple explanation of the UK’s decision
to acquire and modernise its nuclear capabilities in the period 1945-1990, when the
Soviet Union posed a threat to the survival of the nation. Yet, the explanation
provided by these theories seems problematic after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
It would seem that variables other than the level of perceived threat are required to
fully explain the decision by the UK government to expend resources to replace its
aging Trident nuclear weapons systems. These variables are extended and
expanded by Scott D. Sagan7 in his article “Why Do States Build Nuclear weapons?:
Three Models in Search of a Bomb”8
6 Stephen Walt, Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
. In this article Sagan offers two additional
7 Scott D. Sagan is an Associate Professor of Political Science and a faculty associate of the Centre for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. He functions as advisor for the US Congress Commission of Strategic Posture and the US National Intelligence Council. 8 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
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models that have to be contemplated when explaining states incentives to acquire
the nuclear deterrent. Sagan posits that domestic bureaucratic interests and norms
can lead to nuclear proliferation. It is the intention for this thesis to apply Sagan’s
models on proliferation to the UK case. Proliferation is, in this thesis, interpreted as
keeping the nuclear deterrent.
1.4. Theory. The additional variables suggested by Scott D. Sagan to explain why states seek
and acquire nuclear weapons – Norms and bureaucratic interests – are used as
intervening variables to explain the UK’s decision to modernise the nuclear
deterrent.9
The level of perceived threat is presumed to affect these as well as to
have an independent and direct affect upon the decision. A model of these
relationships is illustrated in the following diagram:
1.5. Operationalization. The operationalization of the theory serves to identify the core of the applied theory
in order to be able to answer the main question as precisely as possible.
The three models that Sagan has suggested to answer why states are interested in
possessing nuclear weapons is the operationalization of three IR paradigms; the
‘Security model’ is operationalization of realism, the ‘Domestic politics model’ is
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 54 – 86. 9 Scott Sagan, ”Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21, 3 (Winter 1996/97).
The Norms Model
Security Model
Domestic Politics Model
Nuclear modernisation
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operationalization of liberalism, and the ‘Norms model’ is the operationalization of
constructivism. These three models are in the theory chapter explained with focus on
the ‘problem’ which is the main question of this thesis.
1.6. Application of the Theory. Sagan’s three models will be applied to two cases where the UK Government faced
the dilemma of either investing substantial resources to modernise its nuclear
capabilities or become a non-nuclear weapons state. In each case there will be a
descriptive analysis of the theory of the individual model applied to the case. Both
cases will end with a part conclusion. These two part conclusions will form the basis
for the synthesis, where the two cases will be compared model by model.
The two cases for the thesis are:
• The decision to acquire the RESOLUTION-class SSBN and the Polaris SLBM
system in 1962.
• The decision to acquire, a yet to be determined, follow-on system to replace
the VANGUARD-class SSBN operating the Trident system in 2006.
The first case in 1962 does not directly answer the main question of this thesis but
acts as a datum to give a basis for determining what factors are unchanged in 2006,
therefore deeply rooted in the UK’s incentives to possess the nuclear deterrent, and
what factors are new. This serves to highlight those that have changed due to new
factors that have emerged since 1962. The conclusion will be based on the findings
in the synthesis.
1.6.1. Validity. It is necessary to ensure that the chosen method will actually investigate what it is
supposed to investigate.10
10 Andersen, Ib, (1997). Den skinbarlige virkelighed – om valg af samfundsvidenskabelige metoder, Samfundslitteratur, Frederiksberg. P.109.
This is ensured by making sure the sources are valid and
interoperable with the theory. There are three main types of source that have been
used in this thesis. The first type is peer reviewed articles and books which have
Kvale, S. (1997). Interview – En introduktion til det kvalitative forskningsinterview, Kø-benhavn, Hans Reitzels Forlag p.223.
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been chosen on their relevance for the thesis, this type of source is deemed very
valid. The second type is the memoirs of the two Prime Ministers, these give insight
in their biased perception of the situation, or at least how they retrospectively justified
their actions. As the theory is about interests and normative aspects it is deemed
very relevant. Finally, various articles have been used but only to extract facts and
quotes. This extracted information is deemed valid as well. The collection of
information ended on 25 March 2012.
1.6.2. Reliability. Reliability is about how adequate the method is to investigate the ‘Problem’.11
1.7. Delineation of the thesis.
The
adequacy of the method is deemed high as it is based on the peer reviewed and
internationally highly regarded IR scholar Scott D. Sagan. Sagan’s method is
developed to answer why states’ acquire nuclear weapons and the ‘Problem’ of this
thesis is why the UK wants to keep the nuclear weapons. The thesis will describe
the subtle difference this means. The answer to the ‘Problem’ is shaped by the
chosen method, theory and sources. The wide range of validated information that
has formed the base for this thesis is deemed to give a solid foundation for the thesis
to deal with the ‘Problem’.
Albeit the formal decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent was taken by a vote in
Parliament, the informal decision made by the Prime Minister Blair in December
2006 will be the object of the investigation in this thesis. The justification for this is
that the decision was, as the thesis will show, taken in a small enclosed circle and
forced through parliament by a ‘three line whip’.
Finally, the 2006 decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent was not debated in the
SDSR in 2010. This thesis will not investigate why this didn’t happen but merely only
assume that the Government didn’t wish to debate the issue.
11 Andersen, Ib, (1997). Den skinbarlige virkelighed – om valg af samfundsvidenskabelige metoder, Samfundslitteratur, Frederiksberg. P.109. Kvale, S. (1997). Interview – En introduktion til det kvalitative forskningsinterview, Kø-benhavn, Hans Reitzels Forlag p.223.
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1.8. Thesis Design The structure of the thesis is shaped by the need to apply the theory with the three
models to two cases. The thesis is introduced in the first chapter. In chapter 2 the
theory is explained. Chapter 3 and 4 contain the application of the theory to the two
cases. Chapter 5 is the synthesis of the analysis in the two cases. Finally, chapter 6
contains the conclusion and implications for the future. A visual display of the model
for the thesis looks like this:
Chapter 6
Chapter 5
Chapter 4
Chapter 3
Chapter 2
Chapter 1
Theory
Descriptive analysis of the Security model 1962
2006
Part conclusion on the 1962 decision
Part conclusion on the 2006 decision
Synthesis
Conclusion
Descriptive analysis of the
Domestic Politics Model
Descriptive analysis of the Norms model
Descriptive analysis of the Security model
Descriptive analysis of the
Domestic Politics Model
Descriptive analysis of the Norms model
Introduction
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2. THEORY. 2.1. Security Model: The level of perceived threat. Sagan’s security model builds on the realism paradigm where all states exist in a
self-help system, and states must consequently safeguard their survival, and
protection of their interests and sovereignty.
The model divides states into two groups; strong states, capable of building a
credible deterrent, and weaker states, which cannot build a credible deterrent and
therefore needs to enter into alliances in the hope of being sheltered under the
umbrella of the extended deterrence guarantees that a nuclear weapon state can
offer.12 Sagan is questioning the value, for the weaker state, of such a nuclear
alliance by posing the question: “the policy inevitably raises the questions about the
credibility of extended deterrence guarantee, since the nuclear power would also
fear retaliation if it responded to an attack on its ally”13
The security model offers the following explanation as to why nuclear weapons
proliferate: Nuclear weapons affect the international system and force states to act
within a frame where it is paramount to maintain the balance of power and status
quo. The zero sum logic means that an increase in one states security will mean a
reduction of other states security. This means that if one state acquires nuclear
weapons the neighbouring state or other states who now feels threatened will be
forced to reconsider their own security policy and contemplate acquiring the nuclear
weapon too. This can cause a domino effect where the security dilemma starts a
chain reaction that will increase the arms race and thus escalate the chances of
conflict. Sagan frames this by quoting George Shultz: “Proliferation begets
proliferation.”
The fundamental question is;
can states trust their ally to protect them or do they need to be able to help them-
selves?
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12 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
The IR scholar John Mearsheimer argues that the uncertainty of the
intentions of other states makes cooperation to overcome the security dilemma very
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57 13 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57 14 George Shultz, cited in: Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57.
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unlikely.15 “Whenever a new state is seen to be developing nuclear weapons, it is
likely that its rivals will consider preventive war under this ‘better now than later’
logic.”16
Sagan contemplates the effect the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) has on states’ possibilities to overcome the collective action
problem. The NPT is the international institution, which can offer the transparency,
and control, that is essential to create trust between states which is in turn crucial in
reducing states’ motivation to acquire the nuclear deterrent. It is, however,
questionable how important this NPT provided transparency really is in promoting
the collective disarmament. Sagan does not have much faith in this “Each state
would prefer to become the only nuclear weapons power in its region, but since that
is an unlikely outcome if it develops a nuclear arsenal, it is willing to refrain from
proliferation, if and only if, its neighbours remain non-nuclear”17
The theory of the link between perceived threat and incentives to build nuclear
weapons works both ways in that the incentive to build a nuclear weapon increases
or decreases in tune with the perceived increased or decreased threat or security
challenge. The latter is Sagan’s way of explaining nuclear limitation with the Realism
paradigm.18 In short, from a realist’s perspective, nuclear restraint is caused by the
absence of the fundamental military threats that produce positive proliferation
decisions.19
15 John J. Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, p. 53. 16 Scott D. Sagen, in: Scott D. Sagen/ Kenneth N.Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p 61. 17 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 62. 18 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 61. 19 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 61.
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2.2. The Domestic Politics Model: Bureaucratic interests. Sagan argues in his domestic politics model that states’ decisions with respect to
nuclear armament or disarmament are not solely made in tune with the emerging or
diminishing threat to the state. The states’ internal struggle and political changes will
influence the decision as well.20
Sagan additionally highlights the importance of
sources of prestige for domestic actors. The argument is simple: Pro-nuclear
weapons actors gain additional influence if nuclear weapons represent a positive
symbol in the domestic debate. An example of positive symbols could be national
technological superiority and strong armed forces. Conversely, if nuclear weapons
represent a negative symbol these actors will use their influence to argue that the
nuclear weapons represent a challenge to their economy and therefore are not good
for the nation. An example of this is the French wine industry that still suffer from the
negative publicity the French nuclear test blast in the 1990s gave France abroad.
This has not caused France to disarm but it has effectively stopped nuclear tests.
There are three main actors in the domestic politics model who will seek to influence
a state’s decision to acquire the nuclear deterrent:
• The state’s nuclear energy establishment, including scientific institutions and
companies; (in this thesis referred to as: Nuclear defence industry actor)
• Influential bodies within the state’s military as a domestic bureaucratic actor; (in
this thesis referred to as: Military actor)
• Politicians who wish to use the theme of nuclear weapons for their own parochial
interests in the political party, or in shaping their personal profile to obtain public
support.21
It is important to monitor the public opinion within a country to
understand cases of nuclear proliferation or, in other cases, nuclear restraint. (in
this thesis referred to as: Political actor)
These actors will, according to ‘Domestic Politics Model’, seize all opportunities to
emphasise aspects of emerging or diminishing threats and use them in the domestic
20 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 69. 21 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 63 – 64.
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debate and link the nuclear weapon to the debate in order to create a window of
opportunity to pursue their own agenda.22
There is still no well-developed political theory that outlines the conditions under
which coalitions of bureaucratic actors can become powerful enough to affect the
decisions on nuclear proliferation and thereby produce their preferred outcome
23.
The social construction of technology related to military procurement during the Cold
War has, by Morton H. Halperin,24 been used to describe how the bureaucratic
actors have been affecting the decisions they preferred by exacerbating the
perception of the security threat to promote their own parochial agendas. The
‘Domestic Politics Model’ argues that scientists and their organisations will support
military development in order to secure a steady flow of funding to the research that
they find technically interesting and promotes their prestige. These scientists will
form a coalition with military bureaucratic actors who can see an advantage in
supporting the scientist cause by promoting their own military responsibilities and
favoured weapons systems.25 The coalition between the scientific sector and the
military will then build a broader coalition with politicians by shaping the politicians
cost benefit perception. The politicians will latch on to this conclusion either because
the politician will have to trust the expert in the field26
or because the public opinion
is in favour of the nuclear weapons program as argued above.
Sagan’s main arguments of the Domestic Politics Model are summed up in these
quotes: “nuclear weapons programs are not obvious or inevitable solutions to
international security problems; instead, nuclear weapons programs are solutions
looking for a problem to which to attach them-selves so as to justify their
existence.”27
22 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65. 23 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 64. 24 Morton H. Halperin with the assistance of Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, 1974. 25 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 64. 26 Peter D. Feaver. 2003. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 27 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65.
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“Security threats are therefore not the central cause of weapons decisions according
to this model: they are merely windows of opportunity through which parochial
interests can jump.”28
Background analysis of potential domestic politic actors is
required to reveal the parochial interests often hidden from public view under the
cover of the security argument.
2.3. The Norms Model: Nuclear symbols and state identity. 2.3.1. Identity. In the ‘Norms Model’ the key to proliferation or non-proliferation is the identity of the
actor and the interest that is attached to this identity. The ‘Norms Model’ further
suggests that nuclear weapons have more functions than purely to provide security.
Sagan posits that nuclear weapons are artefacts that serve important symbolic
functions, symbolic functions that simultaneously shape and reflect the states’
identity. Accordingly, a state’s normative behaviour is determined by “deeper norms
and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international
relations”29
The ‘Norms Model’ includes sociologists and political scientists work about myths in
a constructivist perspective. The ‘Norms Model’ applies the constructivist
perspective on the role norms play in proliferation by emphasising the influence of
institutional isomorphism where modern organisations and institutions tend to
become similar to each other
.
30
28 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
. According to the theory of institutional isomorphism,
organisations (in this paper organisations = states) tend to mimic each other –
especially when an organisation is in doubt of the onwards strategy the organisation
will emulate another perceived successful organisation. In this context Sagan points
towards that states do have “interests” but that these are “shaped by the social roles
actors are asked to play, are pursued according to habits and routines as much as
through reasoned decision”. This is caused by the interests being embedded in the
social environment which encourages certain behaviours as rational and legitimate.
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65. 29 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 73. 30 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 74.
18
States will therefore choose their place in the international environment which
encourages certain actions as rational and legitimate and denigrate others as
irrational and primitive.
2.3.2. The Nuclear Myth. The nuclear myth is the narrative of symbolic meanings that nuclear weapons
symbolise to a state – symbolise in terms of identity and the desire / interest for
international status and international prestige - what Wendt calls the collective self-
esteem31. Sagan makes a historic link between pro-nuclear decisions and enhanced
international prestige, prestige in terms of influence on the international scene and
security. The ‘Norms Model’ states that the politics of nuclear weapons are
symbolising the international and national politics of a state because both pro and
anti-nuclear decisions will be “shaping and reflecting a state’s identity”32. Sagan
uses the example that nuclear states in the 1960s, when nuclear testing was still
perceived a legitimate act, were proud of these tests33. The nuclear states were
using these nuclear tests as a symbol to show the rest of the world, their
sophisticated level of development. “From the sociological perspective, military
organizations and their weapons can therefore be envisioned as serving functions
similar to those of flags, airlines, and Olympic teams: they are part of what modern
states believe they have to possess to be a legitimate, modern state.”34
By this
Sagan points to the general perception in the early nuclear age that Great Powers
had to have nuclear weapons, in the same way that they had to have the other
above mentioned symbols.
2.3.3. The Nuclear Taboo. “The ‘nuclear taboo’ refers to a powerful de facto prohibition against the first use of
nuclear weapons.”35
31 Alexander Wendt, Cambridge University Press, Social Theory of International Politics, 1999, p236.
This quote from Nina Tannewald who is one of the leading IR
32 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 73. 33 This was actually not the case for the UK, Macmillan did not want to test more than necessary as it was polluting the atmosphere. 34 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 73. 35 Nina Tannenwald, Cambridge University Press, The Nuclear Taboo, The United States and the non-use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945, p10
19
scholars in the field of why the nuclear weapon has not been used since World War
II. The quote frames what the nuclear taboo is today, which is the opposite of the
nuclear myth.
The nuclear taboo has grown over time from being almost non-existent in the
beginning of the nuclear era to have become almost ubiquitous in today’s nuclear
debate. The nuclear taboo has grown because the legitimacy of nuclear weapons
has changed over time. In the beginning there were no prohibitions or rules that
regulated the use of nuclear weapons. There are still no laws that explicitly outlaw
nuclear weapons, however their legality and use is disputed36
. The change in the
perception of the nuclear weapon has been formed by the same normative beliefs
that led to the ban of chemical weapons which were based on the fear that they
would be used again. The ghost of the First World War, where an incomprehensive
amount of people were killed by chemical weapons, was a strong driver to ban these
weapons as they were seen as inhumane and an inappropriate behaviour in the
modern world. The same pattern has led many states to oppose the development of
nuclear weapons simply due to the reaction to the bombings of Nagasaki and
Hiroshima creating an anti-nuclear demeanour in the general population.
2.3.4. The Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT is a tangible outcome of the nuclear taboo. The growing fear of a nuclear
war combined with the myopic interests of the super powers led to the inception of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. The NPT is traditionally viewed to have
three pillars:
1. Non-proliferation,
2. disarmament, and
3. the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.
In essence the NPT is a bargain and a child of the cold war where the non-nuclear
signatories would get the benefits of shared peaceful nuclear technology and a
promise by nuclear weapons states on ultimate disarmament in exchange for the
acceptance of foregoing the acquirement of nuclear weapons. The benefit for the
36 In an advisory opinion from 1996 The UN World Court found, “that the use or threat of nuclear weapons is ‘generally’ unlawful”. On the other hand it said that it could not definitively conclude if it would be unlawful to use nuclear weapons in self-defence if the continued survival of the state depended on it
20
nuclear signatories was that they would remain the only nuclear powers and that
they could avoid additional arms race while benefitting from unrestricted commercial
access to a lucrative market.
There are two problems with the NPT. The first problem is that nuclear material and
technology for peaceful purposes can also be used in the production of a nuclear
weapon. The second problem is that the nuclear signatories committed to ultimate
nuclear disarmament in article VI of the treaty. The first is a problem for obvious
reasons and the latter is a problem because the treaty is only effective as long as the
non-nuclear signatories trust the nuclear weapon states will to disarm.
Despite these two fundamental problems to the treaty, the NPT has, since its
inception in 1970, possibly been the strongest normative driver to change norms
relating to the status and legitimacy of possessing nuclear weapons. Sagan
mentions Ukraine as an example of a state that has voluntarily relinquished the
entire inventory of nuclear weapons. Ukraine had incentives other than economy to
disarm, the added benefit of being perceived as a good “NPT state” far compensated
for the loss of a weapon that Ukraine could neither afford to maintain nor had any
likelihood of using kinetically. The risk of being perceived as a rogue state in the
international system and particularly the EU is likely to have had a decisive influence
on the decision to disarm. The motivation to keep or disarm nuclear weapons will
vary from state to state, but in the Ukraine case the ownership of nuclear weapons
was not associated with the prestige and status of a modern state.37
In Sagan’s view compliance with the NPT supports the non-proliferation norms and
since its inception in 1970 possession of nuclear weapons has become a matter of
questionable legitimacy.
38
The cases will show how the introduction/existence of the
NPT has affected the UK’s decision making with respect to nuclear weapons.
37 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 76. 38 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 76 and p. 83-84.
21
3. CASE 1962 - DECISION TO ACQUIRE THE POLARIS SLBM. Setting the scene for the 1962 case. The UK’s security concerns after the Second World War were dominated by the
country’s worldwide colonial obligations, commitments and interests combined with
the fear that the USA would return to the isolationist policy it employed after the First
World War. In the years between the Second World War and the founding of NATO,
the UK’s greatest worries were the fear of the toxic combination of a resurgent
Germany, the Soviet Union becoming increasingly more hostile and the USA
returning to an isolationist policy. These are the security concerns that most likely led
the UK to decide to develop a nuclear weapon.
The decision to develop a nuclear weapon was taken by Prime Minister Clement
Attlee in 1947. The decision was taken by a small board of politicians and advisors –
the full Cabinet was not included in the decision. The decision to build a nuclear
capability was announced to the House of Commons in May 1949, but neither the
cost of the program nor the budget details were disclosed to the members of
Parliament.39
In the early 1950s the nuclear capability changed from being a weapon of last resort
to being the primary means of Great Britain’s defence under a doctrine of
deterrence. When Winston Churchill returned to office as Prime Minister he slowed
down the spending on conventional forces to the benefit of nuclear weapons as the
nuclear capability was seen as the key to British security.
40
The UK’s first successful test of the nuclear weapon in 1957 was the important
milestone that UK had to achieve to be a credible nuclear partner for the USA and
make USA interested in re-engaging on nuclear cooperation. The result of the UK’s
efforts was that Prime Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower concluded the
“Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence
Purposes” in 1958.
Great Britain’s primary
delivery system at the time was a fleet of strategic aircraft the so called V-bombers.
39 Walter C. Ladwig III, Strategic Insights, Vol 6, No 1(January 2007), pp 31-50, p34 40 Walter C. Ladwig III, Strategic Insights, Vol 6, No 1(January 2007), pp 31-50, p34
22
This agreement led to the USA and the UK pooling their designs for warheads and
the UK opting for the US design in order to benefit in terms of cost from the large
scale production of the hydrogen bomb rather than developing UK’s own design.41
3.1. Security Model. In this section the thesis will show how the increasing threat to the UK posed by the
Soviet Union drove the UK to build a credible independent nuclear deterrent. This
section will further show that the UK had very limited if any options but to seek help
from the USA to acquire the credible independent nuclear deterrent.
3.1.1. The increasing threat to the UK In the beginning of the 1960s there were 4 states with nuclear weapons capability.
In the west it was the USA, France and the UK and in the East it was the Soviet
Union. Furthermore China was believed to be close to having a nuclear weapon
which they indeed successfully tested in 1964.
The UK security situation leading up to the decision to acquire the Polaris system
was mainly focused on the Soviet Union who the UK could not match in either
conventional or unconventional strength. As the UK did not feel reassured that their
main ally, the USA, would not withdraw to the previous isolationist policy the UK had
no alternative but to develop their own independent nuclear deterrent in order to
counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union, in line with Sagan’s view on the
credibility of nuclear alliances42
.
3.1.2. A credible delivery vehicle. The problem for the UK in terms of the nuclear deterrent was not so much the
capability to produce the nuclear warhead but more capability to produce the
adequate delivery vehicles for the nuclear warhead. Before the acquisition of the
Polaris system the UK’s nuclear capability consisted of gravity bombs with nuclear
payload. Through the 1950s the manned bomber remained the UK’s only way to
deliver a nuclear bomb. These gravity bombs had to be dropped close to the target
41 Walter C. Ladwig III, Strategic Insights, Vol 6, No 1(January 2007), pp 31-50, p34 42 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57
23
which would mean flying deep into the Soviet Union. The introduction of surface to
air missiles in the late 1950s seriously upset the ability of a bomber to penetrate
Soviet airspace. Therefore the probability of an airstrike making it past the growing
Soviet air force was decreasing by the day, which constituted a fundamental
credibility problem for the UK nuclear deterrent.
The UK initially attempted to deal with these challenges with the Blue Steel air
launched stand off missile and Blue Streak IRBM. Neither of these weapons were
ideal; the Blue Steel was too short-ranged, and the Blue Streak was vulnerable to
Soviet attack because the UK’s territory does not have the size and thereby the
strategic depth to hide silo launched missiles.
Security wise, it was therefore of immense importance that the UK acquired the
capability to launch ballistic missiles to deliver the nuclear warheads before the
remaining credibility of the nuclear deterrent ceased to exist.
The air launched Skybolt appeared to be a better system for the UK. The Skybolt
combined the range of the Blue Streak with the mobility of the Blue Steel, it and was
possible to launch it from the Vulcan bomber that the UK already possessed.
Consequently Prime Minister Macmillan had, at Camp David in 1960, raised the
question of the UK’s options to take part in the development of the air launched
ballistic missile Skybolt to President Eisenhower. President Eisenhower had
committed to both Skybolt and the submarine launched Polaris systems.43 Prime
Minister Macmillan opted for the Skybolt “because it would seem to be the best way
for us to prolong the life of the bomber and utilise the advantages of its long
experience”44. The UK counter contribution was to give the USA access to the Holy
Loch near Glasgow for the US Polaris class submarines, which President
Eisenhower saw as an enormous enhancement of the range and capacity of the
submarine weapon.45 President Eisenhower assured Prime Minister Macmillan that
if necessary the UK could rely on the Polaris instead.46
When the USA’s Defence Minister McNamara unilaterally decided to cancel the
Skybolt project, ostensibly because of cost, it was seen by the UK as an enormous
43 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p357 44 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p357 45 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p357 46 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p357
24
blow to the UK’s security and prestige – the latter is discussed below in the norms
model.
In addition, the UK Prime Minister perceived the security situation in mainland
Europe to have become increasingly more alarming over the last part of 1961.47
The
Soviet pressure on Berlin took a new form with the building of the Berlin Wall
combined with increased coercive Soviet diplomacy in Eastern Europe.
3.1.3. The Nassau summit and the Polaris system. The worsening security situation combined with the cancelation of the Skybolt project
meant that when Prime Minister Macmillan travelled to the Nassau summit it was
with one overriding point at the agenda. The UK had to persuade the USA to
cooperate on the delivery system. The USA had to be convinced that it was for the
best for both the USA and the UK, if the UK obtained a credible operationally
independent nuclear deterrent. Prime Minister Macmillan knew that failure to get the
USA on side would mean an exposure of British vulnerability until the country could
build a national delivery system, which could take years.48
After a few days of heated negotiation (described under the norms model of this
case) between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan the USA agreed in
principle to sell the Polaris missiles to the UK. This decision was announced in the
statement of the results at the Anglo – American summit. The statement reads “the
President and the Prime Minister agreed that a decision on Polaris must be
considered in the widest context both of the future defence of the Atlantic Alliance
and of the safety of the whole free world”
49 and “Accordingly, the President and the
Prime Minister agreed that the United States will make available on a continuing
basis POLARIS missiles (less warheads) for British submarines.”50
The agreement was conditioned on the UK making the missiles available for NATO
and a multilateral nuclear defence force in defence of the western alliance “except
where her Majesty’s Government may decide that supreme national interests are at
stake”
51
47 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p142
. The last exception was Prime Minister Macmillan’s unconditional demand
48 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p363 49 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p554 50 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p554 51 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p554
25
in order to secure the UK a credible, operationally independent, nuclear deterrence.
This is a clear indication of the UK’s saw the need to be able to act unilaterally and
not be wholly dependent on an alliance.
3.2. Domestic Politics Model. In the following the thesis will show that it is most likely that the three bureaucratic
actors represented by; Sir William Penney, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
(UKAEA), the Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Louis Mountbatten and Prime
Minister Macmillan had made an informal coalition constituted by a mutual
understanding. This section provides evidence that by securing the nuclear deterrent
for the UK all three actors achieved goals within their own parochial interests.
3.2.1. The military as an actor. When looking for influential bodies in the military, as described in the ‘Domestic
Politics Model, it seems to be an obvious choice to look at the Chief of the Defence
Staff. As this case is about acquiring the submarine launched Polaris system, the
First Lord of the Admiralty is included as well.
Admiral Mountbatten was appointed as Chief of the Defence Staff in 1959 where he
inherited, among other challenges, the above mentioned failing UK projects of Blue
Streak and Blue Steel. Admiral Mountbatten was personally against the nuclear
deterrent, but he recognised that the security situation dictated the need for the UK
to acquire it. The question was where? And in what guise? In addition, for the UK
military, the prestige involved in having a nuclear deterrent was important in a similar
way to that of the government and the country as a whole. Once one of the largest
military forces in the world, the post World War II reductions were of grave concern
to senior military figures.
Armed Forces are traditionally often used to capacity or indeed overstretched in
commitments - by that they have a constant demand for increased resources.
Militaries in history are not known to voluntarily reduce in size or capability. The fact
that many in the military hierarchy were sceptical about the nuclear weapon and saw
limited tactical use for it did not mean that they would be willing to give it up or
26
surrender what many saw as the ‘balance of force’ required to maintain security in
the West52
The First Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Selkirk, was in fact initially reticent in
pushing the Polaris case due to worries on the cuts in conventional forces that he
saw as an unavoidable consequence of the Royal Navy taking over the nuclear
deterrent
.
53. Once it was clear that the Blue Streak / Blue Steel programmes were
failing and, most importantly that the replacement system would not result in
conventional cuts, then the Royal Navy began lobbying strongly for Polaris. The
Royal Navy began to see the benefits of the increase in technology for submarines
and subsequently became strong actors in the debate54. The Chief of the Defence
Staff also began to see a tactical benefit for the Armed Forces to have the nuclear
deterrent at sea “where real estate is free” as the US Chief of the Naval Staff Arliegh
Burke phrased it in a letter to Admiral Mountbatten55
. The Admirals Burke and
Mountbatten were in agreement on the tactical benefits of placing the ballistic
missiles on a nuclear propelled submarine. The sea offered the ability to hide the
missiles in an environment where they could not be tracked and thereby became
almost invulnerable.
3.2.2. The nuclear industry. Using Sagan’s model the second actor in a potential coalition is the nuclear industry
and in this case in 1961 this was personified by Sir William Penney who was the
UK’s leading personality in the UK’s endeavours of research in the nuclear field. He
was sent during World War II to the USA to participate in the ‘Manhattan project’56
52 Louis Mountbatten, A Military Commander Surveys the Nuclear Arms Race, International Security, Vol 4, No3 (1979-1980), p3-p5.
where, after a few weeks, he was selected on his merits to be part of the core group
who made the central decisions. In this core group he worked alongside
personalities such as Robert Oppenheimer. The Americans considered Penney to be
53 Andrew Priest, “Kennedy, Johnson and NATO – Britain, America and the dynamics of alliance, 1962-68”, Routledge, p14. 54 Andrew Priest, “Kennedy, Johnson and NATO – Britain, America and the dynamics of alliance, 1962-68”, Routledge, p16. 55 Andrew Priest, “Kennedy, Johnson and NATO – Britain, America and the dynamics of alliance, 1962-68”, Routledge, p16. 56 Code name for the development of the first nuclear bomb
27
among the five most distinguished British contributors to the work57. Penney followed
the project to the end and was one of very few who monitored the bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the air and was later one of the first to evaluate the
effects of the bomb on site. After World War II Penney returned to the UK to be the
Chief Superintendent Armament Research (CSAR) and later the Chairman of the
UKAEA at the behest of the UK Government, with the task from the then Defence
Minister Macmillan to develop the first UK hydrogen bomb. However, through the
course of the late 1940s and 1950s Penney also maintained links with the USA’s
nuclear research programme including playing a vital part in the Bikini Atoll test
blasts.58
All of the above proves Penney’s credentials in the scientific field but in order to be
thought of as a serious actor in a potential coalition he must have the trust of the
other two actors and principally that of the Politician, in this case Macmillan.
Macmillan’s trust and admiration for Penney is reflected in the way he describes
Penney at the Nassau Summit. “the Americans fielded a large and distinguished
team of experts who produced a massive series of papers, most of which were to me
unintelligible. Sir William Penney was more than a match for them all.”
Penney was furthermore instrumental in restoring the exchange of nuclear
technology between the UK and the USA in 1958 after it had been stopped by the
US MacMahon Act in 1946.
59
3.2.3. The Prime Minister as the political actor. The third actor in the potential coalition, Macmillan, became the Conservative PM in
1957, taking over from Eden and before him the enormous presence that was Sir
Winston Churchill. The British Empire was falling apart in the aftermath of World
War II and this constituted a difficult situation for Prime Minister Macmillan. Serving
his apprentice in government as Churchill’s Defence Minister from 1954 - 1955 he
would have been influenced by the nations desire to remain a great power and was
cognisant of the UK public’s need to be seen as such. Stepping out from the
shadow of Churchill, it is likely that Macmillan wanted to make his mark in the post
war strategic political environment. The summit at Nassau was a personal triumph
57 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 58 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 59 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p146
28
for Macmillan in raising his personal profile and role as a world statesmen and this
triumph was in some large part due to the input of Penney who was a member of the
party that escorted Macmillan at the Nassau Summit.
Evidence points towards an informal coalition between the three actors of the
‘domestic politics model’ and there is a strong case to argue that they all satisfied
their parochial interests with the decision to acquire the Polaris system.
To the UK Armed Forces the benefit of the Polaris decision was that they maintained
the status quo as a force with a nuclear capability. The Royal Navy in particular
gained advantages in form of a new capability with strategic influence and a huge
uplift in technology that would significantly improve the fleet of hunter killer
submarines as well. The senior military advisor to the Prime Minister is the Chief of
the Defence Staff who at the time was the Royal Navy Admiral, Louis Mountbatten.
Although in general Chiefs of the Defence Staff act in the interest of all three armed
services it is likely that he would have a natural bias towards the Royal Naval
Service. The transfer of the responsibility of the nuclear deterrent from the Royal Air
Force, without cuts to conventional forces, would be seen in the Naval hierarchy as a
huge achievement.
The benefits for Sir William Penney as the head of the UKAEA were at least two fold.
First of all the decision secured a sustained funding for the continued development of
nuclear warheads that he had been working on for years already. Secondly as a side
benefit, he could also look forward to new funding to start a research programme for
nuclear propulsion for placing ballistic missiles at sea and thereby increase the
UKAEA footprint. This would in turn raise Penney’s personal profile and prestige as
well as the UKAEA’s. The area of nuclear propulsion was of considerable interest to
Admiral Mountbatten and it is posited that this common ground would point towards
a potential coalition between Penney and Mountbatten in arguing against continuing
with Skybolt. By being a member of the Nassau Summit party Penney was very well
placed to influence the decision to opt for the promising Polaris project rather than
the failing Skybolt Project.
29
For Prime Minister Macmillan the acquisition of the nuclear deterrent gave him
personal credibility in the UK’s population as the successful statesman who could
deliver in securing the UK’s status as a great power. It is important to note here that
in every case of nuclear decision making the Prime Minister has played a far more
personal / autonomous role than in other political fields in that the full cabinet was
not consulted and consequently Macmillan could pursue his own agenda. As an
aside Macmillan also had a personal interest in the continued development of the
hydrogen bomb, which he himself as defence minister had initiated.
The events leading up the Nassau Summit and the underlying threat that the UK
could be pushed out of the ‘nuclear club’ caused him a great deal of anxiety not only
for the UK (within the norms model) but importantly for the ‘domestic politics model’
for his own prestige and position and the public’s perception of him as a leader /
statesman. For Macmillan the nuclear weapon was a bit of a panacea in terms of a
means to secure the UK’s status as a great power because the nuclear deterrent
could both deter the Soviet Union and it would keep the UK in the league of
technologically sophisticated nations. The alternative, that of giving up on the
nuclear deterrent, would mean that the UK would be significantly reduced in military
credibility and the UK’s position as a leading nation in Europe would be threatened.
30
4.3. Norms Model. This section will describe the ‘Norms Model’ influences on the UK’s decision to
acquire the Polaris System, based on two main themes. Firstly, the UK’s self-
perception as a Great Power on the world stage and secondly, its ties to the Super
Power of the USA through the ‘Special Relationship’. This thesis posits that the
possession of the independent nuclear deterrent is a vital part of both of these
themes. The Nassau Summit is discussed in some detail here as it reveals, through
the loaded language used by the politicians involved, how the UK’s identity was
strongly tied up with the possession of the nuclear deterrent and the myth of the
special relationship with the USA.
3.3.1. The UK’s identity as a great power. “We have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs…we have got to have a
bloody Union Jack on the top of it”60
This quote has been used by historians to indicate that the decision to acquire
nuclear weapons in the first place was dominated by UK’s aspiration to maintain
international political influence and to maintain status as a Great Power. The sheer
cost of nuclear weapons is alone a witness of how important this symbol “the Union
Jack on top of it” was to the UK at the time.
After the end of World War II, the UK underwent an enormous change. The country
was nearly bankrupt after the war. Churchill, the Conservative Prime Minister during
the war was, voted out of office and the incoming Labour government nationalised a
great part of the industry. The British Empire was falling apart and the UK was
struggling to find its new role in the international society because the UK had not yet
formed its new identity. The nation who used to rule over a quarter of the world’s
population was now barely coping with handling the territory of the British Iles which
is a 1/600 of the world’s landmass. This was naturally a deep blow to the UK’s
collective self-esteem61
In order for the UK not to lose what could be called the collective self-understanding
and all of the collective self-esteem of previous times of greatness it was crucial for
.
60 Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, 1946. 61 Alexander Wendt, Cambridge University Press, Social Theory of International Politics, 1999, p236.
31
the UK to remain a great power. Two symbols seemed to be of utmost importance in
the efforts of remaining identity as a great power. These two symbols were;
acquisition of an operationally independent nuclear deterrent, and the maintenance
of the special relationship with the United States of America. These two symbols will
at first sight appear to be unconnected, but the thesis will show that the UK needed
the nuclear weapon to be a credible military ally in order to maintain the special
relationship with the United States and that the UK would have struggled to acquire
an operationally independent nuclear deterrent without the special relationship with
the USA. As the acquisition of the operationally independent nuclear deterrent under
the ‘Security Model’ has already been described this thesis will now turn to the
‘special relationship’ and expand this side of the identity.
3.3.2. The myth of the “special relationship”. The phrase “special relationship” is a phrase Winston Churchill used in a speech in
194662
The links, mutual understanding and trust that were formed during the two world
wars persist today. It would seem, however, that UK leaders acknowledged from an
early point that, the special relationship is more important to the UK than it is to the
United States and if the UK was to benefit from the special relationship, it would
require a constant personal engagement. The UKs approach has always been
diligent and followed two overall lines i.e. incorporating strong personal support to
the President as well as rendering military and political aid where possible. These
two lines have worked side by side from the beginning. With the personal
engagement being an important part it is unsurprising that the best relationships
between the USA and the UK have been when the UK Prime Ministers and US
. Ever since this speech many leaders over time have used this phrase to
describe what ostensibly seems to be an unusually close relation between the USA
and the UK. The special relationship refers to the close ties the USA and the UK
have in terms of cooperation within political, diplomatic, cultural, economic, military
and historical matters. The two countries have close relations with other countries
with respect to these matters but the relationship between the USA and the UK
seems unparalleled in these areas.
62 'Sinews of Peace Address' Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946
32
Presidents have followed shared goals. It seems obvious why the UK will benefit
from a special relationship with a significantly bigger ally and Super Power, but why
is the special relation important for the USA? The answer would seem to be that,
with the special relationship the USA has now and historically has had a strong ally
to influence Europe. Furthermore a strong ideological ally in form of a ‘permanent 5’
is important for the USA when pursuing USA’s agenda abroad. Another great power
supporting the USA’s stance in power politics enhances the USA’s legitimacy in
international relations.
To the UK the special relationship also means that they have the ear of the President
of the USA and will be discussed in the next paragraph, looking at the critical turning
point in the Polaris acquisition.
3.3.3. The Nassau Summit.
When Prime Minister Macmillan was interviewed on television in 1958 he made clear
the reason the UK was working on acquiring nuclear weapons. Macmillan said about
the nuclear programme;
“the independent contribution (British nuclear weapons)...puts us where we ought to
be, in the position of a great power.”63
It was with this mindset that Prime Minister Macmillan flew to the Anglo – American
summit in Nassau, Bahamas in December 1961. In his memoirs Prime Minister
Macmillan describes the meeting with President Kennedy and the discussions, that
led to the agreement on the sale of Polaris missiles to the UK. The national pride and
sensitivity is clearly felt when, in his argument with Kennedy, Macmillan reiterates
the historical background to the nuclear weapon initially called “tube alloys”; in doing
so Macmillan highlights that the nuclear bomb was originally – in his opinion - a
British invention. Macmillan states that when Churchill and Roosevelt agreed during
World War II that further development of the nuclear bomb should be done in the
USA, that this agreement was because of “convenience and safety”
64
63
. In other words
it could, in Prime Minister Macmillan’s view, just as well have been Great Britain that
had retained the nuclear expertise and associated research development.
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1673 04/03/2012-1213 64 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p356
33
Macmillan is here playing on the fact that the UK trusted the USA and the USA
should respect that fact and trust the UK as well.
Macmillan furthermore states that he had already brokered an agreement with
President Eisenhower at Camp David in 1960 saying that the UK could buy 144
Skybolt missiles. President Eisenhower had assured Macmillan that if Skybolt were
to fail the UK would be offered the Polaris instead.
Prime Minister Macmillan knew that he had no power instruments in terms of
economy or military to assist him in persuading the Americans to cooperate on the
military side of the nuclear development. With his hands tied Prime Minister
Macmillan said to President Kennedy:
“If the difficulties arising from the development of Skybolt, were used, or seemed to
be used, as a method of forcing Britain out of an independent nuclear capacity, the
results would be very serious indeed. It would be deeply resented both by those of
our people who favoured an independent nuclear capability and by those who
opposed it. It would offend the national pride and would be resisted by every means
in our power”.65
Kennedy was caught between a rock and a hard place as he had to balance the
needs of the UK and at the same time not upset the French President De Gaulle. De
Gaulle was avidly against the Anglo – American nuclear cooperation which De
Gaulle saw as secretive and an attempt to alienate France in the western alliance.
At the same time Kennedy had to accommodate the needs of a staunch ally that
would perceive it as an unacceptable failure if the UK didn’t remain an independent
nuclear power.
According to Macmillan Kennedy was “somewhat taken aback” by
this.
Both Kennedy and Macmillan used the term ‘interdependence’ but they used it in
different ways. Macmillan viewed interdependence as a form of partnership – a
special relationship - in which both countries would aim to pool their efforts more
effectively and consistently, particularly in the field of defence.66
65 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p357
To Kennedy the
term meant more effective central control, and hence American control of western
66 Nigel John Ashton, “Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Cold War: the irony of interdependence”, 2002, p152
34
defence efforts. The difference in this perception of the term can explain the
conundrum Kennedy had to solve. On the one hand Kennedy was veering towards
establishing a centralised Multilateral Nuclear Defence in which France would be an
equal partner and the prestige sensitivities of the French identity would thereby be
met. On the other hand De Gaulle would perceive the resuscitation of the Anglo –
American nuclear weapons development as the USA favouring the UK. If the USA
chose not to sell the Polaris it would most likely mean the end to UK nuclear
deterrence and this would mean that France would be the only remaining nuclear
power in Europe. Macmillan describes in his memoir how painful this would be to
the UK. “America must realise that the nations of Europe, with their different histories
and varying responsibilities, would demand a reasonably degree of dignity and
security. Certainly Britain with her world-wide commitments must continue, for the
present at any rate, to have some independent nuclear force.”67
3.3.4. Countering American bureaucracy Only 10 months after the Nassau meeting when Prime Minister Macmillan retired
President Kennedy declared “In nearly three years of cooperation, we have worked
together on great and small issues, and we have never had a failure of
understanding or of mutual trust.”68 President Kennedy’s and Prime Minister
Macmillan’s feelings of trust in each other were mutual as the then retired Macmillan
told President Kennedy’s widow Jacqueline Kennedy “He (President Kennedy)
seemed to trust me—and for those of us who have had to play the so-called game of
politics—national and international—this is something very rare but very precious”69
The special relationship on the personal level between President Kennedy and
Prime Minister Macmillan was not echoed in the entire US administration. George
Ball the US under-secretary of state at the time of the Anglo – American Nassau
meeting saw the result of the meeting as a mistake and a self-inflicted wound when
he reflected on the meeting “it encouraged Britain to continue thinking of herself as a
67 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p359 68 John Dickie, Special No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1994), p. 105. 69 Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986: Volume II of the Official Biography (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 304
35
great power, and deflected her from coming to terms with her European destiny”.70
empire
Dean Acheson a former Secretary of State expressed his view on the special
relationship in a speech given at West Point “Great Britain has lost an and
has not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate power role—that is, a role
apart from Europe, a role based on a ‘Special Relationship’ with the United States, a
role based on being the head of a ‘Commonwealth’ which has no political structure,
or unity, or strength and enjoys a fragile and precarious economic relationship—this
role is about played out” 71
Philip of Spain
Macmillan’s response to the speech reveals that he is hurt on his national pride and
prestige but he has no contemporary arguments to disprove Acheson’s accusations
so he reverts to historical examples of British resolution and will “In so far as he
appeared to denigrate the resolution and will of Britain and the British people, Mr.
Acheson has fallen into an error which has been made by quite a lot of people in the
course of the last four hundred years, including , Louis XIV, Napoleon,
the Kaiser and Hitler.”72 Hitler was of course contemporary but the UK would most
likely not have been able to defeat Nazi-Germany without the help from the USA.
Macmillan is arguing against the perceived underestimation of the commonwealth,
simply by saying that “He (Acheson) also seems to misunderstand the role of the
Commonwealth in world affairs.”73
70 Matthew Harries, Britain and France as Nuclear Partners, Survival, vol 54 no. 1, p7-30, p9 71 Alistair Horne, Macmillan: Volume II of the Official Biography (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 429 72 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p339 73 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p339
36
3.4. Part conclusion of the 1962 decision. The UK was not strong enough conventionally to counter the Soviet Union which
explains the UK’s actions in 1962. The UK consequently had to evaluate if the
NATO alliance was a strong enough alliance not in military might but in will. The UK
saw the USA’s full committed participation in the alliance as NATO’s Centre of
Gravity. As the UK had doubts whether they could count on the USA’s nuclear
security guarantees, the UK had from a security point of view no other option than to
acquire an operationally independent nuclear deterrent.74
The security issues were, however, not the only drivers that led the UK to buy the
Polaris system. The three bureaucratic actors all had incentives to promote the
purchase of the Polaris system as well. The bureaucratic actors all had a shared
goal in that they wanted the UK to rise within the nuclear field albeit they had very
different parochial motives to get there. Sir William Penney was interested in
securing additional funding to the atomic energy sector, the Chief of the Defence
Staff Admiral Mountbatten was interested in securing the ‘senior service’ an
important asset to be able to operate on the grand strategic level. And finally the
Prime Minister Macmillan was interested in cementing his political base by being
seen to be the one who kept the UK at the top table.
The special relationship was severely tested at the Skybolt crisis in 1962 when
President Kennedy initially reneged on the promise President Eisenhower had made
to the UK. Prime Minister Macmillan who had no instruments of power to lever the
agreement descended to using the emotional well of shared Anglo – American
sacrifice and common nuclear history, which proved to be the decisive argument that
won the day75
74 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
despite the severe friction in the US administration - the UK would be
supplied with the Polaris missile. It can be concluded that it was not due to domestic
and or foreign political interest that the USA chose to sell the Polaris to the UK.
Actually Kennedy chose to sell the Polaris to the UK in spite of domestic and to
some degree foreign political issues. Kennedy’s reasons to sell the Polaris to the UK
were partly and only partly because of the perceived threat as the UK contribution
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57 75 Matthew Harries, Britain and France as Nuclear Partners, Survival, vol 54 no. 1, p7-30, p9
37
was only a limited enhancement in western capacity. It would seem that the special
relationship was indeed the most compelling argument. This justifies the UK’s
emphasis on the special relationship with the USA as a part of the UK identity.
To sum up the 1962 case the nuclear deterrent was the most advanced weapon at
the time and it was seen to be the means to re-forge the special relationship with the
USA, defend the UK against future threats and thereby cement the UK’s status in the
world as a great power. The thesis has described how all three models contributed
significantly to the UK’s decision to buy the Polaris system. It is difficult to measure
which one of the models gives the most causal weight to explain the decision of the
Polaris purchase. For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction – this
argues that the invention of the nuclear bomb with the subsequent shift in the
balance of power was the catalyst to drive the UK to need to acquire the nuclear
deterrent for security reasons. Due to the clear and present danger posed by the
Soviet Union the bureaucratic interests of the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ and status
concerns of the ‘Norms Model’ may have been just secondary to the Security Model.
However, the two other models do carry significant causal weight in that the
acquisition of the nuclear deterrent had three significant impacts:
1. It cemented the UK’s status within NATO, denied France the status as the only
European nuclear power, and it stipulated the UK’s independence of action.
2. It took the UK back to the super league in Europe and gave the UK significant
leverage in world affairs – in other words a statement to say that the UK was not
just a puppet controlled by USA.
3. It showed the USA that the UK was willing to own up to the special relationship
by sharing the burden and liability of Europe’s defence and thereby giving the
USA an incentive to fortify the pledge to Europe.
38
4. CASE 2006 – DECISION TO MODERNISE THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT: In this chapter the thesis will show the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the lobbying of a, in relative terms, huge nuclear defence industry. Contrary to the
first case, this chapter will show the tangible effect of the nuclear taboo and the
inception of the of Non-Proliferation treaty.
4.1. Security Model.
In the Foreword to the White Paper “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear
Deterrent” Prime Minister Blair argues that the security of the nation over the last 50
years has rested on the ultimate assurance the Nuclear Deterrent has provided. The
security situation in Britain in December 2006 was, however, very different than how
it had been during the Cold War where the previous decision had been taken.
During the Cold War years the role of the nuclear deterrent was always clear. The
situation in December 2006 was dominated by the threat from other present and
future nuclear states and terrorism. The country’s territorial integrity was more
secure than it had been for a long time. The threats to the UK that are relevant for
this thesis are threats from other nuclear states and from generic terrorists with
weapons of mass destruction capability. The thesis will now turn to the nuclear
threats that existed in 2006 as far as the UK was concerned.
4.1.1. Other nuclear states. In December 2006 Russia, the old enemy from the Cold War, no longer had a
posture that threatened the UK. By the action of dissolving the Soviet Union, Russia
had relegated itself from being a super power to being on level with the UK, i.e. both
countries were trying hard to maintain status as a great power. Russia was no
longer on a confrontational course with the UK, but to the contrary more on a course
to establish cooperation with the EU albeit whilst maintaining national dignity, which
had slowed the cooperation.
Pakistan had become a state in possession of a nuclear weapons capability in 1998
as a consequence of the India – Pakistan conflict. This was, again, a result of a
chain reaction because India had developed their nuclear weapon as a consequence
39
of the India – China conflict. In other words a textbook example of “proliferation
begets proliferation”76
North Korea had proved to the world that they were now a nuclear state when they
detonated a test bomb in October 2006. Furthermore Iran, a neighbour country to
Pakistan and an ideologically fierce enemy of Israel, had for some years been
suspected of developing a nuclear weapons programme which was aggravated by
Iran denying inspectors of the UN access to the ostensible nuclear power plants.
.
As argued above the nuclear threat was different in December 2006 to the last time
the UK had to decide on keeping the nuclear deterrent during the Cold War in 1980,
although some of the realities of the Cold War persisted. The countries with large
nuclear arsenals still remained nuclear states (exempt Ukraine) and some were even
modernising these weapons.77 The threat from the other nuclear states was not an
imminent threat to the UK, but as Prime Minister Blair stated: “With this development
we cannot predict the way the world will look in 30 or 50 years’ time”78 Furthermore
Prime Minister Blair stipulates that “none of the present recognised nuclear weapons
states intends to renounce the nuclear weapons”79 This is interpreted by the
government as the UK cannot be sure that a major nuclear threat will not emerge
over the longer term and this is echoed by Foreign Secretary David Miliband: "We
reject unilateral nuclear disarmament for ourselves precisely because the world
cannot end up in a situation where responsible powers get rid of their weapons, but
the danger of nuclear proliferation by other powers remains."80 In his memoirs Prime
Minister Tony Blair deemed giving up the nuclear deterrent too big a risk for the
defence of the country in an uncertain world.81
76 George Shultz, cited in: Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a
The Prime Minister and the Foreign
Secretary are here looking at the nuclear question through the realism perspective
where they acknowledge that they cannot trust other states and the only way to act
Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57. 77 Tony Blair, Foreword to the White Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006 78 Tony Blair, Foreword to the White Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006 79 Tony Blair, Foreword to the White Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006 80 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8270092.stm 04/03/2012-1422 81 Blair, A Journey, Hutchinson London, 2010, p636
40
is in a self-helping way. In other words they argue that the UK needs to keep the
nuclear deterrent, if for nothing else then as an insurance policy to cover the future
nuclear threats.
4.1.2. Asymmetrical attack and 9/11. The new threat on the security agenda was terrorism. Terrorism per se was not a
new phenomenon but the attacks on 11 September 2001 on the United States were
a change in paradigm. These attacks forced the Ministry of Defence to issue an
addition to the 1998 Strategic Defence and Security Review a so called ‘New
Chapter’. The then Defence Minister, Geoff Hoon, explained the necessity of the
addition by stating that the attacks on the only remaining super power demonstrated
that the adversaries had the potential for using “asymmetric action to achieve
strategic effect”82 In the ‘New Chapter’ the UK Government specifically mentions that
the UK need to deter countries that in the future would “seek to sponsor nuclear
terrorism from their soil”83
82 Geoff Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, Foreword to the “The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter”, p4.
. The extreme interpretation of this would be that this
means the UK would retaliate with nuclear means on a country where a few
disturbed people engaged in terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. This
doesn’t seem to chime with the policy of ‘no first use’ which is understood to be
aggression from nuclear powers or with the proportionality principle in the
international laws of war. Modern terrorism is a threat to the UK, and to many values
within western democracies, but terrorism does not constitute a threat to the UK’s
territorial integrity. The war against Al Qaida in Afghanistan has shown that the
world society generally, with a few myopic countries as the exception, accept very
aggressive and forceful means to fight terrorism. However international society
would be unlikely to accept a retaliation which is not targeting the culprits directly
with a minimum amount of collateral damage. It is implausible that the world society
would accept a collective punishment on huge numbers of innocent people in order
to retaliate a weapons of mass destruction attack on the UK. There is very little to
suggest that the UK could use the nuclear weapon on a tactical level to counter
terrorism.
83 Tony Blair, Foreword to the White Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006
41
4.2. Domestic Politics Model. In the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ we look at the three actors; the military actor, the
nuclear industry actor and the political actor. The following will show that the armed
forces were interested in improving the footprint of the nuclear deterrent, the nuclear
defence industry had huge economic incentives to influence the Government on the
decision to renew the nuclear deterrent and finally, the politicians had their own
interests in the modernisation. Just as in the 1962 it gives evidence of an informal
“alliance” between these actors and it is demontrated that they all benefitted one way
or another by the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent.
4.2.1 The Military as an actor. In the lead up to Prime Minister Blair making the decision to renew the nuclear
deterrent the Royal Navy and the UK’s Armed Forces did not see the renewal of the
nuclear deterrent as a procurement that would have an impact on the conventional
forces. The funding of the nuclear deterrent had historically been borne by the
Treasury and there was no discussion on this issue before Prime Minister Blair’s
decision in December 2006. The Royal Air Force’s nuclear capability was
decommissioned in the 1998 SDSR, consequently leaving the Royal Navy as the
single nuclear weapons service. This meant that there was no inter service rivalry
surrounding the nuclear capability leading up to December 2006. As described
under the 1962 case, armed forces are big organisations with an inherent imperative
to expand resources to meet their core mission, which means that they are very
unlikely to suggest a reduction of size or a capability. As a case in point in 2006 the
Royal Navy and the Chief of the Defence Staff lobbied for 5 submarines to replace
the 4 VANGUARD-Class just as they had done at the previous decision when the
replacement of the RESOLUTION-class carrying the Polaris System was debated.84
84 Tanya Ogilvie-White, IISS, On Nuclear Deterrence – the correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan, p225
The Royal Navy argued that 5 submarines would ensure that the Royal Navy would
be able to keep 2 submarines on patrol at all times. The Royal Navy promoted it by
stating that with the cost of one extra submarine the Royal Navy could effectively
double the operational capability. There seems to be a lack of reasoned objective
security argument for the requirement to double the capacity in 2006, which indicates
parochial interest, promoted by exaggerating the threat, rather than objective
42
national interests. The decision on the future number of submarines to replace the
VANGUARD-class is still debated as the previous and current government are more
inclined to reduce the number of submarines to three to keep the cost down.
4.2.2. The (Civil and Military) Nuclear Industry 4.2.2.1. Nuclear weapons as a business. The following paragraph contains facts and figures about the UK defence industry
with emphasis on the provision of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in order to
show the scale of this sector and the impact on government decisions.
A recent global report published by ICAN in 201285 stated that, currently, worldwide
there are over 300 financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, pension funds
etc.) financing companies that manufacture, upgrade and maintain nuclear weapons
and their relevant delivery vehicles. The UK comes second only to USA in the
number of financial companies supporting this industry (41 companies listed out of
the 300). It is a large percentage of the total number and is significantly larger than
the next on the list India (19). Major British financial institutions listed in the report
include Aviva Insurance, Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, Prudential and
The Royal Bank of Scotland. The report details 20 major nuclear weapons producers
of which 5 are UK owned. These are Babcock International, BAE Systems, Redhall
Group, Rolls-Royce and Serco Group. A close look will show that these companies
have significant portfolios in the civilian nuclear sector as well as the military nuclear
sector, which is unsurprising given the close historic connections between the civilian
and military side nuclear development. Indeed historically, for the nuclear weapons
states, commercial nuclear power was a spinoff from the nuclear weapons
programmes86
All 5 companies are, or have been, involved directly or indirectly with the current
VANGUARD-class submarine from design and build through to maintenance. To
show the scale of these contracts an example is that Rolls-Royce have a 10 year
85 ‘Don’t Bank on the Bomb: The Global Financing of Nuclear Weapons Producers published by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) March 2012 http://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/about-the-report/ 04/03/2012-1620 86 Nuclear Industry Subsidies Part III: The Military Connection Blog: http://theenergycollective.com/charlesbarton/60336/nuclear-industry-subsidies-part-iii-military-connection 04/03/2012-1522
43
non-revocable maintenance contract worth £1 billion to maintain the nuclear
propulsion. Of these companies the following three BAE Systems, Babcock Marine
and Rolls-Royce form a triumvirate responsible for the successor of the
VANGUARD-class so far simply called the ‘Successor’.
4.2.2.2. Impact if the modernisation of the nuclear deterrent is scrapped. As the 2006/2007 case is a case where the UK maintains status quo on the nuclear
deterrent as opposed to the 1962 case where the UK de facto acquired a new
capability it is relevant to consider what would suffer if the nuclear capability was
decommissioned.
The 5 companies that are directly involved in the maintenance and modernising of
the nuclear deterrent generated a net profit in the last financial year of £1.9 billion.87
It is estimated that the defence industry supports around 300,000 jobs across the
country and generates around £35 billion a year for the economy, while defence
exports are worth somewhere between £5-7 billion a year. Britain is Europe’s
number one exporter and, in global terms, is second only to the USA.
According to an independent commissions investigation four local economies are
vulnerable to a cancellation of the modernising of the nuclear deterrent.
“A replacement will possibly support some 26,000 jobs some of which are located in
high unemployment areas (e.g. Barrow-in-Furness). Cancellation also means job
losses with some high unemployment areas at risk. The worst case scenario for
submarine-related jobs assumes that after 2052, the United Kingdom will withdraw
completely from the operation of nuclear-powered submarines. The result would be
the loss of 9,200 jobs after 2037 followed by the loss of a further 21,700 jobs after
2052: a total of almost 31,000 jobs being lost”.88
The direct impact on the defence industry if the modernisation of the nuclear
deterrent is scrapped is of course the loss of ‘Successor’ manufacturing revenue as
well as the maintenance / running revenue estimated to be £15-20 billion plus £750
87 The figures for the financial year of 2006 has not been accessible 88 BASIC Trident Commission Discussion Paper 2 An independent, cross-party commission to examine UK nuclear weapons policy
44
million in maintenance per year. Second order losses could include a reduction in
numbers of the new hunter killer submarines of the ASTUTE-class, which is currently
budgeted at £3.9 billion for the first 2 out of seven. Furthermore there is a probable
capability loss in the nuclear submarine building industry as a consequence of small
production numbers resulting in prolonged gaps in production therefore causing
problems retaining the required specialist knowledge and skillsets.
4.2.2.3. Mutual interdependence. The MOD set out its strategy in the ‘Defence Industrial Strategy” from 200589
Close connections between the military, politicians and defence industry are vital in
the UK to safeguard the national industries as well as national security, none more
so than in the area of nuclear submarines and the nuclear deterrent. UK’s
determination to maintain some level of autonomy and maintain the secrecy required
for national security renders the companies producing nuclear propelled and nuclear
armed submarines a monopoly.
. This
strategy describes the ‘strategic assurance’ requiring national Research and
Development and national production on national security-sensitive equipment and
services. In the 2006 white paper it says “It would be our intention to build the new
SSBNs in the UK, for reasons of national sovereignty, nuclear regulation, operational
effectiveness and safety, and maintenance of key skills.”
This government self-inflicted dual facetted monopoly (one customer one seller)
means that the government and the nuclear defence industry have to live in a
symbiosis to survive. This suggests that the MOD is no longer entirely capable of
making unbiased recommendations.
4.2.3. Key figures in Government. A few named persons are interesting for the ‘Domestic Politic Model’:
The first is the former First Sea Lord Admiral Alan West who in 2006 was the chair of
QinetiQ which is a British global defence technology company, and a former UK
government agency. The retired Admiral West undoubtedly had strong personal
89Defence White Paper: ‘Defence Industrial Strategy’ http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/f530ed6c-f80c-4f24-8438-0b587cc4bf4d/0/def_industrial_strategy_wp_cm6697.pdf 17/03/2012-1252
45
connections to the top of the Labour Party as he became the minister for Security
and Counter terrorism 6 months later when Gordon Brown took over from Tony Blair.
Considering West’s previous career and his position at the time it is assessed that he
applied pressure and used his personal relationship to affect the decision on whether
or not to modernise the nuclear deterrent.
John Hutton, MP for Barrow-in Furness (where the UK’s submarines are build) and a
member of Blair’s cabinet. Hutton was openly a strong supporter of Tony Blair, and
he was made a life peer on his retirement for work as an MP. Hutton saw it as his
duty to support the modernising of the nuclear deterrent for the sake of his
constituency where unemployment was, and still is, high. In fact he is recorded as
voting ‘very strongly’ for the Trident replacement.90
““It is a bold person who believes the UK will face a threat to its territorial integrity
from another state in the next 50 years. But it’s a reckless one who rules it out. And I
am not prepared to be reckless with our nation’s security.”
He was quoted as saying:
91
Exactly as Sagan
predicts Hutton is using a security argument as a window of opportunity to promote
his parochial interests. Unsurprisingly he is strongly pro-nuclear and in fact in June
2011 Hutton took over as Chairman of the Nuclear Industry Association
Prime Minister Tony Blair himself was known for being a strong supporter of some of
the UK’s largest defence companies. Most notably in 2006 it is claimed he
persuaded the then Attorney General Lord Goldmsith to abandon the inquiry into
corrupt and fraudulent dealing by BAE Systems with respect to ‘kick back’s’ to
prominent figures in the UAE in order to gain contracts. Prime Minister Blair said he
took full responsibility for the decision. A former Labour minister Peter Kilfoyle was
quoted as saying “I certainly think there is now an argument to be made for an
independent judicial inquiry into the whole affair. This raises serious questions on
what [Blair's] motivation was in intervening in the [al-Yamamah investigation in the
90 Report on MPs voting decision, http://www.theyworkforyou.com/peer/lord_hutton_of_furness#votingrecord 16/03/2012-1555 91 Northwest Evening Mail (Local newspaper) Report June 2009 http://www.nwemail.co.uk/news/trident_replacement_still_on__says_hutton__despite_call_to_delay_decision_1_563475?referrerPath=home 17/03/2012-2022
46
UK] and what influences were brought to bear on him." 92
Systems had over the Prime Minister. This can be extrapolated to BAE Systems
influencing the renewal of the nuclear deterrence. Prime Minister Blair’s motives and
sensitivity to influence becomes particularly significant in the light of the fact that the
decision to renew the nuclear deterrent in 2006 was taken by the Prime Minister and
a small group of advisers and not the whole cabinet
The Liberal Democrats'
deputy leader, Vince Cable, said "The British government was up to its neck in this
whole business. Government ministers were almost certainly fully aware of what was
happening." It would seem that this example is a strong indicator of the symbiosis
that exists between the government, the MOD and the defence industry. Of
significance in Peter Kilfoyle’s quote is the insinuation of the level of influence BAE
93
.
4.2.3.1. The Prime Ministers version. Prime Minister Tony Blair does not use many words in his memoir ‘A Journey’ to
explain his decision to keep the nuclear deterrent. Blair does not offer much
granularity to the factors of the deliberations he must have had prior to his decision.
He simply argues that there were perfectly good arguments for both keeping the
nuclear deterrent and to give it up. He gives a very few carefully selected reasons to
keep the nuclear deterrent, some related to security and some related to status of
the nation – these reasons are discussed under the ‘security model’ and the ‘norm
model’ above and below.
There are two strong indicators of the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ to be found in Tony
Blair’s memoirs. The first is when Blair narrates “So, after some genuine
consideration, and reconsideration, I opted to renew it (the nuclear deterrent). But
the contrary decision would not have been stupid. I had a perfectly good discussion
about it with Gordon (Brown), who was similarly torn. In the end we both agreed, as
I said to him: Imagine standing up in the House of Commons and saying I’ve decided
to scrap it. We’re not going to say that, are we? In this case caution costly as it was,
won the day.”94
92 The Guardian newspaper Investigations /
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/feb/01/bae.saudiarabia 17/03/2012-2213 93 Tony Blair, A Journey, Hutchinson London, 2010, p636 94 Tony Blair, A Journey, Hutchinson London, 2010, p636
47
In other words Prime Minister Blair admits that he decided to keep the nuclear
deterrent mainly because he didn’t have the courage to take, what would most likely
be an irreversible decision, to disarm the nuclear deterrent and neither did his
designated successor Gordon Brown.
Prime Minister Blair was often accused of being more interested in being in the lime
light on the international arena than to be the Prime Minister of the UK. This, in
conjunction with Prime Minister Blair’s crusade for engaging UK forces as a ‘force for
good’, with or without UN support, can give additional explanation to why Prime
Minister Blair did not want to disarm95
The second indicator of the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ is what follows when he
describes the following approval in the cabinet in October 2006. Blair describes how
he and the Cabinet agreed on the forward policy which they called “Pathways to the
future”. Blair makes clear that the purpose of this policy was to create the perception
of unity and “to meld together the Blair and Brown teams, and to allow Gordon’s
assumption of leadership to be defined as continuity as well as change, and above
all as New Labour.”
. Simple vanity in the form of a desire to be a
significant figure on the international scene with his finger on the nuclear trigger
could be the reason.
96 Especially the last part about ‘New Labour’ is important as the
‘Old Labour’ with their opposition to the nuclear deterrent had made the party
unelectable in the 1980s.97 It would seem that Blair and the Cabinet were
determined to stay with the line that the ‘new Labour’ had committed to in the
election of 1997 and the Security and Defence Review in 1998, where they
abandoned the previous opposition to the nuclear deterrent. A contemporary
independent public opinion survey found that more than 70% of the British
population favoured the retention of UK nuclear weapons in all or some
circumstances.98
95 Richard Little,Mark Wickham-Jones,
These two examples are evidence, if circumstantial, that these
politicians have adopted the view of the majority of the population simply to stay in
power. This is what Sagan refers to when he says that “Nuclear weapons programs
Manchester University Press , New Labour's Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade?, p. 16.
96 Blair, A Journey, Hutchinson London, 2010, p636 97 Michael Clarke (2004), International Affairs 80, 1, p49-62, P54 98 Michael Clarke (2004), International Affairs 80, 1, p49-62, P54
48
are solutions looking for a problem to which to attach them-selves so as to justify
their existence”99
4.3. Norms Model.
In this section the Norms Model is analysed in a similar fashion to that in chapter 4
for the 1962 case. Here the twin propositions of the UK’s desire to still be
considered a great power and having a special relationship with the USA will be
revisited again with respect to the role the nuclear deterrent plays. In addition,
looking at the 2006 case the significant change in the international society’s
perception of the use of nuclear weapons, especially in light of the changed security
situation as described earlier in this chapter, will be further explored under the
heading ‘the nuclear taboo and the NPT’
4.3.1. The UK’s identity. Has the UK’s role on the international stage changed significantly from that in 1962?
Many of the great symbols still remain whether it is a nationally named (albeit
privatised) airline, the Union Flag’s appearance on Commonwealth nations’ flags or
indeed ‘The Bomb’. The old colonial obligations have morphed into such things as
the necessity to play a decisive role in maintaining international peace and security
and the promotion of western values. In analysing the position of the UK in the
international society one has only to look at such things as holding a permanent seat
on the United Nations Security Council, membership of the G8 and having the 4th
largest defence budget in the world. This identity is reflected in the words of Prime
Minister Tony Blair “Britain can and should play a crucial role, no longer as a global
power, but as a pivotal power”100
The UK’s perception is that international reactions to future conflicts must be based
on western values of justice, liberty and democracy. These values and security can
only be upheld “through active defence and promotion of these values”
101
99 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
The UK’s
readiness and ability to intervene in conflicts is shaped by a feeling of duty to uphold
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65. 100 Tony Blair, speech on foreign affairs, 15 DEC 1998, London 101 Tony Blair, speech,texas 7 april 2002, Bush Presidential Library.
49
western values and international security. Prime Minister Tony Blair argued in March
2006 that the alternative to an activist foreign policy would be an isolationist one,
which in his judgement would only lead to more insecurity. Consequently in Prime
Minister Blair’s view the UK needs to stay ready to apply hard power and use military
force to intervene where it is necessary in the world. In order to be this “force for
good” the UK needs to keep a military force with global reach.
After the end of the cold war one of the new raison d’être for the nuclear weapon has
become the ‘insurance policy’ for the UK’s actions of intervention. The rationale is
that the UK can only intervene in conflicts where there is a threat of weapons of
mass destruction be it chemical or biological, if the actors in the conflict are
effectively deterred from using these weapons. Prime Minister Tony Blair argues in
the foreword to the MOD’s ‘The Future of the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent’ that the UK
“needs¨ to stay ¨at the ¨forefront of ¨the global¨ ¨war on ¨terrorism ¨and ¨must ¨remain a
¨nuclear weapons state to¨ ensure that¨ our capacity¨ and ability to act ¨would not be
¨constrained by nuclear black mail”. ¨
Under the UK’s official layer of perceived rational justification to keep the nuclear
deterrent there is a deeper feeling that the UK should have nuclear weapons in the
military inventory to remain a ‘Pivotal power’. The UK’s history and influence in the
international society gives in the UK’s self-perception, the obligation to maintain
peace and security. This leads to the UK identity being of an interventionist nature
and in the UK’s own perception it is a ‘force for good’ with the possession of an
independent nuclear deterrent supporting the UK’s desire to be a ‘pivotal power’.
The nuclear weapon has consequently become a part of the UK’s identity.
4.3.2. The UK’s identity and the myth of the special relationship. There is a mutual trust between the UK and the USA which has facilitated extended
military and intelligence cooperation. Of significant importance for this thesis is the
cooperation within military procurement and especially the cooperation with nuclear
weapons development.
The UK’s identity as an interventionist power is linked to the special relationship the
UK have with the USA. The two nations shared history and values have meant that
the UK has aligned its foreign policy with the USA since the end of the World War II.
The UK’s political interest is to keep this close relation to the USA. Prime Minister
50
Tony Blair stated that “New Labour’s primary ¨foreign policy principle is to remain the
closest ally of the USA, and as allies influence them to continue broadening their
agenda”102
Just as in the 1962 case the UK’s interest in the special relationship is to avoid that
the USA becomes isolationist rather than staying engaged in the world and bridging
the Atlantic between the USA and Europe. Furthermore the UK shows full
commitment to the values of the USA that the UK sees as their own and the UK is
willing to defend these values by force by supporting USA’s national security goals
e.g. the UK’s full commitment after 9/11. It is well known that there was a strong
personal and ideological connection between Blair and Clinton. Blair had to “work”
harder to gain Bush’s trust and friendship. This was probably why Tony Blair was
the first to support the USA after 9/11 in 2001 and he was on one of the first flights to
Washington to show personal as well as British compassion with the American
people and commitment to fight for common values.
This side of the UK’s identity demands that the UK can fully contribute to the USA’s
operations with credible and interoperable forces. The nuclear capability serves two
purposes in this framework. During the cold war and still today the nuclear deterrent
serves a role in sharing the burden of defending NATO and Europe as the French
deterrent is not a part of the NATO cooperation. Perhaps more importantly for the
UK the nuclear deterrent serves to give the UK credibility in Washington as it is an
USA-UK interoperable asset that can project substantial power. The link to the USA
is therefore central to the UK’s identity and security strategy. The nuclear deterrent is
therefore also central to this special relationship with the USA and a sign of the UK’s
military strength.
4.3.3. Nuclear taboo and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In 1994 the UK made a formal agreement with the Russian federation that the two
nations would not pre-programme their weapons with destinations inside the other
country as a matter of course. This was introduced as a means to minimise chances
of a genuine mistake leading to abhorrent consequences.
102 ¨Tony ¨Blair, Speech¨ at the ¨Foreign ¨Office, ¨London, Jan¨ 2003
51
In tune with the demise of the ghost of the Soviet Union the UK gave up the strategy
of ‘first use’ of the nuclear weapon as formalised in the 1998 Strategic Defence
Review.103
The UK has opted for a solution where the successive governments claimed that the
UK only maintain a “Credible minimum deterrent”
Furthermore the UK has removed smaller payload tactical nuclear
capabilities from the Army and the Royal Air Force leaving only the submarine
launched strategic system. In addition, since the inception of the NPT, on every
review of the nuclear deterrent the UK has reduced the number of nuclear warheads
held. The submarines are now officially only armed with 16 missiles with up to 48
strategic and sub strategic warheads. This is all to accommodate the new norms
that the NPT has invoked since its inception in 1970.
104
In 2006 the UK announced a 20 per cent cut to the number of warheads which
brought the UK possession of warheads down to fewer than 160
Compared to the height of the
Cold War where the UK possessed more than 400 nuclear warheads distributed over
all three services the UK government can with some justification claim that today’s
deterrent consisting of 4 submarines carrying a minimum load of warheads is
actually a minimum in order to be capable of strategic nuclear deterrence.
105
Unlike Russia, China and the USA the UK does not have a nuclear triad where
warheads can be delivered by land, sea and air as a guarantee mutually assured
destruction. Even Israel is believed to have a nuclear triad with the submarine part
being based on sub launched harpoons and India and Pakistan have two of the three
capabilities in a nuclear triad. When the UK has opted for only basing the nuclear
deterrent on submarines it because it is the cheapest way to keep a credible nuclear
deterrent while also keeping it at a minimum. With the words of Prime Minister Tony
Blair this “means Britain continues to set an example for others to follow in our
commitment to work towards a peaceful, fairer and safer world without nuclear
which is less
than 1 per cent of what is believed to be the world’s total number (16.945).
Furthermore it is significantly less than the majority of other nuclear nations, with
only North Korea, Pakistan and India having fewer.
103 Strategic Defence Review (London HMSO, July 1998, p. 25 104 HMG, Stategic Defence and Security Review, 1998, para 60-61 105 HMG, White paper, Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006, p.5.
52
weapons.”106 And he continues “Our decision to maintain the deterrent is fully
compatible with all our international obligations”107
the obligations Prime Minister
Blair refers to are the obligations laid down in the NPT.
It is a basis for disagreement whether the article VI of the NPT means that the UK
cannot renew the nuclear deterrent. One side of the argument is that the nuclear
states promised ultimate disarmament and the renewal is contra to this policy. The
other side of the argument is that there is no time limit on the NPT article VI. The
fact is that the arms race stopped several years ago and all the western nuclear
powers have reduced their inventory of nuclear weapons significantly since the
inception of the NPT. In line with other nations, the UK has contributed to this
reduction and today it possibly holds the smallest stock of nuclear warheads (as
described above) and also the least varied capability of the five original nuclear
signatories to the NPT. The status concerns and the security concerns are here
battling with the norms of the NPT. While keeping the nuclear deterrent the Blair
government tried to accommodate the nuclear taboo, and the principles in the NPT,
by making “further significant reductions from Cold War levels, both in the number of
weapons and in our day to day operating posture”108
The NPT and the nuclear taboo is a powerful tool in the hands of the domestic
opposing actors in a country like the UK. This can be part of the explanation to why
. The decision to cut the number
of nuclear warheads by 20 per cent was indeed another step in the direction of
ultimate disarmament. Not as big a step as the campaigners against nuclear
weapons would prefer, but it is a step closer none the less. The realities are that the
regulations in the NPT would mean that the UK would be prohibited from re-
acquiring the nuclear deterrent again in the future, if the UK were to disarm. The
government declares that it is still committed to ultimate disarmament, but it has to
do it in small steps as the other nuclear states are not showing any sign of
disarming. To the contrary the old nuclear powers are all in fact modernising their
nuclear weapons. The UK has announced that it would be willing to disarm if all
other nations do as well.
106 HMG, White paper, Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006, p.5. 107 HMG, White paper, Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006, p.5. 108 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review, p17
53
UK decreased the number of war heads in 1980, 1998 and in 2006 but ultimately the
nuclear taboo is not strong enough to counter pro deterrent argument in order to
encourage the UK to unilaterally disarm.
54
4.4. Part conclusion of the 2006 decision. In 2006 the UK is, by the ‘security model’ definition, a strong state with an
independent nuclear capability as well as being a member of the strongest alliance in
the world’s history. In addition there is no major threat to the UK’s territorial integrity.
In practical terms the UK is safer today than at any previous point in history. This
therefore makes the security model justification for retention of the nuclear deterrent
a weak argument apart from the maintenance of the status quo. That said, the UK
government continues use the security model argument to justify retention of the
nuclear deterrent albeit with emphasis on an ‘insurance policy’. This policy is
deemed to be protection against an uncertain future and also as the ultimate
contingency plan when intervening in conflicts where there is a potential threat of
biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction. The UK Government now
linking the nuclear deterrent to their activist foreign policy is a text book example of
Sagan’s prediction of “nuclear weapons programs are not obvious or inevitable
solutions to international security problems; instead, nuclear weapons programs are
solutions looking for a problem to which to attach them-selves so as to justify their
existence.”109
In December 2006 the fact that the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent was
again made by a small enclosed circle enhances the effect of ‘Domestic Politics
Model’ as only a few people need to be influenced by actors within the Armed Forces
and the nuclear industry to give the desired effect.
This ties the ‘Security model’ in with the ‘Domestic politics model’.
For the Armed Forces it is estimated that the evaluation of threat to the UK was not
the driving factor in the Armed Forces lobbying for the renewal of the ageing
VANGUARD-class. It is assessed that the real incentive is to be found in the
argument of not wishing to reduce or lose a capability with the possibility of this
having repercussions on the fleet of hunter killer submarines as well.
The nuclear industry as well as the financial world had huge financial incentives to
lobby for the modernisation of the nuclear deterrent. The finances involved in the
nuclear industry both civil and military are of a magnitude that could affect the UK’s
total economy not in a threatening way but enough to be uncomfortable.
109 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65.
55
The BAE corruption scandal in the UAE showed that Prime Minister Blair was
interested in the well-being of the defence industry for one reason or another. This
finding compared with the decision being forced through parliament with a ‘three line
whip’ is a strong indication that the informal alliance of the first two actors in the
‘Domestic Politics Model’ had had a successful effect on the last of the three actors.
The trinity of the Influential bodies within the Armed Forces, the nuclear industry and
the politicians on the deciding level have all affected the perception of the threat level
and emphasised the uncertainty of the future in order to secure the renewal of the
nuclear deterrent. By doing so they all promoted their own parochial causes and
interests. This gives evidence of the ‘Domestic Politics model’ in the 2006 decision.
The thesis can therefore conclude that there are very strong indicators of the
‘Domestic Politics Model’ being a part of the 2006 decision
It may be that the great power term is no longer synonymous with the UK’s identity
but is clear that the country still has influence on the international arena. Prime
Minister Blair has introduced ‘pivotal power’ as a term to describe the UK’s position
and, along with the term ‘force for good’, uses it to justify the activist foreign policy.
The UK’s perceived role in world politics as a protector of the western values justifies
to the country’s psyche that ownership of the nuclear deterrent is the UK’s right
In conjunction with the argument that the nuclear deterrent is linked to the UK’s
identity it also is a defining factor in the UK’s special relationship with the USA. The
special relationship is based on shared history and common values and a sense of
responsibility for international peace and security. The UK’s possession of the
nuclear deterrent symbolises their commitment to that shared responsibility.
All of the positive symbols of nuclear ownership above are lessened in the face of
the NPT and the nuclear taboo. Whilst it is clear that being a signatory to the NPT
has influenced the UK to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal, it is not sufficiently
strong to counter the argument to renew the nuclear deterrent nor is it close to
persuading the UK to unilaterally disarm.
56
5. SYNTHESIS In the previous two chapters Sagan’s three models have been analysed for each
case. In order to determine the causal weight of the three models each individual
model will be compared over the two periods. The advantages of this is that it maps
the changes between the cases in order to determine what factors are unchanged in
2006 and therefore deeply rooted in the UK’s incentives to possess the nuclear
deterrent, and what conditions are new which serves to highlight those that have
changed due to new conditions that has emerged since 1962. 5.1. Security model.
The decision to keep the nuclear deterrent in December 2006 distinguishes itself
from the decisions in the previous case with the fact that the Cold War had ended a
decade and a half ago. Russia was a shadow of its former might both in terms of
economy but not least in military capability, if still the largest nuclear weapons
holder. However, the terrorist attacks in the United States on 9 September 2001 had
turned the security focus to asymmetric attacks from terrorists, and the UK was at
the time heavily involved in the operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition
Pakistan and North Korea had become nuclear states. None the less the direct
threat from the Soviet Union was the strongest driver for the UK to acquire the
nuclear deterrent in the first place – so it is argued that the demise of the Soviet
Union should have a major impact on the decision whether or not to keep the nuclear
deterrent. The argument to counter this is stated to be the fear of an uncertain future
in the face of continued proliferation.
Consequently the sense of vulnerability in the UK has decreased significantly from
the 1962 case to the 2006 case. In the earlier case there was a genuine fear that
the UK could be left without an independent deterrent and reliant on an alliance that
had not yet reached maturity. The causal weight of the ‘Security Model’ in 1962 was
therefore high. Compare that with the situation in 2006 where the sense of national
security is strong and the NATO alliance was stronger than any in history. With this
change in threat and vulnerability the likely kinetic use of nuclear weapons has
reduced to almost zero.
In sum: When the threat increases, the positive influence on the decision to
proliferate will increase as well. When own strength increases it has a negative
57
influence on the decision to proliferate. This has been mapped in the diagram below
which gives the causal weight of the argument in the ‘Security model’ of 2006. By
plotting both factors it becomes obvious that the strength of argument, and causal
weight provided by the ‘Security model’ is significantly less in 2006 than in 1962.
(the greater the strength the lower the value on the Y-axis)
5.2. Domestic Politics Model.
The level of incentives for the military actor to influence the decision of nuclear
deterrent has remained high in the two cases and possibly increased slightly. The
underlying reasons have changed in that in the 1962 case the military actor strove to
gain a new asset with considerably improved defence capability and political impact.
In the 2006 case the military feared losing this prestige-loaded asset with the
additional potential further loss of capability. It is estimated that the military on both
occasions participated proactively in the informal alliance to influence the decision
and contributed to exaggerate the perception of the threat to the UK to gain their own
parochial interests.
The causal weight of the military actor in the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ is therefore
assessed to have been high in 1962 and have increased slightly from 1962 to 2006.
The nuclear and defence industries have both grown considerably in size in the
intermediate time between the two cases. This is a direct result of the decision in
1962 where a part of the decision to acquire the Polaris system was the decision that
the UK should build their nuclear warheads and nuclear propelled submarines with
UK national industry.
In 1962, Sir William Penney was fighting for an idea of a project that to him meant
intellectual pride and prestige. This differs from 2006 in that Penney’s project was
Threat to the UK territory UK and NATO Strength
1962 2006
Positive Influence on the decision
58
effectively nice to have whereas in second case to some extent there a fight for
survival for the nuclear side of the defence industry. It is generally accepted that the
fight for survival is fiercer than that of an idea. Albeit Penney is deemed to have
been a very influential actor in the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ in 1962, the influence of
the nuclear defence industry seems to have become even greater. Indeed the
multibillion pound nuclear defence industry has proved to have a very powerful
lobby, with the ability to influence at all levels of the political spectrum, and it is even
suggested that less honourable means have been used to affect the Prime Minister.
Additionally, where the 1962 case is essentially a case where everybody gained from
the decision it cannot be documented that any of the actors would de facto have lost
from the opposite decision. The 2006 case is of a different nature as the decision of
remaining status quo meant modernisation which was a benefit to all actors. For all
actors a decision to disarm would almost only have had a negative result. That is
certainly the case for the military and the nuclear defence industry. With regards to
the Prime Minister he could have had the benefit of being the moral winner in the
eyes of the anti-nuclear campaigners. However for the Prime Minister there were
more to be lost in the public eyes by the huge impact on economy and the livelihood
of 26000 people who would lose their job.
The causal weight of the nuclear defence industry actor in the ‘Domestic politics
model’ is therefore assessed to have been high in 1962 and have increased
significantly from 1962 to 2006.
With regards to the Prime Minister there are a great deal of similarities between
Macmillan and Blair in that the decision on the nuclear deterrent served to promote
them nationally and internationally as successful statesmen. Blair seems to have
been primarily interested in securing that he was not seen to be a Prime Minister
without ‘The big trigger’ although national concerns such as the wellbeing of the
defence industry had substantial effect on him as well. Additionally to Macmillan it
was an enormous triumph that he was able to re-forge the military and in particular
the nuclear cooperation with the USA.
In terms of personal prestige for the Prime Minister, the equality of the two cases is,
that they were both very sensitive, to the effect a potential weakening of the
relationship with the USA would mean to them.
59
The causal weight of the political actor in the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ is therefore
assessed to have been high in 1962 and have increased slightly from 1962 to 2006.
When mapping the assessed change in level of influence of the three actors in the
‘Domestic Politics Model’ from the 1962 case to the 2006 case it is obvious that there
has been a significant overall increase in the influence of the ‘Domestic Politics
Model’.
5.3. Norms Model. The UK’s desire to play a significant role in international politics has by and large
remained the same from the 1962 case to the 2006 case. The UK’s former colonial
identity engendered a deep feeling that the UK should be a great power in 1962. By
2006 the UK Prime Minister had changed the term to ‘pivotal power’ but in essence it
covered the same deep feeling that the UK should be a leading nation and it should
be the promoter of western values. In 1962 the decision to purchase the Polaris
system was to protect not only the UK but also the ‘free world’ i.e. Western Europe.
In 2006 the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent was also based on the
values of protection but this time it was to expand the western values to the rest of
the world in cooperation with the USA. The difference in this approach to protection
is that in 1962 protection had a slightly selfish connotation in that it meant protection
of the UK and its allies, whereas in 2006 protection means creating a better world
which is seen to be an altruistic cause and therefore the right cause.
In both cases the special relationship with the USA was a vital part of the UK’s
identity as it facilitated the role that the UK wanted to play. A role that possibly would
have been unrealistic without this special relationship.
1962 2006
Military Actor
Nuclear Industry Actor Political Actor
Positive Influence on the decision
60
The NPT, which was introduced in the intermediate time between the two cases, has
had the greatest effect in the change of norms concerning the possession of a
nuclear deterrent. The NPT has undermined the legitimacy of the nuclear deterrent
but it has however, not been a strong enough normative driver to make the UK
disarm. It has, on the other hand, encouraged the UK to reduce the nuclear inventory
every time the UK has had to decide on a future nuclear deterrent since its inception
in 1970.
When looking at the factors in the Norms Model and comparing them in causal
weight it is assessed that the level of influence was high in 1962 and despite the
significant effect of the NPT the level of influence of the Norms model is still high in
2006. It is assessed that the deeper feeling of doing the right thing and having the
right cause as a minimum balances the effect of the NPT. The Norms Model is
assessed to be at the same level in the two cases.
1962 2006
Identity Special relationship Force for good NPT
Positive Influence on the decision
61
6. CONCLUSION As discussed in the introduction the level of perceived threat seen through the realist
perspective can provide a simple explanation of the UK’s decision to acquire and
modernize its nuclear capabilities in 1962 and in 2006. The simple explanation the
realist theories offer becomes problematic especially after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. In order to give the needed additional explanation to the ‘Problem’ the thesis
has used Scott D. Sagan’s two additional theories of the ‘Domestic Politics Model’
and the ‘Norms Model’ which have proved suitable to answer the main question of
this thesis:
What factors were behind the UK Government’s decision to spend substantial amounts of funds modernising its nuclear weapons when they are unlikely to be used (kinetically) in the current and the likely future international security environment?
The decisions to acquire and modernise the nuclear deterrent in 1962 and 2006
have formed the basis for two cases where the three models have been applied in
order to establish the relevance of each factor in the final case of 2006.
What are the findings then when looking at these three models?
The synthesis showed that in the 1962 case the level of influence, that the three
models had on the decision to acquire the Polaris system, was almost the same.
However, with the security model being slightly more important than the two other
models. This is illustrated in this diagram:
The synthesis also showed, that the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that the
perceived threat to the UK has reduced significantly and the UK is possibly safer
Influence on the decision
1962
Security Model
Domestic Pol. Model
Norms Model
62
than ever before in modern history. This means that the causal weight of the
‘Security Model’ to explain the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent in
December 2006 has decreased significantly. The amount of influence the ‘Security
Model’ has lost has consequently been shifted to the other models.
Comparing the influence of the three actors in the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ over the
two cases showed that all three actors had increased their incentives to push for
modernisation of the nuclear deterrent. It is furthermore proved that the influence
from especially the nuclear defence industry has increased significantly in tune with
the MOD becoming more biased as a result of mutual interdependence. It is
concluded that the causal weight of the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ has increased
significantly in explaining the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent in
December 2006.
UK’s nuclear deterrent has achieved important political objectives. Despite public
statements to the contrary the role of the nuclear deterrent has, to the UK, been a
solid symbol of Great Britain’s claim to continue to have status as a great power.
The nuclear deterrent has also been the UK’s central means to maintain a special
relationship with USA. The latter has been, and still is, so important a justification
that nurturing of this special relationship has become the goal where the nuclear
deterrent works as a means to achieve this goal. Comparing the variables of the
‘Norms Model’ showed that there has not been a shift in the causal weight to explain
the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent in December 2006.
On the basis that the causal weight of the ‘Norms Model’ has stayed high and the
causal weight of the ‘Security Model’ has shifted significantly towards the ‘Domestic
Politics Model’ it is concluded that the distribution of the causal weight in 2006 is as
follows;
Security model: LOW
Domestic Politics Model: VERY HIGH
Norms model: HIGH
63
This is illustrated in this diagram:
The answer to the main question is consequently:
The UK chose to modernise the nuclear deterrent primarily due to the bureaucratic
interests by a coalition formed of the Ministry of Defence, the nuclear defence
industry and Prime Minister Blair. The symbiosis between the MOD and the nuclear
defence industry has grown over the decades. This is caused by the desire for
“security assurance”, as stated in the defence industry strategy, which has rendered
the government almost incapable of taking decisions solely in the interest of national
security without factoring in the commercial / financial and employment
consequences of a major decision within this field.
The UK’s perceived role as great power and a crusader for western values combined
with the desire to have a ‘special relationship’ with the USA also played a significant
role. The need for an ‘insurance policy’ for an uncertain future had some impact on
the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent albeit to a much lesser degree.
Security Model
Domestic Pol. Model
Norms Model 2006
Influence on the decision
64
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The NPT and nuclear taboo will keep the UK Government under pressure to disarm
as it would seem that the UK cannot reduce the capability further without
contemplating the next logic step of disarming completely. This thesis has, however,
shown that unless there is a substantial change of paradigm the UK will keep their
nuclear deterrent until all other states’ holding weapons of mass destruction disarm
their’s. This will not be in the foreseeable future due to the reasons argued in the
‘Security Model’ therefore the only likely driver for the UK to disarm is if nuclear
weapons are rendered useless by impossibility of delivery e.g. by construction of a
‘missile shield’.
It is believed unlikely that the UK will disarm in the near future for two reasons. Firstly
the world has not yet seen a permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council disarm its nuclear weapons. Secondly it would be unwilling to make a
decision that would have unpredictable ramifications to the special relationship that
the UK has with the USA.
The recently suggested Anglo – French cooperation on nuclear deterrent raises
questions on whether the UK and France, in the future, could join efforts. The
answer to this depends on what this cooperation would entail. The possible range
goes from practical coordination of patrol zones over knowledge sharing to the other
end of the continuum which is a true combined deterrent force. The latter seems
unlikely as it would mean that the two countries would share the burden of patrols at
sea and not have a national independent continued deterrent. The UK has, since
the beginning, always used exactly that argument to keep the nuclear deterrent.
65
7. LIST OF LITTERATURE
Books, articles and documents:
• Allison, Graham T. & Zelikow, Philip, (1999), “Essence of Decision” (second
edition), Longman.
• Andersen, Ib, (1997). Den skinbarlige virkelighed – om valg af samfundsvidenskabeli-ge metoder, Samfundslitteratur, Frederiksberg.
• Baylis, John, Wirtz, James J., Gray, Colin S. & Cohen, Eliot (Eds.), Strategy in
the Contemporary World – An Introduction to Strategic Studies, 2nd Edition,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Blair, Tony, (2010), “A Journey”, Hutchinson London.
• Brooks, Stephen G., (1997): ”Dueling Realisms”, International Organization, Vol.
51, No. 3, Summer
• Christopher, Layne, (1997): ”From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing”,
International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1
• Dale, Walton, C. & Gray, Colin S., (2007): “The Second Nuclear Age: Nuclear
Weapons in the Twenty-First Century”,
• Gray, Colin S., (1999): ”Inescapable Geography”, Chapter 9, i Colin S. Gray &
Geoffrey Sloan (Eds.), Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, London: Frank
Cass,
• Halperin, Morton H., (1974), “Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy”, The
Brookings Institution.
• Horne, Alistair,(1989), Macmillan 1957-1986: Volume II of the Official Biography,
London: Macmillan.
• Jackson, Robert & Sørensen, Georg (2007):”Social Constructivism”, Introduction
to International Relations – Theories and Approaches, 3rd Edition, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
• Kvale, S. (1997). Interview – En introduktion til det kvalitative forskningsinterview,
København, Hans Reitzels Forlag
• Luttwak, Edward N., (2001): “Armed Suasion”, Chapter 14, i Strategy – The Logic
of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition, London: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press
66
• Macmillan, Harold, (1973), At the End of the Day, Macmillan London.
•
• Mearsheimer, John J.,( 2001) ,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton
& Company.
• Ogilvie-White, Tanya, (2011), “On Nuclear Deterrence – The correspondence of
Sir Michael Quinlan”, Routledge.
• Tannenwald, Nina, (2007), “The Nuclear Taboo – The United States and the non-
use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945”, Cambridge University Press.
• Waltz N., (Eds.), The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics,
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.
• Wendt, Alexander, (1992): “Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics”, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring.
• Young Hugo, (1989), “One of Us”, A biography of Margaret Thatcher, Macmillan
London.
Articles:
• Larsen, Jeffrey A., Ph.D., “The Future of U.S. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
and Implications for NATO Drifting Toward the Foreseeable
Future” http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/05-06/larsen.pdf
• Ladwig III, Walter C., Strategic Insights, Vol 6, No 1(January 2007), pp 31-50.
• T Milne, H Beach, J L Finney, R S Pease, J Rotblat, British Pugwash Group, “An
End to UK Nuclear Weapons”
• Matthew Harries, Britain and France as Nuclear Partners, Survival, vol 54 no. 1,
p7-30
• ‘Don’t Bank on the Bomb: The Global Financing of Nuclear Weapons Producers published by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) March 2012 http://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/about-the-report/
• Nuclear Industry Subsidies Part III: The Military Connection
Blog: http://theenergycollective.com/charlesbarton/60336/nuclear-industry-subsidies-
part-iii-military-connection
• BBC NEWS (unknown journalist), 4 December 2006 “UK nuclear weapons plan
unveiled”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6205174.stm
67
• Hopkins, Nick, The Guardian, 18 May 2011, “The military gamble at the heart of
UK defence cuts” http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/defence-and-security-
blog/2011/may/18/uk-defence-cuts
Documents:
• HM Government, 2010, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National
Security Strategy. http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191639.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=nationalsecuritystrategy
• HM Government, 2010, Strategic Defence and Security Review, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf
• HM Government, 2006, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent. http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/ac00dd79-76d6-4fe3-91a1-6a56b03c092f/0/defencewhitepaper2006_cm6994.pdf
• HM Government, 2002, The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter. • HM Government, 2005, Defence White Paper: ‘Defence Industrial Strategy’
http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/f530ed6c-f80c-4f24-8438-0b587cc4bf4d/0/def_industrial_strategy_wp_cm6697.pdf