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The EuthyphroDilemma

The Origin of the

Euthyphro Dilemma

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Plato428-348 BC

The name Euthyphro

comes from the title of a

dialogue written by Plato.

What Is the Dilemma?

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A dilemma is a choice between

two options:

either when both options are desirable but only one can be chosen ...

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either when both options are desirable but only one can be chosen ...

either when both options are desirable but only one can be chosen ...

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or when both options are less than desirable and one must be chosen.

or when both options are less than desirable and one must be chosen.

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or when both options are less than desirable and one must be chosen.

or when both options are less than and one must be chosen.

desirable

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What Is the Euthyphro Dilemma?

In its contemporary version, the Euthyphro Dilemma asks whether

something is good because God wills it or does God will it because it is good.

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First Horn of the

Dilemma

Is something good because God wills it?

This option has come to the known as the

Divine Command Theory.

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Problems with the First Horn

First, if X is good because God wills it, then this would seem to mean that if God willed rape (or racism, or murder, or any other

sin) then it would be good.

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Second, if X is good because God wills it, then this would

make the statement "God's will is good" to be "God's will is what

God wills" which is an empty claim; what philosophers call

"trivially true."

Second Horn of the

Dilemma

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The second option says God wills X because X is good.

Problem with the Second Horn

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This seems to imply a standard of good that is

outside of and above God.

A Third Option: Splitting the Horns of the

Dilemma

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Good is ultimately grounded in the nature of God.

A Challenge with the Third Option

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However, the problem of being trivially true and empty of moral content seems to

remain.

response: There is a difference between "the order of knowing" and "the order of being"

map to SES example

The map is first in the order of knowing.

SES is first in the order of being.

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In other words, one may need to know what "good" means

before one can apply the word to God, but God has to exist before there can be "good."

The "horns" of the dilemma can be "split" by opting for a third alternative, viz., good is

grounded in the nature of God.

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Further, this option can avoid the problem of the "trivially true" (viz., "God is good." amounts to nothing

more that "God is according to God's nature.") by maintaining that one can understand the notion of 'good' apart from understanding of the notion of

'God.' without denying that, metaphysically, the good is grounded

in God.