Dual-use Governance in Synthetic Biology

Promises, Hype and SecurityBrett Edwards, University of Bath

Back ground

• PhD thesis– Why do some aspects of Synthetic Biology attract

dual-use concern and not others?• Case studies: US and UK• Qualitative historical/ constructivist approach.

» Security Studies, Risk, STS

– National level focus

Overview

1) Studying ‘what isn’t there’2) Synthetic Biology A Case in Point3) Findings

Studying what isn’t there(1)

- Ethical ‘Gold Standard’?- Existing risk assessment

frameworks?- Contrast stated objectives

with actual achievements in key institutions?

- Contrast experiences ‘on the ground’ with policy/academic literature.

Which approach to adopt for the purposes of the research?

Studying what isn’t there(2)

• Key aim is to examine political processes which have underpinned the emergence of policy outcomes. – Agency– Institutions/ structures– Ideas

• Want to examine changes in ‘the feasible ’ with regard policy as well as implementation.

Focus of analysis

Subject and Scope

Politics and Practice

National Approach

Studying what isn’t there(3)

Key Concepts• Four Domains of Governance

Studying what isn’t there(3)

Key Concepts (2)

Primary and Secondary Securitization- New channels/ forums- Implementation politics

Fair Explanation?

Underlying causal mechanisms

Unearthing norms: S&T and risk Provision of a theoretical

lens

Synthetic Biology A Case in Point

What is Synthetic Biology (1)?

• Defined initially by funding councils– Fed into ethical framings in Both the US and UK• EU Ethics reports and SynBerc.

• Promissory• Interdisciplinary• Controllable Biology/ Controllable Risks• Applications of Engineering Principles?

What is Synthetic Biology (2)?

• Six subfields (Lam et al 2009)– DNA circuits

• standard biological parts– Synthetic metabolic pathways

• biological synthesis of chemicals– Proto-cell creation

• model of a cell– Unnatural components

• New proteins, with functions– Synthetic Microbial Consortia

• Cells, working together

Dual-use concerns about synthetic Biology (1)

• Spread of concern– DNA Synthesis Academic Field Amateur

Community• Key areas of concern. – Scenarios/ and pre-existing concerns with

oversight.

Dual-use concerns about synthetic Biology (1)

Key findings

• Roles and successes and failings of specific institutions– NSABB/ ELSI dead zone

• Rhetoric belies little governmental interest• Simularity of US and UK

– ELSI is king• Role of concerns about ‘Top- down’ Securitization• Externalisation of dual-use concerns about biodefense• Patch-work of responses.

Further questions

• Risk and dual-use• Generalizability– Other fields/ other countries

• Future relevance of ELSI in Synbio?• Militarization

Thank you!