Post on 10-May-2022
Domestic Support: Relationship of Government Agencies and the DoD
by
Lieutenant Colonel David L. Dodd
United States Army National Guard
United States Army War College Class of 2012
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited
This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Senior Service College Fellowship. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the
Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
31-03-2012 2. REPORT TYPE
Civilian Research Paper 3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Domestic Support: Relationship of Government Agencies and the DoD
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)
Lieutenant Colonel David L. Dodd
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
AND ADDRESS(ES)
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
University of Texas 1 University Station G1000 Austin, TX 78712
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
U.S. Army War College
122 Forbes Ave.
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
Carlisle, PA 17013 NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
DISTRIBUTION A: UNLIMITED
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
Military support to civilian authorities has always been one of the missions of the Department of Defense (DoD). With the increased threat that a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) could be deployed within our borders and the continuing threat of environmental disasters, are the varying levels of government and Department of Defense prepared? Although the primary focus of DoD has been on supporting WMD events, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, it became obvious that there will be natural disasters of such catastrophic force, that federal Title 10 forces will be required to assist. With this increased emphasis on the use of federal forces in both events, have we created the right force structure to provide a seamless and timely response between the differing agencies?This paper will identify the differing governmental agencies responsible for domestic relief activities and discuss force structure changes by DoD to provide a more comprehensive response to civilian authorities. The analysis will address the following: 1) Is the DoD prepared to provide a coordinated and integrated relief effort? 2) Effects of the Posse Comitatus Act 3) If current plans are not adequate, recommendations to increase our domestic response relief efforts.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Homeland Support; Department of Homeland Security; Department of Defense; 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
18. NUMBER OF PAGES
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED
b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED
c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED
UNLIMITED
26
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area
code)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
USAWC CIVILIAN RESEARCH PROJECT
DOMESTIC SUPPORT: RELATIONSHIP OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THE
DOD
by
Lieutenant Colonel David L. Dodd United States Army National Guard
Dr. Kenneth M. Matwiczak,
Adviser
University of Texas
This civilian research project is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Senior Service College Fellowship Program.
The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, the U.S. Government or the University of Texas.
U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT
AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel David L. Dodd TITLE: Domestic Support: Relationship of Government Agencies and the
DoD FORMAT: Civilian Research Project DATE: 31 March 2012 WORD COUNT: 5,256 PAGES: 26 KEY TERMS: Homeland Support; Department of Homeland Security; Department
of Defense; CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
Military support to civilian authorities has always been one of the missions of the
Department of Defense (DoD). With the increased threat that a weapon of mass
destruction (WMD) could be deployed within our borders and the continuing threat of
environmental disasters, are the varying levels of government and Department of
Defense prepared?
Although the primary focus of DoD has been on supporting WMD events, in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, it became obvious that there will be natural disasters of
such catastrophic force, that federal Title 10 forces will be required to assist. With this
increased emphasis on the use of federal forces in both events, have we created the
right force structure to provide a seamless and timely response between the differing
agencies?
This paper will identify the differing governmental agencies responsible for
domestic relief activities and discuss force structure changes by DoD to provide a more
comprehensive response to civilian authorities. The analysis will address the following:
1) Is the DoD prepared to provide a coordinated and integrated relief effort? 2) Effects
of the Posse Comitatus Act 3) If current plans are not adequate, recommendations to
increase our domestic response relief efforts.
DOMESTIC SUPPORT: RELATIONSHIP OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THE DOD
“Effective response to mass emergencies is a critical role of every level of government. It
is a role that requires an unusual level of planning, coordination and dispatch among
governments’ diverse units. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, this country went
through one of the most sweeping reorganizations of federal government in history.
While driven primarily by concerns of terrorism, the reorganization was designed to
strengthen our nation’s ability to address the consequences of both natural and man-made
disasters. In its first major test, this reorganized system failed. Katrina revealed that
much remains to be done”i
Since the birth of our great nation, the federal government’s response to
catastrophic events in a state did not receive national media attention nor did our
leaders in Washington pay particular attention to the requirement of disaster responses
unless they happened to occur in their specific districts. Since then, “Homeland
Security”, “Homeland Defense” and “Homeland Support” have leapt to the forefront of
national attention and become household terms.
When we hear these terms, there are two events that spring immediately into our
minds. The first act, perpetrated by terrorists against the United States on 11
September 2001(9-11), revealed how vulnerable our homeland had become.ii The
second act was the perfect storm, Hurricane Katrina, which quickly became one of the
largest natural disasters to strike the United Statesiii. The first was created by man and
the second by Mother Nature. It can be argued that while these acts were both great
response failures, they also spurred sweeping changes designed to greatly increase the
United States’ preparedness to unprecedented heights in order to protect our citizens
from both human actors and environmental catastrophes.
2
Although these three terms are interrelated in many aspects, they all require
distinctly different plans, actors (federal, military and state) and capabilities to prevent,
deter, fight and respond in support of. All three can be applied to a single event, but this
paper will examine the “Support” piece of the triad, specifically to answer “who are the
major players when a significant event occurs within our borders” and “are we better
prepared to provide the requisite support"?
The 9-11 terrorist events created the greatest organizational changes within our
federal government since the consolidation of the Department of Defense under
President Harry Trumaniv. These sweeping changes within our federal government are
the direct results of conclusions from the investigations following the attack. We believe
the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and
managementv. Although the commission exposed failures across the board, specific
responses to the attacks revealed the great successes of the different responsible
agencies, both federal and state.
Hurricane Katrina prompted our federal Government to closely examine
responses to natural disasters. The Senate’s subsequent investigation and hearings
found that varying government agencies at all levels had failed, with a few exceptions.
Specific findings included, “Top officials at every level of government – despite strongly
worded advisories – did not appear to truly grasp the magnitude of the storm’s potential
for destruction before it made landfall”vi. To all who witnessed these events unfold, it is
apparent that lives could have been saved if we had adequately prepared for and
responded with the full capabilities available to our leaders.
3
When both disasters are examined, we identify a myriad of dropped balls ranging
from failure to fully anticipate the event, to the government’s inadequate response once
an event occurs. Yet, have we applied the lessons learned, especially in the response
arena? Are we better prepared today to deal with the after effects of a disaster to save
the lives of our citizens and help them get on the road to recovery quicker?
Who Are the State Domestic Response Actors
Historically, local officials have had the responsibility to provide support in
response to disasters. Emergency response normally begins at the lowest possible
level with local first responders. Once local government officials determine that their
capabilities have or will become overwhelmed, they will request assistance from the
state governments. In turn, state governments request federal resources when the
capabilities at both the local and state level become overwhelmed. During this entire
process, the federal government can be providing financial support, even when no
federal agency is directly providing physical support. The following illustration
demonstrates the physical responsevii:
4
Individual states have designated agencies and operations centers tasked with
the responsibility to develop, implement and execute operations in support of
catastrophic events. Texas has designated the Emergency Management Division under
the Department of Public Safety to “plan and carry out programs to aid the State, local
governments, and individual citizens in preparing for, responding to, and recovering
from emergencies and disasters – natural, technological, or man-made”viii. Texas
further delegates disaster decision making down to Mayors and Judges, giving them the
authority for “Declaring a local state of disaster when appropriate. After such
declaration, they may issue orders or proclamations invoking specific emergency
5
powers of those granted the Governor in the Texas Disaster Act on an appropriate local
scale to respond to and recover from the disaster.”ix
Along with state agencies, each has military forces operating under the control
and direction of the Governor. Unlike the federal Army and the US Army Reserve, these
forces have two distinct and separate chains of command in order to execute both state
and federal missions. Mainly funded and equipped by the federal government, the
Army and Air National Guards fall under state control during peace time, with the
Governor as Commander in Chief, while also remaining subject to being called to
Federal Active Duty by the President of the United States.
Most states have military capabilities within their National Guard units to respond
and provide requisite support to civilian authorities in times of any disaster within their
local jurisdictions. All states have some type of combat or combat support unit (Infantry,
Artillery, Military Police, etc.) to provide crowd control, law enforcement and general
security type missions as well as combat service support units (Transportation, Medical,
Engineers, etc.) to provide general logistics support such as vehicles with deep fording
capability, field feeding, mass casualty evacuation, etc., to their civilian populations
during catastrophic events.
National Guard units are present in over 3,000 communities across the nation
and are uniquely situated to provide immediate response to any disasters.
Guardsmen’s role as “citizen solders” ensures that they have a close link to their
communities and are personally invested in appropriate responses to support their
families and prevent property damage. Although unit members may be “truck drivers”,
“infantry grunts”, or “personnel officers” in the military, they are also your local police
6
officers, firemen, doctors, builders, welders, etc… in their civilian jobsx. Not only do they
bring professional military skills to bear in state emergencies, they bring their civilian
skills which give the governors and military commanders greatly enhanced capabilities
within their formations.
Two additional factors enhance the state’s National Guard unit’s capabilities
providing assistance during and after catastrophic events. The military leadership will
be familiar with any vulnerabilities or weaknesses existing within their state, and in a
majority of states; or the National Guard Leaders are members of the state’s emergency
management systems. Additionally, many of the state’s Adjutants General wear a
second hat as the head of their state emergency agenciesxi.
Most states, and especially the gulf coast states, have standing Emergency
Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) wherein military members of one state’s
Guard may operate in another state. The supporting state’s Adjutant General
surrenders command and control of his deployed forces to the Adjutant General of the
supported statexii. These agreements were successfully executed during the massive
support effort following Hurricane Katrina.
The Federal Actors
As discussed above, primary responsibility for responding to and providing relief
support in homeland disaster incidents lies with local and state authorities. When their
capabilities become overwhelmed, how do state officials request federal assistance? In
2002, with passage of the Homeland Security Act, the Federal government consolidated
the emergency response capabilities of four agencies under the Department of
Homeland Security. The Secretary of Homeland Security was given the primary
7
oversight responsibility for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the
Office of Emergency Preparedness, the National Disaster Medical System, and the
Metropolitan Medical Response System of the Department of Health and Human
Services, while the Federal Emergency Management Agency remained the lead agency
within the Federal system.xiii
As the lead federal cabinet head, the Secretary of Homeland Security is directed
by the Act to:
1. Coordinate the Federal government’s response to both natural and man-made disasters, including terrorist attacks, that occur within the United States;
2. Develop and implement a comprehensive national incident management system that enables Federal, state, and local governments to efficiently coordinate the mobilization of resources during emergency response; and
3. Consolidate the existing emergency response plans of individual Federal agencies into a single, comprehensive national response planxiv.
Before, each federal agency developed its own set of disaster plans and acted
independently without a coordinated effort in responding to states’ requirements. This
consolidation of federal agencies addressed the disjointed effort at the federal level; it
still left any response effort disjointed between state command and control, and federal
command and control.
While the Homeland Security Act provided for the consolidation of agencies
plans and systems, it did not address the processes, authorizations, and to what extent
federal resources might be spent in support of disasters. These issues are addressed
in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act (Stafford Act), which
identifies types of assistance, limitations, establishes eligibility for assistance and the
8
conditions that may warrant presidential action, and addresses the appropriations to the
Disaster Relief Fund, administered by DHSxv.
Governors of the affected states must request federal assistance through the
FEMA Regional Director who in turn submits the request to the FEMA Director. Under
the Stafford Act, approval for the use of federal assets rests with the President of the
United States (POTUS). No federal resources (fiscal, personnel, equipment or
supplies) may be utilized until the POTUS has declared a “federal emergency or
disaster”xvi.
An additional reform involved the issuance of Homeland Security Presidential
Directive No. 5 (HSPD-5) signed by President George Bush in 2003. President Bush’s
Directive created “a single, comprehensive national incident management system” and
directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to “develop and administer a National
Incident Management System (NMIS) and a National Response Plan (NRP)xvii”.
The National Incident Management System provides a standardized nationwide
approach to domestic incident management equally applicable to all jurisdictions and
across functional lines. To a large extent, the NIMS address organizational structure,
method of operation, resource management and communications. HSPD-5 requires
that Federal preparedness assistance be conditioned on full compliance with the
NIMSxviii.
The National Response Plan established “a comprehensive, national, all-hazards
approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of activities including
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery”xix. The NRP identifies fifteen
emergency support functions at the Federal level and the agency or department
9
responsible for providing or coordinating that function. These functions and responsible
entities arexx:
Emergency Support Function Responsible Department/Agency
Transportation Dep’t of Transportation
Communications Dep’t of Homeland Security
Public Works and Engineering Dep’t of Defense/U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers
Firefighting Dep’t of Agriculture/Forest Service
Emergency Management Dep’t of Homeland Security/Emergency
Preparedness and Response/FEMA
Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services Dep’t of Homeland Security/Emergency
Preparedness and Response/FEMA
Resource Support General Services Administration
Public Health and Medical Services Dep’t of Health and Human Services
Urban Search and Rescue Dep’t of Homeland Security/Emergency
Preparedness and Response/FEMA
Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Environmental Protection Agency
Agriculture and Natural Resources Dep’t of Agriculture
Energy Dep’t of Energy
Public Safety and Security Dep’t of Homeland Security/Dep’t of Justice
Long-term Community Recovery and Mitigation Dep’t of Homeland Security/Emergency
Preparedness and Response/FEMA
External Affairs Dep’t of Homeland Security
With so many differing departments/agencies providing support, it is easy to see how
the Federal response could quickly become disjointed without a single agency or
department with overall command and control responsibility.
Department of Defense Role in Domestic Response
Department of Defense (DoD) military forces have always played a key role in
providing support to civilian authorities when the scope of required capabilities
outweighed the local relief efforts abilities. Although all military forces (Army, Navy, Air
Force and Marines) are at DoD’s disposal for use, normally two of the Army’s three
components are called upon to support civilian authorities. First, The Army’s Title 10
active duty units which provide aid in a strictly narrow support role and second, the
10
National Guard which may be utilized within the narrow Title 10 support role, or in its
much broader Title 32 state role. Under very limited instances, Army Reserve units may
be mobilized for duty in support of civilian authorities.
The Stafford Act authorizes the President to utilize DoD resources in the
“immediate aftermath” of a disaster which may ultimately qualify for Federal aid and “for
the purpose of performing on public and private lands any emergency work which is
made necessary by such incident and which is essential for the preservation of life and
property”xxi.
Additionally, the military has an “inherent emergency power” which is not based
on statutory authority but finds its roots in the U.S. Government’s inherent constitutional
right “to insure the preservation of public order and the carrying out of governmental
operations within its territorial limits.xxii This exception is included in DoD regulations
pertaining to “Military Support to Civilian Authorities”, is limited in scope and covers
“Actions that are taken under the inherent right of the U.S. Government, a sovereign national entity under the U.S. Constitution, to ensure the preservation of public order and to carry out governmental operations within its territorial limits, or otherwise in accordance with applicable law, by force, if necessary.xxiii
Use of military forces in support of local civil authorities is invoked primarily to; (1)
“protect Federal property and Federal governmental functions” when local authorities
fail to provide adequate protection, and (2) “prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of
property and to restore governmental functioning and public order when sudden and
unexpected civil disturbances, disasters, or calamities seriously endanger life and
property and disrupt normal governmental functions to such an extent that duly
constituted local authorities are unable to control the situations.”xxiv
11
Although the DoD recognizes that the use of military forces for domestic missions
is forbidden without specific request from a state’s governor and authorization of the
President, DoD Directive 3025.12 allows the use of military forces in the absence of
Presidential approval under certain emergency circumstances when:
“the use of Military Forces is necessary to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property, or to restore governmental functioning and public order. That "emergency authority" applies when sudden and unexpected civil disturbances (including civil disturbances incident to earthquake, fire, flood, or other such calamity endangering life) occur, if duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation and circumstances preclude obtaining prior authorization by the President.”xxv
DoD officials and commanders must use all means available to seek out and acquire
Presidential authorization through the chain of command while applying this emergency
authority. Because this power is based upon a constitutional mandate, DOD maintains
that it may utilize the emergency power regardless of whether the President has
declared an emergency thereby authorizing the use of military forces, and irrespective
of the limitations imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act, which states:xxvi
“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both”xxvii.
Enacted in 1878 following Reconstruction, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of
federal military forces in performing civilian law enforcement tasks. However, there are
no restrictions on federal military units providing support such as debris clean-up,
transportation, search and rescue, medical support or damage assessment.
Although there are opposing viewpoints to the generally accepted applicability of
the Act, it is generally interpreted to ban the use of U.S. military forces to enforce
12
domestic laws or perform traditional civilian law enforcement duties such as
investigating crimes or arresting and incarcerating individuals suspected of breaking
civilian laws except as otherwise allowed by federal law or the Constitution.
The most notable exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is the use of state
National Guard units in conducting state active duty (SAD) missions. In these
instances, the state’s military units are acting under the authority of the state’s Governor
as the state commander in chief, and not as a federal military force. Other notable
exceptions included:
1. The US Coast Guard.xxviii Although a U.S. military armed force, the Coast Guard falls under the Department of Homeland Security.
2. The Insurrection Actxxix. 3. Assistance in the case of crimes involving nuclear materialsxxx. 4. Emergency situations involving chemical or biological weapons of mass
destructionxxxi.
DoD has implemented significant changes in how it has provided support to
civilian authorities. In 2002, DoD established United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) to provide command and control of all Department of Defense efforts
in support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM’s specific mission is to conduct
homeland defense, civil support and security cooperation to defend and secure the
United States and its interests. With the creation of USNORTHCOM, DoD consolidated
under one single command existing domestic support missions previously executed by
other DoD organizationsxxxii. The command is comprised of members from all of DoD’s
military services including the reserve components.
USNORTHCOM is responsible for planning and executing homeland defense
and civil support missions. It has very few units assigned but maintains several
permanent standing Joint Task Forces (JTF) responsible for deployment and
13
assumption of command and control over Title 10 military forces deployed whenever
necessary as ordered by the president or secretary of defensexxxiii.
The USNORTHCOM permanent subordinate command that has primary
responsibility for military support of civilian authorities is U.S. Army North (ARNORTH)
located at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. As the Army Service Component Command of
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), it provides command and control of
Department of Defense (DoD) military units deployed in support to civilian
authoritiesxxxiv.
ARNORTH coordinates and works daily with each of the 10 FEMA regions to
plan for and conduct civil support operations. ARNORTH has two permanent JTF’s;
Joint Task Force – North responsible for providing support to law enforcement agencies
within ARNORTH’s area of responsibility and Joint Task Force – Civil Support,
responsible for managing the consequences of Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear and high yield Explosive (CBRNE) catastrophes across the United Statesxxxv.
Even with the steps taken by the Department of Defense to strengthen military
shortfalls of the pastxxxvi and despite the fact that DoD forces generally have more
capability to quickly mobilize and deploy assets than its other civilian federal
counterparts, there still remains the difficulty of maintaining ready dedicated troops
prepared to respond to a domestic catastrophic event, particularly in light of the Army’s
constant troop demands to support the contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
DoD has created several different types of units designed to provide capabilities
to assist with certain types of events when local authorities become quickly
14
overwhelmed. As early as 1998, DoD stood up 10 Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil
Support Teams (WMD-CST). These teams were established to “deploy rapidly to assist
a local incident commander in determining the nature and extent of an attack or
incident; provide expert technical advice on WMD response operations; and help
identify and support the arrival of follow-on state and federal military response
assetsxxxvii”. These 22- man teams were added to the National Guards full-time force
structure providing expertise and capabilities to assist a state’s emergency response
forces in preparing for and responding to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
(CBRN) incidents. Today, there are 57 WMD-CST’s located in every state, territory,
and the District of Columbiaxxxviii.
CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP) were established in the
mid-2000’s to conduct casualty search and extraction, medical triage and treatment,
decontamination operations and fatality search and recovery missions. Also, a National
Guard asset but unlike the WMD-CSTs, the CERFPs were units consisting of 170
traditional guardsmen with a small staff of full-time personnel. 17 CERFPs are spread
throughout the US and are designed to provide a rapid response within 6-12 hours of an
incidentxxxix.
While both the WMD-CST and the CERFPs are designed as rapid response
forces (hours instead of days), their primary goals are to provide initial assessments to
determine follow on military force capabilities and requirements and to conduct
immediate, critical life-saving missions; they are not designed to conduct sustained
operations. To fill this capability gap, DoD created the Chemical, Biological,
15
Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management
Reaction Force (CCMRF).
The CCMRF is a task force comprised of capabilities found in both Active and
Reserve Component structure with the Reserve Component forces responding in a
federalized status. The CCMRF's primary role is to augment the consequence
management efforts of the state’s first responders in a CBRNE eventxl.
Of the 4,700 personnel assigned to the CCMRF, 2,900 are Army personnel with
the remaining personnel and capabilities supplied by the other services. Capabilities of
the CCMRF include robust command and control, comprehensive decontamination of
personnel and equipment, hazardous material handling and disposal, air and land
transportation, aerial evacuation, and sustainmentxli. Of note, to avoid any potential
violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, there are no security forces assigned.
CCMRF provides aid and support in the event of catastrophic events such as
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil or an accidental CBRNE incident which would produce
catastrophic results likely to overwhelm the civil authorities' response capabilitiesxlii.
While these developments greatly increase the DoD’s domestic response readiness, it
still leaves gaps in the Title X and Title 32 command relationships. Response times
could still take days, and questions remain about who would be responsible for security
at the catastrophe site.
To address these issues, the Secretary of Defense has approved a plan to
restructure the CCMRFs to include integrated state response capabilities by standing up
10 National Guard Regional Homeland Response Forces (HRF). These geographically
16
distributed HRFs located in each FEMA region will improve the ability of DoD to quickly
respond to major or catastrophic CBRNE CM event by providing the necessary life
saving capabilities to the incident area within hours rather than daysxliii.
Each unit is scheduled to have 570 Guardsmen assigned, and will be comprised
of a medical team, a search and extraction team, a decontamination team and very
robust command and control capabilities along with a security element. The units are
required to have the first response en route within six hours noticexliv.
These units will provide a presence in each FEMA region able to provide timely
life-saving capabilities within the first 48 hours of an event and, when necessary, to
establish a regional command and control structure synchronizing all SAD/Title 32
CBRNE response forces and prepare for follow-on forces. Each HRF is intended to be a
USNORTHCOM asset operating in a state status, bridging that Title X/Title 32
command and control capability gap. The HRF, along with the WMD-CSTs and
CERFPs, as state military forces, provide those initial site responses and conduct
security missions without violating the Posse Comitatus Act; but they may be
federalized if required.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations will ensure that DoD can provide the requisite
support in response to a catastrophic event:
1) Although DoD has created dedicated forces for use in domestic catastrophic
events, they are concentrated strictly on CBRNE response capabilities. Certification
exercises are based solely on response to that type of event. Large scale natural
disasters are not factored into these exercises. These response forces are capable of
17
responding to both types of events, but are being set up for failure by a lack of planning
and practice for a Hurricane Katrina type event or especially for a multiple catastrophic
disaster such as the Japanese earthquake, tsunami and nuclear incident.
2) DoD must clearly address and define the command and control responsibilities
(Title X versus Title 32) of military formations for all types of disaster responses. We
have made strides in building the requisite mix of forces for a response, but must further
refine the command and control relationships in different types of scenarios. DoD must
address and exercise who is in charge at each level, including internal and external
logistics support responsibilities.
3) The federal government and DoD should establish a combined school and
training facility dedicated to educating both government actors and DoD personnel in
the processes, capabilities and actions of each level of responders. This education
process should include a capstone event bringing all levels of governmental support
together in responding to a catastrophic event.
4) DoD should include domestic response education at all levels of the officer
education system. With the forthcoming budget cuts and troop reductions, it is going to
be important that leaders at all levels understand the DoD’s disaster relief
responsibilities.
5) DoD must develop detailed plans, assign responsibility and establish
dedicated sites to fully integrate military forces as they deploy in support of civilian
authorities.
6) US Congress needs to revisit the Posse Comitatus Act for relevance in today’s
operating environment. Numerous laws already exist that address Title X military
18
forces’ ability to exercise “law enforcement” type activities within the U.S borders.
Repealing the act would enable greater cooperation and coordination between military
installation commanders and local civilian authorities in addressing emergency events
within that area.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the history of the United States, government agencies and the
military have responded to catastrophic events within our borders. Until 2001, and
certainly as late as the 1995 Murrah Building bombing in Oklahoma City, relief support
for the civilian population was viewed as the sole responsibility of local government
jurisdictions. In the immediate future, threats by terrorists (both domestic and foreign)
will continue to threaten our cities, infrastructure, major venues, and our government
entities for the foreseeable future, and in all probability, will be the norm instead of the
exception. Environmental threats will continue as man will never be able to harness
and control Mother Nature. The probability for extensive damage to both humans and
infrastructure is constant, with the likelihood of an event quickly overwhelming local
authorities.
Governments at all levels must address these threats and continuously assess
capabilities for providing support for our civilian population. With all the differing
governmental actors involved, it is easy to wrongly assume that another response actor
has requisite skills and capabilities needed to support an overwhelmed local jurisdiction.
The National Incident Management System and the National Response Plan must be
not be allowed to sit on a shelf to collect dust. Responsible agencies charged with
19
response capabilities must coordinate and practice their plans, adjusting responses
based on ever-changing requirements.
As the Department of Defense resets and settles into its roles with reduced force
structure and budgets, we must continue to keep our domestic response capabilities as
a high priority. Our domestic response support plans must be exercised in conjunction
with the civilian government National Response Plan to gain and maintain a working
knowledge of each entities capabilities and limitations to better complement relief
efforts.
Great strides have been made in the development of dedicated military units
designed to support civilian authorities, but DoD must address command and control
issues to include both Title X and Title 32 forces to gain unity of effort. As a
consequence of our war-time mission readiness, DoD forces are in the best position,
both in location and capabilities, to provide rapid, life-saving capabilities and
significantly lessen the impact of disasters. Through properly coordinated planning,
training, and exercises with our civilian agency counterparts, domestic relief assets can
be brought to bear to effectively minimize loss of life and property in future catastrophic
events.
ENDNOTES
i S. Rep. 109-332, at 2 (2006) ii Jay Smith, “A Changing of the Guard: The U.S. National Guard and Homeland
Defense.” BCSIA Discussion Paper 2003-04, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP 2003-01, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, May 2003
20
iii Government Accountability Office, “Hurricane Katrina, Better Plans and Exercises
Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters”, GAO-06-643, (Washington, D.C., May 15, 2006)
iv “Homeland Security Department, Secretary of Homeland Security”. (nd) The
Washington Post, retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com. v National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004). The 9/11
Commission Report, New York: W.W. Norton and Company,. Pg. 339. ISBN 0393326713. vi S. Rep. 109-332, at 43 (2006). vii Ken Barber, JTF-CS 101 Brief, United States Northern Command, 2008 viii Texas Disaster Act. Ch 418 Sec. 418.041 Amended by: Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S.,
Ch. 1146, Sec. 2A.02, eff. September 1, 2009. ix Texas Department of Public Safety, Texas Division of Emergency Management: Local
Emergency Management Planning Guide. Pg 1-3. January 2008. x Jay Smith, “A Changing of the Guard: The U.S. National Guard and Homeland
Defense.” BCSIA Discussion Paper 2003-04, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP 2003-01, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, May 2003
xi Ibid. xii MG Timothy J. Lowenberg, “The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and
Homeland Security”, National Guard Association of the United States, pg 6 xiii “Federal Authorities for Disaster Response” (nd) Center for Strategic and International
Studies, pg. 1 retrieved from http://csis.org/ xiv Ibid. xv U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance:
Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding”, pg 1, Francis X. McCarthy, RL33053 June 7, 2011 retrieved from http//www.fas.org
xvi Ibid, pg 3. xvii “Federal Authorities for Disaster Response” (nd) Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Pg 3, retrieved from http://csis.org/. xviii Ibid. xix “Federal Authorities for Disaster Response” (nd) Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Pg 3, retrieved from http://csis.org/. xx “Federal Authorities for Disaster Response” (nd) Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Pg 4, retrieved from http://csis.org/.
21
xxi Robert T. Stafford Act, Title 42, USC, Sec 5170b(c)(1). xxii “Federal Authorities for Disaster Response” (nd) Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Pg 6, retrieved from http://csis.org/. xxiii U.S. Dep’t of Defense, DoD Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,
DoD Dir. 5525.5 (Encl. 4) § E4.1.2.3 (1989) xxiv Ibid xxv U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances, DoD Dir. 3025.12 §
4.2.2. (1994). xxvi “Federal Authorities for Disaster Response” (nd) Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Pg 6, retrieved from http://csis.org/. xxvii The Posse Comitatus Act, Title 18 USC, Sec 1385. xxviii Coast Guard, Title 14 USC Sec 89. xxix Armed Forces, 10 USC Sec 331-335 xxx Crimes and Criminal Procedures, Title 18 USC, Sec 831 xxxi Armed Forces, Title 10 USC, Sec 382 xxxii About NORTHCOM. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.northcom.mil xxxiii Ibid. xxxiv Ibid xxxv U.S. Army North. (n.d). Retrieved from
http://www.arnorth.army.mil/Documents/TriFoldInside8Nov11.aspx xxxvi Government Accountability Office, “Hurricane Katrina, Better Plans and Exercises
Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters”, GAO-06-643, (Washington, D.C., May 15, 2006)
xxxvii Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. (n.d.). Retrieved from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/wmd-cst.htm xxxviii National Guard Homeland Response Force (HRF). (n.d.). National Guard Bureau,
Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/nsrd/DoD-CBRNE-Panel/panel/meetings/20100317/D-2-National-Guard-Homeland-Response-Force-Overview.pdf
xxxix Department of the Army. (2009). National Guard Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP).
22
Washington, DC: 2009 Army Posture Statement Information Paper. Retrieved from http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/national_guard_chemical_biological.html
xl Department of the Army. (2009). Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High
Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management Reaction Force (CCMRF). Washington, DC: 2009 Army Posture Statement Information Paper. Retrieved from http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/cbnre_consequence_mgmt_ccmrf.html
xli Ibid xlii Ibid xliii National Guard Homeland Response Force (HRF). (n.d.). National Guard Bureau,
Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/nsrd/DoD-CBRNE-Panel/panel/meetings/20100317/D-2-National-Guard-Homeland-Response-Force-Overview.pdf
xliv Department of Defense. (n.d.). Department of Defense Homeland Response Force
(HRF) Fact Sheet. Washington D.C. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/d20100603HRF.pdf