Post on 18-Jun-2019
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
― ―81
Abstract
The2011TohokuEarthquakewashugedamagetoJapan,especially,alongthecoastsof
Miyagi, Iwate, and Fukushima. There was catastrophic damage by tsunami created by this
earthquake.JapanfrequentlyhasbeenaffectedbystrongearthquakebeforeTohokuEarthquake.
Much has been emphasized about the impacts of human and physical visible damages since
disastersstruckandtherearealotofstudiesaboutdisasterintermsofseismology,meteorology,
geology, structuralmechanics, etc. But, the invisible damages, such as supply chain network,
productionsystemhasbeenobstructed,notrevealed.Inspiteofourexperiencesinhugedisasters,
wehavenʼttriedtounveiltheseinvisibledamages.Infact,theautomobileindustriesalsosuffered
agreatlossduetothisdisaster.Suppliesofassemblies/productsfromJapanhadstopped,and
interruptedotherproductionactivitiesintheworld.
Inordertounveilinvisibledamages,thispaperdescribestheaffectstothesupplychain
network,productionsysteminJapaneseautomobilemanufacturersbytwodisasters-the2011
TohokuEarthquakeandthe2007NiigataChuetsu-offshoreEarthquake-. Inaddition, tounveil
fundamental issues of their damages, there are the research questions; “Why did automobile
manufacturersimmediatelydecideallassemblyplantsʼshutdown”,“Whatʼsthedifferenceofthe
impactsbydisasteranddepression”and,“IsthelimitationoftheJITreallyexists,ornot”.
Keywords :Disaster,JIT,SupplyChain,JapaneseAutomobileManufacturers
1.Introduction
AutomobilemanufacturersonthetopofhierarchyofAutomobileindustryassemblecars.
First Tier suppliers supply major components such as body, engine, and transmission, to
automobilemanufacturers.TheSecondTiersuppliersfurnishthesub-assembly/componentsthat
theFirstTiersuppliersrequire.Similarly,lowerlevelsupplierssupplyhigherlevelsuppliers.If
onlyonecomponentisunavailable,thentheproductionprocessisinterrupted.
Around2008,therewastheworldwidedepressioncausedbythesubprimemortgagecrisis
ofLehmanBrothersintheUS,andin2011,therewastheTohokuEarthquake.Thesecrisisand
disaster affected the Japanese automobile industry. The demand for automobiles also rapidly
droppedduetothesubprimemortgagecrisis,andthen,thesupplyofautomobileswasfurther
delayedbytheEarthquake.Especially,inthesituationofglobalizedandcentralizedsuppliersin
thelowertiers;ifthesesupplierswereaffectedbyadisaster,theproductionatsupplierʼsplant
Disaster Management and JIT of Automobile Supply Chain
Toko Sasaki
*SASAKI,Toko〔情報システム学科〕
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
― ―82
stop,thenalmosteveryautomobilemanufacturerwillbeaffectedbyit.
2.Supply Chain Network of Japanese Automobile Industry
TheJapaneseautomobilesupplychainnetworkisverycomplex.TheJapaneseautomobile
suppliernetworkiscalled“keiretsu”.This“keiretsu”structureofassembler-supplierrelationship
historically enabled Japanese automobile manufacturers to remain lean and flexible while
enjoyingalevelofcontroloversupplyakintothatofverticalintegration(AhmadjianandLincoln
2000).TheJapaneseautomobileindustrywaslikeapyramid,(asshowninFigure1a),divided
into threeoranymore tiersofsuppliers, centredaround thesevenmainassemblygroupsor
singleassemblers-Toyota-Daihatsu-Hino,Nissan-Subaru-NissanDiesel,Honda,Mazda,Mitsubishi,
Isuzu,andSuzuki(Shimokawa1994).TheJapanesesuppliernetworkhadahierarchicalstructure,
with each major car manufacturer at the top of the hierarchy. In the 1980s, the in-house
productionratioofJapanesecarmanufacturerswascomparativelylowerthanthoseofUSand
Europeancarmanufacturers(Konno2005).InJapan,onlyabout30-40percentofpartswasʻin-
houseʼ. In North America and Europe up until the early 1980s, the rate of ʻin-houseʼ parts
productionwas60percentto70percent(Shimokawa1994).
However,inthe1990s,theJapaneseautomobileindustryfacedseveralcrises,suchasthe
Figure 1:SupplyChainNetworkofAutomobileIndustry
(a) Pyramidal Structure
The rate of 〝In- house” parts production is 20-30%
(b) Diamond Structure(Barrel Structure)
The rate of 〝In- house〞 parts production was 30-40%
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
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collapseofʼbubbleʼeconomy,theyenʼsappreciation(1990:140yen,1995:79yentothedollar),
the1995KobeEarthquake,andtheincreaseoftheconsumptiontax(from3percentto5percent;
1997).Duetotheimpactofthesecrises,theJapaneseautomobileindustryacceleratedshifting
ofproductiontooverseassite,movingtowardoptimalparts,andpromotionoftheestablishment
Figure 2: The Changes of Supply Chain Network of Automobile Industry
In the lower tier, some weak companies in price and/or quality competitiveness disappeared.
Superior companies in priceand/or quality remained.
Similarly, some weak companiesdisappeared, superior companiesremained and became bigger.
Decentralized
Centralized
Companies in the lower tier competedacross the Keiretsu.
The first and second tier parts are decentralized suppliers,the lower tier parts are centralized in specific companiesthat has the specialized process technology.
Pyramidal Structure
Diamond Structure(Barrel)
AutomobileManufacture
AutomobileManufacture
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
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ofaglobalsupplynetwork.Infact,therearesomeJapanesecompanieswhichsupplypartstonot
only assemblers inside the keiretsu group but also outside the group, as shown Figure 1b.
Moreover, some of the major parts manufacturers supply the entire Japanese automobile
manufacturers. In fact, a lot of suppliers in the lower tier provide own products across the
keiretsu. The first and second tier parts (functional components) are decentralized amongst
severalsuppliers,thelowertierparts(simplecomponents)arecentralizedinonecompanythat
usesspecializedprocesstechnology(Fujimoto2011).Thisisthe“diamondstructure”or“barrel
structure”ofsupplychainofJapaneseautomobileindustry.Figure2showsthechangesofthis
structure.
Inpyramidalstructurecase,asshownFigure3a,ifdisastersuffersinthelowersupplierʼs
plant,althoughautomobileassemblyplantsnotdamage,theywereinterrupted.Becauseofthe
supplyofcomponentsfromthesuppliersinthelowertiersstopped.Theimpactofautomobile
industryaffectedinthe“keiretsu”group.Ontheotherhand,indiamondstructurecase,inthis
situation of centralized suppliers in the lower tiers, as shown Figure 3b; the production at
suppliersʼplantstop,thenalmosteveryautomobilemanufacturerareaffectedbyit.
In 2007, about four years before the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, there was a strong
earthquakeinNiigata.Thisearthquakeisnʼtknownwell,butRikenʼsKashiwazakiPlantinNiigata
had huge damage by this earthquake, affecting the operations of all of Japanʼs automobile
manufacturers.
For the following chapter, I will attempt to clarify the effects that the lack of a small
componentinautomobileaffectedtoentireJapaneseautomobileindustry.
3.Rikenʼs Kashiwazaki Plant (2007 Niigata Chuetsu-offshore Earthquake)
3.1 Rikenʼs Overview
TheRikenCorporationʼsmajorproductsarepistonringofenginepartsandsealringof
transmissionparts,asshownTable1.Thereare,dependingonRikenʼsparts,differentcompanies
that Riken supplies parts. In the case of Mazda, directly procure piston rings from Riken,
transmissionpartsaresuppliedfromRikentoJatco(transmissionmanufactureinNissankeiretsu),
Figure 3: The Damages of Supply Chain Network by Disaster
(a) Pyramidal Structure (b) Diamond Structure(Barrel )
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
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afterthensuppliedtoMazda.PowersteeringʼspartsaresuppliedfromKYB(KayabaCo.,Ltd.),and
thensuppliedtoMazda.RikenproducestheminRikenʼsKashiwazakiPlant.In2007,thisPlant
had huge damage from the Niigata Chuetsu-offshore Earthquake. The seismic center of this
earthquake was close to the Rikenʼs Kashiwazaki plant. The Rikenʼs Kashiwazaki Plants had
suspended operations for one week after this earthquake, then, the Japanese automobile
manufacturersalsointerruptedoperation.
3.2 Rikenʼs Piston Rings
TheRikenʼsKashiwazakiPlantproductsapproximately50percentofthepistonringsthat
usedbytheentireautomobileindustryinJapan(theworldmarketsharewasapproximately20
percent).ThereareonlythreecompaniesofpistonringinJapan,thus,pistonringmarketisan
oligopoly.Inthismarket,Rikensuppliesthemostpistonringstoallautomobilemanufacturers,as
shownChart1.Sinceallautomobilemanufacturersdependedonthesupplyofpistonringsand
other components from Rikenʼs Kashiwazaki Plant, all plants of automobile manufacturers
suspendedproduction.
3.3 Chronological Events at Rikenʼs Kashiwazaki Plant (Operations)
Followingtheoccurrenceoftheearthquakeon16July2007,alltheproductionlineshad
stopped at Rikenʼs Kashiwazaki Plant. Fortunately, 16 July was holiday. Although, Rikenʼs
KashiwazakiPlantwasoffduty, several employeeswere injuredwhileworkingonequipment
maintenanceatRikenʼsfacilities.Astotheequipment,thereoccurredsomeslideslip,somepieces
Table 1: Overview of the Riken Corporation
Capital ¥8,573,597,000(asofMarch2011,allofRikenCorporation)
NumberofEmployees 1,627(asofMarch2011,allofRikenCorporation)
MajorProducts
PistonRing ◦Engineparts ◦Approx.50%ofdomesticmarketshareSealRing ◦Transmissionparts ◦Approx.70%ofdomesticmarketshare
MajorCustomers
AutomobileandotherVehicleManufacturers
Honda, Suzuki, Toyota, Nissan, Fuji Heavy Industries. Ltd,Mitsubishi, Mazda, Daihatsu, Mitsubishi Fuso Truck and Bus,Nissan Diesel, Hino, Isuzu, Yamaha, Kawasaki Heavy Industries.Ltd,Ford,BMW,VW/Audi,OPEL,FIAT,Renault,Porsche,Jaguar,Hyundai,Kia
DistributorsandSalesAgentsforAutomobileParts
Eiwa, Empire, Auto Parts Uematsu, Global Tsusho, ChicagoProduct,SumishoMachineryTrade,DaishoTrading,TMTTrading,Toko Trading, Parts International, Heian Boeki, Meiji Sangyo,MotorixInternational
AutomotivePartsManufacturers
Aisin AW, Jatco, Musashi Seimitsu Industries, Calsonic Kansei,KYB, Nissin Kogyo, Yamaha Marine, BrotherPrecisionIndustry,Valeo,AisinSeiki,WagaPrecision,ZF
Source:CorporateInformationofRiken
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
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oftheequipmentgotlopsidedortoppledover.Someofproductsthatwerefinishedorinprocess,
molds,jigsandtools,andmeasuringinstrumentsfelltothefloor.Rikenʼsmachineʼslosseswere
100millionyen,inventoryʼslosseswere200millionyen,andittookrecoverycost1,200million
yen(consolidated).
Theautomobilemanufacturersvoluntarilyprovidedassistancewithengineeringandrepair
immediatelyafterearthquakeandhelpedRikenrestartmuchmorequicklythanitwouldhave
beenabletoonitsown.Theyhelpedcleanupandrepairthedamagetomanufacturingequipment
and the lossofbuildingcontents.Totalnumberofassistanceswasapproximately9,000from
about 25 automobile manufacturers and automobile parts manufacturers. That is to say,
Chart 1: Monthly Supplies and Purchases of Piston Rings in Japan, in 2005
Source: Daniel E. Supply Chain Disruption Risk and Recovery: Temporary Diversification and Its Limits, 2011
Table 2: Recovery at Rikenʼs Kashiwazaki Plant
DateDaysLater
Events Operations
16July2007
0The2007ChuetsuOffshoreEarthquakestruckat10:13a.m.AlltheproductionlinesatRikenʼsKashiwazakiplathadstopped.ToyotasentRikenabout20employeestoassessthesituationofthedamages.
0%
17July-2007
1 6companiesvoluntarilyprovided41assistancestoRikenʼsKashiwazakiPlant. 0%
18July2007
2 MazdasentRiken8employees. 0%
19July-2007
3Therewere700skilledvolunteersfromautomoblemanufacturersandpartsmanufacturers.(Toyota:200employees,Mazda:13maintenanceengineers)
0%
22July2007
6 Rikenstartedtrialoperation. 0%
23July2007
7Rikenresumedproductionsofmajorproducts (pistonrings,seal rings,andcamshafts)at10a.m.Partofthelinesdidnʼtresumeyet.25companiesprovided830assistances23-24July.
Almost100%
1August2007
16 RikenannouncedRikenʼscompleterecovery. 100%
Source:PressReleaseofRikenandarticlesofNihonKeizaiShinbun(Japanʼsmostprestigiouseconomicnewspaper)
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
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Automobile/partsmanufacturersprovidefivetimesasmanyassistancesasRikenʼsemployees.
Table2showsthechronologicaleventsatRikenʼsKashiwazakiPlant.On23Julywhichoneweek
aftertheearthquake,RikenʼsKashiwazakiPlantresumedoperations.
3.4 The Rikenʼs Affects to Japanese Automobile Manufacturers
Riken has specialized in design and technologies of piston rings and other automobile
components,sothatothersuppliersdonʼtimitateiteasily.Allmajorautomobilemanufacturersin
JapandependonRikenʼspistonringsandotherparts.Inadditiontospecialization,“Just-in-Time”
thataimedtoreduce the inventory levelofcomponentsatautomobilemanufacturersandthe
upper tail suppliers, had stopped productions of automobiles in Japan. Figure 4 shows the
operations by automobile manufacturers after 2007 Niigata Chuetsu-offshore Earthquake.
AlthoughToyota,Subaru,Suzuki,andDaihatsuhadsuspendedoperationsfrom19July,Mazda
wentonoperating.BecauseplantsofMazdaare in the fardistance fromRikenʼsKashiwazaki
Plant,sothattherewasatimelagofthedelivery.ThisissimilartoHondaʼsmini-vehicleproduction
lineinKumamotoPlant.
4.Renesas Electronics Corporationʼs Naka Plant (2011 Tohoku Earthquake)
4.1 Renesas Electronics Corporationʼs Overview
ThemajorproductsofRenesasElectronicsCorporation(REC)areMicrocontroller,System
LSIs/SystemonChip(SoC)Devices,andAnalog&PowerDevices,asshownTable3.In2011,REC
had huge damage from the Tohoku Earthquake. Especially, RECʼs Nala Plan had suspended
operationsfor82daysafterearthquake.RECʼsNakaPlantproducedalittlelessthan20percent
ofRECʼsMicrocontrollerUnits(MCUs)andSystemLSIs/SoCSolutions,andalittlelessthan10
percentofRECʼsAnalog&PowerDevices.
4.2 RECʼs Microcontroller
RECistheworldʼslargestmanufacturersofMCUwithmarketshare.Chart2ashowsthe
worldwideMCUmarketsharein2010fromtheDatabeansEstimate.In2010,beforetheTohoku
Source: Press Releases of each automobile manufacturers and articles of Nihon Keizai Shinbun
Figure 4: Operations of Major 8 Automobile Manufacturers in Japan
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
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Earthquake,theMCUmarketshareofRECwas30.0percent,theMCUrevenueofRECwas4,441
milliondollar.Accordingtoothermarketresearchcompanies,RECʼsMCUmarketsharewas29
percent(Gartner),27.3percent(IHSiSuppli)in2010.
In2010,theautomotiveMCUmarket(5,358milliondollar)was36.2percentofthetotal
MCUmarket (14,800milliondollar).Chart2b shows theworldwideautomotiveMCUmarket
sharein2010fromtheDatabeansEstimate.TheautomotiveMCUmarketshareofRECwas41.5
percent,theautomotiveMCUrevenueofRECwas2,221milliondollar.
4.3 Chronological Events of RECʼs Naka Plant (Operations)
Theimpactoftheearthquakeon11March2011causedeightRECʼsplants(includeNaka
Plant)outoftwentytwoofRECʼsplantsinJapantoimmediatelyshutdownproduction.These
Table 3: Overview of Renesas Electronics Corporation (as of April 2012)
Capital ¥153.2billion
NumberofEmployees 44,000(Consolidated)
MajorProduct MicrocontrollerSystemLSIs/SoCDevices.Analog&PowerDevices.
GroupCompanies InJapan◦ 1SalesCompanies.◦ 14ManufacturingandEngineeringServiceCompanies.◦ 7DesignandApplicationTechnologiesCompanies.◦ 2BusinessCorporationsandOthers.Overseas◦ 11SalesCompanies.◦ 8ManufacturingandEngineeringServiceCompanies.◦ 4DesignandApplicationTechnologiesCompanies.◦ 6BusinessCorporationsandOthers.
Source:CorporateOutlineofRECʼs
Source: Databeans Estimates, Company Reports Note: Amount of the MCU revenue was 14.8 billion dollar in 2010 Amount of the automotive MCU revenue was 5.36 billion dollar in 2010
Chart 2: Worldwide MCU Market Share by Suppliers in 2010
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
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Figure 5: Locations of RECʼs Plants
Temporarily Shut down
Front-end line: 5 plantsBack-end line: 3 plants
Center of Earthquake
REC’s Naka Pla
Back-end Line(Assembly & Test: 12 plants)
Front-end Line (Wafer Fabrication: 10 plants)
Table 4: Chronological Events at RECʼs Naka Plant
Date Afterdays Events
11March2011 0
The2011TohokuEarthquakestruckat2:46p.m.7(includeNakaPlant)outof22ofRECʼsplantsinJapanhavetemporarilyshutdownproduction.RECʼsproductionvolumefelttoapproximately50%.
13-14March2011 2-3
8RECʼsoffices/sitesinJapanhadbeenimpactedfromtheblackoutmeasurebyTokyo Electric Power Company, These offices/sites shut down operationproduction.
21March2011 10 RECestimatedthatNakaPlantwillresumepartofproductionon1September.
28March2011 17 RECannouncedthatNakaPlantwillresumepartofproductionon15July.
22April2011 42 RECannouncedthatNakaPlantwillresumepartofproductionon15June.
23April2011 43 NakaPlantstartedtestproductionatthe200-mmwaferfabricationline.
25April2011 45 NakaPlantstartedtestproductionatthe300-mmwaferfabricationline.
11May2011 61 REC published that Naka Plant will resume 200-mm wafer fabrication line of
productionatNakaPlanton1June,300-mmlineofproductionon6June.
1June2011 82 200-mmwaferfabricationlinestartedmassproduction.
6June2011 87 SystemLSI(300-mm)waferfabricationlinestartedmassproduction.
10June2011 91 RECannouncedthattimingonwhenthesupply(shipment)capacitywillreturnto
thatofpre-earthquakelevelsintheendofSeptember.
June2011 RECʼsproductionvolumerecoveredtoapproximately85%.
Mid-September2011 Thesupply(shipment)capacityreturnedtothatmorethanpre-earthquake.
Source:PressReleaseofRECandarticlesofNihonKeizaiShinbun
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
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plantswerefivesemiconductorwaferplantsandthreeassemblyplants,asshownFigure5.Due
toplantʼsshutdown,productionvolumeofthewholeRECʼs200-mmwaferfabricationfeltto50
percentafterthisearthquake.
Table4showsthechronologicaleventsatRECʼsNakaPlant.RECʼsNakaPlantwastheworst
affected in all RECʼs plants. Although, just after the Tohoku Earthquake, initial predictions
estimatedthatNalaplantwouldresumeproductioninSeptember2011, infact,productionat
Naka Plant restarted on 1 June 2011. The supply/shipment capacity returned that of pre-
earthquakelevelsinthemiddleofSeptember2011,sixmonthsafterthe2011TohokuEarthquake.
Total number of assistances was approximately 80,000, and there were maximum 2,500
assistancesperday.Thisnumberwasmanymore than1,900employeesofRECʼsNakaPlant
(includingitsrelationcorporations).
4.4 The 2011 Tohoku Earthquakeʼs Affects to Automobile Manufacturers
REC isamajormanufacturerofMCUswhichJapanesecompaniesholdinga largeshare
worldwide.Theeffectoncustomercompaniesʼsupplychainwasverylarge.Infact,theJapanese
Automobile manufacturers had been hit hard by shortages of MCUs and other components,
causingRECʼsplantsandotherlowertiershadshutdown.Mostautomobilemanufacturerswas
fewdirectdamagetoplantsbytheearthquake,butNissanʼsIwakiplanthadwithaftershocksstill
heavilyimpactedtheregion, itsrecoverytooklongerthantheotherplants.Toyotasuspended
productionatallplantsforabouttwoweeksbetweenfrom14Marchto26March.Followingthis,
thedomesticautomobileproductionsofToyotainMarch2011wasrecordedas129,491units.
Comparedwiththe347,281unitstotalrecordedforthesamemonthofthepreviousyear,thisis
adecreaseof217,790unitor37.3percent.Itwasthe38daysaftertheTohokuEarthquakethat
allToyotaʼsplantsresumedoperation.Similarly,otherstookaboutamonthtoresumeallplantʼs
operation.
Table 5 shows the reductions in production by the Tohoku Earthquake. Automobile
productionof thewholeJapaneseautomobilemanufacturers inMarch2011wasrecordedas
403,937 units. Comparedwith the 945,220 units total recorded for the samemonth of the
previousyear,thisisadecreaseof541,283unitor42.7percent.Itʼsalso5.3timesasmanyas
thereductionsinthe2007NiigataChuetsu-offshoreEarthquakeandover38timesofthe1995
KobeEarthquake.
Table 5: Reductions in Productions by the Earthquake
Earthquake Reduction Productions
The1995KobeEarthquake14,021
(January1995)January1994:772,858January1995:758,837
The2007NiigataChuetsu-offshoreEarthquake101,636
(July2007)July2006:977,856July2007:876,220
The2011TohokuEarthquake541,283
(March2011)March2010:945,220March2009:403,937
Source:ActiveMatrixDatabaseSystemofJAMA
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
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5.Summary of Earthquake Effects on Production
5.1 Earthquakeʼs Effects to Automobile Manufacturers
5.1.1 The Effect to Automobile Manufacturersʼ Operation
After both earthquakes, Japanese automobile manufacturers decided/executed the
disruptionofallassemblyplantsearly.IncaseofToyota,ontheeveningofthe19July,2.5days
after the 2007 Niigata Chuetsu-offshore Earthquake, all Toyotaʼs plants started to suspend
operation.Similarly,afterthe2011TohokuEarthquake,allplantsstartedtosuspendoperation3
dayslater.Theaveragenumberofdaysofthemajoreightautomobilemanufacturerswas3.6(in
2007),and3.0(in2011),asshownP1inFigure6.
Consideringthehugescalesoftheseearthquakesanddamagesbythem,theirdecisionof
theshutdownsandtheresumptionofoperationswarespeedyandappropriately.Thereasonwhy
Japanese automobile manufacturers decided/executed the disruption so early after both
earthquakes,therewererelatedtotheToyotaProductionSystem(TPS)thatawidelyaccepted
productionsystem.TPSwasestablishedbasedontwoconcepts-“jidoka”and“JustinTime(JIT)”-.
“jidoka” means that when a problem occurs, the equipment stops immediately, preventing
defectiveproducts frombeingproduced. For this reason, therewerenotwrongdecisions for
Japaneseautomobilemanufacturerstostopproductionlines/plantbybothdisasters.Thesecond
Earthquake All plants operated Some plants operated partially All plants stopped operation
* P1: The number of days from the day on which the earthquake stroke until the day on which all assembly plants stopped operation.** P2: The period of days in which all assembly plants stopped operation*** P3: The number of days from the day on which the earthquake stroke until the day on which all assembly plants resumed operation.
Figure 6:ComparisonofAutomobileManufacturerʼsRecoveryTime
TOYOTA0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
16Jul
17Jul
18Jul
19Jul
20Jul
21Jul
22Jul
23Jul
24Jul
25Jul
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue Wed2007 Niigata
2007 Niigata 2011 Tohoku
P1* P2** P3*** P1* P2** P3***
Toyota 2.5 4.5 9 3 14 38
Nissan 4 5 9 1 18 38
Honda 7 1.5 9 4 9 31
Mazda 5 2 9 3 8 24
Mitsubishi 4 3 9 3 2 38
Subaru 2.5 5.5 9 3 9 25
Suzuki 3 4 9 3 8 25
Daihatsu 2.5 3.5 9 4 7 38
Average 3.8 3.6 9.0 3.0 9.4 32.1
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
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istheconceptofJIT,inwhicheachprocessproducesonlywhatisneeded,whenitisneed,andin
theamountneeded.“JustinTime”madeeliminatingunnecessaryinventoriesinprocess.Tokeep
inventoriestoacceptablylowlevelachievenotonlycostreductionbutfastrecovery.Itisimportant
fordisaster-struckplanstorecoverquicklyfromthedestructiveeffectsofseismicdisaster.
5.1.2 Speed of the Recovery
AsshownP3inFigure6,inthecaseofToyota,on25July,9daysafterthe2007Niigata
Chuetsu-offshoreEarthquake, allToyotaʼsplants resumedoperation. Similarly, after the2011
TohokuEarthquake,allplantsresumedoperation38dayslater.Theaveragenumberofrecovery
daysofthemajoreightautomobilemanufacturerswas9.0inthe2007earthquake,and32.1in
the2011earthquake.Likethis,ittookoveramonthtoresumetheoperationofallplantsinthe
2011TohokuEarthquake.
This delay effects to the recovery speed of production. Chart 3 shows the rate of the
domesticproductionofallautomobilemanufacturersforoneyearaftertheearthquake.Although
thewholeJapaneseautomobilemanufactureshadrecoveredtheirproductionafteramonthof
the2007NiigataChuetsu-offshoreEarthquake,ittookfivemonthsuntiltheproductionofthem
returnedtonormalproductionafterthe2011TohokuEarthquake.
5.2 Chronological Changes of the Domestic Product in Japan
Chapter9showsthechangesofthedomesticautomobileproductsinJapanfromJanuary
1995throughMarch2012.Itappearstwothingsfromthischapter.First,thedisasterʼsimpacts
toJapaneseautomobilemanufacturersʼproductionwerenotmorethanthedepressionʼsimpacts.
Chart 3:Thechanges(%)oftheDomesticAutomobileProducts
Source: Active Matrix Database System of JAMA Note: The previous year’s result indexed at 100
(Months later)
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
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Second,therecoveryspeedsofJapaneseautomobilemanufacturerʼsproductionatdisasterswere
quicker rather than the depressions. Especially, in the Tohoku Earthquake, there was huge
damagenotonlytotheJapaneseautomobileindustrybutalsotothewholeeconomyinJapan.
Japaneseautomobilemanufacturersalsorapidlydecreasedtheirproductsbyinterruptingofthe
assemblyplants.Despiteofthem,therecoveryspeedafterthisearthquakewasquickerthanthat
ofthedepressionsuchastheLehmanShock.
5.3 Disaster and JIT
AsshownTable6, in thecaseof JIT, the inventory level/costof theassemblyplantsof
automobilemanufacturersislower,thetransportationcostishigher.Becausetheleadtimesof
thetransportationareshorterandmorefrequent.Duetothefewerinventories,theadaptability
ofenvironmentssuchasdepressionandcrisisishigherthannonJIT.
AfterbothEarthquakes,therewerenotafewarticlesthatinsistedofthelimitationsofJIT
innewspaper,journal,andpublicreports.Buttheirargumentsfocusedonthatthelowerinventory
causedtotheshutdownofplantsafteradisaster.AswasmentionedSection5.1,therewerenot
wrongdecisionsforJapaneseautomobilemanufacturers to immediatelystoptheirproduction
plantsbybothdisasters.Itwasveryimportanttorecoveryproductionquickly.Becauseofthe
Japaneseautomobilemanufacturersknewit,theyvoluntarilyprovidedalotofassistancestothe
damagedplantsofthelowertiercompaniesdoetorecoverplantsquickly.AsshownTable11,in
JIT case, the recovery speeds are quick, excluding large scale disasters such as the Tohoku
Earthquake.Thisisreasonthatthelossondisposalofinventoriesatthedamagedplantsreduces.
Ifdamagedplantshavealotofinventories,thelossondisposalofinventoriesincrease,theyneed
moretimetorecover.Therefore,itisimpossibletosaydefinitelythatthelimitationofJITexists
inthesituationofdisasters.
As for the riskmitigation strategy to dealwith large scale disruptions of supply chain
Chart 4:Thechanges(Units)oftheDomesticAutomobileProductsfromJan1995throughJan
2011
Source: Active Matrix Database System of JAMA
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
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network,makeprovisionstomovetoalternativesitesforproduction,iftheyareunabletoproduce
componentbyadisaster,asshownFigure7.InRikenandRECcases, inspiteofthedamaged
plantsdisruptedforalongtime,theywerenotabletoimmediatelyproduceequivalentcomponents
inotherplants.Thisreasons thatbothcorporationscreated thehigher technicalskilland the
strengthofpricecompetitivenessinaplant,cometoholdarelativelylargeworldmarketshareof
someparticularautomobilecomponents
6. Conclusion
Thispaperhasrevealedtheinvisibledamagesbyfocusingontheeffectstothesupplychain
Table 6: Comparisons of JIT and Non JIT
NormalInventory
Level / CostTransportation
L.T. / CostEnvironmentAdaptability
JIT Low/Low Short/High High
NonJIT High/High Long/Low Low
Abnormal(Depression)
StorageTime
InventoryCost
InventoryRisk
JIT Constant(Short) Constant(Low) Constant(Low)
NonJIT Longer Higher Higher
Abnormal(Disaster)
Shutdown of PlantsLoss on disposal of
InventoriesRecovery Speed of Plants
JIT
DamagedPlants: ImmediatelyOtherPlants: Earlier
DamagedPlants: LowOtherPlants: Non
DamagedPlants: QuickOtherPlants: Quick
NonJIT
DamagedPlants: ImmediatelyOtherPlants: Later/Avoid
DamagedPlants: HighOtherPlants: Non
DamagedPlants: SlowOtherPlants: Slow
Figure 7:MutualComplementNetwork
Riken & REC In future
Nodes of the Mutual Complement Network of Production
Mutual Complement Network
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
― ―95
network, production system in Japanese automobilemanufacturers by these disasters.As for
recoveryspeedfromdisasters,JIToperatedtoadvantagetotheJapaneseautomobileindustry.In
addition,fundamentalissuesoftheirdamageswereunveiled.
AsforTPS,therewerenotwrongdecisionsforJapaneseautomobilemanufacturerstostop
productionlines/plantsbybothdisasters.Thecomparisonofdisasteranddepressionintermsof
thedecreasingspeed/volumeofsupplyandtherecoveryspeed.Itisimpossibletosaydefinitely
thatthelimitationoftheJITexists.
References
Ahmadsian and Lincoln, Keiretsu, Governance, and Learning: Case Studies in Change from the Japanese Automotive Industry Institute of Industrial Relations University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper No.76, 2000.
Koichi Shimokawa, The Japanese Automobile Industry, Continuum International Publishing Group, 1994.
Takahiro Fujimoto. Supply Chain Competitiveness and Robustness: A Lesson from the 2011
TohokuEarthquakeandSupplyChain “VirtualDualization”.ManufacturingManagement
ResearchCenter(MMRC)DiscussionPaperseries2009.
YoshinoriKonno,Suppilers'PerformanceandTransactionswithCustomers:RoleoftheAdvanced
R&DCollaborationbetweenAutomakersandSuppliersintheJapaneseAutomotiveIndustry,
TheResearchInstituteofInnovationManagement,HoseiUniversity,WorkingPaperSeries
No.58,2008.