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5-2011
Contradiction in Terms: Nation States, IndividualRights and Refugee Policy in the UniversalDeclaration of Human RightsElyse BrouhardPacific University
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Recommended CitationBrouhard, Elyse, "Contradiction in Terms: Nation States, Individual Rights and Refugee Policy in the Universal Declaration of HumanRights" (2011). Humanities Capstone Projects. Paper 19.
Contradiction in Terms: Nation States, Individual Rights and RefugeePolicy in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Document TypeCapstone Project
Degree NameBachelor of Arts
DepartmentHistory
First AdvisorRichard Jobs
Subject CategoriesArts and Humanities | History
RightsTerms of use for work posted in CommonKnowledge.
This capstone project is available at CommonKnowledge: http://commons.pacificu.edu/cashu/19
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ContradictioninTerms:NationStates,IndividualRightsandRefugeePolicy
intheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights
In1945delegatesfromfifty‐onenationscametogethertodraftthecharterofthe
UnitedNations.Twoyearslateranothersetofrepresentativescametogethertodraftthe
UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR).Thefirstdraftingprocesswasmeanttogive
nationstatesaforumtosolvedisputesandprotectnationalsovereignty.Thesecondwas
intendedtoarticulateandprotectindividualrights.Thoughamarkofprogressforindividual
rights,theforceoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightswasnonethelessbluntedbya
preemptiveconcernfornationalsovereignty.Thiswas,andis,adocumentsettingoutthe
universalrightsofindividuals,butwrittenbyrepresentativesofnationstates.Itisadocument
proclaimingthesovereigntyofindividualscraftedwithinthecontextofagreatdeferencefor
nationalsovereignty.Thegoalofshapingauniversalplanktosecureindividualrightswas
doomedfromthestart–astheUNreallyhadnopowertoenforcetheserightsandnationshad
littleobligationtoupholdthem.Thistensionbetweentheguaranteeofindividualrightsandthe
primacyofthestatewasevidentfromtheoutsetofthedraftingofthedeclaration.
Theassertionofnationalsovereigntyisalsoquiteevidentintheinternationalconflict
takingplacesimultaneously:theArab‐IsraeliWar.TheArab‐IsraeliWarwasthefirst
internationalconflictandinstanceofhumanrightsviolationwithwhichtheUNwasconfronted
asitattemptedtolayoutastandardofuniversalhumanrights.Itwasthefirstnon‐theoretical
ElyseBrouhardThesisdraft,final5‐9‐11
2
eventwithwhichtheUDHRwasputindirectconversation.Thedraftersmadeitclearthatthey
wereawaretherefugeefalloutfromthewarwaspreciselythetypeofsituationthedeclaration
wasmeanttoaddress,andtheemergingdeclarationprovidedaframeworkthroughwhichthe
warwasapproached.Ultimately,thesetwoevents,thedraftingoftheUDHRandtheArab‐
IsraeliWar,examinedintandemilluminatetheimpasseandconflictbetweentherightsof
nationstatesandthoseofindividuals,particularlywhenwelookatthestatusofrefugees.
Nevertheless,theUDHRisregardedbymanyasalandmarkofprogresswithintherealm
ofhumanrights,asoneofthefirstinternationalinstrumentstorecognizetheuniversalityof
certainindividualrights.However,thecontradictioninherenttothedocumentislargely
overlooked.Theconceptofagroupofnationstatesensuringuniversalrightstoindividuals–
rightswhichitisoftennotintheirbestinteresttoensure,andwhichtheyhavenorealimpetus
tocompelthemtoabideby–isinherentlycontradictory.
OnlyonemonthaftertheendofWorldWarTwo,delegatesmetinSanFranciscoto
draftthecharterthatwouldestablishtheUnitedNations.1TheUNwasfoundedasa
replacementofsortsfortheUN’spredecessor,theLeagueofNations.TheLeagueofNations
hadbeendeemedafailureduetoitsinabilitytopreventthewar.AftertheSecondWorldWar,
theworldcommunitymadeasecondattemptatforminganinternationaladministrativebody.
TheUnitedNationswas,inmanyways,verysimilartotheLeague.MarkMazower,scholarof
Europeanhistory,callstheUnitedNations“awarmed‐upLeague”becausetheLeagueandthe
UNboreaverycloseresemblancetooneanother.However,theUnitedNationsdifferedfrom
theLeagueinsomesignificantways,perhapsmostsignificantlysointhatvetopowerwasgiven
1EmmaHaddad,TheRefugeeinInternationalSociety:BetweenSovereigns,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),78.ThewarinEuropeendedMay8thandtheUNCharterwassignedJune26th
3
totheBigThree(thenamegiventotheUS,USSRandUK).Thisspecificchangemade“thegreat
powers...simultaneouslybothmorewillingtosupporttheUN–sinceitcouldnotactagainst
them—andmorewillingtoignoreit(forthesamereason).”2
InNoEnchantedPalace:TheEndofEmpireandtheIdeologicalOriginsoftheUnited
Nations,MazowerwritesacriticalreviewoftheoriginoftheUnitedNations.Hetakesahard
lookatthemotivesbehinditsfounding,andgivesarealisticevaluationoftheefficacyofthe
organization.Specifictoitshumanrightspolicy,hewritesthateventhoughtheLeagueof
Nationsgetsaharshassessment,itreallyhadbetterhumanrightsprotectionsthantheUN:
“minoritieswouldfindlessprotectionundertheUnitedNationsthantheyhaddoneunderthe
League...TheUnitedNationsbecameanevenfiercerdefenderofnationalsovereigntythan
theLeaguehadbeen.”3Despiteitsaimsatprovidingmoreprotectionforindividuals,theUnited
Nationsultimatelyachievedless,inthisregard,thanitspredecessorhad.Particulartorefugee
rights,theUNputinplaceabillofrightsthatdeferredtonationalpower.However,Emma
Haddad,ResearchAssociateattheUniversityofOxfordRefugeeStudyCentre,comparesthe
LeagueofNationsandtheUNinadifferentway,sayingthattheLeagueofNationshada
positiveviewofsovereigntythat“sawastate’sinternalsovereigntyastheguaranteeofthe
protectionofindividualsquacitizens,thenegativeviewofsovereigntyupheldbytheUnited
Nationssawastate’sexternalsovereigntyastheguaranteeoftheprotectionoftheindividuals
quaindividuals.”4WheretheLeagueofNationssawthemeansofprotectionforindividualsto
2MarkMazower,NoEnchantedPalace:TheEndofEmpireandtheIdeologicalOriginsoftheUnitedNations,(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2009),16.3MarkMazower,NoEnchantedPalace:TheEndofEmpireandtheIdeologicalOriginsoftheUnitedNations,(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2009),24and25.4EmmaHaddad,TheRefugeeinInternationalSociety:BetweenSovereigns,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),137.
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resideintheirstatusascitizensofnationstates,theUNattemptedtomakeindividualrightsa
universalguarantee,regardlessofcitizenship.TheUDHRwasakeypartofthischange.Adopted
in1948,theUDHRwasoneofthefirstinternationalinstrumentstorecognizetheuniversal
natureofindividualrights.
Withintheliteratureonhumanrights,refugees,andinternationalpolicy,thereisa
generalrecognitionofthisdilemmabetweensovereigntyandrights,butfewmakeaspecificor
detailedanalysisoftheinconsistencywithintheUDHRitself.Attheinitialadoptionceremony
oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,EleanorRooseveltsaid,“Westandtodayatthe
thresholdofagreateventbothinthelifeoftheUnitedNationsandinthelifeofmankind.This
declarationmaywellbecometheinternationalMagnaCartaofallmeneverywhere.”TheUDHR
hassincebeenreferredtoasthechangingpointinthehumanrightsmovement,the
preemptorynormforinternationalpolicy.Scholarsonthesubjectagreethat,althoughthe
Declarationwasadoptedwithoutanenforcementmechanism,ithasrevolutionizedthe
internationalhumanrightsregime.In“TheDeclarationofHumanRightsinPostmodernity,”
diplomatandprominenthumanrightsactor,JoseAlvesexaminestheDeclarationinrelationto
postmodernity.Alves,likemanyscholars,writesoftheDeclaration’spivotalroleinthehuman
rightsmovement:
Formorethanhalfacentury,theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,proclaimedbytheUnitedNationsin1948,hasplayedanextraordinaryroleinthehistoryofmankind.Itcodifiedthehopesoftheoppressed,supplyingauthoritativelanguagetothesemanticsoftheirclaims...Itlaunchedanewandprofusejuridicaldiscipline,theInternationalLawofHumanRights...Itsetparametersforevaluatingthelegitimacyofanygovernment,replacingtheefficacyofforcebytheforceofethics.5
5JoseLindgrenAlves,“TheDeclarationofHumanRightsinPostmodernity,”HumanRightsQuarterly22.2(2000),478.
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AlvesacknowledgestheDeclaration’sflaws,butisintriguedbywhatheseesastheimpactit
hashadinspiteofthis.OtherscholarsagreewithAlvesabouttheUDHR’smonumentalimpact
onhumanrightslawandpractice.JohannesMorsinkwrites,“Inthelate1940sbelieversin
humanrightshadtofightforintellectuallegitimacy,abattletheyfinallywononaccountofthe
horrorsperpetratedbytheNazis.Now,asthedocumentpassesitsfiftiethanniversary,critics
havetomaketheircaseagainstthebackgroundoftheextraordinarysuccessthatthe
Declarationhasbecome.”6Morsinkreferencesalonglistofinternationalhumanrights
instrumentsandcourtcases,allofwhichreferenceorwereinspiredbytheUDHR,asproofof
itssuccess.7LikeMorsink,JamesNickelwritesinMakingSenseofHumanRightsoftheUDHRs
roleininfluencinghumanrightshistoryandpolicy:“TheUniversalDeclarationhasbeen
amazinglysuccessfulinestablishingafixedworldwidemeaningfortheideaofhumanrights.”8
He,too,citesanumberofinternationalinstrumentsinspiredbytheUDHR.
SpecifictorefugeerightsandtheUDHR,Haddadexplorestherolesofrefugeesin
internationallaw.ShewritesinTheRefugeeinInternationalSociety:BetweenSovereignsthat
“withthenewemphasisonindividualrights,asimmortalizedinthe1948Universaldeclaration
ofHumanRights,refugeeswererecognizedasindividualswitharighttoprotectioninastate.”9
Shedoesnotgoontomentionthatthisrecognitionhaslargelybeeninnameonly.Itisoften
notpointedoutthattheprogressmarkedbytheUDHRwasprimarilyabstract.W.M.Reisman
6JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),xi.7TreatiesandconventionsinspiredbytheUDHRinclude:theEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(1950),theConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugees(1951),theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(1966),TheAmericanConventiononHumanRights(1966),andasmanyasfortyothers.8JamesNickel,MakingSenseofHumanRights,(Oxford:BlackwellPublishing,2007),9.9EmmaHaddad,TheRefugeeinInternationalSociety:BetweenSovereigns,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),137.
6
writesaboutsovereigntyinrelationtointernationalhumanrightsinhisarticle“Sovereigntyand
HumanRightsinContemporaryInternationalLaw.”Hefocuseshisdiscussionmorespecifically
onstateversuspopularsovereigntyintermsofgeneralelections,buthecreditstheUniversal
DeclarationofHumanRightswith“dethroning”thesovereign.Healsoclaimsthat“noserious
scholarstillsupportsthecontentionthatinternalhumanrightsare‘essentiallywithinthe
domesticjurisdictionofthestate’andhenceinsulatedfrominternationallaw.”10While
Reismanistechnicallycorrectinhisassertion(becausethehumanrightsreformafterthe
SecondWorldWarchangedtheassumptionthatstatesaresolelyincontroloftheirinternal
affairs)theideaisnonethelessonlytheoreticallyupheld,especiallywhenitcomestorefugees.
Inpractice–forexampleduringtheArab‐IsraeliWar—refugeeswerenomoreguaranteed
protectionafter1948thantheyhadbeenbeforetheDeclarationwasdraftedandendorsed.
TheadoptionoftheUDHRin1948spurredthecreationandadoptionofanumberof
subsequenttreatiesandconventions.However,continuingrefugeecriseslikethePalestinian
refugeesfromthe1948Arab‐IsraeliWardemonstratetheproblematicnatureofupholdingthe
principlesenshrinedintheUDHRandthefollowingconventions,fromtheveryoutsetofits
creation.InDecember2008,theGeneralAssemblyoftheUNcelebratedthe60thanniversaryof
theUDHR,wheretheyrecognizedtheimpactoftheUDHRbutalsothecontinuingneedfor
betterpracticalenforcementofit.MartinUhomoibhi,presidentoftheUNHumanRights
Council,spokeatthe60thanniversaryoftheDeclaration:“Simplyput,humanitytodayno
longerlacksthehumanrightsinstrumentstopromote,protectanddefendhumanrightsand
fundamentalfreedoms.However,whatissorelyneededisforStatespartytoexistinghuman
10W.M.Reisman,“SovereigntyandHumanRightsinContemporaryInternationalLaw,”AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,84No.4(1990),868and869.
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rightsinstrumentstotakethepracticalstepsnecessarytoimplementtheirprovisionsforthe
benefitofallmankind.”11Thus,over60yearslatertheUDHRremainsastheoreticalastheday
itwasdrafted.TheUNhasnomorepowertoenforceitsprinciples,andnationstatesjustas
littlereasontoliveuptothem.Inhisdiscussionofhumanrightshistoryandpractice,Charles
Beitzwritesthat“internationalhumanrightspracticenotoriouslylacksastandingcapacityto
enforcemanyoftherightslistedinthemajortreaties,andevenwhenanenforcementcapacity
exists,itusuallyappliesselectivelyandoftenonlyatthesufferanceofthosestatesagainst
whichitmightbeused.”12
IagreethattheUDHRisnotpracticallyeffective;itisofgreattheoreticalsignificance
withoutanysubstantialapplication.Thislackofeffectivenessischieflyduetotherootconflict
ofsovereigntybetweenstatesandindividuals.Iexaminethisconflictthroughaclosereadingof
therefugeearticleswithintheUDHR,andthroughacarefulexaminationoftheUNdebates
surroundingthedeclaration.ThoughtheUDHRisimportantfortheideologicalchangeit
effected,itsdownfallhasbeenthatthegreatideaspromotedwithinitlackapracticalmeansof
enforcementorstateswillingtorigorouslyapplythem.Beitzwritesthat“onereasonwhy
governmentsfounditpossibletoaccepttheprincipleofinternationalconcernforhumanrights
wastheexpectationthattheUNwouldrespectthedomesticjurisdictionofstatesbyrefraining
frominterventionintheirinternalaffairs.”13TheUDHRwasadoptedbecauseitsdrafterswere
comfortedbytheknowledgethattheywouldnotbeforcedtoabidebyit.TheUDHRwasa
majordevelopmentintherecognitionofuniversalrights,butwhatmadenationstateswilling
11U.N.GeneralAssembly,63rdSession.65thMeeting,MeetingRecord.10Dec.2008(A/63/PV.65).12CharlesR.Beitz,TheIdeaofHumanRights,(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford:2009),3.13CharlesR.Beitz,TheIdeaofHumanRights,(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford:2009),21.
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tosignitinthepasthasmadeitsenforcementproblematicinthepresent.Iarguethatthe
UDHRisbothconsequentialandinadequate.Thoughanimportantstepforwardinthe
recognitionofhumanrights,thesupremacyofnationalsovereigntycrippleditsefficacy.The
declarationdebateswerefraughtwiththistensionbetweennationalpowerandindividual
rights,andthefinalarticulationofrightswithintheUDHRdisplaysthisconflict.Lastly,the1948
Palestinianrefugeecrisisshowsthiscontradictioninpractice.
TheinitialrefugeeproblemwithwhichtheUnitedNationswrestledaftertheSecond
WorldWar,whendraftingtheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,actuallyhaditsoriginsin
theFirstWorldWarandtheshiftininternationalrefugeepolicyinthe1920sand1930s.Tofully
understandthepolicychangesthatcameinthepost‐warera,itisnecessarytooutline
internationalrefugeepolicyduringtheFirstandSecondWorldWars.
DuringandaftertheFirstWorldWar,immigrationpolicychangedthroughouttheworld.
Specifically,nationsbeganpassingstrictimmigrationquotastolimitthenumberofimmigrants
allowedintotheircountrieseachyear.Inherbook,RefugeesinInter‐warEurope,Claudena
SkranwritesthattheabruptendoftheperiodoffreeimmigrationbeganintheUnitedStates.14
TheU.S.setitsfirstimmigrationquotain1921,whichestablishedlimitsonthenumberof
immigrantsallowedeachyearandattemptedto“ensureacertainethniccomposition.”15Other
nationssoonfollowedsuit.Thissameperiodofimmigrationquotassawthedevelopmentof
otherbarrierstoimmigration:theinstitutionofapassportsystem,stricterbordercontrol,and
14ClaudenaSkran,RefugeesinInter‐WarEurope:TheEmergenceofaRegime,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),21.15EstherRosenfeld,“FatalLessons:UnitedStatesImmigrationLawDuringtheHolocaust,”UCDavisJ.Int'lL.&Pol'y,1995.p.2.AndClaudenaSkran,RefugeesinInter‐WarEurope:TheEmergenceofaRegime,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),22.
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alienregistration.Thisrestrictionofimmigrationfurthercomplicatedtherefugeeproblemby
addingobstaclestointernationalmobility.16
IntheyearsprecedingtheSecondWorldWar,therefugeeexodusinEuropebecamea
crisis.AfterHitlercametopowerin1933andsubsequentlyembarkedonbuildingtheThird
Reich,Germansbeganfleeingthearea.Initiallythemajorityofthosefleeingwerepolitical
opponentstoHitler;latertherefugeeswerepredominantlyJewish.AtthesametimeasHitler
wasbuildinghisReichinGermany,FranciscoFrancowasrisingtopowerinSpain.Shortlybefore
thewar,hundredsofthousandsofSpaniardsjoinedtherefugeeexodusastheyfledFranco’s
regime.17Fewnationswerewillingtotakeinmorethanafewhundredofthethousandsof
Europeanrefugees.
Thereluctancetoacceptrefugees,inparticularthoseofJewishdescent,wasaggravated
byeconomichardshipandtheNazilawsimpoverishingemigrants.Theworldwideeconomic
depressionlastedfarintothe1930s,andconsequentlymostnationswerereluctanttoexpand
theirpopulations.18Nazipolicyfurthercomplicatedemigrationissues.NazilawsstrippedJews
ofpropertyandbankaccountsbeforetheywereallowedtoemigrate.Hitleraskedtheworldto
takeinimpoverishedrefugeeswhowouldnothavebeenwelcomeunderthemostideal
circumstances.Nationsoperatedunderstrictimmigrationquotasystemsthatsetlimitsonthe
16ClaudenaSkran,RefugeesinInter‐WarEurope:TheEmergenceofaRegime,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),21and22.17MichaelRobertMarrus,TheUnwanted:EuropeanRefugeesfromtheFirstWorldWarthroughtheColdWar,(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,2002),123.18RichardRubensteinandJohnRoth,ApproachestoAuschwitz:TheHolocaustandItsLegacy,(Atlanta:JohnKnoxPress,2003),122.
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numberofrefugeesallowedfromeachcountry.Intheend,onlyoneintwelveEuropeanJews
wasabletofindrefugeabroad.19
In1938,aftertheAnschluss20andthesubsequentincreaseinpressuretotakein
refugees,U.S.PresidentRooseveltcalledforaninternationalconferencetodiscusstherefugee
crisis.OnJuly6th1938,delegatesfromthirty‐twonationsconvenedinEvian‐les‐Bains,France.
ThefocusoftheconferencewasonrefugeesinEurope,particularlyJewishrefugeesfrom
GermanyandAustria.21TheConferenceresultedinarecognitionofthegrowingcrisisin
Europe,butafirmunwillingnesstoofferhelp.ThechairmanoftheEvianConference,former
U.S.SteelCorporationCEOandpersonalfriendofRoosevelt,MyronC.Taylor,stressedthe
importanceofnationalsovereignty.Otherdelegatesfollowedsuitand,and,whileexpressing
“supportforthehumanitarianprinciple”behindrefugeeaid,statedconcernfortheirown
nationalwelfare.22Allinall,thedelegatesconcludedthatnationswereunabletoaidrefugees
andstressedtheimportanceofindividualmigrationthroughprivateorganizations.TheEvian
ConferenceresultedinthecreationoftheIntergovernmentalCommitteeonRefugees,but
offeredlittlehelptorefugeesthemselves.23
TheattitudetowardsrefugeesattheEvianConferenceandotherwiseduringthisperiod,
wasfraughtwithracialundertones,asasubstantialpercentageofimmigrantsduringtheinter‐
warperiodwereJewish.WhentheleadersofNaziGermanypursuedapolicyofmassexpulsion
19MartinGilbert,TheHolocaust,(NewYork:BraunCenterforHolocaustStudies,1994),11‐12.20Anchlussliterallymeans“union”or“connection.”AnchlusswasthenamegiventoHitler’sannexationofAustriain1938.21ClaudenaSkran,RefugeesinInter‐WarEurope:TheEmergenceofaRegime,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),211.22ClaudenaSkran,RefugeesinInter‐WarEurope:TheEmergenceofaRegime,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),209and212.23ClaudenaSkran,RefugeesinInter‐WarEurope:TheEmergenceofaRegime,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),214.
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fortheJews,thenationsoftheworldclosedtheirdoors.Ofthe10millionJewsinoccupied
Europe,only800,000foundrefugeelsewhere.Thatisfewerthanoneinsevenofthetotal
numberofJewsmurdered.24ItwasattheEvianConferenceof1938thattheAustralian
delegatesummeduptheattitudeoftheworldtowardtheJews:“Itwillnodoubtbe
appreciatedthataswe[Australians]havenoracialproblem,wearenotdesirousofimporting
one.”25Nonationwantedtheburdenofthousandsofrefugees,particularlyJewishones,andso
theyremainedtrappedinplaceswheretheywereeasilycapturedandlatermurdered.
AftertheSecondWorldWar,asthescaleofatrocitybecameknown,internationalpolicy
towardrefugeescameunderaprocessofreview.Thetragediesofthewarbroughtona
renewedsenseofdutytotheinternationalcommunity.TragiceventssuchastheNazi
HolocaustandtheJapaneseRapeofNanking,putpressureontheworldtotakeresponsibility
forhumanrightsviolations.Thesetragedies,andparticularlythetestimoniesintheaftermath
ofwar,madetheinternationalcommunityfeelremorsefornothavingtakenactionsooner.
Thissenseofresponsibilitywasevidentintheshapingofpost‐warpolicy.
ThepreeminentdocumentoftheUnitedNationsregardingindividualrightsisthe
UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.Auniversaldeclarationofhumanrights,orsomething
withasimilareffect,hadbeencalledforsincethemiddleoftheSecondWorldWarbutwasnot
completeduntillate1948.By1943,thedemandfor“somesortofhumanrightsplank”within
theprospectivepeacetreatieswasfervent;privateorganizationsevenbegantakingthe
initiativetodrafttheirownversionsofaninternationalbillofrights.”WhiletheCharterofthe
UnitedNationsdidnotincludeabillofrights,itdidmandatetheestablishmentofa
24MartinGilbert,TheHolocaust,(NewYork:BraunCenterforHolocaustStudies,1994),13.25MartinGilbert,TheHolocaust,(NewYork:BraunCenterforHolocaustStudies,1994),12.
12
CommissiononHumanRights,withtheassumptionthatthiscommissionwouldthendraftan
internationalbillofrights.26Withanincreasinglyintensedemandforanexpressionofhuman
rights,theHumanRightsCommissionbegandraftingTheDeclarationin1947.Thedrafting
processlastednearlytwoyears,fromJanuary1947toDecember1948,insevenstagesthat
includeddifferentcommitteemeetingsanddebatesthroughoutwhichthearticulationofthe
declarationwasrefined.27
ThedraftingoftheDeclaration,likethefoundingoftheUNandthedraftingofrelated
legislation,washeavilyinfluencedbytherecenteventsoftheSecondWorldWar.Inhishistory
ofthedraftingoftheUDHR,JohannesMorsinkwritesaboutWorldWarIIasacatalystfor
humanrightsreform:“thedraftersmadeitabundantlyclearthattheDeclaration...hadbeen
bornoutoftheexperienceofthewarthathadjustended.”28Inthefinaldebate,inwhichthe
GeneralAssemblyputtheDeclarationtoavote,theinfluenceofthewarwasfirmlystated.
Throughoutthetwoyeardraftingprocessaswell,theroleoftheSecondWorldWarasa
catalystwasoftennoted.Specificallyrelatingtotherightofrefugees,anumberofdelegates
citedthewarasareasontoguaranteetheserights.ThedelegatefromBelgiummentionedthat
“[article13]wasofvitalimportance:theprinciplesoffreedomofmovementandfreedomof
residencehadtobestressedatthemomentwhenthewarandtheresultingupheavalshad
demonstratedtowhatpointthatprinciplescouldbetroddenunderfoot.”29Theatrocitiesthat
26JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),1‐3.27JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),4.28JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),36.29U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),322.
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theinternationalcommunitywitnessedduringtheSecondWorldWarmadethenecessityof
theserightsblatantlyobvious.Itwasforthesereasonsthatthemembersincludedaclause
referringtothewarinthepreambletotheDeclaration,whereitstatesthattheDeclaration
wasdraftedbecause“disregardandcontemptforhumanrightshaveresultedinbarbarousacts
whichhaveoutragedtheconscienceofmankind.”30Thisclauserefersbacktotherecent
atrocitiesandthewayinwhichtheyinspiredareformofhumanrightspolicy.Itisalmost
universallyagreedamongscholarsthatthemodernhumanrightsmovementcameoutofthe
SecondWorldWarandthelegacyofthetragediesthathadoccurred.31DavidWeissbrodtand
ConnieDeLaVegaagreethat“thewardemonstratedthatunfetterednationalsovereignty
couldnotcontinuetoexistwithoutuntoldhardshipsand,ultimately,thedangeroftotal
destructionofhumansociety.ItwasoutofthetraumaofWWII...thatthemodernhuman
rightsmovementwasborn.”32TheSecondWorldWarprovidedimpetusforthecreationof
universalhumanrightspolicy,butthesewell‐intendedaspirationseventuallyfelltothe
interestsofthestate.
TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsmarkedanimportantrecognitionofboth
individualanduniversalrights.TheUDHRwasthekeydocumentthatfomentedthe
developmentofhumanrightslaw.Priortothepostwarperiod,“thewayaStatetreatedits
30U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession,Plenary.UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.10Dec.1948(A/res/217A).31However,MarkMazower,inhisbookexaminingtheUnitedNations,notestwoscholarswhodonotseethe1940sasthebeginningofthehumanrightsmovement;SamuelMoyninparticulardoesnotbelievewecandatetheoriginofthemodernhumanrightsmovementbeforethe1970s.31AsweexaminethedraftingprocessoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,itisclearthatWorldWarTwoactedasacatalystforthebeginningofmodernhumanrightspolicy.32DavidWeissbrodtandConnieDeLaVega,InternationalHumanRightsLaw:AnIntroduction,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2007),21.
14
citizenswasregardedasaninternalmatteroverwhichithadsovereigncontrol.”33Afterthe
war,theperspectiveontherightsofindividualsascitizenschangeddrastically.Thewayastate
treateditscitizenswasnolongerconsideredaninternalmatter,butratheraninternationalone
(thoughthisdistinctionwasnotnecessarilytrueinpractice,thewardidchangethe
internationalideology).TheDeclarationacknowledgestheuniversalrighttolife,freedomof
speech,belief,movement,andfreedomfromfear,persecutionanddiscrimination.Articles13,
14,and15specificallyrelatetotherightsofrefugees.Thesearticlesacknowledgetherightto
freedomofmovementandresidence,therighttoseekandenjoyasylum,andtherightto
nationality.34
TheUDHRisofparticularimportancebecauseitwasthefirstinternationaldocument
thatacknowledgedtheuniversalityofparticularrights–rightsthatwerenotdependenton
belongingtoacertainstate.FollowingtheadoptionoftheUDHRalmostall“multilateral
instruments”werebasedontheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.35Forexample,
legislationofparticularimportancetorefugees,suchasthe1951ConventionRelatingtothe
StatusofRefugees,hasusedtheUDHRasakindoflegalfoundation.TheUDHRquiteobviously
playedapivotalroleinthedevelopmentofanewhumanrightsideology.Theextenttowhich
itsroleremainspurelyideological,however,isequallycrucial.
33ErikaFellerandVolkerTürk,RefugeeProtectioninInternationalLaw:UNCHR’sGlobalConsultationsonInternationalProtection,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),37.34JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),332.35EmmaHaddad,TheRefugeeinInternationalSociety:BetweenSovereigns,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),74and78.
15
TheContradictionInherent
ManyarticlesintheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightscameupagainstthenewly
invigorateddemandforindividualrightsandalongstandingdeferencefornationalsovereignty.
Noneofthearticlesfacedoppositionlikethearticlesconcerningfreedomofmovement,
asylum,andnationality.36Articles13,14,and15wereparticularlytroublingforthedrafting
committeesastheyinvolvednotjustonestate,butthecooperationofmanystatestoallow
mobilityfromoneplacetoanother.(SeeAppendixforthefulltextofthesearticles)
Thelanguageofthesearticlessparkeddebatefromtheveryoutsetofthedrafting
process.ThedraftingcommitteeaskedJohnHumphrey,DirectoroftheSecretariat’sDivisionon
HumanRights,todraftapreliminaryversionofadeclaration.37Humphrey’s“base”draftwas
thenreviewedbythelargerdraftingcommittee,theCommissiononHumanRights,the
EconomicandSocialCouncil,andtheGeneralAssembly.Throughoutthesedifferentsessions,
thelanguagewaschangednumeroustimes,oftenwithnationstatesaskingformoreambiguity
andlessresponsibilitywhileNGOsdemandedstrongerprotectionsforindividuals.38Itwasthe
meetingsoftheThirdCommitteethatfinalizedtherefugeearticles.
Sessions120through124oftheThirdCommitteeoftheThirdSessionoftheGeneral
Assemblyconcernedthearticlesaboutrefugeesandasylum,whichbecamearticlesthirteen
throughfifteenoftheDeclaration.WhileArticles13and15demonstratetheconflictbetween
statesrightsandthoseofindividuals,theprovisionsofArticle14broughtonaparticularly
36JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999,72.37JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),5.38JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),76and77.
16
ferventdiscussion.Article13concernsfreedomofmovementandresidence,article14theright
toasylum,andarticle15therighttonationality.
Article13particularlywasnotseenasmuchofathreattonationalpower.The
discussionofthisarticlewaslargelyfocusedontheamendmentputforthbytheUSSR,which
attemptedtorestrictthescopeofthearticleindeferencetonationalsovereignty.Unlikeinthe
discussionthatfollowedforarticle14,mostofthestatesdidnotfeelthreatenedbythe
provisionsofarticle13–largelybecauseArticle13“presupposedthattheindividualinquestion
hadalreadyobtainedpermissiontoenterthecountry,therightofentrybeinggovernedbythe
legislationofthecountryconcerned.”39Consequently,themajorityofthedelegatesopposed
theUSSRamendment.
TheUSSRamendmentsoughttoaddthewords“inaccordancewiththelawsofthat
State”totheendofparagraphone,statingthat“Everyonehastherighttofreedomof
movementandresidencewithinthebordersofeachState.”Andalsotoincludetheclause"in
accordancewiththeprocedurelaiddowninthelawsofthatcountry,”afterthewords
"Everyonehastherighttoleaveanycountry,includinghisown.”40Thegeneralconsensusabout
theUSSRamendmentwasthatitwouldundulyrestricttheprovisionsofthearticle.Whilea
“statewasentitledtodecidehowtheprinciplewastobeapplied;...toincludesuch
interpretationinadeclarationofhumanrightswouldimplytherenunciationoftheinherent
rightsofmankind.”41ThisopinionwasvoicedbythedelegatefromChile,andconfirmedbythe
39U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),319.40U.N.CommissiononHumanRights,3rdSession.ReportoftheThirdSessionoftheCommissiononHumanRights.28June1948(E/800),11and41.41U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),remarkbytheChileandelegate,316.
17
otherdelegates.Itwasfeltthat“adocumentdrawnupinthatsensewouldbeadeclarationof
theabsoluterightsoftheStateandnotadeclarationofhumanrights.”42Obviouslythetension
betweennationalsovereigntyandindividualrightswasapparenttothedraftingdelegations,
However,theywereabletobeidealisticaboutsacrificingnationalsovereigntyonlyaslongas
thissacrificeremainedtheoretical.Assoonasthediscussionturnedtoasylum,theiridealism
quicklydissipated.
Whileanumberofstatesfoundarticle13troubling,43themajoritywerecomfortable
withit,andarguedagainstputtingmorerestrictionsonit.Duringthisdebate,mostnations
actuallyexpresseddivergentconcernsfromtheonestheywouldexpressonlyadaylater,
duringthedebateonarticle14concerningasylum,inwhichtheyexpressedconcernsabouttoo
muchinfringementuponnationalsovereignty.Inthearticle13debate,delegatesinstead
voicedcautionsaboutgovernmentrestrictions.TheHaitiandelegatefelt,“government
restrictionsrancountertotheaspirationsoftheuniversalconscience;theymightbetolerated
asatemporarynecessity,buttherecouldbenoquestionofincludingtheminthe
declaration.”44ThePhilippinesdelegationagreedthat“theamendmentsproposedbytheUSSR
delegation,ifadopted,wouldnullifythemeaningofarticle[13],becauseinsteadofestablishing
commonstandardstogovernthemovementsofpeopleingeneral,theCommitteewouldbe
sanctioningthedeplorablestateofaffairswhichexistedintheworld.”45Thissamepointcame
upduringthediscussionofArticle15–ontherighttonationality–andwasagainpointedata
42U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),316.43LargelytheEasternBlocstates(USSR,Poland,UkrainianSSR,andBelarus).44U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),318.45U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),318.
18
USSRamendment.TheUSSRdelegate,AlexeiPavlov,“wishedtostressthefactthatthe
questionofnationality–bywhichwasmeantaspecificrelationshipbetweentheStateandthe
individual—fellentirelywithintheinternalcompetenceofeachState.Tograntnationalityorto
takeawaywasaprerogativeofsovereignStateswithwhichnothirdpartyshouldinterfere.”46
Theresponsetothispositionwastoreiterateadesirenottosanction“thedeplorablestateof
[world]affairs.”ThedelegatesrespondedtoPavlovwithremarksabouttheintendednatureof
thedeclarationbeingtosetaninternationalstandardandtobeabastionofprincipleforthe
nationsoftheworld.Thedelegatesfeltcomfortablebeingidealisticwhentheyweresecurein
theirsovereignty.TheChileandelegaterespondedtotheUSSR,remarking:
[the]purposewasnottoimposelawsonanysovereignState,buttoenablethepeopleofaStatetojudgeforthemselveswhetherthelawsunderwhichtheylivedwereinconformitywiththeprinciplesofthedeclaration.IftheHitlerregimewerestillinexistence,theresultofadoptingtheUSSRamendmentwouldbetojustifytheactsofthatregimeratherthantoprotectindividualsagainstthem.47
EleanorRooseveltagreedwiththeChileandelegateabouttheneedforsovereignstatestogive
upalittlepowerinordertoconformmorewhollywiththeDeclaration:“Tostatethatfreedom
ofmovementshouldbegrantedonlyinaccordancewiththelawsofeachcountrywouldbe
equivalenttolimitingthefundamentalrightsoftheindividualandincreasingthepowersofthe
State.”HereRooseveltexpressedadesiretoplaceindividualwell‐beingabovestatepower.
However,whenthedebateturnedtotherightofimmigrationorasylum,nationswerequickto
46U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.123rdMeeting,MeetingRecord.5Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR123),355.47U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.123rdMeeting,MeetingRecord.5Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR123),357.
19
restrictthescopeofthearticle,towillingly“increasingthepowersoftheState”and“limiting
thefundamentalrightsoftheindividual.”48
WhentheissueofimmigrationcameupbrieflyinthediscussionofArticle13,andlater
withinthediscussionofArticle14,manydelegatesquicklyreversedtheiropinionsonsacrificing
statesovereignty.RooseveltsympathizedwiththeviewexpressedbytheHaitiandelegate
“especiallywhenheexplainedthateverymanshouldhavetherighttosettleinthecountryof
hischoice”butshefeltthatbecause“economicconsiderationshadforcedcertaincountriesto
takelegalmeasuresrestrictingimmigration...Adeclarationofhumanrightsshouldnot
containprinciplestheapplicationofwhichwasrenderedimpossiblebyexisting
circumstances.”49Thisattitudetowardsovereigntyandimmigrationandasylumisfullyevident
withinthearticle14discussion.
Article14,ensuringtherightofasylum,wasthemostcontestedarticleinthe
Declaration.JohnHumphrey,authoroftheoriginaldraft,wroteinhismemoir,“Noarticlein
theDeclarationhasbeenmorecriticizedthanArticle14,whichsaysthateveryonehastheright
‘toseekandenjoy’asylumfrompersecution.Thisgivesnorighttoasylumbutonlyarightto
enjoyitonceithasbeengranted.Itwasprobablytoomuchtoexpectthatgovernmentswould
giveuptheirdiscretionarypowerunderinternationallawtorefusetoallowforeignerstoenter
theirterritories.”50Humphreyhimselfrecognizedthereluctanceofnationstatestorelinquish
powerinhisoriginaldraftinwhichhe“sidetrackedtheissuesayingmerelythat‘everystate
48U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),319.49U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),319.50JohnP.Humphrey,HumanRightsandtheUnitedNations:AGreatAdventure,(NewYork:TransnationalPublishers,1984),70.
20
shallhavetherighttograntasylumtopoliticalrefugees,’arightwhichwasalreadyrecognized
byinternationallaw”andwhichdidlittletoactuallyfurtherthestatusofrefugees.51Hisdraft
wasamendedtoincludestrongerguaranteesforrefugeeslargelyduetotheinfluenceand
lobbyingofnon‐governmentalorganizations,butthefinaleditingofthearticlewouldstripout
itsstrongestlanguageinfavorforguaranteesmoreamendabletonationstates.
InNovember1948,duringthefinaldebateonthedeclaration,amendmentstothis
articlehadbeenproposedbyeightcountries:Bolivia,Cuba,Egypt,France,SaudiArabia,the
UnitedKingdom,Uruguay,andtheUSSR–allseekingtoamendthearticlestatingthat
“Everyonehastherighttoseekandbegranted,inothercountries,asylumfrompersecution.”52
Thediscussionincludedwhowouldberesponsibleforensuringasylumandwhetherembassies
wouldcountasportsofasylum,butmostofthediscussionconcernedtheextenttowhichthe
articleguaranteedrefuge.Manyofthedelegatestookissuewiththefactthatthearticlewas
guaranteeingtherighttobegrantedasylum.Theyarguedthatthisinterferedwiththe
sovereigntyofthenation,andthattheyoughttoretainthechoiceofwhenandtowhomto
offerrefuge.
ThedebateongrantingasylumbeganwithMargeryCorbetoftheUnitedKingdomand
herreservationsaboutthearticle.TheUnitedKingdomdelegationstatedthatitwasreadyto
“guaranteethatanypersecutedpersonaskingforrefugewouldbetreatedwithsympathy,”but
that“noStatecouldaccepttheresponsibilityimposedby[article14].”53TheUnitedKingdom
51JohnP.Humphrey,HumanRightsandtheUnitedNations:AGreatAdventure,(NewYork:TransnationalPublishers,1984),70.52U.N.CommissiononHumanRights,3rdSession.ReportoftheThirdSessionoftheCommissiononHumanRights.28June1948(E/800).53U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.121stMeeting,MeetingRecord.3Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR121),330.
21
feltthatadoptingarticle14wouldbeimpossible“asnoforeignercouldclaimtherightofentry
intoanyStateunlessthatrightweregrantedbytreaty.”Corbetexplainsthatheramendment
includesthephrase“toenjoyasylum”asopposedto“tobegranted,”andthatthisisabetter
representationoftherighttheassemblywastryingtosecure.TheUnitedKingdomsupported
theSaudiArabianamendment(whichproposedtodeletethewords“andbegranted”fromthe
article),butthoughtitshouldbephrasedas:“Everyonehadtherighttoseek,andtoenjoy,in
othercountries,asylumfrompersecution.”Thisstructuringofthearticlewasamenable
becauseitlimited“theobligationoftheState,”butstillprovidedsomerecourseforpersecuted
people.54
SaudiArabiaagreedwiththeUnitedKingdominthatassuringtheright“tobegranted”
asylum“wouldbeaflagrantviolationofthesovereigntyoftheStateconcerned.”55Because
article14didnotincludeprovisionsforconsultingtheStatesaboutofferingrefuge,ordelineate
whowouldberesponsiblefordirectingpersonstoparticularcountriesforasylum,“thearticle
promisedmorethanitshould.”56Themajorityofthestatessupportedthisposition.The
Australiandelegationvoicedsupport,saying“eachStatemustbefreetodecidetheformin
whichthatright[ofasylum],havingbeenproclaimedinthedeclaration,shouldbeapplied.”57
Thestates’obviousconcernfortheirownpowereclipsedthemorehumanitarianconcernof
securingprotectionsforrefugees.
54U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.121stMeeting,MeetingRecord.3Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR121),330.55U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.121stMeeting,MeetingRecord.3Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR121),331.56U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.121stMeeting,MeetingRecord.3Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR121),331.57U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.121stMeeting,MeetingRecord.3Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR121),338.
22
Theseviewsexpressingconcernfornationalsovereigntywerecounteredbythe
delegatesfromLebanon,PakistanandPoland.Mr.AzkoulofPakistanthoughtthatthe
“conceptionoftherightoftheindividualhadbeenreplacedtoacertainextentbythatofthe
obligationoftheState.Thestatementofarightshouldnot,however,dependonthepossibility
ofStatestocomplywiththatright.”58ThisisexactlytheproblemtheAssemblywaswrestling
withinthisdiscussionofrefugeerights:therightsofastateversustherightsoftheindividual.
Azkoulwasrightinseeingthattheobligationsofthestateweretakingprecedenceoverthe
rightsoftheindividual.Thoughtheybeganwithveryhumanitarianandidealisticintentions,the
delegatessoongotboggeddowninstatepoliticsanddeferencefornationalsovereignty.
PolandthoughtthattheUKandSaudiArabianamendmentwouldweakenthearticle.
UncharacteristicallyforPavlovoftheUSSR,whohadthusfarbeenaferventadvocateofstate
sovereignty,hepushedfortherightnotonlytoseek,butalsotoreceive,asylum:“TheUnited
Kingdomamendmentaffirmedtherighttoseekasylum,butthatwasoflittlevalueunlessthere
wereprovisionsforimplementingit.”59Ultimatelythewords“tobegranted”asylumwere
deletedinfavoroftheideaof“enjoying”asylum,whichputlesspressureonthestatesto
ensureasylum.
ContradictioninPractice
IntheintroductiontohisbookontheUnitedNationsandPalestinianrefugees,Edward
Buehrigwritesthatpoliticalrefugees“arethetragicproductofanincompatible
58U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.121stMeeting,MeetingRecord.3Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR121),335.59U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.122ndMeeting,MeetingRecord.4Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR122),343and344.
23
juxtaposition.”60Hereheisreferringtoconflictslikeclass,religionandideology,butrefugees
arejustaseasilyaproductoftheincompatiblejuxtapositionbetweennationalsovereigntyand
individualrights.Refugeesareoftenunsafeorunhealthyinonecountry,butunwantedby
another.AtthetimeofthedraftingoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,crisesmade
boththenecessityandthecontradictionofthedeclarationevident.TheArab‐IsraeliWarof
1948triggeredamassiverefugeeexodusthatleftthousandsofrefugeescaughtinastruggle
betweennationalsovereigntyandindividualwelfare.Theuseoftheserefugeesinthepolitical
bargainingbetweentheArabstatesandIsraelexemplifiesthedisregardofindividualrightsin
favorofstateconcerns.
ThelongstandingrelationshipbetweentheUNandPalestinemakestheexampleofthe
UDHRandtheArab‐IsraeliWarespeciallymeaningful.TheUNhasbeeninvolvedinthe
Palestineconflictlonger“thaninanyotherregionaldispute.”Itwasinvolvedfromtheoutsetas
crafterofthetwo‐statepartitionplan,asheadoftherefugeereliefeffort,andaspeacekeeper
andmediator.61TheUNplayedakeyroleintheescalationoftheproblemandmorethansixty
yearslatercontinuestopoliceit.Furthermore,theUNsinvolvementinPalestinedeveloped
concurrenttoitsdraftingofauniversalhumanrightsplatform,andthisdeclarationprovideda
backdropforUNactionsinPalestine.
TheoriginsoftheArabJewishconflictinPalestinearecomplexanddateback
considerably.However,theparticularsofthe1948warbeginwithTheBritishMandatein
Palestine.AftertheFirstWorldWar,someterritoriesoftheOttomanEmpire,ofwhich
60EdwardH.Buehrig,TheUNandthePalestinianRefugees:AStudyinNonterritorialAdministration,(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1971),3.61NathanPelcovits,TheLongArmistice:UNPeacekeepingandtheArab‐IsraeliConflict,1948‐1960(Boulder:WestviewPress,1993),1.
24
Palestinewasone,weredividedintomandates.TheLeagueofNationsmandatetransferred
controlfromtheOttomanEmpiretovariousalliedcountries.TheUnitedKingdomgained
controloftheareain1917,andwasofficiallygivenamandatetoadministeranewlydefined
Palestinein1923.62
Throughouttheperiodofthemandate,therewasconstantconflictamongJews,Arabs,
andtheBritish.PalestinianArabsdemandedanArabPalestinewhileZionistJewsrefusedto
curbimmigrationortamedemandsforaJewishstateinPalestine.DuringtheFirstWorldWar,
andtheentiretyofthemandateperiod,theBritishmadepromisestobothgroups,thoughthey
weremoreconsistentlysupportiveofaJewishstate.TheBalfourDeclarationof1917stated
outrightBritishsupportforaJewishstateinPalestine,andthisdeclarationwasincludedasa
partoftheofficialmandateoverthearea.AfteranArabrebellionin1936,theBritishwithdrew
someoftheirpromisestotheJews,andmadeanattempttorestrictJewishimmigration,but
theirprevioussupportforaJewishstateinPalestinehadalreadybothalienatedandinjuredthe
Arabsthere.63
InFebruary1947,BritaindecidedtorelinquishcontrolofPalestineduetoaninabilityto
findanacceptablesolutiontotheconflictandanincreasingdifficultyinmaintainingcontrol
overthearea.64TheMandatewouldnotofficiallyenduntilMay1948,butthe“problem”of
PalestinewasofficiallyhandedovertotheUNinFebruary.65InMaytheUnitedNationsSpecial
CommitteeonPalestine(UNSCOP)wasformedtocreateasolutionfortheconflictinPalestine.
62BennyMorris,1948:AHistoryoftheFirstArab‐IsraeliWar,(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008),11.63IlanPappe,AHistoryofModernPalestine:OneLand,TwoPeoples(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),84and107.64BennyMorris,1948:AHistoryoftheFirstArab‐IsraeliWar,(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008),15and37.65IlanPappe,AHistoryofModernPalestine:OneLand,TwoPeoples(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),121.
25
InAugust,UNSCOPpresentedapartitionplantotheGeneralAssemblythatsuggesteddividing
Palestineintotwoseparatestateswithaneconomicunion.Theplanwashotlydebatedinthe
Assembly;deliberationslasteduntilNovemberof1947andtheplanstillbarelymanagedtoget
therequiredtwo‐thirdsmajorityforadoption.Ultimately,theplanwasacceptedbytheJewish
communitybutrejectedbythePalestinians.66
OnSeptember1,1947,thedayafterthepartitionplanwasbroughtbeforetheGeneral
Assembly,fightingbrokeoutinPalestine.Thewidespreadviolencesoonbecameafull‐outcivil
war.67PalestinianArabsriotedandattackedJewishownedbusinesses.InDecember,theArab
HigherCommitteeorganizedastriketoprotesttheadoptionoftheUNpartitionplan.68The
PalestinianArabswereoutragedbythepartitionplanthatgave“37percentofthepopulation
55percentoftheland(ofwhichtheyownedonly7percent)”andwhichforcedthemfromthe
mostfertileland.69TheJewsrespondedtoArabattackswithattacksoftheirown.Thecivilwar
was“characterizedbyguerrillawarfareaccompaniedbyactsofterrorism.”70Thiscivil‐war
betweenPalestinianArabsandJewsintheregionlasteduntilMay1948,whentheBritish
MandateinPalestinewasterminatedandtheArab‐Israeliwarbegan.
TheArab‐IsraeliWarofficiallybeganaftertheJewishnationdeclaredstatehoodonthe
14thofMay,anticipatingtheconclusionoftheBritishMandate.FiveArabstates(Egypt,Iraq,
Jordan,LebanonandSyria)respondedbyinvadingthenewlycreatednation.TheArabStates
66IlanPappe,AHistoryofModernPalestine:OneLand,TwoPeoples(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),125.67IlanPappe,AHistoryofModernPalestine:OneLand,TwoPeoples(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),127.68YoavGelber,Palestine,1948:War,EscapeandtheEmergenceofthePalestinianRefugeeProblem(Sussex:SussexAcademicPress,2006),16.69BennyMorris,1948:AHistoryoftheFirstArab‐IsraeliWar,(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008),65.70BennyMorris,1948:AHistoryoftheFirstArab‐IsraeliWar,(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008),77.
26
weremotivatedbyastrongdesirenottohaveaJewishstateestablishedamongtheirown
nations.TheywerefurthermotivatedtoinvadebythesteadyrefugeeflowfromPalestineas
wellastheincreasingcertaintyofPalestinianArabfailureintheconflict.Israel’sdeclarationof
statehoodandtheinvasionbytheArabstatestriggeredfurtherfightingbetweenJewishand
Arabgroupsinthecitiesandontheroads.71
Thefirstwaveofrefugeescamebeforethewarevenbegan.AftertheUNGeneral
Assemblyresolutiononthe29thofNovember1947sanctionedthedivisionofBritishcontrolled
Palestineintotwostates,ArabpeoplebeganleavingtheJerusalemandJaffaareas.Thecauses
oftherefugeeexoduswerethen,andarestill,ferventlydebated.Bothsidesblamedtheother
fortherefugeecrisis:“accordingtotheArabHigherCommittee,some550,000Palestinian
ArabshadbeenforcedtoleavetheirhomesasaresultofJewishattacks”butaccordingto
Israel,“mostofthese[refugees]hadleftPalestineduringrecentmonthsinthewakeofthewar
launchedagainstIsraelbyneighboringArabStates,partlyinobediencetodirectordersbylocal
Arabmilitarycommanders,andpartlyasaresultofthepaniccampaignspreadamong
PalestinianArabsbytheleadersoftheinvadingArabStates.”72Itislikelythatthecauseofthe
refugeeexodusisacombinationofmanyevents.TheinvasionbytheArabstatesexacerbated
theinstabilityalreadypresentintheregion;duringthecivilwarthatprecededtheofficialArab‐
IsraeliWar,thereweresporadicattacksbetweenArabandJewishgroups,aswellasa
persecutioncampaignfocusedontheArabsbytheHaganah.73Inthemonthsleadinguptothe
officialoutbreakofwar,PlanDalet,aZionistoffensiveagainstArabswasenacted.This71BennyMorris,TheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),13.72TheUnitedNations,YearbookoftheUnitedNations1947‐1948,447.73HaganahwasaJewishParamilitarygroupthatlatebecametheIsraeliDefenseForces.BennyMorris,TheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),67.
27
campaignincludedforcedmigration,attacks,rapes,andanumberofmassacresofArab
villages.74Theoutbreakofwaronlyincreasedtherefugeeflow.ByJuly1948itwasclearthata
refugeecrisiswasat‐hand.75Bythistime“400,000‐500,000Arabshadbeendisplacedbythe
fighting.”76Therefugeecrisiswasaconcerntotheinternationalcommunity,andparticularlyto
theArabstates,butnoonestatefeltthattheycouldorshouldtakeresponsibility.Therewasa
generalcallfortheUNtoheaduptherefugeereliefeffort.
ThePalestinianrefugeesfirstcameunderdiscussionatthe117thand118thmeetingsof
theThirdSessionoftheUNGeneralAssembly–atthesamesessioninwhichtheywere
conductinganarticlebyarticleanalysisoftheUDHR.FollowingtherecommendationofUN
envoyFolkeBernadottethattheUNtakechargeofrefugees,thecommitteeinitiateda
discussionregardinghowbesttoprovideaid.Themeetingminutesofthe117thmeeting
recognizethatthecaseofthePalestinianrefugeeshadrelevancetotheuniversaldeclarationat
hand.Theminutesstate,“theThirdCommitteewasnolongerfacedwithanabstractideaof
humanityasdescribedinthedeclarationofhumanrights,butwithaspecificcase.”77TheArab‐
IsraeliWarpresentedthecommitteewithanopportunitytomoveawayfromtheabstract
principlestheyweretryingtouphold.Theyacknowledgedthat“thosefineideasand
stimulatingprovisionshadbeenviolatedinthemostmanifestfashioninthecaseofthe
74DavidGilmour,Dispossessed:TheOrdealofthePalestinians,1917‐1980(London:SidgwickandJackson,1980),68and69.75EdwardH.Buehrig,TheUNandthePalestinianRefugees:AStudyinNonterritorialAdministration,(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1971),26.76BennyMorris,TheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),39.77U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.117thMeeting,MeetingRecord.29Oct.1948(A/C.3/SR117),283.
28
Palestinerefugees.Thatcrimewasbeingcommittedundertheveryeyesofthejudges.”78The
discussioncenteredaroundwherebesttoprocurefundsfromandhowbesttoadminister
them.Thesesessionsledtothedevelopmentofasub‐committeetofurtherexploretheissue.79
Thesub‐committeedraftedaproposalforareliefprogram.AfterreviewbytheGeneral
Assembly,theUnitedNationsReliefforPalestineRefugees(UNRPR)wascreatedonNovember
19th1948.80TheUNRPRwasfollowed,in1950,bytheUnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgency
(UNRWA).TheUNRPRwasfundedbytheUN’sWorkingCapitalFundanditsmemberagencies.
Theirfocuswasonofferingeconomicaidfortherefugees.TheUNWRAabsorbedtheworksof
theUNRPRandcontinuesthisworktoday.
TheoriginalUnitedNationsmediatortoPalestine,Bernadotte,whohadrecommended
therefugeesbecomeaUNcharge,wrotetotheAssemblythatthe“choiceisbetweensaving
thelivesofmanythousandsofpeoplenoworpermittingthemtodie.”81Thesolutionbythe
UnitedNations,toofferaidtotherefugeesbutnopermanentrefuge,lefthundredsof
thousandsofrefugeesinalimboofsorts.Refugeecampsstillexistfromthe1948war,more
thansixtyyearslater.TodaytheUNWRAcontinuestoprovide“assistance,protectionand
advocacyforsome4.7millionregisteredPalestinerefugeesinJordan,Lebanon,Syriaandthe
78U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.117thMeeting,MeetingRecord.29Oct.1948(A/C.3/SR117),283.79U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.117thMeeting,MeetingRecord.29Oct.1948(A/C.3/SR117),279.AndU.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.118thMeeting,MeetingRecord.30Oct.1948(A/C.3/SR118),304.80TheUnitedNations,YearbookoftheUnitedNations1948‐1949,202.81FolkeBernadotte,UnitedNations,ProgressReportoftheUnitedNationsMediatoronPalestine,16Sep.1948,(A/648),53.
29
occupiedPalestinianterritory,pendingasolutiontotheirplight.”82Noonewaswillingtotake
responsibilityfortherefugeesandtodaythesepeoplecontinuetosuffer.
BothIsraelandtheneighboringArabstatesusedtherefugees“asapoliticalpawn.”83
Israelrefusedtolettherefugeesreturn,butlaterusedthemasabargainingpieceinattempts
togainamorefavorablepeacedeal.84DespiteUNsanctionsaskingfortherepatriationof
refugees,theofficialIsraelipolicy,asvoicedbyPrimeMinisterMosheSharett,remainedas
follows:“inthemainasolutionmustbesought,notthroughthereturnoftherefugees
toIsrael,butthroughtheirresettlementinotherstates.”85TheArabstatesinturnrefused
toabsorbtherefugees,hopingthatIsraelwouldeventuallytakethembackandthuseffectively
“destabilize”theJewishstate.Stuckinthemiddleofapoliticalbattlebetweenstates,
individualrightsonceagainweredisregarded.
Israel’sdesireforaJewishstateleftnoroomforthereturnofthousandsofArab
refugees.InamemorandumtotheUnitedNationsConciliationCommissionforPalestine,the
governmentofIsraelwroteinJuly1949:
Theclockcannotbeputback.Sincethisfirstarose,theJewishpopulationhasincreasedby50%.ThequestionofhousingthenewcomerswaspartlysolvedbyplacingthemintohabitablehousesinabandonedArabtownsandvillages.Immigrationcontinuesatanaveragerateof800perday.ThesefiguresalonegiveclearindicationthattheindividualreturnofArabrefugeestotheirformerplacesofresidenceisanimpossiblething.NotonlycanthewholeArabeconomicsystemnotbesimplyrestoredbecause
82TheUnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgencyforPalestineRefugeesintheNearEast,“AboutUNRWA,”http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=4783QuotefromMarkEtheridge,PalestineConciliationCommission,inTheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,BennyMorris,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),39.84BennyMorris,TheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),551.85IsraeliMinistryofForeignAffairs,MemorandumtotheUnitedNationsConciliationCommissionforPalestine,8Aug.1949(A/AC.25/IS.33).
30
itsbasishaspracticallydisappeared;butalsothephysicalreturnoftheArabmiddle‐classessuchasshopkeepers,tradesmen,freeprofessions,hasbecomeaphysicalandgeographicalimpossibility.Theirhouseshavegone,theirjobshavegone.86
TheIsraeliMinistryofForeignAffairssuggestedresettlementinArabcountriesasasolution
morefavorablethanrepatriation.TheArabcountrieswerebothunwillingandunableto
committoincorporationofthehundredsofthousandsofrefugees.Stubbornnessonbothsides
coupledwiththeUN’sinabilitytoenforceitssanctionsledtoastalemateontheissue.Concern
forhumanrightssoonfelltothewayside,asnationalconcernovershadowedthedesireto
secureindividualwelfare.AsthememberstatesoftheUNhadnotadoptedaguaranteeofthe
righttosecureasylum,theUNputpressureonIsraelinanefforttoenforcetherightofreturn,
whichhadbeenestablishedbytheUDHR.Thefinallanguageofarticles13and14inthe
DeclarationhadapivotaleffectonhowthecountriesinvolvedintheArab‐IsraeliWarwere
framed.TheUNrecommendedbothrepatriationandresettlementfortherefugees,but,
becauseoftheinfluenceoftheUDHR,morestronglypushedIsraelontheissueofrepatriation.
TheArab‐IsraeliWarclearlydemonstratesthetragedyofnotestablishingdefinitive
languagetoguaranteerefugeesasylum,butitalsoexhibitsacleardismissalofwhatrightshad
beenguaranteed–specificallytherightofreturn.Thefinaldebateoverarticle13focusedmuch
attentionontherightofreturn.TheworkingdraftoftheDeclarationguaranteedanindividual’s
rightto“toleaveanycountry”andthefinaldebatemadeapointtoguaranteethatan
individualhadtherightto“leaveanycountry,includinghisown,andtoreturntohiscountry.”
ThisrighthasbeenignoredforPalestinianrefugees.ThousandsofPalestiniansfledtheirhomes
86GovernmentofIsrael,MemorandumtotheUnitedNationsConciliationCommissionforPalestineonPrinciplesGuidingtheResettlementofArabRefugees,28July1949,(A/AC.25/Com.Tech/8).
31
andwereneverallowedtoreturn.ThenewlydeclaredStateofIsraelwasthreatenedbythe
ideaofthousandsofArabsreturningtothearea,andrefusedtoletthemback.InAugust1948
theybeganimplementinganofficialanti‐repatriationpolicy.Thisincludeddestroyingor
occupyingPalestinianhomesandvillages.87
OnDecember11th1948theUnitedNationspassedResolution194onPalestine.The
resolutionlaysoutanumberofguidelinesforthesituationinPalestine,perhapsmostnotably,
theresolutioncallsforareturnoftherefugeestotheirhomes:“[TheGeneralAssembly]
Resolvesthattherefugeeswishingtoreturntotheirhomesandliveatpeacewiththeir
neighboursshouldbepermittedtodosoattheearliestpracticabledate.”88Thisdirecturging,
aswellasitsbackingprinciple,Article13intheUDHR,officiallyadoptedonedayprioron
December10th,1948,wasdisregardedbytheStateofIsrael.Israeladamantlyrefusedto
repatriatetherefugees,andtheUNwasinnopositiontoforcethemtodoso.Resolution194
wasthefirstofmanyUNresolutionsurgingIsraeltoacknowledgetherefugee'srighttoreturn.
Infollowingyears,theUNwouldcontinuetosanctionIsrael,petitioningthemtorepatriatethe
Palestinianrefugees.TheUNannuallyrenewsResolution194,andcontinuestoaskIsraelto
"affirmtheinalienablerightsofallinhabitantswhohadlefttheirhomesasaresultofthe
outbreakofhostilitiesintheMiddleEasttoreturnhome,resumetheirnormallife,recovertheir
propertyandhomes,andrejointheirfamiliesaccordingtotheprovisionoftheUniversal
DeclarationofHumanRights."89ThewayinwhichthearticlesintheUDHRwereaffectedbythe
conflictbetweensovereigntyandindividualrightsshapedthewaythe1948Arab‐IsraeliWar87IlanPappe,AHistoryofModernPalestine:OneLand,TwoPeoples(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),145.88U.N.GeneralAssembly,Resolution194,11.Dec1948(A/RES/194(III)).89U.N.GeneralAssembly,CommitteeontheExerciseoftheInalienableRightsofthePalestinianPeople,11March1976(A/AC.183/L.3).
32
wasdealtwith.TheUNhasalsourgedArabstatestoconsiderofficiallyresettlingPalestinian
refugees,buthasdonesowithoutthebackingoftheUDHR,andwithlessforcethanwithwhich
ithasapproachedIsrael.
DespiteUNsanctions,theurgencyofthePalestinianrefugeeproblemsoonfadedfrom
internationalattention.ThoughtheUnitedNationsinitiallyapproachedtheArab‐Israeliconflict
withaferventdesiretobrokerpeaceandimplementtherightsintheUDHR,“intheend,allthe
parties,includingIsrael,accommodatedthemselvestothestalemateofanarmisticepolicedby
theUNpeacekeepers.”90Thischangeinattitudeappliedtotherefugeesituationaswell.The
UNquicklywentfromtryingtoresolvetheproblemtosimplysustainingtherefugeesasthey
were.Thisattitudewasespeciallyapparentthroughoutearly1949,whentheUNbegan
discussingIsrael’sapplicationforUNmembership.JustmonthsaftertheadoptionoftheUDHR
andtheissuingofResolution194,UNmemberstatesshowedlittlecompulsiontoabidebythe
principlestowhichtheyhadagreed.TheArabstatesmadestrongobjectionstoIsrael’s
admission,specificallyduetoIsrael’snoncompliancewiththerefugeesituation.FawziBeyof
EgyptdidnotsupportIsrael’sapplicationandmentionedtherightsgiventotherefugeesbythe
UDHR:“Werethoserefugeesnothumanbeings?DidnotaUniversalDeclarationofHuman
Rightsexist?”TheSaudiArabiadelegationagreedwithBey:“Itwouldbeunwisetoadmit
[Israel]...Theyhadcarriedoutactsofterrorismattheverymomentwhencertaindemocratic
StateswerepromotingtheadoptionoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandwere
abouttosigntheConventiononGenocide....Despitethosefacts,someMembersstill
consideredtheapplicantapeace‐lovingState.”AsBeystates,despiteIsrael’snon‐compliance
90NathanPelcovits,TheLongArmistice:UNPeacekeepingandtheArab‐IsraeliConflict,1948‐1960(Boulder:WestviewPress,1993),7.
33
withtheUDHRandsubsequentUNsanctions,themajorityofthememberstatesarguedto
admitIsraelintotheUN.WarrenAustinoftheUSsummedupthemajorityopinionbyagreeing
thatIsraelneededtoabidebytheUNresolution,buthenonethelessthoughtthat“thelong
discussionofIsrael'sapplicationwasevidenceofthegeneraldeep‐rooteddesireforajust
solutionofquestionsrelatingtoPalestine,andespeciallythoseofJerusalemandtheArab
refugees,”andinlightofthat“theUnitedStatesdelegation,togetherwiththelargemajorityof
membersoftheSecurityCouncilandoftheAdHocPoliticalCommittee,consideredthatIsrael
fulfilledtherequirementsof[membership].”91TheArabStates,withtheirconcernsregarding
Israelandtherefugeecrisis,werehugelyoutnumbered.Israelwasadmittedasamemberto
theUNonMay11th1949.92
Inasomewhathollowgesturetowardsaconclusionoftheconflict,theUNcontinuesto
requestIsrael’srepatriationoftherefugees,andIsraelcontinuestoignorethisrequest.93The
StateofIsraelactivelyignoresindividualrightsinfavorofitsownnationalagenda.Atthesame
time,Arabstatesrefuserefugeescitizenship,denyingthemboththerighttotrueasylumand
therighttonationality.Therefugeetragedystemmingfromthe1948Arab‐IsraeliWar
exemplifiesthetenuousrelationshipbetweentherightsandinterestsofnationstatesand
thoseofindividuals.Bothintheoryandinpractice,nationstatesinfringeuponindividualrights
fortheirownbenefit.Regardlessoftheprogressmadeininternationalpolicy,orthe
promulgationofrights’declarationsandconventions,therightsoftheindividualarenot
secure.
91U.N.GeneralAssembly,207thPlenaryMeeting,MeetingRecord11May1949(A/PV.207).92U.N.GeneralAssembly,207thPlenaryMeeting,MeetingRecord11May1949(A/PV.207).93DavidGilmour,Dispossessed:TheOrdealofthePalestinians,1917‐1980(London:SidgwickandJackson,1980),75.
34
Conclusion
BoththedraftingoftheUDHRandtheArab‐Israeliwarexhibittherepercussionsofthe
tensionbetweenstatepowerandindividualrights.Despitetheambitiousandhumanitarian
intentionsfollowingWWII,numerousfactorsmitigatedthemorehumanitariangoalsofthe
internationalcommunity.InhislargertextontheUDHR,JohannesMorsinkmentionsthat“the
lessonlearnedfromtheHolocaustwaslostinthedisagreementsaboutwhattodoaboutthe
halfmillionrefugeescreatedbythe1948Arab‐Israeliwar.”94Morsinkbrieflysuggeststhatthe
concernsoftheArabstateswerethecausebehindthechangeinlanguageintheUDHR.
However,heglossesoverthefactthatthemostvocaladvocatesforchangingtheprovisionsof
theasylumarticlewerewesternnations,suchastheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom.
ThesenationsdidnotexperiencethesamepotentialaffectoftheunfoldingArab‐Israelirefugee
crisis,yetremainedadamantaboutnotguaranteeingrefugeeasylum.
Still,theUNdiscussionsoftherefugeesfromtheArab‐Israeliwardoillustratetheway
theconflictbetweenstateinterestsandindividualinterestswithintheUDHRplayedout.Yet,
thetwoeventsarenottiedasintimatelyasMorsinkimplies.Becauseofthesimultaneity,itis
temptingtoseeadirectcorrelationbetweenthedraftingoftheUDHRandtheeventsofthe
Arab‐IsraeliWar.Thatis,eithertherefugeecrisisshapedthedebatesandfinalarticulationof
rights,ortheUN’sgrowingconcernforhumanrightsledtheinstitutiontoaddressthe
PalestinianrefugeecrisisinwaysinlinewiththeUDHR.WhiletheArab‐IsraeliWarwasa
legitimatecrisisofhumanrightswithwhichtheUNanditsmemberstateswereconfrontedjust
94JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),78.
35
astheywereattemptingtoarticulateuniversalrightsforindividuals,thewaractuallyillustrates
theinherentcontradictionofacommunityofnationstateschargedwiththesecurityof
universalindividualrights.Statesholdthepowertoensurerights,buthaverarely
demonstratedthemotivationtoupholdthemwhenworsecomestoworst.Consequently,
Article14oftheUDHRwaspassedwithoutfirmlanguageassertingtherightofrefugees“tobe
granted”asylum,insteadtheywereleftwiththerightsimply“toseekandtoenjoy”asylum.
Otherarticles,likeArticle13regardingtherighttoasylum,whichwerepassedwithfirmer
languagehavesimplybeenignored.And4.7millionArab‐Israelirefugeescontinuetolivea
troubledandstatelessexistence.
However,overthelong‐term,thearticlesintheUDHRandtheparticularwaysinwhich
theyarticulatedthistensionbetweensovereigntyandindividualrightshaveshapedtheway
the1948Arab‐IsraeliWarhasbeenapproached.Becauseofthewaynationalsovereignty
reignedintheUDHRdebates,therighttoasylumwasnotassured,yettherighttoreturnwas.
Becauseofthis,theUNandahostofothershavebeenabletousetheUDHRasatooltoput
pressureonIsraeltoallowthereturnofrefugeestotheirland.Atthesametime,theUDHR
doesnotservetourgetheArabstatestograntthesesamerefugeesasylum.Thisisevident
withintheUNdiscussionsandensuingmeasures,suchasResolution194of1948.Theissueof
grantingasylum(ornot)andtherightofreturnestablishedanintellectualframeworkforhow
thestatesinvolvedwiththePalestinianrefugeeswouldberegarded.
TheUN’sentrenchedinvolvementintheArab‐IsraeliWar,aswellasthetimingofthe
conflict–justasthedelegateswereintheendstagesofdraftingtheUDHR—maketheWara
particularlyinterestingexample.TheArab‐IsraeliWarandtheensuingrefugeecrisisnotonly
36
demonstratetheconflictbetweennationsandindividuals,butthewayinwhichtheUNandthe
internationalcommunityapproachedthesituationwasshapedbythepromulgationofthe
UDHR.BecauseoftheprincipleswithintheDeclaration,pressureremainsonIsraeltorectify
therefugeecrisis.ArabstatescontinuetoofferrefugetomillionsofPalestinians,butrefusefull
asylumorcitizenship.ThesimultaneityoftheconflictandtheDeclarationaffectedthewayin
whichthecrisishasbeen,andis,managed.
TheimpassedemonstratedintheexamplesofboththeUDHRdraftingandtheArab‐
IsraeliWarareparticularlyrelevanttoday,inaworldwherestatesincreasinglyrestrictthe
provisionsforrefugeesinfavorofensuringstatesecurityandnationalsovereignty.ErikaFeller
andVolkerTürkwritethat:
SecurityconcernssincetheattacksintheUnitedStateson11September2001dominatethedebate,includinginthemigrationarea,andhaveattimesovershadowedthelegitimateprotectioninterestsofindividuals.Anumberofcountrieshave,forinstance,revisitedtheirasylumsystemsfromasecurityangleandhaveintheprocesstightenedproceduresandintroducedsubstantialmodifications.95
Stateconcerns,fromPalestinianrefugeestomodern‐dayterrorists,haveoftenovershadowed
therightsofindividuals.Especiallyintheeraofterrorism,whennationalsecurityisheightened
aroundtheworldandimmigrationiscontinuouslybeingrestricted,refugeerightsandtheir
historyareimportant.
InthecaseoftheUDHR,refugeeprotectionsweremarginalizedinfavorofstate
protection.BeforetheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightswascomplete,theArab‐Israeli
Warplayedouttheconflictsbetweennationalandindividualrightsthatthedraftersfaced.
95ErikaFellerandVolkerTürk,RefugeeProtectioninInternationalLaw:UNCHR’sGlobalConsultationsonInternationalProtection,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),5.
37
WhatwasamomentousDeclarationhasbecomelittlemorethanatheoreticalnodtoindividual
rights—rightswhichdonotactuallyplayoutontheinternationalfield.Thisdeep‐rooted
tensionpreventsindividualsfromtrulyhavingtheserightsguaranteed.
38
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41
APPENDIX–Articles13,14,and15oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights
Article13(1)Everyonehastherighttofreedomofmovementandresidencewithinthebordersofeachstate.(2)Everyonehastherighttoleaveanycountry,includinghisown,andtoreturntohiscountry.Article14(1)Everyonehastherighttoseekandtoenjoyinothercountriesasylumfrompersecution.(2)Thisrightmaynotbeinvokedinthecaseofprosecutionsgenuinelyarisingfromnon‐politicalcrimesorfromactscontrarytothepurposesandprinciplesoftheUnitedNations.Article15(1)Everyonehastherighttoanationality.(2)Nooneshallbearbitrarilydeprivedofhisnationalitynordeniedtherighttochangehisnationality.