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Virtue: Confucius and AristotleAuthor(s): Jiyuan Yu
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 323-347Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399830
Accessed: 03/09/2009 02:27
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VIRTUE: CONFUCIUS AND ARISTOTLE
Myaim in thisessay is to compareAristotle's onceptionof virtue(arete)
with Confucius'key notion ren-which has also been interpretedas
"virtue"1-in orderto make explicit whether and to what extent theycorrespond.The issue is of current nterestgiventhe distinctionbetween
ethics and moralityin the contemporaryrevival of Aristotelianvirtue
ethics.2 Confuciushas been interpreted s a thinkerwho concentrated
on ethics or moralphilosophy.Now, with regard o the distinctionbe-
tween ethics and morality,we may askon which side Confucius ies. Is
ren, understoodas a virtue,the sortof virtue that should be treatedas
standing n contrast o morality? hope thatthe following synopticcom-
parison of these two complex notions will be helpful not only in
achievinga mutual lluminationbut also in bringingConfucius'thinking
into the framework f contemporary irtueethics.
Structural imilarityThe word "virtue" s a transliteration f the Latin virtus(fromvir,
literally"manhood"),which was in turnemployed by Latinauthorsto
translate the Greek arete, originally referring o excellence of manly
qualities. The word ren was employed in the Book of Poetry(a text
earlier than Confucius)to describe noble huntsmen. Some scholars
thereforespeculatethat the concept of ren means, in a sense, "manly"or "manhood."3If that is true, an etymological parallelbetween ren
and virtue(arete) omes to the surface.
Butthey come to be used differently.The term ren consists of two
components, meaning, respectively,"human"and "two," and pointstoward human relationships.It is this sense that figures in Confucius'
basic teaching that by learningto be good one becomes a person of
ren. In Athenianphilosophy, the word arete is associated with aristos
(excellent,best)and meansthe goodnessof a kindof thing(itis therefore
also translatedas "excellence"). ForAristotle,"something'svirtue [or
excellence] is relative to its own properfunction (ergon),"4hat is, the
characteristicactivity peculiarto somethingor its distinctive mark.5A
virtuousXis an Xthatfulfills tsergonwell. Anykindof thingcan be said
to possess its (specific)virtueby performingts functionwell. As farashumanbeings are concerned, virtue is human excellence or goodnesswith regard o humanfunction. As Aristotle ays:"thevirtueof a human
being will likewise be the state that makes a human being good and
makes himperformhis functionwell" (1106a23-24). Hence, philosoph-
ically, areteis related o humanfunction,while rento human relations.
Confucius does not furnish a unified definitionof ren. Of various
utterances ecorded n hisAnalects, wo remarkscharacterizing en have
AssistantProfessor f
Philosophyat the State
University f New York
at Buffalo
PhilosophyEast&WestVolume48, Number2
April1998323-347
? 1998
by University fHawai'i Press
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been thoughtto be fundamental:"to love man"6 and "to return o ii"- (12:1; the translationof li rangesfrom "rites" to "propriety,""cere-
mony,""decorum"and "manners").What, then, is the relationbetween
ren as love and renas returningo li?Which one of these two determi-
nationsshouldbe consideredas central? nthe prevailing nterpretation,
ren as love is taken as the fundamentalmeaning,and the two aspectsofthe notion of ren in questionare describedas the relationbetween ren
and li. This is certainly upportedby the followingremark: Whatcan a
man do with li who is not ren?" 3: 3). Theconformityo liwithout inner
feeling can only be a formality,without any humangoodness. Never-
theless, given the fact that love is a naturalproperty,how can that
determine what moral goodness is? A man might love his parents,brothers, ndfriends,but he maystillbe a bankrobber,a drugsmuggler,oreven a brutalmurderer.Confucius s not unawareof thisgap between
love and human good. He explicitly claims that to be "fond of ren
withoutbeing
fond oflearning
s liableto lead to foolishness"17:8;
cf.
8:2). Learningmeans to learnli, to recognize it and embody it in one's
behavior.Hence ren as love is not identicalwith humangoodness, and
needs to be constrainedby li. "To return o li" turnsout to be equallybasicforbeing good, thatis, beinga personof ren.Ifneitherrenas love
nor ren as returningo li can be a complete notion of humangoodness,what is ren in such a sense?
Confucius sometimes views ren as a particularquality, along with
being clever, trustworthy,orthright,ourageous,unbending,and so on.
However,there are also many passages in which ren is describedas a
comprehensivevirtue,
includingall the above and othermoralqualities
and determining heirgoodness. The distinctionbetween ren as exclu-
sive and inclusive is well recognized.7How, then, is this distinction
related to the distinctionbetween ren as returningo li and as love? Is
therea unified notion to cover all these aspects?While Confucius'concept of ren involves a tension between ren
as returning o li and ren as love, there is also a tension at the heart
of Aristotle'snotionof virtue.Accordingto his ergon argument,human
virtue is the good performance f humanfunction.And human function
is, literally ranslated,"the soul's activitythat expresses reason" (kata
logon)or "notwithout the reason"(me aneu logou)8 (1098a5-6). Kata
logon and me aneu logou refer o two partsof the soul thatdistinguishahumanbeingfromotherkindsof animals.Theformer s the part hat has
reason in itself,and the latter s the partthat is nonrationalbut obeysreason(cf. 1102b14-1103a1, 1198a4). Aristotle hen divides virtueinto
two kinds: hat which corresponds o the partof the soul that has reason
in itself is intellectualvirtue (dianoetikearete,or excellence of intelli-
gence), and that which corresponds o the partof the soul thatis nonra-
Philosophy ast&West tional but obeys reason is ethical virtue (ethikearete,or excellence of
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ethical character). t follows that intellectualvirtue is the excellence of
exercisingreason,while ethical virtue can be understoodas the excel-
lence of obeying reason.9"The humangood," forexample eudaimonia
(happiness, or well-being), Aristotleconcludes, "turns out to be the
soul's activity hatexpressesvirtue" 1098a16).
Aristotle's rgonargument mmediatelyaces a
challenge.Reasonas
a naturalpropertymay distinguishhumansfrom other animals but does
not seem to be the criterion hatdistinguisheshumangood fromhuman
evil. Actingrationallyand actingwell ethicallydo not seem to be iden-
tical. Ifone performs robeys one's rational unctionwell, we would saythat one is intelligentor clever ratherhanthatone is good in the ethical
sense. For ntelligencemaybe putto the serviceof evil actions.A clever
bank robberor a thief with sophisticated killsat stealingis "good"as a
robberor as a thief, but is unlikelyto be accepted as being good ethi-
cally. There is a gap between rationalexcellence and social respect.For
Aristotle,however,there is anotherdimension of human nature:
"Man is by naturea political [social]animal."10A personcannot live in
isolation romsome communityand mustparticipatenand sharethe life
of society. Ethicalvirtue,which is the soul's activityin obeying reason
accordingto the ergon argument, s, in a more directsense, concerned
with character(ethos)(1103a17), which is informedby social and cul-
turalcustoms and habits(ethos).Itis the dispositionorquality o feel and
act inways admiredbythe society.This kind of stable, settled,and long-
lastingdispositionformsa state (hexis,which in Greek is relatedto "to
have")."1 n terms of the claim that a humanbeing is a social animal,Aristotle voids Socrates' xtremepositionof intellectualism, ndexpandsthe area of ethics fromthe studyof moralknowledgeand reasoning o
the studyof developmentof good habitsof feelingand action.
Aristotle'sdistinctionbetween intellectualvirtueand ethical virtue s
hence notonly based on the two partsof the soul, butcorrespondso the
dual dimensionsof a person'shuman natureas a purelyrationalanimal
and as a social animal. There are various debates regardinghow to rec-
oncile these. InAristotle's thics, they lead to two seemingly incompat-ible notions of eudaimonia(happiness).Eudaimonia s the activitythat
expressesvirtue(1098a16). Accordingto the ergon argument, he best
life shouldbe that which mostfullyexercises one's rationalactivity,and
that,forAristotle, s the life of contemplation NEX, 7 ff.).On the other
hand, eudaimoniaas the most desirable sort of life needs to include
all intrinsicallyworthwhile activities and, in addition, externalgoods(1099a31-b6).12The issue that is more essential to our currentpurposeis this: is ethical virtue determinedmore fundamentallyby the estab-
lished habitsand customsof the particular ulturaland historical ontext
into which one happensto be thrown,or by humanrationality,which
belongs to any self-determiningagency? Intellectualvirtue includes JiyuanYu
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theoreticalwisdom, and practicalwisdom (phronesis).13 While theo-
reticalwisdomdoes not involveaction,practicalwisdom is "concerned
withaction about what is good or bad fora humanbeing"(1140b4-6).The question,then, is about the relationbetween practicalwisdom
and ethical virtue. On the one hand, ethical virtue must be the excel-
lence of obeying reason,and Aristotleclaims thata full virtue"cannotbe acquiredwithoutpracticalwisdom" (1145a16). On the other hand,he says: "practicalwisdom, the eye of the soul, cannot reach its fully
developed state without virtue"(1144a30-31); and it is his recurringremark hat "virtuemakes the goal correct,and practicalwisdom makes
what promotesthe goal."14We seem to be caught in a cycle between
ethical virtueand practicalwisdom(1144b31-32).Thisessay intendsto arguethat a complete notion of virtuein Aris-
totle lies in an interplaybetween the two determinations f intellectual
virtueand ethical virtue.Similarly, completenotion of reninConfucius
lies in asynthesis
of the two determinations f ren as love and ren as
returningo li. On this basis, I tryto providean answer to each of the
questions raised above. Both ren and Aristotle'svirtue are concerned
with how a personshould live within a society. While Aristotle's irtue
hinges on practicalwisdom, ren is contingenton filial love. This is be-
cause while Aristotleemphasizes how a person as a self-determining
being can live, Confucius'li is an ideal social system, and hence his
concernis how a personcan complywith li, rather han whatwe should
complywith. Finally,Iwill show thatdifferent onceptionsof virtuealso
lead to differentpicturesof the cultivationof virtue.
Philosophy ast&West
Li,Ethos,and PracticalWisdom
Let us startwith Confucius'ren as returningo Ii. Lioriginallyrefers
to the rulesconcerningritualsor ceremonies involvedin religiousaffairs.
In the Analects t is conceived farmorebroadly,containingboth abstract
principlesand detailed formsof social regulations. tprescribesnotonlywhat the relationsbetween rulerandsubjectshould be (3:18, 3: 19) and
what one oughtto do in supportingone's parents, n holdinga funeral,and in payingfor a sacrifice(2:5), but also what kind of ceremonialcapone should wear, and even when one should prostrateoneself before
ascendingsteps in to see a king(9:3). This latterprescriptions like the
rulethatrequiresone to wear a blacktie to a fellows' dinnerat Oxford.Both are culturalnorms rather hanmoraldemands.In12: 1, Confucius
claimsthatreturningo li means that one should followthe guidanceof li
in "looking,""listening,""speaking,"and "moving.""One has no wayof takinghis stand unless he knows ii"(20:3). Liis thus the totalityof
socially acceptablebehaviorpatterns nd lifestyles, ncludingboth moral
and non-moralnorms.Itcorrespondso Aristotle's thos(socialcustom),15thatis, the traditional ocial moresand cultural ettings.
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When Confuciusclaims that ren means to return o li, he is askingeach agentto act in conformitywith social values, and therebybecome
acceptedand respectedby the societyor traditionhe or she is in. To be a
personof ren is firstof all to be a social person, equipped with what
Aristotle alls "excellence of character"or "ethicalvirtue."
Yet Confucius' i immediately urnsout not to be ethos or custom assuch (in Chinese:feng su). He is not a commonsense moralist.Li is an f;6
object that Confuciusrequiresus to "return o" (fu)rather han simply V
to "conformwith." The word "return"n Chinesemeans to go back to
what we have deviated from.Lithus has a particular eference, he li of
the Zhou dynasty(fromca. 1122 B.C.).Confucius has a profoundcom-
mitment o the Zhou li: "TheZhou had the advantageof surveying he
two precedingdynasties.How resplendent s its culture(wen)!I follow i
Zhou"(3: 14). He even claims thatthisset of liwould notbe changedfor
morethan a hundredgenerations:"Should there be a successor to the
Zhou,even a hundred
generationshence can be known"(2:23).
InConfucius' ime,theZhoudynastycollapsedintomanysmallstates
that had been warring againsteach other. Chinese society underwent
a turbulentperiodof transitionduringwhich there was little order and
stability.When the Zhou house overthrew its predecessor,the Shang
dynasty,it claimed that the Shanghadforfeited he TianMing(Mandate iriof Heaven)or TianDao (Wayof Heaven)through ts misrule,while its _own social institutions onformedto the will of Heaven. Yetthey were
now broken.Where,then, could be found the Way of Heavento order
the stateand guide people's lives?This is the basic problemforpre-QinChinese philosophy.Confucius'answer is that the social turmoilof the
timeswas due to the lossof the traditional alues of the Zhouculture.He
thereforerequiresus to "return" o the social frameworkof that ideal
state.Renas returningo li means to be a personacceptableaccording o
the Zhou Ii.
Although he Analects does not presenta blueprintof the Zhou li,16
its core turns out to be a humane social hierarchymodeled on family
relationships."Letthe ruler be a ruler, he subjecta subject,the father
a father, he son a son" (12:11). A society is governedby a networkof
names each of which reflects a status which has a prescribedset of
duties.Anorderedsociety is that in which names are "rectified." feach
personplayeda rolesuitable o the personagehe assumedin society,the
societywould be pacifiedand harmonious.
Confucius'upholdingof the Zhou 1i has been interpretedas testi-
monyto his radicalconservatismortraditionalism; ence, those scholars
who would uphold Confuciusgenerally' nd not to clarifythat his li is
the Zhou ii.However,Confucius'conservatism s not necessarilya fault.
Hisbeliefs were generatedby his reflectionon the brutal ocial realityof
his time. This mightbe comparedwith EdmundBurke'sconservatism, JiyuanYu
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the result of his reflectionon the violence of the FrenchRevolution.It
does sometimes seem thatConfucius ails to distinguish learlybetween
fundamentalprinciplesand the trivialregulations n the Zhou ii,and his
frequentemphasison regulatory etailconveys an impressionof rigidity.Nevertheless,what he reallyembraces is the spiritand essence of the
Zhou ii.When he claimsthat the Zhou li will not change fora hundredgenerations 2:23, 3: 14), he is not sayingthat none of the detailedreg-ulationsof theZhouli is changeable.As a matter f fact,he does endorse
some changes. For nstance, rugalitys preferredo extravagance n cer-
emonialpractice 3:4), and a ceremonialcap of linen can be exchangedfor a cap of black silkforreasonsof economy (9:3).
Confucius ullyrealizes that the Zhou li itself is a development rom
the precedingtwo dynasties, incorporating varietyof good elements
from them (15:11). The idea of social development is not alien to his
thinking.What should remainunchanged,however,is the deep meaningof the Zhou
li,the
trulyradical alterationof which can
onlylead to
FX calamity.As hisdiscipleZi-Xiasays:"Ifone does notoverstep he bounds
in majormatters,t is of no consequence ifone is not meticulous n minor
matters"19: 11).Confuciusadmires he Zhouli becausehe believes that
this must be the idealof social regulation,and this is the context within
which humanity an find its fullexpression.Li sthustheWay,or logos.17To "return"s not simplyto go back, but to hold onto the authentic.A
personof ren should embody the authenticspiritof a culture. Chinese
civilization is the longest-livedof historical raditions, nd it is generallybelieved that Confucianism s what has generatedthe cohesive force
behindthis civilization.And the strength f Confucianism s its insistence
on traditional alues.
Confuciusdoes notpresentdetailedjustificationorwhy the Zhou li
is the basis for the ideal ethical and politicalorder.He seems to believe
i m that it has a divinity hat is derivedfrom he Heaven(Tian) nd Dao. The
factthat the Zhou li had declined in his time he ascribesto the fact that
Dao had not prevailedin the empire(16:2, 5: 6). To illustrate he rela-
tion between Tianand li, we musthere introduceanothermajornotion
,S?- of Confucius:de. While ren is referredo as virtue,de in varioustrans-
lations is also defined as virtue. The identicaltranslation or these two
concepts could be justifiedon the groundthat de in Chinese is derived
from"toget"and inConfuciuscan be understood s the consequenceof
returningo li. It is hence a counterpart f ethical virtuein Aristotle. f a
culture(li)acquiresthe spiritof Dao (or HeavenlyDao), it is endowed
with "de."It is in this sense that Confuciussaysthatthe de of Zhou "can
be said to have been the highest" 8:20). Ifa personlives in accordance
with li, then he has de. SometimesConfuciusmakesthe directclaim that
heaven is the authorof de (7:23; cf. also 9:5), and sometimes he jus-Philosophy ast&West tifies de in termsof the operationof Heaven. Forinstance, in Chinese
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culture, clever talk or loquacity is not considered as a de (15:27,17:17). Why is this?Confuciusexplains:"Whatdoes Heaven ever say?Yet there are the four seasons going round and there are the hundred
things coming into being. What does Heaven ever say?"(17:19). Con-
fucius takes the Zhou li as the full embodimentof Dao or logos.
He furtherdistinguishes he "de of the gentleman"from the "de ofthe small man," but never says what the groundis for this distinction,thusgivingriseto some confusionin understandinghisconcept. Such a
distinction eems to suggest precisely he distinctionbetweenthe Zhou li
(ethos)and ethos ingeneral.Ifde is cultivatedoutof the Zhou li, it is a de
of the gentleman,and if it is a habitualqualityout of the prevailingbut
non-authentic thos, it is the de of the small man. He says:"Thevillage
worthy s the ruinof de" (17:13). But he existence of the village worthyis no doubta kindof tradition.A good personshould neitherbe liked nor
dislikedby all in the village, but should be likedby those who aregoodand disliked
bythose who arebad
(13:24).While Confucius'ethics is confined to the sacred Zhou li, Aristotle's
ethos is simplythe prevailing ocial customs and conventions. Aristotle
believes that a humanbeing must be a social animal,and accordinglymust conform o social norms.Nevertheless, ikeConfucius,he does not
feel that to cultivate ethical virtue is simplya matterof passivelycom-
plyingwith the existingcustomsand rules,whateverthey may be. It is
possible that the existingends are in conflict, and are not even good.Withinthe same social context,there are rival listsof virtuesand differ-
ent definitionsfor the same virtues.This situation is not exceptionalwithin the
polisof Athens in the fifth
century,as Plato's
earlydialoguesattest. Forexample, Aristotledistinguishesbetween "a good man" and
"a good citizen" (1130b28, Politics1276b34). Social norms,constitu-
tions, and formsof government change, and the meaningof a "goodcitizen"changes accordingly."There s not one singlevirtueof the goodcitizen thatis perfectvirtue" Politics1276b32-33). Incontrast, here is a
single perfectvirtue for human beings as human beings, namely their
reason.Aristotle'shumanity ies both in his maintaininghimselfas a self-
determiningpersonand as a personself-determined y the social norms.
But since his ethics concerns morewhat a good personshould be than
what a good citizen should be, reason becomes the ultimatedetermi-
nant."For t is our decisions to do what is good or bad, not our beliefs,that makethe characterwe have"(1112a4).
Hence, while one cannot live in isolationfrom society, one must
maintaina reflectiveattitude owardethos in order o be a good person.This reflective unction is one's practicalwisdom (phronesis).First,prac-tical wisdom helps one to understandwhy the ways of behavior that
one has learnedare reallynoble and true. One thereforeproceedsfrom
knowing"that"(oti)to knowing"why" (dioti).A personof experience JiyuanYu
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sometimes can do better han a personof knowledge,but knowledgeis
stillsuperior o experiencebecause itgrasps he cause, while experiencedoes not.18A personof practicalwisdom (phronimos) erformsa virtu-
ous act because it is reallyvirtuous,rather han a simulacrum f virtue.
Second, practicalwisdom does not merelyprovidea personwith a
morearticulateopinion as to why the instructedbehavior s good, but isalso required o comparevarious views of what goodness is, and then
alsoto grasp he trueconceptionof what ends arereallygood and should
be pursued n conflictingsituations 1143b21-22).19Thisclarification f
existingends is itself also the processof achievinga new end. ForAris-
totle, practicalwisdom is concerned withthe conceptionof the good life
in general, and the phronimosdeliberateswell "aboutwhat promotes
livingwell in general"(1140a27-28).
Third,practicalwisdom has a dimensionof contextualityor partic-
ularity.Aristotleacknowledges hatthe subjectof ethics is indeterminate,and thatuniversal
principlesare notflexible
enoughto
copewithvarious
particular ituations(1098a26 ff., 1103b34). Practicalwisdom is con-
cernedwith actions, and actions are always aboutparticulars.Hence it
hasa dimensionof perception, hatis, practical ntuition, ordeterminingwhat should be done or can be done well in certainparticular ircum-
stances: "For nothing perceptible is easily defined, and [since] these
[circumstances f virtuousand vicious action]areparticulars,he judge-ment about themdependson perception."20A practicalperceptionrec-
ognizes the salientfeaturesof the particulars nd is aware of the limitsof
the universalprinciplesin application. Practicalwisdom thus enables
one to reachanequilibrium
betweenthe universaland theparticular
nd
to be aware of what should be done in accordancewiththe good end in
a concretesituation.
Aristotle hen develops the topics related o practicalwisdom, such
as choice, deliberation,responsibility, ncontinence (akrasia),and so
on. Incontrast,Confuciussays littleabout these issues.21This is largelybecause his li is not somethingtowardwhich we are required o main-
tain a criticalattitude.We have a choice only between following li and
fallinginto disorder.ForConfucius,"a good man" and "a good citizen"
shouldnot be different, nd indeed it is as a good citizenthat one can be
a good person. Aristotledoes agree that in the best form of society a
good personand a good citizen would be the same,but the bestformof
society is to be foundthrough he science of politics.Both Aristotleand
Confuciusare concerned with what a good personshould be and con-
nect this with social cultureandtradition.However,while Aristotlesug-
gestsan attitude hat is not one of blindcompliancewithtradition,Con-
fucius insistson the continuityand authenticityof tradition.It is out of
this belief thatConfuciusdevotes muchof his life to the transmission fthe ancientclassics,which record he li or civilizationof Zhou.
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Nevertheless, he lack of an Aristoteliannotion of practicalwisdom
turnsout to be the weakness in Confucius'thinking.Here we need to
discuss anotherof his important otions:yi (whichis generally ranslated A
as "righteousness," meaning,"or "morality").n one instance,he says:"Indealingwith the world thegentleman s not invariablyorandagainst
anything.He is on the side of yi" (4:10). What, then, is yi, and what isits relation o li? Yiappearsin the Analectstwenty-four imes withouta
unified definitionor elucidation.Moreoften, this term is used in oppo-sition to personaladvantageor profit -also li):"Thegentlemanunder- Il]
standsyi, the small man understandswhat is profitable" 4:16; cf. also
19:1, 7:15, 14:13). Yi in this sense means the principleof rightbe-
havior,in contrast o egoism. Itis somethinglike the principleof justiceor whataction one should follow or conform o. Thissense is in fact not
far fromli.22 '1
The relationbetween li and yi can be understoodas follows. As we
mentionedearlier,
i has both its detailedformsand itsspirit.
Itsdetailed
formscannot cover all the possibleand complex situations n ouractual
life.When such a situationoccurs,we should act in accordance with the
spiritof li, the rightnessagreedto and believed in by the community.Yi
is thus close to the convention of what is morallybinding.23Accordingly,Confuciusis saying, in the passage at 4:10 (quotedabove), thatwhen
a particular ct lacks the guidance of the concrete form of li, we must
follow the right (yi). And the source of the rightis the spiritof li, or
authentic radition.
If we should adhere to yi in a situation where the concrete regu-lations of li are not available, we need a way to judge and elaborate
what is the right(yi),that is, what constitutes he deep spiritof li or the
enduringdao and what is peripheralo the authentic radition.We need
to reflectupon what concrete forms of li embody the authenticspiritof
the tradition and what should be emended, revised, and even partly
rejected.We mustidentifywhen the Dao or Way prevailsor when it is
hidden.Confucius'notion of yi seems to open the door for an Aristote-
lian practicalwisdom, but he fails to work it out. He has a majorvirtue
called "wisdom" (zhi), but it must also be based on conformity o li.."How can the man be considered wise who, when he has the choice,does not settle in ren?" 9:1). Yet he says nothing urther bout how zhi,
based on ren,can determinewhat yi is.24
FilialLove and Self-love
The mainproblemaddressedby Aristotle's thics is how one shouldlive. When Confuciusclaimsthat a personof ren isto live in accordancewith li, he seems already o haveprovidedan answer o thisquestion.He
then needs to deal with how it is possiblefor a personto "returno" or
"complywith" ii. For,unlikeMencius afterhim, Confucius s not a uto- JiyuanYu
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pianconcerninghuman nature.he does not believe that humannature s
innatelyprogrammedo complywith ii.Instead,he has a deep suspicionthat it is naturally ttracted o ren:"Ihave never met a manwho finds ren
attractiveor a man who finds not-renrepulsive.A man who finds ren
attractivecannot be surpassed" 4:6). When he claims that ren is "to
returno li,"the morecompleteexpression s "toovercome oneself andto return o ii."Accordingly, n returningo li, one must firstof all dis-
cipline the "self."
Of course, one could be forced to accept the requirementsof li
throughpunishment.Yet in that case one "will stay out of troublebut
will have no sense of shame" (2:3). Confucius' i mightbe normative,but in contrast o both Kantian thics and utilitarianism,t is not some-
thing external that one ought to obey without regardto one's inner
motivation.Forhim,ethics is not a matterof how we shouldbe bounded
(obligare),but of how we can follow social ruleswillinglyand naturally.It is
againstthis
backgroundhat Confucius introduceshis other
majorinterpretationf ren: "Ren s to love humanity" 12 :22).Renas love is based on the feeling one has toward one's own par-
ents and brothers."Filialpiety and brotherly ove are the roots of ren"
(1 :2).25 InConfucius'view, these roots have the most important thical
value: "Thegentlemannourishes he roots,for once the roots are estab-
lished,the dao will growtherefrom"1 :2). Iffamilylove is the basisfor
dao to prevail, given the relation between dao and li, ren as love
becomes fundamental or ren as returning o li. Filial love as natural
sentimentis inborn and not culturallyspecific. What is required s to
cherish and nurture t.
Filiallove is crucialbecause Confuciusbelieves thatgratitudeand
affection towardone's parentsenable one willinglyto accept parental
authorityand the hierarchicalrelation between parentand child. Such
an ingrainedand intimaterelation s givenas justificationor the practiceof the three-yearmourningperiodaftera parentdies: "Achild ceases to
be nursedby his parentsonly when he is threeyearsold. Threeyears'
mourning s observedthroughout he Empire" 17:21). To repaythree
yearswith threeyearsmightappeartoo formal,butthe idea here is that
filial love might inspirean internal eeling that causes one willinglyto
carryout the responsibilityowardone's parents.Kinshipnvolves a nat-
uralhierarchyand throughit is establishednaturalauthorityrelations,while its extension/expansionto other social relationsnaturalizes he
idea of hierarchyand authorityn the widersociety. Bythe same token,the feelingtowardone's brothersmakesone agreeablyaltruistic.A family
maynot be a democratic orumorprovidea context forequality,but it is
a place one loves to be in.
The idea of ren as love is the expansionof the rootsof filiallove. This
expansionconsists in the transferringf the familyrelationsof hierarchy
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and fraternityo the larger ociety. As a good fathermakes a good ruler,a good son makes a good subject. A person of ren startswith lovingthe parent,and then graduallyexpands the circle of love. "Theyoungshouldbehavewith filialpietyat home, and with brotherlyove abroad"
(1:6); eventually,"All withinthe FourSeas are his brothers"12:5). "A
man who possessesfilialpietyand brotherlyove is unlikely o transgressagainsthis superiors,and to incline to starta rebellion" 1 :2).
Hence, the determinationhat "ren is to love man" serves to justifythe innerbasis of returningo li. Earlier mentioned, but without dis-
cussion, that there is a well-recognized but unspecifieddistinctionin
Confuciusbetween ren as completevirtueand ren as particular irtue.If
my argument hus far is sound, this distinctioncan be set on an intelli-
gible foundation.While ren as love seems a particular irtue,ren in its
complete sense is a synthesisof ren as love and ren as returningo li.
Neitheris dispensable.On the one hand, the conformity o iimust be
based on ren as love:"Whatcan a man do with liwho is not ren?"3:3);on the otherhand,ren as love itselfmust be regulatedby li:being "fond
of ren without being fond of learning[i.e., ii] is liable to lead to fool-
ishness"(17: 8). One can be fully good onlywhen one conforms o li out
of love. AlthoughConfuciusdoes not specify, it does not seem far from
his mind that such an interplayor synthesis underlies all admirable
characteristics,hatis, particular irtues.For nstance,couragecannot be
characterizedas a virtueif it does not contain this unityof ren as love
and ren as returningo li. Itwill become unrulyif not regulatedby li
(8:2, 17:8), but if it is not motivatedby love it will also lead to unrulybehavior (8:10). Evenfilial piety as a virtue is determinedby such a
unity.On the one hand, filialpiety needs to conformto li: "Whenyour
parentsarealive, complywith li in serving hem;when they die, complywith li in burying hem and in sacrificing o them" (2:5). On the other
hand, it requiresa feeling of love in servingone's parents;otherwise
"Evenhoundsand horsesare, in some way, providedwith food. Ifa man
shows no reverence,where is the difference?"2: 7).Ren as love not only keeps the compliance with li from being a
matterof externally imposed limitations,but also provides an inner
ground oraltruism.Virtues an be eitherself-regardingrother-regardingor both. It has been a central concern for virtue ethics to providethe
rationale oraltruism,hatis, other-regardingirtue.Confucius'insight sthat ifwe want to nurture ltruism, hen filial love serves as a rootor an
innatespring.26LikeConfucius,Aristotle ully acknowledgesthe intrinsicgoodness
of love. Philia,which isgenerally ranslated s "friendship,"sthe central
topic in several treatises.27Humanbeingsarepoliticalor social animals,
"tendingby nature o live togetherwith others"(1169b17), while "The
will to live togetheris friendship(philiaY' Politics1280b38). Philiain- JiyuanYu
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cludes every kind of social relation nvolvingmutualloving and liking,and hence "love" seems a bettertranslation.28 t exists not only within
familymembersand fellow citizens, but also in various associationsof
individualswho share a common interest n utility,pleasure,or virtue.
The formerkindis natural,while the latter s voluntary.
ForAristotle, t is friendship hat creates"familyconnexions, broth-erhood, common sacrifices"(Politics1280b37), and it is "the greatest
good of states"(Politics1262b8) to have and to preserve riendship.At
a personallevel, friendship s necessaryfor happiness (eudaimonia). t
is not merely the "greatest"and "most necessary"of externalgoods(1169b10, 1154a4-5), but also intrinsic o a happylife. Forone needs it
in all circumstancesand in every periodof life. A man withoutfriends
cannot be happy (1155a5-6, 1169b8-10, 1169b16-17). It creates an
arenafor one to realize and express one's virtue. The natural ove or
friendshipwithin the family is also highlyvalued by Aristotle.A parentloves his children because he
regardshem as
"somethingof
himself,"and children ove theirparentsbecause they regard hem as the "source
of origin" 1161b18-19). Brothersove each other becausethey are from
the same parents.The discussionof friendshipor love earns Aristotle reditforputting
friendshipand familyattachmentas important, ntrinsic tems into the
ethical sphere.This is regardedas a significantadvantageof his ethics
over modern moral theories that focus instead on impartiality nd the
impersonalpointof view. Aristotle'sdiscussion of friendship, speciallyof family ove, correctsPlato'sradicalanti-family osition nthe Republic.
Both Confuciusand Aristotleadvocatethe ethical statusof love, but
theirdiscussionsdiffer n certainsignificantaspects.Thefamilylove that
Confuciusemphasizes is filial love, the love of children toward their
parents.Filial ove is prior o virtueand is the root of the latter.We nur-
ture this rootto the effect thatsociety is seen as an enlargedfamily.All
social sympathyor love is derived from filial love and can be reduced
to it.On the otherhand,the familylove Aristotle mphasizesis parentallove. He believes thatparental ove towardchildren s more intensethan
the otherway round. This is because parentsknow children better and
have a stronger ense of possessing,and also because theirlove toward
theirchildrenstartsright rom heirbirth,"while childrenbecome fond of
the parentwhen time has passedandthey have acquiredsome compre-hension or perception"(1161b27). Since a parentis an adult and has
alreadyestablisheda stablecharacter,parental ove cannotbe a starting
point for the formationof virtue and is not associated with the notion
that a state is an enlargedfamily. Hence, when Aristotledistinguishesbetween naturalamilylove andvoluntary ocial love, he neversaysthat
the latter is derivedfrom the former.He draws a clear-cut distinction
between household and political life, and claims that it is mistaken o
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think that families and city-statesare differentonly in size rather han in
kind (Politics1,1). He truly acknowledgesthe importanceof familyand
social sympathyin ethics, but, unlike Confucius,he fails to appreciate
family love as an ethical value that is the basis for other social regu-lations.29 ndealingwith familyand emotionalcommitment,Confucius
goes much further han Aristotle, or he not only does justice to theseethical phenomena but also considers them an Archimedeanpoint for
his ethics.
ForAristotle,social love and friendshipare an extension of one's
love of oneself rather han an extensionof filial love: "Thedefiningfea-
turesof friendshiphat are found in friendshipo one's neighbourswould
seem to be derived romfeaturesof friendshipowardoneself" (1166a1
2). All formsof love mustbe understood n the context of self-love. Such
an analysisof the essence of friendship s associatedwithAristotle's iew
that a humanbeing is essentiallya rationalbeing. He declares that "The
good personmustbe a self-lover."30He
distinguisheswo kindsof self-
lovers:one is a base egoist who does his best to gratifyappetiteand the
nonrationalpartof the soul (1186b17, 1168b22-23); the other pursuesthe gratification f the rationalpartof the soul, for reason is, above all,"what each person is, and the decent person likes this most of all."31
The good man as a self-loveris the latterkind,who is obedient to the
voice of reason within himself and sets his life in accordance with
rationality.We once againface the relationbetween Aristotle's ual dimensions
of humannature.A humanbeingas a socialanimalrequiresove, but as a
rationalbeing explainsthe natureof love. The love of others is groundedin the love of self. Itfollows that a humanbeing is, firstof all, a rational
being rather han a social being, albeitthe latter tatus s indispensable.Aristotle s chargedwith leavinglittle room for altruism n his ethics.
He fails to explain why a rational person needs to cultivate other-
regardingvirtues.A good personwill performactions in otherpeople'sinterests,but thatis for the perfectionof one's own character. fso, when
thereis a conflictwith otheragents in pursuing he developmentof their
own characters, t is rational or a moralagentto develop hisown, rather
thancurtailingt. Furthermore,ccording o Aristotle's thics,one should
only pursue he actionsthat are relevant o one's developmentof ethical
character.Aristotle'svirtuouspersoncould certainlybe altruisticout of
habituation,but a rational elf-loveaccount seems not to be sufficient o
justify his tendency. Indiscussingthe paradigmcase of friendship, hat
is, the friendshipbased on virtue, or what Cooper called "character
friendship,"32Aristotlekeeps remarkinghat those friends "wish goodto their friend or the friend'sown sake"(1156b10-12; cf. 1156a17-18,1156b10; cf. also EE1244b15-22, Rhetoric1385a18-19). Manycom-
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or modificationof Aristotle's gocentricethics. Butthis hardlystandsupunderclose scrutiny.Aristotle tillexplainsthis form of altruism n terms
of rational self-love: "In loving their friend they love what is goodforthemselves"(1157b33).A virtuefriend is "anotherme" or "another
self." We care for friends because a friend is a mirrorby which I can
contemplatemyselfbetter.33What we seek in this kind of love is thefriend's rationalityand persistenttraits of character,rather than the
friend'saccidentalproperties.By experiencingthat characterwe enrich
and develop ourown ethical characters. nthe finalanalysisthe love of
one's virtuous riends s stillself-oriented.34
Confucius'ren as love providesa sort of justification or altruism.
Nevertheless,his altruism s graded.Love is certainlyuniversal, or we
are required o treat all people under heaven as brothers.Yet this does
not mean that a manof ren should love everyone equally.Theexpansionof love is hierarchicaland makes distinctions. This idea is explicitlydefended
byMenciusin
criticizinghe Moist
typeof
impartialuniversal
love. Thisgradedlove has been accused of partiality.Nonetheless, it is
intrinsic to Confucius' thinking. Love must be rooted in family love
because the latter nvolves an inherent ntimacybetween affection and
ethical training. Denial of this intimacy will destroy the Confucian
groundof complying with li, in particular he inner groundof other-
regardingvirtue. Such a graded love seems to be echoed in con-
temporary ociobiology and evolutionaryethics, which suggestthat we
have a gene-determinedaltruistic endency as a humanadaptation n
evolution, but,everythingbeingequal,we arebiologicallydeterminedo
cooperatefirstof all with our close kin and otherswhose reciprocations
expected. Itis also echoed incontemporarynvironmental thics,which
extends the scope of moralcommunitybeyond humanbeingsto animals
and even to nature tself.
An equal and impartialuniversal ove is definitelymore desirable,but as the highest ethical virtue it requiresan independentsource of
justification.The central concern of modern moral systems is such a
justification.But neitherdeontologynor utilitarianisms thought o fulfill
this tasksatisfactorily.Bothareaccused of holdingan impersonalpointof
view. As a matter f fact,one's affection owardother,unknownchildren
cannotbe as intense as towardone's own. Williams' amousproblemof
whether a rescuer is permitted o rescue his wife first35will presentadilemmaforan advocateof impartialove, but not for Confucius.
Given its fundamental tatus,Confuciusprotectsfilial love stronglyfromany harm. This is illustrated n the case of a fatherwho steals a
sheep. The governorof the village believes that the son who testifies
againstsuch a father s an example of a "straight" erson.On the con-
trary,Confucius claims that "Fathers over up for theirsons, and sons
coverupfor their athers. nsuch behavior sstraightnesso be found as a
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matterof course"(18:18). Whathe is saying is that the fathermightbe
open to punishment orhiswrongdoing,but it is not his son's positionto
take responsibilityor seeing thatjustice is done.36Family ove itself is
certainly ubjectto the regulation f ethos oryi (rightness), ut if an ethos
encouragesthe disruptionof filial love, it is, for Confucius, he greatestevil.
Cultivation
ForConfucius, de, the acquiredren, is "to get," and for Aristotle,ethical virtue is connected with "hexis"(having).Both "to get" and "to
have" requirea processof ethical trainingand culturalrefinement.For
Confucius,this is a process of expandingone's filial love to society so
that one maywillingly accept the constraintsof li; forAristotle, his is a
process of the habituationand development of practicalwisdom. But
both believe that such a process of cultivation is lifelong, and virtues
areeventually
nternalizedas second nature.According
oConfucius,
he
himselfset his hearton learningat fifteen,but not untilseventycould he
follow his heart's desire "without oversteppingthe line" (2:4). That
amountsto sayingthatat thattime the dispositionwas well entrenched
and was a hexis, or second naturein the Aristotelian ense (1103a31-
b21).Confuciusviews the process of cultivation as mainly a matter of
education. Public education is an extension of family education. The
Chinese word for "education,"jiaoyu, is composed of two words: fW
"teaching"(jiao)and "nurturing"yu),and this education is not merely : W
for the purposeof conveying knowledge, but also for
shapingcorrect
behaviorpatternsand internalizing hem as partof one's character.In
Hansen'swords,it is "characterbuilding."37 uchaneducationis carried
out througha dualdialectic. On the one hand,a personis taughtby his
parents,teachers, and the noble people surroundinghim what should
be done and how to do it. He is required o respectall those who teach
him as father-like.In Chinese culture,a teacher is traditionally alled
"teacher-father,"nd the proverbgoes, "Ateacher of one day makes a
father for all life." Governmentofficials, as the practitioners f li, are
called "parentofficers."The head of the state is called "thestatefather,"and the first adythe "statemother."On the otherhand,a father upportshis family, but more importantly hould be seen as an educator,as isreflectedin the proverb hat"it is a fault for a fatheronly to supportbut
not to educate."A teacher'sdutyis not merely o teach, butalso to serve
as a model of ethical behavior. In China,the duty of a teacher is fre-
quentlydescribed as "to be a teacher and model for others." Further-
more,the functionof a ruler s notonly to order,butalso, andeven more
importantly,o serve as a model of behaviorfor the people. The basic
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in line with Ii"rather han"to employ punishment" 2:3; cf. also 2:1).This is because, in a sense, rulersare also teachers,and are also requiredto love theirsubjectsas theirown children.
Hence, the hierarchicalrelationships a model-copy relationship f
behaviors,and each formcan be reduced o a teacher-pupil elationship,which is in turn reduced to a father-son
relationship.The
personswho
are superiorare supposed to establish themselves as the paradigmof
humanity, hatis, the model forjuniorsand inferiors o follow and catch
upwith. Society is an extended school as well as an extendedfamily.Confucius s reported o have remarked hatthere is a single thread
pervadinghis dao (4:15), which is interpreted y his discipleas "zhongT 'L and shu." The character"xin"(heart) s a component of both words.
Zhong, traditionally enderedas "loyalty," s bettertranslatedby D. C.
Lauas "doingone's best,"thatis, inone's relationshipswith others.Shu,
etymologicallyrelatedto "as," is explainedby Confucius o mean "Do
notimpose
on others whatyou yourself
do not desire"(15:24),
and its
translationvaries:"usingoneself as a measureto gauge others"(Lau),"altruism"(Wing-tsitChan), "consideration"(Waley), "reciprocity"(Dawson),and so on. Shu is intrinsically elated o ren in its etymologi-
cally relational ense,38and in one instanceConfuciusconsidersrenthe
positivearticulation f the principleof shu:"Apersonof renhelpsothers
to taketheir stand insofaras he himselfwishesto take his stand,andgetsothersthere insofaras he himselfwishes to get there"(6:30).
How to interprethis "singlethread" has been a matterof consid-
erablecontroversy.Giventhe relationbetween shu and ren,and giventhat the self of a ren
personin Confucius s
essentiallyembedded in his
relationswith his familymembers,I suggest reading he "singlethread"
as meaningthat one should do one's best to deal with others as one
deals with one's parentsand brothers.Interpretedhis way, Confucius'
"singlethread" ndicateshow one can extend filial love to society;that
is, it is a way of cultivatingvirtue.Thisseems to be confirmedby Con-
fucius' remark hat "To be able to judge othersby what is nearto our-
selves maybe called the methodof realizingren."39One's parentsand
brothersare certainlywhat areclosest to a person.To makean analogyof them in deciding what one should or should not do in dealingwith
othersis the art of acquiringvirtue.InChineseethicaltraining,a personis generally old "to thinkof him as yourbrother" r "tothink of her as
yoursister"when decidingwhatyou should or should not do in dealingwith others. Evenin the trainingof a self-regarding irtue such as dili-
gence, a personis taught"to work hard o earnhonorforyourparents"or that "if you bear in mindyour parent'shardship n raisingyou, youwill not be lazy." The family-centered ultureof the Chinese is essen-
tially indebted o Confucius' eaching.Philosophy ast&West Aristotleagreeswith Confucius hat humanbeingsare not by nature
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one's practicalwisdom.40Inthe course of repeatedlyperforming ctionssaid to be noble and just,one comes to realizewhy they are said to be
good. One's dependence on otherpeople tellingone what to do dimin-
ishes, and one comes to see what is rightfor oneself. A person alsocomes to develop a practicalperceptionof what should be done in a
particularcircumstance.The exercise of rationaljudgment becomesinherent neducation.Confucius'pictureof cultivation, ncontrast, acksthe developmentof practicalwisdom.
Earlierwe mentioned that in Aristotle'sconcept of virtuethere is a
cycle between practicalwisdom and ethical virtue.On the one hand,
practicalwisdom is not simplya matterof rationalcalculation; t is dis-
tinguished rom such notions of capacityas deliberation bouleusis)andcleverness(deinotes).It is not morally ndifferent, ut involves an essen-tial reference o, or presupposes,ethicalvirtue(1143b11-14, 1144a30-
31). Aristotleexplicitlydeclares that"we cannotbe a personof practicalwisdom without
being good" (1144a36),and he therefore
rejectsthe
idea that an incontinentpersonhas practicalwisdom. Practicalwisdomis inseparable romethical virtue and is embedded in the tradition.On
the otherhand,practicalwisdomalso reflectsandcriticizes he tradition,as we have indicatedin the second section of this essay. Viewed fromthe standpointof the dynamic process of cultivation,this cycle is not
vicious. It is inherent nthe processand promotes he fabricof characteras well as the reformation f the tradition tself.The ethical virtue that
provides he goal forpracticalwisdom is not the full virtue,forthe goalit teaches derivesfromexperiencerather han fromclearknowledgeanda criticalattitude.A human
beingas a rationalanimal cannotbe
merelya creatureof habit.Withoutexercisingrationalactivitya humanbeingcannot be human in the fullest sense. Only when one develops one's
own practicalwisdom can one fully enjoy doing noble things. A full
moralvirtue,that is, one's second nature,cannot be acquireduntil oneexercisesone's own reason.
A state of charactercan be good because it aims at the mean stateof feelingand actions(1106b28, 1109a20-30). This notion of a mean is
not one of quantitybut one of correctness.41The mean is a state that"enablesone to act at the right ime, aboutthe right hings,toward the
rightpeople, for the rightend, and in the rightway" (1109a20-23). This
rightness s determinedby correctreason(orthos ogos),thatis, practicalwisdom (1144b28). Reasondeterminesrightnessdifferently n differentsituations.On this basisAristotlederives his complete definitionof eth-icalvirtue:"virtue s a state (hexis)concerned thatdecides, consisting na mean,the meanrelative o us,which is definedby reference o reason,i.e., to the reasonby reference o which the personof practicalwisdomwould define it"(1107a1-3).
We now see that while for Confucius a complete notion of ren is
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a synthesisof renas love and renas conforming o li, forAristotlea full
notion of virtuecomprisesvirtueas a state of characteras well as virtue
as exercising practicalrationality,and is an organic synthesisof these
two aspects. It is the synthesisof these two that determinesthe mean
state. Virtue as mean in turn determines he natureof all other ethical
virtues.
It is interesting o note that, with regardto the concept of virtue,neither Confucius' synthesis nor Aristotle'ssynthesis has been fully
respected historically.In the West, Aristotle'spractical wisdom and
ethical virtuehave been separated ince the Enlightenment. hilosopherscontrast the authorityof reason to tradition,and then try to establish
universaland trans-cultural rinciplesof morality n which virtue does
not have any significantplace. The currentrevival of virtue ethics is in
a sense a "return" o Aristotle's nterplaybetween reason and virtue,
althoughwith significantalterations.42Correspondingly,n the East, he
Confuciansynthesis
of ren as love and ren asreturning
o li is also
severed in the laterdevelopmentof Confucianism.Ren as observingli
comes to be moreand morerigidand inflexible,and moves farfrom ren
as love. Li was eventually accused, in the May Fourthmovement,of
"eating man."43 The basic motivationof the May Fourth movement
was to establisha sharpcontrastbetween Chinese traditionand Western
science and democracy,and then uphold the latterwhile rejecting he
former.But the recentresurgenceof Confucianism n EastAsia empha-sizes the value of Chinese traditionand criticizes Western individualist
morality.Thissounds like a tendencyto "return"o Confucius'notionof
ren. Ifthecomparison
in thepresentessay
is sound, we would like to
suggestthat while an Aristotelian evival would do well to borrow the
Confucian insightof filial love, a Confucian revival could hardlybe
constructivewithoutdevelopingan Aristotelian unction of rationalityn
weighingand reanimatinghe tradition.
NOTES
An earlierversion of this paperwas presentedat the ChinesePhilosophy
Symposiumof November 1995 held at the Centerfor Modern Chinese
Studies,University f Oxford.Thereaftertwas circulated n the Center's
working-papereries(editedby Nicholas Bunnin). would like to thank
NickBunnin or his helpfuladvice andgenerous supportat each stageof
the developmentof thisessay. Iam also grateful o RogerCrisp,Kenneth
Dorter,Matthew Liao,James McMullen, ChristopherTaylor,and the
refereesof thisjournal orvaluable commentson the earlierversions. JiyuanYu
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Abbreviations re used in the Textand Notes as follows:
EE Eudemian Ethics
NE Nicomachean Ethics
1 - Ren has been translated in a variety of ways, including "humanity,""benevolence," "love," "virtue," "manhood," "authoritative per-
son," and so forth. James Legge calls it "complete virtue," but he
admits that "We cannot give a uniform rendering of this term" (The
Four Books [New York:Paragon Book ReprintCorp, 1966], pp. 2-
3). Given this situation, I find it more convenient to keep it
untranslated in discussion. Arete is translated as either "virtue" or
"excellence," but "virtue" seems more popular. Hence Iadopt this
conventional translation, despite the asymmetry I might create as I
keep ren untranslated.
2 - Cf. BernardWilliams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London:
Fontana Press, 1985), p. 6. These two terms originally mean the
same thing. "Ethics" is a transliterationof the Greek word ethikos,
and "morality" is from the Latin word moralis, which is the Latin
translation of ethikos. Currently, morality is characterized as deal-
ing with an agent's actions and their consequences, and as attempt-
ing to formulate legalistic moral principles and rules that are uni-
versally applicable to all moral actions. Itemphasizes "obligation"and "moral rightness" and takes an impersonal point of view
regardingmoral
agents. Moralityin this sense denotes modern
moral systems, in particular utilitarianism and Kantiandeontology,and has been the target of the recent anti-theory or anti-moralitymovement. Williams even claims, with regard to such a morality,that "we would be better off without it" (ibid., p. 174). Ethics, on
the other hand, is believed to concern, as the word "ethics" itself
suggests, an agent's character, or the kind of person an agent is, and
treats the agent as culturally and traditionallyembedded. Its central
notion is "virtue," or the excellence of character, and it takes per-sonal commitment, attachment, and deep convictions into serious
consideration. Hence thesphere
of ethics is much broader than that
of morality. This distinction is essentially a distinction between
virtue and morality. An anti-morality movement seeks to replace
morality with a virtue ethics, a tendency described as "from
morality to virtue" (Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue [New
York: Oxford University Press], 1992).
3 - Cf. Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China
PhilosophyEast&West (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1985), p. 75.
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4 - NicomacheanEthics,1139a17. Hereafter, ll quotations romAris-
totle without prefixare from (and cited as) NE. Unless otherwise
specified, the translationis from Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics,trans.TerenceIrwin Indianapolis:Hackett, 1985), with occasional
alterations.
5 - ForAristotle, function s also a thing'send (cf. De Caelo286a8-9;Parts f Animals694b13-15; EudemianEthics EE] 219a8) orwhat
constitutesa thing'sessence (cf. Meteorology390a10-12; Partsof
Animals 640b33-641a6; Generation of Animals 731a25-26;
Metaphysics1045b32-34; NE1176a3-9; Politics1253a23-25).
6 - Lun Yu(Analects)12.22. Hereafter,all quotationsof Confucius OA
withoutprefixare fromthe LunYu.Unless otherwisespecified,the
translation s based on that of D. C. Lau(Hong Kong:Chinese Uni-
versityPress, 1979), with alterations."Love"as a determination f
ren is affection and emotional attachment that originate amongfamilymembersand are thenextendedto the larger ociety. Itcarries
the implicationof neither romantic ove nor sacred love. Love in
Confucius is close to "care"or "concern,"and is similarto the
Greekphilia (see below, note 28).
7 - For a list of the texts upon which this distinction is revealed, see
Wing-tsitChan, "The Evolutionof the ConfucianConcept Ren,"
PhilosophyEastand West4 (1955):297-298.
8 - Following Urmson and Irwin, I prefer to translate "kata" as
"expressing" ather han "inaccordancewith."
9 - Thispointenables ethicalvirtue o connect to reasonby definition,but this is not clearlyenough expressedin the current iterature, s
it usuallymakesa generalclaimthat the humanfunction is reason.
Thiscreatesthe impression hat(ethical)virtue has littleto do with
the ergon argument.
10 - Politics1253a1; cf. NE1097b9-11, 1169b18-19.
11 - Categories8b27-28 (cf.also 9a8-13); NE1100b11-17, 1105a32-
33, 1152a30-33.12 - There is no need in this essay to enter the long-standingdispute
about whether Aristotle's notion of eudaimonia is intellectualist
(dominant)or comprehensive (inclusive). PersonallyI am sym-
patheticto the positionthatthe tension between these two notions
is not as sharpas is generally supposed.A life of contemplation s
an ideal for humanbeings. Aristotleadvises us to seek to realize
completelythis ideal, as he himselfdid throughouthis life. Buthe JiyuanYu
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also acknowledgesthat it is beyond humancapability.For his rea-
son, althoughhe remarks hatthe life of moralvirtue"ishappyonlyin a secondary degree"comparedwith contemplation,he affirms
that "theactivitiesexpressing hisvirtueare human" 1178a8-10).
13 - Othertranslationsof phronesis include "intelligence"(Irwin)and
"Prudence" Rackham).
14 - 1112b13. Cf. 1112b34-35, 1144a8-9, 1145a5-6, 1140b11-20,
44a34-b1, 1151a15-19; EE1227b12-19. This remark eads to a
readingthatpracticalwisdom and ethical virtue constitutea rela-
tion between the end and the means,and consequently hat reason
has nothing o do with ends. Thisreadingwas initiatedbyJ.Walter,Die LehrederpraktischenVernunftn dergriechischenPhilosophie(Jena, 1874), and has had a numberof supportersn this century.In opposition, many commentators end to argue that the Greek
phrase"meansto the end" (tapros to telos)indicatesa widerrela-
tion than its Englishcounterpart uggests. "Means" can be eitherconstitutive i.e.,whatpertainso theend)or instrumentale.g.,what
is toward the end) (cf. Metaphysics1032b27; Politics 1325b16,
1338b2-4; EN 1144a3), and what Aristotlemeans is the former
rather han the latter. This is certainlyright.However, once we
notice thecycle between reasonand ethicalvirtue, he interpretationbecomes also one-sided.
15 - It also amounts to what Wittgensteincalls "form of life." Foran
interpretationf li in terms of "formof life,"see Chad Hansen,A
DaoistTheory
of ChineseThought:
APhilosophicalInterpretation(New York:OxfordUniversityPress,1994), pp. 75 ff.
16 - Analects, book X, describes in detail li in daily life, yet this
description s widely regardedas "inauthentic."
17 - Inthis sense HerbertFingarettes certainly right o call it a "holyrite" or "sacred ceremony" (Confucius:The Secular as Sacred,
HarperTorchBooks[New York:Harper nd Row, 1972], pp. 6-7).
18 - Metaphysics 981 a29.
19- This is, indeed, the task Aristotleascribesto his ethics. His dia-
lectical ethics shows that we need to examine the endoxa, thereceived views (1098b23-26), at leastthe most influentialamongthem (1095a28-30), to discover the aporiai hese views cause, and
then decide which of them should be followed or what can be
preserved 1146b5-6; EE1235b15-18). Aristotle ries to draw the
whole truth hat other views captureonly in part.
20 - 1109b22-23. Cf. also 1110b6; 1126b4; 1141b27-28; 1142a24-
Philosophy ast&West 27; 1143a28-35, b6; 1147a3, 25-26, b5.
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21 - In this sense, Fingarette s certainly right in remarkinghat Con-
fucius lacks a propermoralpsychology.Cf. Fingarette,Confucius,
chap. 2, "AWay without a Crosswords."
22-Cf. 1:13, 2:24, 5:16, 7:3, 12:10 and 20, 13:4, 15:16, 16:11.
On the notionof "yi"at the passage4:10 underdiscussion,many
translatorsend to view it as somethingexternaland objective,andrender it as "what is moral"(D. C. Lau)or "righteousnessas the
standard" Wing-tsitChan).Inothersenses, yi is sometimesrelated
to the regulationof the characterof courage(2:24, 17:23), which
is again close to li, and is sometimesopposed to small cleverness
(15:17). Confuciussays:"Thegentlemanhas yi as his native sub-
stance (chi), and by observing li puts it into practice" (15:18). fSince nativesubstance at 4:16 is in contrast o culture(wen),yi in
this context seems to refer to natural character before cultural
refinement.
23 - Schwartz(Worldof Thought,pp. 79-80) also distinguishes i from
yi, but he claims thatyi is simplywhat is rightbeyondthe reach of
the prescription f li, and thus makesyi an independentsource of
rightbehavioralongside ii. Chad Hansen also sees the distinction
between li andyi as the distinctionbetweenetiquette social mores)and realmorality.Nonetheless,he also remarks: Giventhe nature
of Confucius' reference to yi (morality),we cannot tell if he dis-
tinguishedbetween realmoralityand a community's ocial mores,"and "the discourse in the Analects makes no distinctionbetween
moraldao andconventionalmores" Hansen,DaoistTheory, . 82).
24 - This account of yi and its relationto li is in contrast o the inter-
pretationof Hall and Ames (ThinkingThroughConfucius[Albany:StateUniversity f New YorkPress,19871),who claim that here is a
long-ignoreddistinctionbetween li and yi. While li is not "divinelyestablished"(p. 89), the notion of yi reflects a capacityto importthe agent's significanceinto the world,a "flexibilityor a personto
interactwith and integratento ever new situations"; i is particular,creative,and responsive,and it is a "central heme" in Confucius
to "underscore he creative and novel dimensions of yi" (p. 95).
Consequently,a personof ren is made by exercisinghis own judg-ment(yi) o adaptthe tradition li).Although he authorsdo not referto Aristotle, t is interesting hat their readingof Confucius is vir-
tuallyan Aristotelian ne. Licorresponds o undogmaticethos,and
yi to practicalwisdom (phronesis).Since I have arguedthat Con-
fucius insisted on the continuityof the Zhou li, and thatyi is con-
ventional on the basis of li rather hanpersonal, heirinterpretationseems to me to be open to challenge. Nevertheless, t is insightful f
the authors of this interpretationo draw our attention to the JiyuanYu
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ignorednotion of yi, which seems exactlythe place fordevelopingConfucius'thinking.
25 - Here I follow the translationof Wing-tsitChan (A SourceBook in
Chinese Philosophy[Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1963],
p. 20).
26 - BertrandRussell seems to miss the point entirelywhen he says:"Filialpiety, and the strengthof the familygenerally,are perhapsthe weakest point in Confucianethics" (The Problem of China
[London:GeorgeAllenand Unwin, 1922], p. 40).
27 - NEVII;EE7; Rhetoric1380b33 ff.
28 - This is suggested by MarthaC. Nussbaum(Fragility f Goodness:
Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedyand Philosophy [Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress,1986], p. 354). Other translations n-
clude "social relation" Urmson)and "socialsympathy" Barker).
29 - ForAristotle, he relationsbetween fatherand son, between hus-
band and wife, and between brothersare various.They can be
eithermonarchic,aristocratic, nd timocratic,or tyrannical,oligar-chic, and democratic.Accordingly,family relation cannot be in
itselfa source of social justice.
30 - Philautos1169a11; cf. also 1169b1.
31 -1169a2; cf. also 1162a15, 1168b35, 1178a2-3.
32 - J.M.Cooper,"Aristotle n Friendship,"nAmelieRorty, d., Essays
on Aristotle'sEthics Berkeley:University f CaliforniaPress,1980),p. 308.
33 - MagnaMoralia1213a10-26; EE1245a29-37; NE1170b7.
34 - Furthermore, irtue friendshipexists only between good peoplewho are similar n theirvirtues.Hence virtue s prior o and neces-
saryforfriendship.
35 - BernardWilliams, "Persons,Characterand Morality," n Moral
Luck:Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980 (Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress,1981), p. 18.
36 - This was later recognized in Chinese imperial law. See I. J.
McMullen, "Filial Piety, Loyaltyand Universalismin Japanese
Thoughtof the TokugawaPeriod," n FilialPietyand FutureSociety
(Songnam:Academyof KoreanStudies,1995), p. 640.
37 - Hansen,Daoist Theory, . 78.
38 - For a useful discussion of their relationship, ee Hall and Ames,
Philosophy ast&West ThinkingThroughConfucius,pp. 286-287.
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39 - The translation s based on that of Wing-tsitChan (SourceBook,
p. 31), whose paragraph umber s 6:28, while Lau's s 6:30.
40 - Thereis indeed a traditional nterpretationn Aristotle cholarshipthat the cultivationof ethical virtue out of habits is a purelynon-
cognitive process of habituation.But this has been convincingly
rejectedby Burnyeat,"Aristotle n Learningo be Good," RichardSorabji,"Aristotle n the Role of Intellect n Virtue" botharticles
are included in Rorty, Essayson Aristotle'sEthics),and NancySherman, The Fabricof Character:Aristotle's Theoryof Virtue
(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1989).
41 - The traditional iscussionof Aristotle's octrineof the mean focuses
on its quantitativedetermination,and the doctrine is accordinglynot highlyvalued. But this traditionalapproachhas been rejected
by Urmson,who arguesconvincinglythat the mean refers o the
mean dispositiontowardaction, rather han a dispositiontoward
the mean action. See Urmson,"Aristotle'sDoctrineof the Mean,"inthe AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly1973):223-230, reprintedin Rorty,Essayson Aristotle'sEthics.
42 - Alasdair Maclntyre asks, "Whose justice? Which rationality?"(WhoseJustice?WhichRationality NotreDame, Indiana:Univer-
sityof Notre Dame Press,1988]), and BernardWilliamsattempts o
replaceboththeoryand prejudicewith "reflection" Ethics nd the
Limitsof Philosophy London:Fontana,1985], p. 112).
43 - The remarks fromLu Xun'sDiaryof a Madmanand OtherStories *LE
(Honolulu:Universityof HawaiiPress,1990).
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