Post on 10-Feb-2017
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CHAPTER – VI
MANIPUR AND THE REVOLT OF 1857
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MANIPUR AND THE REVOLT OF 1857
The march of Chittagong mutineers towards North East had not only shaken Cachar in North
East India but also had a deep impact on the princely kingdom of Manipur. It occurred when the
mutineers of the 34th
Native Infantry Chittagong drifted towards this princely kingdom passing
the district of Cachar. Knowing this tough situation faced by the British Government Raja
Chandrakirti Singh was seriously concerned about the matter and he decided to help the British
Government heart and soul. When McCulloch, Political Agent at Manipur, heard about the Battle
of Latoo, 18th
December, 1857, he requested Raja Chandrakirti Singh to send the latter‟s army on
the Cachar border to intercept the mutineers. The Raja instantly responded as it was stated, “That
night the Raja at my request ordered 400 men under a Major to start for the Jeeree–the boundary
between Cachar and Munnipore, there, to intercept the mutineers should they come that way.”1
On the other hand, the masses of Manipur were indirectly on the side of mutineers. They
objected to the recruitment process of the Manipur Regiment which had taken place in the
months of August and September 1857. Besides, they also stated that the mutineers being co-
religionist would have no harm and so they should not sacrifice blood for the Firunghis. In this
way, the common people of Manipur were against the wishes of their Raja in 1857 Revolt.
6.1 Historical background
In 1823, when Gambhir Singh was the virtual Raja of South Cachar, the Burmese not only
occupied Assam and Manipur but also invaded Cachar from three directions viz. Assam, Jaintia
and Manipur. The third party from Manipur had arrived at south Cachar and inflicted a defeat on
the Raja Gambhir Singh‟s local levy. Now the prince fled to Sylhet and started communications
with the British to face the Burmese aggression. At that juncture, the British Government also
felt the great danger with which their frontier was threatened. They also thought of the bravery
and warlike character of Manipuris who had been resisting the Burmese onslaughts for many
years. Here, it was reported, “The Munneepore country, which is inhabited by a brave and hardy
race, who have frequently opposed a noble resistance to their Burmese invaders would thereby
accrue to the security and tranquillity of our North-E Frontier.”2 Again, in a letter to the Court of
Directors, it was stated, “Under such an emergency it was natural that every resource, however
trifling, should be sought after and the re-establishment of the Munnipore dynasty seems to have
been a scheme peculiarly favoured by the late agent Mr. Scott.”3 Ultimately, it was accepted to
join the British force by a group of Manipuris known as the Raja Gambhir Singh‟s Levy which
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consisted of 500 infantry and 40 cavalrymen.4
Lord Amherst, the then Governor General of
British India, declared war against Burma on 5th
march, 1824, and the Raja Gambhir Singh‟s
Levy joined the British outpost at Badarpur (Cachar) in April of the same year. They were
supplied with arms and their expenses were also borne by the British. However, they were
irregulars as no pay was entitled to them.
By this time, the Burmese had built their strongholds at Talain Mountain, Jatrapur and
Dudpatil in Cachar. Their number in those positions was estimated at about 8000. The British
army under Lt. Col. William Inns arrived at Badarpur on June 20 and then proceeded by water
along the river Barak to Jatrapur where he arrived on June 27. On the way, he tried to dislodge
the Burmese from the heights of Talain where they strongly fortified. For three days (July 6, 7, 8)
British guns fired on the stockade; Gambhir Singh with his excellent local knowledge, assisted
the operation.5
In this battle, the Manipuris under Gambhir Singh chased and captured Takheng
Mitlao and Gun Singh who were Burmese agents coming to arrest Chourjit, Marjit and Gambhir
Singh (Manipuri brothers). Later, the two were killed by throwing into the water of Barak River.6
Towards the end of October 1824, the entire Burmese army in Cachar retired to Manipur. On the
role played by Gambhir Singh in Cachar, it was stated, “Gumbheer Sing ...with whom we had
negotiated, raised from among his own followers a body of 500 men, who actively co-operated
with our troops in expelling the Burmese from Cachar.”7
At this juncture, Brigadier-General
Shuldham, Commanding Eastern Frontier decided to march to Manipur so that the gravity of the
war in the Arakan frontier could be diverted to the advantage of the British army. However,
because of the hopelessness of this wet and mountainous kingdom the General‟s mission was
suspended. Yet, Gambhir Singh breaking the ice, proposed to take up the task condemned as
hopeless by General Shuldham. Earlier, the former had also been induced by David Scott to lead
an expedition for the conquest of Manipur. He was also told that “Manipur would be placed
under him if he could liberate it.”8
Ultimately, Gambhir Singh‟s proposal was accepted, and thus
the prince made preparations with his own levy. They were supplied with guns by the British
Government. The Raja Gambhir Singh‟s Levy left for Manipur on 17th
May, 1825, with
Lieutenant R.B. Pemberton.9
In this mission, the latter “volunteered to accompany Gambhir
Singh to Manipur with the additional object of obtaining some accurate information about the
passes into Manipur, its resources and the strength of the Burmese.”10
The party, after facing so
many difficulties, reached Maklang (a village in Manipur valley) on June 10. Hearing their
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arrival, the Burmese army in Manipur were divided into four parts making stockades at Kameng,
Andro, Nambol and Phunal Hills.11
The Burmese stronghold at Nambol was defeated by a party under Nur Singh killing
many of them. Gambhir Singh, sitting on horseback and utilizing his war skill, invaded the
Burmese at Kameng and Phunal hills and the Burmese, being defeated, fled to Burma.12
Ultimately, the Levy successfully captured Kangla (capital of Manipur) on 12th
June, 1825,
expelling the entire Burmese force from Manipur. In this way, the irregular Raja Gambhir
Singh‟s Levy executed the task which General Shuldham had failed to do. On this levy it was
stated, “The men could move lightly equipped without a paraphernalia of a regular army.”13
Once more it was complimented:
“The primary objects in view, viz. The expulsion of the Burmese from Manipur was,
however, achieved by Gambhir Singh, who had accompanied the troops with an irregular
levy of five hundred Manipuris and Kacharis. These men had been provided with arms by
the British commander, but they were wholly undisciplined, and it was only at Gambhir
Singh‟s urgent request that he was permitted to advance with them to Manipur.”14
Therefore, the conquest of Manipur in the First Anglo-Burmese War was the handiwork of the
irregular, unpaid but gallant Manipuris under Raja Gambhir Singh.
The levy faced untold difficulties due to the lack of provisions as there was less
cultivation in Manipur and above all, the Levy, being irregular, did not enjoy regular provisional
supply. Consequently, Gambhir Singh left 300 men at Manipur and returned to Sylhet by the end
of June 1825, to discuss his problems and other policy matters. Lt. Pemberton, returning to
Sylhet with Gambhir Singh, reported on the latter that “the success of the enterprise was due
mainly to his energy, perseverance and skill.”15
At Sylhet, Gambhir Singh was intimated about
the order of the British Government accepting his levy on regular basis, and also allowed to
increase its number with a new denomination. With this happy news Gambhir Singh departed
Sylhet for Manipur on 4th
December, 1825, along with Captain F.J. Grant and Lieutenant R.B.
Pemberton. Reaching Kangla on 23rd
instant, Gambhir Singh declared:
The title Raja Gambhir Singh‟s Levy would be denominated as the Manipur Levy; the
British Government had accepted to increase its strength to 1500 infantry and 150
cavalry; the pay, provisions and all equipments of the Manipur Levy would be borne by
the British Government and the same would be collected from the Magazine at
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Chandrapur (place at the western foothills of the Bhuban Mountain, Cachar); Cap. F.J.
Grant and Lt. R.B. Pemberton would be the Commissioner and the Assistant
Commissioner of Manipur Levy with Lt. George Gordon as Adjutant (who had not
arrived at Imphal that time).16
Here, Cheitharol kumbaba also mentions that the Maharaja coming with two Firunghis entered
the capital on Friday, the 23rd
December, 1825, and arranged a grand feast for the Four Victoria
Battalions.17
On this occasion, Alexander Mackenzie also writes, “In 1825 the force was
increased to 2000 men, and placed under the command of Captain Grant; it was denominated the
Manipur Levy.”18
On the cavalry wing of the levy, T.C. Robertson, Agent to the Governor-
General reported later:
“An annual advance of about fifteen or twenty thousand Rupees appropriated to the
support of a small body of cavalry, to be paid through the British Residence would also I
conceive benefit the country...and secure the presence of the only description of auxiliary
force which we are even likely to find of any real use to us in the event of another contest
with the Burmese.”19
In this way, Manipur was projected seriously for the war against Burma and also to defend the
eastern frontier from the latter‟s aggression thereafter.
Gambhir Singh now decided to expel the Burmese from the Kabaw Valley which had
been for Manipur for ages in the past. Nur Singh was therefore sent along with 1000 men to
Tamu on 1st January, 1826. Being asked for reinforcement, Gambhir Singh along with the two
British Officers left for Tamu on 13th
January, 1826.20
The Burmese fort at Tamu was a very
strong and well protected one. Therefore, the two Sahibs suggested the need for cannon. But
Gambhir Singh, disfavouring the proposal, planned to send Nur Singh to invade Samsok with
300 selected men. Meanwhile, surrounding the Tamu Fort to obstruct provisional supply for five
days, the Burmese were compelled to leave the place in the night of 23rd
January, 1826.21
In the
another front, Nur Singh had a fierce engagement for three days in Samsok and ultimately broke
the latter‟s capital. In this battle, king Soimoila, Kakangka (king of Khampat), king of Kale and
brave Poiyong were arrested among 30 war prisoners. Besides, they also captured muskets,
bullets, rice and paddy receptacles, fish containers and a lot of valuables like silver, gold etc.
Getting the message of the fall of Samsok capital, Gambhir Singh along with the two British
Officers arrived on the bank of the Ningthee on 1st February, 1826.
22 Hereafter, declaring his
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conquest up to the Ningthee River, Gambhir Singh unfurled the flag of Manipur on the bank of
this river.23
In this way, under the leadership of Gambhir Singh, the united Manipuris of the
Manipur Levy, restored their lost kingdom. Had it not been there the status of Manipur would
have been very uncertain. On the role of Gambhir Singh and those gallant Manipuris in the First
Anglo-Burmese War, Captain Grant reported:
“...the activity, judgement, and skill, he (i.e., Gambhir Singh) had displayed on this
occasion, have proved the justice of the opinion previously entertained of his merits. The
steady gallantry which, without the usual aid of cannon, could force a brave enemy to
evacuate a strong fortified position is a very satisfactory illustration of the character of his
followers....”24
Indeed, had the British not received the sacrificing spirit of those brave sons of Manipur it would
have been impossible for the Company to launch an attack on Ava through Manipur and bring
the war to conclusion so early in 1826. However, this highly disciplined and dependable Manipur
Levy seems to change its character very soon as it was stated in January 1834, “The Levy,
consisting of about 3000 men, was shown to be but very imperfectly disciplined and very little
under the control of the officers specially appointed for the purpose of ensuring its efficiency.”25
The following are some of the points why Manipuris had become so disinterested and
disappointed with the British policy.
6.2 Problem over the Kabaw Valley
During the First Anglo-Burmese War, the Manipur Levy, under its gallant leader Gambhir Singh,
conquered the entire Kabaw Valley and unfurled the flag of Manipur on the bank of Chindwin
River. Yet, in the Treaty of Yandaboo, 1826, the British Government failed to enter any clear
provision on the said valley. As the question of this valley remained unsettled, there started a
great unrest on the Burmese border. Soon after the treaty, the Burmese started encroaching into
the territory of Manipur crossing the Chindwin River. It resulted in a serious headache to
Manipuris and consequently they were highly discontented towards the British policy.
6.3 Dispute over South Cachar
Before the First Anglo-Burmese War, Gambhir Singh had established his political hegemony on
South Cachar by ruling over its territories for about six years (1818-1823). His followers, the
chunk of Manipur Levy, had enjoyed the wealth and prosperity of South Cachar. Although they
were defeated by the Burmese in the last part of 1823, yet they contributed much to the expulsion
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of the Burmese from Cachar in the First Anglo-Burmese War. After the Treaty of Yandaboo
(1826), Gambhir Singh and his followers established their outpost at Chandrapur (Cachar)
claiming that the latter was the property of Manipur. After the death of Govindachandra (Raja of
Cachar) in 1830, there was the question of succession in Cachar. Here, Gambhir Singh became a
strong claimant submitting a proposal to the British Government “to farm out Cachar for a period
of twenty years in return for an annual revenue of rupees fifteen thousand...”26
However, the
British policy on Cachar and Manipur had already been formulated as it was expressed earlier,
“By the improvement of Cachar country, therefore, it is to be hoped that our means might be
facilitated of assisting Munnipore against Ava.”27
They also considered Cachar the granary of
this region. Therefore, after the Treaty of Badarpur, (1824), the Commissioner of Sylhet had
been instructed “to keep a keen watch on the conduct of the Raja (Govindchandra) and to
ascertain whether he will be willing to cede the territory to the British.”28
Ultimately, the British
Government annexed South Cachar in 1832 to the great dissatisfaction of Gambhir Singh and his
followers. By the Treaty of 1833, Gambhir Singh was given the mountainous region between the
Jiri and the Barak Rivers which was considered by the British as worse than useless in every
point of view. Hence, Manipur was not suitably compensated for its sacrifices made in Cachar.
6.4 Boundary between Manipur and Assam
It is rightly stated that the Court of Directors represented a mercantile company and was
naturally very sensitive about money. Therefore, the Company‟s Government always tried to
annex those resourceful plain areas leaving mountainous terrain to the indigenous rulers. When
the Naga Tribes raided the neighbouring plains protected by the British Government, the latter
stated, “Gambhir Singh should be held accountable for the behaviour of the Nagas thus
considered to be placed under his permanent authority.”29
Here, L. Iboongohal Singh writes:
“Facts come to light which made it clear that the object which Gumbheer Singh had in
view was the permanent conquest of the Naga Hills. The ambitious Manipuris would
have been a very dangerous neighbour of our vassal Purander Singh, whom we were then
endeavouring to establish on the throne of Upper Assam, and the Government began to
feel uncomfortable in prospect of Gumbheer Singh‟s operation (Political proceedings,
19th
December 1833). It did not absolutely prohibit him from subjugating the Nagas; but
it forbade him to descend into the plains on the Assam side.”30
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Indeed in 1835, “the forest between the Doyeng and the Dhunsiri was declared to be the
boundary between Manipur and Assam (Political proceedings, 11th
February, 1835).”31
Consequently, Manipuris were not allowed to expand their territory beyond the unproductive and
dangerous land in the hills.
6.5 Loss of Kabaw Valley
Kabaw Valley, mainly the plain area between Manipur and the Chindwin River, had been under
Manipur during the most part of its political history. It is stated, “For the greater part of the
century (18th
century) the Kubo Valley unquestionably belonged to Manipur and it was never in
any sense a Burmese province, being, when not under Manipur, a feudatory of the great Shan
Kingdom of Pong.”32
Later, it was given to Burma by Marjit Singh (1813-19) just to possess the
throne of Manipur. After seven years Burmese devastation of Manipur (1819-1825), the latter
was re-conquered by Manipuris under Gambhir Singh. When the prince became the Raja of
Manipur after the Treaty of Yandaboo, 1826, this valley became the thrust area of political
dialogue between Burma and the British Government (ally of Manipur). Here, it was expressed:
“Within a few weeks of the conclusion of the treaty of Yandabo some Burmese troops
crossed the river Ningthi and entered the disputed valley, but they soon retired into
Burmese territory of their own accord. Instead of renewing hostilities Gambhir Singh
submitted the matter to the decision of the British Government.”33
In June 1826, Major General Archibald Campbell was informed that “the Government should
maintain the right of Gambhir Singh over northern and middle portion of Kabow Valley (Samjok
and Khampat) but the southern portion (Kule) had to become a subject of negotiation.”34
However, the Burmese court objected to the line of boundary proposed by the Government of
India. The latter appointed Captain F.J. Grant and Lieutenant R.B. Pemberton as the
Commissioners of Manipur. Lieutenants Montmorency and Rawlinson were deputed to
accompany the Burmese Commissioners to the meeting on the Chindwin which was scheduled to
be held in February 1828. As the season was quite advanced, they postponed their programme.
The British Commissioners met the Burmese in January 1830, and fixed the Chindwin
River as the future boundary between Burma and Manipur and planted flags accordingly; but the
Burmese refused their witness. The latter‟s court was greatly agitated over the step of Grant and
Pemberton, which they thought was unwarranted by any instruction of Government of India and
decided to send a deputation to Calcutta. Accordingly, two Burmese envoys arrived at Calcutta
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in1830, and their first and the foremost demand was “the restoration of the Kabow Valley.”35
Before their arrival the British Indian Government also sent Major Burney as British Resident at
Ava in April 1830. He was instructed that “your attention should be given to the trade of Ava
with a view to reporting to his Lordship-in-Council the practicability of extending and
facilitating British commerce and the consumption of British manufactures.”36
In the previous
letter from Burney it was stated that the importation of British goods in Burma was on the rise,
but in December 1830, he stated, “Some of my former reports expressed an opinion that the
present king of Ava will take the first favourable opportunity of engaging in another contest with
us.”37
The Burmese Government also appointed their Governors of Prome, Bassein, and other
cities in the delta as military chiefs (Bo) who had the power to call out the inhabitants of their
districts to meet armed at any point of time. In this way, the Government of Ava was in a state of
war against the British Indian Government.
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Sketch Map of N.E. India & Burma
(Courtesy:- Lt-Col. H.J. Huxford, History of the 8th
Gurkha Rifles)
Here, the British Government felt the difficulties and the huge loss of resources in men and
money in the First Anglo-Burmese War as it was expressed by the British Commander-in-Chief
of the said war:
“When I consider the enormous expenditure of treasure …… and …… the great
sacrifice of British blood, when I contemplate the obstacles of difficulties which …… still
present themselves to our views……; when I bear in mind the extraordinary hardships and
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deprivations to which our troops have been already subjected and which they must still be
prepared to encounter; when, above all, I recollect the insalubrity of the climate……, I
cannot disguise my anxiety that, consistently with our honour, this contest may be
brought to the speediest conclusion.”38
Above all, the authorities of Calcutta were also very serious about the trade facilities which they
could enjoy when they developed a good relationship with Ava. The Burmese mainly exported
vegetable oil, petroleum and teak-wood. About the latter it was stated, “It is found also in
Bombay, but in small quantities, and is extremely dear; whereas in Pegu and Ava there are such
immense forests of it, that it can be sold to as many ships as arrive, at a moderate price.”39
By 1830, keeping in view of the above circumstances, the Company felt the need of
ceding the Kabaw Valley to Burma. To Manipur it was a very delicate issue. Therefore, the
Company cleverly took up this matter as it was mentioned in the Cheitharol Kumbaba (royal
chronicle of Manipur) that on Tuesday, the 24th
December, 1833, the British Officers of Calcutta
requested the Raja of Manipur to allow the Burmese to cultivate in the Kabaw Valley as the
latter did not have enough land for cultivation on annual payment of 6000 Tangkhas. The Raja
accepted to it.39
Later on, the British Government declared its final decision:
“......the Supreme Government still adheres to the opinion that the Ningthee formed the
proper boundary between Ava and Manipur; but that in consideration for His Majesty‟s
(i.e. of the king of Burma) feelings and wishes and in the spirit of amity and good will
subsisting between the countries, the Supreme Government consents to the restoration of
the Kubo Valley to Ava, and to the establishment of the boundary at the foot of the
Yoomadoung hills.”40
Accordingly, Major Grant and Captain Pemberton, in a highly diplomatic move, had
given the Kabaw Valley to Burma on the 9th
January, 1834. In a way to compensate this great loss
to Manipur the British Government paid 500 Sicca Rupees per month to Manipur. To Manipur,
the loss of Kabaw Valley was just like snatching of a child from a mother‟s lap. Gambhir Singh
died on the same day of the cession of Kabaw Valley to Burma. Hence, the British Government
knowingly executed this extremely delicate issue as it was expressed by the Court of Directors:
“We are glad to find that the transfer of the Kuboo Valley to the Burmese authorities took
place so satisfactiously, and that the boundary was amicably settled. Major Grant and
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Captain Pemberton, the Commissioners and Lt. Macleod, deputed by the Resident to
accompany the Burmese Officers are entitled to commendations for the manner in which
they executed their rather delicate duty.”41
In this way, the British Government, in a move to fulfil its design on Burma, sacrificed the
interest of a less powerful kingdom of Manipur by ceding the Kabaw Valley to Ava (Burma).
Soon after this cession the Burmese Government reduced its port charges on the British ships.
Here, the Court of Directors again expressed:
“It is satisfactory to find that Lt. Colonel Burney prevailed upon the Woongy of Rangoon
to diminish the port charges on our commerce, and although the concession seems to
have been intended as a mark of personal respect to that officer..., there appears to some
hope that the Government of Ava may be induced to make the concession permanent.”42
On the other hand, the British pre-empted the rise and growth of Manipur into a powerful and
resourceful kingdom which it would have achieved if it had established its control and
sovereignty over the said valley. Indeed, the resourceful Kabaw Valley and the commercial
activities of the river Chindwin would have supported Manipur in its economic development.
6.6 British Interferences after 1834
After the cession of Kabaw Valley the British Government conceived that the Burmese would
not aggress towards Manipur and ultimately, removed most of the assistance given to Manipur
Levy issuing this order, “It has been resolved to discontinue the British superintendence over the
body denominated the Manipur Levy, and to leave it optional with the Government of the
country to maintain that force or not as it please.”43
However, to keep in touch with the political
developments in respect of Manipur as well as Burma, Captain Gordon was appointed as
Political Agent and Lieutenant Pemberton as Joint Commissioner in 1835. The policy of
interference in the internal affairs of Manipur started mainly in 1844, when, after an unsuccessful
attempt on the life of Nur Singh (Regent), the young Raja Chandrakirti Singh fled to Cachar with
his mother Kumudini and the people of Manipur, declaring Nur Singh the new Raja, asked the
British Government to recognise him and deliver the Kabaw compensation money. Here, the
new Raja was given a condition to pay financial assistance to the ex. Raja and Maharani in proof
of the stability of the Government. The Rajah hereafter consented to assign to the young Rajah
and to the Maharani 80 Rs. and 20 Rs. a month respectively, and then he was formally
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recognised by the British Govt. as the Rajah of Muneepore.44
Therefore, from this time onwards,
the Kabaw compensation could not be claimed by any declared Raja of Manipur unless the latter
was recognised by the British Government.
Again, in 1850 when Chandrakirti Singh ascended the throne of Manipur, in the name of
maintaining peace in the kingdom, the British Government made a public avowal to punish any
contender to the throne of Manipur as it was stated:
„Influenced by a desire to put an end to the frequent attempt by exiled members of the
Rajah‟s family to effect a change of Government you have authorized the Political Agent
to make “a public avowal of the determination of the British Government to uphold the
present Rajah and to resist and punish any parties attempting hereafter to dispossess
him”.‟45
With such developments, the British Government became the protector of the Raja of Manipur
scaling the height of its interference in Manipur and to the great irritation of Manipuris.
In financial matters, Raja Chandrakirti Singh was not satisfied when Rs. 150 per month
was deducted from the Kabaw money for the maintenance of ex. king Devendro Singh and his
sons as it was stated, “In regard to the provision of 150 rupees a month for Debindro Sing and his
sons, although he thought it too much he said as it was expected of him he would agree to it.”46
Raja Chandrakirti Singh‟s amicable relationship with the British Government could better be
assessed from his letter translated by the Political Agent:
“The only revenue of our Munneepore which comes in rupees is the Rs. 500 allowance
on account of Kubo. 2nd
Please cause Koonjauba to be forwarded to Dacca from his
arrival there I will give 20 rupees from the Kubo money. 3rd
In consequence of the unruly
nature of Koonjauba and Bogendro Sing were both to remain in Cachar much confusion
would be created in this country. 4th
Of the 5 princes including Debindro Maharaja who
at Dacca receive 150 rupees, from two Phalokngamba and Chaikoingamba no confusion
will arise in the country, therefore, releasing these two might the two Koonjauba &
Bogendro Sing be substituted in their place? 5th
If this be not consented to and I should be
unable to pay their/ Koonjauba & Bogendro Sing‟s monthly allowance I shall represent it
to the Sahib is there anything which might not be agreed to in this?”47
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Hence, Raja Chandrakirti Singh, being helpless economically, had no other way out of the
colonial and selfish design of the British Government, but to side with the latter to secure his
position to the greatest disappointment of the people of Manipur.
6.7 Raja Chandrakirti Singh in 1857
When Raja Chandrakirti Singh heard about the Revolt of 1857 he went to meet
McCulloch two times and expressed his deep feelings as the Agent stated, “The Raja twice called
upon me. He expressed sympathy at the anxiety I must feel and horror at the atrocities he had
heard of.”48
After this, Chandrakirti Singh wrote a letter in Manipuri expressing the following
statements:
Raja Chandrakirti Singh with his courtiers
(Courtesy of the family:- (L) R.K. Jayantakumar s/o (L) R.K. Sanahal, Imphal)
“In a time like the present that I would to my utmost support the Sahib Lok I have
thought. I have heard of what is now doing in Hindustan. Give me an order what to do. I
shall do my utmost to act up to it. And please to believe my country as the Sahib Lok‟s
own.”49
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On 25th
December, 1857, McCulloch heard about the Battle of Latoo and requested Raja
Chandrakirti Singh to send the Manipur Army towards Cachar border. Instantly, the Raja
responded sending 400 men under a major and subsequently another 60 men were also sent as it
was reported, “60 men were subsequently added on Lieutenant Stewart‟s stating that he had not
men for the pursuit of the mutineers should they escape him.”50
After the Battle of Binnacandy (Cachar), 12 January 1858, the Manipur Army arrested
many Chittagong mutineers and sent them to the British Authorities in Cachar. They also
arrested Manipuri prince Narendrajit Singh (Sana Chahi Ahum), who had joined the mutineers
and revolted against the British Government. The prince was brought promptly to Manipur, but
on the repeated appraisal of Lieutenant Stewart (Superintendent of Cachar) to send the prince to
Cachar, the Raja acted on and sent the prince on 25th
April, 1858. Here the Cheitharol Kumbaba
expresses that on 25th
January, 1858, king‟s elder brother Chahi Ahum arrived from Cachar and
on 25th
April,
Longjamba Roma Chingakham Pukhramba Sougaijam Balram
(Courtesy of the family: (L) R.K. Jayantakumar s/o (L) R.K. Sanahal, Imphal)
1858, he was sent back to Cachar.51
In honour of the role played by Raja Chandrakirti Singh in
1857, McCulloch reported, “A sword and belt and suitable dress of honour to be given to the
Rajah of Munnipore, and that they will be despatched. Also that smaller presents will be given to
the officers of the Rajah.”52
Accordingly, Raja Chandrakirti received a sword, a belt and a robe
of honour. Longjamba Roma Singh was rewarded with Mutiny Medal. Another eight officers
namely- Chingakhumba (pukhranba), Chingakhumba (Dewan), Nepra Selungba, Sawaijamba
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Selungba, Nundababu (Lairikyengba Hanjaba), Nameirakpa Major, Haojoumacha Major and
Gokul Thakur were given Khilluts.53
6.8 Manipuris against the British in 1857
Although the Raja of Manipur supported the British Government the majority of people were
against the British. When the event of 1857 was unfolding, the Government decided to establish
a Manipur Regiment thinking that Manipuris were a very brave race. Here it was reported, “It
might be easy and expedient through the civil and military authorities in the N-E Frontier and
Manipur to raise a very useful body Muneepoorees, and Cacharees for general service.”54
Accordingly, orders were issued to the Political Agent at Manipur and the Commandant of the
Sylhet Light Infantry Regiment to raise a corps each of 1500 Manipuris to be drilled at
Cherraponjee. There, the old jail was repaired for their accommodation. It was stated:
“Natives of Muneepore were recommended for enlistment in preference to Cacharees.
The former being more active and warlike it was suggested that they should receive the
same pay as the Sylhet Light Infantry while under training and that their pay should be
increased when they became general service corps.”55
However, the people of Manipur did not like to extend their full support to this recruitment rally.
Besides, those disaffected Manipuris also objected to support the British Government on that
matter. Therefore, around 300 men only that too mostly from Cachar joined the recruitment. The
Government then had a suspicious eye on them as it was reported, “It was strongly urged, that
until thoroughly disciplined and drilled the corps should be employed in the lower province and
in the S.W. Frontier.”56
When there was less response from Manipur on that recruitment process
the Government expressed its desire to fill in the vacancies by the Kukis as it was expressed,
“Should a sufficiency of Muneepoorees not be procurable the enlistment of Kookies was
sanctioned.”57
In the event of 1857, the Manipuris in Cachar supported the Chittagong Mutineers
under their prince Narendrajit Singh, and thus the British Government reacted brutally towards
the Manipuris in Cachar. It reacted to the psyche of the Manipur Regiment, and ultimately their
station was removed from Cheeraponjee to Jamalpore. Here, it was reported:
“Mr. Allen also noticed the existence of much discontent among the men of the
Munipoor Regiment who were before a cheerful, willing, and well behaved set...the
unsettled state of the Munipooris in Cachar whence the great majority of the recruits of
164
the Regiment had been drawn, rendered it in his opinion very desirable to expedite their
removal to Jamalpur.”58
McCulloch was also doubtful about the fidelity of the Manipur army already sent to Cachar
frontier. When the Raja wanted to send more of his force McCulloch reported, “The Raja wished
to send more troops towards the boundary, but doubtful of the fidelity of those already there I
dissuaded him from doing so.”59
It justifies that even a section of Raja Chandrakirti Singh‟s army
was not willing to support the British Government in this great event.
When the mutineers had arrived at Cachar, it was stated:
“During the last two days the common conversation of the Munniporees has been in a
style shewing they would rather have nothing to do with the mutineers; saying that as
they are co-religionist they can meet no harm from them and that all mutineers want is
the Sahibs life and why sacrifice lives for the Ferunghees.”60
In this way, the masses of Manipur were not on the side of the British. When McCulloch was
asked about the number of Manipuris who seriously assisted their Government the former
expressed:
„I regret the discrepancy pointed out and beg to apologize for having written so loosely in
my letter of 12th
Feb. 1858. When I used the expression “one or two” I meant not to
convey one man only or at the most two men, but that the number was very limited.‟61
Hence during the event of 1857 in Manipur, it was only the Raja and some of his officers who
had seriously supported the British Government. The masses of Manipur were against the British
Government. Therefore, the response of Manipur to the Revolt of 1857 was bi-focal in nature.
165
REFERENCES
1. Foreign Political Consultations (Hereafter, FPC), 28 May 1858, No. 139, McCulloch to Secy.
Govt. of India, Foreign Dept. Mannipore, 12th
Feb.1858, Manipur State Archives (Hereafter,
MSA).
2. FPC, 14 May 1832, No. 84, to Agent, N.E. Frontier from George Swinton, Chief Secy. to
Govt. Fort William, 30th
May 1829, Para 10, National Archives of India (Hereafter, NAI).
3. Foreign Political Letters to Court of Directors of 16 January 1834, No. 2, NAI.
4. B. Kulachandra Sharma, Meitrabakki Ningthou Phambal Kallakkhidaba Ningthou Macha
Mashushing, (Imphal, 2009), p. 117.
5. A. C. Banerjee, Eastern Frontier of British India, (A. Mukherjee & Co. Private Ltd.,
Calcutta, 1964), p. 253.
6. Haodeijamba Chaitanya Singh, “Manipurer Itihas”, in R. K. Sanahal Singh, Haodeijamba
Chaitanya Singhgi Lairikshing Punshinba, (Imphal, 1982), p. 29; also see L. Ibungohal and
N. Khelchandra (eds.), Cheitharol Kumbaba, (Manipuri Sahitya Parishad, Imphal, 1989), p.
223.
7. E. W. Dun (compiled), Gazetteer of Manipur, (Vivek Publishing House, Delhi, 1975), p. 43.
8. J. B. Bhattacharjee, Cachar under British Rule in North East India, (Radiant Publishers, New
Delhi, 1977), p. 40.
9. B. Kulachandra Sharma, op. cit., p. 127.
10. R. K. Jhalajit Singh, A Short History of Manipur, (Moirangkhom Imphal, 1965), p. 196.
11. S. Barmani, Meitei Ningthourol, 2nd
part, (Imphal, 2005), pp. 26-27.
12. Ibid., p. 27.
13. Sir James Johnstone, Manipur and Naga Hills, (Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2002),
p. 89.
14. Sir Edward Gait, A History of Assam, (Lawyer‟s Book Stall, Gauhati, 1997), p. 273.
15. A. C. Banerjee, op. cit., p. 261.
16. B. Kulachandra Sharma, op. cit., p. 144.
17. L. Ibungohal and N. Khelchandra (eds.), op. cit., p. 225.
18. Alexander Mackenzie, The North-East Frontier of India, (Mittal Publications, Delhi, 2005),
p. 150.
166
19. FPC, 7 January 1833, No. 82, G. Swinton, Chief Secy. to the Govt. from T. C. Robertson,
Agent to the G.G. at Gowalpara, 14th
Dec. 1832, NAI.
20. L. Ibungohal and N. Khelchandra (eds.), op. cit., p. 225.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. B. Kulachandra Sharma, op. cit., p153.
24. A.C. Banerjee, op. cit., 261.
25. Foreign Political Letters to Court of Directors of 16th
January, 1834, No. 2, NAI.
26. J.B. Bhatacharjee, op. cit., p. 54.
27. FPC, 14 May 1832, No. 84, to the Agent N.E. Frontier, from George Swinton, Chief
Secretary to the Government, Fort William, 30 May, 1829, para 11, NAI.
28. J.B. Bhatacharjee, op. cit., p. 44.
29. Foreign Political Letters to Court of Directors of 16 January, 1834, No. 2, NAI.
30. L. Iboongohal Singh, Introduction to Manipur, (Imphal, 1987), p. 133.
31. Ibid., pp. 133-134.
32. Jyotirmoy Roy, History of Manipur, (Imphal, 1973), p. 71.
33. A.C. Banerjee, op. cit., p. 367.
34. Gangmumei Kabui, “Controversy over the Kabow Valley”, in Lal Dena (ed.), History of
Modern Manipur, (Orbit Publishers-Distributers, Delhi, 1991), pp. 19-20.
35. A.C. Banerjee, op. cit., p. 377.
36. Ibid., p. 376.
37. Ibid., p. 377.
38. Ibid., note 11, pp. 500-501.
39. Ibid., p. 420.
40. R.K. Jhalajit Singh, op. Cit., p. 218.
41. India Dispatch from Court of Directors 1836, Political Department, No. 24 of 1836, para
2,NAI.
42. Ibid., para 4.
43. FPC, 11 February, 1835, No. 105, to Major Grant, Commissioner Manipur from W.H.
Mecnaghten Esqr., Secy. to the Govt. of India, NAI.
44. FPC, 23 May, 1850, No. 120, NAI.
167
45. Political Letters from Secy. of State, 5th
May 1852, No. 14, Our Governor General of India
in Council, London, 5th
May, 1852, NAI.
46. FPC, 14 March 1851, No. 163, McCulloch to F.J. Halliday Esqr., Officiating Secy.,
Government of India, Munneepore Agency, 19th
Feb. 1851, NAI.
47. FPC, 22 August 1850, No. 140, translation of a letter from Chunder Kirtee Sing Raja of
Munneepore to the Political Agent at Munneepore, dated 14th
Shrabon, 1773, NAI.
48. Foreign Secret Consultations, 28 August 1857, Nos.140-41, Cap. McCulloch, Pol. Agent to
G.F. Edmonston Esqr., Secy. to the Govt. of India, Munnipore, 18th
July 1857, para 3, NAI.
49. Ibid., para 2.
50. FPC, 28 May 1858, No. 139, McCulloch to Secretary, Govt. of India, Foreign Dept.,
Munnipore, 12th
February 1858, MSA.
51. L. Ibungohal and N. Khelchandra (eds.), op. cit., pp. 335-36.
52. FPC, 25 Nov.,1859, Nos. 136-37, McCulloch to R. Simson Esqr., Foreign Dept., Fort
William, Mannipore, 14th
Oct., 1859, NAI.
53. B. Kulachandra Sharma, Sana Chahi Ahum, (Imphal, 2011), pp. 192-93.
54. Judicial Letters of the Court of Directors, Special Narrative Vol. 44, 2-8 Aug. 1857, 29
Aug. 1857, No. 20, para 108, Govt. of Bengal, West Bengal State Archives (Hereafter,
WBSA).
55. Judicial Letters of the Court of Directors, Special Narrative Vol. 44, 30 Aug.-5 Sep. 1857,
12 September 1857, No. 24, paras 110-111, Govt. of Bengal, WBSA.
56. Judicial General Letters to Court of Directors, Special Narrative, 6-12 Sept. 1857, 19th
Sept.
1857, No. 25, para 81, Govt. of Bengal, WBSA.
57. Ibid., para 82.
58. Judicial Dept. 15th
April 1858, Special Narrative, 21-27 March 1858, No.22, Govt. of
Bengal, WBSA.
59. FPC, 28 May 1858, No.139, McCulloch to Secy. Govt. of India, Foreign Dept., Fort
William, Mannipore, 12th
Feb. 1858, MSA.
60. Ibid.
61. FPC, 25 Nov. 1859, Nos. 136-37, McCulloch to R. Simson Esqr., Foreign Dept., Fort
William, Mannipore, 14 Oct. 1859, para 2, NAI.