Post on 23-Feb-2022
feel toward them is envy. This quadrant embraces the classic mid-dleman minorities, such as Jews in medieval Europe, Chinese inMalaysia, Tutsi in Rwanda, and Indians in East Africa. In a stablesocial structure, people show public respect for and defer to mem-bers of envied out-groups, but if the social order breaks down,these out-groups may become targets of communal hatred and vio-lence because they are not liked and are not perceived as people“like us.”
The top-left quadrant includes out-groups that are viewed aswarm, and thus likable, but as not competent. Those falling intothis category include people who have experienced some misfor-tune but are otherwise perceived as “people like me,” such as thedisabled, the elderly, the blind, or the mentally retarded. One couldimagine being in their shoes but for an accident of fate, and so therelevant emotion is pity. We like the members of these out-groups,but recognizing their lack of competence, we also feel sorry for
Categorically Unequal
12
PitiedOut-group
EsteemedIn-group
EnviedOut-group
DespisedOut-group
Competence
Warmth
Source: Author’s compilation.
Figure 1.1 The Stereotype Content Model
Roosevelt and his New Deal and then under Harry S. Truman andhis Fair Deal.
The economic policies of both “Deals,” in combination withstrong deflationary pressures during the 1930s and the SecondWorld War, led to a remarkable compression of the income distribu-tion and a sharp decline of inequality during the 1940s (Goldin andMargo 1992). By 1952, when Republicans finally reoccupied theWhite House, the share of income going to the top 10 percent of tax-payers had fallen from 45 percent to 32 percent; that going to thetop 5 percent had dropped from 35 percent to 21 percent; and thataccruing to the top 1 percent had declined from 20 percent to 10percent. These figures represent respective declines of roughly 30,40, and 50 percent from the peak levels of inequality in 1928 mea-sured by Piketty and Saez.
Categorically Unequal
34
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Perc
enta
ge o
f Inc
ome
1922
1927
1932
1937
1942
1947
1952
1957
1962
1967
1972
1977
1982
1987
1992
1997
2002
Year
NeoliberalRestructuringPostwar Consensus
New Deal–Fair Deal
Laissez-Faire Era
Top 10%
Top 5%
Top 1%
Figure 2.1 Share of Income Earned by Top Segments ofTaxpayer Income Distribution, 1922 to 2002
Source: Piketty and Saez (2003).
available until the 1990s, they are not considered here.) Althoughwhite and black households both experienced rising incomes overthe period, very little progress was made in closing the racial gap,despite policies and programs instituted during and after the civilrights era. In real terms, the size of the racial gap actually grew from1972 to 1988, going from $16,700 to $19,700 before falling back to$18,000, around which it has fluctuated ever since. In other words,three decades of affirmative action efforts and antidiscriminationpolicies have not closed the gap between black and white incomes.To put it bluntly, racial inequality remains a basic feature of the U.S.stratification system.
Since the civil rights era, of course, the United States has changeddemographically in rather dramatic ways, and Latinos recentlyovertook African Americans as the nation’s largest minority. His-
Categorically Unequal
38
$50,000
$45,000
$40,000
$35,000
$30,000
$25,000
$20,000
Inco
me
(Con
stan
t 200
2 D
olla
rs)
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Year
Whites
Latinos
Blacks
Figure 2.2 Median Household Income, 1967 to 2003
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
households after the great U-turn are clearly indicated in the figure.Whereas the incomes of households at the bottom of the distribu-tion stagnated and the median inched slowly upward, incomes atthe top of the distribution rose dramatically. Among households inthe lowest quintile, for example, average income stood at $8,800 in1972 and had risen to $10,200 by 2002, an increase of $1,400, or 16percent, in twenty years. Those at the middle of the income distri-bution fared little better. Over three decades, the median householdincome grew from $37,000 to $43,400, for a real gain of $6,400, or 17percent. In contrast, average income for the highest quintile in-creased by 66 percent, going from $88,700 in 1972 to $147,000 in2002, for a real gain of $58,300.
Figure 2.3 illustrates a basic feature of inequality in the post-in-
Categorically Unequal
40
$300,000
$275,000
$250,000
$225,000
$200,000
$175,000
$150,000
$125,000
$100,000
$75,000
$50,000
$25,000
$0
Mea
n In
com
e (C
onst
ant 2
002
Dol
lars
)
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Year
Top 5%
Top 20%
Bottom 20%
Median
Figure 2.3 Average Constant Income Earned by Households atDifferent Points in the Income Distribution, 1967 to2002
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
than from a deterioration in the economic position of men. In 1973the median personal income for males stood at $28,900; thirty yearslater it was only $29,900, a real increase of only $1,000, or 3.5 per-cent. Among women, median personal income rose from $10,000 in1973 to $17,300 in 2003, an increase of $7,300, or 73 percent. Al-though this pay raise is nothing to scoff at, thirty years of progressstill leaves the average woman receiving less income than the aver-age male got back in 1951, and 43 percent less than that of the aver-age male today.
Earlier we noted that median household income rose by 17 per-cent from 1972 to 2002. Given that male median income rose byonly 3.5 percent over the same period, there is only one reasonableexplanation for the continued increase in household income during
Rise and Fall of Egalitarian Capitalism
43
$35,000
$30,000
$25,000
$20,000
$15,000
$10,000
$5,000
$0
Inco
me
(Con
stan
t 200
2 D
olla
rs)
1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
Year
Males
Females
Figure 2.4 Median Personal Income Earned by Males andFemales, 1947 to 2002
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
a period of stagnant male income: female household members en-tered the labor force in large numbers to generate additional in-come that offset the declining fortunes of men. Although middle-income households managed to achieve modest income gains afterthe great U-turn, more household members—usually wives—hadto work to do so. In other words, in the post-industrial politicaleconomy of the United States, it increasingly requires two earnersfor a household to remain in the middle class.
The importance of having two incomes is illustrated in figure 2.6,which shows the change in median income since 1987 among one-and two-earner households. Naturally, two-earner householdshave more income than those with one breadwinner, but we are in-terested in relative change, not absolute amounts, so each series hasbeen divided by its value in 1987 to indicate proportional growth
Categorically Unequal
44
0.6
0.55
0.5
0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3
Rat
io
1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
Year
Figure 2.5 Female Personal Income as a Proportion of MalePersonal Income, 1947 to 2002
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
since that date. As can be seen, from 1987 through 1990 the incomesof one- and two-earner households moved together, but thereafterthey began to depart. The recession of the early 1990s hit all house-holds hard, but whereas two-earner households saw their incomesdrop, they never dipped below the median for 1987, and by 1992they had begun to rebound. In contrast, the median income of one-earner households fell to 96 percent of the 1987 value and did notmake it back to parity until 1997. Thus, one-earner households ex-perienced an entire decade with no growth in income, whereastwo-earner households were able to hang on during the recessionand increase their incomes by 10 percent by 1997. By the year 2003,two-earner households enjoyed a median income that was 19 per-cent above what they reported in 1987, whereas the median incomeearned by one-worker households was only 8 percent more.
Rise and Fall of Egalitarian Capitalism
45
1.2
1.15
1.1
1.05
1
0.95
Val
ue R
elat
ive
to 1
987
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Year
Two-Earner Households
One-EarnerHouseholds
Figure 2.6 Incomes of One- and Two-Earner HouseholdsRelative to Their Values in 1987
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
America’s New InequalityThe purpose of this chapter has been to provide a general descrip-tion of what happened to Americans with respect to income strati-fication during the twentieth century. As we have noted, the pastone hundred years have been tumultuous for both the world andthe United States, including two periods of globalization, both ac-companied by massive shifts in trade, investment, population, andsocial structure. The first era of globalization was accompanied byhigh levels of inequality that in the United States peaked in the late1920s, when the effects of the First World War, isolationism, andprotectionism brought national and global economies crashingdown.
Rise and Fall of Egalitarian Capitalism
47
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1
0.9
0.8
Val
ue R
elat
ive
to 1
973
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
Year
Peak Peak Peak
FemaleParticipation
MalePersonalIncome
Female Ratein 2003: 59.3
FemaleRate in 1973: 42.0
Figure 2.7 Trends in Female Labor Force Participation andMale Personal Income
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
doubled their private recruitment efforts (Durand and Arias 2000).The number of contract workers entering the United States grew to17,000 in 1920, and legal immigration reached an unprecedented51,000 persons. American insecurities about all things foreign cameto a head during the recession that followed the war, and the redscare of 1918 to 1921 was accompanied by a wave of anti-immigranthysteria. Congress passed the first quota law in 1921 to curtail im-migration from southern and eastern Europe and enacted an evenstricter version in 1924. During this period, both legal immigrationand contract migration by Mexicans fell, reaching lows in 1922 of18,000 and 12,000, respectively. But economic recovery led to thesustained economic boom known as the Roaring Twenties, andgiven the new restrictions on European immigration and steadily
Building a Better Underclass
121
90,000
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
Num
ber
of M
igra
nts
1900
1902
1904
1906
1908
1910
1912
1914
1916
1918
1920
1922
1924
1926
1928
1930
Year
Gentlemen'sAgreement
MexicanRevolution
FirstQuota Act
Legal Immigrants Apprehensions Temporary Workers
U.S. EntersWorld War I Founding of
Border Patrol
Figure 4.1 Mexican Migration to the United States, 1900 to 1930
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Table 4.1 Distribution of People Depicted on Magazine Covers, by Race, Ethnicity, andGender, Compared to Distribution Among Immigrants and U.S. Population
CoverActual Data Cover Photos Illustrations
Variable and Immigrants, U.S. Total, Non- Non-Distribution 1990s 2000 Immigrants immigrants Immigrants immigrantsNational origin, race, ethnicity
European/white 15% 69% 10% 71% 0% 69%Asian 31 4 40 12 9 0Afro-Caribbean/black 15 13 23 2 46 2Latin American/Hispanic 37 13 26 1 45 25
GenderMale 55 51 79 70 73 100
Sources: Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Bureau ofthe Census; Chavez (2001).
sented racial inferiors rising above their assigned station, and in thecharged atmosphere of wartime Los Angeles, anti-Mexican riotingbroke out. On June 3, 1943, a group of servicemen on leave com-plained that they had been assaulted by a gang of pachucos wear-ing zoot suits (Obregón Pagán 2003). In response, an angry mob ofwhite soldiers and civilians headed into the Mexican barrio of EastLos Angeles, where they attacked all males wearing zoot suits,beating them severely while ripping off the offensive garments andburning them on the spot.
Rather than protecting U.S. citizens of Mexican origin, the LosAngeles police swept into the barrio and arrested hundreds of al-
Building a Better Underclass
125
Figure 4.2 Mexican Migration to the United States, 1940 to 1965
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
Num
ber
1940
1942
1944
1946
1948
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
Year
World War II Ends
Bracero ProgramBegins
OperationWetback
Legal Immigrants Apprehensions Temporary Workers
Bracero ProgramEnds
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
braceros or legal immigrants during the late 1950s, the total inflow ofMexicans through legal channels fell to just 62,000 per year from1965 to 1985—13 percent of its former level. The gap between the de-mand for visas on the part of employers and workers and the paltrynumber offered by the government was increasingly made upthrough undocumented migration, and annual apprehensions alongthe border climbed steadily from 55,000 in 1965 to 1.6 million in 1985.
In essence, the shift in U.S. immigration policy after 1965 trans-formed Mexican migration from a de jure guest-worker programbased on the circulation of braceros into a de facto guest-workerprogram based on the circulation of undocumented migrants (Du-
Building a Better Underclass
129
Figure 4.3 Mexican Migration to the United States, 1965 to 2005
1,800,000
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
Num
ber
1965
1968
1971
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
Year
HemisphericQuota TakesEffect
CountryQuotasImposed
Limits to FamilyImmigration Imposed
Legal ImmigrantsApprehensions
Temporary Workers
Deportations
ImmigrationReform and Control Act
Sources: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; U.S. Department ofHomeland Security.
Thus, U.S. immigration and border policies transformed Mexi-can immigration from a circular flow of male workers into a settledpopulation of families. By the year 2005, the total number of undoc-umented Mexicans present north of the border had reached 6.1 mil-lion, and the total number of foreign-born Mexicans had climbed to11 million. These figures imply that one of every ten people born inMexico now lives in the United States, and 55 percent are present inillegal status. At the same time, immigrants now constitute a grow-ing fraction of all Mexican Americans, roughly 40 percent as of2005, and the large number of undocumented among them meansthat midway in the first decade of the twenty-first century, morethan half of all Mexican-born persons—and more than one-fifth ofall persons of Mexican origin—lack any social, political, or eco-
Categorically Unequal
142
Figure 4.4 Growth of the Undocumented Mexican Population ofthe United States, 1965 to 2005
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
Num
ber
in T
hous
and
s
1965
1968
1971
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
Year
Sources: Woodrow-Lafield (1998); Hoeffer, Rytina, and Campbell (2006).
groups: South Americans, Latinos, Mexicans, farmworkers, andAfricans. The most despised immigrant group of all is undocu-mented migrants, who rate lowest of all on both warmth and com-petence, such that they approach the portion of the graph usuallyreserved only for the most detested and socially stigmatizedgroups, such as criminals and drug dealers. In societal terms, this isdangerous territory, since it implies that undocumented migrantsare not perceived as fully human at the most fundamental neurallevel of cognition, thus opening a door to the harshest, most ex-ploitive, and cruelest treatment that human beings are capable ofinflicting on one another.
Categorical Stratification After 9/11Just as the criminal justice system has emerged as a new and pow-erful institution in promoting categorical inequality between blacks
Categorically Unequal
150
War
mth
high
high
low
low
Competence
Homeless People
Housewives
Elderly People
Italian
Irish
JapaneseKorean
Chinese
RichPeople
AsianProfessionals
Tech Industry
Canadian
CollegeStudents
European
Indian
ThirdGeneration
DocumentedAmericansMexican
Latino
Poor People
African
SouthAmerican
Farmworker
UndocumentedGerman
RussianFrench
FirstGeneration
EasternEuropean
Vietnamese
MiddleEastern
Figure 4.5 Stereotype Content Model Applied to Immigrants
Source: Lee and Fiske (2006). Reprinted with permission from Elsevier.
onward, Hispanics replaced blacks at the bottom of the male earn-ings hierarchy.
The top two lines show trends in the relative earnings of His-panic and black women to reveal a similar switching of positions,one that occurred even earlier than among minority men. In 1972Hispanic women earned the same income as white women, whileblack women earned 92 percent of what their white counterpartsearned. During the 1970s and 1980s, however, the earnings ofwomen in both minority groups deteriorated relative to those ofwhite women, but the decline was more rapid among Hispanicwomen. In 1981 the two lines crossed, and from then on Hispanicwomen replaced black women at the bottom of the female earningshierarchy.
Categorically Unequal
152
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
Inco
me
Rat
io
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Year
Immigration Reformand Control Act
Hispanic Men
Black Men
Hispanic Women
Black WomenOperationBlockade
Figure 4.6 Hispanic and Black Personal Income as a Ratio ofWhite Income
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Despite this early crossover, however, the Hispanic-white andblack-white income ratios remained quite close to one another untilIRCA passed in 1986. After this date, the deterioration in black fe-male income slowed down, and then in the early 1990s it reversedand began to move upward. In contrast, the deterioration in His-panic women’s earnings accelerated, and the two income ratios be-gan to pull apart at a rapid pace, yielding a widening gap. From 1987to 2002, the ratio of black female income to white female income rosefrom .80 to .96, while the income ratio for Hispanic females fell from.80 to .70 before coming back up to end the decade at .77.
The shifting fortunes of Hispanics and African Americans in theU.S. labor market are also clearly reflected in American poverty sta-tistics. Historically, rates of Hispanic poverty were far below thoseof blacks, but over the course of the 1980s and 1990s the differential
Building a Better Underclass
153
1.2
1.1
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
Rat
io to
Whi
te P
over
ty
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Year
Immigration Reformand Control Act
OperationBlockade
Figure 4.7 Ratio of Hispanic to Black Poverty Rates
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Relations Act in 1935, whereupon union membership surged, morethan tripling from around 10 percent of workers in 1935 to one-third of all workers just ten years later.
With the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1949, however, unionmembership ceased growing and then began to decline after 1959when Landrum-Griffin further strengthened the hand of employ-ers. From a peak rate of 33 percent in 1954, unionization fell to 23percent by 1980, at which time Ronald Reagan was elected to thepresidency. His first year in office proved to be pivotal. In 1981 theunion representing air traffic controllers voted to go on strike forbetter working conditions and improved safety requirements. In-voking Taft-Hartley, President Reagan declared the strike illegaland promised to fire all those who did not return to work within
Remaking the Political Economy
163
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
Uni
on M
embe
rs/N
onfa
rm W
orke
rs
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Air TrafficControllers'Strike
Landrum-Griffin Act
National LaborRelations Act
Taft-Hartley Act
Figure 5.1 Level of Unionization in the United States, 1900 to2004
Source: Carter et al. (2006).
share of workers enjoying this earnings premium declines as well.In addition, with unionization no longer viewed as a credible threatby employers, they have little incentive to pay workers higherwages as an inducement not to form a union. Studies reveal that inthe past the threat of unionization served to boost the wages of allworkers, even those who were not union members (Corneo andLucifora 1997; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Leicht 1989; Neumarkand Wachter 1995), including even midlevel managers (Rosenfeld,forthcoming).
As a result, over time there has been a strong positive relation-ship in the United States between the frequency of strikes and the
Remaking the Political Economy
165
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Freq
uenc
y R
elat
ive
to 1
946
1936
1940
1944
1948
1952
1956
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
Year
SuccessfulElection
Strikes
Figure 5.2 Relative Frequency of Strikes and Successful UnionElections, 1936 to 2000
Source: Carter et al. (2006).Note: 1946 = 1.
figure 5.4 illustrates the effect of these wage reductions on the wel-fare of families supported by low-wage workers.1 Specifically, itcomputes how much income would be earned working full-time(38.5 hours per week) for a full calendar year (52 weeks) and ex-pressing the result as a share of the official poverty level for a fam-ily of four. As can be seen, never in the course of the past fifty yearshas the official minimum wage been sufficient to lift a family withone breadwinner out of poverty, although during the height ofJohnson’s Great Society it came close. In 1968 a minimum-wageworker employed full-time generated annual earnings equal to 93percent of the federal poverty limit.
The figure has been labeled to show Republican versus Democ-ratic administrations. After the 1960s, Republican administrations
Remaking the Political Economy
167
Figure 5.3 Real Value of the U.S. Minimum Wage (2002Dollars), 1938 to 2004
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
Wag
e pe
r H
our
1938
1943
1948
1953
1958
1963
1968
1973
1978
1983
1988
1993
1998
2003
Year
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
were very clearly associated with falling minimum wages, whereasDemocratic administrations were associated with steady, fluctuat-ing, or rising minimum wages. A well-controlled and more com-prehensive analysis by Larry Bartels (2004) showed that Republi-can presidents indeed produce greater income growth for rich thanpoor families and that rising inequality is reliably associated overtime with Republican administrations. By minimizing the mini-mum wage, Congress by the year 2005 guaranteed that the poorestworkers in America would make no more than 53 percent of thefederal poverty rate even if they worked full-time. In other words,even two full-time workers employed at the minimum wage wouldearn barely enough money to keep a family of four above thepoverty threshold of $19,800 per year.
Categorically Unequal
168
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55
0.5
Prop
orti
on o
f Pov
erty
Ear
ning
s
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Republican Republican Republican
Rep
ublic
anDemocrat
Dem
ocra
t Democrat
Figure 5.4 Earnings for a Full-Time Minimum-Wage Job as aShare of Poverty Earnings for a Family of Four
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Bureau of the Census,Statistical Abstract of the United States.
From a per capita level of around 12 cents in 1960, spending on an-tipoverty programs more than tripled to peak at 30 cents in 1972 be-fore falling precipitously during Nixon’s second term. The free fallin poverty-related social services was checked early in the Carteradministration but then resumed during the inflation of the late1970s as Congress failed to make adjustments to transfers to reflectthe rising cost of living. Throughout the presidencies of RonaldReagan and George H. W. Bush, antipoverty spending remainedflat at only slightly above the level it had been on the eve of theGreat Society, a level that persisted through the early years of theClinton administration.
Thus, in terms of social spending on the poor, by the early 1990sit was as if Johnson’s war on poverty had never happened. Even
Categorically Unequal
170
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
2003
Dol
lars
per
Une
mpl
oyed
Wor
ker
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Year
Nixon-Ford Carter Reagan-Bush Clinton
Figure 5.5 Spending on Unemployment Benefits perUnemployed Worker
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the UnitedStates.
this reduced level of spending on the poor was too much, however,for congressional conservatives, who in 1996 succeeded in passingthe Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity ReconciliationAct (PRWORA), essentially forcing mothers of dependent childrenoff of welfare rolls and into the labor force by ending the entitle-ment to open-ended income transfers. Aid to Families with Depen-dent Children (AFDC) was replaced by a new program called Tem-porary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which gave mothersonly two years of assistance before requiring them to work. Accord-ing to the terms of the legislation, 25 percent of all families weresupposed to leave the welfare rolls by 1997, with 50 percent ex-pected to be working by 2002.
As indicated by figure 5.7, which depicts the percentage of poor
Remaking the Political Economy
171
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
2003
Dol
lars
per
Per
son
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Year
Roosevelt-Truman
Eis
enho
wer Kennedy-
JohnsonNixon-
Ford
Car
ter Reagan-Bush
Figure 5.6 Per Capita Public Spending on Social Services for thePoor, 1930 to 1995
Source: Carter et al. (2006).
families receiving AFDC or TANF benefits by year, the effect of thenew law on welfare use was sudden and dramatic. Historically therate of welfare use in the United States had been low because Con-gress wrote the Social Security Act to exclude black workers anddelegate to states the right to determine eligibility. Given the over-representation of African Americans among the poor and the dis-proportionate location of all poor families in southern states withstringent eligibility requirements and low payments, only a tinyfraction of the poor actually received welfare before the 1960s. In-deed, until 1965 the share of poor families receiving income trans-fers ranged only from 10 to15 percent.
The passage of civil rights laws and other federal reforms duringthe Great Society made it more difficult for states to deny relief to
Categorically Unequal
172
Figure 5.7 Poor Families Receiving AFDC or TANF, 1960 to 2005
Sources: Carter et al. (2006); U.S. Bureau of the Census.
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Perc
enta
ge o
n W
elfa
re
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Bankruptcy of NWRO
Founding of NWRO
PRWORA
into legislation. The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-tunity Reconciliation Act was a self-proclaimed effort to “end wel-fare as we know it,” and as is obvious from figure 5.7, the effect onusage rates was immediate and profound. From a figure of 36 per-cent in 1996, the share of poor families receiving federal incometransfers fell sharply to just 10 percent in 2004, a level of welfare uti-lization last observed in 1963. Along with the decline in welfare re-ceipt came a drop in spending for other entitlements that were tiedto it, such as food stamps. As shown in figure 5.8, real expendituresfor food stamps fell dramatically as the new welfare policy pushedwomen off of welfare and into ineligibility for food stamps.Whereas federal spending on food stamps had totaled $840 perpoor person on the eve of welfare reform, by 2000 the figure had
Categorically Unequal
174
Figure 5.8 Real per Capita Spending on Food Stamps, 1970 to2002
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the UnitedStates.
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
2003
Dol
lars
per
Poo
r Pe
rson
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Year
Nixon-Ford
Carter Reagan-Bush Clinton
Nixon and Ford administrations and stabilized at 8.8 workers perthousand under President Jimmy Carter.
The decline in federal employment resumed during the first Rea-gan administration, but then recovered somewhat before experi-encing a sustained decline over the course of the two Clinton administrations. The election of George Bush in 2000, however,brought an unprecedented assault on federal employment: thenumber of federal workers per thousand fell to a record low of 6.2within two years of his assuming office, the fastest drop in federalemployment in American history. In relative terms, the federal gov-ernment is now smaller than at any point since 1940, reflecting itsreduced capacity for managing and regulating the U.S. politicaleconomy.
Categorically Unequal
176
Figure 5.9 Nondefense Government Workers per 1,000Population
Sources: Carter et al. (2006); U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States.
10
9.5
9
8.5
8
7.5
7
6.5
6
Num
ber
per
1,00
0 Pe
rson
s
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
ClintonKennedy-Johnson
Nixon-Ford
Carter Reagan-Bush Bush
5.11 plots the average interest rate charged on credit cards com-pared with the interest rate prevailing in the rest of the economy. Ascan be seen, the gap between the two series was relatively narrowduring the 1970s, averaging only 4.4 percentage points. Over thecourse of the 1980s and 1990s, however, the gap steadily widened,earning credit card lenders, in real terms, more money per dollarloaned. During the period 2000 to 2005, the gap between the inter-est rate on credit cards and the prevailing rate averaged 8.2 percent-age points.
The rising mountain of consumer debt is not without risks tobanks, of course, despite high interest rates and record profits, for ifthe debt becomes too burdensome to sustain, some credit cardholders simply walk away from their obligations by declaringbankruptcy. Historically, bankruptcy laws in the United States were
Categorically Unequal
178
Figure 5.10 Per Capita Consumer Debt, 1945 to 2005
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve.
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
2006
Dol
lars
per
Per
son
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Year
relatively lenient with consumers who borrowed over their heads,allowing them to go to court and wipe away most of their obliga-tions to begin their financial lives afresh. For bankers left with theunredeemable loans, however, this act represented an “abuse” ofthe bankruptcy system, and at their behest, Congress in 2005passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-tion Act.
The new law placed barriers on the road to bankruptcy andforced struggling consumers to pay down more of their accumu-lated debt. After 2005, debtors were obligated to undergo “creditcounseling” in a government-approved program before being al-lowed even to file for bankruptcy, and then once a filing had beenmade, they had to pay all back taxes before being allowed to pro-
Remaking the Political Economy
179
Figure 5.11 Interest on Credit Card Debt Versus Overall InterestRates, 1975 to 2005
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve.
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Inte
rest
Rat
e
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
Year
Credit Card Interest
Overall Interest
percent in 1917, and reaching 77 percent in 1918, again with no dif-ferentiation between capital gains and regular income. The end ofthe war brought a slight reduction in taxes, with the top rate fallingto 73 percent until 1922, when a Republican administration andCongress lowered the top rate to 58 percent before easing it steadilydownward to 44 percent in 1923 and 25 percent in 1924, where it re-mained until the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. At the sametime, beginning in 1922, Congress also differentiated capital gainsfrom regular income, reducing the rate of tax on gains from the saleof assets such as stocks and bonds to just 12.5 percent.
The advent of the New Deal revolutionized American tax policyby introducing a progressive system that taxed additional incomeat steadily higher rates as earnings rose. From 1932 through 1935,the wealthiest Americans paid 63 percent on regular income over$1 million, and the tax on capital gains rose from 12.5 percent to
Remaking the Political Economy
181
Figure 5.12 Top Marginal Tax Rates and Capital Gains TaxRates, 1913 to 2005
Sources: Carter et al. (2006); U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States.
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Tax
Rat
e
1910
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Year
Rate on Top Income
Rate on Capital Gains
ity to the system, raising the average tax rate to nearly 40 percentfor wealthy households while leaving the rates paid by affluent andpoor household about the same.
Most recently, George W. Bush’s tax cuts reduced the averagerate for all three classes, but progressivity was substantially re-duced compared to the Clinton years, and the burden of paying forgovernment was shifted downward in the income distribution. Asof 2005, poor households paid 20 percent of their income in taxes,affluent households paid 27 percent, and wealthy households paid34 percent—not quite the bonanza for the rich achieved at the endof the second Reagan administration, but a far cry from the pro-gressive taxation that prevailed from 1932 to 1980 under arrange-ments set by the New Deal.
Categorically Unequal
184
Figure 5.13 Average Tax Rates for Households Earning $20,000,$200,000, and $2 Million per Year
Source: Author’s calculations.
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Tax
Rat
e
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
ClintonNixon-Ford Reagan-Bush Bush
$20,000 Income
$2 Million Income
$200,000 Income
represents a complex choreography, a “dance of ideology and un-equal riches” in which polarization inhibits support for redistribu-tion, which produces greater inequality, which feeds more polariza-tion, which generates even more inequality.
They argue that the power of this choreography has been exacer-bated by an increase in the number of poor people without politicalrights who cannot vote and thus cannot exert political pressurefrom the bottom in support of redistributive policies. They point tothe post-1965 revival of immigration and note that the correlationbetween the percentage foreign-born and political polarization is0.92. The current potential for polarization and inequality is evengreater than they suppose, however, for they do not take into ac-count the huge increase in the share of immigrants who are not
Remaking the Political Economy
189
Figure 5.14 Indices of Income Inequality and PoliticalPolarization Developed by McCarty, Poole, andRosenthal (2006)
Source: Piketty and Saez (2001), figure 1.2. Reprinted with permis-sion from MIT Press.
21
19
17
15
13
11
9
7
.85
.8
.75
.7
.65
.6
.55
.5
Perc
enta
ge S
hare
Pola
riza
tion
Ind
ex
1913
1917
1921
1925
1929
1933
1937
1941
1945
1949
1953
1957
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
1981
1985
1989
1993
1997
Year
r = .78
Income Share of Top 1% House Polarization Index
tial concentration of advantage and deprivation is best measuredusing the P* isolation index, which yields the proportion of poor oraffluent families in the neighborhood of the average poor or afflu-ent person (Massey and Denton 1988; Massey and Eggers 1990).Figure 5.16 shows trends in the concentration of poverty using P*indices computed for 1970 through 2000, and figure 5.17 does thesame for the concentration of affluence.
At all points in time over the past thirty years, affluence has beenmore concentrated spatially than poverty. In other words, thosewith money are more likely to live in homogenously affluent envi-ronments than are those without money to live in homogenouslypoor environments. Geographic concentration increased at both
Remaking the Political Economy
193
Figure 5.15 Income Segregation in Large Metropolitan Areasof the United States, 1970 to 2000
Source: Massey and Fischer (2003).
0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
Aff
luen
t-Po
or D
issi
mila
rity
1970 1980
0.398
0.287
0.43
0.373
1990 2000
Year
194
Figure 5.16 Concentration of Poverty in Large U.S.Metropolitan Areas, 1970 to 2000
Source: Massey and Fischer (2003).
0.3
0.28
0.26
0.24
0.22
0.2
0.18
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
Pove
rty
Isol
atio
n In
dex
1970 1980
0.162
0.136
0.279
0.246
1990 2000
Year
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
Aff
luen
ce Is
olat
ion
Ind
ex
1970 1980
0.276
0.308
0.3560.338
1990 2000
Year
Figure 5.17 Concentration of Affluence in Large U.S.Metropolitan Areas, 1970 to 2000
Source: Massey and Fischer (2003).
Categorically Unequal
competence. Figure 6.1 reproduces Eckes’s results to show how dif-ferent subtypes of women are stereotypically perceived within con-temporary society.
It is immediately apparent that most of the subtypes cluster inthe top left-hand or bottom right-hand quadrants of the socialspace, zones normally reserved for pitied and envied out-groups.No women really fall into the despised quadrant at the bottomright, and none really fall into the esteemed quadrant at the top left.Those closest to the space normally reserved for despised out-groups are “bourgeois women” and “chicks,” and those closest tothe space usually occupied by esteemed in-groups are “societyladies” and “confident types.” But for the most part the zones asso-ciated with esteem and contempt are empty.
Instead, the social spaces associated with pity and envy are
Categorically Unequal
216
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.51.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
Competence
War
mth
Cluster A
Cluster B
Cluster C
Cluster D
Housewife
Wallflower Secretary
Naive Type
ChickBourgeois
Trendy
Society LadyConfident Type
VampIntellectual
HippiePunk
Women's Libber
Career Woman
Feminist
Typical Woman
Figure 6.1 Stereotype Content Model Applied to SelectedFemale Subtypes
Source: Eckes (2002). Reprinted with permission from Springer-VerlagGmbH.
Although the level of occupational segregation between menand women remained fairly constant from 1860 to 1960, the under-lying size and structure of the labor market changed dramatically.Whereas in 1860 the female workforce numbered just 5.2 million,only 16 percent of whom held white-collar jobs, by 1960 the num-ber of female workers stood at 22.2 million, and 53 percent heldwhite-collar jobs (see Carter et al. 2006; figure 6.2). Overall, the la-bor force grew by 144 percent, and the structure of employmentshifted decisively away from agriculture—first toward manufac-turing and then toward services.
The fact that gender segregation remained constant despite thesemassive shifts suggests that a great deal of boundary work was
Engendering Inequality
219
Figure 6.2 Occupational Segregation, Female Labor ForceParticipation, and Female Concentration in White-Collar Jobs, 1860 to 2000
Source: Carter et al. (2006).
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Perc
enta
ge
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Year
Male-Female Segregation
Percentage White-Collar
Labor Force Participation
ers on the right. The y-axis indicates the percentage of women inthe different occupational categories. As can be seen, relativelymore women work in nonmanual jobs, but within the white-collarsector the presence of women falls as one moves up the ladder ofoccupational earnings and prestige; the same pattern prevails in theblue-collar sector.
The rise of horizontal segregation in the United States is sug-gested by the data in figure 6.4, which plots the percentage of fe-male workers in manual and nonmanual jobs from 1860 through1990. Up through 1900, there was no differentiation between thetwo sectors. Few women were in the labor force, but they were
Engendering Inequality
221
Figure 6.3 Charles-Grusky Model of Gender Segregation
Source: Charles-Grusky (2004).
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
Perc
enta
ge F
emal
e
Profes
sional
Man
ager
ial
Clerica
l
Serv
ices
Sales
Crafts
Operati
ves
Farm
worker
s
Laborer
s
OccupationManualNon-manual
equally likely to work in the manual or nonmanual sector. There-after, female specialization in white- as opposed to blue-collar jobsincreased at an accelerating rate, producing a widening gap in thegender composition of the two sectors. Whereas 55 percent of non-manual workers were female by 1990, only 31 percent of manualworkers were women.
Figure 6.5 illustrates the rise in vertical gender segregation after1900. Up through 1900, those few females who worked were just aslikely as men to be employed as managers, proprietors, clericalworkers, or sales workers, and females were actually overrepre-sented in professional occupations compared to their small share inthe labor force. After 1900, however, women came increasingly todominate clerical occupations, until by 1990 nearly 80 percent ofclerical workers were female. Women also came to constitute a
Categorically Unequal
222
Figure 6.4 Percentage of Female Workers in Manual andNonmanual Occupations
Source: Carter et al. (2006).
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
Perc
enta
ge F
emal
e
Year18
6018
7018
8018
9019
0019
1019
2019
3019
4019
5019
6019
7019
8019
90
Nonmanual Occupations
Manual Occupations
growing share of sales workers. After 1910, however, the share ofwomen in professional occupations leveled off and then fell gradu-ally through 1960 as the number of female managers and propri-etors grew very slowly and at levels below their rising share of thetotal labor force, a pattern that lasted until 1970.
The most comprehensive account of the gendered transforma-tion of the American labor market in the twentieth century is that ofGoldin (1990). After 1900, industrialization increased the demandfor office workers. Managers, professionals, clerks, secretaries, andsales personnel became increasingly important in creating value forbusiness enterprises. To meet the surge in demand for nonmanualworkers, legislatures passed new laws mandating school atten-dance and increased funding for secondary education. As a conse-quence, levels of high school graduation rose among both malesand females, but with factories providing an attractive and lucra-
Engendering Inequality
223
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States Millennial Edition.
Figure 6.5 Percentage of Female Workers in NonmanualOccupations
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
Perc
enta
ge F
emal
e
Year
Professionals
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
ManagersProprietorsClerical
Sales
231
Figure 6.6 Mean SEI Score and Percentage with CollegeDegree, by Occupational Status Quintile
100.0
90.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0SEI S
core
or
Perc
enta
ge o
f Col
lege
Gra
dua
tes
Status Quintile
College-MaleCollege-Female
Status-MaleStatus-Female
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Source: Jacobs (2001).
Figure 6.7 Earnings by Occupational Status
$70,000
$60,000
$50,000
$40,000
$30,000
$20,000
$10,000
$0
Ear
ning
s
Status Quintile
Males
Females
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Source: Jacobs (2001).
Figure 6.8 puts aside education and shows the degree to whichother measured factors statistically account for observed differ-ences between male and female earnings. As already noted, expe-rience accounts for only 16 percent of the gap, and given the weak-ened state of unions, as described in the last chapter, it is hardlysurprising that unionization accounts for only 5 percent of the gap.Likewise, racial composition explains only 4 percent of the gap,suggesting that women earn roughly the same amounts regardlessof race. By far the two most important measured factors account-ing for the male-female earnings gap are industrial location (33percent) and occupation (42 percent), implying that if the distribu-tion of men and women across occupations were somehow equal-ized, up to three-quarters of the earnings differential would disap-pear.
Engendering Inequality
233
Figure 6.8 Contribution to Gender Pay Gap of MeasuredCharacteristics
16%
4%
42%
5%
33%
Experience
Race
Occupation
Industry
Unionization
Source: Blau and Kahn (2006).
collar occupational distribution. There has been little or no move-ment of women into skilled crafts and operative categories, the twomost highly remunerated blue-collar occupations. Moreover, al-though the share of women increased slightly among farmworkers,it rose substantially among unskilled laborers, the lowest and mostpoorly paid blue-collar job category. From 1960 to 2005, the share ofwomen among laborers increased by a factor of ten, going from 2percent to 20 percent. Women have gained access to blue-collarjobs, but only those at the bottom of the occupational distribution.Within the blue-collar sector in general, women remain substan-tially underrepresented compared with their counterparts in thewhite-collar workforce.
Categorically Unequal
236
Figure 6.9 Women in Major Occupational Groups
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Perc
enta
ge F
emal
e
Profes
sional
Man
ager
ial
Clerica
l
Serv
ices
Sales
Crafts
Operati
ves
Farm
worker
s
Laborer
s
Occupation
19601980
20002005
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Stratification at Home and AbroadProcesses of categorical stratification occurring along the lines ofrace, class, and gender have combined to make the United Statesthe most unequal among advanced industrial nations.
A common way of measuring inequality is by forming the ratioof the ninetieth to the tenth percentile of the income distribution.Figure 7.1 uses data from Smeeding (2005) to show this ratio for se-lected nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD), essentially the “club” for developed nationsaround the world. These ratios reveal the exceptional nature ofAmerican inequality. The American income ratio of 5.45 is well
Categorically Unequal
250
Figure 7.1 Ratio of 90th to 20th Percentile of IncomeDistribution in Selected OECD Nations
6
5.5
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
Rat
io
Finlan
d
Swed
en
Nether
lands
Germ
any
Belgiu
mFra
nce
Switz
erlan
d
Canad
a
Australi
a
United K
ingdom
United St
ates
Country
2.9 2.96 2.983.18 3.31
3.54 3.623.95
4.334.58
5.45
Source: Smeeding (2005).
figure 7.3. Specifically, this figure shows the percentage of variancein personal income explained by each categorical factor from 1950to 2005.
As can be seen, in 1950 most of the explained variance in per-sonal income was accounted for by gender. The predominant cleav-age in American society was thus between male and female work-ers, with gender explaining 74 percent of the variance comparedwith only 18 percent for class (as measured by education) and 4percent for race. Over the next fifty-five years, however, gendersteadily declined as a significant factor in the American stratifica-tion system, with the share of variance explaining stratificationdropping at a rate of 0.8 percent per year from 1950 to 1980, then ac-celerating to 1.4 percent per year between 1950 and 1980 before leveling off in 2000 and 2005. Over the entire period, the share of in-come stratification explained by gender fell from nearly three-quar-ters in 1950 to less than one-quarter in 2005.
What replaced gender in terms of explanatory power was class:the share of income explained by education went from 18 percent in1950 to 62 percent in 2005. The percentage of variance explained byrace fluctuated somewhat over the period but changed little over-
America Unequal
253
White Black Asian Hispanic Other
Male
Female
College Graduate
One to Three Years of College
High School Graduate
Less Than Twelve Years of Schooling
Figure 7.2 Four-by-Five-by-Two Factorial Design for Analysisof Variance in U.S. Income Inequality, 1950 to 2005
Source: Author’s compilation.
all, bottoming out in 1970 when it reached 3 percent and then risingto 8 percent in 2000 before falling back to 7 percent in 2005. Consis-tent with the conclusions of chapter 6, the interaction between classand gender also increased in importance over the period, as shownin figure 7.4, which plots the percentage of variance captured by thevarious interactions between race, class, and gender from 1950 to2005. Although the percentage of variance explained by the class-gender interaction is small compared to the main effects, its relativeimportance nonetheless rose steadily and significantly from 1950through 2000, going from 3 percent to 7.5 percent before droppingto 5.5 percent in 2005.
Figure 7.5 repeats the ANOVA using family income instead ofpersonal income. Although the overall story is similar, the timing of
Categorically Unequal
254
Figure 7.3 Variance in Personal Income Explained by Race,Education, and Gender, 1950 to 2005
Source: IPUMS.
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Perc
enta
ge
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Year
GenderRaceEducation
the changes in categorical importance is different when they are fil-tered through the American family system, which itself underwentsignificant change over the period. The critical year in accountingfor family income appears to be 1980. Until that date, the relativeimportance of gender was rising, with the percentage of varianceexplained going from 38 percent in 1950 to 51 percent in 1980, whilethe share explained by education fluctuated around 40 percent withno clear trend. After 1980, however, the relative importance of gen-der in explaining family income dropped markedly, going from 51percent to 28 percent by 2005, while that explained by educationrose from 40 percent to 61 percent.
Figure 7.6 shows the share of variance in family income ex-
America Unequal
255
Figure 7.4 Variance in Personal Income Explained by Race-Education-Gender Interactions
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Perc
enta
ge
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Year
Gender EducationGender RaceRace EducationGender Race Education
Source: IPUMS.
plained by the various interactions of race, class, and gender at dif-ferent points in time. As with personal income, there is a very clearincrease in the gender-class interaction, but most of the change incategorical importance is observed after 1980, and the decline from2000 to 2005 is sharper. Unlike the case of personal income, how-ever, there is also evidence of an increase in the race-class interac-tion after 1980, though in absolute terms it is relatively small.
The Future of Categorical InequalityAmerican income inequality has thus shifted from stark divisionson the basis of gender to new foundations based on class. That class-based categorical mechanisms have risen to undergird America’s
Categorically Unequal
256
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Perc
enta
ge
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Year
GenderRaceEducation
Figure 7.5 Variance in Family Income Explained by Race,Education, and Gender
Source: IPUMS.
new system of inequality is also suggested by figure 7.7, whichshows Gini indices of income inequality for selected OECD nationscomputed before and after the deduction of taxes. The before-taxGini coefficients indicate the amount of raw inequality generated bycapitalist markets in each country, whereas the after-tax Gini indi-cates the degree of inequality that remains after transfers have beenmade to fund the social welfare system in each country. As the graybars show, before taxes the United States is no more or no less equalthan any other country. Its pre-tax Gini is .45, only slightly above thevalue of .44 in Sweden, .43 in Germany, and .42 in the Netherlands,but well below the values of .50 and .49 in Belgium and France andthe same as those prevailing in Australia and Britain.
Taxation works in a redistributive direction for all countries, as
America Unequal
257
Figure 7.6 Variance in Family Income Explained by Race-Education-Gender Interactions
Source: IPUMS.
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Perc
enta
ge
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Year
Gender EducationGender RaceRace EducationGender Race Education
indicated by the universally lower values for the after-tax Ginis, butthe extent of the redistribution is much less in the United States. Itscoefficient drops much less as a result of taxation than happens inother countries. The Gini coefficient for income inequality in Bel-gium, for example, falls from .50 before taxes to just .26 after taxes.The after-tax Gini coefficient is at .30 or below for all countries ex-cept Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and inthe former two nations the respective figures are .31 and .34, com-pared with .37 in the United States. Thus, whereas the economy ofBelgium produces a distribution of income that is 11 percent moreunequal than in the United States before taxes, afterward the insti-
Categorically Unequal
258
Figure 7.7 Gini Index of Income Inequality Before and AfterTaxes in Selected OECD Nations
0.5
0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
Gin
i Coe
ffic
ient
Finlan
d
Swed
en
Nether
lands
Germ
any
Belgiu
mFra
nce
Switz
erlan
d
Canad
a
Australi
a
United K
ingdom
United St
ates
Country
0.240.25 0.25 0.25 0.26
0.290.3 0.3
0.31
0.34
0.37
0.450.450.45
0.41
0.39
0.490.5
0.430.42
0.44
0.4
Pretax GiniAfter-tax Gini
Source: Smeeding (2005).