Post on 30-Oct-2014
Francis GillerlainRussian Comprehensives
There Is No Alternative?:
Russian Electoral Opposition in the 2012 Elections
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was well known for insisting that there was
“no alternative”i to free-market capitalism, and that it was the only viable economic model.ii
Echoes of this certainty are found today in Russia’s political system. Before the 2011 State
Duma election, and before the re-election of Vladimir Putin to a third term as president of the
Russian Federation,iii many claimed that there was “no alternative” to Putin and his party of
United Russia. The New York Times’ Tyler Miksanek claimed late in 2011 that “with no
established opposition, Putin is the only possible outcome for the future of Russia.”iv Putin’s
campaign manager Vladimir Litvinenko is on the record stating that Purin “is the only choice.”v
Even one of Putin’s 2012 presidential challengers, Mikhail Prokorov, was quoted in his blog
saying “Putin is so far the only figure who can manage this inefficient state machine.”vi
What of these claims? United Russia did maintain tenuous control of the State Duma in
2011,vii and Putin did win the 2012 Presidential Elections, albeit with widespread accusationsviii
of voter fraudix in both cases. To a certain extent, this backs up the assertions of Putin’s
“inevitability” when viewed in a certain light, but something is different about this round of
elections. The claim that there is “no opposition” is beginning to change. Though they did not
change the outcome, the turnouts of these elections have spawned humongous, spontaneous
protests against Putin and his regime,x lasting from before the State Duma elections until today,
in the aftermath of the Presidential Elections.xi New parties, opposition coalitions, and
movements are forming, both within the electoral system and outside of it, uniting under the
common goal of getting rid of Putin and United Russia.
Thesis
To what degree, then, is the conception that there is “no alternative” to Putin actually
true? What do the opposition parties themselves say, what are their programs for Russia, and
how much do these parties represent a realistic and reasonable “established opposition” that has
an actual chance of both meeting their shared goal and truly governing Russia?
A. United Russia (ER)
In order to understand the programs and goals of the opposition, one must first understand
who and what they are up against. Founded in 2001, the contemporary United Russia party was a
merger of Boris Yeltsin’s Unity Party and the Fatherland – All Russia Bloc. These individual
pieces, constituting the new Party, backed former PM Vladimir Putin for the presidency in the
2000 election, and formed the party shortly thereafter. With Putin’s continuing leadership, the
Party has maintained dominance within Russia’s political system since that time. Putin’s
ascension marked an end to the fierce competition raging in the 1990s, between parties that stood
behind the newly founded capitalist systems, and opposition parties who wished for a return to
the socialism of the Soviet Union. This argument was dropped in favor of addressing the
immediate concerns of national stability. Putin both promised and supplied that stability,xii
combatting the chaos of economic “shock therapy” with new economic programs, crushing some
of the burgeoning corrupt oligarchy under the heel of the state, and returning some of that
corporate power back to the state apparatus.
The contemporary program of United Russia reflects that continuing focus on prosperity and
stability at any cost. The modern Party promises a new “modernization of economy, education,
business climate, industry, infrastructure, innovation, productivity and safety regulations,” new
social welfare programs, combatting of continuing business and bureaucratic corruption, a re-
tooling of the judicial system, fighting both against illegal immigration and xenophobia,
development of a new, inclusive political system, strengthening internal and external security,
and a foreign policy focused specifically on the “welfare of the people” of Russia, as well as the
creation of a new Eurasian political and economic Union.xiii In a sentence, everything, for
everyone, at all times, centered around a gigantic modernization effort pushed forward by Putin
and fueled by Russia’s immense hydrocarbon export profits.
The strength of E.R. and Putin’s program comes primarily from its universality. E.R., as a
“centrist” party, has largely subsumed the policies and planks of the opposition and diluted them
into a palatable format for the average Russian voter. Combine that with a strong grasp on the
media, and this allegedly wide-spread voter fraud, and one begins to get a handle on the iron grip
Putin and United Russia have been able to maintain for so long. This control is seemingly
beginning to slip, with United Russia’s loss of 77 seats in the latest round of elections, falling
from 64.3% of the Duma vote in 2007 to 49.4% in 2011’s elections.xiv Putin’s popularity has also
dropped, earning only 63.60% of the popular vote,xv as opposed to the high 70% garnered both
by Medvedev in 2008 and Putin himself in 2004.xvi Despite electoral setbacks, United Russia
does still maintain a membership numbering around two million, according to their own
statistics, remaining the largest party membership in the Russian Federation.xvii This suggests
that, despite this widespread political ubiquity and dominance, Putin and United Russia’s
popularity may be beginning to wane.
B. The Opposition
Russian opposition to Putin and United Russia is composed of two blocs: the officially
registered political parties which compete in elections and thus operate “within the system,” and
those that have either been barred from registering, were banned outright, reject the political
process wholesale, therefore operating entirely “outside the system.”
i. “System” Opposition
There are only six registered political parties in Russia aside from United Russia that
compete in elections, four of which ran alternate presidential candidates, and three of which
i "Press Conference for American correspondents in London." Speeches, Interviews and Other Statements. Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d. Web. <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/Speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=104389&doctype=1>
ii "Origin of the expression: There is no alternative." The Phrase Finder. Phrases.co.uk, n.d. Web. <http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/376000.html>
iii "Russia election: Vladimir Putin celebrates victory." News - Europe. BBC, n.d. Web. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17254548>
iv Miksanek, Tyler. "Putin’s Problem: A Rumbling Russia- December 9, 2011 ." RantAWeek. N.p., n.d. Web. <http://rantaweek.com/putins-problem-a-rumbling-russia/>
v "Midas Touch in St. Petersburg: Friends of Putin Glow Brightly." World News. New York Times, n.d. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/world/europe/ties-to-vladimir-putin-generate-fabulous-wealth-for-a-select-few-in-russia.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all>
vi "Prokhorov sees no alternative to Putin, urges ruling party reform." Features - Society. RIANovosti, n.d. Web. <http://en.ria.ru/society/20111208/169496911.html>
vii "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2012 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100028713304&vrn=100100028713299®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100028713304&type=233>
viii "Voters Watch Polls in Russia, and Fraud Is What They See." World News. New York Times, n.d. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/world/europe/russian-parliamentary-elections-criticized-by-west.html>
ix "Russia Elections: Voting Fraud Allegations Mar Putin's Win." Huffpost World. Huffington Post, n.d. Web. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/04/russia-elections-fraud-putin_n_1319796.html>
x "Russian election: Biggest protests since fall of USSR."News - Europe. BBC, n.d. Web. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16122524>
xi "No to NATO, Afghan drugs and WTO: Communist anger spills into Russian streets." News. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/news/communists-nato-bases-protests-507/>
xii "Sudden rise of the Unity party ." News- Europe. BBC, 1999. Web. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/572646.stm>
actually passed the 7% threshold to receive Duma representation. Within this small band, there is
arguably one that represents a legitimate alternative political program, that has made any
considerable progress in creating political momentum against E.R.
a. Parties with Representation in State Duma
1. Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)
The top “system” opposition party is the successor party to the banned Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, which hold the sorts of views one would expect them to. In their party
program, the Communist Party openly calls for the full and uncompromising restoration of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The KPRF believes that nothing less than a total return to
socialism, what they deem as an establishment of “democratic workers’ power” with “maximum,
and increasing worker participation in government,” can solve what they see as capitalism
“inevitably giving rise to exploitation of man by man,” leading to societal discord, or the “deep
split” in Russia’s society. They expand this further, claiming that there will be a “planet-wide
catastrophe” if capitalism remains the dominant system. They strongly reject Gorbachevian
reform attempts, or a “socialist democracy” with a “friendly face,” and strongly defend the
xiii "Программное обращение Партии." официальный сайт партии . ЕДИНАЯ РОССИЯ, n.d. Web. <http://er.ru/party/program/>
xiv Nordsieck, Wolfram. "Russia - 2007 & 2011 Duma Elections." Parties and Elections in Europe . N.p., n.d. Web. <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/russia.html>
xv "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2012 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100031793509&vrn=100100031793505®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100031793509&type=227>
xvi "Results of Previous Presidential Elections." Russia Votes. Centre for the Study of Public Policy The Levada Center - Moscow, n.d. Web. <http://www.russiavotes.org/president/presidency_previous.php>
xvii официальный сайт партии. ЕДИНАЯ РОССИЯ, n.d. Web. <http://er.ru/party/program/>
‘contributions’ of J.V. Stalin to Soviet socialism.xviii Party leaders have therefore called for a “re-
Stalinization” of Russia.xix In a move in this direction, the KPRF takes a tough stance on
immigration, calling for entry quotas, supremacy of the Russian language, and return to Soviet
era ethnic cataloguing in official documentation.xx
Perhaps surprisingly to Americans, and yet maybe also unsurprising for some Russians,
the KPRF has been steadily gaining in popularity. The KPRF gained 19% of the 2011 Duma
vote,xxi up from 11% in the last elections,xxii and Presidential Candidate Zyuganov gained 17% of
the 2012 vote,xxiii holding conspicuously steady from the previous cycle’s results.xxiv The
Communist Party also reportedly had a membership of some 180,000 spread in some 80 regions
as of 2007, though the number is likely higher today, corresponding with better success at the
polls.xxv This membership number also does not account for support from allied non-KPRF
socialist groups within Russia. These results suggest that the old question of capitalism vs.
socialism – the one moved away from with the end of the Cold War and the rise of United Russia
– may be coming back. Reuters recently suggested that the rise of the KPRF is accounted for
mainly by KPRF votes “against it all,” or support from liberal ‘fellow travelers’ whose vote was
merely a “count against United Russia” and not for the KPRF.xxvi The rise of Melechon and the
Front de Gauche in France,xxvii as well as the KKE in Greece,xxviii suggests that it may also be
more complicated than that, and that the KPRF may also be attracting a real base due to
economic instability, creating a loss of what little faith in the market existed in Russia.
Nonetheless, the KPRF is both continually criticized from those “farther Left” for being a
xviii "Программа партии." КПРФ, n.d. Web. <http://kprf.ru/party/program/>
xix "Communists lay carnations for Stalin." Breaking News. News.Com.AU, n.d. Web. <http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/communists-lay-carnations-for-stalin/story-e6frfku0-1225974765203>
xx "Minority report: Communists play ethnic card ." Politics. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/communists-nationality-passport-election-587/>.
‘comprador’ or ‘Kremlin-backed’ party, while simultaneously receiving criticism from the right
for the simple fact of being self-described Communists. Despite such criticism, the Communist
Party still receives wide-spanning support, and the electoral results also suggest that the KPRF is
seen as the most “credible” of the approved opposition parties. This is enhanced by the KPRF’s
having of one of the more “radical” and truly distinguishable alternative programs. It remains
unclear how the KPRF would fare in such elections if other Leftist parties were allowed to
register and participate, but for the time being, the KPRF remains the strong voice of the official
left wing in Russia.
2. A Fair/Just Russia (SR)
Originally formed with Kremlin backing in 2006 as a merger of the Rodina, Pensioners
and Life parties, and later the Greens and other socialist parties, the Russian Social Democrats
represent a more moderate, pseudo-Euro-socialist party.xxix A Just Russia calls for a vast political
and economic liberalization (sans their call for a total renationalization of all natural resource
monopolies), including the introduction of direct elections from local to Federal levels, strong
public-access television, reduction of income and VAT taxes and new ‘wealth’ taxes, subsidies
for alternative energy production, and social welfare.xxx They, too, openly wish for a Eurasian
Union, and the ‘protection of ethnic Slavs’ within “post-Soviet space.” The SR terms this
program a “New Socialism, (…) implementing universal and national values in a real social
practice.” They also criticize United Russia as “not interested in change,” the KPRF as “stuck in
the distant Soviet past,” the LDPR as “loudly criticizing, but quietly cooperating with the
government,” and the ‘Just Cause’ as “a convenient oligarchic sparring partner for ‘United
Russia,’” making the SR out to be the only legitimate alternative choice, of course outside of the
merely ‘outdated’ KPRF. A Fair/Just Russia boasts an impressive 400,000 members, though this
does not necessarily translate into equally impressive electoral results.xxxi The SR is the third
most popular political party, up 4% from the 2007 Duma Elections to 13% in 2011.xxxii
Presidential candidate Mironov is slightly less popular than his party, only winning 3.8% of the
popular vote in the 2012 Presidential Elections.xxxiii Mironov himself predicted a Putin win in
2012 and promised himself to back Communist candidate Zyuganov,xxxiv as well as Putin in
2004,xxxv seemingly never believing in his own ability to run. As it stands right now, the SR is
Kremlin “pocket opposition” in the hands of Mironov. It lines up with United Russia or the other
registered political parties in most of its policies, and does not represent a true alternative
xxi "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2011 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100028713304&vrn=100100028713299®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100028713304&type=233>
xxii "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2007 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100021960186&vrn=100100021960181®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100021960186&type=233>
xxiii "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2012 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100031793509&vrn=100100031793505®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100031793509&type=227>
xxiv "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2008 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100022249920&vrn=100100022176412®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100022249920&type=227>
xxv "Коммунистическая партия Российской Федерации."Партии. Lenta.Ru, n.d. Web. <http://duma.lenta.ru/parties/kprf/>
xxvi Carbonnel, Alissa. "Russian communists win support as Putin party fades." World. Reuters, n.d. Web. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/05/us-russia-election-communists-idUSTRE7B40KL20111205>
xxvii "In French Vote, Sound and Fury From the Left ." News -World. New York Times, n.d. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/world/europe/in-french-elections-sound-and-fury-from-the-lefts-melenchon.html>
xxviii “πολιτικού κόμματος KKE." Elections Meter. N.p., n.d. Web. <http://electionsmeter.com/polls/communist-party-of-greece?title=Greece>
political force. The SR seems also to believe that it will not move forward with Mironov at the
helm, and may be gearing up for a merger with the KPRF and other leftist parties.xxxvi There are
also rumors that the SR may boot Mironov in favor of a total revamp, including an alliance with
other, currently unregistered political forces.xxxvii If the merger or revamp go through, it is
possible that the SR could revitalize itself and its program, and become a political force to be
reckoned with.
3. Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)
Another allegedly Kremlin-backed “project,” the LDPR was formed in 1991 with leader
Vladimir Zhirinovsky at the helm. Zhirinovsky still leads the party to this day, and represents the
greatest “draw” of the LDPR: “crazy Vlad’s” own personality. He has been called both a
“fascist”xxxviii and the “Russian Hitler” on multiple occasions, not helped by the fact that he has
allied his party with other Russian ultranationalists as well as German far-right extremist parties,
threatening to close the borders of Russia as well as encourage Russian ethnic separatism in
European states.xxxix The party program itself is not much different, showing itself to be far more
aggressive than United Russia or the KPRF. The LDPR suggests re-nationalization of the energy
sector, restoration of a planned economy, and “priority of the military-industrial complex” within
the Russian economy. They are also unabashedly anti-immigration, stating that the country is in
need of “defense (…) from migrants.” The LDPR, like the KPRF, also calls for Russian
linguistic and ethnic centralism. The “Liberal Democrats” then represent a third step of
extremism after the KPRF and United Russia, in that they essentially want the Soviet economy
back without the Marxist-Leninist overtures to labor, with some social welfare windowdressing,
and a huge focus on the military. The LDPR also take a very hard line in foreign policy. They
state that the “sole source of aggression in international politics (…) is the United States,” and
that the main goals of the LDPR are to contain and combat the United States and strengthen
Russian power. They aim to do this through what is ostensibly a forced “economic and political
integration ‘of the Slavic world’ [and] former Soviet republics.” They also seek to cool relations
with China and strongly protect the Russian Far East, force the EU through economic warfare to
abandon NATO and the Baltic states, and reach out to form stronger military and economic
partnerships with “Iran, India, Pakistan, (…) and Venezuela.”xl This extreme party boasted a
membership count of 185,000 in 2010, although it has been known to “puff up” membership
numbers in the past.xli The LDPR is the fourth largest party within the Duma, winning 11% of the
vote in 2011, up from 8% previously. Candidate Zhirinovsky only managed to collect 6% of the
xxix Wilson, Josh. Chapman, Hannah."A Fair and Just Russia The Political Platform of Russia's Social Democrats Part 1: Philosopy and the Current State of Russia." POLITICS IN TRANSLATION. SRAS, n.d. Web. <http://www.sras.org/fair_and_just_russia>
xxx "Манифест парти." СПРАВЕДЛИВАЯ РОССИЯ, n.d. Web. <http://www.spravedlivo.ru/information/manifest2011/>
xxxi "History." Homepage. Sergei Mironov, n.d. Web. <http://mironov.info/just-russia-party/history/>
xxxii "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2011 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100028713304&vrn=100100028713299®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100028713304&type=233>
xxxiii "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2011 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100028713304&vrn=100100028713299®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100028713304&type=233>
xxxiv "Fair Russia candidate predicts Putin win in first round."Politics. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/mironov-election-zyuganov-conference-947/>
xxxv "Zyuganov and Mironov: Back to the future ." Russian Elections. Al-Jazeera, n.d. Web. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/russianelections/2012/02/201222535730502215.html>
xxxvi Andre Ballin, Russland Aktuell. "Mironov reassesses his political future." Politics. Russia Beyond the Headlines - Rossiskaya Gazeta, n.d. Web. <http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/03/11/mironov_reassess_his_political_future_15027.html>
xxxvii "Fair Russia goes radical." Politics. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/fair-russia-opposition-nemtsov/>
popular vote in 2012, down from 9% in 2008, again suggesting a rising party and a falling leader,
marred with continual accusations of cooperation with, and respect of Putin.xlii This suggests that,
even though the SR itself is considered to be a Kremlin-backed ‘artificial’ party, the criticisms of
the SR’s party program may, in fact, be entirely truthful.
b. Parties with No Representation in State Duma
4. Patriots of Russia (PR)
Founded in 2005 from the dregs of the KPRF, the Patriots of Russia are a bizarrely
unspecific Euro-socialist party, if it is not indeed an elaborate Kremlin-produced joke. Adorned
with a beautiful rainbow right below the very serious subtitle “Political Party,” the Patriots of
Russia online program, like that of many an impressionable first-year university student, loudly
proclaims the party’s “anti-political patriotic ideology,” consisting mainly of platitudes about
loving one’s country, not seeing divisions of “left and right,” or splits based on “nationality,
religion, sex and social status (…) only seeking to unite all citizens interested in the prosperity of
our country,” only seeing the gloriously ambiguous “Russian Patriot.” Their social policy is
summed up simply as “a happy man makes a happy country.” What the party stands for, outside
of these platitudes, or what is already being done by United Russia or has been said by A
Fair/Just Russia, is not elaborated in the party program. The PR also promises a doubling of
income, strong demographic growth, social welfare for all, and the complete elimination of mass
unemployment.xliii One then begins to wonder why the PR left out the very important “bring back
unicorns” and “cake for everybody” policies, as they fit in with the level of political “maturity.”
Such political infantilism is reflected in their unimpressive garnering of a mere .97% in the 2011
elections, and their Kremlin links are illuminated in their failure to run their own party leader
Gennady Semigin, instead backing Putin in the 2012 elections.xliv Nonetheless, the party still
managed to retain some 86,000 official members as of 2011.xlv The Patriots of Russia may be on
the way out, but like the Just Cause party, they simply desperately hang on year after year.
5. Just Cause (PD)
Formed in 2008 as a merged of the Union of Right Forces, Civil Force and the
Democratic Party of Russia, the PD is an openly Kremlin-sponsored, pro-oligarch, right-wing
“liberal” party, again correctly noted by the SR political platform. The PD political platform is
mainly centered on “liberation of entrepreneurship and economic growth,” primarily through
liberalization and privatization in the political and economic spheres, combined with
maintenance of some of the old Soviet-style social welfare systems. This program was made
manifest in the choice of billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov to run for president – he is the owner of
the New Jersey Jets and one of Russia’s wealthiest oligarchs. This presidential choice also
caused a split within the PD leadership, where candidate Prokhorov quit the party to run as an
independent after calling the PD a “puppet Kremlin party,” and railing against the electoral
system as an “elaborate sham orchestrated by a puppet master (…) Vladislav Surkov,” deputy
head of the administration. Despite this, Prokhorov, who managed to win 7% of the popular vote
in 2012, failed to criticize Putin or United Russia, and as noted earlier in fact praised Putin as
xxxviii Umland, Andreas. "Zhirinovsky’s "Last Thrust to the South" and the Definition of Fascism." Russian Politics and Law, vol 46, #4. <http://ku-eichstaett.academia.edu/AndreasUmland/Papers/91919/Zhirinovskys_Last_Thrust_to_the_South_and_the_Definition_of_Fascism>
xxxix Bidder, Benjamin. "Zhirinovsk'ys Follies Nuclear Threats and Busty Ladies in the Race for Second-Place in Russia." Russia. Spiegel.de, n.d. Web. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,538403,00.html>
xl "Программа ЛДПР." Либерально-демократическая партия России LDPR, n.d. Web. <http://www.ldpr.ru/>
xli Umland, Andreas. "Neo-Fascist Vladimir Zhirinovsky and His Extremely Right-Wing LDPR in Russia's Upcoming Parliamentary Elections." World. Foreign Policy Journal, n.d. Web. <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/11/07/vladimir-zhirinovsky-and-the-ldpr/>
xlii "Zhirinovsky, Mironov congratulate Putin on election win."Russian Presidential Elections 2012. radio Voice of Russia, n.d. Web. <http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_03_05/67538538/>
being the only capable leader. PD itself has fared much worse, being a pro-oligarch party in a sea
of anti-oligarch public sentiment, and is now left without a semi-popular leader. The party still
retains 60,000 members,xlvi but the PD is holding at just .6% of the Duma vote, and it is likely
that Just Cause will cease to exist in the next election, barring Prokhorov making an unlikely
return, or the party undertaking significant revamp.
6. Russian United Democratic Party (“Yabloko”)
Formed in 1993 from the pro-US and EU-oriented western integration electoral grouping
of Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin,xlvii the last registered, non-represented party is the RODP:
“Yabloko,” which holds many of the same views as its prior electoral bloc. Current leader Sergei
Mitrokhin “proposed to build “a modern state of the European type” in Russia,” with “people
capitalism” replacing “oligarchic capitalism,” including all of the guaranteed constitutional
freedoms and privatizations that would entail. Despite the fact that they are approved to
participate in elections by the Kremlin, the party’s opposition candidate Grigory Yavlinsky was
barred from running in the 2012 Presidential Elections. Yavlinsky criticized this move, but
himself admits that “only 20% of Russians have turned out to march against [these unfair]
parliamentary elections” opposed to 80% in the 1990s, and that “the opposition lacks any real
goal or leader,” again suggesting a lack of confidence in his own party’s ability to effect change
as well as in his own ability as a leader. The party currently has 55,000 members,xlviii and has
xliii "ПРОГРАММА ПАРТИИ." Патриоты России, n.d. Web. <http://www.patriot-rus.ru/partyProgramm/>
xliv "Russia's Patriots party supports Putin for president."Presidential elections in Russia (2012). RIANovosti, n.d. Web. <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111219/170366069.html>
xlv "Patriots of Russia ." Russian Parliamentary elections 2011. radio Voice of Russia, n.d. Web. <http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/09/21/56511568.html>
xlvi "О партии." ПРАВОЕ ДЕЛО, n.d. Web. <http://www.pravoedelo.ru/party/about>
fared as well as is possible given the restrictive elections. The “Yabloko” recently made small
progress in the Duma, doubling from 1.59% in 2007 to 3.43% in 2011, but they remain hobbled
due to policy absorption by A Fair/Just Russia and United Russia itself. This assimilation of
policies led the “Yabloko” leadership to claim that this was a deliberate attempt by the Kremlin
at splitting their voting bloc.xlix This splitting and poor performance has led Yabloko mainly to
act as electoral observersl in the recent voting cycles. In doing so, they have uncovered vast cases
of fraud, but it is unknown if this will translate into better success at the polls.
With only three effective, strongly represented registered opposition parties in the
running, two of which are difficult to distinguish from United Russia, disillusion is no surprise.
The masses of people who went out on the streets to protest against allegedly fraudulent
elections were not only fed up with United Russia, but with the lack of officially sanctioned
alternative choices. The “system” opposition has responded, through occasional attempts to unite
the various personalities and parties that make up the opposition, though typically with littleli to
no success, without cooperation from parties on the “outside.” It is certainly no surprise, then,
that people are increasingly turninglii to such parties “outside the system” to vent their frustration
and focus their efforts at real political change.
ii. “Non-System” Opposition
xlvii "Программные документы Российской объединенной демократической партии "ЯБЛОКО"." . ЯБЛОКО, n.d. Web. <http://www.yabloko.ru/Union/program.html>
xlviii "Краткая справка о партии." ЯБЛОКО, n.d. Web. <http://www.yabloko.ru/about>
xlix Golosov, Grigorii. "Reflections on Mikhail Prokhorov and the Right Cause." Post-Soviet World. oDRussia, n.d. Web. <http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/grigorii-golosov/reflections-on-mikhail-prokhorov-and-right-cause>
l "United Russia Ready to Work with Yabloko Observers."Russia. RIANovosti, n.d. Web. <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120125/170947807.html>
The Russian “non-system” opposition is comprised of political parties that have either failed
to meet registration requirements or have refused to participate in the electoral process. Broadly
categorized, they either fall into coalitions of the political Left or coalitions on the Right. The
following list of the opposition is not exhaustive and only covers the largest coalitions and their
constituent members in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 and 2012 elections.
a. The Left
1. The “Left Front”
The “non-system” Russian Left has mainly organized itself into a loose coalition of far-
leftist parties, organizations, and yet more coalitions, in order to strengthen its position and
increase its political clout. This coalition includes not only hard-line Marxist-Leninists, but also
allied Trotskyists, Maoists, Anarchists, Stalinists, and essentially anyone and everyone involved
in Left politics that is willing to join them.liii The “Left Front” does have decent ties with the
KPRF, whom they backed in the 2012 Presidential Elections,liv although many members openly
criticize the Communist Party for their Kremlin approval as well as many different iterations of
what each Leftist party deems ideological “revisionism.” This also led the “Front” to seek
registration as an official party, which was denied due to their extremist tendencies.lv Despite this li "Russian Opposition Parties Unite In Udmurtia." Russia. RFERL, n.d. Web. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russian_opposition_parties_unite_in_udmurtia/24408832.html>
lii "Московская полиция объявила численность митингов." Политика. Lenta.ru, n.d. Web. <http://lenta.ru/news/2012/02/04/gumvd/>
liii "The Voice of the Left." Transnational Institute. Russia Profile, n.d. Web. <http://www.tni.org/inthemedia/voice-left>
liv "News Analysis: The Paradox Of Russia’s Left ." Russia. RFERL, n.d. Web. <http://www.rferl.org/content/the_paradox_of_russias_left/24488988.html>
lv "Opposition activists ask Supreme Court to register Rot Front party." Politics. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/rot-front-supreme-court/>
unity in voting, the “Left Front” is hardly a cohesive faction, and the differing tendencies with
divergent within it each organize and act in accordance with their own goals, more closely
resembling the Unity Frontslvi of the early Comintern than an actual political party. The three
main tendencies are centered around the so-called “anti-revisionist” Marxist-Leninsts, the
Trotskyites, and associated Anarchists.
i. United Labor Front (ROTF) “Rot Front”
Founded in 2010, the United Labor Front represents the “anti-revisionist” hard-line
‘Tankie’ wing of the Russian far-left. This group’s leadership has claimed that “the Communist
Party of Gennady Zyuganov is in many ways not communist: it combines nostalgic 'Sovietism'
with Russian nationalism and religious aspirations, [Russian] Orthodoxy,” and represents a
“more bourgeois than revolutionary” force in politics.lvii Instead of a simple homage to the Soviet
past in nostalgic calls for “re-Stalinization” with Russian nationalist overtones, the ROTF’s
member parties are more committed to a complete revitalization of “Soviet power” in the legacy
of Stalin, Enver Hoxha, or Yuri Andropov. This is evidenced in the party program of “Rot Front”
member party “Revolutionary Communist Worker’s Party – Revolutionary Party of
Communists” (RKRP-RPK), who blast Gorbachev as leading Russia to “degeneration and
opportunism,” and call the nomenklatura of the old Russian Communist Party “disguised social
democrats.”lviii This specific party within the larger ROTF claimed 55,000 members as of 2006,
suggesting even larger numbers for the entirety of the “Rot Front,”lix easily on par with Yabloko
or Just Cause. The “Rot Front” openly calls for yet another Russian Revolution and has
participated in several protest actions against the Putin regime, reaching out to organize for
lvi "The united front." . International Socialism Quarterly Journal, 117, n.d. Web. <http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=397&issue=117>
revolt against the regime with like-minded trade unions and political organizations in the
“Front.” Simultaneously, the ROTF pledges in its party manifesto that it will operate within the
law,lx and has also attempted to stand for registration as a legitimate political party on its own,
although owing to its extreme radicalism, it has also been denied again and again.lxi These
hardline neo-Soviets are the largest participants in the Front, but they are not alone.
ii. The Russian Socialist Movement (RSD)/CWI
There also exists a large coalition of Russian Trotskyite organizations allied with the
“Left Front,” known as the “Russian Socialist Movement,” as well as several separate Russian
Trotskyite parties, such as branches of the Committee for a Workers Internationallxii and the
International Committee of the Fourth International.lxiii These groups split due to various
lvii "Russian Left-Wing Party Holds Founding Congress."News : From Our Bureaus. RFERL, n.d. Web. <http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_LeftWing_Party_Holds_Founding_Congress/1965322.html>
lviii "Введение." Наша Программа. РКРП-РПК , n.d. Web. <http://rkrp-rpk.ru/content/view/1/47/>
lix Backes, Moreau. "Communist and Post-Communist Parties in Europe." GoogleBooks. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, n.d. Web. p. 561.
<http://books.google.com/books?id=H23Pv4Ik3vMC&pg=PA561&lpg=PA561&dq=55,000+members+as+of+2006+Russia+Communist&source=bl&ots=aqBPoXdV-o&sig=WpNzrgHcSY6aA7eMBUoZK8ZpDQ4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=1JSHT-KoBevRiALgp-SkAg&ved=0CDUQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=55%2C000%20members%20as%20of%202006%20Russia%20Communist&f=false>
lx УСТАВ политической партии «Российский Объединённый Трудовой Фронт»." . Российская Коммунистическая Рабочая Партия - Революционная Партия Коммунистов, n.d. Web. <http://rkrp-rpk.ru/content/view/4414/63/>
lxi "Opposition activists ask Supreme Court to register Rot Front party." Politics. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/rot-front-supreme-court/>
lxii "Программа секции КРИ в СНГ." . Комитета за Рабочий Интернационал, n.d. Web. <http://socialistworld.ru/programma-sekczii-kri-v-sng>
lxiii, Duncan. "Russian socialists regroup to deepen struggle for new left party Vpered and Socialist Resistance merge into Russian Socialist Movement." News from around the world - Russia. International Viewpoint, n.d. Web. <http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article2400&var_recherche=Russian Socialist Movement>
disagreements on policy, especially the position on the 2008 South Ossetian War, though all of
them take active roles in protests and actively defend Russia’s LGBTQ communities.lxiv Within
the Trotskyites alone, there is a tremendous amount of infighting about ‘which Workers
International is the best representative of the “true” Fourth International,’ with groups slinging
around accusations of ‘opportunism’ and ‘comprador tendencies’ at one another freely, without
getting into numerous jabs at the “Rot Front.”lxv RSD is the only cohesive Trotskyite group
actively participating within the “Left Front,” though it is also possible the other groups
participate in some respect. Regardless, these groups do not represent as powerful or cohesive a
grouping as the “orthodox” Marxist-Leninist groups, and gain traction only through associations
in the “Left Front.”
iii. Anarchist Organizations
Even more fractured than the Trotskyites are the Anarchists. One of the largest loose
anarchist/libertarian groupings, Autonomous Action, is the only group openly associating with
the “Left Front.”lxvi Other groups, such as the “Confederation of Revolutionary Anarcho-
Syndicalists”lxvii may also participate, but very little is published and known about such
groupings and their activities outside of reports of the normal anarchist fare of squatting, setting
up autonomous communes, vandalism, and corporate sabotage.
lxiv ‘Igor.’ "Repression of Gay Pride in Moscow." LGBT - Russia. CWI-CIT, n.d. Web. <http://www.socialistworld.net/eng/2007/06/02russia.html>
lxv Volkov, Vladimir. "The Russian Socialist Movement—a political trap for the working class." World Socialist Website. International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), n.d. Web. <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/dec2011/russ-d23.shtml>
lxvi " Новости об анархизме, антифашизме, акциях протеста." анархисты, либертарные коммунисты, антифа. Автономное Действие, n.d. Web. <http://avtonom.org/>
lxvii "КОНФЕДЕРАЦИЯ 2009." Главная. РЕВОЛЮЦИОННЫХ АНАРХО-СИНДИКАЛИСТОВ - СЕКЦИЯ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ АССОЦИАЦИИ ТРУДЯЩИХСЯ (К.Р.А.С. - М.А.Т.), n.d. Web. <http://www.aitrus.info/node/2>
b. The “Center”
1. “Other Russia” (DR)
The “Other Russia” coalition represents an interesting intermeshing of very different
political parties of all stripes into a singular oppositional coalition and is the reason for the quotes
around “Center” in this heading. It includes such personalities as Gary Kasparov, former Chess
Master and president of the United Civil Front liberal party, Eduard “You Know I Love the Taste
of Blood”lxviii Limonov, formerly of the National Bolshevik semi-ironic “left-wing Nazi party,”
as well as their supporters, some members of the “Rot Front,” and other various liberal and leftist
parties and leaders. Collectively, the “Other Russia” states in its party program that it wants
nationalization of key mineral export sectors, a secular state, wealth taxes, a new capitol, new
infrastructural and agricultural focuses, nationalism, a new Union State, independent judiciary,
Islamic religious self-determination in the Caucasus, extensive social welfare programs, and
abolishing of conscription in favor of volunteer forces.lxix This more closely resembles the later
Comintern policy of creating a politically broad “Popular Front”lxx of opposition forces, as
opposed to a smaller, ideologically similar “Unity Front.” The “Other Russia” has also been
extensively involved with protests against United Russia, being a major force behind the “Russia
Without Putin” and “March of the Dissenters” protest movements.lxxi Despite being an odd mash-
up, the “Other Russia” nonetheless has a dedicated cadre of respected opposition leaders and
lxviii Interview with Professor Walter Richmond, Occidental College
lxix "Программа." политической партии "Другая Россия". Другая Россия, n.d. Web. <http://drugoros.ru/programm.html>.
lxx Harman, Mike. "1914-1946: Third Camp Internationalists in France during World War II." LibCom, n.d. Web. <http://libcom.org/library/1914-1946-third-camp-internationalists-france-during-world-war-ii>
lxxi Stolyarova, Galina. "THOUSANDS TAKE TO CITY STREETS FOR PROTEST." News. The St. Petersburg Times, n.d. Web. <http://www.sptimesrussia.com/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=20875>
calls on the aid of numerous supporters, representing a potent organizing force within the anti-
systemic movement.
2. People’s Freedom Party (“Parnas”)
Founded in 2010 as a merger of the Russian People’s Democratic Union, Republican
Party, Democratic Choice and the non-Kasparov segments of United Civil Front, the “Parnas”
Party represents a grassroots attempt at the political program espoused partially by both the
“Yabloko” and Just Cause parties, including liberalization and democratization.lxxii Much like the
“Yabloko” and PD, the Parnas party program calls for Russia to become “part of the all-
European civilization.”lxxiii The union currently holds 46,000 members, and is gaining more
members at a rapid pace. The “Parnas” Party has attempted to register for both Duma and
Presidential elections, but has been rejected due to application “inconsistencies.”lxxiv This led
party leader Boris Nemtsov to call for a mobilization “for a struggle. From now on, there will be
mass street protests all across the country,”lxxv a call which was indeed heeded. Individual
“Parnas” members have participated in these protests and have also been arrested teaching others
how to invalidate their ballots as a protest measure.lxxvi Parnas, then, represents an interesting,
lxxii Michael Smeltzer, Josh Wilson, Molly Goodwin-Jones. "Parnas: The People's Freedom Party History and Platform." POLITICS IN TRANSLATION . SRAS, n.d. Web. <http://www.sras.org/parnas_people_freedom_party>
lxxiii "Opposition leaders set up Party of People’s Freedom."Politics. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/russia-opposition-people-freedom/>
lxxiv "Russian Opposition Party Denied Registration." News: From Our Bureaus. RFERL, n.d. Web. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_opposition_party_denied_registration/24242929.html>
lxxv Nemtsova, Anna. "To the Streets! Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov predicts more street protests—and countrywide economic decline.." World News. The Daily Beast, n.d. Web. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/09/26/boris-nemtsov-russian-opposition-leader-interview.html>
lxxvi "Russian Opposition Party Devises Way To Sabotage Duma Election." News: From our Bureaus. RFERL, n.d. Web. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russian_opposition_party_devises_way_to_sabotage_duma_election/24384761.html>
new, and truly moderate or “reasonable” grassroots political force, with some potential to
become a registered anti-Kremlin party.
b. The Right
1. Nationalists and Neo-Nazism
While difficult to distinguish, the Russian right is composed primarily of ethnic-
supremacist nationalists, fascists, and neo-Nazi groupings. Nationalist organizations include the
semi-self-explanatory “Movement Against Illegal Immigration” (DPNI), in fact more broadly an
anti-immigration and pro-Russian ultranationalist organization,lxxvii and the similarly-oriented
Slavic Union and Russian Public Movement. All of these organizations call openly for the
expulsion of migrant workers, make claims of Russian ethnic superiority, and increasingly hold
anti-Semitic views, though claim not to be Nazis themselves. Many of these groups are
themselves banned, and have therefore occasionally supported the LDPR, whom they believe
hold similar views to their own.lxxviii These nationalist organizations only represent the public
face of nationalism and fascism in Russia.
Although very murky, there definitively exist several Neo-Nazi or Fascist groups within
the Russian Federation. This runs the gamut from Neo-Nazi organizations responsible for
murders of immigrants and ethnic minorities, such as the Russian National Socialist Party,lxxix to
the ultra-nationalist/fascist goose-stepping and uniform-wearing Russian National Unity Party.lxxx
lxxvii "Лента новостей. Последние новости экономики, криминала, политики." ДПНИ, n.d. Web. <http://www.dpni.org/>.
lxxviii True, Christopher. "Candidates exploit nationalism in Russia poll." Russian Elections. Al-Jazeera, n.d. Web. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/russianelections/2012/03/20123162536448660.html>
lxxix Schwirtz, Michael. "Video Draws Attention to Growing Violence Against Minorities in Russia." World News. New York Times, n.d. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/world/europe/12moscow.html?_r=1>
lxxx "Главная страница • Новости и события."ОБЩЕРОССИЙСКОЕ ОБЩЕСТВЕННОЕ ПАТРИОТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ. Русское Национальное Единство, n.d. Web. <http://soratnik.com/>
Both hold to a National-Socialist ideology of anti-Semitism and ethnic and nationalist
supremacism, and exist as paramilitary organizations, combined in the Russian context with
Russian Orthodox Christianity. Despite not representing a large, united force, these organizations
nonetheless exist and carry out terrorist acts on Russian soil and can represent a future threat in
the event of further unrest. This is evidenced by Greece’s Neo-Nazi “Golden Dawn” Party, very
similar to the Russian National Unity Party, possibly reaching thresholds necessary to enter into
the Greek parliament.lxxxi
All of the non-systemic opposition parties, no matter the external projected unity in
protest, face an internal split on political tactics. Strife arises over the choice between five major
political tactics, outside of the direct use of violence reserved for the fascists, anarchists, and
ultra-leftist communists. These tactics include the “passive boycott” of avoiding the ballot and
also protesting, “spoiling ballots” by invalidating them, removing or destroying ballots,
“Limonov’s Option” of publicly demanding to be removed from the voter rolls, or “Navalny’s
Option” (named after a prominent activist) of voting for any party other than United Russia, such
as KPRF. The differences over such tactics, as well as individual political ideologies, keep the
opposition relatively fractured and weak despite the large protests.
c. Reforms and Effects: Chaos and the Parties of Kind People and Beer Lovers
United Russia has noticed the rise of the KPRF and the insurgent strength of the fractured
non-system opposition in its protests. The Kremlin under Medvedev began reaching out to the
“non-system” opposition to brainstorm political reform, in an attempt to seemingly subsume the
opposition in talks, while stalling real reforms and further protests.lxxxii Surprisingly, within two
months, the Kremlin eased party registration requirements, such as lowering signature
lxxxi RACHEL DONADIO and DIMITRIS BOUNIAS. "Hard Times Lift Greece’s Anti-Immigrant Fringe." World News. New York Times, n.d. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/world/europe/far-right-golden-dawn-sees-opening-in-greeces-woes.html>
requirements for registration from 40,000 to 500. This has led to a massive surge of registration
attempts, including return registrations of the old joke Parties of the Party of Beer Lovers and
Party of Love, as well as attempts from new parties like the Ten Commandments’ Party, Party of
Subtropical Russia, and Party of Social Networking Sites.lxxxiii There are also new coalitions
forming, including a new union of the ultranationalist anti-immigration/semi-fascist parties into
the National Democratic Party,lxxxiv a new Swedish-styled pro-IP-infringement Pirate Party,lxxxv a
freshly revitalized Gorbachev-backed Social-Democratic party, and new attempts to register
parties in the “Left Front.” This reform and political restructuring has led to massive unrest in the
opposition, with new political unions forming and breaking apart at light-speed based on the
ever-changing political calculus introduced through these reforms.lxxxvi
In all, 68 new parties have expressed interest in becoming established and registered.
This move is simultaneously a “concession” from the Kremlin as well as a possible political
masterstroke. There are rumblings that this is an attempt at a “smooth transition from ‘soft
authoritarianism’ to expanded political competition in Russia”lxxxvii in order to further fracture
lxxxii "Meeting with leaders of unregistered political parties ."News. Office of the President of the Russian Federation, n.d. Web. <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/3441>
lxxxiii "Russia’s Political Discontent Moves from Winter to Spring." News. VOANews, n.d. Web. <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Russias-Political-Discontent-Moves-from-Winter-to-Spring--146135395.html>
lxxxiv "Russian Nationalists Unite to Form New Party."Features, Opinion & Analysis. RIANovosti, n.d. Web. <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120329/172469704.html>
lxxxv "Председателю «Пиратской партии России» грозит 6 лет тюрьмы." Анонсы . Пиратская партия России, n.d. Web. <http://pirate-party.ru/page.php?id=402>
lxxxvi "Opposition Leaders Will Not Join Gorbachev’s New Party." Khodorkovsky & Lebedev Communications Center. The International Legal Team of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, n.d. Web. <http://www.khodorkovskycenter.com/news-resources/stories/opposition-leaders-will-not-join-gorbachev’s-new-party>
lxxxvii Morozov, Alexander. "Party Time in Russian Politics The Latest Party Law Reform Preserves United Russia’s Dominance." Politics. Russia Profile, n.d. Web. <http://russiaprofile.org/politics/57097.html>
opposition while appearing to stimulate and embrace it, thus extend Putin and United Russia’s
lifespan. Opening up the field to multitudes of new players may shatter the unity that was
beginning to show in the 2011-2012 protests, scattering the opposition due to their new political
conflicts. The steady gains made by the KPRF may also be undercut by the official registration
of fresh grassroots leftist and liberal political formations.
B. Conclusions: The Future of Russian Political Opposition
It is very likely in the short term that the political reforms initiated by the Kremlin will
succeed in stalling oppositional unity and organization efforts, but the question becomes “for
how long?” The cracks in Putin’s political empire are already becoming visible, evidenced by a
near-‘Ceausescu moment’ of deputies walking out his address to the Duma in 2012.lxxxviii It is
impossible to predict whether this reform strategy will succeed in maintaining the political status
quo, or whether the KPRF will be undercut, leading the political arena to implode for a time.
Either situation could eventually result in a re-coalescence of opposition political parties,
whether with stronger coalitions behind the old registered parties, or with new, stronger, more
legitimate opposition. If such ‘fake’ reform attempts or a true political fracturing can’t be
dragged out until the next elections in 2018, E.R. may be voted out by a theoretical new
oppositional juggernaut. If E.R. can drag it out, then Putin and United Russia will have prevented
the opposition from succeeding at the ballot box. This stifling of oppostition may still lead to a
popular revolt dragging them out of the Kremlin, especially if Russia’s economic situation
worsens again.
This set of political dynamics therefore makes the short-run chances of “regime change”
low, with longer-run prospects within the next six to ten years moderate to high. As far as the
lxxxviii Timothy Heritage and Gleb Bryanski. "Russia's Putin calls for unity but opponents walk out."World News. Reuters, n.d. Web. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/11/us-russia-putin-idUSBRE83A06Z20120411>
ideological substance of a possible replacement, statistics, general trends, and historical inertia
tend to indicate that (barring a sudden explosion of popularity for Yabloko or Parnas) whoever
replaces United Russia and Putin will likely be more ideologically extreme. Whether the stated
views of any party that manages to displace United Russia will actually translate into governance
is unknown, but nobody truly expected Hitler or Stalin to act in the ways that they did either.
Only time will tell.