Post on 10-Jul-2020
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By Judd Devermont, Amelia Cheatham, & Catherine Chiang | June 2019
Chinese investments in sub-Saharan African ports1 present potential threats to U.S.
influence in sub-Saharan Africa as well as African sovereignty. A recent CSIS report, Influence
and Infrastructure: The Strategic Stakes of Foreign Projects, identifies some of the strategic risks
posed by the three stages of Chinese infrastructure projects, enabling Beijing to potentially
restrict access to its rivals, exploit ports during conflict, and collect intelligence. Drawing on
English-language press releases and open-source reports, the CSIS Africa Program identified
46 sub-Saharan African ports with financial, construction, or operational involvement by
Chinese entities.
Some caveats are needed. The data presented in maps and charts here does not represent
an exhaustive list of Chinese involvement in African ports nor does it capture the value of
funding shares or the precise stage of completion due to limited information.2 Despite its
shortcomings, this approach applies a methodology to distinguish which ports are more
vulnerable to Chinese strategic intervention and provides practitioners and scholars a
foundational framework from which to build future research. While it does not purport
to reveal the next Djibouti military base or Hambantota port in Africa, the data indicates
where Beijing is making a bigger bet on a port’s potential and reveals which ports are more
susceptible to Chinese influence and control.
Why Ports?
Sub-Saharan African ports play an integral role in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the
sprawling network of Chinese infrastructure projects linking China with Europe, East Africa,
and Southeast Asia. With the launch of BRI in 2013, President Xi sought to open China to
1. The CSIS Africa Program reviewed all projects relating to overall port investment including, for example, investments in harbors, terminals, berths, quays, piers, etc. The data covers a wide range of port projects (e.g., container ports, oil ports, multipurpose ports, and roll-on roll-off vessel ports, which vary widely in size, operation, and structure). 2. Information on Sino-African port contracts is limited to statements made by both parties. Notably, Chinese compa-nies are accused of embellishing the number and progress of their investments which could lead to inflated counts.
Assessing the Risks of Chinese Investments in Sub-Saharan African Ports
ASSESSING THE RISKS OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN PORTS | 2
new markets, expand his country’s political influence globally, and secure military access and
mobility across regions. Forming the backbone of China’s “Maritime Silk Road,” investments
in African ports provide a gateway to the region’s trade and economic development, empower
China with political leverage and clout on the continent, and provide a foothold for People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) activities.
The 46 ports identified in this data align with broader Chinese military, commercial, and political
objectives. One of the key challenges is decoupling these three objectives, distinguishing which
ports have security dimensions from those that offer purely commercial gains.
There are signs that Beijing plans to use these port investments to increase its military and
political reach. The various Chinese entities driving African port development have deep ties
to Beijing.3 At least six of the ports captured within this data were also visited by Chinese
naval vessels or are dual-use civilian-military ports.4 Seven of the eleven ports operated
by Chinese entities are deep-water, opening the possibility for larger commercial, but also
military, vessels to dock.5
Not all Chinese port investments, however, pose a direct security risk to U.S. or African
interests. Most are likely pursued for commercial gain. China has risen in the last decade as
the continent’s main trade partner, and port investments are just one of the main avenues
through which it is establishing commercial supremacy in the region. Not only do many
Chinese-backed ports found within our data hook into other BRI projects, but Chinese
companies have directed resources towards ports with the most commercial potential.6
Moreover, port expansion and rehabilitation projects are key to furthering African growth and
development. Ninety percent of African exports depend on ports. Chinese investments that
aim to address congestion and outdated port infrastructure, which currently limit trade flows
on the continent, are projected to contribute toward regional GDP growth.7 These port projects
consequently, not only fuel African growth, but also reinforce China’s image as a development
partner and boost its political influence. At a ceremony celebrating China Harbor Engineering
Company’s project at Walvis Bay Harbor, Namibia, the Chinese Ambassador to Namibia, Zhang
Yiming said:
3. Our research uncovered about 18 state-owned enterprises with interests in African ports. China’s central govern-ment allegedly also influences Huawei, one of two private companies identified. Major Chinese players in African ports include China Communications Construction Company Limited and China Merchants Group Limited, the latter of which makes up about 40 percent of the ports operated by China. 4. Data on dual use ports is found here: https://ig.ft.com/sites/china-ports/. Data on Chinese port visits was compiled from news reportage of the Chinese naval hospital vessel, the Peace Ark, voyage in African waters. These data sources were then cross-referenced with ports known in our data in which the Chinese invested (Dar es Salaam Port, Momba-sa Port, Djibouti Port, Freetown Port, Port of Pointe Noire, Walvis Bay).5. Lekki Deep Sea Port; Kribi Deep Sea Port; Autonomous Port of Abidjan; Lomé Port; Port of Djibouti; Bagamoyo Port; Port of Pointe Noire. 6. PwC projects that the Ports of Durban, Abidjan, and Mombasa will lead their sub-region’s trade as commercial hub ports, with Lagos-Apapa, Tema, and Djibouti or Dar es Salaam close behind. Chinese entities have invested in all seven of these ports. 7. PwC estimates that a 25 percent boost in port performance would coincide with a 2 percent rise in regional GDP.
DEVERMONT, CHEATHAM, & CHIANG | 3
[T]his is the benchmark project for China-Namibia friendly and pragmatic cooperation, which
symbolizes the great attention of our leaders to our relations and the brotherhood between our people.
Mapping Chinese Port Investments
There are at least 46 existing or planned port projects in sub-Saharan Africa, which are
funded, built, and or operated by Chinese entities. Chinese investment was present in
roughly 17 percent of the 172 sub-Saharan African ports captured in the 2017 World Port
Index.8 These ports are positioned along each coast, providing Chinese access to main
maritime routes and chokepoints.
MAURITANIA
SENEGAL
GUINEA
SIERRA LEONE IVORY
COAST
BENIN
NIGERIA
CAMEROON
GABON
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
ANGOLA
NAMIBIA
SOUTH AFRICA
TANZANIA
KENYA
SOMALIA
DJIBOUTI
ERITREACAPE VERDE
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPLE
MOZAMBIQUE
MADAGASCAR
TOG
OGHANA
SUDAN
CHOKE POINT
NOUADHIBOU
NOUAKCHOTT
MINDELO
KAMSAR
CONAKRY
PEPEL
FREETOWN
ABIDJAN
ATUABO
TAKORADI
JAMESTOWN (ACCRA)
TEMA
LOMÉ
TIN CAN ISLAND (LAGOS)
APAPA (LAGOS)
LEKKI
DOUALA
KRIBI
BATA
LIBREVILLE
FERNÃO DIAS
POINTE-NOIRE
CAIO
CABINDA
LOBITO BAY
WALVIS BAY
DURBAN
MATUTUINE DISTRICT (MAPUTO)
AMBODIFOTATRA (NOSY BORAHA)
TOAMASINABEIRA
MTWARA
DAR ES SALAAM
BAGAMOYO
MPIGA DURI
MOMBASA
LAMU
DJIBOUTI CITY
MASSAWA
MATAKONG
CALABAR
RICHARDS BAY
TADJOURAH
DAMERJOG
NARINDA BAY DEEP-WATER PORT
SHAIKH IBRAHIM LIVESTOCK PEIR
= Operator
= Builder
= Funder
= Multiple ports
CHINESE PORT INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA
= Ports
= Main shipping route
= Minor shipping route
= China Maritime Silk Road
View the interactive map: https://csis-ilab.github.io/mapbox-custom/africa-ports/
Strategic Opportunities to Exploit Port Infrastructure
Further research is essential to separate port projects that pose a security threat to African
governments, the United States, or other international partners from those that are made
with commercial intent. In the sections below, the CSIS Africa Program has enumerated the
security risks tied to each phase of port investment. We identify operation/ownership as the
most immediate risk to U.S. interests followed by financing and construction.
8. Sixteen of the ports found in our data were not within the World Port Index, in part because they still in a pre-con-struction or construction phase, or otherwise initiated in 2017 or after.
ASSESSING THE RISKS OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN PORTS | 4
Operation. Chinese port ownership or operation pose immediate risks to U.S.
interests,9 potentially allowing China to extract intelligence, block the U.S.
government from accessing territory or services (such as critical port access at
Djibouti City), and use ports to dock military vessels. China’s technical knowledge
and operation of ports spread across the region may also provide strategic depth to
preposition, deploy, and refuel its naval fleet, as well as block adversaries, during
periods of conflict. Notably, port investments do not always precede Chinese military
access to ports. China, for example, secured the right to dock military vessels at
Seychelles through a separate bilateral military agreement. Neither do operation rights
ensure that an African government will allow a Chinese military vessel to dock in
their waters. The port authority’s role in operations and its lease agreements, as well
as the relationship between the host government and Chinese state are factors that
future research should consider.
Chinese entities operate 11 of the 46 sub-Saharan African ports identified (see below
Figure 1. Ports Operated by Chinese Entities). Seven are situated on the west coast and
four on the east coast. The Doraleh Multipurpose Port in Djibouti City is currently the
most concerning port given its proximity to a maritime chokepoint and U.S. military
base. If counting its naval base, China currently controls two of the five terminals at
the Port of Djibouti. Additional research could reveal the strategic significance of the
other 10 ports.
Financing. Through funding, China can solicit projects that further its policy objectives,
feed corruption, and influence local politics. In addition, funding allows China to favor
Chinese construction companies, negotiate operational control and access to resources,
and potentially seek further concessions if African countries renege on debt payments.
Chinese entities financed 27 of the 46 sub-Saharan African ports identified.10 Chinese
entities operate 75 percent of Chinese financed ports, and Chinese entities also
constructed 90 percent of these ports (see below Figure 1. Ports Operated by Chinese
Entities and Figure 2. Ports Financed or Constructed by Chinese Entities).
Construction. Construction enables China to collect intelligence on port infrastructure,
establish a dependency on Chinese technology and expertise, and ensure long-
term interoperability with Chinese materials and technology. Chinese entities have
overseen construction projects at 41 of the 46 sub-Saharan African ports identified
(see below Figure 1. Ports Operated by Chinese Entities and Figure 2. Ports Financed or
Constructed by Chinese Entities).
9. Operation is defined here as ports in which Chinese entities are contractually granted the right to operate facilities or ports in which Chinese entities own more than a 50 percent equity share.10. Financing is defined here as Chinese-backed loans or the purchase of minority equity shares. Notably, information on minority versus majority equity holdings is limited.
DEVERMONT, CHEATHAM, & CHIANG | 5
PORT PROJECT(S) APPROX. LOCATION OPERATOR FUNDER BUILDER STATUS
West Africa
Lekki Deep Sea Port Lagos, Nigeria X X X In Progress
Tonkolili Iron Ore Project, Pepel Port & Tagrin Point Port Pepel, Sierra Leone X X X Various Stages
Kribi Container Terminal, Kribi Deep Sea Port
Mboro Village (Kribi), Cameroon X X X Various Stages
Various Projects, Autonomous Port of Abidjan Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire X X X Various Stages
Tin-Can Island Port Container Terminal Limited,
Tin Can Island Port
Tin Can Island (Lagos), Nigeria X Completed
Lomé Container Terminal, Lomé Port Lomé, Togo X Completed
East Africa
Doraleh Multipurpose Port, Port of Djibouti Djibouti City, Djibouti X X X Completed
Bagamoyo Port Bagamoyo, Tanzania X X X Stalled Indefinitely
Maruhubi Multipurpose Port Mpiga-Duri, Tanzania X X X Announced
Shaikh Ibrahim Livestock Pier, Port of Sudan Port Sudan, Sudan X X Completed
Central Africa
Pointe Noire Mineral (Ore) Port Project, Port of Pointe Noire
Pointe-Noire, Republic of the Congo X X X Announced
Figure 1. Ports Operated by Chinese Entities*
* See footnote 9 for the definition of “operation” applied throughout this review.
ASSESSING THE RISKS OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN PORTS | 6
PORT PROJECT(S) APPROX. LOCATION OPERATOR FUNDER BUILDER STATUS
West Africa
Conakry Container Wharf Expansion Project,
Port of Conakry Conakry, Guinea X X Various Stages
Various Expansion Projects, Friendship Port of Nouakchott Nouakchott, Mauritania X X Various Stages
Tema LNG Terminal, Tema Port Tema, Ghana X X In Progress
Takoradi Port Takoradi, Ghana X X In Progress
Bakassi Deep Sea Port Calabar, Nigeria X X In Progress
Multipurpose Terminal Project, Apapa Port Apapa (Lagos), Nigeria X X Announced
Mindelo Deepwater Port Mindelo, Cabo Verde X X Announced
Kamsar Fishing Port Economic Zone Kamsar, Guinea X Announced
Mineral Port of Nouadhibou Nouadhibou, Mauritania X Completed
Atuabo Free Port Atuabo, Ghana X Stalled Indefinitely
Queen Elizabeth II Quay Expansion Project,
Freetown PortFreetown, Sierra Leone X In Progress
Douala Chanel Expansion Project, Douala Port Douala, Cameroon X Various Stages
Jamestown Fishing Port Complex Jamestown (Accra), Ghana X In Progress
Simandou Iron Ore Project, Makatong Deep Water Port Matakong, Guinea X Stalled
Indefinitely
Figure 2a. Ports Financed or Constructed by Chinese Entities
DEVERMONT, CHEATHAM, & CHIANG | 7
PORT PROJECT(S) APPROX. LOCATION OPERATOR FUNDER BUILDER STATUS
East Africa
Tadjourah Port Tadjourah, Djibouti X X Completed
Djibouti Damerjog Industries Development Damerjog, Djibouti X X In Progress
Various Expansion Projects, Dar es Salaam Port Dar es Salaam, Tanzania X X Announced
Expansion Project, Mtwara Port Mtwara , Tanzania X In Progress
Various Expansion Projects, Massawa New Port Massawa, Eritrea X Completed
Lamu Port Lamu, Kenya X In Progress
Construction of Three Berths, Mombasa Port Mombasa, Kenya X Various Stages
Central Africa
Expansion and Rehabilitation Project, Port of Bata Bata, Equatorial Guinea X X Completed
Deep Sea Trans-Shipment Port Fernão Dias, São Tomé e Príncipe X X Announced
Various Expansion Projects, Port Mole Libreville, Gabon X Stalled
Indefinitely
Figure 2b. Ports Financed or Constructed by Chinese Entities
ASSESSING THE RISKS OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN PORTS | 8
PORT PROJECT(S) APPROX. LOCATION OPERATOR FUNDER BUILDER STATUS
Southern Africa
Various Expansion Projects, Port of Lobito Lobito, Angola X X Completed
Caio Deep Water Port Caio, Angola X X Stalled Indefinitely
Rehabilitation and Expansion Project, Beira Fishing Port Beira, Mozambique X X Completed
Various Rehabilitation Projects, Port of Durban Durban, South Africa X X Various Stages
Various Renovation Projects, Port of Ambodifotatra
Ambodifotatra (Nosy Boraha), Madagascar X In Progress
Tamatave Deepwater Harbour Toamasina, Madagascar X Announced
Narinda Bay Deep-Water Port Bay of Narinda, Madagascar X Announced
Various Expansion Projects, Port of Walvis Bay Walvis Bay, Namibia X In Progress
Port of Cabinda Cabinda, Angola X Various Stages
Shipbuilding and Repair Facility, Richards Bay Port Richards Bay, South Africa X Announced
Deep Water Port of Techobanine
Matutuíne District (Maputo), Mozambique X Announced
Judd Devermont is the director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Washington D.C. Catherine Chiang is a program coordinator and research assistant with
the CSIS Africa Program. Amelia Cheatham was a former intern with the CSIS Africa Program.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Figure 2c. Ports Financed or Constructed by Chinese Entities