Post on 16-Oct-2021
Repositorium für die Medienwissenschaft
Yuk HuiAnamnesis and Re-Orientation2015https://doi.org/10.25969/mediarep/920
Veröffentlichungsversion / published versionSammelbandbeitrag / collection article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:Hui, Yuk: Anamnesis and Re-Orientation. In: Yuk Hui, Andreas Broeckmann (Hg.): 30 Years After Les Immatériaux. Art,Science and Theory. Lüneburg: meson press 2015, S. 179–201. DOI: https://doi.org/10.25969/mediarep/920.
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Anamnesis and Re-Orientation: A Discourse on Matter and Time
Yuk Hui
The whole question is this: is the passage
(anamnesis) possible, will it be possible with,
or allowed by, the new mode of inscription and
memoration [mémoration] that characterizes the
new technologies? Do they not impose syntheses,
and syntheses conceived still more intimately in
the soul than any earlier technology has done?1
Lyotard’sLes Immatériauxcanbereadasaprofounddiscourseonmatterandtime,onethataimstogobeyondthesimplecorrelationbetweentechnicsandmemory,andtowardtheanamnesisoftheunknown–orbetter,asIwillexplainbelow,there-orientationoftheOccident.Platomemorablydescribedmatterasthefoster-motherintheTimaeus,whereheproposesathirdgenreofbeinginadditiontothetwohehaddiscussedpreviously–aneternalintelligiblepatternandtheimitationofsuchpattern.Thethirdgenre,explainsPlato,“isthereceptacle,andinamannerthefoster-mother,ofallgeneration”.2 Matteristhereceptacle,butalsothemediumofinscription.HenceinLyotard’s
1 Jean-FrançoisLyotard,“LogosandTechne,orTelegraphy”,inThe Inhuman: Reflections on Time,trans.GeoffreyBenningtonandRachelBowlby(Cambridge:PolityPress,1991),p.57.
2 Plato,Timaeus,trans.BenjaminJowett,classics.mit.edu/Plato/timaeus.html;translationmodified.
180 30 Years after Les Immatériaux
systemof“mat-”wefindmaternity.3Timestandsformultiplesenses:memory,history,repetition,anamnesis.ThenewtheoreticalrigourthatLyotardwantedto show throughout Les Immatériauxandbeyond–especiallyasexpressedin his essay collection The Inhuman, publishedaftertheexhibition–dem-onstratesaphilosophicalefforttotranscendthetotalityanticipatedbyrapidtechnologicaldevelopment,seekinganewmodeofdeterminationofmatterandindeterminationofthought.Les ImmateriauxservesasacritiqueoftheOccidentaltraditionofphilosophising.OnecanidentifybothanaffinitytoHeideggeryetalsoadesiretotakeadistancefromhim,sincethequestionoftheOtherstandsatthecentreofLyotard’sinquiry.
ThisarticleaimstoelaborateonLyotard’sanamnesisoftheOther,andtointroduceanotherquestiononrethinkingthepotentialofnewtechnologies.Isuggestthatthesetwoquestionsarecloselyrelatedtoeachother,andintherestofthearticleIwanttoshowhow.
TheOtherstandsforanaddresseeandanaddresser,aswellastheconditionof a différend,whichturnsagainstitselfandproducesthedifférend as an openingofquestions.MichelOlivierhasrightlypointedoutthatthedifférend isnotcontingent–rather,itisalreadywithinthelanguage.Ifweunderstandthe différendhereastheconflictbetweenthedifferentrulesoftwoparties,howthencanwethinkaboutthequestionoftranslation?Towhatextentcana translator be loyal to the différend?Thiswilldependonanotherquestion:Howsensitiveisthetranslatortowardthedifférend?ThisOtherstandsastheinterlocutoroftheanamnesisthatLyotardendeavouredtopropose.ToaskwhothisOtheris,wefirsthavetoanswerthequestion:IsthepostmodernmerelyaEuropeanproject?AndifitisaEuropeanproject,thenwouldsuchadiscoursebeapplicabletonon-Europeancultures?
The Postmodern – Is it a European Project?Thisquestionisambivalent.EventhoughthedebateswerecontextualisedwithinEuropeanculture,includingLyotard’scritiqueofHabermas’sinsistenceontheEnlightenmentproject,itsinfluencewentfarbeyondEurope.Theinfluenceofhisconceptofthepostmodern–throughglobaltechnologicalexpansion,includingthetranslation,publicationandcirculationofLyotard’sThe Postmodern Condition–hasalreadybetrayeditsintentionasaEuropeanproject.Ontheoccasionoftheexhibition,Lyotardorganizedateleconferencetoshowhowtimeandspacearetraversedbythenewmaterial(laterwewillsee that it is the immaterial),withrepresentativesfromJapanandBrazil,aswellasCanada,theUSA,andFrance.OnecanpostulatethatLyotardalreadyhadonhismindthetechnologicalglobalisationwhichisthereasonwhy
3 Lyotardanalysestheetymologicalrootmâtintermsofreferent(matière),hardware(matériel),support(matériau),matrix(matrice),maternity(maternité).
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postmoderndiscourseisnolongerlimitedtoEuropebutextendsaroundtheglobe.Ifthisisthecase,thenwehavetoconsider:Whatdoesitmeanwhencountriesadoptthepostmodernwithouthavingbeenmodern,asforexampleinthecaseofChina,whichsomeFrenchthinkersconsidertobeacountryofmodernisationbutnotmodernity?AfterthepostmodernofLyotard,andfur-therthroughFredericJameson,wecanindeedseeanintensivediscourseonthepostmodernquestioninChina.However,inChinaatleast,thesedebateshavenotgonebeyondaestheticsandnarrationsinliterature.Itseemstomethat,besidesitsaestheticvalue,whichpresentedasortofZeitgeist,thepost-modernquestionhasstillnotreallybeentackled,andthatfurtherinquiriesareneeded.
LyotardoftenreferredtheconceptoftheOther(oroneoftheseOthers)tothethirteenth-centuryJapaneseZenmaster,Dôgen,asareferenceandmirror by which the différendwithintheEuropeanlogoscanbereflected.Infact,DôgenwasprobablyoneofthekeyinspirationsforthenewmetaphysicswhichLyotardspokeofduringthepreparationoftheLes Immatériaux,inordertoarticulateanewrelationbetweenmatterandtime,andhenceanamnesis.Thequestionofmatterisfirstlyexpressedintheoriginaltitleoftheexhibitionprojectitself,whichwasLes nouveaux matériaux et la creation[NewMaterialsandCreation].The“immatériaux”arenotimmaterial,butratheranewformofmaterialbroughtaboutbytelecommunicationtechnologies.Thenewformofmaterialturnedagainstthemodernprojectwhichproduceditandcreatedarupturewithit.Itmaynotbeappropriatetosaythatthepostmodernwasanepochalchangethatsuddenlybrokeawayfromthemodern;rather,thepos-sibilityofthepostmodernwasalwaysalreadytherewithinmodernthought,asLyotardhimselfwroteinThe Postmodern Condition:“Aworkcanbecomemodernonlyifitisfirstlypostmodern,inthecurrentstate,andthisstateisconstant.”4Forexample,forLyotard,DenisDiderot’sgrand salon or Michel deMontaigne’sprosearealreadypostmodern.Thechangesinthematerialconditionduetotechnoscientificdiscoveriesandinventionshaveamplifiedthismodeofthinkingandnarration.Hence,wecansaythatthepostmodernistheresultofanamplification,andthethemethatisatcentreofLyotard’sexhibitionisbothmaterialandfigurative.
Thisprocessofamplificationhasalsobroughtaboutstructuraltransfor-mationsacrossalldomainsconcerningknowledge.Inthisnewmaterialcon-dition,themeaningofcreationhassignificantlychanged.Lyotardpreferstounderstandtherelationbetweenhumansandthingsnotascreation,inthesenseofasubjectcreatingitsworld,“forthepurposesoftheprovisionsofthis
4 Jean-FrançoisLyotard,The Postmodern Condition,trans.byGeoffreyBenningtonandBrianMassumi(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress),p.79.
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worldandenjoymentofthisworld,enjoymentofknowledge,power”.5 On the contrary,thisnewmaterialityhasputanendtothisanthropocentrism.6Forthisreason,Lyotardpreferredtoconceptualisethenewmatterasinteraction ratherthancreation.This,Isuspect,isalsooneofthereasonswhytheword“creation”wasremovedfromtheexhibitiontitle.Thisreconceptualisationdemandsanewmetaphysicswhichreconfiguresthesenseofbeing,andfundamentallytransformstheconceptofhumanexistence.Lyotardsays:
Ifyousaycreation,thatmeansthatyouprohibittheothermetaphysicsthatIevokedearlier:ametaphysicsinwhich,precisely,manisnotasub-jectfacingtheworldofobjects,butonly–andthis“only”seemstometobeveryimportant–onlyasortofsynapse,asortofinteractiveclickingtogetherofthecomplicatedinterfacebetweenfieldswhereinflowtheelementsofparticlesviachannelsofwaves.7
WhatdoesLyotardmeanby“interaction”here?Hedoesnotmeanthatthehumaninteractswithobjectsratherthancreatingthemlikebeinginadia-logue–Lyotardwentmuchfurther;interactionsignifiesanontologyofthetransmissionofamessagewithoutend,inwhich“manhimselfisnottheoriginofmessages,butsometimesthereceiver,sometimesthereferent,sometimesacode,sometimesasupportforthemessage;andwheresometimeshehimselfisthemessage.Thisplasticityofhumansmeansthatthisstructureofcommunicationtodayseemslikesomethinguponwhichidentitiescannolongerbefixed.”8ThismetaphysicscannotbefoundinthethoughtofDes-cartes,saidLyotard,butitwouldbepossibletothinkthroughSpinoza,orZenBuddhism–thoughnot,headded,ZenasunderstoodinCalifornia,butrathertheZenoftheChinesetradition,asincarnatedbyagreatJapanesephilosopherlivinginChina,whoiscalled…”.9Eventhoughthenameismissinginthisreport(Après six mois de travail…),wewillseelaterthatitisDôgen.
In Après six mois de travail…,LyotardonlytoldhalfofthestoryaboutDôgen,toexplaintheconceptualisationofbeingintermsofinteractioninsteadofcreation.CreationisthequestionthatwasposedatthebeginningoftheEuropeantradition,andduringmedievaltimes;creationisthepointwhereChristiantheologyandAristotelianmetaphysicsmerge,whichinturnfoundswhatHeideggercalled“ontotheology”.LyotardtoldthesecondhalfofthestoryaboutDôgeninatalkinvitedbyBernardStieglerontheoccasionofa
5 Jean-FrançoisLyotard,Après six mois de travail…,1984,ArchiveduCentrePompidou,translatedas“AfterSixMonthsofWork…",inthisvolume,p.36(“àdesfinsdedis-positionsdecemondeetdejouissancedecemonde,jouissancedesavoir,depouvoir”).
6 Ibid.7 Ibid.8 Ibid.,p.37.9 Ibid.
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colloquiumatIRCAMoftheCentrePompidouin1986,laterpublishedas“Logos and Techne, or Telegraphy”.
However,letusstepbackandask:WhyisthequestionofanamnesissoimportantforLyotard,andhowdoesitrelatetothenewtechnologieshewit-nessedinthe1980s?
On the Senses of AnamnesisThequestionposedbyLyotardthatwasquotedatthebeginningofthisarticlewasdirectedtoBernardStiegler,thephilosopherofanamnesis.LyotardwasthesupervisorofStiegler’smaster’sdegreethesisatthattime,andthusunderstoodverywelltheworkoftheyoungphilosopherwholaterdedicatedthree volumes of Technics and Timetoanamnesis.Althoughthereisnorecordofthisdiscussion,itseemsintriguingthatthequestionhasstillnotyetbeenansweredinasatisfactorymanner,atleastnotinthecontemporaryliteraturethatIcanfind.InordertounderstandthecomplexityofLyotard’squestiononanamnesis,andourambitiontounderstandthemeaningoftheLes Imm-matériauxoutsideoftheEuropeancontext,wewillneedtorevisittheconceptofanamnesisinPlato,Stiegler’stakeonPlato,Freud,andLyotard’stakeonFreud.
The Platonic Concept of Anamnesis
AnamnesisplaysanimportantroleinthePlatonicsystemofknowledge,understoodasthepathtowardstruth.Plato’swritingonthisroleofanamnesisisclearlyexpressedinboththePhaedoandtheMeno,whereheformulatedtheconceptasaresponsetothechallengefromtheSophists.LetusreformulatetheSophists’challengeinthisway:Ifyouknowwhatvirtueis(intheMeno),orwhatbeingappropriateis(inthePhaedo),thenyoudon’treallyneedtopursueit,sinceitisalreadyinyou;ifyoudon’tknowwhatitis,thenyouwon’tbeabletorecognizeitorconductyourselfaccordingtoit.Thisisaparadoxwhichleadstotheconclusionthatonecanneverfindthetrueknowledgeortheultimategood.Platosolvedthisparadoxbysaying:onedoesinfactknowit,andindeedonedoesinfactknowit,andindeedhasalwaysknownit.Thesoulisimmortal,saidPlato,butineachincarnation,thesoulforgetseverything.However,forgettingdoesn’tmeanthatonecannotrecognizethevirtuethatoneisafter.Forgettingistheconditionofrecognizing,andrecollection–anamnesis–themethod.Therelationbetweentruthandanamnesisisthusestablished.SocratesandPlatoarenotteachersinthesenseofgivingknowledgetostudents,butrather,asPlatosaid,spiritualmidwiveswhohelpthestudentstorecollectwhathasbeenforgotten.Hence,intheMeno, with thehelpofSocrates,theslave-boylearnstosolvesomegeometricalques-tionsdespitehavingnopriorknowledgeofthematter.Recollectionisnot
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onlyaboutrecollectingacertainfactorprinciple,butratheraprocessofrecoveringthewholenessofknowledge.IntheMeno(81c-d),Platostated:
Sinceallnatureisakin(συγγενής),andthesoulhaslearntallthings,thereisnothingtopreventher,byrecollectingonesinglething,recoveringalltherest.10
OnecannoticethatthereisakindoflogicalinferenceinPlato’sconceptoftheanamnesis,buthowdoesitwork?OneinterpretationisthatitfunctionsonthebasisofthePlatonicIdea,likeasortofa priori concept which allows such aninferencetohappen.11 This a priori,however,isnotwhatweunderstandintheKantiansenseoftheterm.ThePlatonicIdeafollowsratherParmenides’sthe One,inwhichthinking(theintellect)andbeingfindtheirunity.However,PlatodetachestheIdeafromtheparticularsthroughhisconceptofthechōrismós,orseparation.ThisseparationisalsoonethatremovestheIdeafrommatter,thatistosaytruthfromanymaterialcondition.ThisconceptofseparationwasreproachedbyAristotle,sincethePlatonicdoctrinedisregardstherealityoftheparticular.Aristotlewantstoreintegratematterintohisdoc-trineofbeing.ThePlatonicIdeawhichcorrespondstotheAristotelianconceptofform(eidos)becomesthefirstofthefourcausalitiesthatAristotleoutlinedin his MetaphysicsBookV:causa formalis,causa materialis,causa efficiens,andcausa finalis.
There-inscriptionofmatterbecomesanimportantphilosophicaltaskforthetraditionofEuropeanphilosophy,includinginmodernphilosophy,wherewefindattemptstounifythebodyandthesoulinthedoctrinesofDes-cartes,SpinozaandLeibniz.Tosituateanamnesisinourdiscussion,IwouldliketorefertothereadingofPlatobyBernardStiegler.Stieglerhasdecon-structedtheexamplegivenbyPlatoinMeno,sincePlatohasforgottenthetoolthatSocratesusedtodemonstratethesegeometricalquestions,whichwasdrawingonthesand.ForStiegler,technicsconstitutesacrucialroleintheconceptofanamnesis,foranamnesisisnotpossiblewithoutasupportthatisoutsidethenoeticsoul.StieglerhenceproposesaretentionalsystemthatcharacterisestheprocessesofanamnesisthroughareadingofHus-serl’sphenomenologyoftime-consciousness:primaryretention(impression,association),secondaryretention(memory,recognition)andtertiaryretention(exteriorisedmemory).Withinthissystem,theretentionsconstituteacycleofmutualdetermination,meaningthatthetertiaryretentionsconditiontheselectionoftheprimaryretention,whichinturnconditionstherecognitionofthesecondaryretention,andsoon.Later,Iwillshowhowthisreadingoftechnicsandtime,asapathtowardstruth(eitherinthesenseoftheGreekwordalētheiaorincontemporarysenses),demonstratesadiscrepancy
10 ReginaldEdgarAllen,“AnamnesisinPlato’sMenoandPhaedo”,The Review of Metaphysics,vol.13,no.1(Sept.1959),p.167.
11 Ibid.Iwillargueagainstthisassertion.
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betweenthephilosophicalWestandthephilosophicalEast.Theexaminationofthisdiscrepancywillprovideuswithanewperspectivefromwhichtolookatthepostmodernturn.
The Freudian Concept of Anamnesis
Therelationsbetweenmatterandtime,accordingtoLyotard,canbegraspedinthreedifferenttemporalsyntheses:thoseofhabit,remembranceandanamnesis.Habitisasynthesisthatexpressesitselfbodily.Remembrancealwayssearchesforanarrativewithanorigin,orabeginning.Anamnesis,forLyotard,meanssomethingratherdifferentandmustbecarefullydis-tinguishedfromremembrance.ThisdistinctionhasitssourceinFreud,especiallyhis1914essayErinnern, Wiederholen und Durcharbeiten.InthisessayFreudtriedtoshowthattherearetwotechniquesofanalysis,onethroughhypnosis,whichhelpsthepatienttoreconstructtheunconscious-nessinasimpleformofremembering–simpleinthesensethatthepatientisremovedfromthepresent,andwhatmattersistheearliersituation.Freudaddedasecondscenarioinwhich“nomemorycanasaruleberecovered”.12 Thisoccurs,forexample,withsomeexperiencesofchildhoodwhichwedidn’tunderstandatthetime,butwhichdisclosethemselvessubsequently.Thebiggestdifferencebetweenthetechniqueofremembranceinhypnosisandthetechniqueofuncoveringrepetitionisthatinthelatterthepatient“reproducesitnotasamemorybutasanaction;herepeatsit,without,ofcourse,knowingthatheisrepeatingit”.13Theanalyst’staskinthiscaseistohelpthepatienttouncoverthesourceoftheresistance.However,asFreudidentified,therearetwodifficultieshere:thefirstisthatthepatientrefusestothinkthereisaproblem,thatistosay,heorsherefusestoremember;thesecondisthatnoviceanalystsoftenfoundthat,evenafterrevealingthisresistancetothepatient,therewasnochange.Atthispoint,Freudintroducesthethirdterm,Durcharbeiten or “working-through”:
One must allow the patient time to become more conversant with this resistancewithwhichhehasnowbecomeacquainted,towork throughit,toovercomeit,bycontinuing,indefianceofit,theanalyticworkaccordingtothefundamentalruleofanalysis.14
In the lecture “Logos, Techne, or Telegraphy” (1986),LyotardcommentedonStiegler’sretentionalmodelofmemorybyreferringtothreetypeofmemories:namely,bleaching( frayage),scanning(balayage)andpassing(pas-sage),correspondingrespectivelytohabit,remembranceandanamnesis.
12 SigmundFreud,Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through,invol.12ofStandardEdition(1950),p.149.
13 Ibid.,p.150.14 Ibid.,p.155.
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LyotardidentifiesFreud’sDurcharbeitenwiththethirdtypeofsynthesisoftime–anamnesis.Lyotard’sreadingofDurcharbeitenis,aswewillseebelow,quitedifferentfromthatofFreud.15ForLyotard,thisanamnesishastwodifferentsenses,thenuancesofwhichhavetobecarefullydistinguished.ThefirstsenseofDurcharbeitentakesaformoffreeassociation:asLyotardsays,thepassingtakesmoreenergythanscanningandbleaching,preciselybecauseitdoesn’thaverules.16Thissenseistakenuponanotheroccasion,inLe Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants,whereheunderstandsavant-gardismasamovementhighlyresponsibleforthepresuppositionsimpliedinmodernity.TheworkofthemodernpaintersfromManettoDuchamporBarnettNewman,couldbeunderstoodintermsofananamnesisinthesenseofpsychoanalytic therapeutics:
Justasthepatienttriestoelaboratehispresenttroublebyfreelyassociating some apparently inconsistent elements with some past situ-ation–allowingthemtouncoverhiddenmeaningsintheirlivesandtheirbehaviour–inthesamewaywecanthinkoftheworkofCézanne,Picasso,Delaunay,Kandinsky,Klee,Mondrian,Malevich,andfinallyDuchampasaworkingthrough(Durcharbeiten)performedbymodernityonitsownmeaning.17
ForLyotard,theseartists,includingtheavant-gardes,didn’trepresentarup-turefromthemodern,butratherananamnesisofthemodern.Hencepost-modernartisaliberationfromrulesandresponsibility,andapassingbeyondtherulesofinscription,throughanamnesis.Whatismoreinteresting,andseemstobehighlypuzzlinginLyotard’sthought,isthedemandforsomethingwhichisnotinscribedandhencecannotbelimitedbytherulesofwriting.Thisoriginisnotsomethingremembered,andindeeditisamemorywhichisnotinscribed,butcannotbeforgotten.OneexampleisFreud’snotionoftheexperienceofchildhoodassomethingthatisnotrememberedbutthathastobeworkedthrough.HenceChristopherFynskproposedtoemphasizetheroleofinfancyinLyotard’sconceptofanamnesis,notingthatLyotard“understoodhimself to be writing fromaninfancyandtoaninfancy”.18 It is not only that Lyotardhaswrittentwobooks,onefrominfancy(Lectures d’Enfance),theother to infancy(Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants),butthatdeeplyrootedinhis
15 InthearticlebyScarfoneDominique,“Àquoiœuvrel’analyse?”,Libres cahiers pour la psychanalyse1/2004(N°9),109–123,theauthorstatesthatforFreudtheDurcharbeiten isataskthatcomesbacktothepatientandtheanalystcanonlywaittoletthingscomealong;forLyotard,itisthecontrary,meaningthatitisthe“thirdear”(termtakenfromNietzsche,Ohren hinter den Ohren)oftheanalyst,thatshouldbringforththeDurcharbeiten,p.116.
16 Lyotard,“LogosandTechne,orTelegraphy”,p.57.17 Jean-FrançoisLyotard,Postmodern explained: correspondence, 1982–1985,trans.DonBarry
(Sydney:PowerPublications,1993),p.79–80,translationmodified.18 ChristopherFynsk,“Lyotard’sInfancy”,inJean-Francois Lyotard: Time and Judgment,Yale
French Studies,No.99,(2001),p.48.
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thoughtis,asFynskshows,theimpulseofinfancybecomingtheconditionofanamnesis,andhenceofwriting.
Clear Mirror and the Negation of the LogosIhavenoobjectiontosuchaninterpretationofLyotard’sanamnesis,butIwouldliketocomplicateit.IwouldarguethatanamnesisispresentinLyotard’swritingsatonceasatechnique–aswehaveseenabove–butalsoasalogic–asIwillnowelaborate.Inthetextthatwehavestartedtoanalyse,inthesectiononanamnesisinwhichLyotarddramaticallytalksaboutanexamplefromDôgen,LyotardusesDôgentoexplainwhathemeansby“passing”,oranamnesis.HerewecanobserveanuancethatIproposedbefore,concerningtheuseofthewordanamnesisasDurcharbeiten.AsFynskwrites,“IbelievethattheappealtoDôgen,here,isnotmerelyaninstanceofexoticism,howevereffectiveitmightalsobeonthatscore.Itisratheranimplicitacknowledgmentthatwhatheseekstothinkdoesnotsurrendertotheconceptortoanytheoreticalexposition–thatifthereisapassagefrominfancytothought,itisnotestablishedbytheconcept”.IwouldliketotakethisreferencetoDôgenmoreseriouslythanFynskdoes;indeed,referencestoDôgendonotonlyappearonceinLyotard’swritings,butalsoappearinvariousnotesandinterviews.
IwanttoproposethatwhatLyotardwasthinkingwasmuchmoreintriguing,andevensomethingmoreuncanny,thanFynskdescribes.Icallthislogicthe negation of logos.Theword“negation”isperhapsnotcorrect,ordoesn’tcarrytherightsense.Thenegationatstakehereisnotatotalnegationnorapartialprobation(e.g.part,intensity).Thedifferencebetweenprivationandnegationhastobeclarifiedfirst.LetusparaphraseHeidegger’sfunnyexampleofskiingtoclarifythedifferencebetweenprivationandnegationasunderstoodbytheGreeks.19WhenIamaskedifIhavetimeforskiing,Ireply,“no,Idon’thavetime”.Infact,Idohavetime,butIdon’thavetimeforyou.ThenegationthatIwanttodemonstratehereisnotthatbeingisnegatedintakingareversedirection,butratherthatitis“privated”insuchawaythatthedirectionisdiverted.Thefirstcaseisexemplifiedinthemovementfrommoderntopostmodern.Thepostmodernistheself-negationofthemodern.Itisnotthat,atacertainmomentofmodernity,somethinghappened,andthenwehavethepostmodern.Itmeansratherthat,atsomemomentofitsdevel-opment,thelogicofmodernityturnedagainstitselfandchangeditsdirection.Thisnegationasprivationcomingoutofinternaldevelopmentisaneologism
19 MartinHeidegger,Zollikon Seminars: Protocols, Conversations, Letters,ed.MedardBoss(Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2001),p.46–47.Heideggerwrites:“IttookGreekthinkerstwohundredyearstodiscovertheideaofprivation.OnlyPlatodiscoveredthisnegationasprivationanddiscusseditinhisdialogueThe Sophist.”
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presentedbyLyotardinhisintroductiontoLes Immatériaux.20 The reference toDôgenseekstodemonstratethesamelogic,butnolongerlimitedtothecaseofmodernity,butrathertothelogosasawhole.IbelievethathereliesLyotard’sultimatequestionontechnics–which,however,remainsambiguous.LyotardattemptedtocomparewhathemeansbyanamnesiswithwhatDôgencalls “a clear mirror” in Shōbōgenzō,theclassicofZenBuddhism.IwillquoteatlengththecommentfromLyotard,inordertomakeclearwhathethinksaboutit.Let’slookcloselyatLyotard’sdiscussiononDôgen:
Itmakessensetotrytorecallsomething(let’scallitsomething)whichhasnotbeeninscribediftheinscriptionofthissomethingbroke the sup-portofthewritingorthememory.IamborrowingthismetaphorofthemirrorfromoneofthetreatisesofDōgen’sShōbōgenzō,theZenki,therecanbeapresencethatthemirrorcannotreflect,butthatbreaksitintosmithereens.AforeigneroraChinesecancomebeforethemirrorandtheirimageappearsinit.ButifwhatDōgencalls“aclearmirror”facesthemirror,then“everythingwillbreakintosmithereens”.AndDōgengoesontomakethisclear:“Donotimaginethatthereisfirstthetimeinwhichthebreakinghasnotyethappened,northatthereisthenthetimeinwhicheverythingbreaks.Thereisjustthebreaking.”Sothereisabreakingpresencewhichisneverinscribednormemorable.Itdoesnotappear.Itisnotaforgotteninscription,itdoesn’thaveitsplaceandtimeonthesupportofinscriptions,inthereflectingmirror.Itremainsunknowntothebreachingsandscannings.21
ThispassageseemstomethemostpuzzlingpartofLyotard’sintervention.Themirrorandclearmirrorseemtohavealotofmetaphoricalconnotations.Asakindofdialoguebetweenatwentieth-centuryFrenchphilosopherandathirteenth-centuryJapanesemonk,itisverydifficultforustoanalysethisstatementwithoutgoingintoanykindofexoticism.Theclearmirrorisnotamirror;rather,itisonepossibilityofthemind,beforewhichnothingexistsaswhatitis:thingscanexistornotexist.Theclearmirrorpresentssomethingalmostoppositetoanyconceptualisationofsubstance,sinceitismereemptiness.Firstly,theclearmirrornegatesthesubstanceoressence(ousia)aseidos.Hence,therehasn’tbeenanyeventthatbreaksthemirrorandmarksthebeginning.Infrontofaclearmirror,thereisonlyconstantbreaking,whichdestroystheconceptoftheself(theselfcannotbemirroredatall).SoaChinesepersoncanseehimself,sincehestillhasupādāna (clinging,grasping,attachment),whichisadesiretowardsrepresentation.Incontrast,aclearmirrorseeseverythingbroken,sincein-itselfitisempty.Lyotardfurtherwrotethat“IamnotsurethattheWest–thephilosophicalWest–hassucceeded
20 Jean-FrancoisLyotard,Deuxième état des immatériaux,Mars1984,ArchiveduCentrePompidou.
21 Lyotard,“LogosandTechne,orTelegraphy”,p.55.
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inthinkingthis,bytheveryfactofitstechnologicalvocation.”22Platodidn’tsucceedwithhisconceptofagathon,or“beingbeyondessence”;Freudtriedwithhisconceptof“originaryrepression”(Urverdrängung);andHeideggertriedwithhismetaphorof“theclearing”(die Lichtung),butheignoredtheviolenceofit.
Lyotardtransformsthe“clearmirror”intoaquestionofwriting,thatisalsoaquestionofthelogos.Herewecomeacrossanothermeaningofsubstance,whichisthesupport,thehypokeimenon.Thequestionis:canbeing[ens] be withoutbeingcarriedinthehypokeimenon?Or,asLyotardaskedinthefirstarticle of the Inhuman,“canthoughtgoonwithoutabody?”Canlogos facilitate ananamnesisthatisnotinscribedbyit?Inotherwords,canlogos – and,here,techno-logos – instead of determiningtheanamnesis,ratherallowittoarriveinanon-deterministicway?Thisquestionisveryspeculative,andfartoodifficulttobeansweredinonearticle(indeed,itmaytakeseveralgenerationstomakeitclearwhetherornotthisquestioninitselfisavalidone).Lyotardhopestomove away from the logos through the logos,suchaswasdemonstratedinthepostmodernturn.IntheteachingofDôgen,thereisanothersimilarpassagethatdemonstratesthislogic.TheZenmasterteaches“Think of not-thinking.Howdoyouthinkofnot-thinking?Non-thinking.Thisistheessentialartofzazen.”23 Zazen or tso-ch’an, literallymeans“sittingZen”,andisatechniqueofmeditation.TheoppositionthatDôgencreatedisthinkingandnot-thinking.Thisisapurenegation,sincethinkingcannotbenot-thinking,andnot-thinkingcannotbethinking.Butbetweenthinking(shiryō)andnot-thinking( fushiryō),thereisathirdwaywhichisnon-thinking(hishiryō);itnegatesboththinkingandnot-thinking,throughtheprivationofthinking.Thenon-istheOther.This negation of the logosdivertsitselftowardssomethingelse,andthereLyotardfindsinDôgentheOtherwhichisnotinscribedinthelogos.Lyotardwasinfavourofthislogic.InatalkgivenatacolloquiumontheoccasionoftheopeningofanexhibitionoftheworkofartistBrachaLichtenbergEttinger,laterpublishedasAnamnesis of the Visible,Lyotarddescribedherworkas“I remember that I no longer remember”.24Wecanprobablysaythatthisdouble-bindisthelogicofanamnesis:Isthenon-logospossiblethroughthenegationof logos within logos?Inthelastparagraphofthearticle,Lyotardraisedthequestionthatwecitedatthebeginningofthistext:
Thewholequestionisthis:isthepassagepossible,will it be possible with, or allowed by,thenewmodeofinscriptionandmemorationthatcharacterizesthenewtechnologies?Dotheynotimposesyntheses,and
22 Ibid.,p.55.23 CarlOlson,Zen and the Art of Postmodern Philosophy: Two Paths of Liberation From the
Representational Mode of Thinking(NewYork:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,2000),p.68.
24 Jean-FrancoisLyotard,“Anamnesis:OftheVisible”,inTheory Culture and Society2004,No.21,p.118.
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synthesesconceivedstillmoreintimatelyinthesoulthananyearliertechnologyhasdone?25
Lyotardaskedwhatkindsofnewpossibilitiescouldbeopenedupbythisnewtechnology,towardstheunknown.Or,incontrast,heaskedwhetherthenewtechnologyisonlyinfavourofasynthesiswhichisevenmoreefficientandhegemonic,e.g.automation.IbelievethatthisisLyotard’scentralques-tion,anditwaspresentthroughouthispreparationforLes Immatériaux.Thequestionwasposedtothephilosophersofwriting,orofmnemotechnics.Thetaskofthisarticle,initsmostambitioussense,istoquestionwhetheritisavalidquestion.Thelogosisconfrontedwiththeclearmirror,inordertothinkwhetheritispossibletorealizetheclearmirrorwiththetechno-logos.Ifweonlythinkfromthisperspective,thepostmodernwillremainonlyaEuropeanproject,andhencethediscourseofglobalisation,ofthe“commontime”,26 is nomorethanapretext.ThereisnoeasywaytoevaluatethisquestionwithoutgoingbacktotheOther,fromwheretheclearmirrorcomes,andwherethedifférendhappens.Itneedscouragetobringinsomethingexotic,andIthinkLyotarddidit,withbestintentions,tothinkwiththedifférend,aspaceopenedupbetweenEuropeancultureandJapaneseZenBuddhism.Butinordertounderstandthedifférend,onehastoanalysetheregimeofphrases(whichdefinestheintentions,descriptive,prescriptiveorinterrogative)andthegenreofdiscourses(whichdefinestherules)oftheOther.Unfortunately,thisanalysisisyettobeelaborated.
Clear Mirror Confronts the LogosLyotardwasrighttorelatetheclearmirrortoHeidegger’s“clearing”orLichtung,butIthinkitisnotLichtung per se,butratherGelassenheit which preparesforthecomingoftheclearing.Gelassenheit,forHeidegger,isthequestionofprivation.However,thereisafundamentaldifferencebetweenthe system of Gelassenheitandthesystemoftheclear mirror.TheKorean-GermanphilosopherByung-ChulHan,inhisbookShanzhai: Dekonstruktion auf Chinesisch,makesaninterestingobservationinwhichheshowsthatthe“path”,orthetao,isdifferentfromtheWegofHeidegger,sincefortheformerthereisnocreationbutonlyde-creation(Ent-schöpfung),regardlessofitsorigin;27whileforthelatter,itisalwaysasearchofanorigin,sincethissearchistheconditionunderwhichtheforgettingbroughtaboutbyontotheologymightberecognisedassuch,andtherebyovercome.Itwouldbetooquicktoequatetao with clear mirror,sinceTaoismandBuddhismstandastwodistincttraditionswithinChina.However,itisnotadistortiontoshowthattheEnt-schöpfungsetsupacommongroundforculturesthatunitedifferentreligious
25 Lyotard,“LogosandTechne,orTelegraphy”,p.57(italicsadded).26 Ibid.,p.47.27 Byung-ChulHan,Shanzhai: Dekonstruktion auf Chinesisch(Berlin:Merve,2011).
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thoughts.Again,theEnt-schöpfungthatIborrowfromHanisnotopposedtocreation(Schöpfung)asdestruction;ent-standsnotfornegationbutratherprivation.
Whenwedealwithtwoformsofknowledge(let’sfollowLyotardinspeakingofthephilosophical“West”andthephilosophical“East”),wealwaysrisksim-plifyingthem,butinordertohaveadialogue(ifthisispossibleatall),itishardnottosimplifythemastwosystems.Adialogueneedsacommonground,andthesearchforacommongroundisalwaysaprivation.IcanhereonlygiveaquicksketchofthereflectionsoftwomajorChineseandJapanesethinkers,andIwillhavetofindanotheroccasiontogiveadetailedaccount.Fornow,IwillallowmyselfsomeshortcutsbyplacingitwithintheKantianframework,aswasalreadyproposedbytheChinesephilosopherMouZongsan.MouisoneofthemostimportantfiguresofthenewConfucianism,andarguablytheonlyoneinthetwentiethcenturywhounderstoodbothWesternandChinesephilosophy.AspecialistinTaoism,BuddhismandConfucianism,aswellasthe translator of the three CritiquesofImmanuelKant,MouunderstandsthedifferencebetweentheWestandtheEastwithinKant’sframework:inarathersimplifiedsense,oneconcernsaknowledgethat,constrainedbythereceptivityofsensibleintuitionandthecategoriesoftheunderstanding,isconfinedtophenomena;theotherconcernsanintellectual intuition that con-cernstheexperiencewhichgoesbeyondthephenomenontowardswhatKantcallsthenoumenon.Mouwrites:
AccordingtoKant,intellectualintuitionbelongsonlytoGod,butnottohumans.Ithinkthisisreallyastonishing.IreflectonChinesephilosophy,andifonefollowsthethoughtofKant,IthinkthatConfucianism,Bud-dhismandTaoismallconfirmthathumanshaveintellectualintuition;otherwiseitwouldn’tbepossibletobecomeasaint,buddha,orZhenren.28
Indeed,theintellectualintuitionconceptualizedbyMouisonethatlooksneitherforscientificknowledgenorhistory(anoriginquadifference),buttoasensibilityinwhicheverythingreflectsanon-pheneomenalworld:enteringthething-in-itself(nomatterwhatitis,butprobablynotyetpossiblewithacomputer).Thedesiretoenterthenoumenonischaracterisedbydistancingfrom substance as both hypokeimenonandeidos,fromphysicstometaphysics.ThislineofthoughtisfurtherpursuedbytheJapanesephilosopherKeijiNishitani,whostudiedunderHeidegger,andwasalsoasuccessorofKitarōNishida,animportantfigureoftheKyotoSchool.Duringthe1980s,NishitaniheldseveraldiscoursesindifferenttemplesinJapan,discussingmodern-isationandBuddhism,andlaterpublishedthemasabookwiththetitleOn Buddhism.Astonishingly,Nishitaniclaimedthattheconceptofthehistorical
28 MouZongsan,Phenomenon and the Thing-in-itself(《現象與物自身》)(Taiwan:StudentBook,1975),p.5(mytranslation).ZhenrenistheTaoistspiritualmaster,whohasbecomefreeandimmortal.
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doesnotexistinAsianculture.Whathemeantbyhistoricalistheawarenessofsituatingoneselfasahistoricalbeing,andtheanamnesisofhistoricaleventsthatreconstructahistoricity,orGeschichtlichkeit:
IamsurethatBuddhismfallsshortofsuchhistoricalconsciousness,atleasttosomeextent.Generallyspeaking,somethingcalled“historical”existsnolessinChinathaninIndiaandJapan.ButIhavetheimpressionthatinthesecountriestherehasbeennotraceofseeingtheworldashistoryinthetruesenseoftheword…Thiswayofthinkingissomewhatdifferentfromanhistoricalone,atleastofthesortprevalentinthemodernworld.29
NishitanifurthercommentedthatsuchaconceptofhistoricityisneglectedinthemodeofthinkingpropertoEastAsia–thatis,thesearchoftheintellectualintuition,underdifferenttitles.Iamnotsureifwecanunderstandtheclearmirrorasakindofanamnesis,sinceittotallyunderminesthechronologicalnotionoftime.Nishitani,however,attributestheconceptofhistoricitytotheChristiantradition,withoutaskingthequestionofanamnesis.AdialoguecouldbemadebetweenNishitaniandBernardStiegler.Thishistoricityhastoberetrievedthroughtheanamnesisofwriting,ortechnics,whichStieglercalls“theepochaldoubleredoubling”,thatis“(re)constitutingawho,andthushistoricity–ifnotHistory”.30Writing,asStieglerfurthershowedinthethirdvolume of Technics and Time: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise,isthe“spatialisationofthetimeofconsciousnesspastandpassingasWeltgeschicht-lichkeit”.31Historicityisonlypossiblethroughanamnesiswithmnenotechnics,andforittohappenitdemandsanoriginofsomesort(orthedefaultoforigin).ThislineofthoughtontimeandmatterisnotpresentinAsiancultures,asNishitaniexplains:
theotheraspect–namely,thatitishistoricalandthatbeingistime–iscomparativelyneglected.OrratherIshouldsay,iftheterm“neglect”isabitofanexaggeration,itisnotsufficientlydeveloped.ThisisattributabletothefactthatBuddhismplacesemphasisonthenegativeinherentinthecontentionthattimeissomewhattransientandthatthisisaworldofsuffering.Buddhismseemstohavefailedtograspthattheworldoftimeisafieldinwhichsomethingnewemergeswithoutinterruption.32
29 KeijiNishitani,On Buddhism(NewYork:SUNY,2006),p.40.30 BernardStiegler,Technics and Time,vol.2(Stanford:StandfordUniversityPress,2009),p.
77.31 BernardStiegler,Technics and Timevol.3(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,2011),p.
56.32 KeijiNishitani,On Buddhism, p.49–50.
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“Timeistransient.”33However,thistransienttimehastobeovercomeinordertoattainastatuswherebybeingisconstant.34Inthisstatus,timenolongerhasanymeaning.Hence,followingtheHeideggerianmotif,Nishitaniobservesthatbeinghasneverbeenunderstoodastime,andhencethataworldhistoryisnotfullygraspedinAsianculture.Aquestionmaybeposedimmediately:Isn’ttherealsowritinginEastAsia;andindeed,weren’ttheChinesethefirsttoinventpaper?Thequestioncanbeansweredintwoways.Firstly,therewasa privation of the anamnesis of history in favour of an anamnesis of the clear mirror,meaningthatthereisatendencyinEasternthoughtwhichignoresthequestionofsupport.Secondly,thetechnicsofanamnesisoftheWestisnotlimitedtohistoryasrecordsofevents,butratheramodeofthinkingwhichsearchesforanorigin,nomatterwhichone.Theanamnesisoftheclearmirrordesignatesanotherconceptionoftimeandmatter(support).WewillseelaterhowthiscontributedtothefactthattheOrientwasnotabletoresistthemnemotechnicsoftheOccident.
Disorientation and Dis-orientationItisonlywithintheanalysisofthediscourseoftheOtherthatonecandefinethe différend.ThepostmodernforLyotardisadisorientationthatchallengestheauthoritytoannouncesomethingchildish.AtypicalexampleofthemoderngazeiswhenDescartescriticisedthecitybuildinginParis,arguingthatitwasnotwellplannedandhenceseemedlikeachildren’sgame.Thisdisorientationhasadoublesense,asaliberationfromthemodern,fromtheresponsibilityandprojectsintrinsictothemodern;yetitisalsoamel-ancholia,sincethepost- is the search for an anamnesis which has not yet arrived,andhenceconstitutesitsveryquestioning.Butbeforethisques-tioncanbereposedandreformulated,itisnecessarytoseeanothertypeofdis-orientation,inwhichtheclearmirrorconfrontsthetechno-logos in materialtermsandsubstantialformsinwhatwasoncecalledcolonisationandimperialism,andnowglobalisation.
IallowmyselftobrieflysummariseahistoricalmomentaftertheOpiumWars.WhenChinarealiseditsincompetenceinwarfare,itimmediatelyadoptedWesterntechnology,scienceanddemocracy,whichtotallyrewrotetheconceptionoftime.AftertheOpiumWars(1839–1842,1856–1860),ChinarecognizedthatitwouldbeimpossibletowinanywarwithoutdevelopingWesterntechnologies.TheseriousdefeatsitsufferedledtotheSelf-StrengtheningMovement(1861–1895),whichextensivelymodernizedthe
33 Ibid.,p.49.34 Iusetheword“constant”bymakingallusiontoFrançoisJullien’sdistinctionbetween
eternal(Christiantheologicalperception)andconstant(Chineseperception)asthecoordinatesystemoftime;seeJullien,Du temps – éléments d’une philosophie de vivre (Paris:Livredepoche,2012).
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military,industrializedproduction,andreformedtheeducationsystem.Twosloganscameoutofthemovementwhichfullycharacterizethespiritofthetime.Thefirstoneis,“learningfromtheWesttoovercometheWest”(师夷长技以制夷);thesecondonebearsamoreculturalandnationalistspirit:“ChineselearningforfundamentalprinciplesandWesternlearningforpracticalapplication”(中学为体,西学为用).WesterntechnologyproducedhypeinChina,butmorefundamentally,itproducedfear.WecanrecalltheexampleofthefirstrailwayinChina,fromShanghaitoWoosung,builtbytheEnglishcompanyJardine,Matheson&Co.around1876-1877.Therailwayledtosomuchfear(intermsofsecurityandpotentialaccidents),thattheChingDynastypaid285,000taelsofsilvertobuytherailwayanddestroyit.35Suchmomentsofthetransformationofcultures,whichsomeAsianscholarstendtoambiguouslycall“modernisation”or“adifferentmodernity”,isindeedverymodern,sinceitisabsolutelyCartesian,inthesensethatoneholdsthatthecorephilosophicalthoughtcansustainandtransformthematerialcondition.
Thesecondreflectionontechnoscienceaswellasdemocracycameafterthe1911revolutioninChina,whenthosewhohadbeensentabroadaschildrenlaterbecamesuchintellectuals..Oneofthemostimportantintellectualmovements,nowknownastheMay Fourth Movement,eruptedin1919.Duringthe1920sand30s,WesternphilosophystartedtoflourishinChina.ThreenamesarecloselyrelatedtothecontemporaryintellectualhistoryofChina:WilliamJames,HenriBergsonandBertrandRussell(notethatinfactnoneofthesephilosophersarespecialistsintechnics).TheintellectualdebatesoftheperiodconcernedwhetherornotChinashouldbefullyWesternisedandfullyadoptWesternscience,technologiesanddemocracy,assupportedbyintellectualssuchasHuShi(astudentofJohnDewey),and(ontheoppositeside)criticisedbyCarsunChangChia-sen(astudentofRudolfEucken),ChangTung-sun(theChinesetranslatorofBergsoninthe1920s)andothers.Thesedebates,however,ledtounresolvedquestionsanduncompromisingpropositions.SomeintellectualsstartedtorealisethemistakeoftheCartesianbinaryoppositionbetweenthemindandtheinstrument,expressedintheearlierconceptionoftherelationbetweenChineseandWesterncultures.ThesedebatesultimatelydidnotgobeyondeithertheaffirmationofamodernizedChina(whichincludedthealphabetisationofChinesewriting),ortheinsistenceuponthevaluesoflifeintraditionalthoughtthatresonatewiththemetaphysicsofEuckenandBergson.
Chinawasunabletogofurtherbecauseofalackofunderstandingoftechnics.TheintellectualsofthegenerationofMouZhongsansawtheirultimatetaskasoneofabsorbingChristianityintoChineseculture.TechnicshasneverconstitutedthecorequestionofChinesephilosophyorChineseculture.One
35 Sun,Kuang-Teh,Late Ching Tradition and Debates around Westernisation (Taiwan:CommercialPress,1982)孫廣德,晚清傳統與西化的爭論(台灣: 商務印書館, 1982).
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canalsosaylikeStieglerthat,intheWest,thequestionofprosthesis–thatisalsothequestionoftechnicsasanamnesis–didn’tcometolightuntilrecentcenturies.Butthetechno-logosisalwaysthere,actingliketheunconscious,orthe NachträglichkeitofFreud,whichdesignatesatonceadeferredactionandalsoasupplement(Nachtrag).Theeffectuationoftechnicsdependslargelyontheadoptionandadaptationwhichislimitedbyculture.Anethnicgroupadoptstechnicsfromanothertointernaliseit(suchasChinahasdonetotheperipheralcountries),oradaptsitselftoothers’technicsandbecomessub-ordinatedtothem.Culturehereactsasastabiliseroftechnics,eitherlimitingitorpromotingit.However,followingthesixteenthcenturyChineseculturedidnothavethetendencytoadvanceitsowntechnics,whichdidnothappenuntilthenineteenthcentury,whenitwasforcedtoadoptWesternscienceanddemocracy.ThesituationisdifferentinJapan,whichhadtheconsciousnessof“overcomingmodernity”beforeChinastartedonthepathtomodernisation.WecanspeculatethatthismaybethereasonwhyNishitanihadthesensibility todiscovertheproblemoftimeinAsianculture.Incomparisonwiththedis-orientationofthepostmodern,whatwehaveseenaboveisadisorientationinadoublesense,whichisnotonlythelossofdirection,butalsotheabilityofidentification.Whatisleftwouldonlybeapoliticsofidentity–theOrientisnolongeroriented,butdis-oriented.
The Nachträglichkeit of Les ImmatériauxNow we see the différend,butitremainsvirtual,sinceadialogue–ratherthanasetofspeculations–isyettobeinitiated.Thedistanceof30yearssinceLes Immatériaux providestheoccasionforposingthisquestionagain,orforquestioningthequestion.TheinitiativeoforganisinganeventonLyotard’sLes Immatériaux was itself a Nachträglichkeit.Firstly,therewastheshockthatIexperiencedwhenIcameacrosstheworkofNishitaniandBernardStiegler’sTechnics and Time 2: Disorientation in2009,whenitseemedtomethatthequestionofadialoguebetweentheWestandtheEastbasedontheques-tionoftechnicshadremainedunanswered,andindeedalmostuntouched,foracentury.Secondly,Lyotard’squestionwasdeferred,andhencehastobeadded,nachgetragen.Itisdeferredinthesensethathisquestionwasnotintelligibletohiscontemporaries–oratleast,inhisownwords,remained“toodialecticaltotakeseriously”.36 It is these two Nachträglichkeiten that urgeustogobacktosomequestionsposedbyLyotardbothduringthepreparation(includinghistreatiseonKantandWittgensteinLe Différend)andrightaftertheexhibition(includingL’inhumainandLe postmoderne expliqué aux enfants),questionswhichconcernstheradicalopeningbroughtbymoderntechnologiesandthespeculationontheirnewpossibilitiesforboththephilosophical“West”and“East”. Itriedtoapproachthisintersectionofthe
36 Lyotard,“LogosandTechne,orTelegraphy”,p.57.
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NachträglichkeitenwiththequestionthatIposedattheverybeginningofthisarticle:namely,whetherthepostmodernisaEuropeanproject.ItmaybeaEuropeanproject,butitshouldn’tbeaEuropeanproject;andindeed,itshouldservetheoccasionforaprofoundandspeculativereflection.NomatterhowspeculativeisthequestionthatLyotardposed,whichwecitedattheopeningofthisarticle,itproposestoradicallyreflectuponbothtechnologicalprogressandtheneedtotransformitbyfirstreconceptualisingit(aswehaveseenintermsofanewmetaphysicsofinteraction).Lyotard’sspeculationplacesitshopeinthenewmaterialitythatonenowadayscalls“digital”.Howseriousisthishope,andinwhatwaycanonecontinuetohope?
Qu’arrive-t-il?
Lyotardwasverymuchawareofthedangersbroughtbytelecommunicationculture;ashewrote,“thequestionofahegemonictelecultureisalreadyposed”,37andheendeavouredtocontemplatethisnewconditionandtosearchforametaphysicswhichisbothmaterialandpolitical.Whatliesbehindthedis-orientationofthepostmodernisadesireofare-orientation,notonlyfortheOrient,butalsofortheOccident,sincetheOccidentexistsinrelationtotheOrient,le différent.Arrive-t-il?Lyotardasked,“whatdoes‘here’meanonthephone,ontelevision,atthereceiverofanelectronictelescope?Andthenow?Doesnotthe‘tele’elementnecessarilyobscurethepresence,the‘here-and-now’oftheformsandtheir‘carnal’reception?Whatisaplace,amoment,notanchoredintheimmediate‘suffer’ofwhathappens[arrive].Isacomputerinanywayhereandnow?Cananythinghappen[arriver]withit?Cananythinghappentoit?”38LyotardrecallsHeidegger’sEreignis,andthesublimeofKant,whichmanifestsitselfinthisnewmaterialconditionasasortofphilosophicalresistance.Thearrive-t-il,withoutsubject,withoutcontent,ishoweveralwayshauntedbythequestionqu’arrive-t-il?
InBeijingin2000,therewasanexhibitionentitledPost-Material Interpretations of Everyday Life by Contemporary Chinese Artists,whichissaidtohavebeeninfluencedbyLyotard’sLes Immatériaux.39The“post-material”inthetitlewasnotmeanttoindicatesomethingspiritual,butrather,followingLyotard,anewformofmateriality,forexamplegeneticengineering,orartificialintelligence.Attheendoftheexhibition’scuratorialstatement,thecuratorWangZuwrote:
Weknow,duetotheadvancementoftechnology,thatweareconfrontingthepossibilityofdevelopinganewmoral,andwewillneedtobuildanewstructureofsuchamoral.Post-material,insteadofsayingthatit
37 Ibid.,p.50.38 Jean-FrancoisLyotard,“Quelquechosecomme:communication…sanscommunication,”
in L’Inhumain: causeries sur le temps (Paris:Galilée,1988),p.129.39 PersonalcorrespondencewithProfessorWangMingAnoftheBeijingCapitalNormal
University.
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describestheexpansionofmaterialandthedeclineofthehumanspirit,representstheiropposition…Wewillhavetocreateanewmoralvisuality,whichredefinesart,aswellaslife.40
ThelogicofthisexhibitionresemblesLyotard’s.However,onewillnoticetwopunctainthiscuratorialstatement.Firstly,whatispresentedisanaffirmationofthedisorientation,whichnolongerdistinguishestheWestandtheEast.Technologybecomesaglobalphenomenonandfundamentaltoeverydaylife.ShouldthisnotalsoberegardedastheproblemofhistoricitythatNishitanilamentedinthe1980s?Secondly,thestatementreferstoanoppositionbetweenthedeclineofspiritandtheexpansionofmaterial,andhencecallsforanewmoral,whichisfundamentallyalsoanewlogic.
InNovember2002,theFrenchphilosopherPaulViriliocuratedanexhibitionentitledCe qui arrive attheFondationCartierinParis.Inthisexhibition,Viriliowantedtodrawattentiontocatastrophescausedbytechnologicaldevel-opmentinthepreviousdecades,andannouncedthatareversalofwhatAris-totledistinguishedassubstanceandaccidentshadtakenplace.Inlightoftheanticipationofthenormalisationofcatastrophesinthetwenty-firstcentury,Viriliohopedtogobacktothequestionofresponsibilityandreflectontheproblemofindustrialisation,whichbecomesdestructivetobothcorporalandspiritualbeings.Viriliopointsoutthat,forAristotle,accidentsservetorevealsubstance;inotherwords,substanceisalwaysaccidental;hencewhatfollowsfromaccidentsarenewinventions.Accidentsaresomewhatnecessary,sincewithoutthemtherecanbenotechnologicaldevelopment.Butthegreatdis-coveries,accordingtoVirilio,alsocreatethegreatcatastrophes.Globalisation,through techno-logos(andthroughphilosophy),isalsoaprocessoftheproductionofacatastropheatthescaleofnature:
andsoitismerelyhightimethatecologicalapproachestothevariousformsofpollutionofthebiospherearefinallysupplementedbyaneschatologicalapproachtotechnicalprogress,tothisfinitenesswithoutwhichdearoldglobalisationitselfrisksbecomingalife-sizecatastrophe.41
ViriliocondemnedtheEnlightenment’snotionofprogress,andtheideathattheOrientcannotescapefromtheprogressoftheOccident.HequotedtheFrench-IranianphilosopherDaryushShayegan,whoclaimedthatonecannotimagineculturesasseparateblockswithoutinterpenetration,andthathencewe are all Occidents.42ViriliomockedShayegan,claimingthattotalkabout“lightcomingfromtheOccident”and“aworldwhichcannotescapeprogress”isironic.Itishereweseethevalueoftalkingaboutle différend,andthe
40 后物质:当代中国艺术家解读日常生活, 北京红门画廊 (21 Oct–30 Nov, 2000), http://www.xu-ruotao.com/exhibitions/group-2/post-material-interpretation-of-everyday-life-by-contem-35(mytranslation).
41 PaulVirilio,The Original Accident,trans.(Cambridge:PolityPress,2007),p.24.42 PaulVirilio,Ce qui arrive(Paris:Galilée,2002),p.89.
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resistancetoprogressandtheuniversalisationoftheteleculture.Indeed,ifitdoesnottakethequestionoftechnicsandanamnesisseriously,IamnotsurewhetherthephilosophicalEastcaninspiretheWestanyfurtherthanwhatLyotardtookfromDôgen.
Re-orientation: an Anamnesic Resistance?
Asthequestionofdisorientationtakesthenewshapeofaglobaldis-orientation,Heidegger’scritiqueoftechnologyseemstoechofromtimetotime.Inthedawnofthedigitalage,didn’twealreadyseethereturnoftheCalifornianZen,whichwasoncecalledCalifornianIdeology?Whatwillbethedifferencethatistobeshaped?IfeelthataftermodernisationinAsia,thesequestionsarenolongerasked.TodayifwetakeupthequestionbyLyotard,thetaskwillbetolookintothematerialityofthedigitalandthenewtechnologicalconditionaccompaniedwithit,inordertofindapossibilitythatmay preserve the différend,orevenmultiplythedifférend.
Lyotardwasverybravetoraisethisquestion,whichdemandsanewlogicofthinkingabouttechnology,andaturningagainsttechnologyinordertoexploreitspossibility.Itisnolongerthelogicthatfunctionswithinmachines,butratheralogicthatliberatesbeingsfromsuchastrictlyformalizedthinking.OrmaybewecanrefertowhatSocratesrevealsinhischallengeinthe Protagoras,thetechne of all technai,athinkingthatgovernsallpracticaltechnics.Socrateshaschosenreason,andsetabeginningofWesternphilosophyseparatedfromthepre-Socraticmetaphysicalthinking.Butthisreason,aswehaveseeninLyotard’sthinking,hastobeproblematizedbyintroducingtheOther,bothamirrorandaclearmirror.Theinteractionmodel,forLyotard,isthepossibilityofdismantlingtheconstantupādāna of creation.IfherethenewmaterialityallowsustorethinkthetraditionofthephilosophicalWest,itisequallysignificantforthephilosophicalEasttorethinkthequestionofanamnesisfromanotherdirection.Inthissense,wemayunderstandwhyHeideggerrefusestoseekanysolutionintheEast,ashesaysin the famous Der Spiegel interview “Only a god can save us”:
myconvictionisthatonlyinthesameplacewherethemoderntechnicalworldtookitsorigincanwealsoprepareaconversion[Umkehr]ofit.Inotherwords,thiscannothappenbytakingoverZenBuddhismorotherEasternexperiencesoftheworld.ForthisconversionofthoughtweneedthehelpoftheEuropeantraditionandanewappropriationofit.Thoughtwillbetransformedonlythroughthoughtthathasthesameoriginanddetermination.43
43 MartinHeidegger,“NurnocheinGottkannunsretten”,Der Spiegel30(Mai,1976):193–219.Trans.byW.Richardsonas“OnlyaGodCanSaveUs”inHeidegger: The Man and the Thinker(1981),ed.T.Sheehan,p.45–67.
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HereliesboththeaffinityanddifferencebetweenLyotardandHeidegger.Lyotardismoreopentodialogue,totheradicalpossibilityofthedifférend. Indeed,thereasontolookforthedifférendisnottodestroythedifferences,butrathertorecognizethe“inevitableandinescapablepossibilityofheterogeneity”.44ButhowisthispossibleinthecaseofLyotard,withhisinsistenceontheOther?Lyotardgavearesponsetothisquestion,andIthinkthiswillperhapsbethestartingpointforreflectingonapossibleprojectofre-orientationthroughthepracticeofananamnesicresistance.Isummarisethis response in terms of three points: writing,originandsystem,thoughwehavetobearinmindthatsuchasummarymaynotreallyreflectthesystem-aticthinkingofLyotard.
Writing.Lyotardhaddifficultyprovidinganexampleofthenewtechnologythatheimagined,whichcanrealizethepotentialofsuchanamnesicresist-ance.Hewrites:“TheonlythingIcanseethatcanbearcomparisonwiththisa-technicalora-technologicalruleiswriting”.45WritingalsodistinguishestheanamnesisofLyotardfromthatofFreud,sinceFreud’sanamnesisislimitedtofreeassociation,whileforLyotarditistheproductionofwork.Anamnesisisoriginallyaninterminableprocess;however,inthecaseofpsychoanalysisitisbroughttoanendwhenthetreatmentiscomplete;whileinthecaseofartisticcreation(includingwriting),theartistsstopsincelabourisnolongerindispensable.Whatmarksthedifferencebetweenthesetwoendsistheworkoftheartists–whichisalsothemnemotechnics.Lyotardspeculatesonapassingwhichisnotpsychoanalytical,butratheraformofresistanceagainstthe techno-logos:
Weenvisagethiswritingaspassingoranamnesisinbothwritersandartists(it ’sclearlyCezanne’sworking-through)asaresistance(inwhatIthinkisanon-psychoanalyticalsense,morelikethatofWinstoninOrwell’s1984) tothesynthesesofbreachingandscanning.Aresistancetocleverprogrammesandfattelegrams.46
WinstonisfurthermentionedinthechapterentitledGlose sur la résistance in Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants.WerecallthatWinstondecidestowriteadiarytoexpresswhathethinksandfeels,asanactofrebellion.Itwillbeinter-estingtoask:arebellionagainstwhat,whenthelawdoesn’texistanymore?Winstonhasnoideaoftheexactdate.Itisnottheanamnesisofanhistoricalevent,butratheranactofresistancetothesystematicstupidityoftheParty.LyotardturnedtotheexamplesofBenjamin’smicrologynamedbyAdorno.In One Way Street andBerlin Childhood,whatispresentedisnotthestoryofchildhood,butratherthechildhoodofevents;toputitinanotherway,what
44 MichelOlivier,“Ledifférent,oulaquestiondel’enchaînement”,inLes Transformateurs Lyotard(Paris:ÉditionHermann,2008),p.211.
45 Lyotard,“LogosandTechne,orTelegraphy”,p.5646 Ibid.
200 30 Years after Les Immatériaux
isinscribedisthepotentialofinfinitizationinsteadofthecompletionofahis-tory.Thestoriesonlyinscribetheirungraspability.
Thequestionofwritingenabledbythenewtechnologywasoneofthecentralthemes of Les Immatériaux.TogetherwithThierryChaput,LyotardsetupanexperimententitledÉpreuve d’écriture,whichwaswhatonetodaycallscollab-orativewriting,withBrunoLatour,JacquesDerrida,ChristineBuci-Glucksman,IsabelleStengersandothers,creatingentriesofkeywordsandcommentingoneachother’sentries.Eventhoughtoday,withthedigitalnetworks,wecanwritethroughblogging,socialnetworking,audio-visualcreation,codingandsoon,asystematicprogrammeonwritingasresistance,asidefromitsjournalisticvalue,stillhastobethoughtthrough;notonlyataskfortheintellectuals,asdemonstratedintheÉpreuve d’écriture,butalsoforthepublic.
Origin. Theoriginistheungraspable.ThephilosophicalEastpaidlittleattentiontotherelationbetweentheoriginandthesupport.TheanamnesisoftheoriginforLyotardisnotareturntotheoriginthatdesignatesaplaceanddateofanevent,butrathertheunknownable,whichcannotbeinscribed.Suchanorigin,however,hasitssupportinwriting;thatistosay,theanamnesiscantakeplacethroughwriting,butalsoescapesbeingwritten.Ifanamnesisislikelanguage,movingfromonephrasetoanother,itneedschains(enchaînement)inorderforittoreachthereferent.Theprincipleoftheanamnesis,accordingtoLyotard,emphasisesthefactthat“’reason’forthechainisneverpresentableintermsofapastevent(originaryscene).Itisimmemorial”.47Theunknowablepresentsitselfinthethingandthevoice,whichserveascalls,orratherasmotifs,forthereconstructionofthelostorigin.
InalectureentitledPhilosophie et Origine giventofirstyearundergraduatesattheSorbonnein1964,LyotardstartedwithareflectiononHegel’sfirstmajorphilosophicalwork,thewhichmarkedhisseparationwithSchellingandFichte,The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s Systems of Philosophy (1801).Hegeldescribedthebirthofphilosophyasaresponsetothelossoftheforceofuni-ficationofhumancommunities:“Whenthemightofunionvanishesfromthelifeofmenandtheantitheseslosetheirlivingconnectionandreciprocityandgainindependence,theneedofphilosophyarises.48” Philosophy was born in ordertoretrievethelostunity(thisbecameevenclearerinHegel’sLectures on the Philosophy of History,1837).Philosophyisnothistoryperse,whichtracesthehappeningofthisevent,butratherseekstorecoveritfromthepresentmoment,writesLyotard,“the origin of philosophy is today”.49 The origin escapes bothwritingandphilosophyandservesastheconditionofphilosophizing,
47 Lyotard,“Anamnesis of the Visible”,p.109.48 G.W.F.Hegel,The difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s system of philosophy,trans.H.
S.HarrisandWalterCerf(Albany,NY:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1977),p.91.49 Jean-FrancoisLyotard,Pourquoi philosopher?(Paris:PUF,2012),p.61.
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whilethepossibilityofphilosophizingresidesintheactofwritingandsearching;ontheotherhand,theoriginwithoutsupportanditspracticeofanamnesisisalsothesourceofthedis-orientationthatwehavedescribedabove.
System. AlthoughLyotardadoptedHegel’sconceptionofthetaskofphilosophyastherestorationoforiginalunity,hemovedawayfromHegel’stendencytowardssystematisation(letusrecallthatHegelstandsasthemostsystem-aticoftheGermanIdealists).Theactofanamnesisisoneofresistanceagainstsystematisation.Lyotardspokeofthesystemaswhatsurvivedtheruinsofthebourgeoisworldafterthecrisisofcapitalism,twoWorldWars,andtheexter-minationofEuropeanJews.50Systematization,accordingtoLyotard,isthedominationofhumansandnaturebyreason.Thepoliticsofanamnesisisapoliticsthatseekstheincalculable,somethingbothofthisreasonandagainstit.ThirtyyearsafterLes Immatériaux,thenewmaterialitydescribedbyLyotardhasnottakenthedirectionthatheenvisaged,butratherhasledtoanewmodeofreificationandcontrol,whichBernardStieglercalls“hypermaterial”.InChina,therapidadoptionoftechnologieshasledtoamiseryofpollutioninallaspects:water,food,soil,andblood.Economicandtechnologicalprogresstodayenjoysthespeedofmovingintotheimpossibilityofanamnesis,ofboththeunknownandhistoricity.Thisconsistsinthenecessityofresistingthesmartprogrammesorfattelegrams.Ihopethattheelaborationofthe différendconcerninganamnesisinthetwogenresofdiscourseofthephilosophicalWestandEast,however,canbecomeasupplement(Nachtrag)toeachother.ThereisprobablynobetterwaytoendthisarticlethanbycitingthelastsentenceofLyotard’s“Logos, Techne or Telegraphy”:
I’llstoponthisvaguehope,whichistoodialecticaltotakeseriously.Allthisremainstobethoughtout,triedout.51
50 Lyotard,“Anamnesis of the Visible”,p.117.51 Lyotard,“LogosandTechne,orTelegraphy”,p.57.