ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES

ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIESMANAGING SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS IN ARMED CONFLICT TO REDUCE THE HUMAN COST OF WAR

CONTENTSAbout this publication ............................................................................................................................. 4

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 4

Foreword ..................................................................................................................................................5

List of abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ 6

Icons ........................................................................................................................................................7

Executive summary ..................................................................................................................................8

Part A – Problem analysis .......................................................................................................................11

1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 121.1 Navigating this document .................................................................................................................................................121.2 Definingsupportrelationshipsinarmedconflict ....................................................................................................141.3 Internationalhumanitarianlawandprotection .......................................................................................................151.4 Complexconflictcharacteristics ....................................................................................................................................16

1.4.1 Putting support relationships in context ........................................................................................................... 19

2. Risks and opportunities in support relationships ..............................................................................202.1 Theneedforcoherencebetweenpartners ................................................................................................................202.2 Riskstociviliansandothersnotfighting ...................................................................................................................212.2.1 Diffusionofresponsibility .................................................................................................................................. 21

2.2.2 Aspectrumofresponsibilities .............................................................................................................................22

2.2.3 Interconnected support relationships ................................................................................................................24

2.3 Theopportunityforsupportrelationshipstoimprovetheprotectionofcivilians andothersnotfighting ....................................................................................................................................................242.3.1 Influencingpartnerbehaviour ...........................................................................................................................25

2.3.2 Towardscoherentlyresponsiblesupportrelationships ..................................................................................26

Part B – Specific factors in support relationships ...................................................................................29

3. Understanding support relationships ................................................................................................303.1 Typeofconflict .....................................................................................................................................................................303.1.1 Internationalarmedconflict ..............................................................................................................................30

3.1.2 Non-internationalarmedconflict ......................................................................................................................31

3.1.3 Parallelarmedconflicts .......................................................................................................................................31

3.2 Actorsinvolved .................................................................................................................................................................... 323.2.1 States .....................................................................................................................................................................32

3.2.2 Multinational coalitions ...................................................................................................................................... 33

3.2.3 Peaceforces ........................................................................................................................................................... 35

3.2.4 Non-State armed groups .................................................................................................................................... 37

3.2.5 Privatemilitaryandsecuritycompanies ..........................................................................................................39

3.3 Militaryoperationsandassociatedactivities...........................................................................................................403.3.1 Weapons and ammunition management ......................................................................................................... 41

3.3.2 Theconductofhostilities.....................................................................................................................................42

3.3.3 Capture, arrest and detention ............................................................................................................................44

3.3.4 Lawenforcementoperations ..............................................................................................................................45

3.4 Formsofsupport .................................................................................................................................................................463.4.1 Political support ....................................................................................................................................................47

3.4.2 Armstransfers .......................................................................................................................................................49

3.4.3 Partneredmilitaryoperations ............................................................................................................................ 51

3.4.4 Otherformsofsupport ......................................................................................................................................... 57

4. The protection of civilians and others not fighting .......................................................................... 604.1 Personsdeprivedoftheirliberty ....................................................................................................................................614.2 The dead ..................................................................................................................................................................................634.3 Internallydisplacedpersons ...........................................................................................................................................654.4Missingpersons ...................................................................................................................................................................674.5 Accesstomedicalcareinarmedconflict ...................................................................................................................684.6Essentialservices .................................................................................................................................................................704.6.1 Schoolsandothereducationalfacilities ............................................................................................................71

4.7 Thenaturalenvironment ..................................................................................................................................................724.8Landminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar ...............................................................................................................74

Part C – Framework of practical measures ............................................................................................. 77

5. Framework overview..........................................................................................................................785.1 Managingsupportrelationships ....................................................................................................................................785.2 Contextualization ................................................................................................................................................................825.3 Overarchingquestions .......................................................................................................................................................83

6. Considerations for decision makers .................................................................................................. 846.1 Preparation.............................................................................................................................................................................84

6.1.1 Internal readiness to engage ..............................................................................................................................84

6.1.2 Normativeengagement .....................................................................................................................................88

6.1.3 Assessmentandframingoftherelationship ................................................................................................... 91

6.2 Implementation ....................................................................................................................................................................986.2.1 Institutionalcapacitybuilding ...........................................................................................................................98

6.2.2 International humanitarian law training .....................................................................................................102

6.2.3 Assistance in international humanitarian law compliance ........................................................................ 107

6.2.4 Monitoringandevaluation ..............................................................................................................................109

6.2.5 Internaloversight ............................................................................................................................................... 114

6.3 Transition ............................................................................................................................................................................. 1176.3.1 Structured disengagement .................................................................................................................................117

6.3.2 Learning............................................................................................................................................................... 123

7. Questions for decision makers ......................................................................................................... 1267.1 Preparation........................................................................................................................................................................... 127

7.1.1 Internal readiness to engage ............................................................................................................................ 127

7.1.2 Normativeengagement .................................................................................................................................... 130

7.1.3 Assessmentandframingoftherelationship ................................................................................................. 132

7.2 Implementation .................................................................................................................................................................. 1387.2.1 Institutionalcapacitybuilding ......................................................................................................................... 138

7.2.2 International humanitarian law training ...................................................................................................... 141

7.2.3 Assistance in compliance with international humanitarian law ............................................................... 145

7.2.4 Monitoringandevaluationofthepartner ..................................................................................................... 147

7.2.5 Internaloversight ............................................................................................................................................... 150

7.3 Transition ............................................................................................................................................................................. 1527.3.1 Structured disengagement ................................................................................................................................ 152

7.3.2 Learning............................................................................................................................................................... 155

Glossary ............................................................................................................................................... 156

Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 159

ABOUT THIS PUBLICATIONStates,multinationalcoalitions,peaceforces,non-Statearmedgroups,privatemilitaryandsecuritycom-paniesandotherprivate-sectorentitiesthatprovidesupporttopartiestoarmedconflictshavethepotentialtopositivelyinfluencethesepartiesinordertoenhancetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Thispublicationpresentsananalyticalframeworkfortacklingthecomplexityofsuchsupportrelationships,highlightstherisksandopportunitiesbroughtaboutbysupportrelationshipsintermsofprotectingcivil-iansandothersnotfighting,andoffersdecisionmakersawidearrayofpracticalquestionsthatcanhelptoguidethemastheydesignandimplementtheirsupport.Thecontentofthispublicationisbasedonbilateralconsultationsheldinseveralcountries,theexpertiseoftheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)andexistingliteratureonthesubject.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSTheresearchunderpinningthispublicationcameoutoftheICRC’sSupportRelationshipsinArmedConflictsproject.Butthisdocumentwouldnothavebeenconceptualized,draftedandpublishedwithoutthegenerouscommitmentofcolleaguesinvariousICRCunits,divisionsanddelegations.InadditiontotheleadauthorClementineRendle,wewishtothankDominiqueLoyeandMaryWerntzfortheiroversightandguidance,andJulienChassany,TimothyFrench,ThomasHallier,PatrickHamilton,SnowyLinternandRubenStewartfortheircontributiontothedraftingprocess.Wewouldalsoliketoexpressourgratitudetonumerousotherindividualswhodrewontheirrespectivefieldsofexpertisetoprovidecommentsandinput.Thisincludesthemembers oftheproject’scoregroup–MayaBrehm,AbbasDaiyar,NettaGoussac,IrénéeHerbet,CarinNaikeKohl, ElpidaPapachatzi,PaulPeugnet,GuiveRafatianandThomasdeSaintMaurice–aswellasthefollowinghead-quartersanddelegationcolleagues:VincentBallon,CarolineBaudot,AlexanderBreitegger,FrancescoBruscoli, Gilles Cerutti, Angela Cotroneo,TristanFerraro,OranFinegan, SusanneGentz, PilarGimeno Sarciada, Eirini Giorgou, Laurent Gisel, Pete Giugni, Gilles Hansoul, Georgia Hinds, Ken Hume, Trevor Keck, NamitaKhatri,JoelleKuhn,GeoffLoane,LouisMaresca,DanielMesserli,VanessaMurphy,MoniqueNanchen,JanNinckBlock,AndreasNotter,HelenObregónGieseken,JelenaPejic,ChristopherPoole,TilmanRödenhauser,FilipaSchmitzGuinote,GuelaSekhniachvili,ShahrokhShakerian,MichaelTalhami,CléaThouin,ErikTollefsen andWenZhou.WearealsogratefultoAriadnaAndreuVillasevilandDigvijayRewatkarfortheirinvaluableresearch.

Thispublicationwaslargelyinformedbytheperspectives,expertiseandexperienceofarangeofprofes-sionals,policymakers,academics,experts,militarycommandersandotherweaponbearers,whoareorwereinvolvedindesigningandimplementingsupportrelationshipsinvariousconflictsituations.WearegratefulforthetrusttheyextendedtotheICRCduringourconsultationsandfocusgroups,andwehopetodeepenourdialoguewiththemonthebasisofthispublication.OurspecialthanksgotoJamesChiswellandCarstenSvenssonfortheirdetailedcommentsandguidance.Lastly,wearegratefultothecommitteeofoutside professionalsandexpertsfortheirtimeinreviewingthispublicationandprovidingtheirfeedback.

FOREWORDWardisruptscommunities,tearsfamiliesapartandcrushespeopleinwaysthatnoothertypeofcrisiscan.ThesearethereasonsthatledtothecreationoftheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),inspiredthedevelopmentofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,anddrivehumanitarianeffortstopreventsufferingandprotectthelivesanddignityofvictims.

ArmedconflictsandothersituationsofviolencehaveevolveddramaticallysincethebirthoftheICRCalmost160yearsago.Warslastmuchlongertodaythaninthepast,resultinginadevastatingandlong-lastingimpactonessentialinfrastructureandservicessuchashealthcare,waterandeducation.Protractedconflictsaffectsocietiesforgenerationsandunderminethestabilityofentireregions.

Warshavealsobecomemorecomplex.Theyinvolveanever-growingnumberofactorsorganizedinover-lappingwebsofalliances,proxiesandothertypesofsupportrelationships.Thistrendhasconsequencesontoday’sconflictdynamicsandpresentsclearriskstocivilians.Thegreaterthenumberofactorsinvolvedinaconflict,themoredifficultitcanbetoachieveapoliticalsolution.Andwhenarmedactorsfightalongsideeachotherinloosecoalitionswithunclearcoordination,thiscanleadtoadiffusionofresponsibilitythatheightensthevulnerabilityofcivilians.Yetsupportrelationshipsbetweenarmedactorsalsoofferopportun-itiestostrengthentheprotectionofcivilians:actorscanleveragetheirinfluenceovereachothertopromoterespectforinternationalhumanitarianlaw.

Toaddressthechallengesthatariseinsupportrelationships,theICRChaslaunchedaglobalinitiativetoworkwithawiderangeofinterestedactorsandidentifymeasuresthatcanimprovecivilianprotection.Thispublication–Allies,PartnersandProxies:ManagingSupportRelationshipsinArmedConflicttoReducetheHumanCostofWar–ismeanttoserveasthebasisfortheICRCtobuildaconstructivedialoguewithgovernments,armedforcesandbothmultinationalandnon-Stateactorsinordertofindpracticalwaysforward.

TheICRCaimstogetdecision-makersthinkingabouttherisksinherentinprovidingsupporttoapartytoanarmedconflictand,perhapsmorefundamentally,abouttheopportunitiesthatwell-directedinfluencecancreatetoreducethehumancostofwar.Everytimeapartnershipissignedandanallianceisformedinawarzone,abondiscreatedthathasthepotentialtoworsen–orlessen–humansuffering.Thepointofthispublicationistogenerateafullerunderstandingofthestakesinvolvedinsupportrelationshipsandguidethedecision-makingprocesswithabroadsetofthought-provokingquestions.

Myhopeisthatthiswillresultinapositivechangeforthewomen,menandchildrenwhoselivesaredis-ruptedbyconflict.IinviteallreaderstosharetheirexperienceinthisareawiththeICRCandthuscontributetotheemergenceofaglobalbodyofpracticalknowledge,bestpracticesandrecommendationsaimedatpreservingthelifeanddignityofvictimsofarmedconflicts.

PeterMaurerICRCPresident

6 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSDDR Disarmament,demobilizationandreintegrationERW ExplosiveremnantsofwarIAC InternationalarmedconflictIDP InternallydisplacedpersonIHL InternationalhumanitarianlawNIAC Non-internationalarmedconflictNSAG Non-StatearmedgroupPMO PartneredmilitaryoperationPMSC PrivatemilitaryandsecuritycompanyPSSM PhysicalsecurityandstockpilemanagementTAAA Train,advise,assist,accompanyWAM Weaponsandammunitionmanagement

ICONS 7ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES 7

The dead

Detention

Essentialservices

General questions General

Healthcare

Internallydisplacedpersons

Keyquestions

Landminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar

Missing

Missingpersons

Thenaturalenvironment

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYTheICRCestablishedtheSupportRelationshipsinArmedConflictInitiativeinresponsetothescaleofhumansufferingresultingfromarmedconflictsinwhichpartiestotheseconflictsreceiveexternalsupport.

Asupportrelationshipinarmedconflictisdefinedhereasoneinwhichthesupportincreasesthecapacityofapartytoconductarmedconflict.TheICRCbelievesthatsupportrelationshipshavethepotential,exercisedornot,topositivelyinfluencetheprotectionaffordedtothosenotfighting.Recognizingthestrengthoflong-termcooperationandtheroleofnon-militarystakeholders,theICRCencouragesactorsinsupportrelationshipstotakeabroadviewoftheirinfluenceoverhowconflictsarefoughtandhowtheiraftermathismanaged.

Throughcontinuedengagementandsharingofexperienceswithactorsinsupportrelationships,theICRCaimstofacilitateanunderstandingofgoodpracticestoreducethehumancostofwar.Tothatend,thisdocu-mentasksdecisionmakerstoconsiderpragmaticwaystomitigatetheriskofnegativehumanitarianconse-quencesandenhancetheprotectionofthosenotfighting,includingthroughbetterrespectforinternationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL).

Withthisdocument,theICRCseekstocontinueitsengagementwithactorsinvolvedinsupportrelationshipswithafocusonhowtofurtherimprovepracticesoastoreducetheimpactofwaronpeople.

Whilewarisneversimple,theICRChasseenthreekeyinterconnectedtrendsemergeoverthelast20yearsthatmakeconflictsevenmorecomplex.Ithasobservedthatconflicts:

• areincreasinglynon-internationalinnature

• involveanincreasingnumberofpartiesandotheractors

• increasinglyfeaturesupportrelationshipsbetweenmanyactorsandthepartiesthemselves.

Thesecomplexitiesposechallengesforactorsoperatinginthesesituationstoensuretheprotectionofcivil-iansandothersnotfighting,includingforhumanitarianactorssuchastheICRC.Thescaleofthehumanitar-ianconsequencesofthoseconflictsinwhichsupportrelationshipsareadistinctivefeatureisimpossibletoignore.Reducingthehumancostofwarisnotonlyahumanitarianimperative:itcanalsoshapetheprospectsforrecoveryandreconstruction–twokeyfactorsthatcontributetolong-termstability.

TheICRCisawarethatconflictdynamicsareever-shiftingandthatimportanttrendsobservedoverthepast20yearsmaynotlastforever.Yetthereiseveryreasontobelievethatsupportrelationshipswillremainanenduringfeatureofarmedconflict.

SupportrelationshipspresentbothrisksandopportunitiesintermsofcompliancewithIHLandthehumani-tarianconsequencesofarmedconflictmorebroadly.

TheICRCbelievesthatactorsshouldseektomanagetheirrelationshipsresponsibly,individuallyandcollect-ively,inviewofthoserisksandopportunities.Thisrequirestheseactorstobecoherentwitheachotherwhenitcomestointent,leadershipandcapacity.Theycantakearangeofpracticalmeasurestoalignthemselveswith,andpositivelyinfluence,theirpartners. Incontrast,alackofcoherencebetweenactorsinasupportrelationshipresultsinadiffusionofresponsibility,astherespectiveactors’rolesandcommandingauthorityarenotclearlydefined.Inotherwords,gaps,reductionsoralackofclarityintheresponsibilitiesassumedbyactorsinasupportrelationshipcaninadvertentlyor,worse,deliberatelydiminishtheprotectionaffordedtopeopleaffectedbyarmedconflictandotherviolence.

TheICRCbelievesthatactorspreparingtoprovideorreceivesupportshouldbedoingmoretofactortheriskstoaffectedpeopleintotheirdecision-making.However,theICRCwouldalsoencouragethemtoexploreoppor-tunitiestoenhancetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingthroughtheirsupportrelationships.

EXECuTIvE SuMMARy 9ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES 9

TheICRCasksactorsinvolvedinsupportrelationshipsto:1. integrateananalysisoftherisksandconsequencesforciviliansandothersnotfightingintohowtheymanagetheirsupportrelationships

2. takegreaterindividualandcollectiveresponsibilityforensuringthatciviliansandothersnotfightingareprotected

3. intheeventofallegationsofIHLviolationsorotherproblematicbehaviourbyapartnerinasupportrelationship,takemeaningfulactiontoaddressthebehaviourofconcern.

Inconsideringtherangeofrisksandopportunitiesthatmayariseinasupportrelationship,decisionmakersshouldtakeintoaccountthebasicfeaturesoftherelationship,namelythetypeofconflict,theactorsinvolved,themilitaryoperationsandassociatedactivitiestobeundertakenbythoseactors,andtheformofsupporttobeprovided.Thesefactorshavethepotentialtoeitheraggravateoralleviatethehumanitarianconsequencesofanarmedconflict.Thisdocumentprovidessomepreliminaryindicationsofthepotentialaggravatingoralleviatingimpactofvariousrisksandopportunities;theseexamplesarenotmeanttolimitthefactorsadecisionmakermayneedtoconsiderinagivencontext.

TheICRCencouragesallactorstomanagetheirsupportrelationshipsresponsibly,withafocusonthepro-tectionofthosenotfighting.Thisrequiresactorstoplacegreateremphasisonthespecificrisksandoppor-tunitiesthesupportrelationshipmaypresent.Thisgoalshouldguidedecisionmakersastheyweighandimplementvariousmeasuresthroughoutthesupportrelationship.

Therearenumerouspracticalstepsthatactorsinsupportrelationshipscantaketomaximizetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Thosestepsshouldbeconsideredandappliedwhilepreparingandimple-mentingthesupportrelationshipandduringthesubsequenttransition.

Basedonitsinitialworkonthetopic,theICRChasidentifiedpracticalmeasuresthatcanbetakenintern-allyorwithinaspecificsupportrelationshipandgroupedthemintenbroadfunctionalareas.Althoughthoseareasarenotionallychronological,inpracticetheyshouldbetakenintoconsiderationthroughouttherelationship.

TheICRCencouragesactorstoconsiderpossiblemeasuresineachareafromalegal,policyandoperationalperspectiveandatalllevelsofdecision-making.Thisrequiresdecisionmakerstolookaheadandtotakeintoaccountthespecificrisksoropportunitiesthatmayariseinthecontextofagivensupportrelationship.Thatassessmentwilldeterminewhetherpracticalmeasuresshouldbetakeninanyorallofthosetenareas.

Byexploringeachofthetenareas,decisionmakerswillidentifykeyfactorsthatwillhelpthemtomanagetheirsupportrelationships.Drawingonitsoperationalexperience,theICRCprovidessomemorespecificlinesofthinkinginthisdocumentasexamples,withoutprejudgingtheapproachtobetakeninanyindividualcontext.

Buildingontheaboveframework,theICRCsetsfortharangeofquestionsthatcanhelptoguidedecisionmakersinagivensituation.Thequestionscoverspecificformsofsupport,activitiesoractorsandtouchonaspectsoflegal,policyandproceduralissues.Decisionmakerscanusethesequestionstofactortheconse-quencesforciviliansandotherprotectedpeopleintotheirstrategicandoperationaldecisionsateachstageofthesupportrelationship.

Thisdocumentrepresentsapreliminaryframeworkandisdesignedtopromptfurtherreflectionandengage-mentonissuesrelatedtosupportrelationshipsinarmedconflict.TheICRClooksforwardtoworkingwithauthoritiesinordertofurtherrefineitsanalysisandrecommendationsinthisarea.

PART A

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

1. INTRODUCTIONOverthepast20years,thescaleofhumansufferingresultingfromarmedconflictshassurged,challengingtheabilityoftheICRC–aswellasthatoftheentirehumanitariansector–toaddressit.Inthattime,theprovisionofsupporttowarringpartiesbyexternalactorshasemergedasaprominentfeatureofwarfare.Assuch,itpresentsbothrisksandopportunitiesrelativetorespectforinternationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL)andtheconsequencesofarmedconflictmorebroadly.

Actors are encouraged to reduce thehuman cost of conflicts in the short and long termbymanagingtheirsupportrelationshipsinordertobetterprotectthosenotfighting.

Supportrelationshipsareawayforactorstosharetheburdenofthewareffort.Yettheseactorsshouldremainattentivetotheimpactofthewaronthosenotfighting.FromtheICRC’sobservations,thedegreetowhichIHLcomplianceandtheprotectionofaffectedpeoplearefactoredintosuchsupportrelationshipsseems,alltoofrequently,insufficient.TheICRCseesaneedforactorstotakeacriticallookatthemselves,inadditiontoworkingwiththeirpartners,inordertomanagetheirsupportrelationshipsmoreresponsibly.

IntheICRC’sview,arangeofpracticalmeasurescanbeimplementedwithinasupportrelationshiptoreducethenegativeimpactofarmedconflictonaffectedpeople.Infact,manyactorsalreadyputinplacesuchmeasures,andtheICRChasbegunconsultingwithsomeoftheminordertolearnfromtheirexperience.Thispublicationthereforereflectstheinitialfindingsfollowingseveralyearsoffocuseddialoguewitharangeofactorsandexpertsinvolvedinsuchsupportrelationships.ItisalsobasedonaliteraturereviewofopensourcesandonarchivalcontentaccumulatedbytheICRCoverthelasttwodecadesofbilateralandconfiden-tialdialoguewithbelligerentsaroundtheglobe.

Farfrombeingadefinitivepronouncement,thispublicationpresentsaninitialframeworkdevelopedbytheICRCtoaddressthephenomenonofsupportrelationshipsinarmedconflictandtheirpotentialhumanitarianshortcomings.Italertsdecisionmakerstosomeoftherisksandopportunitiesofengaginginsupportrela-tionshipsinarmedconflict.Inadditiontoidentifyingarangeofpracticalmeasures,thisdocumentprovidesdecisionmakerswithaseriesofquestionsthatcanhelptoguidethemastheydeveloptheirownpracticalmeasurestomanagetheirsupportrelationshipsresponsibly.

Throughcontinuedengagementandthesharingofexperiences,theICRCaimstopromotegoodpracticesinanattempttoimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingfromadverseconsequencesinsupportrelationships.Inthehopethatthispublicationwillpromptfurtherreflectionandengagementonthetopic,theICRClooksforwardtorenewinganddeepeningitsinteractionswithactorsinvolvedinsupportrelationships,andtoassistingthemwhereverpossibleinidentifyingmeasuresthatcanbeadaptedtotheirspecificsituation.

1.1 NAVIGATING THIS DOCUMENTThispublicationisdesignedasareferencetoolforadiverserangeofreaders.Inparticular,itismeantforpeopleandentitiestakingdecisionsthataffecthowasupportrelationshipismanaged.Giventhebreadthofsupportrelationships(seeSection 1.2),thosedecisionmakersmayworkatanyofanumberoflevelsinthehierarchyandacrossthespectrumofdefence,diplomacy,nationalsecurityanddevelopmentbodiesinStatesandtheirequivalentswithinotheractors.Decisionmakerscanusethisdocumentasaroadmaptoaddressthecomplexinterplayofrisks,choicesandopportunitiesthatsupportrelationshipsentailrelativetoaffectedpeople.

1. INTRODuCTION 13

Thefartheralonginthedocument,themoredetailedtheconsiderations.Similarly,theguidingquestionsraisedthroughoutthedocumentevolvefrombroad,overarchingquestionstomorefocusedquestionstowardstheend.Thedocumentalsocombinesconsiderationsrelevanttoavarietyofcircumstances,therelevanceofwhichwilldependonthecontext.Forthesereasons,differentsectionsmayinterestdifferentreaders.

Part AofthisdocumentexplainstheICRC’sinterestinsupportrelationshipsinarmedconflicts.Section 1 definessupportrelationshipsandframestheroleofIHLwithinbroadereffortstoprotectaffectedpeopleandreducethehumanitarianconsequencesofwar.Thesectionendswithadescriptionoftheplaceofsupportrelationshipsincontemporaryandfuturearmedconflicts.Section 2outlinestheICRC’sviewoftherisksandopportunitiespresentedbysupportrelationshipsinarmedconflictintermsoftheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting:ononehand,adangerousriskofdiffusionofresponsibility,ontheotherhand,anopportunityforpartnerstopositivelyinfluenceeachother.

Part Bunpackskeyelementsthatshouldinformdecisionsabouthowtomanagesupportrelationshipsinsuchawayastoimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Section 3identifiesthemainfactorsshapingsupportrelationshipsaswellastherelatedrisksandopportunities,namely:thenatureoftheconflict(internationalornon-international),theactorsinvolved(States,multinationalcoalitions,peaceforces,non-Statearmedgroups(NSAGs)andprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompanies(PMSCs)),theactivitiesinvolved(e.g.conductofhostilities,arrest,captureanddetention,lawenforcementoperationsandweaponsandammunitionmanagement(WAM)),andtheformsofsupporttobeprovided(e.g.politicalsupport,armstransfersandpartneredmilitaryoperations(PMO)).AstheICRCurgesgreaterconsiderationofthehumani-tarianimpactofsupportrelationships,somekeyconcernsintheprotectionofaffectedpeoplearehighlightedin Section 4(e.g.personsdeprivedoftheirliberty,thedead,internallydisplacedpersons(IDPs),missingpersons,accesstomedicalcare,essentialservices,thenaturalenvironmentandlandminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar(ERW)).Decisionmakerscanadaptthegeneralobservationsfoundinthisparttotheirowncircumstances.

Part Cfocusesonarangeofpracticalmeasuresthatcouldbeusedtomanagesupportrelationshipsresponsi-bly.Section 5givesanoverviewoftheICRC’sframeworkofpracticalmeasuresfordecisionmakerstobetterprepare,implementandtransitionsupportrelationships.Section 6describesthetenareasfordecisionmakers toconsiderinmanagingtheirsupportrelationshipsinordertoenhancetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Tohelpdecisionmakerstocontextualizetheframework,Section 7containsaseriesofpracticalquestionsthattheyshouldaskthemselvesaspartoftheirefforttoengageinsupportrelationshipsresponsi-bly.Thesequestionsaddresslegal,policyandproceduralissuesaswellasanumberofconsiderationsspecifictogivenformsofsupport,activities,actorsorhumanitarianconcerns.TheaimistoenabledecisionmakerstointegratetheriskstociviliansandotherpeopleprotectedbyIHLintotheirstrategicandoperationaldeci-sions at each stage.

Throughoutthisdocument,thereaderwillfindreferencestolegalprovisionsandotherresources.Thesearenotexhaustiveand,uponrequest,theICRCcanprovidedecisionmakerswithfurthersupportintheirefforttoadaptpracticalmeasurestotheirowncircumstances.

AglossaryoftermsusedbytheICRCtodescribesupportrelationshipsinarmedconflictcanbefoundattheendofthisdocument(page156).Whilemanycommonlyusedtermsandconceptsdescribeelementsofsupportrelationships,theICRCdoesnotadoptorendorsethelanguageofanyparticularactor,doctrineororganizationalscheme.Itshouldthereforenotbeassumedthatatermusedherehasthesamemeaningattributedtoitbyotheractors.

1.2 DEFINING SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS IN ARMED CONFLICT

1 ICRC, InternationalHumanitarianLawandtheChallengesofContemporaryArmedConflicts,ICRC,Geneva,2019,p.75:https://shop.icrc.org/international-humanitarian-law-and-the-challenges-of-contemporary-armed-conflicts-recommitting-to-protection-in-armed-conflict-on-the-70th-anniversary-of-the-geneva-conventions-pdf-en;ICRC, InternationalHumanitarianLawandtheChallengesofContemporaryArmedConflicts,ICRC,Geneva,2015,pp.22–23:https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts.

TheICRCdefinesasupportrelationshipasoneinwhichthesupportincreasesthecapacityofapartytoconductarmedconflict.

Supportrelationshipshavethepotential,exercisedornot,topositivelyinfluencetheprotectionaffordedtociviliansandothersnotfightinginanarmedconflict.

Theconceptof“supportrelationshipsinarmedconflict”seekstocapturethebreadthofrelationshipsasso-ciatedwithriskstociviliansandothersnotfighting.

ThedynamicsobservedinrecentyearsshowthatthisconceptincludessupportprovidedbyortoStates,internationalorganizationsandNSAGs.ThosewhosupportpartiestoarmedconflictsmaybeboundbytheIHLrulesregulatingsucharmedconflicts,notablywhencontributingtothecollectiveconductofhostilitiesbyanotherpartyagainstanarmedgrouporbyexertingoverallcontroloveranarmedgroup.1 That is not a definingfeatureofasupportrelationship,however:inothercases,partnersprovideatypeofsupportthatincreasestherecipient’scapacitytoengageinarmedconflictwithoutthemselvesbecomingpartytoit.

Withthisdefinition,therealmofpotentialsupportrelationshipsisvastanddiverse.Thispublicationisnotmeanttocapturethediversityofallpresentandfutureiterationsofsupportrelationships,asactorsanddynamicsofrelevancegobeyond“proxy”and“surrogate”relationships.Somearrangementsmaydirectlyheightenthehumanitarianrisk,whileothershaveamoreindirectimpact.Theaimhereistoprovidealensthroughwhichbothsupportingandsupportedactorscanbetterexaminethehumanitarianimpactoftheirchoices,whateverthecircumstances.

SUPPORT

POLITICAL

ARMS TRANSFERS

PARTNEREDMILITARY

OPERATIONS

1. INTRODuCTION 15

Thesupportprovidedcouldbeintheformofpoliticalsupport,PMOsorarmstransfers,ortakeotherformssuchasinstitutionalcapacitysupport,financialsupport,or“hosting”(allowinganexternalmilitarypresenceortransitrights).Astrendsinwarfareshift,sotoomaytheformsofsupportobserved(seeSection 1.4.1).ForthepurposesoftheICRC’sanalysis,itisnottheformofsupportthatiskeybutratheritseffectonthecapacityofthesupportedpartytoengageinarmedconflict.Whilenotadefiningfeature,somerelationshipsaremutualinthatthesupportingactoralsoreceivessomeformofsupportbackfromitspartner.

Twoobservationsillustratetheimportanceoftakinganexpansiveviewofsupportrelationshipsandtheirroleintheconductandhumanitarianimpactofarmedconflict.

Firstly,manysupportrelationshipsinarmedconflictoccuragainstthebackdropofbroadertiesbetweenthepartners.Amongthosetiesarelong-termsecuritycooperationorassistanceagreementsthatarenotdirectlylinkedtothebeginningorendofaspecificconflict.Stepstakeninthecontextofthoserelationshipscanneverthelesspositivelyinfluencebehaviourifconflictslaterarise.

Secondly,theactionsofpartiesandtheirpartnershaveeffectsthatcontinuetobefeltlongaftertheendofmilitaryoperations,includingforthosewhoremainindetention,displacedfromtheirhomesormissing.IHLrulesstillapplytothesegroupsandcontinuetoprotectthemevenaftertheconflicthasended.Importantly,managingtheaftermathofconflictinvolvesnon-militarystakeholders,fromcivilianauthoritiestoexternal“stabilization”ordevelopmentagencies.

Actors insupportrelationshipsshouldtakeabroadviewof therole theycanplay inhowaconflictisfoughtanditsaftermathismanaged.

1.3 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND PROTECTION

IHLreflectsthesameprinciplesthatexist inmanyculturesandsystems,namelytheneedtominimizetheharmcausedbyarmedconflict.Throughtreatiesandcustom,theseruleshavebecomeincreasinglydetailed,constantlybalancingbetweentheprincipleofhumanityandmilitarynecessity.TherulesofIHLworktogetherwithotherapplicabledomesticandinternationallegalframeworks,includinginternationalcriminallaw,humanrightslawandrulesonarmsandammunition.

AstheguardianofIHL,theICRCseekstoensurethatthisbodyoflawisfaithfullyapplied,effectivelydis-seminatedandproperlyunderstood.TheICRCrecognizesthatchangesinthenatureofarmedconflictovertimegiverisetonewchallengesintheinterpretationandapplicationofIHL.Indeed,itispartoftheICRC’smandatetostimulatediscussionsofsuchchallengesandpossiblesolutions,includingwithbelligerentsthatmaycontesttheapplicabilityorapplicationofIHLtotheiractions.SomearguethatIHLasawholeorspe-cificrulesorelementsthereofdonotapplytotheirconduct,incaseswheretheICRCwouldarguethattheydo.Additionally,someactorsdisagreeontheinterpretationofIHLrulesortheirapplicationtogivencir-cumstances,suchaswhoisprotectedasa“civilian”.Theseargumentsmaybebasedonoperational,legal,ideologicalorpoliticalconsiderations.AlackofclarityontheapplicabilityandinterpretationofIHLplaysaroleinthediffusionofresponsibilityinsupportrelationships(seeSection 2.2.1).TheICRCisconcernedthatsuchsituationsmayleadtotheweakeningofprotectionsowedtociviliansandothersnotfighting,bothinthecaseathandandasaprecedentforfuturecases.

Inviewofcontemporarychallenges,theICRC’sworkonsupportrelationshipsisfocusedonpragmaticwaysforpartnersinsupportrelationshipstosecuregreaterprotectionforthosenotornolongerfightinginarmedcon-flict.PartiestoanarmedconflictandthosethatsupportthemmustfaithfullyimplementtheIHLobligationsincumbentupontheminordertoreduceharmtocivilians,thosehorsdecombatandotherpeopleprotectedbyIHL.ThisincludestakingstepstoincreasethecapacityofpartiestoupholdtheletterandspiritofIHL.

Inthispublication,theICRCasksdecisionmakerstotakeabroadperspectiveintheirsupportrelationshipsandconsiderhowtheywillmitigatetheriskofnegativehumanitarianconsequencesandenhancetheprotec-tionofthosenotfighting,includingthroughbetterrespectforIHL.Arangeofpracticalmeasuresissuggestedthatcanhaveapositiveimpactforaffectedpeoplebothduringaconflictandinitsaftermath,whetherthesemeasuresareimplementedasamatteroflaworpolicy.

Key legal rules

Four Geneva Conventions of 1949

Additional Protocols of 1977

Customary international humanitarian law, as identified in the ICRC Customary IHL Study

For further information on IHL rules, see the ICRC IHL databases

Further reading

International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction (N. Melzer)

IHL in Action: Respect for the law on the battlefield (ICRC)

1.4 COMPLEX CONFLICT CHARACTERISTICS Whilewarisneversimpleintermsofthesituationsitcreatesandthedecisionsitrequires,theICRChasseenthreekeyinterconnectedtrendsemergeoverthelast20yearsthatmakeconflictsevenmorecomplex:1. anincreaseinthenumberofarmedconflicts,drivenbytheproliferationofnon-internationalarmedconflicts(NIACs)

2. agrowingnumberofactorsengagedinarmedconflict3. anincreasedprevalenceofsupportrelationshipsinarmedconflict.

Thesefactorsofcomplexityposechallengestoactors–includinghumanitarianactorssuchastheICRC–workingtoensureciviliansandothersnotfightingareprotectedinsuchsituations.

Number and character of armed conflictsTheoverallnumberofarmedconflictshasbeenrisingconstantlysincethelate1990s.ThisincreasehasbeenprimarilydrivenbythemorethandoublinginthenumberofNIACs,inwhichatleastonepartyisnotaState.

ThemostcommontypeofNIACinthepasttwodecadesisbetweenaStateandoneormoreNSAGs,wherethereisanasymmetryinthemilitarycapacitiesoftheparties.Owingtothisasymmetry,botharmedgroupsandtraditionalmilitarieshavemovedtodevelopnewmeansandmethodsofcombatingtheenemy.

AlongwiththegrowthinthenumberofNIACs,civiliansincreasinglyfindthemselvesatthecentreofcon-temporaryconflicts.Popularsupportisincreasinglycentraltotheperceivedlegitimacyandongoingsecurityofboththeauthoritiesandarmedgroups.Whenhostilitiestakeplaceinpopulatedareas,civiliansandcivilianobjectsaremorelikelytobeharmed,andtheeffectswillbefeltlongaftertheconflicthasended.

Furthercomplexitycomeswhennumerousarmedconflictstakeplaceatthesametimeinthesameterritory.Moreover,thelinesseparatingconflictandothersituationsofviolencearesometimesdifficulttodraw.Asaresult,responsibilitiesareoftendiffuse,andactorsencounterpracticalchallengesthatunderminetheabilitytoprotectaffectedpeople.

1. INTRODuCTION 17

Protractedconflictandinstabilityareotherfactorscontributingtotheconstantriseinthenumberofarmedconflicts.Eachwaveofconflictanditsaftermathcreatetheconditionsforthenextconflict,whichmeanscomprehensiveandlastingpeaceremainselusive.Asanindicationofthis,theICRChasbeenrunningitstenlargestoperationsuninterruptedforanaverageof42years.

Multiplication of actors Thesecondtrendofthelast20yearshasbeenamultiplicationofthenumberofpartiestoarmedconflicts.ICRCdatashowthatStatesexperiencingNIACsarelikelytohavemorethantwoNSAGspresentontheirter-ritory,andmanyStatesexperiencemultipleconflictsontheirterritorysimultaneously.Thistrendispartlyexplainedbythefragmentationandmultiplicationofgroupsinthesamecontext.TheotherdrivingfactoristhelargenumberofStatesinterveninginNIACsabroad.

So,theimageofwarhasprogressivelyshiftedfromoneoftraditionalconfrontationbetweenthemilitariesoftwoopposingStates(seethefigurebelow)toonewheremultipleactorsareoperatinginthesamebattlespace(seethefigurebelow):

BATTLEFIELD STATESTATE

MULTINATIONALCOALITION

HOST STATE

PEACEFORCES

NON-STATEARMED GROUP

BATTLEFIELD

Prevalence of support relationships Inthethirdtrend,asthenumberofactorsandconflictshasgrown,ithasbecomethenormforactorstoworktowardstheirstrategicobjectivesinpartnershipwithotheractors.Forexample,asjustasubsetoftherangeofsupportrelationships,morethanone-thirdofNIACstodayinvolve“coalitions”ofStatesorNSAGsthatarepartiestotheconflict.2ThesecomplexwebsofsupportrelationshipshavebecomeincreasinglyprevalentandareakeyfeatureofalmosteverymajorconflictinwhichtheICRCoperates.3

Thus,contemporaryarmedconflictsarecomplexenvironmentsfeaturingmultipleactorsengagedinvariousrelationshipsofsupportorconfrontation:

HOST STATE

PEACEFORCES

STATESupport relationship

BATTLEFIELD

MULTINATIONALCOALITION

Contemporaryarmedconflictsarefuelledbyasteadysupplyofsmallarms,lightweapons,majorconven-tionalarmsandammunition.Despiteadvancesinregulatingtheinternationalarmstrade,weaponsandammunitioncontinuetobesuppliedinlargenumberstopartiestoarmedconflicts–StatesandNSAGsalike–andtobedivertedtounauthorizedendusersandenduses.Theglobaltradeinsmallarmsandlightweaponsinparticularconsistsofbothnewlyproducedweaponsandsurplusarmsthatarerecycledfromoneconflicttothenextoverdecades.4Thewidespreadavailabilityofweaponsfollowingaconflictoftencontrib-utestocontinuedtensionandviolenceandjeopardizeseffortstoestablishlastingpeace.5

Whilesupportrelationshipsmayreduceeachpartner’sindividualcostandrisk,theICRC’sconcernisthatthisreductionisnotazero-sumgameandmayleadtoadiffusionofresponsibilityforwhichthepriceisultimatelypaidbyciviliansandothersnotfighting.Thespecificrisksandopportunitiesassociatedwithsup-portrelationshipsarediscussedfurtherinSections 3 and 4.

2 Thetermcoalitionisusedhereinitsbroadestsense,i.e.whenanarmedconflictinvolves,atleastononeside,twoormorepartiesfightingtogether.

3 SeeC.DroegeandD.Tuck,“Fightingtogetherandinternationalhumanitarianlaw:Settingthelegalframework”,2017:https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2017/10/12/fighting-together-international-humanitarian-law-setting-legal-framework-1-2/,allwebaddressesaccessedDecember2020.

4 SeeSmallArmsSurvey:http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/transfers.html;ICRC,Targeting theWeapons:ReducingtheHumanCostofUnregulatedArmsAvailability,ICRC,Geneva,2005:https://shop.icrc.org/targeting-the-weapons-reducing-the-human-cost-of-unregulated-arms-availability.

5 Targeting the Weapons(seenote4above).

1. INTRODuCTION 19

1.4.1 PUTTING SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS IN CONTEXTSupportrelationshipsareaprevalentfeatureofarmedconflictsand,basedontheICRC’sobservations,areassociatedwithasignificantscaleofhumanitarianconsequences.TheICRCstronglysuspectsapositivecor-relationinthisregard,althoughitdoesnotseektodemonstratedirectcausationinthispublication.

Escalating and prolonging conflictSupportrelationshipsincreasetheresourcesandcapabilitiesavailabletosupportedpartiestoaconflict.Theythereforeriskescalatingand/orprolongingtheseconflictsandthelackofsecuritythatfollows.Insomecases,theICRCseesescalationspiral,assupportbysomeexternalactorspromptsanincreaseinexternalcounter-supportfortheopposingparty.Theescalationand/orprolongationofarmedconflicthaveimportantimplicationsforaffectedpeoplethatcontinuelongaftertheconflicthasended.Evenwherethesupportisseenasameanstoshortentheconflictorasbeingintheinterestofthecivilianpopulation,actorsshouldstillconsiderthepotentialhumanitarianconsequences.

Humanitarian consequencesAsconflictshavebecomemorecomplexandprotracted,sotoohavethenegativehumanitarianconsequencesforaffectedpeople.Inthesame20-yearperiodwheresupportrelationshipshavebecomeacommonfeatureofarmedconflict,theICRChaswitnesseddevastatinghumanitarianconsequencesinconflictsituations.

Engaginginrelationshipsofsupportinarmedconflicthasconsequences.Whileindividualactorsmayseethemselvesasplayingarelativelyminorroleinpartnershipwithothers,thereisnonethelessaquestionastowhetherthecumulativeeffectoftheirandtheirpartner’sactionsexposesaffectedpeopletogreaterriskintheshortandlongterm.Thehumanitarianconsequencesofwarcan,inturn,shapetheprospectsforrecoveryandreconstruction–twoimportantcontributingfactorstostability.

Supportrelationshipsinarmedconflictallowactorstosharethefinancial,politicalandoperationalburdenofpursuingtheirstrategicobjectives.Thisadvantageislikelytoremainrelevantintheyearsahead.

Theaforementionedtrendsseenoverthepast20yearshavebeensignificantlyshapedbytheconfrontationbetweenself-describedjihadigroupsandtheiradversaries.ThatconfrontationaffectsroughlyhalfoftheStatesexperiencingNIACswithintheirterritory,andthevastmajorityofforeigninterventionsaredirectedagainstthiscategoryofarmedgroups.Ascomprehensivepeaceremainselusiveinthosesituations,itseemslikelythatthesetrendswillcontinueoverthecomingyears.

TheICRCisawareoftheresurgenceofstrategiccompetitionbetween“greatpowers”astheprimarysecuritythreatperceivedbysomeStates.Inanincreasinglycomplexglobalsecurityenvironment,thisshiftinprior-itiesislikelytohavemajorconsequencesforthenatureofwarfare.Theriskofinternationalarmedconflict(IAC)between“peer”Statesloomslargeandwouldhavepotentiallydevastatinghumanitarianconsequences.Againstthatbackground,theuseofsupportrelationshipstosecurebroaderstrategicobjectiveswilllikelycontinue,ifnotincrease.Existingbilateralandmultilateralsupportrelationshipswillprobablybedeepened,andnewsupportrelationshipswillform.Theymayfeaturegreatermaritimeandcyber,andpotentiallyevenspace,components.Developmentsinweaponstechnology,includingarmeddronesandautonomousweapons systems,influencehowwarfareisconductedandthusthedynamicsofsupportrelationships.Insofarastheyraiseuniquechallenges,thehumanitarianconsequencesofsuchconflictswouldbeamatterforfurtherconsideration.

Supportrelationshipswillremainanenduringfeatureofarmedconflict.

2. RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

Thissectionlooksinmoredetailattheriskofadiffusionofresponsibilitybetweenactorsinasupportrela-tionship,aswellasattheopportunityforthemtoworktogethertoenhancetheprotectionof,andreducethenegativehumanitarianconsequencesfor,affectedpopulations.TheICRCasksdecisionmakerstoconsiderhowtheywillmitigatetheriskofnegativehumanitarianconsequencesandenhanceprotectionofthosenotfighting,includingthroughbettercompliancewithIHL.Morespecifically,actorsareaskedtointegrateananalysisoftherisksandconsequencesforciviliansandothersnotfightingintohowtheymanagetheirsup-portrelationships,totakegreaterresponsibilityfortheirprotection,andtotakemeaningfulactiontoaddressanybehaviourofconcern.

AsexplainedinSection 1.2,itisimportanttotakeabroadviewoftheroleofactorsinasupportrelationshipwithregardtotheconductofconflictanditsconsequences.Inkeepingwiththisapproach,thenotionof“responsibility”isnotlimitedtolegalresponsibilitybutratherreferstoabroaderconceptthatalsoincludesethical,moralandpoliticalaspectsofresponsibility.Thus,unlessotherwisestated,referencestoresponsi-bilityarenotastatementoftheinternationallegalobligationsanactormayhaveinagivensituation.

Whiletheconsiderationsapplicabletoeachmaydiffer,bothsupportingandsupportedactorshavearoletoplayinmanagingtheirrelationshipresponsibly.Theyshouldseektoexerciseresponsibilityindividuallyandcollectivelyfortheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.

2.1 THE NEED FOR COHERENCE BETWEEN PARTNERS

IntheICRC’sview,threefactorsarecentraltowhetherasupportrelationshipwillaccentuatetherisksofnegativehumanitarianconsequencesoropportunitiestoimprovethesituation:1. intent2. leadership3. capacity.

Eachactorshouldassess itsownpositionandthatof itspartnerwithrespecttothesethreefactors.Thedegreeofalignmentbetweentheactorsacrossthesefactorsisanindicatoroftherisks or opportunities associated with their support relationship. This understanding should informhowactorspreparefor,implementandtransitiontheirsupportrelationship.

ThesethreefactorsareintroducedbrieflybelowanddiscussedfurtherinSection 6.1.3.

IntentIntentisdefinedhereasthesumtotaloftheobjectivesorgoalsofeachpartner.ThisincludespoliticalormilitarygoalsaswellasthepriorityplacedoncompliancewithIHLandotherinternationalstandardsandtheprotectionofcivilians,othersnotfighting,andbothcivilianandspecificallyprotectedobjects.

Thestrengthofaprospectivepartner’sintentionorwillingnesstocomplywithIHLandpromotetheprotectionofaffectedpopulationswillbeakeyfactor intherelationshipachievingthatoutcome.

2. RISkS AND OPPORTuNITIES IN SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 21

Twopartnersinasupportrelationshiprarelysharepreciselythesameintentbecausetheirstrategicobject-ivesandvaluesdivergetosomedegree,particularlyovertime.TheircommitmenttoIHLandotherprotectivenormsmaywellalsodiverge.Understandingthesefactors,andtheirunderlyingdrivers,iskeytoassessingandmanagingtherisksassociatedwiththesupportrelationshipandtheopportunitiestopositivelyinfluencethepartner.

LeadershipLeadershipreferstotheorganizationalstructureofanactoranditsabilitytoensurethattheactor’sintentanddirections(instructionsorguidance)areunderstood,respected,andfaithfullyexecutedthroughoutthechainofcommand.Thisindicatesthepartners’capacitytoeffectchangeandthelikelihoodthatanintenttocomplywithIHLandprotectaffectedpeoplewillbeproperlyimplementedattheoperationallevel.

Asrolesareallocatedinasupportrelationship,itisimportantforeachactortounderstandtheextenttowhichitcanrelyonitspartner’sleadershipatvariouslevels,andanycountervailinginfluences.

CapacityCapacityreferstothematerialassets,humanresourcesandskillsavailabletoanactortoachieveitsobject-ives.Itconcernsboththescaleandqualityofthoseresources,aswellastheirsuitabilitytotheactivitiestobeundertaken.Apartnermayhavestrongleadershipbutlacktheresourcestoachieveitsobjectives.

Inadditiontoensuringthateachpartnerhasthecapacitytoperformitsagreedrole,itisimportantforthepartners’ capacities tobe complementary.A support relationship inwhichboth intent and leader-shiparestrongmayneverthelesspresentrisksifthepartners’resourcesarenotappropriatelyalignedandinteroperable.

2.2 RISKS TO CIVILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING

NumerousfactorsinasupportrelationshiphavethepotentialtoeitheraggravateoralleviatethespecificriskstociviliansandotherpeopleprotectedbyIHL.Principalamongthemarethetypeofconflict,actorsandactivitiesinvolved,andthetypeofsupportprovided.TheseissuesareexploredfurtherinSections 3 and 4.

Decisionmakerswithinauthoritiesengaginginsupportrelationshipsshouldconsiderthesespecificrisksandtakepracticalmeasurestomitigatethemwhenmanagingthesupportrelationship.

However,theICRCbelievesthattheoverarchingriskisthatofadiffusionofresponsibility.

2.2.1 DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY Supportrelationshipspresentariskofdiffusionofresponsibilitybetweentheactorsinvolved.Whileactinginpartnershipwithothers,eachactor’sresponsibilitiescanbecomeunclearorminimized,whetherinten-tionallyornot.Thisdiffusioniscloselylinkedwiththedegreeofalignmentbetweenthepartners’intent,leadershipandcapacity(seeSection 2.1).

The diffusion of responsibility weakens the protection of affected people and thereforerepresentsthemostsignificantriskassociatedwithsupportrelationships.

Practicalindicatorsofthedegreetowhichresponsibilitiesarediffusedinclude:

• Ownership of the cumulative impact of the relationship

Whilenotinherentlyproblematic,burdensharingthroughsupportrelationshipsrisksreducingonepartner’sunderstandingandsenseofownershipoftheconsequencesoftherelationshipforaffectedpeople.Responsibilityformanagingthecumulativeeffectsofsupportrelationshipsdoesnotliesolelywiththesupportedpartytoaconflict.

• Common understanding of IHL obligations

Clarityabouteachpartner’sobligationsunderIHLisanecessaryconditionforensuringrespectbyitsownforcesandbyitspartner.Ambiguityastothescopeormeaningofapartner’sobligationsorthedenialofresponsibilitycanleavegapsthathaveknock-oneffectsontheotherfactorslisted.

• Clarity in roles and responsibilities

Intheabsenceofclearlydelineatedrolesandresponsibilities,supportrelationshipsarefrequentlymarredbypracticalcoordination-relatedchallengesthatincreasetheriskofharmtoprotectedpopulations.Suchchallengescanresultindirectorindirectharm.Theycanalsocreateconfusionamongthelocalpopulation,preventingpeoplefromreportingissuessuchaspossibleIHLviolations.

• Internal accountability and accountability between partners

Accountabilityinternallyandwithintherelationshipcanrangefromdiplomatictolegalmeasures,dependingontheconduct.Theindicatorsabove(ownership,obligations,andclarityofrolesandresponsibilities)affectactors’accountabilityfortheiractionsandtheconsequencesinarmedconflict.Thiscanbeduetofactualcircumstancesbeingobscured,ambiguityaboutresponsibility,orinadequatesystemsandprocesses.Additionally,actorsarenotalwayswillingandabletoholdthemselvesandtheirpartnersaccountableforerrorsormisconduct.Thispreventstheactorsfromtakingthenecessarycorrectivestepstopreventthoseerrorsfromrecurringandmaycontributetoacultureofimpunity.

• The scale and severity of the humanitarian impact

Thenatureandextentofnegativehumanitarianconsequencesmayindicateadiffusionofresponsibility.Thosenegativehumanitarianconsequencesmayberelatedtotheintentofeitherorbothactors,theircapacityandleadershiptosecurecompliancewithIHLandotherstandards,orotherpracticalchallenges.

Theabove indicatorsmaypoint toan increased severityof thehumanitarianconsequencesof conflict,althoughtheywillnotoccurineverysupportrelationship.Theindicatorsareinterdependent,meaningthatweaknessacrossnumerousindicatorsmultipliestherisksassociatedwiththerelationship.

2.2.2 A SPECTRUM OF RESPONSIBILITIESTheextentofanydiffusionofresponsibilitydependsontheinteractionofnumerousfactorsandcannotbemeasuredinabsoluteterms.Itisnonethelessusefultodifferentiatebetweensomecommonscenarios:

SUBVERTEDRESPONSIBILITY

REDUCEDRESPONSIBILITY

MINIMIZEDRESPONSIBILITY

UNCLEARRESPONSIBILITY

COHERENTRESPONSIBILITY

HIGH RISK LOW RISK

Thegreatestdiffusionofresponsibility–andthushighestrisk–occurswhereresponsibility(whetheritderivesfromlaw,ethicsorothersources)issubvertedbyeitherorbothactorsinthesupportrelationship.Supportrelationshipsthatpresentthelowestriskarethosewhereresponsibilityisclearlyestablishedandcoherentbetweenthepartners.

Subversion of responsibilitySomeactorspursuesupportrelationshipstoavoidlegalorpoliticalresponsibilityformisconductinarmedconflict.Whenrelationshipsareestablishedtodeliberatelyoperateoutsidetheboundsofthelaw,thisoftenresultsinseriousviolationsofIHLandhumanrights.ThepartnersundermineIHLandweakentheprotectionofvictims,notjustinthatrelationshipbutalsowithrespecttootherpartiesandfutureconflicts.

Insomecases,actorstakeadvantageofanunequalsupportrelationshiptoviolateIHLintheknowledgethatitspartnercannotorwillnotholditaccountable.Inothercases,theychoosetoengagewithapartnerknowingthatthepartnerisnotboundbythesamelegalobligationsorwillnotcomplywithitslegalobliga-tions,orboth.Inmoreproblematicsituations,actorssupporttheestablishmentofseparateforcespreciselyforthispurpose.

Somesupportingactorsmaybreachtheirownlegalobligationsbyprovidingsupport(e.g. underArticle1commontotheGenevaConventions,thelawofStateresponsibilityorarmscontrolordisarmamenttreaties).

Minimized responsibility Deliberateeffortsbyeitherorbothpartnerstominimizetheirresponsibilitiesarelikelytoresultinproblemsofcoordination,complianceandaccountability.

Oneformofminimizedresponsibilityiswhereresponsibilityisdelegatedfromoneactortoanother.Thereisadelegationofresponsibilityinrelationshipswherethesupportedpartyiseffectivelyaproxyorsurrogateforitssponsor.Althoughanactormaynotintendtosubvertthelaw,aproblemariseswhenthepartytowhichresponsibilityisdelegateddoesnothavethetraining,resourcesorwillingnesstofulfilitsobligationsunderIHLandotherinternationallaws.Emboldenedbytheabsenceofoversightandaccountabilitybetweenpartners,partiestotheconflictmayfeellessrestrainedintheirconductorgobeyondtheagreedobjectivesofthesupportrelationship.Thus,theremaybeariskofthesupportedpartycommittingviolationsofIHL,eventhoughthiswasnottheintentofthesupportingactor.

Besidessurrogaterelationships,actorsmayseektominimizetheirresponsibilitiesinthewaytheyframetheirroleintherelationship.Forexample,anactormayconsciouslychoosetoprovidesupportthatwouldkeepitsactionsbelowthelegalthresholdofbecomingapartytothearmedconflict(seeSection 3.1).

Minimizingresponsibilityinsupportrelationshipshampersthepartners’combinedcapacitytoprotectthosenotfighting andtoenhancecompliancewithIHL.Thepartnersareoftenunableorunwillingtomonitorandevaluatetheirpartner’sconduct,resultinginalackofaccountabilityandhinderinglearningcycles.

Reduced responsibility Whilenotdeliberatelyseekingtominimizeresponsibility,partnersthatareeffectivelyoperatinginparallelwithouthavingpreparedandimplementedthesupportrelationshiptogethertopreventharmtociviliansandothersmayseegapsinadvertentlyemergeintheiractualorperceivedresponsibility.Theactorsmayhavedivergingintentsorgapsbetweentheircapacityandleadershipthathavenotbeenmitigated.Evenifeachactorhasgoodoversightofitsownactions,theabsenceofmechanismstoliaisewithitspartnermeansthatneitherhasafullandaccuratepicture.Thiscanresultincoordinationissues,alackofoversightandaccountability,andalimitedunderstandingofthecollectiveimpactoftherelationshiponaffectedpeople.

Unclear responsibility Evenbetweenpartnersthatarewellaligned,adiffusionofresponsibilitycanoccurwheretheirrespectiverolesandresponsibilitiesarenotclearlydefinedorthereisambiguityabouthowtheyapplyIHL.Similarly,havingparallel rather than jointreportingmechanismsmayhamperaccountabilityand learning.Thesestructuralfactorscanresultincoordinationproblems.

Coherent responsibilityTherisksthatsupportrelationshipsposeforpeopleprotectedbyIHLaresignificantlylowerwhenthepart-nersclearlyidentifytheirrespectiverolesandtakeindividualandjointresponsibilityforensuringcompliancewithIHLbytheirpersonnelandfortheprotectionofpeoplenot,ornolonger,participatinginhostilities.Thisistheoptimalstateforasupportrelationship,inwhichthereislimitedornodiffusionofresponsibility.

2.2.3 INTERCONNECTED SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPSWherearelationshipiscomposedofseveralpartners,orthereisachainofsupportrelationships,theriskofadiffusionofresponsibilityismultipliedacrossthoserelationships.

Ifthesamepartytoaconflictreceivessupportfrommultipleexternalactors,thereislikelytobedifficultycoordinatingthosesupportrelationships.Thesupportingactorswilleachhavedivergingintents,capacitiesandleadershipfeaturesthatwillshapetheirrelationshipwiththeparty.Thegreaterthedivergences,themoresignificantthebarrierstocoordinatedaction,includingeffortstominimizecivilianharm.Thiscanbethecaseevenwherethesupportisintendedtobecomplementary.

Providingsupporttomultiplepartiesinthesameconflictrunsahighriskofinconsistentoutcomes,whichmayresultinunnecessarydestructionandharm.Supportingactorsmayalsoneedtoconsidertheriskthatsupportprovidedinoneconflictwillhaveaknock-oneffectinanother,forexamplethroughthemovementoffightersorweapons.Decisionstoprovidesupportshouldthereforebetakenatawhole-of-governmentlevel,takingintoconsiderationthepossiblelong-termconsequences.

Asupportingactormayprovideparallellinesofsupport,underseparatemanagement,toasinglepartytoaconflict.Itmaydosoforseveralreasons:whereitneedstodistinguishbetweendifferenttypesofsupport,wheretheagenciesprovidingorreceivingthesupportdiffer,orwhereitisactinginconjunctionwithothersupportingactorsforonecomponentofthesupport.Additionally,formalandpracticalbarrierstocommu-nicationbetweenpersonnelactingunderseparatemandatescreateariskofleaderstakingdecisionsbasedonimperfectorincompleteinformation.

2.3 THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS TO IMPROVE THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING

Instrivingforcoherentresponsibilitywithinasupportrelationship,actorsshouldbeawareoftheoppor-tunitiestomanagetheirrelationshipsinsuchawayastoimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandthosenolongerfighting.

Actorsinasupportrelationshipareinauniquepositiontoinfluencetheirpartners’behaviour.InvestingintherelationshipwithapartnertopreventIHLviolations,operationalizethelawandreducethedangersfacedbythosenotfightingcancontributetoreducingthenegativehumanitarianconsequencesofconflict.Stepscanandshouldbetakentothisendbybothsupportingactorsandsupportedpartiestoaconflict.

Legal reminder

Actors shall, to the extent feasible, exercise their influence with their partners to promote compliance

with IHL and the protection of civilians, those hors de combat and other people protected by IHL.

TheICRCbelievesthatactorscanachievethisbyseekingtoidentifyandproactivelyaddressgapsinalign-mentbetweentheirrespectiveintent,leadershipandcapacity.TheICRChasidentifiedten broadcategoriesofmeasuresforachievingthisandfosteringcompliancewithIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Theseareexploredinthechaptersthatfollow.

Below,thisdocumentlooksathowsupportrelationshipscreateanopportunitytohaveapositiveinfluenceonpartnersinpursuitofbetterprotectionofthosenotfighting.

2.3.1 INFLUENCING PARTNER BEHAVIOURPartners inasupportrelationshiptypicallyhavethepotentialto influenceeachother.Thescaleofthatpotentialwillbedeterminedbyseveralfactors,includingthequantityandqualityofsupport,thedegreeofdependencyeachactorhasontherelationship,andthestrengthofanyothertiesbetweentheactors.Owingtoitsmandate,theICRCisfocusedontheinfluencerelatedtothesupportrelationshipinarmedconflict,eventhoughanactor’stotalinfluencewillbeaffectedbythoseotherties.

Anactor’spotentialinfluencewillvarybetweenpartnersandsupportrelationships,basedonacombinationoftheabovefactors.Asthosefactorschangeovertime–particularlyinresponsetotheevolutionoftheconflictandtherelationship–sowilleachactor’sinfluence.Importantly,evensupportrelationshipsthatmayseemrelativelyminorholdsomepotentialinfluence.Theremayalsobeagapbetweenanactor’spotentialandactualinfluence,dependingonitswillingnesstoexerciseitandtheeffectivenessofthemeasuresemployedtodoso.

Whateverthebalancebetweenthepartners,thereisastilladegreetowhicheachcaninfluencetheotherbyvirtueofwhattheybringtotherelationship.Bothsupportingandsupportedactorscanexercisetheirinfluencebyadaptingtheircontributiontotherelationshiptofosterbetterprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.

Theneedtoexercisethisinfluencebecomesallthemoreacutewheretherearespecificproblemswithapartner’sbehaviour,suchaspossibleviolationsofIHLorsystemicissuesthatmayleadtoIHLviolationsinfuture.However,choosinghowtoexercisethatinfluencemaywellrepresentachallenge.

Ifanactorinasupportrelationshipbecomesawareofproblematicbehaviourbyitspartner,itfacesachoice:tolimitorhaltitsengagementuntiltheproblemisappropriatelyaddressed,ortoincreaseitsengagementtofosterbetterprotection.

Althoughalong-termreductioninsupportmayaltertheactor’spotentialinfluence,short-termmeasurestohaltorwithdrawsupportcanbeanimportantwaytoexerciseinfluenceorpreventhumanitarianprob-lemsfromoccurring.Moreover,choosingnottoadjusttherelationshipmaybeseenastacitacceptanceoftheproblematicbehaviour,possiblyreinforcingit.Yet,increasedsupportcouldeitherenhancethepotentialinfluenceordirectlyimprovetheoverallcapacitytoprotectaffectedpeopleandcomplywithIHL.

Paradoxically,someofthestepstakenbyanactortopositivelyinfluenceapartner’scompliancewithitslegalobligationsmayalsoincreasetheactor’sownlegalresponsibility.However,notallpracticalmeasureswillhavethisresult.Moreover,actorsshouldalsoconsidertheirbroaderresponsibilitytoexercisetheirinfluence,withinthelimitsofinternationallaw.

Legal reminder

under IHL:

• all parties to an armed conflict must respect IHL

• all States must ensure respect for IHL in all circumstances

• all States must do everything reasonably in their power to prevent violations of IHL by the

parties to an armed conflict and bring such violations to an end6

• all States must refrain from encouraging, aiding or assisting in violations of IHL

• all States have a duty to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute serious violations of IHL.7

6 See ICRC, CommentaryontheFirstGenevaConvention,2016,paras.164–173:https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary;IHLChallengesReport2019,pp.75–76(seenote1above):https://shop.icrc.org/international-humanitarian-law-and-the-challenges-of-contemporary-armed-conflicts-recommitting-to-protection-in-armed-conflict-on-the-70th-anniversary-of-the-geneva-conventions-pdf-en.

7 SeeJ-M.HenckaertsandL.Doswald-Beck(eds),CustomaryInternationalHumanitarianLaw,VolumeI:Rules(hereafterICRCCustomaryIHLStudy), ICRC,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2005,reprinted2009,Rule156andexplanation,pp.568–603:https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl.

Actorshaveawiderangeofmeasuresavailabletopositivelyinfluencetheirpartnersinsupportrelation-ships.Dependingontheissue,decisionsaboutwhichmeasurestotakewillbemadeacrossagenciesandateverylevel.Itwillbefordecisionmakerstodeterminewhatapproachwillbemosteffectiveatsecuringtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightinginthecircumstances.TheICRCstandsreadytoassistactorsinapplyingthisdocumenttotheirownsituationwithintheboundsofitslongstandingconfidential,bilateralapproach.

2.3.2 TOWARDS COHERENTLY RESPONSIBLE SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPSManagingsupportrelationshipsisacomplextopicinwhichthechoiceofhowtopositivelyinfluencepartnersmightnotbeobvious.ThepracticalmeasuresandquestionsdetailedinSections 6 and 7setoutsomekeyconsiderationsthatwillhelpguidedecisionmakerstowardsthemostpertinentpracticalmeasuresintheirrespectivecircumstances.

Inadditiontoanylegalobligationstheymayhave,theICRCasksactorsinvolvedinsupportrelationships to:1) integrateananalysisoftherisksandconsequencesforciviliansandothersnotfightingintohowtheymanagetheirsupportrelationships

2) takegreaterindividualandcollectiveresponsibilityforensuringthatciviliansandothersnotfightingareprotected

3) intheeventofallegationsofIHLviolationsorotherproblematicbehaviourbyapartnerinasupportrelationship,takemeaningfulactiontoaddressthebehaviourofconcern.

Part Cofthisdocumentlooksathowthesegoalsmaybeachieved.

PART B

SPECIFIC FACTORS IN SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

3. UNDERSTANDING SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

8 IHLChallengesReport2015,pp.22–23(seenote1above).9 Otherformsofsupportmaynonethelesshaveimplicationsintermsofthelawofinternationalresponsibility.

Thissectionexplainsthekeyfactorsinasupportrelationshipthatcanpresentspecificrisksandoppor-tunitiesforaffectedpeople,namely:1. thetypeofconflict2. theactorsinvolved3. theassociatedoperationsoractivitiesthatthesupportedpartywillundertake4. thetypeofsupportprovided.

Eachoftheabovefactorsisrelevanttounderstandingasupportrelationshipinarmedconflictand,there-fore,howitcanbemanagedsoastoimproveprotectionandreduceharmtoaffectedpeople(seeSection 5.1).Belowaresomeoftheconsiderationsrelevanttoeachoftheabovefactors.However,actorsengaginginsupportrelationshipsshouldundertaketheirowncomprehensiveassessmentoftherisksandopportunitieswithoutlimitingthemselvestotheissuesdetailedbelow.

3.1 TYPE OF CONFLICTInternationallawrecognizesonlytwotypesofarmedconflict:internationalarmedconflict(IAC)andnon-internationalarmedconflict(NIAC).Amongstothercriteria,situationsofviolencemaybeclassifiedaseitherIACorNIACdependingonthenatureoftheactorsinvolved.AsdescribedinSection 1.4,theICRChasobservedamarkedriseinthenumberofconflicts,drivenbyanincreaseinthenumberofNIACs.Ithasalsoobservedagrowingnumberofpartiestoconflicts,eithertothesameconflictortoparallelconflictstakingplaceinthesameterritory.

Dependingonwhichactorsbecomeinvolvedinsupportrelationships(Section 3.2),thetypeofsupporttheyprovide(Section 3.4)andtheirdegreeofcontroloverthesupportedpartytoaconflict,asupportingactormaybecomeapartytoanIACand/oraNIAC.8Althoughsupportprovidedtopartiesdoesnotalwaysreachthisthreshold,9itmayneverthelessincreaseorreducethehumansufferingresultingfromtheconflict.

ItisalsotobenotedthatothersituationsofviolencenotrisingtothelevelofIACorNIACcantakeplacebefore,afteroralongsideaconflict.Theseothersituationsofviolencenormallyinvolvelawenforcementper-sonnelratherthanthemilitary,althoughsuchdistinctionscanprovechallengingincomplexenvironments.

Further reading

“The ICRC’s legal position on the notion of armed conflict involving foreign intervention and on

determining the IHL applicable to this type of conflict” (T. Ferraro)

3.1.1 INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTAnIACoccurswhenoneormoreStateshaverecoursetoarmedforceagainstanotherState,regardlessofthereasonsortheintensityofthisconfrontation.Noformaldeclarationofwarorrecognitionofthesituationisrequired.TheexistenceofanIACand,consequently,theapplicabilityofIHLtothissituationdependonfactualconditionsontheground.

3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 31

Key legal rules

Geneva Conventions of 1949

Additional Protocol I of 1977

Customary international humanitarian law

3.1.2 NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTNIACsarearmedconflictsbetweengovernmentalarmedforcesandNSAGsorbetweensuchgroupsonly.

TworequirementsarenecessaryforsuchsituationstobeclassifiedasNIACs.First,thefightingmustreachacertainlevelofintensity,amountingtohostilities.Second,anNSAGinvolvedintheconflictmustpossessasuf-ficientdegreeoforganization,soastobeconsidereda“party”totheconflict.ThismeansforexamplethatitsforcesmustbeunderacommandstructureandhavethecapacitytosustainmilitaryoperationsandrespectIHL.

Key legal rules

Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949

Additional Protocol II of 1977

Further reading

Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts (M. Mack)

3.1.3 PARALLEL ARMED CONFLICTS ManyStatesexperiencetwoormoresimultaneousconflictsontheirterritory.This,togetherwiththegrow-ingnumberofpartiestoaconflict,isakeyfactorinthediffusionofresponsibilityandheightenedhumani-tarianconsequences(seeSection 1.4).

Supportrelationshipsinsuchcomplexsituationsmaybeparticularlyaffectedbychallengesinpracticalcoord-ination.Thepresenceofotheractorsoperatingontheterritorymayalsoimpedetraditionalapproachestomonitoring,evaluationandoversight,forwhichalternativesolutionswillneedtobefound(seeSection 6.2.4).

Inconsideringtherisksandopportunitiesassociatedwiththeiractivities(seeSection 2),actorsshouldcon-siderwhethertheeffectsoftheiractivitiescombinedwiththeeffectsofotheractors’activitiescouldharmtheaffectedpopulationmorethaniftheeffectsoftheiractivitiesoccurredinisolation.

Notwithstandingthefactualcomplexityofthesituationontheground,theapplicablerulesofIHLremainclear.Actorsshall,totheextentfeasible,exercisetheirinfluencewiththeirpartnerstopromotecompliancewithIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Difficultydistinguishingbetweenfightersandcivilians

• Militarizationoflawenforcement

SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES

• Leverageindustrialandtechnologicalcapacityinordertoreducethenegativeeffectsofconflict

3.2 ACTORS INVOLVED

10 IHLChallengesReport2015,pp.22–23(seenote1above).11 IHLChallengesReport2019,pp.75–76(seenote1above);CommentaryontheFirstGenevaConvention, paras.164–173 (seenote6above).

12 Article1commontotheGenevaConventions;AdditionalProtocolItotheGenevaConventions;ICRCCustomaryIHLStudy,Rules139and144(seenote7above).SeealsoCommentaryontheFirstGenevaConvention, paras.164–173 (seenote6above);IHLChallengesReport2019,pp.75–76(seenote1above).

Oneofthekeyfactorsfordecisionmakerstoconsideriswhoisinvolvedinasupportrelationship.Thetypeandnumberofactorsinvolvedwillhavesomebearingontherisksandopportunitiesarisingfromtherela-tionship.Arguably,themoreactors,thehighertheriskofadiffusionofresponsibilitybetweenthoseactors.

Asupportrelationshipmaybebilateral,withsupportbeingprovidedbyoneactortoanother,orconsistofconstellationsofactorsandrelationshipsthataresignificantlymorecomplex.SupportrelationshipscaninvolveStates,multinationalcoalitionsoralliances,PMSCsandNSAGs,orpeaceforces(seeSection 1.2).Someconsiderationsspecifictoeachtypeofactoraredetailedbelow.However,thereisgreatvariancebetweenindividualactorsandrelationships,hencetheimportanceofassessingtheintent,leadershipandcapacityofeachactorinagivensituation(seeSection 6.1.3).

3.2.1 STATES Asasupportingactor,aStatemayprovidesupporttoanotherStateortoanNSAG.AStatemightalsojoinamultinationalcoalition,contributetroopstoapeaceoperation,orhireaPMSCtoprovidesupporttoanotheractor.Dependingonthetypeofsupporttheyprovide,theseStatesmaybecomepartiestotheconflict– notablybycontributingtothecollectiveconductofhostilitiesbyanotherpartyagainstanarmedgrouporbyexertingoverallcontroloveranarmedgroup.10

AStatemayalsoreceivesupportasapartytoanarmedconflict.ThemostcommonscenarioiswhenoneState(thehostorterritorialState)engagesinaNIAConitsterritoryagainstoneormoreNSAGsandreceivessupporttodosofromoneormoreotherStatesindividuallyorincoalition.

WhereStatesconductPMOs(seeSection 3.4.3),itcanbecomeunclearwhichofthem,ifany,isapartytotheconflict.ItislesslikelythatasupportingStatewillbeapartytotheconflictwhenprovidingotherformsofsupport,butitwillstillhavelegalobligations.

Stateshaveaparticularstatusandlegalobligationsunderinternationallaw.EnsuringrespectforIHLincludesanobligationnottoencourage,aidorassistinviolationsofIHL,aswellasaduediligenceobligationtotakeproactivestepstoinfluencepartiestoconflictandbringthemtoanattitudeofrespectforIHL.11Theobliga-tiontoensurerespectforIHLisanobligationofmeansandnotofresult,andStateshaveverybroaddiscre-tioninchoosingmeasureswithwhichtoexerciseinfluence(seeSection 2.3).

Legal reminder

under IHL, States must:

• respect IHL

• refrain from providing any support that would encourage, aid or assist in violations of IHL

• do everything reasonably in their power to prevent violations of IHL by the parties to an armed

conflict and bring such violations to an end.12

Inaddition,supportingStatesmayhaveobligationsunderotherprovisionsofinternationallaw.Forinstance,partiestotheArmsTradeTreatymustrefrainfromauthorizingweaponstransfersifthereisaclearorsub-stantialriskofthearmsbeingusedtocommitorfacilitateseriousviolationsofIHL(seeSection 3.4.2).

Aterritorial(host)StatereceivingexternalsupportforanIACorNIACwillneedtomanageitssupportrela-tionships.Issuesthatmayariseincludedefiningthescopeofauthorityforforeignarmedforcestooperateonitsterritory(seeSection 6.1.3),ensuringcompliancewithdomesticlaw,andmonitoringandaccountabilityfortheconductofsupportingactors(seeSection 6.2.4).

HowaStatechoosestoframethecontestwithitsadversaryandhowitlabelsitsadversaryaffectitsdecisionsandpracticesrelativetotheuseofforce,forexampleinapplyingtheprincipleofdistinctioninattack,orinthetreatmentofpersonsdeprivedoftheirliberty(seeSections 3.3.3 and 4.1).

Inadvertentlyordeliberatelyimprecisetermsusedtocategorizetheadversaryarelikelytoincreasecivilians’exposuretotheuseofforce.Thishasproventobeanimportantissueoverthelast20yearswiththepreva-lenceofNIACsbetweenStatesandNSAGs,wheretheStatecontrolsdomesticlegalframeworks.

Stigmatizing entire communities as an extension of the adversarymay legitimize permissive attitudestowardstheuseofforceorotherwisenegativelyaffecthowciviliansaretreated.Suchtreatmentmaythenreinforcethesentimentsofexclusion,injusticeanddisenfranchisementthatcontributedtotheconflictinthefirstplace.

Whiletheincreasedmilitarycapacityprovidedbyexternalsupportmaybeanadvantageintheconflict,anover-relianceonthatkineticadvantagemayresultinincreasedorevendisproportionatecivilianharm.ThisisparticularlytruewhereexternalsupportisprovidedtoaterritorialStateagainstanNSAGifthereisalreadyanasymmetryofmeansbetweentheparties.Alternatively,asupportingStatemightprovideweaponsthatarenotsuitedfortheterrainorthesituation,suchasexplosiveweaponswithwideareaeffectsthatareill-adaptedforuseinpopulatedareas.

Byharnessingcross-governmental,military,securityandcivilianinstitutionalcapacity,supportrelation-shipsmaypresentanopportunitytoachieveamoreintegratedapproachtoprotectingciviliansandothersnotfightingduringhostilitiesandintheiraftermath.

Additionally,theremaybeanopportunitytoleverageStates’industrialandtechnologicalcapacitiestoreducethenegativeoveralleffectsofconflict.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Inadequate/imprecisedistinctionbetweenfightersandcivilians

• Militarizationoflawenforcement

• Choiceofmeansandmethodsnotadaptedtomilitarynecessity

• Harnesscross-governmentalcapacitytointegratetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingthroughouttherelationship

• Leverageindustrialandtechnologicalcapacitytoreducethenegativeeffectsofconflict

3.2.2 MULTINATIONAL COALITIONSTheconcernsthatapplytosingleStatesassupportingactorsaremultipliedwhenthesituationincludesacoalitionorallianceofStates.

Typically,eachStateinthecoalitionmaintainscommandandcontrolofitsownarmedforces,whichthenneedtobecoordinated.EachStatewillberesponsiblefortheconductofitsarmedforcesandwillalsobeobligatedtoensureitspartnersrespectforIHL.

WhenaninternationalorganizationhascommandandcontrolovertheoperationconductedbyStatearmedforces,theinternationalorganizationwillbepartytotheconflict,eitherinadditiontoorinsteadoftheStates.Inthatcase,theinternationalorganizationwouldalsohavemutatis mutandisobligationsunderIHLsimilartothoseofStates.

Fromoneperspective,StatesinamultinationalcoalitionmaybeseenascollectivelyprovidingsupporttoanotherState(usuallytheterritorialState).Insuchcases,thecoalitionmemberswillneedtoworktogethertoensurethatthesupportrelationshipismanagedinawaythatfosterscompliancewithIHLandprotectionforthosenotfighting.Althoughthecontributionsofindividualcoalitionmembersmaydiffer,eachmemberwillhaveobligationsunderinternationallawandthecapacitytoinfluencethesupportrelationshipinawaythatwillminimizethenegativehumanitarianconsequencesoftheconflict(seeSection 2.3).

Fromanotherperspective,theremayberelationshipsofsupportwithinacoalition,i.e.betweencoalitionmembers.Thisisapplicablewhereoneormoreofthecoalitionmembersisapartytotheconflictandreceivessupportfromothersforthispurpose.Onthisview,Statesalsohaveresponsibilitieswithrespecttotheirsupportforothercoalitionpartners.

Legal reminder

under IHL, States and international organizations must:

• respect IHL

• do everything reasonably in their power to prevent the parties to an armed conflict from

violating IHL and to bring such violations to an end.

InadditiontothefactorsrelevanttoStates’bilateralsupportrelationships(seeSection 3.2.1),somerisksandopportunitiesariseincoalitionsituations.

Keyconsiderationsincludehowthemandateofacoalitionisestablished(ifany)andhowthecoalitionframestheadversaryasdistinctfromcivilians.Mandatesaregenerallynegotiatedamongstnumerouscoalitionpart-nerswithvaryinginterestsandvaryingdegreesofknowledgeandunderstandingofthesituation.Theriskisthat,innegotiatingthecoalition,theactorslosesightoftheinterestsoftheaffectedpeople.Attentionmaybefocusedonreachingagreementratherthanoptimizingthemanagementoftherelationshiptoreduceharm.Moreover,theprocessofnegotiatingmayleadthecoalitiontoadoptthe“lowestcommondenominator”instandardsandpracticesrelatingtotheprotectionofaffectedpeople.

WhilethecombinationofStateswithdifferingcommitmentsallowsthoseStatestosharetheburdenoftheengagement,theyriskhavingdivergentinterestsandapproachesthatresultindiffusedresponsibility.Atanoperationallevel,theywillfacechallengesofcoordinationrequiringspecificmeasurestoimproveinter-operability(seeSection 2.2.3).Therefore,coalitionsneedtobecarefullymanagedtoensurecoherentrespon-sibilitythroughouttherelationship.

Acoalitionthatisunder-resourcedortowhichsomeofitscontributorsareinsufficientlycommittedmayfinditselfunabletodedicatetheresourcesneededtoadoptgoodpracticestoimprovehumanitarianprotection,suchasinrelationtotraining,monitoringandevaluation.Similarly,significantlyvaryingcapabilitieswithinacoalitionmayalsopresentchallengesinalignmentandcoordination.

Itisimportantthatthelocalcontext–includingtheculture,values,demographicsandpolitics–becon-sideredbythecoalitioninthepreparationphase.Aswithbilateralsupportrelationships,coalitionalignmentagainstaparticularpartytoaconflictmayinflatelocalstigmatizationrhetoricandpracticeswithsignificantconsequencesforcivilians,thewoundedanddetaineesduringandafterhostilities.Stepscouldbetakenbycoalitionmemberstoavoidthis,forexamplebyreinforcingnormsofrestraintandensuringequitableaccesstoanyhumanitarianassistance.

Multinationalcoalitionshaveanopportunitytooptimizenotonlythecollectivecapacityformilitaryactivity,butalsomeasurestoenhancetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingbypoolingcollectiveexpert-iseandresources.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Confusionofrolesandresponsibilities

• Mandatesnotalignedwiththeneedsoftheaffectedpeople

• Lackofalignmentinreportingprocedures,hinderingoversight,accountabilityandlearningprocesses

• Accountabilitygaps

• Lackofalignmentofcapacitybetweenpartners,resultinginadiffusionofresponsibilityandpracticalchallengesofcoordination

• Promotehigheststandards,e.g.throughnormativeengagement,institutionalcapacitybuilding andIHLtraining

• Increasedavailabilityofexpertiseandresourcestoreducetheimpactonaffectedpeople

• Collectiveimprovementthroughlearningprocesses

Further reading

“Multinational Operations and the Law” (IRRC)

See also: – Section 3.2.3Peaceforces – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations

3.2.3 PEACE FORCES13

Thescaleofpeaceoperationshasincreasedinthepast20years,althoughdeploymentshavedeclinedslightlyinrecentyears.14Theseoperationsaremadeupmostlyofmilitarypersonnelbutalsoincludesomepoliceandothercivilianstaff.UnitedNationspeaceoperationsaccountfornearlytwo-thirdsofallpersonneldeployedinpeaceoperations.15

Itisthefactsonthegroundthatdeterminewhetherpeaceforcesbecomeapartytoaconflict,irrespectiveofthemandateassignedtothembytheUNSecurityCouncilandthetermusedfortheirpotentialopponents.As noted in Section 3.2.2,wherearmedforcesareoperatingunderthecommandandcontrolofamultilateralorinternationalorganizationwithinternationallegalpersonality,theorganizationitselfwillgenerallybeconsideredapartytotheconflict,notthetroop-contributingcountries.

Regardlesswhetherthepeaceforcesbecomeapartytotheconflict,theywilloftenbeinarelationshipofsupportwiththeterritorialState.Aswithmultinationalcoalitions,onemightalsocharacterizetherela-tionshipbetweentheinternationalorganizationandtroop-contributingcountries,oramongstthosetroop-contributingcountries,asrelationshipsofsupport.Theconsiderationsspecifictopeacekeepingforcesarethereforesimilartothoseofmultinationalcoalitions(seeSection 3.2.2).

13 Theterm“peaceforces”isusedgenericallytodescribemilitaryandcivilianpersonneldeployedonmultilateraloperationsbytheUnitedNationsorotherwiseauthorizedbytheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilforpeace-enforcementorpeacekeepingpurposes.

14 Forvariousestimates,see:SIPRI,“Globaldevelopmentsinarmedconflicts,peaceprocessesandpeaceoperations”,SIPRIYearbook2020,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2020:https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2020/02;InstituteforEconomics & Peace, TheEconomicValueofPeace2018:MeasuringtheGlobalEconomicImpactofViolenceandConflict, IEP, Sydney,October2018,p.10:https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Economic-Value-of-Peace-2018.pdf.

15 “Globaldevelopmentsinarmedconflicts”(seenote14above).

Legal reminder

under IHL, States and international organizations must:

• respect IHL

• do everything reasonably in their power to prevent the parties to an armed conflict from

violating IHL and to bring such violations to an end.

Asthedecisiontoestablishapeaceoperationisseparatefromtheprocessforresourcingthatoperation,thererisksbeingadisconnectbetweentheaimsoftheoperationandthecapacity(personnel,materialassetsandexpertise)placedatthedisposaloftheinternationalorganization.

Theriskthatamandaterepresentsthe“lowestcommondenominator”ofnegotiationsismoresignificantforaninternationalorganization,giventheneedforconsensus,thanforacoalitionintowhichStatesexpresslychoosetoenter.Thus,thenegotiatedmandatemaynotbewell-tailoredtothegroundrealityawaitingthepeaceforces.Thismightmeanthatagivenpeaceforcedeploysintoanactiveconflictinwhichitmaynothaveamandateenablingittoprotectciviliansfromattack.OritmaymeanthatthesupportitprovidestoaStateincreasinglydrawsitintohostilitiesitself,orthatthesupportprovidedisill-tailoredtothesupportedState.

Havingdecision-makingpowersspreadacrossmultipleactorsandagenciesmayposechallengesforpracticalcoordinationandcoherentresponsibility.Thereisafurtherpossibilityofconfusionaroundmandatesandtheblurringoflineswhenpeaceforcesareoperatinginsituationsinwhichthereareotheractors.Theseissuescantranslateintoconcreterisksforcivilians,detaineesandothers.

Intheory,boththeinternationalorganizationandthetroop-contributingcountrieshavelegal,ethicalandmoralresponsibilities for thepeaceforces.16 Inreality,adiffusionofresponsibilitybetween internationalorganizationsandtroop-contributingcountriesmaycreateconditionsinwhichownershipofthoseforces’performanceisweakened,withresultantrisksforthepeopleaffectedbytheiractivities.AccountabilityforthebehaviourofthoseforcesmayalsofalluneasilybetweentheorganizationalheadquartersandtheindividualState,withthepossibilityofimpunityforIHLviolationsandothermisconduct(seeSections 2.2 and 6.2.4).

Thatbeingsaid,theprotectionofciviliansisincreasinglyanexplicitgoalofpeaceforces.Thisgivesthemincreasedlatitudetoconsiderandimplementmeasurestodecreasecivilianharm.Thereisalsoanopportunityfortheforcestocomeintobroadalignmentonaclearmandatethatconsiderstheprotectionofcivilianstotheconflictinarealistic,contextualizedway,takingintoaccountthesupportprovidedtoapartytothecon-flict.Themandatecanbesecuredbytheinvestmentneededtomeaningfullyensuretheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Ideally,thereareasenseofownershipinboththeinternationalorganizationandtroop-contributingcountries,clarityoverreportingandaccountabilityresponsibilities,andmeaningfulactiontakentoensurerespectforIHLandreducethepotentialnegativehumanitarianconsequencesoftheconflict.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Unclearresponsibility

• Mandatesnotalignedwiththeneedsoftheaffectedpeople

• Leadershipnotharmonized

• Lackofalignmentinreportingprocedures,hinderingoversight,accountabilityandlearningprocesses

• Accountabilitygaps

• Lackofcapacityalignmentbetweentroop-contributingcountries,resultinginadiffusionofresponsibilityandpracticalchallengesofcoordination

16 ForpeaceforcesoperatingundertheauspicesoftheUnitedNations,seeUNSecretary-General(UNSG),UNHuman RightsDueDiligencePolicyonSupportforNon-UnitedNationsSecurityForces(“HRDDP”),5 March 2013,A/67/775-S/2013/110:https://www.refworld.org/docid/537dd44a4.html.

• Adopttheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingasastrategicpriority

• Cross-fertilizationofIHLtraining,frameworks,systemsandprocesses

• Normativeengagement,includingthesharingofgoodpractices

• Collectiveimprovementthroughlearningprocesses

• Meaningfulownershipofresponsibilitiesinthecommunityandindividualtroop-contributingcountries

• Comprehensiveplanforstructureddisengagement

Further reading

kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations

3.2.4 NON-STATE ARMED GROUPSNSAGsareorganizedarmedgroupsthatqualifyasapartytoaNIACandarethereforeboundbyIHL.17 In the ICRC’sestimate,66millionpeopleliveundertheState-likegovernanceofanNSAG.Reachingthesepeopleandrespondingtotheirneedsareamassivechallengeintoday’sconflictenvironment.

SupportrelationshipsinvolvingNSAGsarenotunlikesupportrelationshipsbetweenStates,wheremajorpowerssupporttheirallieswithcapacity(i.e.materialassets,humanresourcesandskills).18StudiesshowthatNSAGswithsupportrelationshipssurvivelonger,recoverfromalossofleadershipmoreeasilyandacquirebettercapabilitiesthanthosewithout.19

LikeStates,NSAGsmayfindthemselvessimultaneouslyinsupportingandsupportedroles.Themainex-amplesofsupportrelationshipsinvolvingNSAGsaresupportrelationshipsbetweenNSAGs,StatesupporttoNSAGs,NSAGsupporttoStates,andPMSCandNSAGrelationships.

Support relationships between non-State armed groupsAlthoughcommonlyperceivedandportrayedasasingleunitedfightingforce,manyoftoday’sNSAGsare,infact,shiftingalliancesofdistinctgroups20rangingfromintegratedcoalitionstoopportunisticschemespoolingresourcesforalimitedobjective.ClustersofNSAGsmakinglocaldecisionsbasedontheirownstra-tegicassessmentcanremainresponsivetoacentralleadershipinpursuingacommongeopoliticalagenda.Thistrendhasemergedasadominantfeatureofthepost-ColdWarconflictlandscape.Thelargernetworkscomprisebetweenadozenandseveraldozenconstituententitiesspanningmultipleregionsandcontinents.Despitecommonfeaturesorclosevariationsofthesamename,thesegroupscanbeorganizedquitedif-ferently.Insuchmovements,thereisacentralizedcorewithavaryinglevelofauthorityoveranumberofsmaller,decentralizedgroups.Theymayoperateasamovementoflooselyconnectednodeswithacommonidentityandideologybutdemonstratesignificantvariationintheirpatternsofviolenceandorientationtoexternalentities.

Support between States and non-State armed groupsInadditiontothesupportrelationshipsbetweenNSAGs,therearealsonumerousinstancesofsupportpro-videdbyStatestoNSAGs.AccordingtotheresultsoftheICRC’s2020mappingexercise,approximately37%(230)ofarmedgroupsreceivesupportfromaStateorfromanotherNSAG.21SupportfromNSAGsforStatesislessprevalent,butdoesoccur.

17 NSAGsareamongthebroadrangeofarmedgroups–withvaryinggoals,structures,doctrines,fundingsources,militarycapacityanddegreeofterritorialcontrol–thatarenotrecognizedasStatesbuthavethecapacitytocauseviolencethatisofhumanitarianconcern.

18 K.Oots,A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism,GreenwoodPress,Westport,1986.19 T.Bacon,“IstheEnemyofMyEnemyMyFriend?”,SecurityStudies,Vol.27,January2018,pp.345–379.20 ICRC, TheRootsofRestraintinWar,ICRC,Geneva,2018,p.24:https://shop.icrc.org/the-roots-of-restraint-in-war-pdf-en.21 ThisstatisticcomesfromtheICRC’sannualmappingofarmedgroups,acategorydefinedasgroupscausinghumanitarianconsequencesthatareofconcernfortheICRC.Withinthisbroaddefinition,NSAGsaregroupsthatareconsideredpartiestoanarmedconflict.

SupportfromorforNSAGs,whichattimestakesplaceoutsideofestablisheddomesticandotherlegalframe-works,canraiseverydifferentconsiderationstothoseapplicabletosupportfromorforStates.Forexample,Statesmay seek to engagewithNSAGs in order to subvert or delegate responsibility (see Section 2.2).Conversely,aStatemayexertoverallcontrolovertheNSAG(whichwillmaketheStateresponsibleforitsactions).Asthegroup’sorganizationalstructure,cultureandpersonnelmaydifferfromthoseoftheState’sarmedforces,sotoomaythepracticalmeasuresimplementedtopromotebettercompliancewithIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.

Legal reminder

All parties to armed conflict, including NSAGs, must respect IHL in accordance with their

obligations.22

Leadership, intent and capacity of non-State armed groups Anarmedgroup’sorganizationalstructureisanimportantdeterminantofitsbehaviour.Itinfluencesmili-tarycapability,thetypeofcontrolexercisedbyleaders,andhowcombatantslearntopracticehonourablebehaviour.

Thisstructureisshapedbyseveralinternalfactors,includingideologyanddoctrine;leadershippreferences;recruitmentstrategies;fundingsources;grouphistory,includinginternecinecompetition;andpre-existingsocialnetworks.Structure isalsoshapedbyexternal factors,suchas theopposingforce’sstrengthandeffectiveness,thetopographyofthegroup’soperatingterrainand–mostimportantly–externalpoliticalormilitarysupport.Forexample,armedgroupshostedinaneighbouringcountrycanorganizecompletelydifferentlyfromthoseoperatingentirelyontheterritoryoftheStateitopposes(seeSection 3.4.4).

Accesstoresourcesstronglyinfluencesthegroup’srecruitmentstrategyand,therefore,relationsbetweenfightersandthecommunity.23Atbothanindividualandgrouplevel,theavailabilityofexternalresourcesdiminishesrelianceoncommunitysupportandthusaffectstheirpropensityforviolenceorrestrainttowardsthelocalpopulation.24Therevenuestreamsavailabletosustainanarmedgroupalsoaffectthetypeofcontrolleadersexert.

Thegroup’sstructuredetermineshowleadership isexercised.Fordecentralizedgroups,sharedcombatexperienceisthemainglueunitinggroupmembers.Theydonotalwayshavewrittencodesofconduct,drawinginsteadonsharedvaluesandtraditions.Centralizedmilitarystructuresfosterloyaltybyforginganidentitybasedongroupnarrativesandcollectiverituals,suchasnationalistidealsorideologywhicharetranslatedintopractices.Theyrelyonclearlyestablishedrulesandvalues,whicharelikelytobeimpartedtotherankandfilethroughindoctrinationandtraining.

SomespecificriskscanbeassociatedwithNSAGsaspartiestoaconflictandinsupportrelationships.TheasymmetryoftenfoundinNIACsbetweenaStateandanNSAGmaypromptthegrouptoresorttomeansandmethodsthathaveagreaterimpactoncivilians.Thereisariskofthegroupnotfulfillingitsdutytoprotectciviliansasitconductshostilities(seeSection 3.3.2),whetherfortacticalreasonsoronthebasisofrhetoricthatframesciviliansastheiradversary.Thiscanmanifestinattacksthataredirectedagainstciviliansandcivilianobjectsorareindiscriminateandintheuseofacivilianpresencetoshieldthemselvesfromattack.AnothersignificantriskisthattheNSAGdoesnotdetainandtreatcaptureddetaineesappropriately,whetherduetoalackofintent,capacity,orleadership(seeSections 3.3.3 and 4.1).

22 ICRCCustomaryIHLStudy,Rule139(seenote7above).23 J.Weinstein,InsideRebellion:ThePoliticsofInsurgentViolence,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2007,ascited

in RootsofRestraint,p.22(seenote20above).24 A.Wennmann,“Graspingthefinancingandmobilizationcostofarmedgroups:Anewperspectiveonconflictdynamics”,ContemporarySecurityPolicy,Vol.30,No.2,2009,pp.265–280,ascitedinRootsofRestraint,p.22(seenote20above).

Furthermore,NSAGsmayhavelittle,ifany,awarenessofIHL,andsomemayrejectitsapplicabilityaspartofabroaderrejectionoftheprevailinginternationalorder.ComplexsituationsfeaturingnumerousNSAGscom-petingforresources,localandglobalconstituenciesorexternalsupportersmayalsofuela“racetothebot-tom”,wheretheNSAGstrytoprovetheirrelevancebyout-doingeachotherintermsofspectacularattacks.

WhenanNSAGhasemergedorgrownrapidly,itmaynothavehadsufficientopportunitytoimplementrobustframeworks,systemsandprocessescapableofpromotingtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Forexample,itmaybuildupitsforceswithoutindividuallyvettingthem.ItmaydeploythoseforceswithoutprovidingrobustIHLtraining,suchasinthechoiceanduseofmeansandmethodssoastoreducerisksforcivilians,orintheadministrationofplacesofdetention.TheseconcernswouldalsoextendtohowthedeadanddisplacedaredealtwithbyNSAGs.

TheguidanceprovidedinthisdocumentiswithoutprejudicetotheprudenceorlegalityofsupporttoNSAGsinanyspecificcontext.TheaimwithNSAGsistoleveragethethreekeyareasofconcernidentifiedabove–resources,recruitmentandcontrol–inordertopositivelyinfluencetheirbehaviourtowardsciviliansandothersnotfighting.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Lackofalignmentbetweenactors’leadership,resultinginadiffusionofresponsibility

• Capacitynotaligned,resultingincoordinationissuesanddiffusionofresponsibility

• Limitedwillingness,resourcesorexpertisetooperationalizeIHLinhostilities(e.g.principlesofprecautions,distinctionandproportionality)andotheractivities(e.g.detention,managingdisplacement,managingthedeadandclarifyingthefateandwhereaboutsofmissingpersons)

• Groupbecomespredatoryonthecommunity

• HaveapositiveimpactonNSAGsbyleveragingtheirneedsintermsofresources,recruitment andcontrol

• EngageonculturalandotherIHL-compatiblenorms

Key legal rules

Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949

Further reading

The Roots of Restraint in War (ICRC)

3.2.5 PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIESPMSCshavebecomeanimportantpartofthelandscapeinconflict-affectedsituations.

PMSCsmaybecomeinvolvedinsupportrelationshipsinanyofatleastthreeways.Firstly,theymaybe contractedtoprovidespecializedservicestoasupportedparty,suchasmilitarytrainingandeducationormaintainingandoperatingtechnologicallyadvancedweaponsystems.Secondly,inpractice,PMSCsmaytakeamoreactiveroleinmilitaryoperationsonbehalfofapartytoaconflict.Insomecases,theirtasksincludedirectlyparticipatinginhostilities.Inothercases,workingnearmilitaryobjectivesmayputthematgreaterriskofexchangingfirewithapartytoaconflict,whetherinself-defenceorforotherreasons.Thirdly,aPMSCmightinfactbecomeapartytoaconflictasanNSAGthatprovidesorreceivessupport(seeSection 3.2.4).

Inallcases,thequestionstobeansweredaretheextenttowhichcompliancewithIHLandotherbodiesofapplicablelawareincorporatedintothePMSC’sactivities,andthedegreeofcontrolandoversightthatareexercisedoveritsoperations.TheStatedirectlycontractingaPMSC(contractingState),theStateinwhichitoperates(territorialState)andtheStateinwhichthePMSCisregistered(homeState)mayeachhaveresponsibilitieswithrespecttoaPMSC,notablytoensurerespectforIHL.

ThecontractingofPMSCswithoutappropriatevettingprocedures,robustcontracts,andcontrolandover-sightcouldleadtoadiffusionofresponsibility,potentiallyresultinginviolationsofIHLeitherbythePMSCsorbythosewithwhomtheywork.

TheMontreuxDocumentrecallstheinternationallegalobligationsofStatesintheirrelationswithPMSCsandpresentsaseriesofgoodpracticestohelpStatesimplementtheseobligations.25

SPECIFIC RISkS

• DiffusionofresponsibilitybetweenPMSCsandactorsinthesupportrelationship

• Confusionbetweenregulatoryapproaches

• Absenceofrobustvetting

• Rulesofengagementdonotadequatelydelimittheuseofforce

• Inabilitytomonitorconductandevaluateresults

• Lackofoversightandaccountability

• PotentialtointegrateIHLintotheprofessionallycustomizedservice-deliveryapproach

• PotentialtobuildinoneormoreterminationclausesintheeventofIHLviolationsbythePMSCand/orthesupportedpartytotheconflict

Further reading

Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict (ICRC and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs)

Business and International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Rights and Obligations of Business Enterprises under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC)

See also: – Section 3.4.4Otherformsofsupport

25 SeeICRCandSwissFederalDepartmentofForeignAffairs,MontreuxDocumentonpertinentinternationallegalobligations andgoodpracticesforStatesrelatedtooperationsofprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompaniesduringarmedconflict, ICRC and SwissFederalDepartmentofForeignAffairs,Geneva,2008:https://shop.icrc.org/the-montreux-document-on- private-military-and-security-companies-pdf-en.

3.3 MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES

Civiliansandothersnotfightingareatriskofharmduringanarmedconflictandinitsaftermath.Thoserisksaregenerateddirectlyandindirectlybytheactivitiesofthepartiestothearmedconflict,includingasaresultofthecumulativeeffectsoftheparties’actions.Forexample,damageordestructiontocriticalcivilianinfrastructureinpopulatedareascanhaveimportantreverberatingeffectsonthecivilianpopulation,suchasillnessanddisplacement.Astheconflictcontinues,multipleattacksand/orotherfactorsdegradeessentialservicesovertime,posingagraverisktopublichealthandpromptingfurtherdisplacement.Moreover,thefailureofactorstoanticipateandmanagetheaftermathofconflictslongafterhostilitieshaveceasedcanalso

presentimportantriskstocivilians.Forexample,peopledeprivedoftheirlibertyforreasonsrelatedtotheconflictremainentitledtohumanetreatmentaftertheconflicthasendedandwillstillneedtobemanaged.

TherulesofIHLaredesignedtoincreasetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Inadditiontoensuringthattheserulesarerespected,actorsinasupportrelationshipshouldconsiderboththerisksthattheiractivitiesposeforaffectedpeopleandanyopportunitiestheymighthavetoreduceharm.

Belowaresomeconsiderationsspecifictotheactivitiesthatactorsshouldintegrateintotheirdecision-makingthroughoutthepreparation,implementationandtransitionphases.

3.3.1 WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENTBeforeorduringanarmedconflict,partieswillacquireandstockpilethemeanstoconductmilitaryoper-ations.Theuseofarms,ammunitionandothermeansofwarfarecomeswithariskofharmtociviliansandcivilianobjects,amongothers.Theriskapplieseverytimethemeansareused,andespeciallywhentheyareusedinviolationofIHL.Stepsshouldbetakenateverystagetominimizeoravoidthatharm.

Properweaponsandammunitionmanagement(WAM)isanimportantfactorinpreventingthediversionandillicituseofweapons.Weakammunitionstockpilemanagementincreasestherisksofunauthorizeduse,theft,lossoranaccidentalordeliberatecatastrophicexplosionofthestockpile.Itcanhamperdisarmamenteffortsattheendofanengagement,raisingtheriskthatarmswillcontinuetobeusedinthecommunityorwillbeusedinotherconflictsintheregion.

WhetherornotstrictcontrolismaintainedoverstocksofarmsandammunitionisanimportantindicatoroftheriskthattheseitemswouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateviolationsofIHLorotherwiseinviolationofinternationallaw(seeSection 3.4.2).

Internationalstandardsandguidelines,endorsedthroughtheUnitedNationsandotherinternationalbodies,havebeendevelopedtosupportbestpracticeinthephysicalsecurityandstockpilemanagement(PSSM)ofammunition,explosivesandweaponsinstoragefacilitiesandinthemanagementofarmsandassociatedmaterielwhenbeingshipped,transferredordisposedof.Actorsshouldbeencouragedtoapplythesestandardsandguidelinesinordertoreducethehazardsofmismanagement,whichcanresultinharmtoaffectedpeople.

Anactorthatisconsideringprovidingweaponstoanotheractorshouldconsidertheriskthattheymaybemisusedduetoinadequatestockpilemanagement.Conversely,actorsinasupportrelationshipcanhelptheirpartnerstrengthentheirWAMprocessesthroughthedevelopmentofpoliciesordoctrines(seeSection 6.2.1)andtraining(seeSection 6.2.2).

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Diversionofweaponsorammunitiontounauthorizedendusersandenduses,includingthroughreselling,theftorloss

• Unsafestorage

• Continuedavailabilityofweaponsandammunitionafteraconflict,fuellingarmedviolence andconflictsandunderminingpeaceandsecurityinthelongterm

• Supporttheestablishmentofframeworks,systemsandprocessestostrengthenweapons and ammunition management

• Trainpartnerpersonnel

Key legal rules

Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), 2001

Further reading

International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (uN)

International Mine Action Standards

Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) (uN)

International Small Arms Control Standards (uN)

See also: – Section 3.4.2Armstransfers – Section 4.8Landminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar – Section 6.3.1.CResponsibleresourcedisengagement

3.3.2 THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIESHostilitiesaretheactivitymostreadilyassociatedwitharmedconflict.Whetherornotasupportingactoritselfparticipatesinhostilities(seeSection 1.2),bothactorsinasupportrelationshipshouldprepareforthelikelihoodthathostilitieswilloccurandwillhavehumanitarianconsequences.

Whenpreparing,implementingandtransitioningasupportrelationship,actorsneedtoconsidertheriskthatthesupportprovidedwouldencourage,aidorassistinviolationsofIHLorotherwisecreatehumanitarianconsequencesforthepeopleaffectedbytheconflict.Thisconcernisespeciallypertinentinrelationtotherulesgoverningtheconductofhostilities.Measuresshouldbetakenthroughoutthesupportrelationshiptomitigatetheserisks.

Legal reminder

IHL prohibits attacks against civilians and civilian objects, indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks,

indiscriminate weapons, and the use of civilians as human shields, among other things. It requires

parties to take all feasible precautions to avoid and, in any event, minimize incidental civilian harm.

Itisimperativethatpartnersinasupportrelationshipmakeminimizingcivilianharmastrategicprioritywhenplanningandconductingtheirmilitaryoperations.Thiscanbeachievedthroughanagreementbetweenthepartnersandelaboratedinadoctrineorpolicy(seeSection 6.1.3).

Measuresdesignedtopromoteinstitutionalcapacitybuildingortrainingbetweenpartnerscouldimprovesystemsandprocessestominimizecivilianharm.Theseincludemethodologiesforcollateraldamageestima-tion,targetingproceduresandbattledamageassessmentsthatincludecollateraldamageassessments.ActorscanalsosharegoodpracticesandencouragerespectforapplicableIHLrules(seeSection 6.1.2).

Partnerscouldprovidetechnicalassistancewhileoperationsarebeingplanned,forexamplebysharinginfor-mationaboutthehumanterrain;geographyandstructures;thelocation,interdependencyandfunctioningofcriticalcivilianinfrastructure;andpatternsoflife.Theyshouldstrengthenthecollectionandsharingofdataoncivilianharm,includingthereverberatingeffectsfromthedamageordestructionofcivilianobjects.Byvirtueofthisinformationandtheirexpertise,actorsmayprovideadviceontheselectionoftargetsandonhowtoverifythattheyarenotcivilians,civilianobjectsorsubjecttospecialprotection;theymayalsoprovideinputonmeansormethodsoronprecautionaryandmitigationmeasurestoreduceincidentalcivilianharm.

Stepsshouldbetakentomonitorandevaluatepartnerconduct(aswellasthatoftheactor’sownforces)duringhostilities(seeSections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5).Itisalsoimportanttoestablishmechanismstoinvestigateharmtocivilians,ensureaccountabilityanddrawlessonstoinformfutureoperationsorrelationships(seeSection 6.3.2).

Partnersmayalsobeinapositiontoprovideassistancethatalleviatestheconsequencesofhostilities,forexamplebydedicatingresourcesorexpertisetosupportessentialservicessuchashealth-carefacilities,toevacuatethesickandwoundedortoprovidehumanitarianassistance.

Theroleofsupportingactorsandsupportedparties inensuringrespect for therulesontheconductofhostilitiesisevenmorecriticalwhenarmedconflictiswagedinpopulatedenvironments–wheremilitarytargetsandciviliansandcivilianstructuresarecommingled,placingciviliansatgreatriskofharm.Civilians’inherentvulnerabilityinpopulatedareasmakesitimperativeforStatesandallpartiestoaconflicttoreassessandadapttheirchoiceofweaponsandtacticssoastoreducecivilianharm,includingbyavoidingtheuseofexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareainpopulatedareasandtoadequatelyprepare,trainandequiptheirarmedforcesforthispurpose.Statesmustalsoexerciseinfluenceovertheirpartnersandotherpartiestothisend.Allpartiestoarmedconflictsshould,wheneverpossible,employstrategiesandtacticsthattakecombatoutsidepopulatedareasinanefforttoreduceurbanfightingaltogether.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Deathofandinjurytociviliansandothersnotfighting

• Damagetoordestructionofcivilianobjectsandspeciallyprotectedobjects(e.g.culturalproperty andmedicalfacilities)

• Civilianharmresultingfromtheindirect(reverberating)effectsofthedamagetoordestruction ofcivilianobjects

• Displacement

• Makeminimizingcivilianharmastrategicpriorityinalloperationsconductedbyorwithpartners

• Preventorminimizecivilianharmbyimprovingtargetingproceduresthroughinstitutionalcapacitybuildingandtraining

• Improvetheselectionanduseofmeansandmethods,ensuringthroughtrainingthattheyareagoodfitfortheenvironment

• Makeavailabletopartnersequipmentorinformationthatcouldhelpavoidorminimizecivilianharm,e.g.intelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissanceequipment

• Ensureciviliansandexternalobservershaveappropriatechannelstofilecomplaints

• Improvepracticesthroughlearningprocesses

See also: – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations – Section 4Theprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting

Key legal rules

Additional Protocol I of 1977

For a full list of relevant treaties, see the ICRC treaty database

Further reading

International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (2019), pp. 15–25 (ICRC)

International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction, pp. 77–129 (N. Melzer)

Explosive Weapons with Wide Area Effects: A Deadly Choice in Populated Areas (ICRC, forthcoming)

Urban services during protracted armed conflict: A call for a better approach to assisting affected people (ICRC)

Displaced in Cities: Experiencing and Responding to Urban Internal Displacement Outside Camps (ICRC)

I saw my city die: Voices from the front lines of urban conflict in Iraq, Syria and Yemen (ICRC)

When War Moves to Cities: Protection of Civilians in Urban Areas (ICRC and InterAction)

3.3.3 CAPTURE, ARREST AND DETENTIONThedeprivationoflibertyisaregularoccurrenceinarmedconflict.Anypartytoanarmedconflict–andactorsthatsupportthem–mustprepareforthiseventuality.Themainprincipleapplicabletothosedeprivedoftheirlibertyishumanetreatment.

Thoseinvolvedinsupportrelationshipsshouldtakemeasurestoensure,totheextentpossible,that any deprivation of liberty is undertaken in conformity with international law andhumanitarian considerations.

Detaineesare inavulnerablesituationbecause theydependcompletelyonthedetainingauthority (seeSection 4.1).Therisksofharmforpersonsdeprivedoftheirlibertycanbeexacerbatedinthecontextofanarmedconflict.Therearefourcommonunderlyingproblems:thedetainingauthoritieslackthecapacitytoensuredetaineesaretreatedhumanelyandthatdetentionconditionsarehumane,detaineesareheldintem-poraryormobiledetentionfacilities,detaineesaretransferredtoanotherauthoritythatdoesnotrespectthefundamentalrightsofthedetainees,ordetaineesareheldincommunicado inundisclosedplacesofdetention.

Regardlessofwhethertheyaredirectlyinvolvedindetentionoperations,actorscantakearangeofpracticalmeasurestoensurethatcapture,arrestanddetentionoperationsbyeitherorbothactorsinasupportrela-tionshipareconductedinconformitywithinternationallawandstandardsbothintheshortandlongterm.Thosemeasuresmayincludeagreeingduringthepreparationphaseonresponsibilitiesandstandardsfordetentionoperations(seeSection 6.1.3);engagingwithpartnersonapplicablelawandgoodpractices(seeSection 6.1.2);strengtheningthecapacitiesofpartnerinstitutions,suchasthroughmechanismstosystem-aticallyregisterpersonsdeprivedoftheirlibertyandnotifytheirfamilies,andreviewingthelawfulnessofdetention(seeSection 6.2.1);trainingpartnerpersonnelinthepracticalaspectsandlegalimplicationsofdetention,includinghowtomanagegroupswithspecialneeds(seeSection 6.2.2);andprovidingresourcesorexpertisetoimprovedetaineetreatmentanddetentionconditions,includingaccesstofoodandwater,shelter,medicalcareandfamilycontact(seeSection 6.2.3).

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Extrajudicialkilling

• Enforceddisappearances

• Tortureandotherill-treatment,includingsexualviolence

• Inhumanedetentionconditions(e.g.overcrowding,malnutrition,epidemicsandlackoffamilycontact)

• Detentionwithoutalegalbasisand/orproceduralsafeguards

• Transferofdetaineeswithoutduerespectfortheprincipleofnon-refoulement

• Failuretoensurephysicalandpsychologicalsafetyatthepointofcaptureorarrestandduringtransfers

• Denialoffairtrialrights

• Conditionsnotadaptedtospecialneeds(e.g. children,thementallyillandpeoplewithdisabilities)

• Engagewithpartnersonapplicablelawandtheimplementationofgoodpractices • Strengthenthecapacitiesofpartnerinstitutions • Trainpartnerpersonneltoimplementrelevantlawandgoodpractices • Providematerialassetsorhumanresourcestoimprovedetentionconditions(e.g.food,water,shelter,medicalcare,familycontact)

Key legal rules

Third Geneva Convention of 1949

Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949

Additional Protocol II of 1977, Articles 4–6

ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 118–128 and 93

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984

Further reading

The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines

Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (uN)

Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (uN)

Towards Humane Prisons: A principled and participatory approach to prison planning and design (ICRC)

Water, Sanitation, Hygiene and Habitat in Prisons (ICRC)

“Partnering in detention and detainee transfer operations” (T. Rodenhäuser)

“The protective scope of Common Article 3: More than meets the eye” (J. Pejic)

“Transfers of detainees: legal framework, non-refoulement and contemporary challenges” (C. Droege)

“Procedural principles and safeguards for internment/administrative detention in armed conflict and other situations of violence” (J. Pejic)

See also: – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations – Section 3.4.4Otherformsofsupport – Section 4.1Personsdeprivedoftheirliberty

3.3.4 LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONSLawenforcementoperationscantakeplacebefore,duringandafteranarmedconflict.Incomplexsituations,therecanbeconfusionaboutwhichbodyoflawgovernstheactivitiesofarmedforcesorotherpersonnel,andthisissometimesexacerbatedbyrhetoricthatstigmatizesgroupsorwholecommunities.

Actorsmayencountersuchissuesinrelationtoarrestanddetentionactivities,measuresformanagingdis-placedpeople,theprovisionofhumanitarianassistance,andoperationsdescribedascounter-terrorismorcounterinsurgencyoperations.

Personnelcarryingoutlawenforcementoperationstypicallyrequiredifferenttrainingandequipmentfromthoseprovidedtoarmedforces.Thisisbecausetherulesapplicabletolawenforcementoperationsaregov-ernedbyinternationalhumanrightslawandtheinternationalstandardsderivingfromit,whiletherules

applicabletotheconductofhostilitiesinarmedconflictaregovernedbyIHL.Bothsupportingactorsandsupportedpartiesshouldbepreparedtomakethisdistinctionintheiroperationsandsupportrelationshipsandadapttheirmindsetaccordingly.Forexample,thearmsprovidedtosupportaparty’sconductofhostil-itiesmaynotbeappropriateorlegaltouseinalawenforcementoperation.Similarly,thetrainingprovidedtoanactoronarrestorcaptureanddetentionactivitiesmayneedtobeadaptedtothesituationathand,i.e.conflictorlawenforcement.

Further reading

Basic Principles on Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (uN)

Military Decision-Making in Security Operations (ICRC)

The use of weapons and equipment in law enforcement (ICRC)

The use of force in law enforcement operations – Factsheet (ICRC)

To Serve and Protect: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law for Police and Security Forces (ICRC)

Expert Meeting – The Use of Force in Armed Conflict: Interplay between the Conduct of Hostilities and Law

Enforcement Paradigms (ICRC)

3.4 FORMS OF SUPPORTAsdescribedinSection 1.2,supportrelationshipsinarmedconflictrefertosituationsinwhichoneactorprovidessupporttoanotheractor,enablingthelattertoparticipateinanarmedconflict.Akeyelementofsuchrelationshipsistheformsofsupportthathavesomebearingonthesupportedparty’sabilitytoengageinarmedconflict.

TheICRChasobservednumerousformsofsupport,threeofwhichareespeciallycommon.

SUPPORT

POLITICAL

ARMS TRANSFERS

PARTNEREDMILITARY

OPERATIONS

LEGITIMIZATION

STRATEGIC APPROVAL FOROTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT

MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT

FORCE GENERATION

KINETIC SUPPORT

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

TRAIN, ADVISE, ASSIST,ACCOMPANY (TAAA)

PARTNERED DETENTIONOPERATIONS

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY SUPPORT

FINANCIAL SUPPORT

HOSTING

Whilethesedifferenttypesofsupportareoftenseenasbeingseparateanddistinctfromoneanother,multi-facetedsupportrelationshipsoftencombinetwoormoreofthem.Eachtypeofsupportisassociatedwithindividualrisks,someofwhicharehighlightedbelow.Decisionmakersareencouragedtoconsiderthecom-binedeffectsofthesupportandhowtherelationshipasawholeismanaged,bearinginmindthatagivenactormayprovidedifferenttypesofsupport.

Decisionmakersshouldconsiderthesupportrelationshipasawhole,notmerelytheconstituentformsofsupportprovided.

Moreover,supportedpartiesmayreceivesupportfrommorethanonesupportingactor,whoseobjectivesmaybeinconsistent(seeSection 2). Inaddition,supportingactorsoftenprovidesupporttoavarietyofparties,someofwhichmaybeoperating inthesameconflictsituation.Asdescribed inSection 1.4, the existenceofmultiplecompetingorintertwiningsupportrelationshipsrisksescalatingandprolongingarmedconflictandthusincreasestherisksposedtoaffectedpeople.

Where possible, decision makers should be mindful of the interaction between, and thecollectiveimpactof,multiplesupportrelationships.

Theseareenvironmentalfactorsthatmaybearupontheformandscaleofsupportprovidedandthedegreeofinfluenceonepartnermayhaveonanother.

Itisrecognizedthatthedecisiontoprovidesupportmaybetakenandthesupportbegunbeforetherecipi-entbecomesapartytoanarmedconflict.Examplesofthisarelong-termsecurityassistanceandsecuritycooperation.Thatdecisionshouldthereforetakeintoaccountthelikelihoodthattherecipientwillengageinarmedconflictintheforeseeablefuture.

Theformsofsupportbeingprovided(oranycombinationthereof)willlikelyaffect–butnotnecessarilydetermine–thepracticalmeasurestobeimplementedwithinthecontextofthesupportrelationship.Hence,actorsshouldconsideralltenareasofpracticalmeasures(seePart C)regardlessoftheformofsupporttobeprovided.

3.4.1 POLITICAL SUPPORT

LEGITIMIZATION

STRATEGIC APPROVAL FOROTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT

MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT POLITICAL

Theterm“politicalsupport”herereferstopoliticalexpressionsofsupportforapartytoanarmedconflictthataffecttheparty’scapacitywithinthearmedconflict.Suchsupportmaybeexpressedonabilateralormultilaterallevel,publiclyordiscreetly,andformallyorinformally.

Expressionsofsupportforanotheractormaytakethefollowingforms:

• legitimization–providingrecognitionorlegitimacytoanotheractor,forexamplebyfacilitatingaccesstointernationalforumsortonegotiationsoradvocatingforhavingthesupportedpartytakenoffsanctionlists.

• mobilization of political support–mobilizationofsupportforthecausesharedwiththesupportedactor(s)andtheneedtoprovidethethreeothertypesofsupport,whetheratthedomesticlevel(amongstconstituents)ortheinternationallevel(amongstotheractors).Examplesincludemobilizing,joiningorsupportingcoalitionsofStatesforthepurposeofjointmilitaryoperations,organizingspecificroundtablesoreventsofinternationalimportancetoinfluenceornegotiatewithotheractorsforthebenefitofthesupportedparty,andrepresentingtheinterestsofthesupportedpartyininternationalforumsandnegotiationprocesses.

• strategic approval for the other forms of support–decisionstoprovide,modifyorwithholdsupport,whetheratthedomestic,regionalorinternationallevel.Thisisthemostpivotalexpressionofpoliticalsupportanddoesnotexcludeotherformsofsupportinthepoliticalrealm.Itisworthnotingthatdecisionsofpoliticalsupportmadeatthestrategiclevelareakeyleverforotherformsofsupport.Hence,itisthelevelatwhichauthoritiescandecidehowtherelationshipwillinfluencethesupportedactorinordertobringaboutbehaviouralchange.

Akeyconcernwhenitcomestopoliticalsupportisthatastrategicdecisiontoprovidesupportmaynottakedueconsiderationoftherisksthatsupportmaygenerateforciviliansandothersnotfightinginthegivensituation.Inparticular,decisionsbasedonshort-termobjectivestendtounderestimatethelong-termriskstoaffectedpeople.Apreliminarysteptowardsaddressingthisconcernistoensurethatthenecessarylegal,policyandoperationalmechanismsareinplaceforariskassessmenttobeundertakenandforthesupporttobeadaptedsoastomitigateanyidentifiedrisks.Forthosemechanismstobeeffective,however,theassess-mentmustbeintegratedintostrategicdecisions.Inotherwords,themeasuresshouldbeinplacesothatsup-portwillnotbeprovidedunlessoruntilthesupportedpartymitigatesanyincreasedrisktoaffectedpeople.

Anactorthatprovidespoliticalsupportshouldalsoconsiderthepossibilitythattheiractionwillpromptotherstoprovidecountervailingsupporttoanadversary,orthattheinvolvementofexternalinterestswillrenderpeacenegotiationsmoredifficultorimpossible.

Inprovidingpoliticalsupporttopartiestoaconflict,actorsmaycreateopportunitiestopositivelyinfluencethem,notablythroughnormativeengagement(seeSection 6.1.2).Inaddition,decisionmakersatthestrategiclevelhaveanimportantroletoplayinensuringthatpracticalmeasuresareadoptedtoimprovetheprotectionofandreduceharmtoaffectedpeople.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Short-termobjectivesdonotaccountforthelong-termrisksandimpactofdecisions

• Thesupportescalatesthearmedconflict,notablybypromptingotheractorstoprovidecountervailingsupporttotheadversary

• Thesupportrelationshipmakesithardertonegotiatepeace

• Positivelyinfluencepartnersthroughnormativeengagement

• Ensurepracticalmeasuresareimplementedinordertopromotetheprotectionofandreduceharmtoaffectedpeople

3.4.2 ARMS TRANSFERS

ARMS TRANSFERS

Theprovisionofsupportintheformofarms,ammunitionandothermeansofwarfaregivesrisetoavarietyofdirectriskstocivilians,andinsomecases,combatants,andcanhaveindirectandlonger-termnegativehumanitarianconsequences.Notably,inadequateWAMpractices(seeSection 3.3.1),theinappropriateuseorthemisuseofweaponsintheconductofhostilitiesandinlawenforcementsituations(seeSections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4,respectively),andthepresenceofunexplodedandabandonedexplosiveordnance(seeSection 4.8)poseariskofharm.

Whentransferringarms,stepsshouldbetakentoreducetheserisks.Thiscanbeachievedbypromoting,amongotherthings,safeandsecureWAM(seeSection 3.3.1),strictcontrolsovertheownershipandpos-sessionofarms,theresponsible(i.e.appropriateandlegal)useofweapons(seeSections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4),measurestopreventdiversion,andmeasurestoaddresstherisksposedbyERWandmines(seeSection 4.8).26

Weaponstransfersrequireparticularcautionandduediligencebecauseoftheirreparableharmthatcanbecausedwhenweaponsaremisused.Toreducehumansufferingandcurtailproliferation,certainweaponsareprohibitedfrombeingtransferred.27SupportingStatesthatprovidethemeansbywhichconflictsarefoughthaveaspecialdutytodoeverythingreasonablyintheirpowertoensurethattherecipientsrespectIHL.InkeepingwithitsobligationtoensurerespectforIHL,anarms-transferringStatemustassesswhethertherecipientislikelytousetheweaponstocommitIHLviolations.Ifthereisanexpectationthatthiswillhap-pen,basedonfactsorknowledgeofpastpatterns,theStatemustrefrainfromtransferringtheweapons.28

Athoroughassessmentoftheriskthatthearms,ammunitionormilitaryequipmenttransferredwillbeusedinthecommissionofviolationsofIHLorinternationalhumanrightslawshouldincludeaninquiryintotherecipient’spastandpresentrecordofrespectforIHLandhumanrightslaw,therecipient’sintentionsasexpressedthroughformalcommitments,andtherecipient’scapacitytoensurethatthearmsorequipmenttransferredwillbeusedinamannerconsistentwithIHLandhumanrightslawandwillnotbedivertedortransferredtootherdestinationswheretheymaybeusedtocommitviolationsofthesebodiesoflaw.29

TheArmsTradeTreaty(ATT)andcertainregionalinstrumentsprovidemoredetailedrulesonassessingtherisksassociatedwitharmstransfers.Someoftheseinstrumentsprovideforconsiderationofmeasurestomitigatetheserisks.Anysuchmitigationmeasuresshouldbeassessedcautiously,intermsofwhatis

26 Notethatarmsaresometimestransferredinthecontextofa“train,advise,assist,accompany”mission;seeSection 3.4.3ofthisdocumentforfurtherdiscussion.

27 ForadiscussionofIHLregulatingtheuseandtransferofweapons,seetheICRCwebsite:https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/weapons.

28 See CommentaryontheFirstGenevaConvention, paras.158–163(seenote6above);K.DörmannandJ. Serralvo, “CommonArticle1totheGenevaConventionsandtheobligationtopreventinternationalhumanitarianlawviolations”,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross(IRRC),No.895/896,September2015,pp.707–736:https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc-895_6-dormann-serralvo.pdf.Treatiesregulatingarmstransfers,includingtheArmsTradeTreaty,imposemoredetailedrequirements.

29 Forfurtherinformationonrelevantindicators,seeICRC,ArmsTransferDecisions:ApplyingInternationalHumanitarianLawandInternationalHumanRightsLawCriteria,ICRC,Geneva,2016:https://shop.icrc.org/arms-transfer-decisions-applying-international-humanitarian-law-and-international-human-rights-law-criteria-a-practical-guide-pdf-en.

realisticallyachievableunderthecircumstances.Theymustbetimely,robustandreliable,andtheexporterandimportermusthavethecapacitytoimplementthemeffectivelyandingoodfaith.30

Legal reminder

Article 7 of the ATT requires States Parties to deny an arms transfer where there is an “overriding

risk” of serious violations of IHL, serious violations of international human rights law, serious acts

of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children, also considering

available mitigation measures.31

In the ICRC’s interpretation, the obligation to ensure respect for IHL means all States must deny

arms transfers where there is a substantial or clear risk that the weapons could be used to commit

violations of IHL.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Improperuse,andmisuse,ofweapons,includinginviolationofIHL,leadingtocivilianharm,includingdeath,injuryanddamagetoorthedestructionofcivilianobjects

• Diversionofweaponstounauthorizedendusersandforunauthorizedenduses,includingthroughresale,theftorloss

• Increasedavailabilityofweapons,fuellingarmedviolenceandconflictsandundermininglong-termpeaceandsecurity

• Buildcapacitytoeffectivelyimplementarmstransferriskmitigationmeasures(e.g.tostrengthendiversionpreventionthroughrobustWAM,marking,record-keepingandtracing)

• Strengthencontrolsontheavailabilityofarmsandammunition

• Providetrainingtosupporttheproperandlegaluseofweaponsandsupportmeasurestoeffectivelyprevent,investigateandsuppressIHLviolationsand,whereappropriate,prosecuteseriousviolations ofIHL

• EncourageStatestoformallycommittoandassistinfaithfullyimplementingthehighestinternationalstandardsonresponsiblearmstransfers,safeandsecureWAM,armscontrolanddisarmament

Key legal rules

Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949

Arms Trade Treaty, 2013

Further reading

Arms Transfer Decisions: Applying International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law

Criteria (ICRC)

Understanding the Arms Trade Treaty from a Humanitarian Perspective (ICRC)

2013 Arms Trade Treaty – Factsheet (ICRC)

International humanitarian law and gender-based violence in the context of the Arms Trade Treaty (ICRC)

30 See ICRC, UnderstandingtheArmsTradeTreatyfromaHumanitarianPerspective,ICRC,Geneva,2016,pp.38–39.31 UnderstandingtheArmsTradeTreatyfromaHumanitarianPerspective,pp.36-37(seenote30above).

See also: – Section 3.3.1Weaponsandammunitionmanagement – Section 4.8Landminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar

3.4.3 PARTNERED MILITARY OPERATIONS

PARTNEREDMILITARY

OPERATIONS

FORCE GENERATION

KINETIC SUPPORT

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

TRAIN, ADVISE, ASSIST,ACCOMPANY (TAAA)

PARTNERED DETENTIONOPERATIONS

For the purposes of this document, the term“partneredmilitary operations” (PMOs) refers to formalarrangementsbetweenpartnerstoachieveaspecificmilitaryaiminaconflict.PMOsareoftenthemostdirectandvisibletypeofsupportprovidedtopartiestoanarmedconflict.AsPMOsmayvarygreatlyintheactivitiesinvolved,theICRChasidentifiedsixcategories,eachofwhichhassubcategories:

• train,advise,assist,accompany(TAAA)

• forcegeneration

• kineticsupport

• partnereddetentionoperations

• intelligencesupport

• logisticalsupport.

Someoftheseactivitiesmayresultinthesupportingactorjoiningitspartnerasapartytoanarmedconflict(seeSection 3.1).Dependingonthecategory,PMOsconsistofavarietyofactivitiesthatgiverisetospecificrisksandopportunities,asdetailedbelow.

Train, advise, assist, accompanyMilitaryarrangementsthataimtobuildthemilitarycapacityofasupportingactorthroughtrainingappeartobethemostprevalentformofPMO-typesupport.Thismaybebecausetheypresentsupportingactorswithatolerablelevelofrisk,allowingthemtoachievestrategicaimsandadegreeofinfluencewithoutmoredirectengagement.

Althoughthissubcategoryplayshosttoawidevarietyofmethodologies,settingsandparameters,mostprogrammescanbegroupedasfollows:

• training –atrainingprogrammeprovidesthepartnerwithspecificskillsorknowledge

• train and equip–atrainingprogrammesetoveraspecificperiodoftimeprovidesthepartnerwithspecificskillsandequipment

• advise and assist (HQ)–personnelareplacedinacommandorheadquarterspositiontoadvisetheirpartnersduringoperations

• accompany (ground) –personnelareassignedtoadvisepartnersduringoperationsdirectlyontheground;theadviseristypicallynotauthorizedtoengageincombatbutmaycallinotherformsofsupportsuchasmedicalevacuation,closeairsupportorlogisticssupport.

ActorsinaTAAAsupportrelationshiparelikelytobeinapositiontoinfluenceeachother.Thedegreeofinfluencemaydependonhowinvolvedtheyare,asdepictedbelow.Whilesupportrelationshipsmaybepursuedasawaytolimitanactor’sdirectinvolvement,increasedinvolvementmaybenecessarytoimproveoutcomes.

Training relationshipspresentauniqueopportunity to conveypositive lessonswithin the scopeof thetrainingrelationship;trainingandadviceonIHLareindeedwaystopromotebetterprotectioninsupportrelationships.

ACCOMPANY

ADVISE/ASSIST

Opportunities to positively influence through TAAA missions and embedding personnel

WhileTAAAmissionspresentimportantopportunitiestopositivelyinfluencepartnerbehaviourandout-comes,thereareneverthelessrisksthatshouldbemitigated.Forexample,supportingactorsfaceimportantlimitationsontheextenttowhichtheycanensurethattheforcestheytrain,adviseandassistcomplywithIHLandtakeotherstepstominimizecivilianharm.

ItisimportantthatappropriatesafeguardsbeintegratedintoaTAAAmissiontoensurethatthetrainingisadequateandeffectiveinthecontext.Thiscanbeachieved,forexample,throughcarefulpartnerselec-tion(seeSections 6.1.3 and 6.2.1.C),monitoring,evaluationandoversight(seeSections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5)andlearningprocesses(seeSection 6.3.2).Ataminimum,theTAAAprogrammeshouldincorporatetailoredIHLtraining(seeSection 6.2.2).

AhostofproblemscanresultfromafailuretoproperlymanageTAAAprogrammesthatdrasticallyincreasetheriskstocivilians.Ifthesupportedparty’sintentisnotalignedwiththatofthesupportingactor,orifitshifts,theremaybeariskthatthosetrainedmaychangeallegianceorbecomepredatorytowardsthelocalcommunity,thusincreasingtheriskofharmandprolonginginstability.Withoutimplementingappropriatemeasurestoensurevisibilityandgeneratefeedbackonthebehaviourofthetrainedpersonnel,thereisariskthatthesupportedpartyorindividualswithinitmightusetheirimprovedmilitarycapacityinwaysthatgobeyondorcontradictthesupportagreement.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Increasedcivilianharm

• Efficacyoftrainingnottestedthroughmonitoringandevaluationoftrainedforces

• TrainingdoesnotincorporateandapplyIHLrules

• Trainedforcesoperateoutsideofscopeofsupportagreement

• SpecificIHLtrainingandinstruction,tailoredtotheexpectedcircumstancesoftheconflict

• Normativeengagementthroughouttheranks

• ImproveIHLcompliance

• Improvecivilianharmmitigation

Force generation Forcegenerationreferstothepracticewherebyactors,oftenexternalStates,recruit,trainandequiplocalarmedforces.ThekeycharacteristicofthistypeofPMOisthattheeffortsofthesupportingactorarecriticaltothecreationofthesupportedforce;itwouldnototherwiseexist.

Thesupportedpartyisusuallydependentonthesupportingactorfortraining,equipmentandintelligence.Becauseofthischaracteristic,animportantqualityofforcegenerationisthesupportingactor’sinfluenceoverthesupportedforce. Inthisway, forcegenerationmorecloselyresembleswhatotherscouldcallapatron-clientorproxyrelationship.

Becausethesupportedpartyreliesonitssupportingactor,thelatterhasconsiderableinfluence–andanimportantresponsibility–toensurethatthesupportedpartycomplieswithIHL.ThemeasuresthattheactorcantaketopositivelyinfluencethepartyincludearrangingrobustIHLtraining(seeSection 6.2.2),providingappropriatemission-specificequipment,andsettingupmonitoringandlearningmechanisms(seeSections 6.2.4 and 6.3.2).

However,ifthesupportingactordoesnotexercisecontrolandinsteadchoosesahands-offordistantrela-tionshiponcethepartnerbecomesoperational, thesepartnershipscanbeparticularlyriskyforaffectedpeople.Theframeworks,systemsorcultureofnewlyestablishedforcesmaynotbeasrobustasthoseofotherforcesandthereforenotaseffectiveatensuringcompliancewithIHL.Amongotherthings,thenewforceswouldhavelimitedexperienceoperationalizingIHLrulesandlearninglessonstoimprovetheirpractices.

Newandinexperiencedforcesthatlackmonitoringandoversightbythesupportingactormayexperiencevariationsinthekeyfactorsofintentandleadershipowingtoinfluencefromotheractors,changesintheenvironmentorsimplyalackofcommanddiscipline.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Nascentinstitutions(frameworks,systemsorculture)notrobust

• InexperiencedinoperationalizingIHL

• Susceptibletovariationsinintentandleadership

• ImbuecultureofrespectforIHL

• Participateinrecruitingandvettingsupportedforces

• SpecificIHLtrainingandinstruction,tailoredtotheexpectedcircumstancesoftheconflict

• Feedbackloop

Kinetic support KineticsupportreferstoPMOswherethesupportingactorengagesinhostilitiesinsupportofapartytoaconflict.

Thedegreeofkineticsupportmayvary,fromembeddedtrainingpartnershipstofiresupport.Sometypicalexamplesinclude:

• embedded support–embeddingpersonnelwithpartnerarmedforcesbefore,duringandafteroperations,directlyontheground.Embeddedpersonnelareauthorizedtoengageincombattogetherwiththesupportedunitandtofacilitatetheuseofsupportingforcecapabilities–suchasfiresupport orlogisticalsupport–toenhancethecapacityofthesupportedforce.32

• combined, joint and partnered operations–operationsconductedbyamixedforceorteamcomposedofunitsorpersonnelfrombothpartners;theycollectivelyengageincombat.

32 Foradiscussionoflegalissuesrelatingtokineticandothertypesofsupport,see“Fightingtogetherandinternationalhumanitarianlaw”(seenote3above).

• strikes or raid operations–astrikeoraraidinsupportofaparty.Itcommonlyinvolvesnichecapabilityforcapturinghigh-valuetargets.

• fire support –twotypes: – deliberatetargeting–pre-plannedattacksagainsttargetsthathavebeenanalysed,vettedandprioritizedinadvance

– dynamictargeting–unplannedandunexpectedattacksinwhichthetargetisnotidentifiedinadvance;usuallyinvolvesaircraftorbitingwithinaspecificareaawaitinginstructionsfortargets thatmayormaynotcome(i.e.targetofopportunity,troopsincontactortime-sensitivetargets).

Kineticsupport increasesthemilitarycapacityinfavourofapartytoaconflict. Itthereforenecessarilyinvolvesariskofdirectorindirectcivilianharm.

Just likeinsomeTAAArelationships,poorlyplannedandexecutedkineticsupportcanplaceciviliansatrisk,forexampleowingto inadequatealignmentofoperationalsystemsandprocesses,suchasrulesofengagementandtactics,techniquesandprocedures.Actorsinasupportrelationshipinvolvingkineticsup-portshouldtakestepstoaddresstheadditionalchallengesthatmaycomewithoperatinginpartnership,suchasinteroperability,oversightandaccountability.Indynamicsituations,havingmultipleactorsinvolvedinaspecifickineticoperationalprocess(suchascallingforcloseairsupport)canleadtoadiffusionofresponsi-bility.Practicalmeasuresmayneedtobeputintoplacetomitigatetheincreasedcivilianrisk,suchastailoredtraininginspecificoperationsor“redcardholder”targetingprocedures.

Ontheotherhand,kineticpartnershipscanpromotegoodbehaviourbymakingthepartner’sactivitiesmoretransparent.Theyincreasethepartners’operationalproximity,whichcanleadtoimprovedassessment,normativeengagement,monitoringandevaluation,andoversight.Furthermore,forthepartnerstoworkthroughandresolveinteroperabilitychallenges,kineticsupportisusuallyplannedandpracticedinadvance.Thispreparationprovidesanopportunityforbothsidesoftherelationshiptoaligntheirobjectives,definetheirrespectiverolesandresponsibilities,testtheinteroperabilityoftheircapabilitiesandtakepracticalstepstomitigateanyrisks.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Increasedcapacitycontributestocivilianharm

• SupportingactorbecomesdirectlyinvolvedinaseriousviolationofIHL

• Increasemonitoring,evaluation,oversightandaccountability

• Increasenormativeengagementthroughouttheranks

• Provideassistancetoaddresshumanitarianneeds

Partnered detention operations Partnereddetentionoperationsconsistofactivitiesthatcontributetothecapture-anddetention-relatedactivitiesofapartytoaconflict,includingcapacitybuilding.

Partnereddetentionoperationscantakeanumberofforms,including:

• capture and transfer –groundoperationsleadingtothecaptureandtransferofdetaineestoaplaceofdetention,conductedbyateamcomposedofpersonnelfrombothpartners;logisticalsupportfromonepartnerforadetentionoperationconductedbyanotherpartner;detentionoperationsconductedbyonepartnermakinguseofanotherpartner’sintelligence;orthecaptureofapersonbyonepartnerandthatperson’stransfertotheotherpartner’splaceofdetentionorjudicialsystem

• intelligence collection–interviewing(i.e.tacticalquestioning,interrogatingordebriefing)detaineesandprovidingandreceivingintelligencerelatingtodetainees

• capacity building–providingapartnerwithspecificskills,knowledge,materialassetsortechnologytoconductdetentionoperationsand/ormaintaindetentionfacilities(e.g. buildingdetentionfacilitiesortrainingandequippingdetentionfacilitypersonnel).

Therisksassociatedwithpartnereddetentionoperationscloselyparalleltherisksattendanttoalldetentionoperations(seeSection 3.3.3).Capture,arrestanddetentionactivitieshavebeenamongthemostcontentiousissuesforactorsinsupportrelationships,bothforlegalandpracticalreasons.Theseactorshavestruggledtoensurecoherenceintheirrespectiveresponsibilities,forexampleinrelationtoinformation-sharingandtransfers.Inpartneredoperations,itisnotalwaysclearwhichpartnerisexercisingcontroloveracapturedperson,whichproceduresgovernthetransferofdetaineesbetweenpartners,andwhichresponsibilitiesthearmedforcesofoneactorhaveregardingthehumanetreatmentofpeoplecapturedbyapartnerforce.Suchpracticalandlegalchallengescanleadtoadiffusionofresponsibilityandresultininhumanetreatmentanddetention conditions.

ActorsshouldtakenecessaryprecautionsintheplanningandexecutionofpartnereddetentionoperationsinordertoanticipateandmitigatetheriskthatIHLandotherinternationalstandardswillbeviolated.Likekineticpartnerships,partnereddetentionoperationstypicallyentailproximitybetweenpartnersthatgivesrisetotworisk-mitigationfactors.First,actorsgainbetterinsightintotheirpartners’decision-makingprocessandactions,andthusarebetterabletoassessanyrisksofharmoropportunitiestoimprovepractices.Second,duringthepreparationstage,partnerscanincorporatemeasurestoreducetheriskofill-treatment,tortureorotherharmoccurringinpartnereddetentionoperations.Preventivemeasurescouldbeimplementedthrough,forexample,legalframeworks,aformaltechnicalagreementorstandardoperatingprocedures.

Amongotherpracticalmeasures,actorsshouldconsiderspecificallytrainingtheirpartners’detentionper-sonnelonapplyingrelevantlawsandstandards,humanelymanagingplacesofdetentionandusingexclu-sivelynon-coerciveinterrogationtechniques(seeSection 6.2.2).Capacitybuildingaimedatstrengtheningthejudicialsystemcouldbettersecuretherightsofdetaineesandensurethattheyarereleasedassoonasthereasonsfortheirdetentionceasetoapply(seeSection 6.2.1).Itmayalsobenecessarytoprovideassistancetoapartytosecurehumaneconditionsforthosedetained(seeSection 6.2.3).

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Extrajudicialkilling

• Tortureorotherformsofill-treatment(includingduringscreening,captureandtransferoperations,andinplacesofdetention)

• Inhumanedetentionconditions(e.g.overcrowding,malnutrition,epidemicsandlackoffamilycontact)

• Detentionwithoutalegalbasisand/orproceduralsafeguards

• Transferofdetaineeswithoutduerespectfortheprincipleofnon-refoulement

• Engagewithpartnersonapplicablelawandimplementinggoodpractices

• Strengthenthecapacitiesofpartnerinstitutions

• Trainpartnerpersonneltoimplementrelevantlawsandgoodpractices

• Monitorandevaluatepartnerdetentionpractices

• Improvepracticesthroughlearningprocesses

• Providematerialassetsorhumanresourcestoimprovedetentionconditions(e.g.food,water,shelter,medicalcareandfamilycontact)

See also: – Section 3.3.3Capture,arrestanddetention – Section 4.1Personsdeprivedoftheirliberty

Intelligence supportPartnersinsupportrelationshipscommonlyshareintelligence,i.e.informationofmilitarysignificancetoaconflict.

Intelligencesupportusuallyfallsintooneoftwocategories:

• intelligence sharing –sharinginformationalreadyavailable

• intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) –sharinginformationcollectedspecificallyfortheoperationbeingsupported,typicallythroughtechnicalmeansbutalsothroughothersources.

Informationmaybelessreliablewhenitissharedbetweenactorswithsignificantdifferencesintermsofintent,andthiscanresultinescalatingtheconflictbyinadvertentlyenlargingitsscope.Actorsshouldalsoconsiderhowintelligencewillbeusedbytherecipient,inparticulartheriskthattheinformationsharedwillcontributetoaviolationofIHL,forexampleinrelationtotheconductofhostilities(seeSection 3.3.2)ordetentionactivities(seeaboveandSection 3.3.3).

Falseorinaccurateinformationcontainedinintelligencethatleadstokineticoperationsordetentionoper-ationscanresult inciviliansandthosedeprivedoftheir libertybeingharmed.Whilesafeguardsmaybeinplaceforverifyingtheaccuracyofinformation,suchprocessesmaybelesseffectivewhereintelligenceissharedbetweenadhocpartners(ratherthan longstandingpartners,wheresuchprocesseshavebeenimprovedovertime),orwherethetimeframetoverifyandactonintelligenceisshort.Actorslikelyalsohavegreaterdifficultyverifyinginformationinsituationswithwhichtheyhavelessphysical,culturalandlinguisticproximityandarethereforelessableto“readtheenvironment”.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Falseorfaultyinformationinintelligencepartnershipsleadstoflawedtargetselectionorthedetentionofpeopleonincorrectgrounds

• Intelligencesharing,combinedwithadequatesafeguardsandmonitoring,canhelptominimizecivilianharm

Logistical support Logisticalsupportreferstoarrangementsthatprovideforthemaintenanceandtransportationofmaterial,facilitiesandpersonnel.

Therearefourcommontypesoflogisticalsupport:

• inter-theatre transport –transportofpersonnelorequipmentfromtheirhomelandtoatheatreofoperation,withoutdeploymenttothefrontline(intra-theatre)

• intra-theatre transport–transportofpersonnelorequipmentwithinatheatreofoperation,usuallyduringoperationsinordertoimprovethebeneficiary’srange,mobilityandspeedofdeployment

• air-refuelling–therefuellingofanaircraftinflightbyanotheraircraft

• specialized technical support –mission-criticalspecializedtechnicalsupportormaintenanceforweapons,aircraft,orotherwar-sustainingequipment.

Althoughitmayseemlessinvolvedthanotherformsofsupport,logisticalsupportcanplayanimportantroleinincreasingthemilitarycapacityofapartytoaconflict.Insuchsituations,thesupportingactorhasbothanopportunityandaresponsibilitytopositivelyaffectoutcomes.

Aslogisticalsupportincreasesapartner’scapacitytoengageinconflict,actorsshouldconsidertheconse-quencesoftheoperationstowhichthesupportcontributes.Ataminimum,actorsshouldassesswhetherthereisariskofthesupportedpartyusingtheincreasedcapacityinviolationofIHLandtakestepstomiti-gatethatrisk.Logisticalsupportthatcanbeconsideredasbeingwithinthecausalchainleadingtoriskybehaviour–suchasin-flightrefuellingforpartneraircraftbeforeindiscriminateairstrikes,orspecializedtechnicalassistancewithartilleryequipmentusedinpopulatedareas–shouldcertainlybeconsideredanopportunitytopositivelyinfluenceapartner.

ActorsthatprovidelogisticalsupportshouldalsoconsiderexercisingtheirinfluencetopromotecompliancewithIHLandprotectionforaffectedpopulations,eveniftheirsupportisnotassociatedwithanyidentifiedrisk.Beyondthepositiveinfluencethatactorscanhavebyvirtueoftheirsupportrelationshipingeneral,actorsshouldconsiderwhetherlogisticalsupportcouldbeonewayofencouragingapartytocomplywithitsIHLobligationsandmanagethehumanitarianimpactofconflictmorebroadly.Forexample,itmayoffertohelptransportessentialgoodstocivilians.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Contributestomilitaryoperationsresultingincivilianharm

• ProvidelogisticalsupporttofulfilIHLobligationsandotherwiseassistciviliansandothersnotfighting,e.g.bytransportingessentialgoods

3.4.4 OTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY SUPPORT

FINANCIAL SUPPORT

HOSTING

Variousotherformsofsupport,whetherprovidedontheirownorinconjunctionwithothersupport(seeabove),mayhaveaneffectontherecipient’scapacitytoengageinarmedconflict.Asaresult,therisksandopportunitiesthattheyposerelativetotheprotectionofaffectedpeoplemustbeassessed.

Themostpertinentoftheseotherformsofsupportinclude:

• institutionalcapacitysupport

• PMSCs

• financialsupport

• hosting.

Considerationsspecifictoeacharedetailedbelow.

Institutional capacity support Institutionalcapacitysupportreferstoexternalsupportforinstitutionsthatisoftenlongterminnature.Suchprogrammesaretypicallyrelevanttosupportrelationshipswhentheyrelatetomilitaryacademies,detentionandjudicialsectorreform.

Providing institutionalcapacitysupportcan increase therecipient’smilitarycapacity.Therefore,actorsshouldintegrateintotheseprogrammesconcretemeasurestopromotetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting,includingthroughcompliancewithIHL.

Intheabsenceofsuchmeasures,thesupportedpartycouldexpanditsroleinaconflictwithoutfullycon-sideringtheimpactonciviliansandthosenolongerfighting.Asaresult,thenumberofIHLviolationscouldincrease.

Institutionalcapacitysupportcanpresentasignificantopportunity.Well-tailored,meaningfulengage-ment,inwhichactorshelpasupportedpartytointegrateIHLintoitssystems,processesandpersonnel(seeSection 6.2.1),cangreatlyreducethenegativeeffectsofconflictonaffectedpeople.

Furthermore,jointlydesignedeffortstostrengthencivilianjustice,theruleoflaw,detentionauthorities,forensicsauthoritiesandothercivilianauthoritiesshouldhelptoreducesufferingduringandafteraconflictamongthosewhoarenotfighting.Theseinstitutionsmayneedspecifictraining,equipmentoradviceinordertomanagetheiractivitiesinaconflictsituation.Properlymanagedinstitutionsmayalsohelptoattenuatelonger-termgrievances,sentimentsofinjusticeandprotractedconflictandviolence.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Increasesonlyfightingcapacity,withlittleornocontextualizedintegrationofIHLandotherprotectivenorms

• EscalatesconflictandIHLviolations

• Supportforjustice,rule-of-lawandforensicsactorsmayalsosufferfrominadequatecontextualizationandtailoringtoimmediateandupcomingneeds

• Rightsofdetainees,civiliansandthedeadviolatedasaresult

• ContextualizedintegrationofIHLintothesystems,processesandforcesofapartytotheconflict

• FewerIHLviolationsandbetterprotectionofciviliansduringhostilities

• Improvedcapacityofcivilianauthoritiestoensuretherightsanddignityofcivilians,thedeadanddetainedarerespected

Private military and security companiesInsomesituations,actorssupportapartytoaconflictbycontractingaPMSCtoprovidespecializedservicestothepartythatthesupportingactormightotherwisehaveprovideditself.Examplesincludetrainingaswellasmaintainingandoperatingtechnologicallyadvancedweaponsystems.

AsdescribedinSection 3.2.5,contractingPMSCswithoutappropriatevettingprocedures,robustcontractsandeffectivecontrolandoversightriskscreatingadiffusionofresponsibilitythatcouldresultinIHLviola-tionseitherbythePMSCorbythosewithwhomtheywork.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• DiffusionofresponsibilitybetweenthePMSCandactorsinthesupportrelationship

• Confusionbetweenregulatoryapproaches

• Absenceofrobustvetting

• Rulesofengagementdonotadequatelydelimittheuseofforce

• Inabilitytomonitorconductandevaluateresults

• PotentialtointegrateIHLintoprofessionallycustomizedservice-deliveryapproach

• PotentialtobuildinterminationclausesincaseofIHLviolationsbythePMSCand/orthesupportedparty

Further reading

Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to

operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict (ICRC and Swiss Federal

Department of Foreign Affairs)

Business and International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Rights and Obligations of Business

Enterprises under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC)

See also: – Section 3.2.5Privatemilitaryandsecuritycompanies

Financial supportFinancialsupportreferstodirectorindirectfunding,includingthroughloanagreementsandinvestments,thatsignificantlyenablesthesupportedpartytoengageinarmedconflict.

WhilefinancialsupportisperceivedasbeinglessinvolvedthanPMOs,forexample,supportingactorsarenotwithoutresponsibilityfortheconductofasupportedpartybenefitingfromtheirfunding.

Externalfinancialsupportmayreduceaparty’srelianceonthesupportofthelocalcommunity,thusre-ducingitssenseofobligationandaccountabilitytowardsit.Asaresult,thepartymaybelessconcernedaboutcivilianharmthanitmightotherwisebe.Additionally,thefinancialsupportmightprolongtheconflictifitallowsthesupportedpartytosurvivemuchlongerthanitwouldhaveifitdependedsolelyonlocalsupportandresources.

Financialsupportbringsanopportunitytopositivelyinfluencethesupportedparty.Forexample,thepro-visionoffundingcouldbeconditionaluponcontinuedcompliancewithIHL(seeSection 6.1.3.B).Theagree-mentbetweentheactorscouldalsospecificallyearmarkaportionoffundingtosupportmeasuresthatwouldreducecivilianharm,suchasIHLtraining(seeSection 6.2.2),providingessentialgoods(seeSection 6.2.3)orclearinglandminesorERW(seeSections 4.8 and 6.2.3).

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Reducedaccountabilitytocivilians

• FundmeasurestopromoterespectforIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting (e.g.training,providingessentialgoodsandclearinglandminesorERW)

• Providefinancialassistancetoaffectedpeople(e.g. addressingtheneedsofthefamiliesofmissingpersons)

Hosting “Hosting”iswhenanactorplacesitsterritoryorfacilitiesatthedisposalofapartytoaconflict.AcommonformofhostingiswhenaStatepermitsforeignarmedforcesorarmedgroupstomakeuseofitssovereignterritory,e.g.therighttotransitthroughitsairspaceorterritorialwatersortouseitsterritoryformilitarybases.Alternatively,anactormayprovideadministrativeservices(enablingtheparties’leaderstoobtaintransportation,visaandfinancialfacilities,forexample).

ActorshostingapartytoanarmedconflictshouldconsidertheriskofthepartycommittingIHLviolations,notablyfromthehost’sterritory.Itwouldthereforebeimportantfortheactortoassessthesupportedparty’sintent,capacityandleadershipandtoformalizetherelationshipinanagreementthatdefinestheconditionsunderwhichsupportwillbeprovided(seeSection 6.1.3).

Actorsprovidingsupportintheformofhostingmaybeabletopositivelyinfluencethesupportedparty.Forexample,agreementstoprovidehostingfacilitiescouldinvolvespecificlanguagemakingthesupportcontin-gentonIHLcompliance.Thesupportedparty’spresenceonthehost’sterritorymayalsoprovideopportunitiestoimplementmeasuresthatpromotecomplianceandprotection,suchasIHLtraining(seeSection 6.2.2).

SPECIFIC RISkS

• EnablesIHLviolations

• Normativeengagement

• IHLtraining

• MakehostingrightscontingentonIHLcomplianceandtheprotectionofcivilians

4. THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING

PROTECTIONOF CIVILIANSAND OTHERSNOT FIGHTING

PREPARATION

IMPLEM

ENTATIONTRANSITION

Thischapterexploressomekeyareasofconcern,relatingtopeopleandobjectsprotectedbyIHL,thatactorsshouldconsiderwhenmanagingtheirsupportrelationships.Itidentifiessomespecificrisksthatactorsshouldseektomitigate,aswellasopportunitiestopromotetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Thisrequiresactorstotakegreateraccountoftheharmthatresults,directlyandindirectly,fromactivitiesrelatedtoarmedconflict(seeSection 3.3).Thesubjectsandconsiderationsdiscussedherearenotintendedtobeexhaustive;actorsshouldundertaketheirowncomprehensiveassessment.

Actorsshouldplacetheprotectionofthosenotfightingatthecentreoftheireffortstomanagetheir support relationships.

IHLprovidesrulestoprotectpeoplewhoarenot,orarenolonger,participatinginhostilities.Generalrulesapplytoprotectciviliansandpersonshorsdecombat,suchasthewoundedandsickandpersonsdeprivedoftheirliberty.IHLalsoidentifiesgroupsrequiringspecificprotection,suchaswomenandchildren,medicalpersonnel,refugees,IDPsandthosewhohavegonemissingasaresultofarmedconflict.Otherbranchesofinternationallawanddomesticlawmayalsoapplytoprotectthesepeople,dependingonthecircumstances.

Thenotionof“civilian”inIHLreferstoallpersonswhoarenotcombatants(inanIAC)orfighters(inaNIAC).“Civilianpopulation”isatermthatreferstogroupingsofcivilians.Thepresenceofcombatantswithinthegeneralcivilianpopulationdoesnotchangethecharacterofthegrouporpopulationasawhole.

Personshorsdecombatarethosewhoareinthepowerofanadverseparty,aredefencelessbecauseofuncon-sciousness,shipwreck,woundsorsickness,orclearlyexpressanintentiontosurrender–providedtheyabstainfromanyhostileactanddonotattempttoescape.

IHLseekstolimittheharmthatpartiestoaconflictmaycausetopeoplebothdirectlyandindirectly.Itpro-videsrulesthatprotecttheaforementionedindividualsduringhostilities,whileinthepowerofapartytoaconflict,andwhenotherwiseaffectedbymilitaryoperations.

4. THE PROTECTION OF CIvILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING 61

Importantly,abroadrangeofactivitiesbyvariousbodiesofagovernmentorotherauthoritycanaffectcivil-iansandothersnotfighting.Forexample,civiliansloseaccesstohealthcarewhentheirhospitalhasnowaterorelectricitybecausethoseserviceshavebeendamaged;civiliansmustleavetheareabecausetheyfeararrestorattackbyoneoftheparties;ormedicalpersonnelquittheirjobsasaresultofthreatsissuedagainstthem.Actorsinsupportrelationshipsneedtobeawareofthelikelyactivitiesofthepartiestoaconflictandtheirconsequencesforciviliansandothersnotfighting(seeSection 3.3).Itisalsoworthhighlightingthatsexualviolence,althoughfrequentlydismissedasa“by-product”ratherthanapreventablewarcrime,isprohibitedasaseriousviolationofIHLinbothIACsandNIACs.

Inadditiontoobligationsnottocarryoutactionsthatmayharmciviliansandothersnotfighting,partiestoaconflictmayalsohavepositiveobligationstowardsthem,suchastoprovidefood,water,sanitationandmedicalcare.Otheractorsthatarenotpartiestoaconflictmayalsohaveobligationstowardsaffectedpeople,forexamplewithrespecttohumanitarianassistance.

UnderIHL,civilianobjectsareallobjectsthatarenotmilitaryobjectives.Thereisageneralprohibitionagainsttargetingcivilianobjectsduringhostilities,aswellasmorespecificrulesregulatingtheuseofcivilianobjectsbypartiestoaconflict.

WhilecivilianobjectsaregenerallyprotectedunderIHL,someobjectsarespecificallyprotected,suchasmedicalfacilitiesandtransport(seeSection 4.5),objectsindispensabletothesurvivalofthecivilianpopu-lation,andculturalproperty.Attacksagainstornearworksor installationscontainingdangerousforces(e.g.damsornuclearpowerplants)areprohibitediftheywouldresultinseverelossesamongstthecivilianpopulation,asareattacksonessentialcivilianinfrastructureiftheforeseeableeffectswouldbedispropor-tionatetothemilitaryadvantageanticipated.Furthermore,IHLprotectsthenaturalenvironmentandaimstolimitthedamagecausedtoit,notonlybecausetheenvironmentsustainshumanlife,butalsobecauseofitsintrinsicvalue(seeSection 4.7).

Actorsshouldalsoconsiderthecumulativeimpactofthesupportedparties’activities,andthoseoftheirsupporters,onaffectedpopulations.

Further reading

International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (2019), pp. 37–46

(ICRC)

Engaging with State Armed Forces to Prevent Sexual Violence (ICRC)

Prevention and Criminal Repression of Rape and other Forms of Sexual Violence during Armed Conflicts –

Factsheet (ICRC)

4.1 PERSONS DEPRIVED OF THEIR LIBERTYWhateverthereasonfortheirdetention,peopledeprivedoftheirlibertyare,bydefinition,inavulnerablesituation.Howvulnerabletheirsituationisdependsonanumberoffactors,includingtheirindividualchar-acteristics(sex,age,etc.),thegeneralsituationinwhichtheyaredetained,thereasonfortheirdetention,thestagetheyareatinanyjudicialoradministrativeprocess,andbywhomtheyarebeingheld.

Inaddition,systemicshortcomingsinfacilities,proceduresandprocessesoftenaffectalldetaineestosomedegree,regardlessofotherfactors.Forexample,inthechaosofarmedconflict,detentionsystemsmaybebadlydisruptedormayhavetobeimprovised.Thejudicialanddetentionsystemsareoftenunabletocopewiththenumbers.Thehumanetreatmentofdetaineesismadeevenmorechallenginginfacilitiesthatareneglectedorovercrowded.

IHLprotectspeopledeprivedoftheirlibertyasaresultofarmedconflict.Theymustbetreatedhumanelyinallcircumstances,andtheyareprotectedinparticularagainstmurder,torture,andcruel,humiliatingordegradingtreatment.Peopledeprivedoftheirlibertymustbeallowedtocorrespondwiththeirfamiliesandbeprovidedwithadequatefood,water,clothing,shelterandmedicalattention.

Actorsinasupportrelationshipshouldplaninadvanceforthelikelihoodthatpartiestotheconflictwillarrest,captureanddetainpeople(seeSection 3.3.3).DetentionactivitiesinparticularpresentspecificrisksinPMOs,includingthediffusionofresponsibilityamongpartners(seeSection 3.4.3).Thesechallengescanaffecthowthosedetainedaretreatedandtheirdetentionconditions.PrincipalamongtheICRC’sconcernsaretherisksofextrajudicialkillingsanddisappearances,ill-treatment(particularlyduringinterrogations),inadequatematerialconditionsofdetention,theabsenceofproceduralsafeguardsand/orfairtrialguaran-tees,harshdisciplinarysanctions,specialneedsleftunmet,anddetaineetransfersamongpartnerforceswithoutrespectingtheprincipleofnon-refoulement.

Whetherornotactorsinasupportrelationshiparedirectlyinvolvedindetention-relatedactivities,theyhaveopportunitiestopositivelyinfluencehowtheirpartnerstreatdetainees.Amongothermeasures,theycouldengagewithpartnersonapplicablelaw,internationallyrecognizedstandardsandgoodpractices(seeSection 6.1.2);strengthenthecapacitiesofpartnerinstitutionsortrainpartnerpersonneltoimplementrele-vantlaw,internationallyrecognizedstandardsandgoodpractices(seeSections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2);andprovidematerialassetsorhumanresourcestoimprovedetentionconditions(seeSection 6.2.3).

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Extrajudicialkillings

• Tortureandotherformsofill-treatment,includingsexualviolence

• Inhumaneconditionsofdetention(e.g.overcrowding,malnutrition,epidemics,lackoffamilycontact)

• Detentionwithoutalegalbasisand/orproceduralguarantees

• Conditionsnotadaptedtospecialneeds(e.g.children,mentallyill,peoplewithdisabilities)

• Engagewithpartnersonapplicablelawandimplementinggoodpractices

• Strengthenthecapacitiesofpartnerinstitutions

• Trainpartnerpersonneltoimplementrelevantlawandgoodpractices

• Providematerialassetsorhumanresourcestoimprovedetentionconditions(e.g.food,water,shelter,medicalcare,familycontact)

Key legal rules

Third Geneva Convention of 1949

Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949

ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 118–128 and 93

Further reading

The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines

Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (uN)

Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (uN)

“Partnering in detention and detainee transfer operations” (T. Rodenhäuser)

“The protective scope of Common Article 3: More than meets the eye” (J. Pejic)

“Procedural principles and safeguards for internment/administrative detention in armed conflict

and other situations of violence” (J. Pejic)

“Protecting people deprived of their liberty” (ICRC)

Sexual Violence in Detention (ICRC)

See also: – Section 3.3.3Capture,arrestanddetention – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations

4.2 THE DEADInconflict,thedeadareprotectedunderIHL.Partiestoaconflictareobligatedtotakeallpossiblemeasurestosearchfor,collectandevacuatedeadbodies,andtoensurethattheyarenotdespoiled.Alleffortsshouldbemadetoensurethatthedeadarenotusedtoinstilfearamongopposingforcesorciviliansorasabargainingchipinnegotiationsbetweenpartiestoaconflict.

Foridentificationpurposes,thepartiesmustrecordallavailableinformationpriortothedisposalofdeadbodiesandmarkthelocationofgraves.Furthermore,thepartiesmustensurethedeadareproperlymanaged,whichincludesdisposingoftheminarespectfulmanner.Theymustalsoseetoitthatgravesitesareregis-teredandmaintainedtopreventdeceasedpersonsfromgoingmissingandtopreservenecessaryinformationforthefutureidentificationofunidentifiedhumanremains,inlinewithapplicabledataprotectionstandards(seeSection 4.4).

Actorsinasupportrelationshipmaybeabletohelppartnerstoimprovetheirpracticesinthesearchfor,collection,evacuationandmanagementofthedeadinaccordancewiththeirresponsibilities.Forexample,theycouldshareexpertiseorresourcesinordertoimplementmechanisms,strengthencapacitiestoidentifycombatantsorestablishagravesregistrationservice(seeSection 6.2.1).Theycouldengagewithandtraintheirpartnersonmanagingthedeadinlinewiththeirobligationsandwithbestpracticeintermsofprotec-tionanddignity(seeSection 6.2.2)andconveyinformationonrelevantlaws,customsandotherstandardsonrecoveringandmanagingthedeadinadignifiedmanner,wherevertheyareoperating(seeSection 6.1.2).

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Missingpersons

• Barrierstocollectionowingtohazardsordeliberateaction(e.g.booby-trappedbodiesorgravesites)

• Bodiesbeingdespoiled(e.g.destructionofhumanremainsduringrecoveryoperations,mutilation ofthedead)

• Gravesitesnotmarked

• Culturalandreligiousneedsnotrespected(e.g.burialrites)

• Remainsnotreturned

• Misidentification

• Returnofthewronghumanremainstoafamilymember

• Impedimenttoreconciliation

• Assistinproperlymanagingthedead,identifyingremainsandregisteringgravesites

• Trainonrecovery,analysisandidentificationtechniques(e.g.autopsy,forensicarchaeology andforensicgenetics)

Key legal rules

First Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 15–18 and 20

Second Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 16 and 18–21

Third Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 66, 77 and 120–122

Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 16, 113, 129–131 and 138–140

Additional Protocol I of 1977, Articles 17, 32–34, 61 and 78

Additional Protocol II of 1977, Articles 4 and 8

ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 112–116

Further reading

Humanity after Life: Respecting and Protecting the Dead – Factsheet (ICRC)

Guidelines for Investigating Deaths in Custody (ICRC)

Management of the Dead under Islamic Law (ICRC)

“Management of the dead from Islamic law and international humanitarian law perspectives:

Considerations for humanitarian forensics” (A. Al-Dawoody)

Management of Dead Bodies after Disasters: A Field Manual for First Responders (ICRC)

Forensic Identification of Human Remains (ICRC)

Operational Best Practices regarding the Management of Human Remains and Information on the Dead by

Non-Specialists (ICRC)

Guidelines for the Use of Forensic Genetics in Investigations into Human Rights and International Humanitarian

Law Violations (ICRC)

Medicolegal Facilities – Guidelines for Architectural Programming and Construction Assistance (ICRC)

See also: – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations – Section 3.4.4Otherformsofsupport

4.3 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

33 N.Crawfordet al., ProtractedDisplacement:UncertainPathstoSelf-RelianceinExile,HumanitarianPolicyGroup,London,September2015.

TheICRCisseeinggreaternumbersofpeopleatriskofdisplacement.Inrecentyears,thousandsofpeopleincitiesonthefrontlineofarmedconflicthavebeendisplacedwithinjustweeksormonths.Thewide-spreaddestructionofresidentialareasandcriticalcivilianinfrastructurecanrenderhomesuninhabitableand,therefore,causedisplacement.Manyremainwithintheirowncountry,althoughtheymayendupfleeingseveraltimes,andmostdisplacementsituationsbecomeprotracted.33

Those displacedmayfind refuge in camps or,more often, outside camps in rural and especially low-resourcedurbanareas,wheretheirarrivalmayaddtothepressureonalreadyweakand/orstrainedservicesanddeterioratedinfrastructure.Thiscanfurtherworseneveryone’slivingconditionsandbeasourceoftensionbetweendisplacedpeopleandthehostcommunities.

IDPsareparticularlyvulnerabletoriskstotheirhealthandlives,includingongoinghostilities;landminesandERW(seeSection 4.8);sexualviolenceandexploitation;andforcedrecruitment.Theymaylackaccesstoessentialservices,suchashealthcareandeducation,foralongperiodoftime.

IHLprohibitstheforceddisplacementofthecivilianpopulationforreasonsrelatedtothearmedconflictunlessthesecurityoftheciviliansinvolvedorimperativemilitaryreasonssorequire.NumerousotherrulesofIHL,notablythosegoverningtheconductofhostilities(seeSection 3.3.2),arecrucialtoprotectingcivil-ians,andviolationsoftheserulesoftentriggerdisplacement.WhenthepartiestoaconflictcomplywithIHL,displacementisminimized,displacedpeoplearebetterprotectedwhilebeingdisplaced,andtheenvironmentbecomesconducivetosafeanddignifiedvoluntaryreturns.

Legal reminder

Displaced persons have a right to voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual

residence as soon as the reasons for their displacement cease to exist. As part of this, the competent

authorities have a duty to take measures to facilitate these returns and the reintegration of displaced

persons.

Partnersinsupportrelationshipscanhelptopreventdisplacement,protectandassistIDPsandestablishtheconditionsandprovidethemeansforIDPstofindadurablesolutiontotheirsituation.ActorscanworkthroughoutthesupportrelationshiptofosterbetterrespectforIHLandtherebyreducedisplacementandtheriskstothosedisplaced.SupportingactorscanalsohelpsupportedpartiestoremoveimpedimentstosafereturnsbyequitablyrestoringaccesstoessentialservicesandclearinglandminesandERW(seeSections 4.8 and 6.3.1).

Returnsshouldonlyoccurundersafeanddignifiedconditions.Itisthereforeimportantthatthecompetentauthoritiesalsotakenon-discriminatorymeasurestosupportIDPs’effortstonormalizetheirsituationwhilewaitingtoreturnhome,ortofacilitatetheirlocalintegrationasadurablesolution.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Forceddisplacement

• Traumaandotherharm

• Familiesseparated

• Peoplegoingmissing

• Lossoflandandmovableproperty

• Lossofofficialdocumentation,impedingaccesstoessentialservices

• Attacks against IDP sites

• Abuseandexploitation(includingsexualviolence)

• Restrictionsonthefreedomofmovement

• Limitedornoaccesstoeducation

• Inabilitytoworkandlossofproductivecapacity

• Secondaryandmultipledisplacements

• Forcedorprematurereturn

• Inter-communaltensionorinstability

• Assistpartnersinfacilitatingdurablesolutions

• HelptorestoreaccesstoessentialservicesandclearlandminesandERW,inaninclusivewayandensuringequitableaccess

Key legal rules

Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 49 and 147

Additional Protocol I of 1977, Article 85

Additional Protocol II of 1977, Article 17

African union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa

(kampala Convention), 2009

Further reading

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (uN)

Displacement in times of armed conflict: How international humanitarian law protects in war, and why it

matters (ICRC)

Addressing internal displacement in times of armed conflict and other violence (ICRC)

Displaced in Cities: Experiencing and Responding to Urban Internal Displacement Outside Camps (ICRC)

See also: – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations – Section 3.4.4Otherformsofsupport – Section 6.2.3AssistanceinIHLcompliance – Section 6.3.1Structureddisengagement

4.4 MISSING PERSONSTheissueofmissingpersonscontinuestobeacommonfeatureofarmedconflicts,bothpastandpresent.Therearelongstandingcasesofmissingpersonsfrompastconflicts,andthenumberofpeoplereportedmissingincurrentconflictsisalarming.

Whenpeoplegomissing,theimpactontheirfamilies,onotherindividualsandonsocietiesisdetrimentalandlong-lasting.Inadditiontonotknowingthefateandwhereaboutsoflovedones,familiesexperiencenumerousotherday-to-dayhardships,includingsocialisolationorstigmatizationandlegal,administrativeandeconomicproblems.Moreover,theanguishanduncertaintymarkfamilyhistoriesovergenerations,jeopardizingtheprospectsforreconstructingthesocialfabricofconflict-affectedcommunitiesandsocieties.

Theissueofmissingpersonscanbeaddressedbothbeforethefact(preventively)andafterthefact(intermsofsolvingcases).Howthisisdone,duringandafterconflict,willdeterminethescaleoftheproblemanditsrepercussionsonthemissingpersonsthemselves,theirfamiliesandthecommunitiesaffected.

Legal reminder

States and parties to armed conflicts have the obligation to prevent people from going missing as a

result of armed conflict. They also have an obligation to clarify the fate and whereabouts of missing

persons, which implies respect for the families’ right to know the whereabouts and fate of their

missing relatives and ensure the dead are treated in a dignified way.

Theseobligationsdonotstartafterhostilitiescometoanend.Thereisaseriesofpracticalpreventiveandearly-actionmeasuresthatpartiestoarmedconflictsshouldtakeduringaconflicttopreventpeoplefromgoingmissing,tosearchandlocatethosereportedmissing,torestorethelinkwiththeirfamiliesand,whererelevant,tobringthembacktogether(whethertheyarefoundaliveordead).

Statesandpartiestoaconflictshouldsupportprofessionalandnon-discriminatoryactioninsupportofmissingpersonsandtheirfamilies.Thisincludesprevention,earlyactionandclarifyingthefateandwhere-aboutsofmissingpersonsoutofrespectforfamilies’righttoknow.

Whiletheissueofmissingpersonsiscomplexandmulti-layered,awealthofinformation,expertiseandknow-howexists.Theseresourcesshouldbesharedbetweenpartnersinsupportrelationships(seeSection 6.2.3).Actorsinsuchrelationshipsmaygettheopportunitytohelppartnersputinplaceframeworks,systemsorprocessesthatcanhelptopreventpeoplefromgoingmissing(seeSection 6.2.1);examplesincluderegisteringpeopledeprivedoftheirliberty,notifyingtheirfamiliesoftheirstatus,andidentifyingthewoundedandsickwhenevacuated.Supportingactorsmayalsobeabletoprovidematerialresources,forexampletofacilitatecontactorrestorefamilylinksbetweenmissingand/orseparatedfamilymembers.Incaseswhereactorsaredirectlyinvolvedinthosemechanisms,theyshouldharmonizetheirrespectiveapproaches.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Personsgoingmissing,includingasaresultofomissionsorpoorpractices:mismanagedorpoorlymanagedregistries(e.g.inhealthordetentionfacilities),lackofgraveregistries,poorpracticesinmanaging the dead, etc.

• Familiesseparated

• Lossofcontactbetweenfamilymembers

• Traumaoffamilymembersleftwithoutanyinformationonthewhereaboutsandfateofmissingrelatives

• Social,legal,administrativeandeconomicchallenges

• Long-termconsequencesforaffectedsocietiesandpossiblenegativeimpactonreconciliationprocesses

Missing

• Supportpartnertopreventpersonsfromgoingmissingortofindthosewhodo

• Assistpartnertofacilitatecontactorrestorefamilylinks

• Institutionalcapacitybuildingtoputinplaceorimproveframeworks,systemsandprocessestopreventpersonsfromgoingmissingandclarifythefateandwhereaboutsofmissingpersons

• Providesupporttounderstandandaddresstheneedsofthefamiliesofthemissing

See also: – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations – Section 3.4.4Otherformsofsupport

Key legal rules

First Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 15–17

Second Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 18–20

Third Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 120–124

Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 16, 129–131 and 136–141,

Additional Protocol I of 1977, Articles 15, 18, 32–34 and 67

Additional Protocol II of 1977, Article 8

ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 98, 112, 116–117 and 123

Further reading

The Missing (IRRC)

Missing persons and their families – Factsheet (ICRC)

Guiding Principles/Model Law on the Missing (ICRC)

The missing and their families (ICRC)

4.5 ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE IN ARMED CONFLICTDisregardfortheprotectionaffordedbyIHLtohealth-careprovidersandtheirbeneficiariesincurrentarmedconflictsmeansthatalargenumberofwoundedandsickcivilians,combatantsandfighterssufferordieunnecessarily.Damagetoorthedestructionofmedicalfacilitiescanhavealong-termimpactonthepublichealthofthecommunityandresultindisplacement.

Militaryoperationscangreatlyunderminebothsafeaccesstoandthedeliveryofhealthcare,especiallywhensuchoperationsrequiresettingupcheckpoints,conductingsearchoperationswithinhealthcentres,orattackingmilitarylocationsnearahealth-carefacility.Supportingactorscancreateopportunitiestoaddresstherisksimplicitinsuchmilitaryoperations,namelybyfacilitatingtheavailabilityofmedicalcare.Themis-useofmedicalfacilitiesormedicaltransportformilitaryoperationsmaycausethemtolosetheirprotectionunderIHLandhenceexposethem,alongwiththewoundedandsickandthemedicalpersonnelinside,totheriskofattack.Workingwithpartnerstoimprovedoctrineandprocessesandprovideadditionaltrainingcanpromotebetterrespectandprotectionformedicalfacilitiesandmedicalpersonnel.

Accesstohealthcaremayalsobeimpededintheimmediateaftermathofconflictduetoongoingsafetyriskssuchasexplosivedevicesandhazardouswaste.Actorsinasupportrelationshipmaybeabletoassistpartnersbyprovidingthespecialistpersonnelorequipmentneededtoidentifyandremovetheserisks.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Deathandinjuryofprotectedpersons(thewoundedandsick,medicalpersonnelandcivilians)

• Damagetohealth-carefacilities(e.g.ambulancesandhospitals)

• Careforthewoundedandsickimpeded

• Thewoundedandsickpreventedordiscouragedfromseekingcare

• Health-carepersonnelthreatenedorevenprosecutedandnolongerwillingtocontinueworkingintheirareaofresponsibility

• Epidemics

• Displacement

• Encouragepartiestoaconflicttorefrainfromattackingcivilians,medicalpersonnelorcivilianinfrastructure,includinghealth-carefacilitiesandvehicles

• Encouragepartiestoaconflicttoliftmeasurespreventingthedeliveryofnecessarymedicalitems

• Providetrainingonprotectingmedicalpersonnel,facilitiesandtransportandaccesstohealthcare

• Providemedicalsuppliesorpersonnelandassistwithrepairingorbuildingfacilitiesorcivilianinfrastructure

• Assistinclearingrisksthatimpedeaccesstomedicalfacilities

• InvestigateincidentsofviolenceagainsthealthcarebypartnersandensureaccountabilityforattacksthatviolateIHL

Key legal rules

First Geneva Convention of 1949

Second Geneva Convention of 1949

Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 20 and 55–56

Additional Protocol I of 1977, Articles 12, 13, 15 and 21

Additional Protocol II of 1977, Articles 9 and 11

ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 25, 28–30 and 35

Further reading

Domestic Normative Frameworks for the Protection of Health Care (ICRC)

Promoting Military Operational Practice That Ensures Safe Access to and Delivery of Health Care (ICRC)

Safeguarding the provision of health care: Operational Practices and Relevant International Humanitarian Law

concerning Armed Groups (ICRC)

The responsibilities of health care personnel working in armed conflicts and other emergencies (ICRC)

Ensuring the Preparedness and Security of Health-Care Facilities in Armed Conflict and Other Emergencies (ICRC)

Ambulance and Pre-Hospital Services in Risk Situations (ICRC)

Protecting Health Care: Guidance for the Armed Forces (ICRC)

4.6 ESSENTIAL SERVICES

34 TheICRCconsidershealth,water,sanitation,electricity,solidwastemanagementandeducationtobeessentialservices.

Armedconflictsareincreasinglyplayedoutinurbanareas,wheremillionsofpeopleareatriskofharmifessentialcivilianservicesaredegradedoriftheycannotaccesssuchservices.34Severaltrendshavecontrib-utedtoadeclineinthedeliveryofessentialservicesandtoanunprecedentedriseinhumanitarianneedsinurbanareas;theseincludeurbanization,thegrowingprevalenceofparallelarmedconflicts,theprotractednatureofmanyconflictsandthesheerscaleofdestructioninurbanwarfare.Itisincreasinglylikelythatmul-tiplecrises,suchasarmedconflictsandnaturaldisasters,willoccuratthesametime,furthercomplicatingtheresponseandtypicallyoverwhelmingallthoseinvolved.

Residentsofurbanareasoftendependmoreonthecentralizeddeliveryofessentialservices,leavingthemmorevulnerable.Urbanservicesystems(watersupply,wastewaterremovalandelectricitygeneration)arelargescaleandinterconnected,entailcomplexlogisticsfortheiroperationsandmaintenance,andrelyonfragileandmulti-layeredgovernancestructures.

IHLcomplianceinmanyoftoday’sconflictsisinsufficient.Toooften,criticalcivilianwater,sanitationandelectricityinfrastructureisdirectlytargetedorotherwiseaffectedbyextensivedestructioninurbanareas(owingtotheuseofexplosiveweaponswithwideareaeffects,forexample).Thereverberatingeffectsofsuchattackssignificantlyreduceaccesstoessentialservices.

Largeswathsofcommunitieswillremainvulnerabletoalackofaccesstoessentialservicesaslongascivilianobjectsareexposedtodamagefromarmedconflict.Thesameholdstruewhenothercomponentsofaser-viceareaffected,suchaswhenconsumablesaredamagedordestroyed,orwhenthepersonnelnecessarytomaintainaservicearekilled,injuredorpreventedfromcarryingouttheirtasks.Thisisfirstandforemostapublichealthconcern,butitalsothreatenslivelihoodsandcancausedisplacement.Areductioninessentialservicedeliverycanalsoaffectrelatedservices,suchascommunications,foodandagriculture,criticalmanu-facturing,andbankingandfinancialservices.

Inadditiontoimplementingmeasurestomitigatetheaboverisks,actorsinsupportrelationshipsmayfindopportunitiestoimproveaccesstoessentialservices.Theycouldhelptorepairor(re)buildcivilianinfra-structureandcouldtakestepstoensuresafeaccessforservice-providerpersonnel(e.g.operatorsandtech-nicians)sotheycanoperateandmaintaintheservicesandconsumables(e.g.chemicalsforwatertreatment)requiredforservicedeliveryinlinewithbasicstandards.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Deathofandinjurytoprotectedpersons(e.g.service-providerpersonnel–operatorsandtechnicians–andothercivilians)

• Damagetoordestructionofessentialserviceinfrastructure

• Damagetoordestructionofotherservice-providerassets(e.g.offices,warehouses,stockyards,vehiclesandmachinery)

• Publichealth(diseaseoutbreaks)

• Displacement

• Economiclosses,lostlivelihoods

• Impairmentofrelatedservices(i.e.criticalcivilianinfrastructuresectors)

• Encouragepartiestorefrainfromattackingcriticalcivilianinfrastructure

• Sharetechnicalexpertiseandgoodpracticesinordertominimizetheimpactofmilitaryoperations onessentialservices

• Assistwithrepairingor(re)buildingcivilianinfrastructure

• Takestepstoensuresafeaccessforservice-providerpersonnel(e.g. operatorsandtechnicians)

Key legal rules

Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 18–19, 53 and 55–56

Additional Protocol I of 1977, Articles 15, 52 and 54–57

Additional Protocol II of 1977, Articles 9 and 14–15

ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 7, 9–10, 14–19, 21, 42, 51 and 53–54

Further reading

Bled Dry: How war in the Middle East is bringing the region’s water supplies to breaking point (ICRC)

When War Moves to Cities: Protection of Civilians in Urban Areas (ICRC and InterAction)

I saw my city die: Voices from the front lines of urban conflict in Iraq, Syria and Yemen (ICRC)

Explosive weapons in populated areas: Humanitarian, legal, technical and military aspects (ICRC)

4.6.1 SCHOOLS AND OTHER EDUCATIONAL FACILITIESEducationalservicesarerapidlyandprofoundlydisruptedduringarmedconflicts.Disruptionoccurswhenstudents,educationalpersonnel,andeducationinfrastructurearedirectlytargetedorincidentallyharmedinattacksandwhenthemilitarymakesuseofeducationalfacilities,impedinglearningandexposingschoolstoattackbyopposingforces.Schoolsarefrequentlyclosedbyauthoritiesowingtonearbyhostilitiesandresourceconstraintsexacerbatedbyconflict;thefearofharmalsokeepsstudentsandstaffaway.Itispar-ticularlychallengingtoprotecteducationalcontinuitywheretheimportanceofeducationasanessentialpublicserviceisundervaluedbybelligerentsorwherethedeliveryofeducationitselfisacontestedissueintheconflict.

Thedisruptionofeducationcanaffectthecommunityimmediately,asschoolsareofteninvolvedinthedeliveryofotherbasicservices.Itseffectscanpersistforgenerations.Forexample,childrenwhoarepre-ventedfromattendingschoolforevenafewmonthsinwartimeoftennevergoback.Thedegradationofbasicservices,includingeducation,hasacumulativeimpactonchildrenandthecommunity,especiallyinsituationsofprotractedconflict.

Inadditiontoimplementingmeasurestomitigatetheaboverisks,actorsinsupportrelationshipsmayhaveopportunitiestoeitherpreventeducationaldisruptionorfacilitatetheremovalofconflict-inducedbarrierstoaccess.Dependingonthebarrierstoeducationinagivensituation,actorsinsupportrelationshipsmayfindthattheycanraiseawarenessoftheneedtoprotectschoolsascivilianobjectsthroughtrainingprogrammes(seeSection 6.2.2),advocateforareductioninthemilitaryuseofschools(seeSection 6.1.2),helptorepairor(re)buildeducationalfacilities(seeSection 6.3.1.D)andtakestepstoensuresafeaccessforeducationalpersonnelorcoordinationwithhumanitarianorganizations(seeSection 6.2.3).Byincorporatingsuchmeas-uresintotheirsupportrelationships,actorscanplayaroleinchangingthemindsetthataccesstoeducationisa“nicetohave”.

SPECIFIC RISkS • Deathofandinjurytocivilians(e.g.students,educationalpersonnel) • Closureofeducationalfacilities • Long-termeffectsoncommunityeducationlevels,withadisproportionateimpactongirls • Recruitmentbyarmedgroups • Damagetoordestructionofeducationalfacilitiesandlossofeducationalmaterial,andaconcomitantriseinfuturerebuildingcosts

• Riseinhumanitarianneedsduetothelossofaccesstocriticalservices,informationandsupporttypicallyavailableinschools

• Cumulativeimpactoflong-termdisruptionondevelopmentstandardsandpublichealth

• Encouragepartiestorefrainfromattackingschoolsandothereducationalfacilitiesaswellasstudentsandeducationalpersonnel

• Advocateforareductioninthemilitaryuseofschools • Providesupportforeducationalpersonneltocontinueactivities,andfacilitaterepairsofeducationalfacilities

• Assisttheauthorities,schoolpersonnelandotherrelevantstakeholdersinassessingandmanagingsecurityrisksaroundschools

• Assistinclearingrisksthatimpedeaccesstoschools(e.g. ERW) • InvestigateincidentsofviolenceagainsteducationcarriedoutbypartnersandensureaccountabilityforattacksthatviolateIHL

Key legal rules

Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 24, 50(1) and 94

Additional Protocol II of 1977, Article 4(3)(a)

ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rule 135

Further reading

Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use During Armed Conflict

4.7 THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENTThenaturalenvironmentisbydefaultcivilianincharacter;allpartsofthenaturalenvironmentarecivilianobjectsunlesstheyhavebecomeamilitaryobjective.Incontemporaryconflicts,thenaturalenvironmentisattimesdirectlyattackedorincidentallydamagedbytheuseofcertainmeansormethodsofwarfare.Itcanalsobeimpactedbydamagecausedtothebuiltenvironment,forexamplewhenwater,sanitationorelec-tricityservicesaredisruptedbyhostilities.Attackscanleadtowater,soilandlandcontamination,renderingdrinkingwaterandagriculturallandscarcerforcivilians;landminesandERWcancontaminatefordecades;andbiodiversitycanbeirreparablydegradedwhenfightingtakesplaceinhotspots.

Theconsequencesofsuchenvironmentaldamageforciviliansaremanifold.Civiliansdependonthenaturalenvironmentforfoodandwater.Farmers,herdersandfishingcommunitiesdependonitfortheirliveli-hoods.Whentheenvironmentisdamagedandfoodandeconomicinsecurityintensifies,thephysicalandmentalhealthofconflict-affectedpeopledeteriorates.Individualsandcommunitiestrytocopebychangingordiversifyingtheirlivelihoods,modifyingtheirwaysoflifeormigratingtonewplaces.Yetthiscapacitytoadaptdecreasesasconflictandenvironmentaldegradationcontinue.

Whileacertaindegreeofenvironmentaldamageisinherentinconflict,actorsinsupportrelationshipsmayhaveopportunitiestopreventseriousenvironmentaldegradation.Theycould,forexample,disseminateandintegrateIHLrulesprotectingthenaturalenvironmentintotrainingprogrammesandsanctionsystems(seeSections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2);encouragepartiestotheconflicttoadoptandimplementmeasurestoenhancetheirunderstandingofthenaturalenvironmentpriortooronaregularbasisduringmilitaryoperations(seeSection 6.1.2);helppartnerstopreventorminimizeharmtotheenvironment,suchasbyprovidingtechnicalexpertiseorsharingenvironmentalimpactassessmentsandmapsshowingparticularlyimportantorfragileenvironmentalresourcesincombatareas(seeSection 6.2.3);andexchangeexamplesandbestpracticesre- latingtomeasuresthatcanbetakentocomplywiththeirIHLobligationtoprotectthenaturalenvironment.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Waterandsoilcontamination,impactingdrinkingwaterandfoodscarcityandlonger-termfoodandeconomicsecurity

• Long-termbiodiversityloss

• Displacement

• Exacerbationofcivilianharmowingtoclimaterisks

• DisseminateandintegrateIHLrulesprotectingthenaturalenvironmentintotrainingprogrammesandsanctionsystemsforpartiestoaconflict

• Encouragemeasurestoenhanceunderstandingofthenaturalenvironmentpriortoorregularlyduringmilitaryoperations

• Providetechnicalexpertiseonconductingenvironmentalimpactassessmentsandmappingparticularlyfragileenvironmentalresourcesincombatareas

• Identifyanddesignateareascontainingparticularlyimportantorfragileenvironmentalresourcesandsharethisinformation

• ExchangeexamplesandbestpracticesrelatingtomeasuresthatcanbetakentocomplywiththeIHLobligationtoprotectthenaturalenvironment

Key legal rules

Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 53 and 147

Additional Protocol I of 1977, Articles 35(3) and 51–56

For a full list of relevant treaties, see the ICRC treaty database

Further reading

Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Situations of Armed Conflict (ICRC)

4.8 LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Untiltheyaresafelycleared,landminesandERW(i.e.abandonedandunexplodedexplosiveordnance)pres-entacontinuedthreatofharmtocivilians.Inadditiontothedirectriskofdeathandinjury,theycanhinderaccesstoessentialservices,infrastructureandagriculturallands,impedethesafereturnofdisplacedpeople(seeSection 4.3),andhamperreconstructionandrecoveryefforts,withlong-termconsequencesforhumanandsocio-economicdevelopment.

Toreducetheseconsequences,supportingactorsshouldtakeeffectivemeasurestopreventandaddresstheeffectsoflandminesandERW–especiallywheretheactorsthemselvessupplytheexplosiveordnance.SuchmeasuresincludeprovidingsupporttoclearminesandERWassoonaspossibleonceactivehostilitiesend,enactingmeasurestomitigatetheriskstociviliansuntilclearanceiscompletedanddeliveringassistancetovictims,inlinewithinternationalstandards.

Legal reminder

IHL sets out a comprehensive framework for preventing and addressing the problems caused by

landmines and ERW. This includes provisions on clearing mines and ERW, implementing measures

to protect civilians (such as marking and fencing) and providing medical, rehabilitative and socio-

economic assistance for victims. It also includes requirements in terms of destroying stockpiles of

anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions – weapons that have been a particular problem, in

humanitarian terms, in post-conflict situations. The use, production, stockpiling and transfer of

anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions are also banned under specific treaties.

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (1997), the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (2003)

(Protocol v to the 1980 CCW Convention) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008) also have

requirements for the States Parties to provide assistance and cooperation to States affected by these

weapons.

SPECIFIC RISkS

• Continuingriskofciviliandeathandinjuryduringandafterconflict

• Preventssafeaccesstobuildings,infrastructureandessentialservices,includingforserviceproviderstooperate,maintain,assessorrepair

• Inabilitytouselandforproductivepurposes(e.g.agriculture)

• Preventsthemovementofpeopleandessentialgoodsandcommercialtrade

• Peopledisplacedandunabletosafelyreturn

• ProvideassistanceandcooperationtoStatesaffectedbylandminesandERW

Key legal rules

Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 1997

Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, 2003 (Protocol v to the 1980 Convention on Certain

Conventional Weapons (CCW))

The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices

as amended on 3 May 1996 (Amended Protocol II to the CCW)

Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2008

Further reading

International Mine Action Standards

Weapon Contamination in Urban Settings: An ICRC Response (ICRC)

Increasing Resilience to Weapon Contamination through Behaviour Change (ICRC)

See also: – Section 3.3.1Weaponsandammunitionmanagement – Section 3.3.2Theconductofhostilities – Section 3.4.2Armstransfers

PART C

FRAMEWORK OF PRACTICAL MEASURES

5. FRAMEWORK OVERVIEWTherearenumerouspracticalstepsthatactorsinsupportrelationshipscantaketomaximizecompliancewithIHLandtheprotectionofthosenotfightingandotherwisereducenegativehumanitarianconsequences.

Fromitspreliminaryanalysis,theICRChasdevelopedaframeworkthatdividesthosepracticalmeasuresintotenfunctionalgroups.Thissectionprovidesanoverviewoftheframeworkandhowitcanbeappliedbydecisionmakersinsupportrelationships.

Bymakingsurethateffectivepracticalstepsaretakenacrossthesetenareaswhereappropriate,decisionmakerscanmitigatetherisksthatthesupportrelationshipposestoaffectedpeople.Itwillbeforindividualdecisionmakerstotailortherangeofstepstheytaketothesupportrelationshipinquestion(seeSections 3 and 4forkeyrisksandopportunities).

Actorsshouldconsidereachareafromalegal,policyandoperationalperspectiveandatalllevelsofdecision-making.Althoughtheyarearrangedintothreestages–preparation,implementationandtransition–themeasuresarenotstrictlysequenced.Manyconcernswillrequirethatstepsbetakenthroughoutthecourseofthesupportrelationship.

5.1 MANAGING SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

Actors should proactivelymanage their support relationships to promote the protection ofciviliansandothersnotfightingfromharm.

Thisframeworkproposesthatsupportrelationshipsbeconsciouslymanagedtoachievethegoalofmaxi-mizingtheprotectionofthosenotfighting.Actorsshouldinvestinpracticalmeasuresacrossthetenareasthatmakeupthethreestagesofpreparation,implementationandtransition.Decisionmakersshouldidentifywhatpracticalmeasuresareneededtoreducetheriskofharmandpositivelyinfluencetheirpartnerthroughtheirsupportrelationship.Notallmeasures–orareasofmeasures–willberelevanttoeveryrelationshipgiventheincrediblydiverserangeofsupportrelationships.Thereare,however,someareasthatwillberele-vantinmostifnotallsupportrelationships,suchasnormativeengagement,assessmentofandframingtherelationship,andlearning.Decisionmakersshouldconsidereachareatodeterminewhetherornotitisrequiredinthecircumstances.

5. FRAMEWORk OvERvIEW 79

NORMATIVEENGAGEMENT

INTERNALREADINESS

ASSESSMENTAND FRAMING

MONITORINGAND

EVALUATION

ASSISTANCE

IHLTRAINING

INSTITUTIONALCAPACITY

INTERNALOVERSIGHT

STRUCTUREDDISENGAGEMENT

LEARNING

PREPARATION

IMPLEM

ENTATIONTRANSITION

Bymakingsurethateffectivepracticalstepsaretakenineachofthesetenareas,decisionmakerswillmiti-gateaconsiderabledegreeofrisktoaffectedpeoplefromthesupportrelationship.Actorswillneedtocon-textualizethesebroadareastodeterminewhatpracticalmeasurestotakeinthesupportrelationshipunderconsideration.

Toassistwithplanning,thesetenareasaregroupedintothreemainphases:1. preparationtoengageinasupportrelationship2. implementationofthesupportrelationship3. transitionawayfromthesupportrelationship.

However,thesemeasuresarenotstrictlysequenced.Alltenareasshouldinformadetailedplanforthesup-portrelationshipattheoutsetandthenbereviewedandadaptedregularlysothattherelationshipremainsfitforpurpose.Manyconcernswillrequirethatstepsbetakenthroughoutthecourseofthesupportrelation-ship.Forexample,learningprocessesandnormativeengagementarerelevantthroughouttherelationship.Andwhileatransitionstrategyisimplementedlaterinarelationship,decisionmakersneedtotakestepstoprepareforastructureddisengagementtoreducetheriskofharm.

Actors should consider and take practical measures throughout the preparation, implementation and transition stages.

ThetenareasofpracticalmeasuresarelistedbelowandthenfurtherdescribedinSection 6.

Protecting civilians and others not fighting Actorsinasupportrelationshipshouldconsciouslymanagetheirsupportrela-tionshipsoastoimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Thisgoalshouldguidedecisionmakerswhenconsideringpracticalmeasuresacrossthetenareasdetailedbelow.

The“protectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting”isusedhereasshorthandfortherangeofmeasuresdesignedtoreducetheharmcaused–directlyandindirectly,intheshortandlongterm–bythepartiestoaconflictandtheactors

thatsupportthem.Includedinthisbroadcategoryaremeasurestoimprovetheprotectionofcivilians,thosehorsdecombatandotherpeopleprotectedbyIHLaswellascivilianandotherspecificallyprotectedobjects.ManymeasuresarerequiredunderorderivefromIHL.

Someoftheparticularhumanitarianconcernsthatshouldbeconsideredaredetailed inSection 4.Theyincludetherisksandopportunitiesspecifictopersonsdeprivedoftheirliberty,thedead,IDPs,missingper-sonsandmedicalpersonnel.Decisionmakersshouldalsoconsiderissuesrelatedtoprotectedobjectssuchascriticalcivilianinfrastructure,medicalfacilitiesandtransport,andthenaturalenvironment,andtherisksposedbylandminesandERW.Therisksandopportunitiesrelatedtopotentialhumanitarianconcernsshouldbeborneinmindwhenmanagingasupportrelationship.

Preparation

NORMATIVEENGAGEMENT

INTERNALREADINESS

PREPARATION

1. Internal readiness to engage–Improvinganactor’sowninternalfunctionsbeforeengagingin asupportrelationship.

• Framework

• Systemsandprocesses

• Personnel

• Cultureandintent

2. Normative engagement–Engagingwithactualorprospectivepartnerstoclarifyandencourage behaviourthatcomplieswitharmed-conflict-relatednorms(legalorotherwise).

• Strategicargumentation

• Contributiontonormdevelopmentandpracticalguidance

• Engagementandinfluencing

• Socialization

• Dissemination

• Mobilization

3. Assessment and framing the relationship –Ensuringthepotentialpartners’intent,capacityand leadershiparealigned.

• Supportassessment

• Agreements

• Specificoperationalreadiness

• Transitionstrategy

Implementation

MONITORINGAND

EVALUATION

ASSISTANCE

IHLTRAINING

INTERNALOVERSIGHT

IMPLEM

ENTATION

4. Institutional capacity building–Preparingasupportedparty’sauthoritiestoprotectandassistpeopleduringanarmedconflictandhelpthemtodealwithitsassociatedconsequences.

• Framework

• Systemsandprocesses

• Personnel

• Cultureandintent

5. IHL training–HelpingpartnerforcesunderstandandoperationalizeIHLandotherrelevantrules.

• Training

• Mentoring

• Monitoringandevaluatingtrainingandmentoring

6. Assistance in IHL compliance–HelpingapartnertofulfilitsIHLobligationsorotherwiseimproveitsprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.

• Capacitymultiplication

• Resources

• Substitutionoffunctions

7. Monitoring and evaluation –Monitoringapartner’sactionsand,wherenecessary,callingthatpartnertoaccountforanyproblematicconduct.

• Monitoringandevaluation

• Recording

• Investigations

• Oversight

• Accountability

8. Internal oversight –Ensuringthatanactor’sownarmedforcesandothergovernmentalorgansoperatewithinthelawandareaccountabletotheirowngovernmentandconstituents.

• Internaloversight

• Investigations

Transition

LEARNING

TRANSITION

9. Structured disengagement –Properlyplanningtheprocessofendingthesupport,suchasbytaperingit,inordertominimizethedisruptiontotheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.

• Systemsustainability

• Ongoingprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting

• Responsibleresourcedisengagement

• Managingtheaftermath

10. Learning –Identifyingandincorporatinglessonslearnedfromthesupportrelationship, i.e.theknowledgeandinsightgainedfromtheexperience.

• Systematiclearningtoensureaffectedpeoplearebetterprotected

• Learningtogether

• Incorporatinglessonsintodoctrineandfuturepractice

5.2 CONTEXTUALIZATIONTheICRCencouragesactorstoassessthemeasuresineachareafromalegal,policyandoperationalper-spectiveandatalllevelsofdecision-making.Incontextualizingtheirapproach,theactorsshouldgenerallyconsiderthetenareas,butalsoinrelationtospecificprotectionconcerns(Section 4)andthetypeofconflict,actors,activitiesandsupportinvolved(Section 3).

PromotingrespectforIHLmeansmorethanjustmitigatingtherisksarisingdirectlyfromthesupportbeingprovided.TheICRCencouragesactorstotakeabroaderviewofthewaysinwhichtheycanpromotepositivebehaviour,includingthroughmeasuresnotdirectlytiedtothesupporttheyprovide.Forexample,theycanengagewithpartnersonrelevantnormsandprovideassistancetomitigatethenegativehumanitariancon-sequencesoftheconflictregardlessofthesupportbeingprovided.

Supportingactorsmayalsoneedtotakepracticalmeasuresbeforeprovidingsupportand/orafterachievingtheirownobjectives.Importantly,eachactor’sobligationsunderinternationalanddomesticlawdonotstartandendwiththesupportrelationship.Forexample,asupportingactor’slegalobligationsmaycontinueafterthesupportrelationshipends,andboththesupportingandsupportedactors’obligationsmayoutlasttheendoftheconflict.Protectingpersonsdeprivedoftheirlibertyandclarifyingthefateandwhereaboutsofthemissingarejusttwoareasinwhichbothtypesofactorsmayhavecontinuingobligationsaftertheendoftherelationshiportheconflict.Theseconsiderationsneedtobefactoredintodecision-makingthroughouttherelationship.

Thepointsraisedinthisdocumentaremerelyindicativeofthemanyissuesthatdecisionmakersneedtoconsiderwhilemanagingasupportrelationship.Decisionmakershavearesponsibilitytodeterminewhatpracticalmeasureswillbemosteffectiveinthegivencircumstancesandtocontinuallyadapttheirapproachifthosemeasuresprovelesseffectivethanexpectedorthecircumstanceschange.35 This document is intended asapracticaltoolforuseinawiderangeofcircumstances.Inpractice,eachactormustmakeitsownassess-mentandactincompliancewithitslegalobligations.

Ifproperlyconsidered,thequestionsinthisdocumentshouldleadtoimprovedoutcomes,buttheyshouldnotberegardedasachecklist.Actorshavearesponsibilitytoanalysetherisksthatthesupportrelationshipposestociviliansandothersnotfightingandtheopportunitiestoimprovetheirprotection,andfactorbothintotheirdecision-makingprocess.

35 IHLChallengesReport2019,pp.75–76(seenote1above).

5.3 OVERARCHING QUESTIONSInordertomanagesupportrelationshipstowardsachievingcoherentresponsibility,decisionmakersshouldbeguidedbyfiveoverarchingquestions:

1) Whattypeofconflict,actors,activitiesandsupportareinvolvedinthesupportrelationship?

2) Whatgapsexistbetweenthepartners’respectiveintent,leadershipandcapacity?3) Whataretheimplicationsoftheanswerstotheabovequestionsforciviliansandothersnotfighting?

4) Whatstepsfromanyofthetenareasofpracticalmeasuresdiscussedabovecould youandyourpotentialpartner(s)taketogethertoimprovethelevelofprotectionandreduceharmtociviliansandothersnotfighting?

5) Ifthegapsidentifiedinquestion2aboveremainsignificant,shouldyoureconsider the support relationship?

Theseoverarchingquestionsaresupplementedbyaseriesofkeyquestionsabouteachofthetenareasofpracticalmeasures(seeSection 6)andmoredetailedquestionsmeanttoorientdecisionmakersatalllevels(seeSection 7).

6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAKERS

FollowingtheoverviewinSection 5,thissectionlooksindetailateachofthetenareasofpracticalmeasuresformanagingsupportrelationships.Foreacharea,keyquestionsareposedfordecisionmakersatthestra-tegiclevel.Thissectionalsoidentifiesanumberofmorespecificconcernsaswellasexamplesofpracticalmeasurestoconsiderineacharea.ThesegeneralconsiderationsarefurtherdevelopedinSection 7throughdetailedquestionsfordecisionmakersatalllevels.

6.1 PREPARATION

NORMATIVEENGAGEMENT

INTERNALREADINESS

PREPARATION

6.1.1 INTERNAL READINESS TO ENGAGEInternalreadinessreferstothemeasuresthatactorscantaketopreparetheir internalfunctionsbeforeengaginginasupportrelationship.

Introduction Actorsshouldtakestockoftheirowninternalreadinesstomanageasupportrelationshipbeforeagreeingtodoso.Internalpreparednessisimportantbecause,whiledecisionmakersmaybepressedtoagreetothesupportrelationshipquickly,thechangesrequiredtooperateinasupportrelationshipmaybesignificantandtaketimetoimplement.

Internalreadinessconsistsoffourkeyelements,including:

• Framework–thelawsandpolicies,bothinternationalanddomestic,thatestablishtherulesandboundariesforhowasupportrelationshipwilloperate

• Systems and processes–theprocedures,boundbytheframework,usedtoestablish,maintain,overseeandendasupportrelationship

• Personnel–determiningthestaffpositionsthatwillbeinvolvedinsupportrelationships,andselectingandtrainingtheindividualsforthesepositions

• Culture and intent–theinfluences,bothinternal(suchasleadership,institutionalcultureandpeerpressure)andexternal(suchaspublicopinion,media,societalcultureandreligion),thatshapehowsupportrelationshipsareconducted.

6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 85

Giventhevarietyofactorsandtypesofsupportthatmaybeinvolved(seeSection 3),preparationsmayneedtobemadewithinandacrossseveralagencies,departmentsorfunctions.Despiteoperatingunderacommonframework,eachoftheseentitieswillhavetheirownsystems,processes,personnelandculture.Forexample,armsexportcontrolagencieshavewell-definedlicencingprocedures,andmilitarybrancheshavedoctrineandrulesofengagement.

Thekeypointistoconsideranactor’soverallreadinesstoengageinasupportrelationshipandthecoherenceofitsapproach.Internalreadinessshouldentailarealisticassessmentofthespectrumofsupportrelation-shipsthegivenactormightengagein.Themeasurestakentoprepareinternallyshouldputtheactorinapositiontomanagefuturesupportrelationshipsinawaythatincreasestheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.

Key questions • Whatconditionsandcriterianeedtobemetinasupportrelationship?Aretheseconditionsandcriteriaconsistentacrossallyoursupportrelationships?

• Doresourcesneedtobeallocateddifferently,doprocessesrequire“partner-proofing”anddopersonnelneedspecifictraining?

• Aretheinternalentitiesinvolvedinasupportrelationshipalignedintheirvision,andaretheysetuptomanagethetypeofsupportrelationshipenvisaged?Howdoyouensurecoordinationbetweentheseentities?

• Doyouhavesystemsinplacetoassessyourpartner’sintent,capacityandleadershipwithregardtoprotectingciviliansandothersnotfighting?

• Doyouhaveestablishedsystemsandproceduresaswellasthecapabilitytomonitoryourpartner’sactions?

Inindividualdecision-makingprocesses,theseconsiderationscanberevisited(seeSection 6.1.3).Aftertakingthenecessarypreparatorysteps,actorsshouldbeabletoadaptmorequicklytoanyspecificsupportrelation-shipthattheyenterinto.

A. FrameworkMostStateactorsthatprovidesupportalreadyhaveasetofdomesticlawsandpoliciesthatcanbeusedasaninitialframeworkformanagingsupportrelationshipsincompliancewithIHL.However,IHLobli-gationsapplytoallthoseengagedinarmedconflict–includingStatesthatreceivesupportandNSAGsthatarelesslikelytohavesimilarnormsandpolicies.

Anoverarchingandcoherentframeworkoflawsandpoliciesisneededtoensureconsistencybetweendepartments,agenciesandfunctionsinvolvedinsupportrelationships.Certainpartsofthatframeworkcanbepreparedinadvance,suchasrelevantmilitarypoliciesanddoctrine,whichshouldbeIHLcompli-antanddesignedtoprotectcivilians.Anotherexampleisthecomprehensivelegalandregulatoryframe-workneededtoeffectivelyimplementandenforcearmsexportandimportcontrols.

PMOswillbereaching–andimplementing–agreementonresponsibilityfortheuseofmilitaryforceatalllevelsandtheuse,locationandcommandandcontrollinesofadvisersandmentorsatheadquartersorinthefield.Draftstatusofforceagreementsordraftsofotheragreementsbetweenactorsthatplaceemphasisonprotectingthosenotfightingcanformpartofthatframeworkandbepreparedinadvanceaspartofinternalreadiness.Forexample,partnerscanagreeonresponsibilitiesandstandardstobefollowedduringpartnereddetentionoperations,withtheaimofmitigatingtheriskofIHLviolationsandavoidingadiffusionofresponsibility(seeSection 3.4.3).Theseagreementscanalsoanticipatethestatusofforcesaccusedofcommittingviolationsaswellasprocessesforclarifyingprimaryandsecondaryjurisdictioninordertoadjudicateanyallegations.

Whenconsidering framework lawsorpolicies, it is also important foractors to establishminimumstandardsandthresholdsthatshouldbemetwhenenteringintoanypartnership.Thesestandardscanbe appliedbothbetween supporting actors, regarding anypotential supportedparty, andby actors

consideringacceptingsupportfromapartner.Thestandardscouldbelinkedtointernalassessmentsand/orexternalbenchmarksusingcriteriasuchashumanrightsrecords,corruption,militarycompetencyandarmsavailability.

Forsupportrelationshipstobetterprotectciviliansandothersnotfighting,theactorsinvolvedmusttakestepstointegratetheseframeworksintothesubordinatesystemsandprocesses.

B. Systems and processesFordecisionmakers,assessinginternalreadinessforsupportrelationshipswillentailreviewingawiderangeofsystemsandprocesses.Itisimportantthatallrelevantsystemsandprocessesintegratemeas-uresdesignedtomoderatebehaviourinconflict.

Wherethesystemsorprocessesofdifferentministries,departmentsoragenciesareinterlinked,aholisticperspectiveofthosesystemsandprocessesisneededtoreduceinternalgaps.Thiscanimproveinternalreadiness,especiallyinviewofthecomplexityofgovernmentadministrationsandsupportrelationships.Thisperspectiveshouldencompassalldepartments,agenciesandfunctionsofagivenadministrationaswellasotheractors(includingactorsinasupportrelationshipsuchasStates,non-Stateactorsandmultilateralorganizations).

Thedevelopmentandimplementationofapolicyontheprotectionofcivilianshelptoraisetheprofileofciviliansandofcivilianharmmitigationmeasuresinreadinessactivities.Suchpoliciesprovideover-archingguidancetobothcivilianandmilitaryentitiesandensurethatthedutytoprotectciviliansisinte-gratedintosystemsandprocessesinacoordinatedway.Internaloversightandaccountabilityprocesseshelptoensuretheeffectivenessofsuchpoliciesinactualpractice(seeSection 6.2.5).

Oneoftheproblemsthatmaychallengeanactor’sabilitytooperateincompliancewithIHL–andrequirespecificsafeguards–isadisparitybetweenitscapabilitiesandthoseofitspartner.Forexample,whereasupportingactorisprovidingcloseairsupport,acapabilitythatishighlydesiredbysupportedparties,caremustbetakentopreventitsmisuse.Thismayrequiremorestepsorverificationsthantheprocessemployedwhenthistypeofsupportisdeliveredtoone’sownforces.

Beforecommittingorreceivingresourcesandfinalizingtheplanningofasupportrelationship,actorsshouldfullyconsiderlessonsidentified,lessonslearnedandbestpractices.Thatwillallowthemtounder-standwhathasworkedpreviously,whathasfailed,andwhatchallengesandrisksarelikelytoarise(seeSection 6.3.2).Theselessonsmaycomefromotheractors,ministries,departmentsandagenciesthathaveprovidedorreceivedsupport,suchasotherdevelopmentactivitiesundertakenwiththesameactor.Thiswillhelptoprovidearealisticcheckofpotentialsupport,themethodologyneededtomanagethesupportandthecommitmentsafuturepartnermayneedtotake.

Actorsthatcommonlyworkwithinacoalitionshouldconsidergeneralstepstheycantakeinordertofacilitatecoordinationwitheachother.Theymightalsoensurethatrolesandresponsibilitiesforalljointorcombinedprocessesareclearlydefined,evenbeforetheserolesandresponsibilitiesareconsideredforaspecificoperationalsituation.

Systems and processes of governments and authoritiesGovernmentsandauthorities,includingtheseniorleadershipinmanycases,arenotalwaysinagreementregardingthesystemsandprocessesrelevanttosupportrelationshipsacrosstheirministries,depart-ments,agenciesandfunctions.Thislackofagreement,whichcanaffecttheirunderstandingofthesup-portrelationshipandintra-agencyexpectations,willbeexacerbatedbytheextralevelofcomplexitythatsupportrelationshipsbring.InthecaseofasupportingState,acomprehensiveapproachisneededatbothcapitallevelandwithinthehostState,wherelocalsupportismanagedbetweendepartmentsandagenciespresentontheground.

Iftheyfailtotakeaccountofthewiderimplicationsthatasupportrelationshiphasoninternalstructuresandresources,actorscouldultimatelyexacerbate–ratherthanmitigate–thehumanitarianrisksasso-ciatedwitharmedconflicts.Thisisespeciallytrueifthatsupportisdeliveredtothepartner’ssecuritysectoralone.Forexample,externalsupportfordefencemayresultinanincreaseindetaineesthatthejusticesectorisunabletoadequatelycopewith.Systemsandprocessesshouldbecoordinatedacrossallgovernmentdepartmentsoragenciesinvolvedtopreparefor,mitigate,monitorandremedysuchgapsasearlyaspossible.

Supportedactorsshouldbecognizantoftheeffectssupportrelationshipscanhaveacrosstheirministries,departmentsandagencies,andtheyshouldapproachsupportrelationshipsinacoherentandconsistentfashionthatpreventsgapsoccurring.

Therefore,whereseveraldepartmentsandagencieswithinoneauthorityareinvolvedinprovidingorreceivingsupport,thesystemsandprocessesshouldbeoverseenbyaleaddepartmentoragencyandincludesufficientcoordinationandinformation-sharingmechanisms.Theauthoritiesinchargeofman-agingrelationshipswiththepartnershouldalsobeclearlydelineated.Bothsupportingandsupportedactorscaninsistuponthesemeasuresfromtheotherpartyintherelationship.

ThisapproachcanhelptoensurethatsupportisdeliveredandreceivedinacoordinatedandconsistentfashionandpreventthelossofvaluableinformationaboutrisksorallegationsofmisconductorIHLvio-lations,asthatwouldreducethelikelihoodofaccountability.

See also: – Section 6.2.5Internaloversight

C. PersonnelDedicatingresourcestodevelopexpertiseinsupportrelationshipscanimproveanactor’scollaborationwithpartners.WhileparticularlyapparentforthoseengaginginPMOs,thisisalsoapplicabletothoseworkingwithpartnersusingothertypesofsupport,e.g.diplomatsandstafffromministriesordepart-mentsofforeignaffairs,intelligenceservices,developmentagenciesandtreasuryofficials.

Overtime,individuals,unitsandagenciesthatspecializeinworkingwithpartnerforcescandevelopahighlevelofprofessionalizationandstandards,includingintermsofIHLdisseminationandpromotingvaluesandpracticesthatprotectciviliansandothersnotfighting.Thismayincludeexperts innon-militaryroles–whomaynotnormallybeperceivedaspartofthedeployableforce–tosupportinstitu-tionalcapacitybuilding.

Trainingandexercisesforfuturesupportingtroops,staffanddiplomatsshouldaddresshowtoworktogetherandencourageapartnertocomplywithIHLandbetterprotectciviliansandothersnotfighting.Militaryexercisesoftenfocusonanactor’sowntroops,whentherealityofsupportrelationshipsisthatthecommandlevelwillbeheavilyinvolvedinrelationship-buildingwithpartnersandapplyingsupport,influenceandoversight.

Smallstepscangoalongwaytowardsachievingbetterreadinessforasupportrelationship.Examplesinclude training in thepotentialpartners’ languageandstaffexchangesbetweenactors,ministries,departmentsandagencies.

D. Culture and intentEachentityinasupportrelationship,includingthosewithinoneactor,mayhaveitsownapproachtosupportrelationshipsthatisdrivenbytheorganizationalcultureandtheorganization’smission.Forexample,diplomats,developmentstaffandtroopsarelikelytoapproachandmanagesupportrelation-shipsinslightlydifferentways.Thisrequiresrobustandongoingcoordinationamongthemtoensureconsistency,lestthesedifferencescreategapsinoperationalizingIHLandprotectingcivilians.

Theseniorcivilianandmilitaryleadership,especiallyindividualswholeadorcoordinateinter-agencyorinter-departmentalactivitiesinvolvedinsupportrelationships,canplayanimportantroleinpriori-tizingIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansasactorspreparetoengageinasupportrelationship.ThiscanbeachievedbyincorporatingIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansintoreadinessactivitiessuchaspolicy-making,byensuringthesetopicsareemphasizedwhenselectingandtrainingstaff,andthroughsystemandprocessdesign.

6.1.2 NORMATIVE ENGAGEMENT Normativeengagementreferstotherangeofmeasurestakentoclarifyandencourageadherencetoconduct-relatednormsinrelationtoarmedconflict.Therelevantnormsmaybefoundininternationallaw(bothtreatyandcustomary),domesticlaw,“soft”laworotherguidanceorbederivedfrompractice.

IntroductionNormativeengagementshouldbetailoredwhenpreparingandimplementingaspecificsupportrelationship.

Tomaximizeengagement,partnersshouldhaveagoodunderstandingofthemajorpolitical,socialandeco-nomicfactorsdrivingtheirpartner’sdecisions.ThesemyriadfactorswillhaveabearingonthevaluepartiesplaceonIHLandtheextenttowhichtheycomply,suchashowtheyconducthostilitiesandtreatciviliansandothersnotfighting.

Awiderangeofgovernmentalandnon-governmentalstakeholderscaninfluenceanactor’sagreementwithandadherencetobehaviouralnormsinanarmedconflict.ThiscanincludesuchdisparateactorsasheadsofStateorgovernment,ministries,ambassadors,operationalcommanders,media,andreligiousandcommu-nityleaders.

ThereisariskthatpartnersdonotsharethesameunderstandingofIHLordonotimplementtheirobli-gations.Whenenteringasupportrelationship,actorsshouldthereforetakestepstoidentifywherethesediscrepanciesmightlieandtoensurethatanyconductwithinthecontextofthesupportrelationshipwillbeundertakenaccordingtothemoreprotectiveofthepartners’standards.

Muchcanbedone,evenbeforeconsideringspecificsituationsandactors,topromoteunderstandingandgoodpracticeswithregardtoIHL.PromotingcompliancewithIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingwithinthebroaderinternationalcommunitywillhelpfuturepartnersprepareforthesupportrela-tionship(seeSection 6.1.1).Morespecificmeasurescanbetakenonceaspecificrelationshiporengagementcomesintoconsideration.

Anactor’sintentisacriticalfactorinIHLimplementationandcompliance(seeSection 6.1.3).Totheextentpossible,supportingactorsshouldseektoassessthestrengthofapotentialpartner’sintenttocomplywithIHLinagivensituationandtotakemeasurestoinfluencethatintentifneeded.Forexample,actorscanmaketheirsupportcontingentuponIHLcompliance.Moreover,actorsinasupportrelationshipshouldengagewiththeirpartnerstoaddresspotentialhumanitarianconcernsandconsidermoregeneralpreventivemeasures.

Key questions • Initsinternationalrelationsandininternationalforums,hasyourleadershipcommittedtobroad,multilateralpositionssupportingIHLcompliance?

• Doesyourleadershipencourageotheractorstoaccedetointernationallegalinstrumentsandotherstandardsintendedtoreducethehumanitarianconsequencesofarmedconflict?

• DoyouhaveprogrammesthatpromoterespectforIHLandtheprotectionofcivilians,anddoyoumaketheseprogrammesavailabletopartnersorpotentialpartners?

• Doyouhavebilateralandmultilateralmechanismsdesignedtoinfluencepotentialpartners’viewsandperspectivesoncompliancewithIHL?

A. Strategic communicationStatementsmadebyactorsininternationalforumscanservetoreinforcestandardsorexpresstheircom-mitmenttobehaveinacertainway.Theycanalsousepublicstatementstocondemnordiscouragepoorbehaviour.Suchstatementssignaltopartnersthestandardsofconductexpectedwhentheyteamupwithsuchactors.Theclosertherelationshipbetweentwoactors,themoreinfluenceoneactor’sstatementislikelytohaveonthepartner.

Forexample,actorscouldmakeknown(publicly,inrelevantforums,orbilaterallytotheirprospectivepartners)howtheirarmedforcesimplementIHLrulesapplicabletotheuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas–inparticulartheprohibitiononindiscriminateanddisproportionateattacksandtheobligationtotakeallfeasibleprecautionsinattack.Theycouldleadbyexamplebymakingpubliccom-mitmentsthatgobeyondtheirlegalobligations.ExamplesincludeboththeSafeSchoolsDeclarationandtheDeedofCommitmentforAdherencetoaTotalBanonAnti-PersonnelMinesandforCooperationinMine Action.36

B. Contributing to the development of norms and practical guidanceBycontributingtotheworkofinternationalormultilateralbodies,actorscanhelptoclarifyinternationallawanddevelopguidanceforoperationalizingit.Relevantbodiesandprocessesmayalreadyexist,suchasconferencesofStatespartytoweaponstreatiesortheMontreuxDocumentForum.37Actorscouldalsoseektoestablishagrouporbodyforaspecificpurpose,suchasaworkinggrouporacentreofexcellence.

Tociteanexample, the ICRCrecommends thatactors sharegoodpractices, experienceand lessonslearnedintheprotectionofciviliansintheconductofhostilitiesinpopulatedareas,includingwithregardtothechoiceanduseofmeansandmethodsofwarfare(seeSections 3.3.2 and 4.6).

C. Engaging and influencingActorsinsupportrelationshipsarewell-placedtoencourageandinfluencetheirpartnerstocomplywithIHL.Amongstotherthings,supportingactorsshouldconsiderremindingallpartiestotheconflictoftheneedtorespectIHLrulesinallcircumstances. Tobeeffective,anyinfluencewillhavetobetailoredtotheparty’scharacteristicsandthenatureoftheconflict.Thus,whereverpossible,argumentsshouldbebasedonasoundunderstandingofthemotivationsandinterestsofthepartytotheconflictandbackedbygoodcontactsandatrackrecordofengagementwiththeparty.

Someofthefollowinginterestsmayhelpstructurethedialogueandengagementwithpartiestoarmedconflicts:1. corevalues2. militaryefficacyanddiscipline3. reciprocalrespectandmutualinterest4. reputation5. criminalprosecution6. economyandinfrastructure.

36 SeeICRC,“TheSafeSchoolsDeclarationandtheGuidelinesforProtectingSchoolsandUniversitiesfromMilitaryUseduringArmedConflict”,ICRC,Geneva,2018:https://www.icrc.org/en/document/safe-schools-declaration-and-guidelines-protecting-schools-and-universities-military-use.FormoreonGenevaCallDeedsofCommitment,seewww.genevacall.org.

37 TheMontreuxDocumentForumisaforumforparticipantsoftheMontreuxDocumentonpertinentinternationallegalobligationsandgoodpracticesforstatesrelatedtooperationsofprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompaniesduringarmedconflict.Formoredetails,seewww.mdforum.ch.

D. Socialization Socialization is the process by which people adopt the norms and rules of a given community.38 Individuals can be socialized into committing violence or, conversely, showing restraint (taking deliberate action to limit the use of violence).

At a minimum, formal socialization mechanisms in armed forces and armed groups inculcate the rules of IHL in all group members, incorporate these rules into practical training, and include the threat of punishment for non-compliance. However, informal norms can be as strong as formal norms. Partners can cooperate creatively with integrated State armed forces and with NSAGs to socialize their fighters of all ranks to act with restraint (see also Section 6.2.1).

Further reading

E. DisseminationArms bearers with little or no IHL training can significantly impede efforts to increase the protection of civilians and others not fighting and to regulate the behaviour of parties to conflicts. There is little likeli-hood that a body of law will be observed unless those whose duty it is to respect and apply it are instructed in it and trained to comply with its obligations.

Parties to armed conflicts have a duty to integrate IHL into their doctrine, training and rules of engage-ment.39 This duty stems from the obligation of all parties to respect and ensure respect for IHL. In cus-tomary law, the duty to train members in IHL is considered binding on both States and armed groups.40

Both supporting and supported actors may be able to assist with IHL dissemination and training aimed at those whose actions and behaviour can affect victims of armed conflicts. They include armed forces, police forces, security forces and others bearing arms, as well as decision makers and members of key departments and agencies, not to mention opinion leaders at both the local and international levels.

See also: – Section 6.2.2 IHL training

F. Mobilization Actors engaged in support relationships should consider engaging and mobilizing other actors, including States, armed groups and international organizations, to encourage the parties to improve their com-pliance with IHL. This would be especially relevant in military coalitions, where multiple actors act in concert to address concerns about the conduct of one partner.

Further reading

38 See J. Checkel, “Socialization and violence: Introduction and framework”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 54, No. 5, September 2017, pp. 592–605.

39 In treaty law, the duty of States to provide IHL instruction to their armed forces is found in Articles 47, 48, 127 and 144 in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, respectively, and in Article 83 of Additional Protocol I. This treaty obligation is applicable both in peacetime and in times of IAC. In a specific reference to NIACs, Additional Protocol II requires, in Article 19, that the Protocol “shall be disseminated as widely as possible”.

40 ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rule 142 and explanation (see note 7 above).

6.1.3 ASSESSMENT AND FRAMING OF THE RELATIONSHIPIntheICRC’sview,assessingandframingasupportrelationshipreferstotheprocessofcarefullyanalysingpotentialpartnersandplanningsupportinamannerthatmorecloselyalignsthepartnersinordertoreducetheriskofharmtoaffectedpeople.

Introduction Assessingandframingarecriticaltomanagingacoherentsupportrelationship.Conductingathoroughsup-portassessmentallowsactorstoidentifyrisksandopportunitiesinrelationtocompliancewithIHLandotherstandardsandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Anysignificantconcernscanbeidentifiedandaddressed–andtherelationshipitselfcanbereconsidered–beforeimplementation.Basedonthatassessment,theactorscanagreeontheparametersofthesupportrelationship,incorporatinganymeasurestoaddresstherisksandopportunitiesidentifiedintheassessment.Finally,creatingadetailedplanforstruc-tureddisengagementclarifiestheintendedoutcomesoftherelationshipandthemeasuresthatwillbetakentominimizeharmduringthetransitionandbeyond.

Inordertoassesstherisksandopportunitiesthatmayariseintermsofprotectingaffectedpeople,thefol-lowingthreefactorsofeachpartnershouldfirstbeanalysed:1. intent 2. leadership3. capacity.

Ofcourse,thesefactorsshouldbeassessedpriortoenteringintoorimplementingthesupportrelationship.41 Theyshouldalsoberoutinelyreassessedinthelightofsubsequentbehaviourandevolvinginternalandexternalcircumstances.

Bringingthesefactorsintoalignmentiscentraltoensuringthatasupportrelationshipservestoenhance,notundermine,IHLcomplianceandtheprotectionofthoseaffectedbyconflict.

IntentIntentreferstotheprospectivepartner’sobjectivesorgoals,notablyitsintentionorwillingnesstocomplywithIHLandpromotetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.IntentionwithrespecttoIHLandprotectioncanbeassessedusingarangeofsources,includingformalcommitmentsandadherencetoIHLandotherrelevantinternationallegalandotherframeworks,therecipient’spastandpresentrecordofrespectforIHLandhumanrightslaw,publicdiscourseandbilateralassurances.42

Alackofintentcanbereflectedinpoliticaldeclarations,priorbehaviourorobjectivesthatareinconsistentwiththeprinciples,rulesandspiritofIHL.Supportrelationshipsinwhichthisintentislackingconstituteaconsiderableriskfortheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting,andsocarefulconsiderationmustbegivenbeforeenteringintosuchapartnership.

LeadershipLeadershipreferstoapartner’sorganizationalstructureanditsabilitytoensurethattheleaders’intent,goals,directions(instructionsorguidance)andvalues–whetherrelatedtoIHLornot–areunderstood,respectedandfaithfullyexecutedthroughouttheorganization’shierarchy.Forexample,thismaybearupontheweightgiventodiplomaticassurances.

41 StatespartytotheArmsTradeTreatyhaveanobligationtoassessthepotentialthatconventionalarmsoritemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateaseriousviolationofIHLorinternationalhumanrightslaw,amongotherfactors,priortoauthorizinganexport.Theyarealsoencouragedtoreassesstheirauthorizationiftheybecomeawareofnewinformation. SeeArmsTradeTreaty,Arts7.1and7.7.

42 See,forexample,ArmsTransferDecisions,p.21(seenote29above),andtheMontreuxDocument(seenote25above).

Althoughtheleadershipaspectisnotalwayseasytoassess,anefforttodososhouldbemadeduringthereadinessstagepriortotakingadecisiontoengage.Assessingthepartner’sstrengthofleadershiprequiresanunderstandingofitsorganizationalstructure,includingthechainofcommandinitsarmedforces,andhoweffectivelytheirdecisionsareimplemented.Understandinganactor’sorganizationalstructurealsohelpstoidentifykeydecisionmakerswithinagroupandprimarycontactsforaddressingoperationalandhumani-tarianconcerns.43ThisexercisemaybemorechallengingincasesofdecentralizedNSAGsorcommunity-embeddedNSAGs,44orwherethelinesofauthorityareotherwiseopaquetotheexternalactor.

Thisassessmentcanalsoindicatetheleversofinfluencethatleadershaveattheirdisposal.Forexample,centralizedarmedgroupsrelyonclearlyestablishedrulesandvalues,whicharelikelytobeimpartedtotherankandfilethroughindoctrinationandtraining.Decentralizedandcommunity-embeddedarmedgroupsdonotalwayshavewrittencodesofconduct,drawinginsteadonsharedvaluesandtraditions.45

CapacityCapacityreferstothematerialassets,humanresourcesandskillsthatenableanactortoachieveitsgoals.

Whenassessingcapacity,onecriticalaspecttoconsideristhedegreetowhichthepartnerisinteroper-ablewithothers.Evenifbothintentandleadershiparestrongandwellalignedbetweenactorsinasupportrelationship,thatrelationshipmaybeweakenedifthepartners’resourcesarenotappropriatelyalignedandinteroperable.

Apartnermayhavestrongleadershipbutlacktheresourcestoachieveitsobjectives.Theactorswillneedtoagreeonrolesandresponsibilitiesinviewoftheirmutuallyassessedcapacities.

Ifthesupportedactoridentifiesanygapsinitscapacitytoeffectivelyreceivesupport,itshouldmaketheprospectivesupportingactorawareofthem.Thegapscanthereforeberectifiedassoonaspracticabletoprotectboththepartnersandcivilians.

Visualizing Intent-Leadership-CapacityActorsconsideringenteringintoasupportrelationshipinarmedconflictshouldcarefullyassesstheirpoten-tialpartner’sintent,leadershipandcapacity.Theiraimshouldbetoidentifystrengths,weaknessesandmajoralignmentgapsduringthepreparationphase.Theobservedgapscouldleadtothediffusionofresponsibility.

Beforeenteringasupportrelationship,eachpartnershouldassessitselfandthenitspotentialpartner,basedonthethreefactorsdescribedabove.

Havingundertakenthosetwoassessments,eachpartnershouldthenconductagapanalysistodeterminewhetherthepartnersarecompatible.

Inallcases,analignmentgapshouldtriggerconsiderationofhowtomitigatetheresultingriskstotheaffectedcommunity.Inconductingthegapanalysis,itisimportanttoconsiderthefollowingpoints:

• Iseachpartnerstrongenoughoneachcriteriontooperatewellinasupportrelationship?

• Workingtogether,wouldthepartnersbecapableofmakingupforanyweaknessesinoneortheother?

• Whatpracticalmeasurescouldbetakentocloseanyidentifiedgaps?

• Howdoyouassesstheeffectivenessofmeasuresaimedatclosingthegaps?

• Whataretheimplicationsofanyremaininggapsforaffectedpeople?

43 RootsofRestraint,p.23(seenote20above).44 RootsofRestraint,pp.23and55(seenote20above).45 RootsofRestraint,p.23(seenote20above).

INTENT

PARTNER A PARTNER B

CAPACITY

INTENT

CAPACITY

LEADERSHIP LEADERSHIP

Ideally,partnersshouldeachbestrongacrossallthreefactors.

INTENT

PARTNER A PARTNER B

ALIGNMENT

CAPACITY

INTENT

CAPACITY

Alternatively,onepartner’sstrengthsmaycompensatefortheotherpartner’sweaknesses.

Wheretherearegapsbetweenthepartners,practicalmeasuresshouldbeidentifiedtoclosethem.

PRACTICAL MEASURES

INTENT

PARTNER A PARTNER B

CAPACITY

INTENT

CAPACITY

However,thereisalimittohowmuchapartnercanreasonablyexpecttobeabletocompensateforanotheractoroverwhichitdoesnothavecontrol.Partneringwithanactorthatdoesnothaveatleastaminimumlevelofintent,leadershipandcapacityshouldbeavoided,assuchasupportrelationshipcouldposeahighandunmitigablerisktociviliansandothersnotfighting.

INTENT

PARTNER A PARTNER B

CAPACITY

INTENT

CAPACITY

HIGH-RISK PARTNER

Similarly,wherethegapsaresignificant,theactorsmayneedtoreconsidertherelationshipaltogether.

INTENT

PARTNER A PARTNER B

CAPACITY

INTENT

CAPACITY

HIGH-RISKPARTNERSHIP

Key questions • Haveyouaccuratelyassessedyourandyourpartner’srespectiveintent,leadershipandcapacity?

• Areanygapsinintent,leadershipandcapacityabletobeaddressedthroughtheplannedsupport?

• Whataretheconditionsthatdefineasuccessfulsupportrelationship?

• Howwillyoutransitionoutofthesupportrelationshipwhen:(a)yourobjectivesaremetor(b)yourobjectivesarenotmet?

A. Support assessmentsAsanextensionofthegapanalysis,itisimportanttoconduct,totheextentfeasible,anaccurateassess-mentoftheneedsandcapacitiesoftheproposedpartner.Suchassessmentsprovidethestartingpointforacomprehensiveplanthatshouldcoverthedurationofthesupportrelationship.Formalsupportassessmentsshouldbereviewedregularlyinthelightofoperationalrealitiesandevolvingcircumstances.

Processes should be established for conducting rigorous assessments and framing the relationshipaccordingly.Carryingoutaneffectivesupportassessmentattheoutset,evenwhereitdoesnotresultintheidentificationofsignificantrisks,willhelpactorstodefineareasonableendstatefortherelation-ship,tailorthesupportaccordinglyandidentifyappropriatemeasurestofosterrespectforIHLandtheprotectionofaffectedpeople.Anassessmentisalsoneededtoidentifyanyriskstobemitigated.Wherethereareidentifiablerisks,theassessmentframeworkprovidesamechanismforfactoringthemintothedecision-makingprocessandidentifyingpossiblemitigatingmeasures.Supportingactorscanconductsupportassessmentsofthesupportedparty,whilesupportedpartiescanassesstherisksassociatedwithacceptingsupport.

Themostobviousriskisthatasupportingactorcouldprovideorenhancethecapacitybywhichviolationsoccur.IfthesupportrelationshipisknowinglythedeterminativefactorleadingtoanIHLviolation,thenthesupportingactorcanrightlybeseenasresponsiblefortheviolation.Wherethereisanexpectation,basedonfactsorknowledgeofpastpatterns,thatthesupporttobeprovidedwouldbeusedtocommitaviolationofIHL,thatsupportmustnotbegiven.46Morebroadly,theprovisionofsupportthatdoesnotproperlymatchthepartner’scapacityandcircumstancesisapttoresultinharmtopersonsprotectedunderIHL.

Assessing risks and defining mitigating measures Inordertoidentifyanyrisksspecifictothepartner,theassessmentshouldincludethepartner’spoliticalandlegalpositions,language,culture,educationalsystemandlevels,economicand/orfinancialcapacity,andmilitaryandtechnicalcapacity.Thepartner’spastbehaviourwillbeanimportantindicatoroftheriskoffutureviolations.However,especiallyfornewlyestablishedforcesorunits,theabsenceofconfirmedviolationsisnoguaranteeoffutureIHLcompliance.Rather,eachactorshouldseektopositivelysatisfyitself,totheextentfeasible,thattheotherpartywillrespectIHLandotherrelevantlegalstandardsthatapplytoit.Totheextentthatpatternsofbehaviourareevident,theactorshouldseektounderstandwhatdrivestheotheractor.Abetterunderstandingofthedriversofbehaviourwillinformthesubsequentconsiderationofpossiblemitigatingmeasuresandtheirexpectedeffectiveness.

Stepsshouldalsobetakentoassessotherrisks,suchasunintendedconsequencesoftherelationshipitself.Theagreementbetweenthepartnersshouldaddressthoserisks,suchasbyclearlydefiningeachpartner’srolesandresponsibilitiesandtheendstateoftherelationship,whichmayincludethesupportedparty’spost-conflictfuturesuchasDDRoptions.

Anactorundertakingasupportassessmentmayultimatelyreachtheconclusionthattherisksassociatedwiththesupportrelationshipcannotbeadequatelymitigated.Insuchcases,thesupportrelationshipshouldnotbeestablishedunlessspecificadditionalconditionsthatdirectlyaddressthesourceoftheriskaremet.

Assessing respective frameworksItislikelythattwoactors’legalframeworks,amongotherthings,willdiffer.Actorsshouldthereforeidentifythecriticalissuesforwhichtheywillneedtounderstandhowtheirpartnerinterpretsandappliesitslegalobligations.CriticalissuesarethosethataffecthowpeopleprotectedunderIHLaretreated,withregardtoissuessuchasdetention;detaineetransfers;thedeathpenalty;thechoiceofmeansandmethodsofwarfare;thedefinitionofcivilians,combatantsandprisonersofwar;andsanctionsforIHLviolations.Differencesregardingtheseissueswillhavesignificantpracticalandlegalimplicationsforbothparties.

Theaboveissuesareamongthosethatwillbeaffectedbythepartner’slegalobligations,whichmaydifferfromthoseoftheotherpartner.Inparticular,onepartnermaybepartytodifferentlegalinstruments,suchastheProtocolsAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsortheConventiononClusterMunitions.Non-Stateactorsmayalsobeboundbyinternationaltreatiesapplicableintheterritoryinwhichtheyoperateandmay,inaddition,havecommittedtoabidebyinternationalstandards.47Inviewofapotentialsupportrelationship,oneactormayencourageanothertoaccedetorelevanttreatiesorcommitments(seeSection 6.1.2).Indeed,StatespartytotheConventiononClusterMunitionsarerequiredtobothencouragetheircounterpartstojointheConventionandtomaketheirbesteffortstodiscouragesuchnon-partyStatesfromusingclustermunitions.48

46 CommentaryontheFirstGenevaConvention, paras.158–163(seenote6above).47 SeeGenevaCallDeedsofCommitment(seenote36above).48 SeeConventiononClusterMunitions,Art.21.AlthoughtheConventionallowsStatesPartiestocontinuetocooperateandengageinmilitaryoperationswithStatesnotpartyevenifthelattermaycontinuetouse,stockpileandtransferclustermunitions,suchcooperationcannotamounttoassistingin,encouragingorinducingprohibitedactivitieswithinthemeaningofArticle1oftheConvention.

Adecisionmakermayalsoneedtounderstandhowtheirpartner’slegalobligationsareinterpretedandappliedwithinitsdomesticorinternalsystem.Forexample,linguisticdifferencesmayleadpartnerstohavedifferentinterpretationsofthemeaningofkeyterms,suchas“civilian”.Suchdifferencescanhaveimportantimplicationsinpractice,especiallyduringPMOs.

Legal reminder

under IHL, States must:

• comply with IHL

• refrain from providing any support that would encourage or assist in IHL violations

• do everything reasonably in their power to prevent IHL violations by the parties to an armed

conflict and bring such violations to an end.49

Legal reminder

In keeping with States’ obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty (2013), where applicable, States that

support parties to an armed conflict must assess the intended recipients’ likely level of compliance

with IHL and refrain from authorizing weapons transfers if there is a clear or substantial risk that

the arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of this law.

Further reading

Understanding the Arms Trade Treaty from a Humanitarian Perspective (ICRC)

Arms Transfer Decisions: Applying International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law

Criteria (ICRC)

B. AgreementsAgreementsaboutsupportrelationshipsservetosetexpectationsandcancontributetoensuringrespectfor IHLandotherrelevantstandards.Theyprovidepartnerswiththeopportunity toreachasharedunderstandingaboutthescopeandobjectivesofthesupportrelationshipandanyconditionsattachedtothearrangement.Suchdetailsmaybecontainedin,forexample,statusofforcesagreements,memo-randaofunderstandingandtechnicalagreements.Whatevertheirform,theseagreementsshouldclearlydelineateandallocaterespectiverolesandresponsibilitiesandaddressissuesassociatedwiththeprotec-tionofciviliansandIHLprinciples.Theinternaldivisionofresponsibilitiesamonganactor’ssubsidiaryinstitutionsshouldbecleartoitselfandtoitspartner(seeSection 6.1.1).

Anyambiguitiesaboutwhateachpartnerwilldo,andthelimitsoftheirresponsibilityandauthority,increasetheriskofconfusionandreducetheactors’combinedcapacitytoensurerespectforIHLandotherrelevantstandards.Confusionastowhoisresponsibleforwhatcanhaveimportantconsequencesinaconflictsetting.Forexample,incertainPMOsofakineticnature,coordinationandexpectationsshouldbeairtight.Similarly,ininformation-sharingpartnerships,acommonunderstandingoftheuseoftheinformationandofanypotentialdoubtoruncertaintyastotheaccuracyorvalidityoftheinformationiscritical.Insomecases,ambiguitiesmaycauseactorsorpersonneltomisunderstandtheirresponsi-bilityforanoperationorforitsconsequences,potentiallyunderminingnormsofrestraint.Moreover,poorlydefinedrelationshipscanresultinthelossofvaluableinformationaboutallegedmisconductor

49 Article1commontothefourGenevaConventions;AdditionalProtocolI,Art.1;ICRCCustomaryIHLStudy,Rules139 and144(seenote7above);CommentaryontheFirstGenevaConvention, paras.164–173(seenote6above);IHLChallengesReport 2019,pp.75–76(seenote1above).

IHLviolationsandcanlimittheactors’capacitytoaddresssuchconcerns.Consequently,clearlinesofauthorityforreportingandinvestigatingallegationsandassigningaccountabilityareparticularlyimport-ant,asaredelineatedrolesandresponsibilitiesforsharedprocessesthatcanhaveadirectimpactuponcompliancewithIHL.

Wherethepartnersdonotsharethesamelegalobligations,itwillbeevenmoreimportantthattheyseektoreachagreementoveranylegalandnon-legalstandardsofbehaviour.Theactorsmayneedtoconsiderhowtheirrespectivecapacitywillenableor,conversely,limittheirabilitytofulfilthosestandardsinagivensituation.Theywillthenhavetotakemeasurestoadapttheircapacityorrolesandresponsibilitiesaccordingly.

Atechnicalagreementorunderstandingcoulddefinethescopeandmeansofthesupportrelationshipandestablishproceduresthatformalizetherelevantlinesofauthorityandreportingresponsibilities.ClearproceduresshouldbeestablishedforallmattersrelatedtoIHLcomplianceandtheprotectionofciviliansinarmedconflict.Theseinclude,forexample,civilianharmtrackingmechanisms,markingandclearingERWanddeadbodymanagement.

Togiveeffecttotheagreement,itisalsoimportanttoestablishclearcommunicationchannelssothatallrelevantproceduresareknown,understoodandfollowedbyallofthepartners’representatives.ThepartnersshouldmaintainaregulardialogueonallmattersofhumanitarianconcernandonthemeasuresundertakentoensurerespectforIHLinpractice.

Whiletheaboveconsiderationsapplytobilateralsupportrelationships,theyarealsorelevanttocoalitionpartnershipsorarrangementswhereanactorreceivessupportfrommultiplepartners(seeSection 2.2.3).Inparticularlycomplexsituations,thereshouldbealignmentbetweenafew“lead-role”functionsthatmightincludetheterritorialState,aleadStateofamultinationalcoalition(orequivalentinanallianceofNSAGs)and/ortheUnitedNations.

MakingsupportconditionaluponcompliancewithIHLorfurthermeasurestostrengthentheprotec-tionofcivilians,togetherwithtargetedmitigationmeasures,givessupportingactorstheopportunitytoimproveotherpartners’conductandalleviatesufferingwhilestillmaintainingthesupportrelationship.Forexample,theICRCrecommendsmakingthetransferofexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareaconditionaluponrecipientsputting inplace limitsontheuseofsuchweapons inaccordancewithanumberofgoodpracticesaimedatavoidingtheiruseinpopulatedareas.Likewise,supportfordetentionoperationscouldbemadeconditionalupontherecipientallowingthesupportingactoraccesstoplacesofdetentionanddetainees.SuchconditionsmaybenecessaryforthesupportingactortobesatisfiedthatthesupportitprovidesisbeingusedasintendedandincompliancewithIHL.

Minimizing harm to civilians and others not fighting should be agreed as a primaryconditionofthesupportrelationship.

C. Specific operational readinessActorswillreviewthemeasurestakentoprepareinternallyandadaptthemtotheidentifiedpartnerandsituation.

Oncethespecificareaofdeploymentisknown,pre-deploymenttrainingincludingculturalawarenessandlanguagetrainingshouldbeconducted.Elementsthatsupportnormativeengagement,suchasthelocalcultureandinfluencesinfavourofIHLcompliance,canbetailoredforthespecificcircumstances.Trainingmaterialsintheappropriatelanguagecanbeprepared,andstaffmemberswithexperienceinthatarea–includingfromotherministries,agenciesanddepartments–canbeapproachedtoenhancespecificreadiness.

D. Transition strategy Theendstateofthesupportrelationshipshouldbeclearlydefined,togetherwithanyconditionsforterminatingorrestructuringthesupport.Duringthepreparationphase,bothactorsshoulddevelopatransitionplanforastructureddisengagement.Thisplanshouldlisttheconditionsforthedisengagementtobeconsideredcompleteandthestepsneededtoendthesupportrelationshipinanorderlyandsafefashion.Theplanshouldanticipatetwoscenarios:oneinwhichtheactors’objectiveshavebeenreached,andtheotherwheretheyhavenotbeenreachedandthesupportiswithdrawnormodified.

Alltoooften,politicalormilitaryconsiderationspromptasupportingactortosuddenlywithdrawitssup-port.Withoutproperplanning,suchanabruptchangecanleaveciviliansandothersnotfightingexposedtonewviolationsofIHLandhumanrights.Itmayalsohindertheiraccesstoremediesforpastviolations.Asuddenwithdrawalmayalsohaveasignificantimpactonthesupportedparty’sbehaviour,andthisimpactmayneedtobeweighedinadvanceagainstthereasonsforthewithdrawal(seeSection 2.3.1).Thetransitionstrategyshouldtakeintoaccount,amongotherthings,theriskstociviliansandothersnotfighting,thevestedinterestsoflocalactors,andquestionsofDDR(seeSection 6.3.1).

See also: – Section 6.3.1Structureddisengagement

6.2 IMPLEMENTATION

MONITORINGAND

EVALUATION

ASSISTANCE

IHLTRAINING

INTERNALOVERSIGHT

IMPLEM

ENTATION

6.2.1 INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDINGInstitutional capacity building refers to the group ofmeasures taken to prepare the institutions that constituteasupportedpartytoundertakeactivitiesassociatedwiththeconductandconsequencesofanarmedconflict.

Fourcomponentsofinstitutionalcapacitybuildingarediscussedhere:A. frameworkB. systemsandprocessesC. personnelD. cultureandintent.

Suchmeasuresareespeciallypertinentwhensupportisprovidedintheformofarmstransfers(Section 3.4.2)andPMOs(seeSection 3.4.3).

IntroductionAkeyconcerninsupportrelationshipsisthesupportedparty’sinstitutionalcapacitytomanageandutilizethesupportitreceivesinamannerconducivetotheprotectionandassistanceofpeopleduringarmedconflictandinitsaftermath.

Actorsenteringasupportrelationshipshouldconsiderwhethertheinstitutionscomprisingthesupportedpartyaresuitablypreparedtoreceivetheproposedsupport(seeSection 6.1.3).Theinstitutionsinquestionarefirstandforemostthoseassociatedwiththearmedforcesandothersecurityforces.However,therangeofinstitutionspotentiallyaffectedbyarmedconflictiswideandincludesthoseinvolvedindetention,policing,criminaljustice,healthcare,education,socialwelfareandcivilregistration.

Takingstepstostrengthenthoseinstitutionscouldhelptomaximizethepositiveimpactofthesupportandminimizetheriskofthesupportbeingmisapplied,inparticulartocommitorfacilitateviolationsofIHL.

Some institutional capacity-buildingprogrammesbetweensupportingandsupportedactorsare imple-mentedinpeacetimeinthenormalcourseofinternationalrelations,suchassecurityanddefencesectorreformprogrammes.Itmaybethecasethatthelong-termnatureoftheseprogrammesandtheirprescribedobjectivesmakethemresistanttoshorter-termadjustments.Ifpartnersengageinconflict,andthiswasunforeseenattheoutsetofthecapacity-buildingrelationship,decisionmakersshouldbeflexibleandpre-paredtoadaptthoseprogrammes.

Key questions • Dothepartner’sinstitutionsapplyaframeworkandusesystemsandprocessesthatsupportandensuretheproposedconflict-relatedsupportactivitiesareincompliancewithIHLandotherrelevantlegalstandards?

• Arepartnerarmedforcesselectedandvettedeffectively?

• Doesthepartnerhavethecapacitytomanagetheaftermathofhostilities?

• Whentheproposedsupportdrawstoaclose,willthepartner’sinstitutionshavethecapacitytocontinueIHL-compliantoperationsontheirown?

A. FrameworkTheframeworkofpoliciesandlawssettingouthowanactorshouldoperate,aswellasthesysteminplacetoenforcethatframework,willinfluenceitsbehaviour.Thebettertheactor’smandateandauthorityaredefined,thegreaterthelikelihoodthattheywillcomplywithIHL.

Asastartingpoint,thepoliciesandrulespromotedbyanactormustbeconsistentwithitsobligationsunderIHL.Amongotherthings,aparty’srulesofengagementandrulesonhumanetreatmentduringcaptureanddetention,andtheprocessbywhichmembersofthepartywillbeheldaccountableincaseofmisconductoraviolationofthelaw,mustallbeclearlyarticulated.Theframeworkmustbeaccompaniedbyaneffectiveorganizationalstructuretoensureadherencetothepoliciesandlaws.

Actorsmayhaveopportunitiestoenhancetheframeworkregulatingtheirpartner’sbehaviourincom-pliancewithIHL,particularlywithrespecttotheirengagementwithcivilians,rulesofengagementandarrestanddetentionoperations.ThisisparticularlyrelevantwhenasupportingactorisoperatingontheterritoryofahostState.

Furthermore,actorsthatsupportpartiestoarmedconflictsshouldconsiderensuring,tothegreatestextentpossible,thatthesupportedpartyhasastrong,effectivechainofcommandandcontrolthatallowscommanderstoenforcecompliancewithIHL.Theyshouldalsoconsiderbringing,whererelevantandappropriate,asupportedarmedgroupintotheestablishedframeworksgoverningtheterritorialState’sarmedandsecurityforcesandstrengtheningthatState’scapacitytointegrate,controlandoverseethegroup.

B. Systems and processesThesystemsandprocessesofallofthearmedforcesorgroups,ministries,departmentsandagenciesthatmakeupthesupportedpartyshouldbealigned,withthegoalofachievinggreaterrespectforIHLandenhancingtheprotectionofcivilians.Civilianentities,evenifnotconsideredpartofthesupportrelation-shiporengagedinthearmedconflict,canplayanimportantroleinpromotingandensuringadherencetoIHL.Effectivesystemsandprocessescanbeimplementedcoherentlyacrossentitiesthroughrelevantlawsandpolicies,suchasprotection-of-civilianspolicies,deedsofcommitmentanddeclarations.Asupportingactorcansupportthedevelopmentofsuchframeworks,systemsandprocesseswheretheydonotalreadyexist.

Armedforcesandarmedgroupsshouldprovidestafftraining,clearstandardsofconductandeffectivesanctionsintheeventofmisconduct.Thearmedactor’sbasicstructuremustallowforclearcommandandcontrol,theabilitytoplanandconductoperations,oversightandclarityonresponsibilityforcon-duct,andasanctionsregime.Theneedsgobeyondoperations,however,andtheynormallyincludeahuman-resourcepolicyandstructure, logistics, trainingandcommunications.Armedgroupsmirrorthesefunctions,albeitthroughavarietyofgroupstructures(centralized,decentralized,orcommunity-embeddedarmedgroups).Clearly,fromintegratedStatearmedforcestothevariousstructuresofarmedgroups,thereneedstobeamechanisminplaceforreportingandinvestigatingpotentialIHLviolations(seeSection 6.2.5).

Actorsshouldtakeallnecessarymeasurestoensurethattheapplicablerulesandsanctionsareintegratedintotheirsystemofreferenceandthattheyareknownandproperlyapplied.Amongothermeasures,effortsshouldbemadetoensurethatnationaljudgesorcompetentjudicialauthoritiesaretrainedinIHL.Thoughbeyondtheremitofthisdocument,thereshouldalsobealignmentbetweenStatesintheguaranteesandproceduresusedbythenationalcourtsresponsiblefordealingwithviolationsofIHL.

Thisconsiderationisparticularlyrelevantforneworburgeoningforces,wheretherecruitmentprocessmayoutpacethedevelopmentofsupportingstructuresandanorganizationalculture.Theabsenceofbothclearguidelinesontheorganizationandmanagementoflocalpartnerforcesandtheleadershipneededtoensuresuchguidelinesareappliedmayexacerbateotheridentifiedrisks.

Further reading

Elements to Render Sanctions More Effective – Factsheet (ICRC)

Further reading

The vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and use of Child

Soldiers

The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups

The Paris Commitments to protect children from unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces or

armed groups

Children associated with armed forces or armed groups (ICRC)

Guiding principles for the domestic implementation of a comprehensive system of protection for children

associated with armed forces or armed groups, pp. 395–396 (ICRC)

Legal Protection of Children in Armed Conflict – Factsheet (ICRC)

See also: – Section 6.3.1Structureddisengagement

D. Culture and intentTheinstitutionalcultureofeitheractorinasupportrelationshipcanbepositivelyshapedtoreinforcethenormativeframeworkadoptedandthesystemsandprocessesemployed.Themeasurestakenforthispurposemayneedtobeimplementedconsistentlyoveralongperiodfortheireffectstobeseen.

Instructureswherethereiscivilianauthorityorinfluenceoverthearmedforces,thecivilianleadershipwillalsoshapeandreinforcetheinstitutionalculture.Measurestoshapeinstitutionalculturecanbepositiveornegative.Forexample,leadersmayimplicitlyencouragebehaviourcontrarytoIHLorotherbranchesoflawbystigmatizingadversariesorsettingsalestargetsforarmstransfers.

Militarycommandersareresponsible for theconductof thearmedforcesunder theircommand.Anappropriatecombinationofguidance,leadershipanddirectionfromthecommanderwillsetthetoneforallactivities.Itisimportantthatacommander’sguidancebecomeroutineandbegiveneffect.Thecommander’sguidanceanddirectionshouldaddressnotonlywhatshouldhappen,butcriticallywhatshould nothappen.Forexample,aclearstatementontheprotectionofcivilianshasbeenseentodirectlyinfluencetheactionsofcombattroops.

Actorsinasupportrelationshipmayworktogethertodevelopmilitaryacademiesorstaffcollegeswithrobustprotection-of-civiliancurricula.Theymayalsomakeiteasyforoneactor’sarmedforcestoattendanother’sprofessionalmilitaryeducationalinstitutions.Long-termexposuretopositiveexamplesoforganizationalcultureandethicswhereIHLisappliedandnon-combatantsareprotectedcanhaveapositiveeffectonsubsequentbehaviour.Itcanalsoformthebasisforlong-terminterpersonalconnec-tionsthatstrengthentheoverallrelationship.

6.2.2 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW TRAINING IHLtrainingreferstotrainingactivitiesspecificallydesignedtoensurerespectforIHLandreduceharmtocivilians,othersnotfightingandbothcivilianandspecificallyprotectedobjects.

IHLtrainingasapracticalmeasuretoimproveprotectionshouldbedistinguishedfromTAAAPMOsasatypeofsupportprovidedtoapartytoaconflict(seeSection 3.4.3).TrainingandinstructiononIHLwouldnotnecessarilyqualifyasasupportrelationshipinandofitself.Conversely,trainingandinstructiononIHLorotherprotectionissuescanbe,andoftenare,incorporatedintobroaderTAAAprogrammes.

Broadlyspeaking,threerelatedtypesofmeasurescouldbeimplemented:A. trainingB. mentoringC. monitoringandevaluatingbothtrainingandmentoring.

IntroductionPropertrainingandinstructionarecentraltoensuringrespectforIHLandtheprotectionofvictimsofarmedconflictmorebroadly.52Theyensurethattheapplicablerulesaresystematicallyknown,internalizedandputtowork.Justastheydedicateresourcestotrainingtheirownpersonnel,actorsthatsupportpartiestoanarmedconflictshould–regardlessoftheformoftheirsupport–considersupportingorprovidingthemwithtrainingandinstructionontherulesandprinciplesofIHLandotherrelevantlawsandstandards.

Legal reminder

Parties to armed conflicts have a duty to integrate IHL into their doctrine, training and rules of

engagement.53 This duty stems from the obligation of all parties to respect and ensure respect for

IHL. under customary law, the duty to train members in IHL is recognized as binding upon both

States and armed groups that are party to non-international armed conflicts.54

Despiteitsimportance,IHLtrainingonitsownmaynotbesufficienttomitigatetherisksidentifiedinthesupportrelationship(seeSection 6.1.3).Moreover,theeffectivenessoftrainingdependsonanumberoffac-tors,asdetailedbelow.Actorsinasupportrelationshipshouldcarefullyconsideranytrainingandmentoringprogrammesandbepreparedtoadapttheminlinewithsubsequentmonitoringandevaluation.

Key questions • DoyouincorporatetrainingonIHLandotherrelevantlawsintoyoursupportrelationship?

• Doyourpersonnelhavetheappropriateskills,includinganunderstandingofthetrainees’languageandculture,toprovidetraining?

• Isyourtrainingprogrammeadaptedtothepartnerintermsofcontent,methodsandmaterials,timingandfrequency,andaudience?

• HowdoyouevaluatetheeffectivenessofyourIHLtrainingandincorporatethatassessmentintosubsequenttrainingcycles?

• IsIHLtrainingintegratedacrossyourbroadertrainingprogramme,suchasincombinedexercises?

• Willyousupplementtrainingorinstructionwithmentoring?

A. International humanitarian law training programmeThechoiceofcontent,format,audienceandtrainersiscentraltoensuringthatatrainingprogrammeiseffective.Ideally,trainingprogrammesaretailoredtotherecipientpartner’sneeds,asdetermineddur-ingthesupportassessment(seeSection 6.1.3).Similarly,trainingprogrammesshouldbereviewedandadaptedovertimeinresponsetooperationalobservations,whethertheyconcerntheperformanceofpasttrainees(seeSection 6.2.2),specificissuesofhumanitarianconcernorotherchangesintheoperationalenvironment.

TheplacegiventoIHLtrainingandeducationwithinabroadertrainingprogrammeshouldservetounderscoreitsimportance.IHLandotherlegalprinciplesapplicabletosituationsofarmedconflictandothersituationsofviolenceshouldnotonlybe taughtasstand-alonemodulesorcourses.Allother

52 RootsofRestraint,pp.28–29 (seenote20above),includingreferencesfoundtherein.53 Intreatylaw,thedutyofStatestoprovideIHLinstructiontotheirarmedforcesisfoundinArticles47,48,127 and144intheFirst,Second,ThirdandFourthGenevaConventionsrespectively,andinArticle83ofAdditionalProtocolI.ThistreatyobligationisapplicablebothinpeacetimeandintimesofIAC.InaspecificreferencetoNIACs,AdditionalProtocolIIrequires,inArticle19,thattheProtocol“shallbedisseminatedaswidelyaspossible”.

54 ICRCCustomaryIHLStudy,Rule142(seenote7above).

militarytrainingmustbeconsistentwiththerequirementsofIHL.Indeed,othertrainingprogrammesorexercisesoftenprovideopportunitiestoreinforceorclarifyIHLrules.

WeaponstrainingwhichappliesIHLprinciplestotheuseofcertainweaponsisevenmoreimportantinthecontextofarmstransfersorPMOs.Asanexample,theICRCrecommendsthat,whenprovidingsup-portintheformofexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactarea,supportingactorsalsocarryouttrainingtoensurethatthesupportedparties’armedforcesknowandunderstandtheeffectsofsuchweaponsinpopulatedareasandimplementgoodpracticestoavoidtheiruseinsuchsituations.

Content Inthecaseofarmedconflict,IHListhebaselineofsuchtraining.ComprehensiveIHLtrainingshouldbeprovidedontherulesgoverningspecificactivities,asneeded,suchasthehumaneanddignifiedtreat-mentofpeopledeprivedoftheirliberty,ortheprinciplesofprecautions,distinctionandproportionalityinattack.Normsandprinciplespertainingtotherespectfulengagementwithciviliansandparticularlyvulnerablegroupscanfurthermitigatehumanitarianconsequences.ProvidingtrainingandadviceonsuchnormsandprinciplesmayfurthercontributetoIHLcomplianceandtheprotectionofpeopleaffectedbyarmedconflict.

Otherlegalframeworkssuchasinternationalhumanrightslaw,internationalrefugeelawandinter-nationalcriminallawmayberelevantinthecircumstancesandmaythereforeneedtobeincludedinthetraining.Asmilitaryandsecurityforcesmayhavetoengageinsituationsbelowthethresholdofarmedconflict,propertrainingshouldbeprovidedonthedifferentlegalandnormativeframeworksgoverningtheuseofforce(armedconflictandlawenforcementparadigms).Theneedforsuchtrainingwilldependonthefunctionsoftheforcesbeingtrainedandmaychangeovertime.

Actorsshouldconsiderincorporatingagenderperspectiveintoallaspectsoftheirtraining.“Gender-blind”trainingcanhaveanegativeimpactonboththemilitarymissionandtheabilitytoprotectaffectedpeople.Conversely,incorporatingagenderperspectiveintothetrainingcanincreasesituationalaware-nessandresultinbetterprotectionforthoseaffected.Includingagenderperspectivealsofacilitatesidentifyingandaddressingtheparticularvulnerabilitiesofmen,women,boysandgirlsinsituationsofarmedconflictandviolence.

Actorsshouldconsultwithlocalpartnerswhenpreparingatrainingprogrammesothatitisinkeepingwithrelevantandsituation-specificchallengesandrealities.

Incertainsituations,theICRCmaybeinapositiontoofferitsservicesindevelopinganIHLcurriculumortocontributetothetrainingitself.

Methods and materials Makinglegalconceptsmorepracticalandgroundingtheminoperationalrealityallowsforbetteras- similationthaniftheyremainpurelyacademicandtheoretical.MixedtrainingmethodsthatcombineIHLbriefings,classroomdiscussions,case-studyreviewsandpracticalfieldexerciseshavebeenshowntobethemosteffectiveininculcatingnormsofrestraintincombatants.55Deliveringpracticaltrainingthatincludesintense,realisticandfast-pacedexercisesbasedontheapplicablerulesofengagementallowstraineestooperationalizeIHLtraining,linkingittoon-the-groundrealitiesandchallenges.

Thepartnerforces’organizationalstructure,levelofintegrationandtypeofcommandmaycallfordiffer-entformsoftraining.Tobeeffective,trainingprogrammesshouldbetailoredtothetargetaudienceintermsofthelanguagespokenandtheireducationallevelandothercharacteristics.Inadditiontoaddress-ingtraineesinalanguagetheyspeakcomfortably,trainersshouldgeartheleveloflanguagetotheaudi-ence,forexamplebyfavouringlesstechnicallanguage,usingimagesandactingoutpracticalscenarios.

55 BasedonempiricalresearchundertakenwiththeAustralianandPhilippinearmiesbyAndrewBell.Forfurtherdetailssee RootsofRestraint(seenote20above).

Understandingpartners’varyingincentivestocomplywithIHLnormsmayinformandshapethetrainingandadviceprovided.Howthelegalnormsareframedcanbeanimportantfactorcontributingto–orundermining–compliancewiththosenorms.Themosteffectivetrainingcombineslegalnormsandprincipleswiththevaluesunderpinningthem.Whilethelawshouldalwaysbepresentedaccurately,andnocompromisesshouldbemadeonlegalprinciplesandnorms,tailoringtheinformationtothespecificcultural,religiousandsocialcontextandoperationalrealitieswillmakethetrainingmoreeffectiveandpersuasive.AndbecauseIHLandotherlegalprinciplesareoftenmirroredincultural,religious,orsocialnormsandtraditions–intermsofcivilianprotectionandprohibitingtheuseofcertainmeansandmethodsofwarfare,forexample–trainersshouldseektoemphasizethiscorrelation.56Incorporatingcomparablehistoricalorcontemporaryexamplesofcompliancecanalsoaddcredibilityandrelevancetothetraining.57Appealingtothetrainees’identityandethoscanhelptoinstilhumanitarianprinciplesandrespectforthelaw.

Timing and frequencyTrainingandinstructionshouldberepeatedatregularintervals,giventheturnoveramongpersonnelandwithinunitsandtheneedtorefreshtheknowledgeofthosealreadytrained.Repeatingtrainingsessionsatregularintervalsservestoanchorrespectforhumanitarianprinciplesasareflexreaction.Thefrequencyoftrainingwillneedtobedeterminedinviewofthetrainees’operationalrequirements,although,asageneralrule,personnelshouldreceivetrainingatleastonceperyear,eveninoperationalsettings.ResearchonintegratedStatearmedforcessuggeststhatmilitaryunitscommandedbyleaderswithmoreintensivetraininginnormsofrestraintengagedinlessviolenceagainstcivilians.58Unitlead-ersareuniquelyplacedtoemphasizenormsofrestraintinkeymoments,forexampleinthewakeofanincidentinwhichaunitmemberhasbeeninjuredorkilled.59

AudienceAnyonewhoplaysakeyroleintheapplicationofIHLshouldbetaughtitsrulesandthesanctionsap- plicabletoviolations.Thatincludesallarmedforces,aswellaslegalofficersandadvisers,regardlessofthegrouptowhichtheybelong,andthoseactingundertheauspicesoftheUnitedNationsoracompetentregionalorganization.Itmayalsoincludecivilianpersonnelwhoperformrelevantfunctions,suchasdiplomaticstaff,armsexportcontrolofficialsandmedicalpersonnel.Thetrainingshouldenableindi-vidualstoclearlyidentifywhatispermissibleandwhatisnot.

Reinforcingnormsofrestraintshouldtakeplacenotonlyatthestrategiclevelofgovernmentorthearmedforces,butatthetacticallevelaswell.Whilethiscanbechallenging,itisanimportantelementinpreventingviolationsofIHL.LeadershipcanbeanimportantfactorininstillinganorganizationalcultureofIHLcomplianceandcivilianprotection(seealsoSections 6.1.2 and 6.2.1).Forexample,juniornon-commissionedofficersarecentraltoeffortstopromotenormsofrestraintamongjuniorsoldierswithinsmalloperationalunits.Whiletrainingseniorcommanders,ambassadorsandotherleadersisworthwhileinitself,theiractiveparticipationintrainingsessionsalsoservestoreinforcethevalueofthetrainingintheeyesofothertrainees.Thismessagingcanbereinforcedbytheleadershipofbothactorsinthesupportrelationship.

TrainersThechoiceoftrainercanmakeadifferenceintheextenttowhichnormsaresocialized.Toidentifythemosteffectivetrainingprovidersforagivenaudience, itwillbenecessarytounderstandtheorgan-izationalandculturalcontext.Insomecases,aneffectiveinstructorinIHLmayrequirecredibilityderivedfromoperationalexperience;thatwillallowthemtodrawondilemmastheyhavefacedandexplainthechoicestheymade.Otheraudiencesmaygivegreatercredencetotrainerswithnocombatexperiencebut

56 RootsofRestraint,p.34(seenote20above).57 RootsofRestraint,p.65(seenote20above).58 AndrewBell,“Measuringtheeffectofnormsocializationonthetreatmentofcivilians:AnanalysisofU.S.armyconductinIraqandAfghanistan”,paperpresentedattheannualmeetingoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,SanFrancisco,31August–3September2017.SeealsoRootsofRestraint,p.28–29(seenote20above).

59 RootsofRestraint,p.29(seenote20above),citinginterviewwithDavidKilcullen,Geneva,29November2017.

recognizedIHLexpertise,suchascivilianlawyersfromtheICRC.Consideringtheimportanceofleader-shipandasenseofrapport,atrainingprogrammemaybemosteffectivewhenthetrainerisinadirect,closehierarchicalrelationshipwiththetraineesand/orisclearlyseentosupporttheprinciplesandideasofIHLbeingconveyedandpracticed.

Someactorsmayhirecontractorstodeliverspecializedtraining.However,thismaycomeatthecostofoperationalexperienceandthefeedbackloopthatwouldbeavailableifthetrainercamefromwithintheactor’sownranks.Additionalframeworksandsafeguardsmayberequiredwhenhiringexternalcontrac-tors,suchasvettingthetrainersbasedontheirpastconductandtraining(seeSection 3.2.5).

Trainingmayalsobemoreeffectivewhendevelopedordeliveredinconjunctionwithlocalauthoritiesandcivilsociety(suchasRedCrossandRedCrescentSocieties,legalprofessionalsand/ornon-governmentalorganizations).Suchpartnersmaybebestpositionedtoappealtolocalvalues,usefamiliarpedagogicalapproachesandexplainconceptsmoreeffectively.Furthermore,suchcollaborationscanhaveapositiveeffectoncivil-militaryrelationsanddeveloptrust,thuscreatingaconduciveenvironmentforcontinuedengagement.

Further reading

Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to

operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict (ICRC and Swiss Federal

Department of Foreign Affairs)

Islamic Law and International Humanitarian Law – Factsheet (ICRC)

B. Mentoring Partnerforcesorcivilianpersonnelwhoreceivetrainingcanalsobementoredinoperationalsituationsoutsideofformaltrainingprogrammesorinstitutions.Thepresenceofmentorsprovidesanopportun-itytoprovidetechnicalguidanceorcoachingthatistailoredtothepartner’sday-to-dayoperationalactivities.Itmayalsoallowcounterpartstodeveloparapportthroughwhichofficialgroupnormsaresupportedorenforcedatthepeerlevel,thusincreasingthelikelihoodthattheywillbeinternalized.60

Thecommonfeatureofmentoringprogrammesisthatthementorisusuallyoutsideofthesupportedactor’shierarchy.Thisfostersaclimateofopendialogue.Justaswithtrainersandadvisers,mentorsshouldbequalifiedandexperiencedintherelevantareaofoperation.

Mentorswhoworkcloselywiththepartner’spersonnelwillbeinabetterpositiontoassesstheefficacyofthetrainingandthepartner’sfurtherneeds,includingchangesthatshouldbemadetotheexistingtrainingregime.Theycouldalsocollectlessonslearnedthatcouldbeusedtoimprovetherelationshipandthepre-deploymenttrainingofincomingpersonnelfromtheirownorganizationorotherpartners(seeSection 6.3.2).

Throughmentors,normsofrestraintcanbecontinuallyreinforcedduringtrainingprogrammes,pre-deploymentpreparationsandspecificmissionsandoperations.Tobeeffective,mentoringshouldbeundertakeninconjunctionwithothermeasures.Italsorequirescontinuityofpersonneloverasustainedperiod,andthepersonnelshouldbeabletoimpartapositiveinfluenceinregardtotheprotectionofcivilians.

60 RootsofRestraint,p.25(seenote20above).

C. Monitoring and evaluationPracticalmeasurestoprovidetrainingormentoringtopartnersshouldbesupplementedbymeasurestoevaluatetheireffectiveness.Anyobservationsshouldfeedbackintothedesignandimplementationoffurthertrainingormentoring–asisthecasewithmonitoring,evaluationandlearningmechanismsingeneral(seeSections 6.2.4 and 6.3.2).

Evaluationmethodscouldincludetestingthetraineesunderduress,aswellaspeer-judgedandcollec-tivelydebriefedexercises.Anotherapproachwouldbetomonitortrainedtroopsonthegroundforaperiodof timefollowingthe trainingtoobserveandassess theoutcome.Extensivedebriefingswithpartnerforcesandotherpartnersengagedwiththetrainedforcescanalsohelpintheevaluationprocess.

6.2.3 ASSISTANCE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMPLIANCEThissectionaddressesmeasuresthatcanhelpanactortocomplywith itsIHLobligationsorotherwiseimproveitsprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.

Thisisdistinctfromthetypeofassistancethatenablespartiestoengageinarmedconflict(seeSection 3.4.3)andismoreoperationallytargetedthaninstitutionalcapacitybuilding(see Section 6.2.1).

TheICRChasidentifiedthreemaintypesofassistance:A. capacitymultiplicationB. resourcesC. substitutingfunctions.

Thesemeasuresprovideactorsinasupportrelationshipwitheffectivewaystoreducethenegativehumani-tarianconsequencesofanarmedconflictwithoutnecessarilybecomingapartytotheconflict.Thesemeasuresareespeciallyrelevantwhereapartnerintendstobephysicallypresentintheconflictsituation–althoughsomeactorsmayconsiderallocatingspecificpersonnelforthepurposeofimplementingthesemeasures.ThesemeasuresrelatetoensuringadherencetoIHLduringtheconductofoperationsandmaytakeplacealongside,andreinforce,similareffortsduringtrainingortobuildinstitutionalcapacity.

Introduction Assessmentsorongoingmonitoringmayrevealgapsinaparty’scapacitiestofulfilitsobligationsunderIHLandotherwiseimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting(seeSections 6.1.3 and 6.2.4). The existenceofasupportrelationshipcanprovideanavenueforapartytoaconflicttoreceiveassistancetofulfiltheseobligations.Throughthesupportrelationship,itcanreceivehelpinenhancingitscapacity,itcanobtainadditionalresources,oritcanbesubstitutedincertainfunctions.Ifthesupportingactorprovidessupportasacapacitymultiplier,itshouldensurethatsuchcapacityisdirectedtowardsimprovingcompliancewithIHLandinamannerthatprotectscivilians,whichmayentailadditionalcontrolmeasuresortraining.

Actorsshouldconsiderwhatspecificortechnicalassistancetheymaybeabletoprovideorneedtorequest,forexampleincaringforthewoundedandsick,preparingforandmanagingdetainees,managingthedead,preventingpeoplefromgoingmissingorclarifyingtheirfateandwhereabouts,andmarkingandclearingERW.Assistancemayserveasameanstomitigateanidentifiedrisk(seeSection 6.1.3),orsimplytocontributetowardsimprovingconditionsforthoseaffectedbytheconflict.

Supportingactorsareencouragedtoplanaheadwhenprovidingthistypeofspecializedassistanceinordertomitigatethenegativehumanitarianconsequencesoftheconflicttowhichtheyhavecontributed,evenaftertheyhaveachievedtheirownstrategicobjectives.Intheeventthatasupportingactorwithdrawscompletelyorreducesitsengagementinagivensituation,itshouldconsidertheongoingimpactonciviliansandothersnotfighting.Wherepossible,arrangementsshouldbemadetoensurethatthesupportedpartyisabletocon-tinuetofulfilitsobligationsandachieveitsprotectionoutcomeswithoutthesupportingactor’sassistance.Itmayrequirethattheassistancebeslowlyrampeddownwhilethosetransitionalarrangementsareestablishedandimplemented.Formoreonthequestionofdisengagement,seeSection 6.3.1.

Key questions • Doesyourpartnerhavegapsintheircapacity,functionsorresourcesthatimpedeitsabilitytofulfilitsobligationstowardspeopleprotectedbyIHL?

• Canyouhelpyourpartnertoincorporatecivilianprotectionintoitsmilitaryplanningandcommitresourcesthataddressthesegaps?

• WhatcontingenciesdoyouhaveinplaceifthesupportedpartyprovesunabletofulfilitsobligationstowardspeopleprotectedbyIHL?

A. Capacity multiplicationBycommittingitselftoasupportrelationship,asupportingactorcanputitselfinapositiontoactivelyassistitspartnerinfulfillingIHLobligationsduringoperations.Naturally,thegreaterthepresenceofthesupportingactorintheoperationalcontext,thegreaterthedegreeofassistancetheycanprovide.

Asupportingactormayrenderassistancebylendingspecificexpertisetothesupportedparty;itmayprovidestafftoundertakespecificfunctionsortoadvisethesupportedpartypersonnelinthosefunctions.Apartnercouldmakeitspersonnelavailabletoprovideadditionalcapacityforagivenperiod,oritcouldofferadviceorrespondtorequestsforadviceonspecificissues.Theadvicecouldbeprovidedatastra-tegic,operationalortacticallevelandpertaintoahostofissues.Itisusuallyconnectedwithaparticulartechnicalcapacityoraspecificissuethatrequiresinputorintervention.

Supportedpartiesmaybeabletoenhancethesupportingactor’scapacitytoabidebyIHLbyprovidinginformationandintelligencethatimprovesthesupportingforce’sunderstandingofcivilianconsider-ations(suchasculturalnormsandpatternsoflife)andhelpsittoidentifytargetsinordertoproperlyapplytheprinciplesofdistinction,proportionalityandprecautions.

Muchasasupportingactormayprovideadvicetoitspartneronmilitaryoperations,itmayalsoenhanceitspartner’scapacitytointegratehumanitarianprinciplesintoitsoperations.Theadviceitprovidesmaybeframedwithinabroadertrainingrelationship.

Whenitcomestoimprovingdetentionconditions,forexample,thesupportingactorcouldprovidethesupportedpartywithaliaisonofficertohelpittoplandetentionoperationsandmanageplacesofdeten-tion.Andwithregardtominimizingcivilianharm,asupportingactormaybeinapositiontoworkwithitspartnertoestablishasystemfortrackingcivilianharm,whichwouldhelpthemidentifypatternsandimprovetheirtargetingprocedures.

Technicalpersonnelassignedtoadviseasupportedpartyshouldbequalifiedandexperiencedinthefieldinwhichtheyprovideadvice.TheyshouldbetrainedinIHL-complianttechniquesthatreducecivilianharmandabletoidentifyandmitigaterisksofIHLviolationsorcivilianharm.Furthermore,advisersshouldbefamiliarwithboththepartnerandthesituation(s)inwhichitoperatesinordertoprovidecontextuallyappropriateadvice.

Thisadvisorymeasureneednotbelimitedtomilitarypersonnel;insomecasestherequiredspecialistsupportcouldbeprovidedbycivilians.Forexample,acivilianharmtrackingsystemcanbenefitfromtheinputofcivilsociety,community-basedorganizations,non-governmentalorganizationsandthemedia.

B. ResourcesAsupportingactormaybewell-placedtocontributeresourcestohelpitspartnertofulfilitsobligations.Examplesincludetransferringessentialgoodsforaffectedpeople,transferringequipmentthatwillhelpthepartyperformitsfunctionsmoreeffectively,orbuildingorrenovatinginfrastructurethatservesahumanitarianpurpose.

Forexample,thesupportingactorcouldassistbyprovidingfood,hygieneservicesormedicalcarefordistributiontopeopledeprivedoftheirliberty,thewoundedandsick,orcivilians.

Infrastructuresupportcouldconcernthesupplyofessentialservicestothecivilianpopulation,orensur-ingadequatestandardsaremetforthoseundertheauthorityofapartytoaconflict,inparticularthosedeprivedoftheirliberty.Thesupportingactorcouldprovidefinancialassistance,physicalresourcessuchasbuildingmaterialsandITsystems,orpersonnel.

C. Substituting functionsWherethesupportedpartyisunabletoperformitsfunctions,thesupportingactorshouldconsidersub-stitutingforthepartyinthosefunctions.Thismaybethecasewhen,forexample,thesupportedpartyisunabletoclearareascontaminatedbyERWorprovidehealthcaretociviliansandothersnotfighting.Thosefunctionscanthenbeprovidedbythesupportingpartyuntilasupportedactorcanfulfilthosefunctionstotherequiredlevel.

6.2.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATION Arangeofmeasurescanbetakenbyanactortoensurevisibilityoveritspartner’sactionsand,whereneces-sary,tocallthatpartnertoaccountforanyproblematicconductortotakecorrectivemeasuresaimedatimprovingconduct.Ordinarily,thesemeasureswillbuildonthemechanismseachactorhasdevelopedtoconductinternaloversightduringasupportrelationship(seeSection 6.2.5).

Decisionmakersshouldconsiderandaddresssixinterrelatedelements:A. monitoringandevaluationB. recordingC. oversightD. reportingproceduresE. investigationsF. accountability.

IntroductionAllactorsshouldregularlyassesstheconductoftheirpartnersinasupportrelationshipandtakemeasurestoreducetheriskstowhichciviliansandothersnotfightingmaybeexposed.

Anactorthatprovidessupporttoapartytoanarmedconflicthasalegal,moralorethicalresponsibilitytoconsiderhowthatsupportisusedandtodevelopmechanismstoholditspartnertoaccountforanyprob-lematicbehaviour.Thesupportingactorshouldalsotakethesupportedparty’sbehaviourintoaccountasitassessestheriskofcontinuingtosupportthatparty,anditshouldseektoidentifyanynecessarycorrectivemeasures.TopreventviolationsofIHLorothernormsfromrecurring,thesupportedpartymustbeheldaccountableforitsactionsandsanctionedappropriately.

Aresponsiblesupportrelationshipthereforerequireseffectivemechanismsthatensurethatthesupportingandsupportedactorseachhaveknowledgeofhowtheotherbehaveswithintheframeworkoftherelationshipandhowthesupportgivenorreceivedisbeingused.Attheoutset,aclearlydefinedagreementthatplacesapriorityonhowadherencetoIHLandtheprotectionofcivilianswillbemonitoredcansignaltheimportanceplacedonthisissueandhaveadeterrenteffect(seeSection 6.1.3).

Where thepartnerseachhaveeffective internalmechanisms, the focuswill beonachievingalignmentbetweentheirrespectivemeasures.Ifanyexistingmechanismsarenotexpectedtobeeffectiveinagivensituation,theactorcanhelpitspartnertostrengthenthem.

Themonitoringandevaluationmechanismsshouldalsobeintegratedintolearningprocesses.Thismeansincorporatinganyissuesidentifiedthroughthosemechanismsintoanalysesand,whereappropriate,makingsystemicadjustmentstopreventthoseissuesfromrecurring(seeSection 6.3.2).

Key questions • Doyouhavevisibilityonyourpartner’soperations?

• Howdoyouevaluatethehumanitarianimpactofyourpartner’soperations?

• HowdoyoudeterminewhetherthesupportyouprovideisusedincompliancewithIHL?

• Whatmetricsdoyouusetoreviewandmodifythesupportrelationshipovertime?

• Whatsystemdoyouusetoaddresspotentialmisconductbythepartner,orotherproblemsin therelationship?

• IfIHLviolationsmayhaveoccurred,howwilltheybeeffectivelyinvestigated?

A. Monitoring and evaluationThecapacitytomonitortheconductofpartnersinasupportrelationshipisabaselinerequirement.Asinallprocessesandrelationshipsinvolvingdifferentactors,timelyandaccurateinformationcanhelptotrackwhetherasupportrelationshipisworkingefficientlyandcorrectlyandtoidentifyanyspecificrisks.MonitoringisparticularlyimportanttoascertainwhethersupportisbeingusedinaccordancewithIHLandotherrelevantinternationallawsandstandards.Itthereforefeedsintotheexerciseofoversight(ifany)andaccountabilitybetweenpartners.Itisalsocloselylinkedwiththerecordingofinformation,reportingproceduresandinvestigations,whererelevant.

One-off assessments are not enough to ensure a responsible support relationship. Ascircumstanceschangeovertime,itisimportanttomonitorthepartner’sconductinordertoidentifylinksbetweenthesupportprovidedandthatpartner’sbehaviour.

Effectivemonitoringdependsonavarietyoffactorsoutsideoftheactor’scontrol.Yetthatactor’sdeci-sionsalsohaveimplicationsforitscapacitytomonitor.Thisisespeciallytruewherethesupportingactor,optingforalight-footprintstrategy,hasdecidedtolimitthenumberofitspersonnelontheground,orduringarmstransferswheretheremaybenopersonnelfromthesupportingactorontheground.

However,theonusremainsoneachactortoensureithassufficient,reliableinformationuponwhichtobaseitsdecisionswithrespecttothesupportrelationship.Theurgencyofsecurityconcernsshouldnotbeseenasoverridingtheneedtoensureadequatemonitoring.

Toconducteffectivemonitoring,theactormustrelyondifferentsourcesofinformation.Triangulatedreportinghelpstoensurethatinformationisreliable.Monitoringprocessesshouldseektogatherinfor-mationprovidedbythewidestpossiblerangeofexternalmonitoringbodies,particularlythosethatareindependentand impartial.Communitiesaffectedbyanarmedconflict shouldbeprovidedwith themeansandmechanismstosafelyreportandshareallegationsthatcouldbearuponsuchevaluations(seeSection 6.2.4.D).Evenwhereanactordoesnothaveaphysicalpresence,therearedifferentwaystoensuresomelevelofmonitoringisavailable.

Potentialsourcesofinformationinclude:

• internalreportsfromcombined,jointandpartneredoperations(seeSection 6.2.4.B)

• reportsfrompersonnelembeddedwithpartnerarmedforces

• specialized,trainedmonitoringpositions

• aperiodicreportingmechanismbythepartneritself

• otheractorsthatarepresent,likeotherarmedforces

• otherministries,departmentsoragenciesofeitherthesupportedorsupportingactor

• independentorganizations

• civilsociety

• externaldata,suchassatelliteimagery,socialmediainformationorpublicreporting.

Insomecases,aphysicalpresencemaybetheonlywayforthesupportingactortobesatisfiedthatthesupportitprovidesisbeingusedincompliancewithIHL.Inothersituations,regularreportsmaysuffice.Thelevelofmonitoringwillofcoursedependonthetypeofsupportprovidedandtheassessmentofthe

riskassociatedwiththissupport.Inanycase,theabsenceofinformationshouldnotberegardedascon-firmingthatthesupportedparty’sbehaviourcomplieswithinternationallaw.

Wherefeasible,anactorcanimproveitsreactivitytoincidentsandfinditeasiertoidentifysystemicissuesifithasdedicatedmonitoringpersonnel.Forexample,inaPMO,thecapacitytorespondquicklytoincidentsofcivilianharmmayhelptoreducethenegativehumanitarianconsequences,respondtotheconcernsofthepartnerand/oraffectedcommunityand,whererelevant,takecorrectivemeasures.

Monitoringandevaluationneednotrequireasubstantialinvestmentoronerousreportingprocedures.61 Indeed,someactorsmayalreadyhaveamonitoringandevaluationframeworkinplaceforkeepingtrackofitsownactivities.Suchframeworksshouldbeadaptedtoensurethattheyincludepartnersandthatthescopeofinformationbeingcollectedincludesissuesrelatedtopossiblemisconductandviolationsofthelaw.Theinformationcollectedthroughmonitoringshouldbeevaluatedtodeterminewhetherthesupportrelationshipisworkingasenvisagedandwhatfactorsaffectitseffectiveness,andtoidentifyanyspecificrisksthathaveormayarise.

B. RecordingCollecting,documentingandretaininginformationrelatingtomilitaryoperationsservemultiplepur-poses:theyenablethepartnerstolearnthroughouttherelationship(seeSection 6.3.2);theinformationcanbeusefulforimprovingoperationaleffectiveness,tailoringtrainingprogrammes(seeSection 6.2.2)andreviewingriskassessments(seeSection 6.1.3);andtheinformationisessentialforanycriminaloradministrativeinvestigationsthatmightbelaunched(seeSection 6.2.4).

Examplesofmattersthatshouldberecordedincludecivilianharm(lossofcivilianlife,injurytociviliansand/ordamagetocivilianobjects)resultingfromoperations;munitionsthathavebeenused, lostorabandoned;andinformationonpeoplewhoarecapturedordetained.Theinformationmayberecordedinoneofseveralformats, includingpost-missiondebriefs,contactreportsandafter-actionreviews.Theinformationrecordedinacivilianharmtrackingmechanism,forexample,canfacilitateiterativeimprovementsinpractice,revealpotentialsystemicissues,supportcontextuallyrelevanttrainingandflagpossibleviolationsthatmayrequireinvestigation.

InPMOs,aprocedure forsharing informationrelated topossible incidentsshouldbeestablished inadvance–yetwithreasonableexpectations,giventhechallengeofverifyingthematerialsharedandclassifyingtheinformationrecorded.62Moregenerally,anactormaytakestepstorecordinformationrelating to itspartner’smilitaryoperationsaspartof itsmonitoringandevaluationprocedure (seeSection 6.2.4.A).

Alearningprocessshouldbeimplementedthroughouttherelationshiptoreviewperformanceandiden-tifylessonsthatcanbeappliedwithintherelationshipgoingforward.Dependingontheissuesraised,thefeedbackloopmaybemoreorlessimmediate.ContinuallearningisespeciallyimportantininstanceswherethereisariskthatviolationsofIHLorotherstandardsmayoccur(orcontinue).Thelearningprocesscanservetoensurethatcorrectivemeasuresaretakentopreventorputanendtotheviolations.Adynamic,on-the-flymethodto identify,captureandapplythoselessonswhiletherelationshipisongoingwillallowforanyimprovementstobeincorporatedintotherelationshipandforanyproblemstobeaddressedassoonaspossible.

61 UNHumanRightsDueDiligencePolicyGuidance(seenote16above).62 N.Lubell,J.PejicandC.Simmons,GuidelinesoninvestigatingviolationsofIHL:Law,policyandgoodpractice, ICRC and the GenevaAcademyofInternationalHumanitarianLawandHumanRights,Geneva,2019,p.15:https://www.icrc.org/en/document/guidelines-investigating-violations-ihl-law-policy-and-good-practice.

Further reading

Guidelines on investigating violations of IHL: Law, policy and good practice, pp. 14–15 (N. Lubell, J. Pejic,

and C. Simmons)

See also: – Section 6.2.2IHLtraining – Section 6.3.2Learning

C. OversightEffectiveoversightisfundamentaltoensuringrespectforIHLandreducingtheriskofharm.Oversight,inthesenseofhavingthepowertoreviewandact,istypicallyamatterforanactortoimplementinternally(seeSection 6.2.5).Itisintheactor’sinteresttoensurethatitspartnerhasadequateinternaloversightand,ifnot,tohelpthemdevelopthenecessarymechanisms(seeSection 6.2.1).

Actorsinasupportrelationshipshouldhaveacertaindegreeofhigh-levelvisibilityintotheirpartner’sbehaviourinthecontextoftherelationshipandhaveatleastsomepowertointervene.Thisisnottosug-gestanysituationofhierarchyorcontrolbetweenactors.Itissimplyaquestionofexercisingoversightbymonitoringtheirpartner’sbehaviourandexercisingtheirpowertopositivelyinfluencethatbehaviourbyreviewing,suspendingordecreasingtheirsupportifnecessary.

Theissueofoversightatanoperationallevelbecomesrelevantinsupportrelationshipswhereoneoftheactorsdoesnothavetheframework,systemsorprocessestoconductitsowninternaloversight.ThisisparticularlyrelevantinPMOs,forexamplewhenitcomestonewlyestablishedforces.Bydefinition,theseforcesarelesswell-establishedthanexistingsecurityforces.Dependingonhowtheseforcesaregener-ated,newrecruitsmaybefreshlytrainedandseniorstaffmaylackcommandexperience.Leadershipandaccountabilitymechanismsmaynotyetberootedintheorganizationalculture.Thesefactorssuggestthesupportingactoritselfshouldexerciseoversight,atthesametimethatitbuildstheforce’scapacitytoaddresspressingsecurityconcerns.Inareaswherelong-termoversightcannotreasonablybeexpectedtobeexercisedbythesupportingactororanotheractor,suchforcesshouldnotbeestablishedorsupported.Suchoversightshouldcontinueuntiltheforcesaredemobilized,integratedintonationalsecurityforces,orotherwisemaderesponsivetothepoliticalandjudicialaccountabilitymechanismsestablishedbytherelevantauthorities(seeSection 6.3.1).

D. Reporting proceduresReportingproceduresprovidethelinkbetweenmonitoringandtheinvestigationofpossibleviolationsofIHL.

Firstly,actorsshouldconsiderwhethertheirpartnershaveanexistingprocedureforreportingpossibleviolationsofIHL.AnyonewithareportingobligationshouldbecapableofrecognizingbreachesofIHL(andofotherrelevant laws).Tothatend,personnel insupervisoryorcommandpositionsshouldbetrainedtorecognizebreachesofthesebodiesoflawandunderstandtheirresponsibilitytoreportsuchbreachestotherelevantauthorities.Itisalsocrucialthatthesepersonnelbeauthorizedtoactonthebasisofoutsideallegations.

Secondly,whenenteringasupportrelationship,actorsshouldseektoimplementuniformreportingpro-ceduresthatareagreedandunderstoodbyallpartiesconcernedandcommunicatedtoallrelevantper-sonnel.Theestablishmentofadatabaseforthispurposewouldhelptrackallegationsandensurethatrelevantinformationispreservedtoassistpotentialinvestigations(seenextsection).Itmaybeappro-priatetoimplementadualreportingsystem,wherebypossibleviolationsarereportedwithinthechainofcommandofeachactorintherelationship.

Thirdly,actorsshouldcreateaccessibleandeffectiveprocessesforreceivingoutsideallegationsofanincidentthatmayrequireinvestigation.63Allegationscouldbemadebyindividualsdirectlyorindirectlyaffectedbymilitaryoperationsorotherpeopleorbodieswithaninterestinthematter.Proceduresandchannelsofcommunicationshouldbeestablishedtoensurecomplainants’safety,securityandprivacy.Actorsmayneedtoaddresschallengessuchaslinguistic,socialandculturalfactorsthatmighthinderindividualsfrommakinganallegation.Sharinggoodpracticeswouldbevaluableinthisregard.

E. InvestigationsThissectionaddressesinvestigationsbyanactorintoapartner’sconduct,andmechanismsforjointinvestigations.Theselectionofappropriatemeasureswillbeinformedbythestrengthofthepartner’sinternalinvestigationprocesses(seeSection 6.2.5.B).

Investigationrefers toactivitiesaimedatestablishing the facts surroundingan incident inorder toallowforasubsequentdeterminationofresponsibility forapossibleviolationof IHLorother law.64 Investigationsmaybeofacriminaloradministrativenature,dependingonthepossibleviolationsinquestion.Forexample,regularmonitoringmaydetectpotentialsystemicissueswhich,throughadmin-istrativeinvestigation,canbecorrectedtopreventpossibleIHLviolationsortheirrecurrence.

Decisionmakerswillneedtoconsiderwhethertheirpartner’sinvestigationprocessislikelytobeeffectiveinthecontextofabilateralormultilateralsupportrelationship.Forexample,asupportingactormayhavedifficultysecuringthecooperationofotheractorsorobtainingrelevantinformationfromthesupportedparty.Stepsmayneedtobetakentoremedypotentialweaknesses,suchasbycollectinginformationtotransmittopartnerauthorities,bytrainingpartnerforcesintheinvestigativeprocessandprovidingcapacity-buildingassistancetothisend,orbyestablishingasystemforjointinvestigations.Jointinves-tigationsmayalsobeappropriatewheretheyarerelatedtocombined,jointandpartneredoperations.Ineithercase,cooperationmaystrengthentheinvestigationandsupportthepartner’sabilitytoregulatetheforcesunderitscommand.

Othermeasuresfailing,anactorshouldbepreparedtoconductitsowninvestigationintopossibleviola-tionsofIHLorofotherrelevantlawscommittedbyitspartner’spersonnelandreferthemtotheauthor-itiesconcernedand/ortriggertheappropriateaccountabilitymechanisms.

Further reading

Guidelines on investigating violations of IHL: Law, policy and good practice (N. Lubell, J. Pejic, and C. Simmons)

F. AccountabilityEffectiveaccountabilityprocessesareessentialtoensuringcompliancewithIHLandotherinternationalstandards.Inasupportrelationship,accountabilityhastwofacets:accountabilitybetweenactorsintherelationshipasafeatureofcoherentresponsibility(discussedbelow),andeachactor’sinternalaccount-ability(seeSection 6.2.5).

Accountabilityprocessescanbemilitaryorcivilian,administrativeorcriminal.Thenotionofaccount-abilityusedhereisnotnecessarilylimitedtolegalprocesses;someissuesinthesupportrelationshipcanbeaddressedinformallyorthroughdiplomaticchannels.Forexample,therapportbetweencommandersoftwoforcesmayallowthemtoshareconcernsabouttheother’spersonnel.Inmoreseriousorsystemiccases,suspendingorterminatingsupportmaybeawayforasupportingactortomakethesupportedpartyaccountableforitspastuseofthatsupport.Eachactorshouldhaveaclearunderstandingoftheappropriateavenuesforaccountabilitydependingontheissueatstake,includingwhereformalaccount-abilitymechanismsarerequiredbyinternationalordomesticlaw.

63 See GuidelinesoninvestigatingviolationsofIHL,p.20(seenote62above).64 Foramorecompleteunderstanding,seeGuidelinesoninvestigatingviolationsofIHL(seenote62above).

Thecentralquestioniswhetherapartnerhasinplaceeffectivemechanismstoensureaccountabilityforitsownactionsandthosetakenonitsbehalf.65Wherethiscannotbeaffirmed,theotheractor(s)inthesupportrelationshipshouldtakestepstoimprovethosemechanismsand,inthemeantime,takeotherpracticalmeasurestofilltheaccountabilitygap.

Allsupportrelationshipsshouldalsohavewell-developedandunderstoodproceduresforeitherpartnertobeinformedof,raiseand,ultimately,resolveanyproblemsrelatingtoeitherpartner.Partnersinasupportrelationshipmayalsoneedasystemforreconcilingtheirrespectivemechanismssothatanygapsarefilledwhileduplicationisavoided.

Inasupportrelationship,theactorsshouldindividuallyorcollectivelyensurethatanaccountabilitymechanismisinplace.Accountabilityprocessesshouldbecapableofdeterminingtheresponsibilityofbothallegedperpetratorsandcommanders;theyshouldalsoleadtoallegationsbeingreported,effect-ivelyinvestigatedandaddressed.

Measurestoensuretheirpartners’accountabilityaremostcrucialwhenactorsareengagedinPMOs.Yettheissueisnolessrelevantwhensupportingactorsarenotpresentonthegroundalongsidethepartner.Insituationswhereacoalitionofactorsprovidessupport,theactorsshouldcoordinatewitheachothertobuildappropriatemechanismsandprocessesthatcanaddressindividualandcollectivebehaviour.

Accountabilitymechanismsshouldbefactoredintotherelationshipfromtheoutsetbybothsupportingandsupportedactors,regardlessofthetypeofsupportprovided.

Accountabilityissuchakeyelementinresponsiblesupportrelationshipsthatthenecessaryprocessesandmechanismsshouldbeincorporatedintothemduringthepreparationphasewhereverpossible(seeSection 6.1).Standingalliancesandcoalitionscandevelopsuchcomplementaryprocessesinpeacetimeasamatterofpreparedness.

6.2.5 INTERNAL OVERSIGHTInternaloversightreferstothegroupofmeasuresestablishedtoensurethatanactor’sownarmedforcesandothergovernmentalbodiesoperatewithinthe lawandareaccountabletotheirowngovernmentorconstituents.

Twoelementsaredescribedbelowforconsideration:A. internaloversightB. investigations.

Introduction Actorsthatengageinarmedconflictoftenhavesystemsinplacetoensurethatdecisionstogotowarandtheconductoftheirforcesinwarhaveasoundlegalbasis.Tothisend,mechanismsareestablishedsothatarmedforcesandothergovernmentalbodiesoperatewithintheirlegalpowers,thattheconductofindivid-ualpersonnelcanbereviewedand,wherenecessary,thatsanctionsareimposedforviolationsofapplicabledomesticandinternationallaw.

Alltoofrequently,however,actorsstructurallyorpoliticallydistancethemselvesfromtheconflictsituationinwhichtheyprovidesupport.Forexample,someprogrammesoractivitiesmaybeexcludedfromstandardoversightframeworksbecausetheyrelatetonationalsecurity.Furthermore,dependingonthetypeofsup-portprovided,supportingactorsmaynotapplydomesticframeworkstocertainprogrammesoractivitieswiththesamedegreeofscrutinyastheywouldiftheseactorswerethemselvespartytothearmedconflict.Evenwhilesupportrelationshipsmayberegardedasameansofminimizinganactor’scostsortheriskoftakingdirectaction,theycouldbeusedtooperatewithimpunityifappropriatemeasuresarenottaken.

65 TheinternalaccountabilityofanactortowardsitsowngovernmentandconstituentsisaddressedinSection 6.2.5 of this document.

Inviewofthepotentialhumanitarianconsequencesofprovidingsupporttopartiestoarmedconflict,itisimportantforsupportingactorstoestablishsystemsofoversightandaccountabilitythatallowthemtoreviewand,wherenecessary,correctthesupporttheyprovide.

Wherethescopeofthesupportprovidediswideorvariesovertime,thereisariskthatnosingleagencyorbodyhasgeneraloversightofthesupportrelationship.Thishamperseffectivecoordination,createstensionbetweendifferentbodiesandcontributestotheinternallackofaccountabilityandthediffusionofrespon-sibility(seeSection 2.2).

Incoalitions,alackofoversightoraccountabilitycanoccurwhereverrolesandresponsibilitiesareunclear.Thisisparticularlyprevalentwhereactorspoolresourcesinlooseallianceswithnoformalcoordinationandaccountabilitymechanisms.

Key questions • DoyouhaveaprocedureforeffectivelyinvestigatingallpossibleIHLviolationsbyyourarmedforcesorpersonnel,includinginthecontextofasupportrelationship?

• Whatisyourprocessforreviewingyourowndecisionstoprovideorreceivesupport?

• Dootherpartsofthegovernmenthavethepowertocheckthatthesupportrelationshipisplannedandimplementedinaccordancewithinternationalanddomesticlaw?

A. Internal oversight Variousmechanismscanbeusedtoreviewanactor’sdecisionsandconductinasupportrelationship.Dependingontheactor’sgovernancestructure,governmentofficials,electedrepresentativesandcon-stituenciesmaybeabletoscrutinizethegovernment’sorauthority’sdecisions.

Oversightmechanismsmaycoverthedecisiontoprovideorreceivesupport,theselectionofthetypeofsupportprovidedandtheconductofpersonnelwhileprovidingsupport.Inadditiontoensuringthatsup-portisprovidedinaccordancewithrelevantlawsandpolicies,suchmechanismsprovideanopportunitytolearnfromthosesupportrelationshipsandbuildonanyidentifiedweaknessesorstrengths.

Havinganeffective internalreviewmechanismisparticularly importantwhen itcomestoactorsoroperationsthatareintentionallyexcludedfromnormalreportingproceduresforsecurityreasons,suchasmissionsconductedbyspecialforcesorintelligenceservices.Whateverthereasonsfornotdisclosingthesetypesofoperations,exemptingthemfromnormaloversightmechanismsrisksdiminishingtheaccountabilityoftheirpersonnel.Reviewmechanismscanbeputinplacethatprotectthosesecurityimperativeswhilestillensuringaccountability.

Parliament Insofarastheyareinvolvedincreatingoramendinglaws,parliamentariansplayanimportantroleingrantingandcontrollingtheauthorityoftheexecutive.Dependingontheparliamentarysystem,parlia-mentscantakeorshapedecisionstoprovideorreceivesupportandmanagetheapplicationofnationalresourcestothisend.Underdomesticlaworcustoms,parliamentariansmaybeabletoaskthegovern-mentquestionsrelatingtotheexerciseofitspowers,ortoestablishcommissionsofinquiryintoagivenmatter.Inexercisingtheirfunctions,parliamentarianscanhaveaccesstoinformationprovidedbythegovernmentorexternalsources,suchasreportsbyindependentobservers.

Parliamentariansrequiretransparencyfromthegovernmentinordertoobtainthenecessaryinformationwithwhichtotakeorshapedecisionsaffectingthesupportrelationship,includingtoamendtherela-tionshipwherenecessary.Wherethetopicsbeingdiscussedareregardedassensitivefornationalsecurityreasons,specialmeasurescouldbeadoptedtoensurethattheinformationissharedonlywiththosewhorequireittoexercisetheirfunctions.

Judicial authorities Amongsttheentitiesabletoprovideoversightaredomestic judicialauthorities.Theymayprovideaforumforchallengingthedecisionsorconductoftheotherbranchesofgovernment.StatescantakestepstoensurethatthenationalcourtshavejurisdictionoverquestionsofcompliancewithIHLandotherinternationallaws.Forexample,domesticlawmaygivecourtstheauthoritytoreviewthelegalityofarmstransferdecisions.Judicialauthoritiesarealsoanimportantmeansofensuringaccountabilityforanycrimes.Thisincludesthetaskofprosecutingwarcrimesallegedlycommittedbytheirnationalforcesorontheirterritory.

Further reading

International Humanitarian Law: Handbook for Parliamentarians (ICRC and Inter-Parliamentary union)

B. Investigations AllsupportingandsupportedactorsshouldhavesystemsinplacetoensurethateffectiveinvestigationsareconductedintopossibleviolationsofIHLundertheirjurisdiction.Investigationsmayberequiredunderinternationalordomesticlaw,suchasincasesofallegedwarcrimes.Theymayalsoserveotherpurposes,suchastoidentifygoodpracticesandlessons,improveoperationaleffectiveness,maintaindiscipline,demonstrateaccountabilitytoaffectedcommunitiesandfacilitateatransitiontopeace.

ManyStateshavenationallegalframeworksandprocessestoinvestigatepossibleviolationsofIHLbypeopleundertheirjurisdiction,includingtheirownarmedforces.However,investigativepracticesvarywidely.

Decisionmakerswillneedtoconsiderwhethertheirinvestigativeprocessesarelikelytobeeffectiveinthecontextofabilateralormultilateralsupportrelationship.Foraninvestigationtobeeffective,itshouldbecapable ofenablingadeterminationofwhethertherewasaviolationofIHL,identifytheindividualandsystemicfactorsthatcausedorcontributedtoanincident,andlaythegroundforanyremedialactionthatmayberequired.Actorsmaysetupadhocframeworks,systemsandprocessesforthesupportrela-tionship,forexampleinmultinationalcoalitionsorpeaceforces.Inaddition,thesupportagreementmayrequirethepartnersandthehostStatetoshareinformationandcooperatewitheachother.

Further reading

Guidelines on investigating violations of IHL: Law, policy and good practice (N. Lubell, J. Pejic, and

C. Simmons)

6.3 TRANSITION

LEARNING

TRANSITION

6.3.1 STRUCTURED DISENGAGEMENTStructureddisengagementreferstomeasurestoensurethattheactorsproperlyplantheendorthereductionofsupportinordertominimizethedisruptiontotheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.

IntroductionItistobeexpectedthatasupportrelationshipwillevolveovertime.Thescaleornatureofsupportmayvaryinresponsetotherecipient’sinvolvementinanarmedconflict,therecipient’sbehaviour,shiftsineitherpartner’sobjectives,orotherenvironmentalfactors.Whateverthereason,itisinevitablethatatransitionwilloccuratsomepoint,whethertherelationshipcomestoanend(withdrawalorhandover)orthesupportbeingprovidedissignificantlyreduced.

Itisimportanttohaveacomprehensiveexitortransitionstrategyinplaceasearlyaspossible,oncethemainparametersofthesupportrelationshiphavebeendefinedandbeforethesupporthasbeenimplemented.Forexample,aprovisionalstrategyshouldbeestablishedbeforePMOsbegin.Becausesomemeasureswillneedtobetakeninadvanceofthedisengagement,waitinguntilshortlybeforedisengagementtocomeupwithaplanincreasestherisksforthelocalcommunity.IntheICRC’sview,actorsshouldplantheirstructureddisengagementfromtherelationship,takingintoaccountscenariosinwhichtheirstrategicobjectiveshavebeenmetorhavenotbeenmet.Actorsshouldalsobeawarethatdisengagementmaynottakeplaceuntilanarmedconflictends.Insomecases,thetransitionstrategywillbepartofalargerintegratedrecoverystrategyencompassing,forexample,economicdevelopment,securitysectorreform,thereturnofrefugeesandIDPs,andjusticeandreconciliation.Thedisengagementstrategywillneedtobereviewedastherelationshipandthenatureandextentofsupportevolve.Thiswillminimizethenumberofchangesrequiredintherun-upto disengagement.

Inadditiontoaddressingtheneedsofthepeopleaffectedbyconflict,thestrategyshouldreflectanassess-mentoftherisksofharmstemmingfromthetransitionitself.Forexample,actorsshouldconsiderhowtheywillmanageanyhandoverandtheimpactofthefutureabsenceofsupport.Thestrategyshouldanticipatethevestedinterestsoflocalactors,anditmayneedtoaddresstheDDRofthesupportedparty’spersonnelaswellasthatparty’scapacityinthePSSMoftransferredweaponsandrelatedammunition.

Theplanshouldalsotakeintoaccountthebroaderhumanitarianconsequencesofthearmedconflictandthesituationasitstandsatthetimeofdisengagement.Theseconsequenceswillbefeltforyearsifnotdecadesaftertheconflicthasended.Thedisengagementstrategyshouldthereforeidentifywaysofminimizingthelong-termimpactoftheactors’activitiesonaffectedpeople.Manyofthesemeasuresmaythemselvesneedtobeimplementedoverthemediumtolongterm.Failingtoproperlymanagetheseconsequencesmayresultincontinuedinstabilityandviolenceoreventherecurrenceofarmedconflict.

Practicalmeasuresmaybetakeninthefollowingareas:A. systemsustainabilityB. ongoingprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingC. responsibleresourcedisengagementD. managingtheaftermath.

Key questions • DoesthesupportedpartydependonthesupporttocomplywithIHL,andwhatcanyoudotoensureitremainscompliantonceyoursupportends?

• Whatotherfunctionsthatthesupportingactorfulfilstopromotetheprotectionofpeopleaffectedbyconflictwillneedtobeassumedbythesupportedpartyoranotheractorwhenthesupportends?

• Howwillthesupportedparty’sintentiontocomplywithIHLandotherrelevantstandardsbeaffectedifthesupportrelationshipchangesorends?

• Haveyouagreedonresponsibleresourcedisengagementmeasures(suchasDDRprogrammesorarmsmanagementprogrammes)toputintoplace?

• Howwillyouassessandmitigatetheriskofharmtomembersofyourpartner’sarmedforcesandtheirfamiliesorcommunitiesoncethesupportorconflictends?

A. System sustainability Acomprehensiveexitstrategyshouldincludemeasurestoensurethesupportedparty’sinstitutionsandoperationsaremaintained,transferredorendedfollowingdisengagement.Functionsofparticularcon-cernarethoseaffectingpeoplenotornolongerparticipatinginhostilities.Theyincludeessentialser-vicessuchashealthcare,detentionandjusticesystems,processestofindmissingpersonsandfacilitatedurablesolutionsforIDPs,weaponsandammunitionmanagementandmarkingandclearingERW,andproceduresaimedatmitigatingcivilianharm(seeSections 3 and 4).

Wherefunctionsaretransferredfromthesupportedpartytoanotheractor,thesupportingactorshouldensurethatmeasuressetuptoprotectciviliansandothersnotfightingremaininplace.Ifthesupportedpartyintendstocontinueitsoperations,thefocusshouldbeonensuringthattheycanbemaintainedinfullrespectofIHLandapplicablehumanrightsstandards.Thismayrequiretailoredmeasuressothatthepartycantakeoveranyfunctionsbeingprovidedbythesupportingactor.Thesupportingactor’sfunc-tionsshouldbegraduallytaperedasthesupportedpartytakesthemover.

Supportingactorspreparingtodisengageinanticipationoftheendofaconflictshouldconsidershiftingtheirtrainingobjectives.Inparticular,thesupportedparty’sweaponsbearersmayrequireincreasedtraininginrulesandbestpracticesapplicableinpeacetime,includinginrelationtouse-of-forceproced-uresandweaponsmanagement.Ifarmedforcesarecalledupontoengageinlawenforcementoperations,specializedtrainingandequipmentisneeded.

Incaseswhereasupportingactorintendstoceaseitsfunctionsortransferthemtoanauthorityotherthanthesupportedparty,suchaspursuanttoapeaceprocess,itsexitstrategyshouldincluderesponsibleresourcedisengagementfromthesupportedparty(seeSection 6.3.1.C).

Ifthesupportedpartyprevailsinaconflict,thesupportitreceiveswillalmostcertainlyneedtobeshiftedawayfromthesecuritysectorandfocusedonbroaderstabilizationneeds,includingdevelopment.Suchatransitionbeforethispoint,orintheabsenceofstrategicsuccess,maybemorechallenging;insuchcasesitmaymakesensetotransitionthesupporttoanotherresponsibleactor.Itisbeyondthescopeofthisdocumenttofullyexplorethequestionoftransition,thepracticalimplicationsofwhichwillneverthelessaffectallgovernmentdepartmentsandagencies.Awhole-of-governmentapproachwillbeessentialtominimizedisruptionandthreatstociviliansandothers.

See also: – Section 3.3.4Lawenforcementoperations

Train the trainersItmayberelevanttodevelopthecapacityofpartnerforcestoconducttheirownIHLtrainingtoensuresustainabilitybeyondtheendoftherelationship.Whiletrain-the-trainerprogrammesareoftenlong-terminitiativesexecutedthroughoutthesupportrelationship,theyareespeciallyrelevantaspartofacomprehensiveexitstrategy.Insuchcases,theymusttakeaccountofthepartnerforces’currentandfuturefunctions,whileatthesametimedistinguishingbetweenlegalparadigmsapplicableduringtimesofconflictandtimesofpeace.

B. Ongoing protection of civilians and others not fighting Actorsinasupportrelationshipmustnotoverlooktheimpactthatatransitionwillhaveonciviliansandothersnotfighting.Evenifthetransitionoccursattheendofaconflict,bothsupportedpartiesandsupportingactorsmayhavecontinuinglegalobligationsorotherresponsibilitiestowards,forexample,personsdeprivedoftheirliberty,thedeadandthemissing.

See also: – Section 4Theprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting

Continued protection of detaineesSpecialconsiderationshouldbegiventotheobligationsthatpartiestoanarmedconflict,andsometimessupportingactors,havetowardspeopledeprivedoftheirliberty.

Ifittransfersdetaineestothesupportedparty,thesupportingactorhasacontinuingresponsibilitytoensurethosedetainees’well-being.Thisdutymaybeimplementedthroughpost-transfermonitoring,forexample(seeSection 6.2.4).

Wherethesupportingactorwithdrawsfinancialandmaterialassistancethatthesupportedpartyrequirestoprovidedignifiedconditionsofdetention,mitigatingmeasuresmustbeimplementedtoensurethatpersonsdeprivedoftheirlibertycontinuetobeprotected.

Actorsshouldalsoconsiderthecapacityofthelocaljusticesector.Ifasupportingactorintendstotrans-fercustodyofalargenumberofdetaineestothesupportedparty,itmustconsiderwhetherthatpartyhastheresourcesandproceduresinplacetodetain,investigateand,whereappropriate,prosecutethosepeopleinaccordingwithinternationalstandards.Supportingactorsmayalsoplayaroleinimplementingconflict-relatedamnesties.

Further reading

Amnesties and International Humanitarian Law: Purpose and Scope – Factsheet (ICRC)

See also: – Section 6.3.1.DManagingtheaftermath

Mechanisms to clarify the fate and whereabouts of missing personsWithoutinfringingupontherightsofthepeopleconcerned,actorscouldshareinformationwiththeirpartnersthatwillhelptopreventpeoplefromgoingmissingandclarifythefateandwhereaboutsofthosealreadymissing,insupportofthefamilies’righttoknow.Thisprocessmayincludeestablishingmech-anismstocentralizeinformationonpeopledeprivedoftheirliberty,hospitalized,deceasedorreportedmissing.Suchmechanismsshouldensurethatfamiliescanreportandreceiveinformationonthefateandwhereaboutsoftheirlovedonesinasafeandnon-discriminatorymanner.

Anytransitionaljusticeprocessesshouldincorporatemechanismstoclarifythefateandwhereaboutsofmissingpersons,althoughtheyarealsorelevantintheabsenceofsuchaprocess.

Further reading

The vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and use of Child

Soldiers

The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups

Implementation Guidance for the vancouver Principles

Children associated with armed forces or armed groups (ICRC)

Guiding principles for the domestic implementation of a comprehensive system of protection for children

associated with armed forces or armed groups, pp. 395-396 (ICRC)

Legal Protection of Children in Armed Conflict – Factsheet (ICRC)

uN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre (uN)

See also: – Section 6.2.1.CPersonnel

Weapons and ammunition management Supportingforceswilloftendeploywithandaccumulatestockpilesofammunitions,weaponsandotherlethalequipmentoverthecourseoftheirsupportrelationship.Transitioningoutofasupportrelation-ship,howeverhastily,doesnotnegateasupportingforce’sresponsibilityforweaponsandammunitionthat,ifnotsafelyandsecurelystored,mayjeopardizecivilianprotection.Topreventweaponsandammu-nitionfrombeingdivertedormisused,andtoavoidaccidentalexplosions,supportingforcescandestroyorpermanentlydisabletheseitems,takethemoutofthecountryorterritorywhentheywithdraw,ortransfercustodyofthemtoaresponsiblepartner.

See also: – Section 3.3.1Weaponsandammunitionmanagement – Section 3.4.2Armstransfers – Section 4.8Landminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar

D. Managing the aftermathActorsinsupportrelationshipsshouldconsidermeasurestoaddresstheimpactofmilitaryoperationsandassociatedactivitiesonaffectedpeople(seeSection 4).Partiestoconflictsandotheractorsmayhavelegalobligationstotakestepssuchascollectingandcaringforthewoundedandsick.Othermeasuresmaybeimplementedasamatterofpolicy.

Takingstepsintheimmediateaftermathofoperations,totheextentfeasible,canhelptolimittheirlong-termandcumulativeimpact.Therefore,measurestomanagetheaftermathofaconflictshouldbeconsideredwhileplanningandimplementingtherelationshipratherthanwaitingforthetransitionortheendoftheconflict.Ofcourse,certainmeasuresmayonlybepossibleoncetheconflicthasendedormayneedtobeimplementedoveralongerperiod.Theyremainrelevantregardlessofwhethertheactorshaveachievedtheirobjectivesinthesupportrelationship.

Reconstruction efforts Totheextentpossible,actorsshouldconsidercontributingtoorotherwisefacilitatingthereconstructionofanycriticalcivilianinfrastructurethatmayhavebeendamagedasaresultofthearmedconflictandre-establishinganyessentialservices.

Measuresmayincluderebuildingorrenovatingdamagedfacilitiesorrenewingthesupplyofgoodssuchasmedicalequipment,withdueconsiderationforcivil-militarycoordinationprinciplesandgoodprac-tice.Reconstructionandrepairsshouldtakeplaceassoonaspossibleinordertomitigatethecumulative

impactonessentialserviceinfrastructureandreducetheriskofalong-termorirreversibledeclineinservice.68Thisisimportantnotonlyforhumanitarianreasons,butalsotopreventmajordevelopmentreversalsandtoreducethelikelihoodofprotracteddisplacement.Careshouldbetakentoensurethatanysuchmeasuresareimplementedequitably,toavoidinflaminganyongoingsocialdivides.

Intheirefforttoincludewomeninpost-conflictreconstructionefforts,Statesmayalsoconsulttheguid-anceandstandardssetoutintheUNSecurityCouncil’shostofWomen,PeaceandSecurityresolutionsandrelatedframeworks.

See also: – Section 4.6Essentialservices

Durable solutions for internally displaced personsThelackofaccesstoessentialservices,especiallyinurbanenvironments,isakeyfactordrivingdis-placementandcanalsoaffectthesearchfordurablesolutionstothisproblem.ReconstructioneffortsmaymakeiteasierforIDPstoreturn,iftheysowish,andhelptoreducethehumanitarianconsequencesofprotracteddisplacement.Itisimportanttorecognizethatnoteveryonedisplacedbyhostilitieswillwantorbeabletogoback.Insuchcases,actorsshouldconsiderhelpingtheirpartnerstofacilitateotherdurablesolutions,namelylocalintegrationandresettlementinotherpartsofthecountry,whileensuringthattheIDPs’optionsarevoluntary,safe,anddignified.

See also: – Section 4.3Internallydisplacedpersons

Clearance of mines and explosive remnants of warAnotherimportantfacetofhelpingpeopletoreturntoordinarylifeistheremovalofERW.Contaminationbyunexplodedordnance,laidmines,abandonedammunition,improvisedexplosivedevicesandweaponscanallposedirectandindirectriskstociviliansandhamperreconstructionandrecovery,withlong-termconsequencesfordevelopment.

Eachactorshouldmarkand,iftheyhavethecapacity,disposeofanyERWdiscovered.Amechanismtocoordinatecontaminationsurveysandhumanitarianclearanceeffortsshouldbeestablishedassoonaspossibleonceactivehostilitiesend.OthermeasurestosupporttheclearanceofminesandERW,mitigatetheriskstociviliansandprovideassistancetoaffectedStatesmayberequiredasamatteroflaworpolicy.

See also: – Section 4.8Landminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar

Key legal rules

Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 1997

Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, 2003 (Protocol v to the 1980 CCW Convention)

Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2008

68 See ICRC, UrbanServicesduringProtractedArmedConflict:ACallforaBetterApproachAssistingAffectedPeople, ICRC, Geneva,2015:https://shop.icrc.org/urban-services-during-protracted-armed-conflict-pdf-en.

6.3.2 LEARNINGA lesson learnedisknowledgeorunderstandinggainedbyexperienceandobservation.Theexperiencemaybepositive,asinasuccessfultestormission,ornegative,asinamishaporfailure.

A“lessonsidentifiedandlearned”(learning)processisonethatcrossesfunctionalboundariesandallowsorganizationstolearnfromboththeirmistakesandsuccesses.Theprocessshouldpreventtheactorsfromrepeatingmistakesandencouragethemtobuildonsuccesses.

Alessonmustbe: • significant,inthatithasarealorassumedimpactonoperations • valid,inthatitisfactuallyandtechnicallycorrect • applicable,inthatitidentifiesaspecificdesign,processordecisionthatreducesoreliminatesthepotentialforfailuresandmishaps,oritreinforcesapositiveresult.

IntroductionLearningprocessesshouldspecificallyaddresstheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting,asthiswillbeakeymeasurementofmissionsuccess.

Iftheydonot learnlessonsfrompastexperience,allactorsare liabletorepeatthesamemistakes.TheobjectiveoflearningprocessesistoimprovecompliancewithIHLandtobetterprotectciviliansbystoppingsomething,doingsomethingdifferentlyordoingsomethingnew.Inthatsense,thelessonisnotlearneduntilithasbeenidentifiedandincorporatedintosubsequentpractices.

Learningisanongoingandcyclicalprocessthattakesplaceateverystageofthesupportrelationship: • atthepreparationstage,whenpastlessonslearnedareincorporatedintotheframework,systemsandprocesses

• duringtherelationship,whenasystemforrecordingissuesthatgowrongisimplemented • aftertheconflictorrelationshipends,whenlessonsareidentified,incorporatedintofuturepracticeandsharedwithothers.

Monitoringandevaluationmechanismsshouldalsobeintegratedintolearningprocesses.Asaresult,prob-lemsidentifiedthroughthosemechanismscanbeincorporatedintolessons-learnedanalysesand,whereappropriate,preventedfromrecurringthroughsystemicadjustments.

SUPPORTACTIVITY

ANALYSELESSONS

IDENTIFIED

IDENTIFYLESSONS THROUGH

A SYSTEMATICPROCESS

UPDATE ANDADJUST PROCEDURES,OTHER INSTITUTIONAL

MEMORY, AND EDUCATION AND

TRAINING

VALIDATELESSONS THROUGH

JOINT EFFORTBY PARTNERS

QUICKREACTIONIF NEEDED

MONITORACTIVITIES AND

IDENTIFY MISTAKES AND SUCCESSES

TRANSFORM LESSONS

IDENTIFIEDINTO LESSONS

LEARNED CHANGE BEHAVIOUR

Key questions • Doyouhaveaprocessforcapturingandmanagingobservationsandlessonslearnedthroughoutthesupportrelationship?

• DoesthelearningprocessallowyoutoidentifyissuesrelatingtoIHLandtheprotectionofthosenotfighting?

• Doyouhaveaprocessforfindingrootcausesanddevelopingremedialactions?

• Howdoyoumakesurethelessonsidentifiedorlearnedarecorrectlyimplemented?

• Doesyourlearningprocessallowyoutoidentify,captureandincorporatelessonsinordertoimprove anongoingsupportrelationship?

• Howwillyouincorporateyourpartner’sfeedbackinthelearningprocess?

• Doyoushareyourlessonswithotherpartnersorallies,orotherparties,inordertoimprove support-relationshippractices?

A. Systematic learning to enhance the protection of affected peopleActorsinsupportrelationshipsshouldestablishanongoingorperiodicreportingsystemthatallowsthemtocontinuallyidentifypotentialissues.Thesystemwillrevealpatternsofissuesthathavenotbeendealtwithonamoreimmediatebasis,andthesepatternswillformthebasisofalessons-learnedprocess.Thesystemwilltypicallycaptureissuesonmultiplelevels.

Culturaldifferencesbetweenthesupportingandsupportedactorsmayalsogeneratecontext-specificlessons(forexamplewithrespecttoculture),andrevealmoregenericnon-contextualpractices.

Adistinctionshouldbemadebetweenrecordinginformationforlearning-relatedpurposesandforinves-tigatingpossibleviolations.Alearning-orientedsystemcanrecordissuesonatechnicallevelwithoutidentifyinglegalliability.IssuesrelatingtopossibleviolationsofIHLorotherlawsshouldalsotriggeraninvestigativeprocessand,whereappropriate,disciplinaryorpenalsanctions(seeSections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5).However,theinvestigationofpossibleviolationsmayalsoproducelessonslearnedthatcanpre-ventfutureviolations.

Reviewprocessesoftenconsideroutputs,ratherthangeneraloutcomes,andignoretheimpactofsupportrelationshipsonthevictimsofarmedconflict.Learningshouldfocusonvictimsofarmedconflictandconsidercivilianprotectionasayardstickforevaluatingthesuccessofamissionanddrawinglessons.

B. Learning together Alltoooften, lessons-learnedexercisesareconductedindependently,usuallywithoneactormakingassumptionsabouttheotheractor’sperspectiveorneeds.Wherepossible,thelessons-learnedprocessshouldinvolvethesupportedandsupportingactorscombiningtheirexperiencesandprovidingjointlessons,inpursuitofafullerunderstandingoftheissue.Theprocessmayneedtobetailoredtotherelationshiptoaccommodateeachpartner’scultureandlearningtradition.Anygoodpracticesidentifiedshouldbesharedwithalliesandpartners.

Tobetter incorporate lessonsrelatedto thehumanitarianconsequencesof thesupportrelationship,learningprocessesshouldbeopentociviliansandcommunitieswheneverpossible.Seekingdirectfeed-backonhowinstitutionalcapacitysupportoraTAAAmissionaffectslocalcommunitiesisacrucialcom-ponentofresponsiblesupportrelationshipsandthelong-termsuccessoftheseprogrammes.

Supportrelationships,evenifpurelymilitary,willhaveimplicationsacrosstheentiregovernment.Theirinfluencewillthereforebemuchbroaderthan“just”military.Thelearningprocessshouldbeopentoinputfromnon-militaryactorsatallstagesbefore,duringandaftertherelationship.

C. Incorporating lessons into doctrine and future practice Whenasupportrelationshipends,acomprehensivelessons-learnedexerciseshouldbeconductedontheentirerelationshipandthoselessonsincorporatedintofuturesupportrelationships.Thoselessonsshouldalsobecarefullyreviewedbeforeembarkingonanewsupportrelationshipwiththesameactor.

Insomecases,itmaybeappropriatetosharelessonslearnedmorebroadly.TheICRCencouragesallactorstopublish,orshareinrelevantforums,theirexperienceandlessonslearnedinrelationtothepro-tectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Areasofinterestwouldinclude,forexample,thechoiceanduseofmeansandmethodsofwarfareinpopulatedareas.

Previouslessonsshouldbestudiedinthepreparationphase,whilerecognizingthatsupportcanbecultur-allyspecific.Theycanprovideextremelyusefulinsightintochallengesthatarelikelytoariseinfuturesupportrelationships,andtheyshouldbeusedfortrainingandexerciseeventsbeforecommittingtoanynewsupportactivity.Supportingactorsneedtoknowwhatdoesanddoesnotworkinordertoapplyinfluenceeffectivelyandlaythefoundationsforasuccessfulsupportrelationship.

Thesupportedpartnermayhavelearneditsownlessonsfrompreviousexperience,eitherformallyorinformally.Partnersandotherministriesoragenciesshouldconferatthepreparationstageandheedlessonslearnedonallsidesastheyimplementtherelationship.

7. QUESTIONS FOR DECISION MAKERS

ThissectionsupplementsSection 6byprovidingspecificquestionstohelpdecisionmakersconsiderwhatmeasuresmayberelevanttotheircircumstances.Foreachoftheten areasofpracticalmeasures,questionsareaimedeitheratsupportingactorsorsupportedparties,orboth.

Additionally, some considerations relevant to specific humanitarian concerns are posed, for exampledetention-relatedrisks.SeeSection 4forfurtherinformationonissuesrelatingtotheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingaswellasthesafeguardingofcivilianandotherspecificallyprotectedobjects.

Somequestionsmayalsoaddressspecificfactorsinthesupportrelationship,asdescribedinSection 3, and somaynotberelevanttoallsupportrelationships.Inthewebversionofthisdocument,decisionmakerscanfilterthequestionsbydifferentvariablesinordertonarrowthelistofquestionstothosemostrelevanttotherelationshiptheyareconsidering.

Thedetailedquestionsinthissectionaresecondarytotheoverarchingstrategicquestionsapplicabletoallsupportrelationships(seealsoSection 5):1. Whattypeofconflict,actors,activitiesandsupportareinvolvedinthesupportrelationship?2. Whatgapsexistbetweenthepartners’intent,leadershipandcapacity?3. Whataretheimplicationsoftheanswerstotheabovequestionsforciviliansandothersnotfighting?4. Whatstepsfromanyofthetenareasofpracticalmeasuresdiscussedabovecouldyouand yourpotentialpartner(s)taketogethertoimprovethelevelofprotectionandreduceharmto civiliansandothersnotfighting?

5. Ifthegapsidentifiedinquestion2aboveremainsignificant,shouldyoureconsiderthesupportrelationship?

Furtheroperationalquestionsareposedbelowforeachofthetenareasofpracticalmeasures.Keyquestionsatthetopofeachsectionhighlighttheprimaryconsiderationsthatshouldguidedecisionsinmanagingthesupportrelationship(seealsoSection 6).Theyarefollowedbymoredetailedguidingquestionsthatmayberelevant,dependingonthecircumstances.

7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 127

7.1 PREPARATION7.1.1 INTERNAL READINESS TO ENGAGE • Whatconditionsandcriterianeedtobemetinasupportrelationship?Aretheseconditionsandcriteriaconsistentacrossallyoursupportrelationships?

• Doresourcesneedtobeallocateddifferently,doprocessesrequire“partner-proofing”anddopersonnelneedspecifictraining?

• Aretheinternalentitiesinvolvedinasupportrelationshipalignedintheirvision,andaretheysetuptomanagethetypeofsupportrelationshipenvisaged?Howdoyouensurecoordinationbetweentheseentities?

• Doyouhavesystemsinplacetoassessyourpartner’sintent,capacityandleadershipwithregardtoprotectingciviliansandothersnotfighting?

• Doyouhaveestablishedsystemsandprocedures,aswellasthecapability,tomonitoryourpartner’sactions?

General questions

General

• Arelegaladvisersavailabletoyourarmedforces?

• Willlegaladvisersprovideguidancetopersonnelondistinctissuesrelatedtosupportrelationshipspriortodeployment?

• HaveyouincorporatedtheGenevaConventionsintonationallaw?

• HaveyouadoptedcriminallegislationtopunishthoseguiltyofseriousviolationsofIHL?

• Doyournationalcourtshaveuniversaljurisdictionoverwarcrimescommittedbyoragainstnationalsofyourcountryoronyourterritory?

• DothelawsofyourStateallowforcorporatecriminalresponsibility?

• Whatmechanism(s)existtodiscussamongtherelevantentitiesmattersrelevanttothesupportrelationship(e.g.aninterministerialcommittee,areviewboardoraworkinggroup)?

• Howaretherolesandresponsibilitiesinasupportrelationshipcommunicatedtotherelevantagenciesanddepartmentsinvolvedinprovidingorreceivingsupport?

• Whatistheprocessforconsidering,acrossgovernmentagenciesanddepartments,mattersofhumanitarianconcernandmeasurestoensurerespectforIHLinpractice?

• Howistheprotectionofciviliansintegratedintomilitarypolicyanddoctrine?

• DoyourmilitarypolicyanddoctrineaddressthemeasurestobetakentoreducecivilianharminPMOs?

• Doyouhaveapolicyontheprotectionofcivilians?

• Doyouhaveacivilianharmtrackingmechanism?

• Doyouhaveasystemtomanageyourhumanresourcesinasupportrelationship?

• Howwillyouharmonizeyouroperationaldirectivesorpolicieswithrespecttothemeansandmethodsofwarfare?

• Areyourcommandandcontrolsystemssufficientlyrobusttoworkinapartneredenvironment?

• Howwillyouensurecommunicationwithfieldcommanders?

• Haveyourcommandandcontrolsystemsbeenadaptedtooperatewithpartnerforces?

Detention

• Doesyourpre-transferriskassessmentallowdetaineestovoicefearsrelatingtotheirtransfer,andifso,howdoyouaddresssuchfears?

Missing persons

• Doyouhaveasystemforsharinginformationcollectedbyyournationalinformationbureau(orequivalent)andothersourceswithyourpartner?

• Doyouhaveprotocolsinplacetocollectandsafeguardallrelevantdataonthewoundedandsickyouevacuate(i.e.personaldataandtheplace,dateandtime,andbywhom,thepersonwasevacuated)?

• Doyouhaveamechanismtonotifythefamilieswhenyouevacuatethewoundedorsick?

• Doyouhaveamechanismtoensurethatpeopleadmittedtomedicalfacilitiesunderyourresponsibilitycanrestoreand/ormaintaincontactwiththeirfamilymembers?

General questions

Missing

Landmines and explosive remnants of war

• IsthereanationalmineactionauthorityinyourState?

• WhataretheroleandresponsibilitiesofthenationalmineactionauthorityinyourState?

• Havenationalmineactionstandardsandstandardoperatingproceduresbeenwrittenanddisseminated?

• Whatinternationalstandardsandguidelinesareapplicable(e.g.IMAS,IATGandMOSAIC)?

Questions for supporting actors

General

• Haveyourlegaladvisersconsideredthespecificissuesthatsupportrelationshipsmayraise?

• Doyouhaveanarmsexportcontrolregime?

• WhichlawsarerelevanttocontractingPMSCs?

• HowdoyouensuretransparencyandaccountabilityintheprocessofcontractingPMSCs?

• Doyouhaveasystemtoensurealignmentacrossgovernmentagenciesinrespectofasupportrelationship?

• Howdoyouensurethatresourcesareappropriatelyallocatedtosupportthepartner?

• Isyourhumanresourcesmanagementsystemadaptedtotherolesyouwishtoassignyourpersonnel?

• AretheunitsassignedtoPMOsspeciallytrainedtoundertakesuchmissions?

• Doyouhaveaunitorgroupinyourarmedforcesthatisspecializedindeliveringtrainingandassistancetopartnerforces?

• Willyourarmedforceshaveaccesstolegaladviserspriortoandduringtheirdeployment?

• Areyourarmedforcestrainedtoaddresstheprotectionofcivilianswithpartnerforces?

• AreyourarmedforcestrainedtoidentifyandaddressviolationsofIHLbypartnerforces?

• Howdoyoupreserveyourinstitutionalmemoryofsupportrelationships?

• Howdoyouensurethatlessonsarecarriedforwardsothattheycanbeappliedinsubsequentsupportrelationshipswiththesameoradifferentpartner?

• Whichministriesneedtobeinvolvedinvetting,selectingandcontractingPMSCs?

• WhatcriteriadoyouapplywhenevaluatingwhethertoemploytheservicesofaPMSC?

• Doyouhaveaprocessinplacetoensurethatlessonsfromsupportrelationshipsareidentifiedandtakenintoaccount?

• Howwillyouestablishclearlinesofresponsibilityintherelationship?

• Dosomeofyourpersonnelhaveexperienceinpartneredoperations?

• Doestheirpre-deploymenttrainingaddressculturalandlinguisticdividesbetweenthemandpartner forces?

• AretheyabletoincorporateIHLtrainingandeducationintotheirtrainingprogramme?

• DotrainingandinstructiononIHLandotherrelevantlegalframeworksaddressissuesrelatedtoworkingwithpartners?

• Doyouhaveareportingmechanismthatincludespartners?

• DoyouhavealogisticschainfitforthepurposeofPMOs?

The dead

• Doyouhavesuitablyqualifiedpeopletocarryoutgravesiteexcavations?

• Howwillyoucontributetotheprocessofrecoveringthedeadwithoutfurthercomplicatingidentificationeffortsandwithoutdesecratingtheremains?

• Howwillyouaddresstheriskstothosewhorecoverthedead?

Missing persons

• Haveyouestablishedasystemforfamiliestoreportmissingpersonsandreceiveinformationontheirfateandwhereabouts?

• Doyouhaveaplaninplaceandthecapacitytoimplementcorrectivemeasuresinyourpartner’shumanitarianmineactionprocess,explosiveordnancedisposalprocessandPSSM?

General questions

Missing

Questions for supported parties

General

• Whataretheimplicationsofhavingadifferentlegalframeworkfromthatofyourprospectivepartner?

• Whatconditionswillyouplaceonagreeingtoenterthesupportrelationship?

• Canyouworkacrossdepartmentsoragenciestofullyunderstandandputintoplacemeasuressothatexternalsupportdoesnotimpedeawhole-of-governmentapproach?

Missing persons

• Doyouhaveamechanismtonotifyfamilieswhenyoudetainpeopleandwhenyousubsequentlytransferthem?

• Doyouhaveamechanismtoensurethatdetaineescanrestoreand/ormaintaincontactwiththeirfamilymembers?

Missing persons and the dead

• Doyouhaveasystemtogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationoncaptured,wounded,sick,missinganddeadpeopleandtotransmitthatinformationtotheotherpartiesduringtheconflict?

General questions

Missing

7.1.2 NORMATIVE ENGAGEMENT • Initsinternationalrelationsandininternationalforums,hasyourleadershipcommittedtobroad,multilateralpositionssupportingIHLcompliance?

• Doesyourleadershipencourageotherpartiestoaccedetointernationallegalinstrumentsandotherstandardsintendedtoreducethehumanitarianconsequencesofarmedconflict?

• DoyouhaveprogrammesthatpromoteIHLcomplianceandtheprotectionofcivilians,anddoyoumaketheseprogrammesavailabletopartnersorpotentialpartners?

• Doyouhavebilateralandmultilateralmechanismsdesignedtoinfluencepotentialpartners’viewsandperspectivesoncompliancewithIHL?

General questions

General

• HowdoyoupromoteIHLinpublicstatements?

• Towhatextentdoyouemploystrategicargumentationtoexplainwhyitisinyourpartner’sinteresttocomplywithIHL?

• WhenencouragingyourpartnertocomplywithIHL,doyouhighlighthowcompliancewillserveyourpartner’smotivationsandinterests?

• IfyoubecomeawareofpossibleIHLviolationsbyyourpartner,doyouaskotheractorstoencourageyourpartnertoimproveitsIHLcompliance?

• DoesyourpartnershareyourinterpretationofIHL,andhaveyouidentifiedanydiscrepanciesthatshouldbeaddressed?

• IfyouandyourpartnerhavedifferentinterpretationsofanIHLrule,whichinterpretationprovidesgreaterprotectionforciviliansorothersnotfighting?

• Foryouandyourpartner,isminimizingcivilianharminplanningandconductingmilitaryoperationsconsideredastrategicpriority?

• Doestheagreementwithyourpartnerincludetheobjectiveofminimizingcivilianharm,andwasthisobjectiveenshrinedindoctrineandpolicy?

• Canyouencouragethesupportedpartytoengageinaconstructive,confidential,bilateraldialoguewiththeICRCtoimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting?

• Haveyoumadecleartoyourpartneryourexpectationsregardingthemeansandmethodstheyuse?

• Doyouencourageyourpartnertograntaccessandprotectiontoneutral,impartialandindependenthumanitarianactors?

• Doesyourpartnerunderstand,acceptandreadilyapplyinternationalstandardsandguidelinesonweaponsmanagement(e.g.IMAS,IATGandMOSAIC)?

• Howdoyoupromotecommonstandards,includingrestrictionsandlimitations,ontheuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareasinlinewithIHL?

• DuringPMOs,howdoyourpersonnelestablishrapportwiththeircounterparts?

Detention

• Canyouencouragethepartnertoengageinaconstructive,confidentialandbilateraldialoguewiththeICRCtoensuredetaineetreatmentanddetentionconditionscomplywithinternationallawandstandards?

The dead

• Doyouengagewithyourpartnerontheneedtoensurethedignifiedmanagementofthedead,includingthoseofenemyforces?

• Haveyouengagedwithyourpartnerontheinternationallawsandcustomsapplicabletomanagingthe dead?

• Haveyouandyourpartnerconsideredtheimportanceofestablishingadedicatedunitforrecoveringandtransferringthedeadwithdignity?

• Doyouencourageyourpartnertoagreeonthetransferofremainstoopposingforces?

• Doyouencouragethepartiestotheconflicttodocumentandrecordwherecivilians,combatantsandfightershavedied?

• Doyouemphasizeforyourpartnertheneedforgravesitesresultingfromarmedconflictto be protected?

General questions

Health care

• Canyouencourageyourpartnertoavoidconductingmilitaryoperationsinvolvingmedicalfacilitiesormedicaltransports,asthatcouldcausethemtolosetheirprotectedstatusunderIHL?

• Doyourpartner’spoliciesormilitarydoctrineaddressdetecting,markingandremovingminesandERWinaccordancewithhumanitarianstandards?

• Haveyouengagedwithyourpartneronaccedingtoandimplementinginternationalinstrumentsprohibitingtheuseofcertainweaponsaboutwhichthereislongstandingconcerninhumanitarianterms(e.g.theConventiononConventionalWeapons,theAnti-PersonnelMineBanConventionortheClusterMunitionsConvention)?

• Isyourleadershipinapositiontourgeyourpartnernottouseanti-personnelminesorclustermunitionsunderanycircumstances?

• Canyourleadershiphelppartnerstodeveloptoolsforcollectingandmanagingdatainsupportofhumanitarianmineaction?

General

• Isthesupportyouprovideaccompaniedbyaparalleldiplomaticefforttoencouragesupportedpartiestoratifyregionalandinternationallegalframeworksandobligations?

• DoyouencourageandhelpyourpartnerNSAGtodevelopitsowncodesofconduct?

• Doyouidentifyandsharegoodpracticesformitigatingtheriskofcivilianharminurbanarmedconflict,includingrestrictionsandlimitationsontheuseofheavyexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas?

• Doestherapportbetweenyourarmedforcesandyourpartner’sforcesenableyourarmedforcestoengagewithyourpartner’sforcesonIHLissues?

The dead

• Areyourpersonnel,includingcombatantsorfighters,awareofthelaws,customsandotherstandardsonrecoveringandmanagingthedeadwithdignity?

• Inyourcombined,jointandpartneredoperationswiththesupportedparty,doyouemphasizetheneedtoensureremainsarecollected,disposedofandtransferredwithdignity?

Health care

• Doyouremindthesupportedpartythat,underIHL,medicalcaremustbeprovidedtowoundedenemieswithoutanyadversedistinction?

• Doyouremindthesupportedpartythat,underIHL,thetasksofcollectingandcaringforwoundedenemiesareneverconsideredmilitaryfunctions?

General

• Areyourpersonnel,includingcombatantsandfighters,awareofIHLrulesprotectingciviliansandothersnotfighting,andoftheconsequencesresultingfromnon-compliance?

The dead

• Haveyouinformedyourpartneroflocallawsandcustomsgoverninghowthedeadaretobemanaged?

General questions

7.1.3 ASSESSMENT AND FRAMING OF THE RELATIONSHIP • Haveyouaccuratelyassessedyourandyourpartner’srespectiveintent,leadershipandcapacity?

• Areanygapsinintent,leadershipandcapacityabletobeaddressedthroughtheplannedsupport?

• Whataretheconditionsthatdefineasuccessfulsupportrelationship?

• Howwillyoutransitionoutofthesupportrelationshipwhen:(a)yourobjectivesaremetor(b) your objectivesarenotmet?

General questions

General

• Whatcriteriadoyouapplytovetandselectpossiblepartners?

• HasyourpartnerintegratedIHLintoitstraining,doctrineandrulesofengagement?

• Isthereanobviousleadershipthatissuesorders?

• Dotheleadership’sordersappeartobefollowed?

• Aretherevisiblesignsofhierarchyanddiscipline,suchasuniforms,saluting,andtheconsistentuseofranksthroughoutthegroup?

• Howdoesyourpartnerrelatetothelocalcommunity?

• Doesyourpartnerreceivepolitical,socialoreconomicsupportfromthelocalcommunity?

• Whoorwhatarethesourcesofpolitical,social,economic,spiritualorothertypesinfluenceoveryour partner?

• Howdoesyourpartnerexertitsauthority?

• Doyourpartner’sactionsreflectitsideology?

• Howarethegroup’srulessocializedandreinforcedwithinthegroup(e.g.throughtraining,rituals,speechesbyinfluentialfigures,orviolentpractices)?

• Doanyunitswithinalargepartnerforceengageinritualsorpracticesthatareatoddswiththegroup’sdoctrineandstatedpurpose?

• Haveyouconductedatechnicalneedsanalysisofyourpartnertoevaluateitslevelofmilitarycompetency(e.g. intheuseofindirectweaponsystems)?

• Doesyourpartnerhaveacivilianharmtrackingmechanism,andwhatdoesitentail?

• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacitytoconductanassessmentoftheeffectofattacksandtoidentifywhetheranattackmaycauseincidentalcivilianharm?

• Howisthelocalcommunityinformedofthedivisionofrolesandresponsibilitiesbetweenactors?

• Arethereeffectivelegalandadministrativemeasuresinplacetopreventandcombatcorruption?

• DoesthePMSChaveallrequisitelicenses/authorizations?

• IstherequirementtocomplywithapplicablelegalframeworksincludedinthecontractwiththePMSC?

• DoesthecontractwiththePMSCprovideforthePMSCtobefinedorthecontractcancelledifthePMSCviolatestheapplicablelegalframework?

• Underyournationallegalframework,canPMSCsandtheirpersonnelbeheldaccountableforviolationscommittedextraterritorially?

Detention

• Doesthepartnerapplyadequateproceduralsafeguardsforpersonsdeprivedoftheirliberty?

• Whatareyourlegalresponsibilitieswithregardtodetaineescapturedorarrestedbyyourpartnerinapartneredoperation?

• Doesyourpartnerhavetheintentandcapacitytohandlethosearrestedand/ordetainedinrelationtotheconflict?

• Dopartnerforceshavethenecessaryfacilities,personnelandexpertisetotakeandholddetainees?

The dead

• Whichlawsandcustomsapplytothecollectionanddisposalortransferofthosekilled,regardlessoftheirstatus,inthearmedconflictintheareawhereyouandyourpartnerareoperating?

• Arelegalframeworksthatapplytotheprotectionofthedeadintegratedintoyoursupportagreement?

• Underwhatcircumstanceswillyou,oralternativelyyourpartner,beresponsibleforcollectingandmanagingthedead?

General questions

Missing persons

• Doesthesupportagreementsetoutobligationsonpreventingpeoplefromgoingmissing?

• Arelegalframeworksthatapplytotheobligationtoaccountformissingpersonsintegratedintoyoursupportagreement?

• Doesyourpartnerhaveprotocolsinplacetocollectandsafeguardallrelevantdataonthewoundedandsicktheyevacuate(i.e.personaldataandtheplace,dateandtime,andbywhom,thepersonwasevacuated)?

Health care

• Arelegalframeworksthatapplytotheprotectionofthemedicalmissionintegratedintoyoursupportagreement?

• Whichactorisresponsibleforensuringthesupplyandqualityofmedicalgoods?

• Howaremedicalsupplylinesmaintained,andaremechanismsputinplacetoverifythequalityofmedicalsupplies(facilities,equipmentandmedications)andsafeguardinventories?

• Whattypesofhealth-caredeliveryareexpectedtobeprovided,andtowhom?

• Howareciviliansinformedofhowhealth-careservicesarerun?

• Howwillyouandyourpartnerpreventthelocalhealth-caresystemfrombeingdisrupted?

• Whatistheimpactofmilitarymedicalclinicsinanarea,andhowcanyouensurethattheywillcomplement–andperhapsenhance–existingmedicalfacilities?

• Isthereanationalmineactionauthorityinyourpartner’sState?

• Whataretheroleandresponsibilitiesofthenationalmineactionauthorityinyourpartner’sState?

• Haveyouassessedyourpartner’scapacitytoengageinhumanitarianmineaction,explosiveordnancedisposalandPSSMmeasures?

General

• Whatlawspermitorlimitthedecisiontosupportapartyandthetypeofsupportthatcanbeprovided?

• Doyouregularlyassessyourpartner’sconductthroughtheprismofIHLbefore,duringandafterthesupportrelationship?

• Howisapartner’sconductinarmedconflictandIHLcompliancefactoredintodecisionstoprovideandcontinuesupport?

• HasthepartnerStateratifiedanyIHLinstruments(i.e.thefourGenevaConventionsof1949andtheirAdditionalProtocolsof1977,treatiesthatexpresslyprohibitorlimittransfersofspecificweapons,orotherkeyIHLtreaties),andhasitaccededtointernationalorregionalhumanrightsinstruments?

• DoesthepartnerStatehavenationallegislationthatprohibitsandpunishesgravebreachesandotherseriousviolationsofIHLandhumanrightslaw?

• HasthepartnerStatejoinedtheArmsTradeTreatyoranyregionalarmstransferinstruments?

• HasthesupportedpartyimplementedthemeasuresrequiredbytheIHLandhumanrightslawinstrumentstowhichitisparty,includingtheadoptionofinternaldoctrineandnationallegislationandregulations?

• Doyourpartner’sarmedforceshaveaneffectiveandtransparentmilitarydisciplinarysystem?

• Haveyouagreedwithyourpartneronthedefinitionofcivilians,civilianobjects,andmilitary objectives?

• Haveyouagreedwithyourpartneronthedefinitionofdirectparticipationinhostilities?

• IsthepartnerapartytoCCWProtocolV?

• DoesthepartnercomplywithitsreportingobligationunderCCWProtocolV?

• DoestherecipienteducateandtrainitsmilitarypersonnelatalllevelsinapplyingIHL(e.g.duringmilitaryexercises)?

• Doestherecipienteducateandtrainitsmilitarypersonnelatalllevelsinapplyingtherulesofhumanrightslaw(e.g.duringlawenforcementoperations)?

• Doestherecipienttrainpoliceandlawenforcementofficialsinapplyingtherulesofhumanrightslaw?

Missing

General questions

• HasIHLbeenincorporatedintomilitarydoctrineandmilitarymanuals,rulesofengagement,instructionsandorders?

• HaveIHLconsiderationsbeenintegratedintotheprocessesoftargetselectionandtargetverification?

• DoesyourpartnerhavethecapacitytoensurethatweaponswillbeusedinaccordancewithIHL?

• Doesthesupportedpartyhavethecapacitytouseweaponssystemscorrectly(andthusaccurately)?

• DoesthesupportedpartyhaveadequatesystemsinplaceforWAMandPSSMinthetheatreofoperations?

• Haverelevanthumanrightsrulesandstandardsbeenincorporatedintothemanualsandinstructionsusedbypoliceandotherlawenforcementofficials?

• HaverelevantIHLandhumanrightsrulesandstandardsbeenincorporatedintothemanualsandinstructionsusedbyweaponsbearers(e.g.armedforces,policeandotherlawenforcementofficials, andPMSCs)?

• ArelegaladviserstrainedinIHLavailabletoadvisethearmedforces?

• Whatisthegeneraldegreeofconcernandrespectshownforthesituationofcivilians?

• HavegravebreachesorotherseriousviolationsofIHLbeencommittedinthepartnercountry?

• Haveviolationsbeencommittedbyactorsforwhichthepartnerisresponsible?

• AretherepoliciesorpracticesbywhichseriousviolationsofIHLandofhumanrightslawaretreatedwithimpunityortolerated?

• Haveseriousactsofgender-basedviolenceagainstwomen,men,boysorgirls,includingseriousactsofviolencetargetingwomenandchildreninthecontextofanarmedconflict,beencommittedintherecipientcountry?

• IfviolationsofIHLareknowntohaveoccurred,hasthepartnertakenmeasurestopreventandsuppresssuchviolationsbyitsnationals,bypeopleunderitscommandoronitsterritory?

• HasthepartnerStatefailedtoinvestigategravebreachesandotherseriousviolationsofIHLallegedlycommittedbyitsnationalsoronitsterritory?

• HasthepartnerStatefailedtosearchforandprosecute(orextradite)itsnationalsorthoseonitsterritoryresponsibleforgravebreachesandotherseriousviolationsofIHL,orhasitfailedtocooperatewithotherStatesorinternationalcourtsinconnectionwithcriminalproceedingsrelatingtogravebreachesandotherseriousviolationsofIHL?

• IsthepartneropentodialogueonIHLconcerns?

• Hasthepartneragreedtoexternalorotherformsofindependentmonitoringand/orinvestigationsofallegedIHLviolations?

• Hasthepartnercommittedseriousviolationsofhumanrightslaw?

• Whatisthenatureoftheviolationsortheharmsuffered(includingacrossdiversegroupsofwomen,men,girlsandboys)?Whatisthescaleoftheviolations?Arecertaingroupsaffecteddisproportionately?

• Haveseriousactsofgender-basedviolenceagainstwomen,men,boysorgirls,includingseriousactsofviolencetargetingwomenandchildren,beencommittedinthepartnerStatebythatStateoritsagents?

• HasthepartnerStatetakenappropriatemeasurestoendhumanrightsviolationsandpreventthemfromrecurring?

• IsthepartnerStateopentodialogueonhumanrightsconcerns?

• HasthepartnerStateagreedtoexternalorotherformsofindependentmonitoringand/orinvestigationsofallegedhumanrightsviolations?

• TowhatdegreedoesthepartnerStatecooperatewithinternationalandregionalhumanrightsmechanisms?

• AremilitarycommandersrequiredtopreventandreportgravebreachesandotherseriousviolationsofIHLandtotakeactionagainstthoseundertheircontrolwhohavecommittedsuchviolations?

• HasthepartnerStateputinplacemechanisms,includingdisciplinaryandpenalsanctions,toensurearmedforcesandotherweaponbearersareheldaccountableforanyviolationsofIHL?

• Aretheresimilarmechanismstoensurethepoliceandotherlawenforcementofficials,aswellasotherStateagents,areheldaccountableforviolationsofhumanrightslaw?

• DoesthepartnerState’snationallegislationallowtheStatetocooperatewithinternationaltribunals?

• DoesthesupportedStatecooperatewithotherStates,adhoctribunalsortheInternationalCriminalCourtinconnectionwithcriminalproceedingsrelatingtogravebreachesandotherseriousviolationsofIHL,genocideandcrimesagainsthumanity,andseriousviolationsofhumanrights?

• IfthesupportedpartyisaNSAG,hasitcommittedtocomplywithIHLandinternationalhumanrightsstandards,forexamplethroughaunilateraldeclarationoranagreement?

• Whatframeworks,systemsorprocessesdoesthesupportedNSAGhaveinplacetoensureitspersonnelrespectIHL?

• Isthepartnerknowntohaverecruitedchildrenortohaveusedthemtoparticipateinhostilities?

• HasthepartnerStateratifiedlegalinstrumentsestablishingaminimumagefortherecruitmentofchildrenandtheirparticipationinhostilities(AdditionalProtocolsIandII,andtheConventionontheRightsoftheChildanditsOptionalProtocolontheInvolvementofChildreninArmedConflict)?

• Isthereanestablishedminimumagefortherecruitment(compulsoryandvoluntary)ofpeopleintothearmedforces(orthearmedgrouporPMSC)?

• Isthereanindependentandfunctioningjudicialsysteminthesupportedparty’sterritory,capableinparticularofprosecutingortakingdisciplinaryaction(asappropriate)inresponsetoviolationsofIHLorhumanrightslaw?

• DoestherecipientStatehaveaneffectivenationalarmscontrolsystemandproceduresinplace(forimport,export,transitandtrans-shipment)thatconformtointernationalnorms,includingthearmstransferinstrumentstowhichitisparty?Doesthesystemincludedecision-makingcriteriabasedonIHLandhumanrightslaw?

• DoestheenduserhavetheknowledgeandcapacitytousethearmsorrelateditemsinaccordancewithIHLandhumanrightslaw?

• Doestheenduserhavethecapacitytomaintainanddeploythearmsorrelateditems?

• Arethetype,qualityandquantityofarmsorrelateditemsinkeepingwiththestatedenduser’smilitaryrequirements(e.g.itsexistinginventoryandforcestructure)?

• Haveyouconductedatechnicalneedsassessmentofyourpartner’scapacitywithregardtoPSSM?

• Doesthearmstransferrecipienthaveinplaceanationalsystemforlicencingandcontrollinginternationaltransfersofconventionalarms,ammunitionandmilitaryequipment?

• Doesthearmstransferrecipienthavelegislative,regulatoryorothermeasurestogovernbrokeringwithinitsjurisdiction,anddoesitapplythesemeasures?

• Whatmeasureshasthearmstransferrecipienttakentopreventorcombattheillicittradeinconventionalarmsandtopreventtheirdiversion?

• Doesthearmstransferrecipienthavethecapacitytoensurethattheweaponswillnotbedivertedtotheillicitmarket,tounauthorizedendusersortoasituationinwhichseriousviolationsofIHLorofhumanrightslawcouldoccur?

• Doestherecipienthaveahistoryofdiversionofarms?

• Areprevioustransfersofarms,ammunitionormilitaryequipmenttotherecipientknownorsuspectedtohavebeenretransferredordivertedtoathirdpartywhentherewasaclearorsubstantialriskthattheywouldbeusedtoviolateIHLorhumanrightslaw?

• Doestherecipientcountryhaveagoodrecordofprovidingauthenticandreliableend-usedocumentation?

• Doesthestatedenduserhaveadequatestockpilemanagementandsecurityproceduresinplace,includingforsurplusarmsandammunition?

• AretheftandleakagesfromstockpilesorcorruptionknowntobeaproblemintherecipientState?

• IstheillicittraffickingofweaponsaproblemintherecipientState?

• DogroupsinvolvedinillegalarmstraffickingoperateintherecipientState?

• ArethereadequatebordercontrolsintherecipientState,orarethebordersknowntobeporous?

• Istherecipienttheactualenduserofthearms,ammunitionormilitaryequipment?Haveguaranteesbeengiveninthisregard(e.g.commitmenttoend-userorend-usecertificationthatconfirmsthattransferreditemswillnotbere-exportedwithouttheagreementoftheexportingStateorusedinamannerotherthanthatdescribedinthecertificate)?

• Doestherecipientagreetothisbeingverifiedandtonottransferthearms,ammunitionormilitaryequipmenttothirdpartieswithouttheauthorizationofthetransferringState?

• WhatlimitationsexistunderapplicablenationalandinternationallawonthetypeofserviceyouwishtocontractaPMSCfor?

• Whatareyourcriteriaforendingeachtypeofsupportprovidedtoyourpartner?

• Whenyoursupportisdrawingtoaclose,willtheforcesyousupportneedtobeintegratedintootherarmedforcesordisarmed,demobilizedandreintegrated?

• Whenarmsareprovidedtorecipients,otherthanStateentities,thatoperateinsituationsofarmedconflict(e.g.armedgroupsorPMSCs),havetheytakenmeasurestoensurethatthearmswillbeusedinaccordancewithIHL(e.g.byadoptinganddistributingIHL-compliantcodesofconduct,standardoperatingproceduresandrulesofengagement;byprovidingtraininginIHL;andbyestablishinginternaldisciplinaryprocedures)?

• Isthereariskofasuddenorunexpectedchangeofgovernmentorauthoritystructures(e.g.overthrowofthegovernmentordisintegrationofStatestructures)thatcouldunderminethesupportedparty’swillingnessorabilitytorespectIHLandhumanrightslaw?

• Doyouhaveaplantomanagethewithdrawalofsupportwhentheend-statecriteriaaremet?

• WhatsafeguardswillbeinplacetoensurecompliancewithIHLincasethesupportissuddenlyhaltedorwithdrawn?

• Ifconcernshavebeenraisedaboutanexistingrelationship,haveeffectiveremedialmeasuresbeentakentoaddresstheseconcerns?

• Hasconsiderationbeengiventothesupportedparty’sexitstrategywhentheyceaseoperations?

• DoesthePMSCyouwishtohirehavesufficientfinancialmeanstopayfinesandcompensationifnecessary?

• Doyouhaveaprocessornecessarypreconditionsforyourpartner’srequestsforfiresupport?

• Doyouverifytargetsindependentlywhenprovidingfiresupport?

• Doestheenduser(e.g.armedforcesorarmedgroup,policeorotherlawenforcementofficials,orPMSC)operateunderclearandaccountablelinesofcommandandcontrol?

Detention

• AretheresimilarmechanismstoensureaccountabilityforviolationsofhumanrightslawbyotherStateagentsorprivateactorstaskedtoperformsecurity-relatedfunctions?

• Doesthesupportagreementincludeaspecificguaranteebythesupportedpartythatitwilltreatalldetaineesinaccordancewithitsinternationallegalobligations?

• Doesthesupportagreementspecifywhichstepsthetransferringpartymaytakeiftransferredpersonsarenottreatedinaccordancewithinternationallaw?

• Doyouhaveclearproceduresonthelawfultransferofdetaineesinaccordancewiththeprincipleofnon-refoulementunderinternationallaw?

• Doesyourpartnerapplyfairtrialguaranteesforpeopledeprivedoftheirliberty?

• Dopartnerforceshaveajudicialoradministrativeframeworktodetainpeopleandholdthemlawfully?

• DoesthesupportedpartytrainweaponsbearersinapplyingtherulesofIHL(whereapplicable)andhumanrightslaw?

• HavethesamemeasuresbeentakentoensureIHLcompliancebyotherweaponsbearers(e.g.thepolice)whomayoperateinsituationscoveredbyIHL?

• HasthesupportedpartyagreedtoallowtheICRCtovisitpeopledeprivedoftheirliberty?

The dead

• Hasyourpartnerdesignatedparticulardepartmentsorpersonneltoorganizethecollectionandmanagementofthedead?

• Doyourdirectivesonthecollection,disposalandtransferofthedeadconformwithlocallawsand customs?

• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveasystemformanagingthedeadinanarmedconflict?

• Doesthesupportedpartyhavethecapacity,eitherwithinoroutsideitsarmedforces,toproperlymanagethedead?

Missing persons

• Doesthesupportedpartyissueidentitytagstoitscombatantsorfighters?

• DoesthesupportedpartytakeDNAsamplesofitscombatantsorfighters?Missing

• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveamechanismtonotifythefamilieswhentheyevacuatethewoundedorsick?

• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveamechanismtoensurethatpeopleadmittedtomedicalfacilitiesundertheirresponsibilitycanrestoreand/ormaintaincontactwiththeirfamilymembers?

• Haveyouconductedatechnicalneedsassessmentofthesupportedparty’scapacitywithregardtohumanitarianmineaction?

• Haveyouconductedatechnicalneedsassessmentofthesupportedparty’scapacitywithregardtoexplosiveordnancedisposal?

• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacity,eitherwithinoroutsideitsarmedforces,toproperlysurveyand,wherenecessary,clearERWorotherweapon-relatedhazardsthatcanhindertheabilitytorecoverandmanagethedead?

General

• HaveyouagreedwithyourpartneronaprotocoltoinvestigateallegationsofIHL-relatedmisconductorviolations?

• Whatlawspermitorlimityourabilitytoreceivesupport?

• Howdoyoufactoryourpartner’sconductinarmedconflictandIHLcomplianceintoyourdecisiontoacceptandcontinueacceptingsupport?

• Havelegalorothermeasuresbeenadoptedprohibitingandpunishingtherecruitmentoruseinhostilitiesofchildren?

• Doesthesupportingactorhaveapost-conflicttransitionplan?

Missing persons

• Haveobligationstoaccountformissingpersonsbeenintegratedintothesupportagreement?

• Haveyousharedwithyourpartnerthepracticaltechniquesyouusetoidentifytheremainsofmembersofyourarmedforces?

• Hasyourpartnerestablishedasystemforfamiliestoreportmissingpersonsandreceiveinformationontheirfateandwhereabouts?

The dead

• Haveyousharedwithyourpartneryoursystemforcollectingandtransferringordisposingofremainswithdignity?

• Aretheregapsinyourcapacitytocollect,record,disposeofortransfertheremainsofpeoplekilledinarmedconflict?

General questions

Missing

7.2 IMPLEMENTATION7.2.1 INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING • Dothepartner’sinstitutionsapplyaframeworkandusesystemsandprocessesthatsupportandensuretheproposedconflict-relatedsupportactivitiesareincompliancewithIHLandotherrelevantlegalstandards?

• Arepartnerarmedforcesselectedandvettedeffectively?

• Doesthepartnerhavethecapacitytomanagetheaftermathofhostilities?

• Whentheproposedsupportdrawstoaclose,willthepartner’sinstitutionshavethecapacitytocontinueIHL-compliantoperationsontheirown?

General questions

General

• Doyourpartner’sinstitutionshavetheorganizationalcapacity,rulesandprocedurestofacilitatetheproposedmilitaryoperationsandassociatedactivitiesincompliancewithIHLandotherrelevantlegal standards?

• Doesyourpartnerhaveasystemforidentifyinglessonsandincorporatingthemintosubsequentoperations?

• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacitytocarryoutpattern-of-lifeassessments?

• Doesyourpartnerhaveaneffectivesystemforcommunicatinginformationtocivilians(e.g.evacuationordersandadvancewarningsofattack)?

• Doesyourpartnerhaveasystemforreceivingallegationsofmisconductfromthepublicandfromyou,andforaddressingthosecomplaints?

• Doesyourpartnerhaveamechanismforapersondeprivedoftheirlibertytoseekreviewofthelawfulnessoftheirdetention?

Health care

• Isconsiderationgiventofollowinguponthedeliveryofhealthcare,eitherbythemilitarymedicalpartnerorcivilianmedicalproviders,followingtheinitialprovisionofcare?

• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacity,rules,policiesandproceduresneededtoundertakenon-technicalandtechnicalsurveysandreportinginrelationtominesandERW,markingandfencing,accidentreporting,minefieldrescue,risk-awarenessandsafe-behaviourprogramming,traumamanagementinemergencymedicalcaresystems,andexplosiveincidentinvestigations(e.g.post-blastandpost-strike)?

• Whatin-theatre“licencing”proceduresdoyouhaveinplaceforexplosiveordnancedisposaloperators,ammunitionstockpileareasandammunitionmanagers?

General

• Whatlegalframeworksregulatetheconductofyourpartner’sarmedforces?

• Doesyourpartnerhaveasystemforinvestigatingand,whereappropriate,prosecutingallegedseriousviolationsofIHLbyitsarmedforces?

• Doyoueffectivelyvetthesupportedparty’sarmedforces,thearmedgrouporthepersonnelofthePMSC?

• Doesthesupportedpartyhavetheknow-howandresourcestomanagetheaftermathofhostilities?

• Doesthesupportedparty’sgovernmentcoordinatetherelevantbodiesinprovidingtheagreedsupport?

• Doyoucontributetobroadercapacity-buildingactivitiesinthemilitaryorsecuritysectorinthenormalcourseofyourrelationship?

• Whatrulesandproceduresregulatetheconductofthesupportedparty’sarmedforces?

• Arethemeasuresyoutaketostrengthenthesupportedparty’sinstitutionalcapacityenoughtomitigatetheriskofIHLviolationsorothercivilianharminanongoingorpotentialarmedconflict?

General questions

• Doesthesupportedpartyhavealearningsysteminplacethatisdistinctfromtheprocessesitusestoinvestigateandprosecutecriminalconductandfromitsdisciplinarymeasures?

• Whatisthescopeofthesupportedparty’slearningsystem?

• Doestheintendedenduserhaveappropriatestockpilemanagementprocesses?

• Whatarethesupportedparty’srulesofengagement?

• Doyourpartner’srulesofengagementdifferentiatebetweenconductingcombatandsecuritytasks?

• Whatmechanismsdoesthesupportedpartyhaveinplacetoimplementinternationalstandardsandguidelinesonweaponsmanagement(e.g.IMAS,IATGandMOSAIC)?

• Whatproceduresdoesthesupportedpartyhaveinplacetovetitscombatantsorfighters?

Detention

• Inrelationtopossibledetaineetransfers,doesthesupportagreementprovideforthetransferringpartytovisittransferredindividualsinordertomonitortheirtreatmentandthedetentionconditions?

• Willthesupportedparty’sjudicialsystembeabletocopewiththenumberandtypeofcasesitislikelytoreceive?

• Doesyourpartnerhaveclearproceduresforallmattersrelatedtotheprotectionofpeopledeprivedoftheirliberty,includingasregardslawfultransfersinaccordancewiththeprincipleofnon-refoulement underinternationallaw?

• Doyoutrainandhelpthesupportedpartytoestablishapropersystemforregisteringdetaineesandnotifyingfamiliesoftheirarrest,detentionandtransfer?

• Doyoutrainandhelpthesupportedpartytosetupawayfordetaineesandtheirfamiliestocommunicate,allowingforaregularexchangeoffamilynews?

The dead

• Hasthesupportedpartyconsideredtheimpactthatanurbanconflicthasonrecoveringthedeadandtheaddedcomplicationsthisentails?

• Howwillthesupportedpartyaddresstheriskstothosewhorecoverthedead?

• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytosetupagraveregistrationservice?

• Howwillyourpersonnelsupplementthesupportedparty’ssystemandtechniquesinrecoveringandmanagingthedead?

Missing persons

• Howcanyouhelpthesupportedpartytoestablishanationalbureauofinformation(oranequivalentsystemtogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationoncaptured,wounded,deadandmissingpeopleandtransmitthatinformationtotheotherpartiestotheconflict)beforeorattheoutsetoftheconflict?

• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveanationalinformationbureau(orequivalentsystemtogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationoncaptured,wounded,deadandmissingpeopleandtransmitthatinformationtotheotherpartiestotheconflict)?

• Whatsystemdoesthesupportedpartyhaveinplacetohelppreventcombatantsorfightersbecomingunaccountedforasaresultoftheconflict?

• Beforedeployingthem,doesthesupportedpartyprovideitscombatantsorfighterswithidentitycardsordiscs?

• Beforedeployingthem,doesthesupportedpartyrecorditscombatants’orfighters’medicalidentifiers(e.g.fingerprints,DNAordentalrecords)toidentifythemiftheydie?

• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveamechanismtosystematicallyregisterpeopledeprivedoftheirlibertyintheircustodyandrecordtheirtransfer?

• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytosetuponeormoremechanismstosystematicallyregisterpeopletheytakeintocustodyandrecordtheirsubsequenttransfer?

• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveamechanismtonotifyfamilieswhenitdetainspeopleandsubsequentlytransfersthem?

• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveamechanisminplacetoensurethatdetaineescanrestoreand/ormaintaincontactwiththeirfamilymembers?

Missing

• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytosetupamechanismtoensurethatpeopleintheircustodycanrestoreand/ormaintaincontactwiththeirfamilymembers?

• Howcanyouhelpthepartiestoanarmedconflicttogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationonpossiblelocationsofgravesitesandtosharethisinformationwithotherpartiestotheconflict?

• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytosetupprotocolstocollectandsafeguardallrelevantdataonthewoundedandsicktheyevacuate(i.e.personaldataandtheplace,dateandtime,andbywhom,thepersonwasevacuated)?

• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytosetupamechanismtonotifythefamilieswhentheyevacuatethewoundedorsick?

• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytosetupamechanismtoensurethatpeopleadmittedtomedicalfacilitiesundertheirresponsibilitycanrestoreand/ormaintaincontactwiththeirfamilymembers?

• Howcanyouhelpthesupportedpartytoestablishasystemforfamiliestoreportmissingpersonsandreceiveinformationontheirfateandwhereabouts?

Health care

• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytodevelopandimplementproceduresandrulestogovernbehaviourduringsearchoperations,prioritizethewoundedandsickatcheckpointsandlimittoexceptionalcircumstancesthedenialofmedicalevacuations,searchesofhealth-carefacilitiesortheremovalofpatientsfromthem?

• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytodevelopandimplementtargetingrulesandproceduresaimedatprotectingmedicalpersonnel,facilitiesandtransport?

• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytodevelopanationalmineactionauthority?

General

• Doyouhaveanarmsimportcontrolregime?

• Doyouhaveasysteminplacetomonitortheimpactofyourmilitaryoperationsonciviliansandtosystematicallycollectdataonanyresultingcivilianharm,includingthereverberatingeffectsofdamagingordestroyingcivilianobjects?

• CanyouprovideintelligenceandinformationtoyourpartnertoimproveitsunderstandingofcivilianconsiderationsrelevanttoIHL,e.g.culturalnorms,patternsoflife,andpositivelyidentifyingtargets?

The dead

• Foreachmilitaryoperation,doyouhavededicatedpersonnelforrecoveringandmanagingthedead,includingthoseofenemyforces?

• Howcanthesupportingactorsupplementyoursystemforrecoveringandmanagingremains?

Missing persons

• Doyouhaveanationalinformationbureau(orequivalentsystemtogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationoncaptured,wounded,deadandmissingpeopleandtransmitthatinformationtotheotherpartiestotheconflict)?

• Canyourpartnerhelpyoutodevelopanationalmineactionauthority?

General questions

Missing

7.2.2 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW TRAINING • DoyouincorporatetrainingonIHLandotherrelevantlawsintoyoursupportrelationship?

• Doyourpersonnelhavetheappropriateskills,includinganunderstandingofthetrainees’languageandculture,toprovidetraining?

• Isyourtrainingprogrammeadaptedtothepartnerintermsofcontent,methodsandmaterials,timingandfrequency,andaudience?

• HowdoyouevaluatetheeffectivenessofyourIHLtrainingandincorporatethatassessmentintosubsequenttrainingcycles?

• IsIHLtrainingintegratedacrossyourbroadertrainingprogramme,suchasincombinedexercises?

General questions

General

• Doyousharebestpracticesincivilianharmmitigationtechniqueswithyourpartner?

• Doyouprovideadvicetoyourpartnerondevelopingandimplementingano-strikelistinordertoensurethatcivilians,civilianobjectsandotherspeciallyprotectedobjectsareprotectedfromattack?

Detention

• WhenconductingPMOs,whattrainingdoyouprovidetopartnerforcesintermsofprotectingpeopledeprivedoftheirlibertyandadministeringplacesofdetention?

The dead

• Canyouprovideyourpartnerwithadviceonaddressinggapsinitssystemforrecoveringandmanagingthedeadwithdignity?

General

• DoyouincorporatetrainingonIHLandotherrelevantlawsintoyoursupportrelationship?

• Whensupportingapartytoaconflict,doyoualsoprovideIHLtraining?

• Whataretheminimumtrainingrequirementsthatotherarmedforcesmustfulfilforyoutoprovidesupporttothem?

• HowdoyoufactorthespecificcircumstancesoftheplannedoperationalcontextintotheIHLcomponentofyourtrainingpackage?

• Doyouadapttrainingprogrammestothespecifictaskspartnerswillperform?

• Whenprovidingmilitaryequipmenttopartnerforces,doyousystematicallytrainthoseforcesintheIHL-compliantuseofthatequipment?

• Howdoyouinstruct,prepareand/ortrainyoursupportedpartnerontakingfeasibleprecautionswhenconductinghostilities?

• Doyourpersonnelhavetheappropriateskills,includinganunderstandingofthetrainees’languageandculture,toprovidetrainingandadvice?

• Whatevents,legends,personalitiesandvaluesarepartofthetrainees’identityandcanshapeformalandinformalsocialization?

• Doanyoverlappingidentities(e.g.religiousorethnic)amongthetraineescreateentrypointsformessagesonrestraint?

• Howmuchinfluencedojuniorandnon-commissionedofficershaveonunitmembers’behaviourandviewpoints?

• Whattrainerprofilewouldbemostcrediblewithparticulartrainingaudiences?

• Isthereaprocessfordevelopingatrainingprogrammeforpartnerforcesthatistailoredtotheirspecificcapacityandneeds?

• Howarethecurriculumandmaterialstranslatedsothatlanguageandculturaldifferencesarewell-integratedintothetraining?

• Doyouhaveaprogrammetorepeatpartnertrainingatregularintervals?

General questions

• HowdoyouincorporatecivilianprotectionandIHLcomplianceintoyourtrainingforthesupported party?

• DoyouincorporateIHLintoyourpracticaltrainingexerciseswithpartners?

• DoyoutrainpartnerarmedforcesonIHLasitrelatestoprecautions,distinctionandproportionality?

• Haveyouincludedatrainingpackageontheappropriateandresponsibleuseoftheweaponsandothermilitaryresourcesthatyouprovidetoyourpartner?

• Isthesupportedpartytrainedinusingmeansandmethodsofwarfareinsuchawayastoavoidorminimizecivilianharm(e.g.trainedtounderstandandanticipatetheeffectsofweaponsandtobeasaccurateaspossiblewhenusingindirectfire)?

• DoyoutrainpartnersonselectingtargetsinaccordancewithIHLandonverifyingtheyarenotcivilians,civilianobjects,orspeciallyprotectedobjects?

• DoyoutrainpartnersonapplyingIHLrulesinurbanwarfare?

• Doyoutrainpartnersonapplyinghumanrightslawinlawenforcementoperations?

• Doyoutrainthesupportedpartyincollateraldamageestimationmethodologies?

• Doyoutrainthesupportedpartytoconductbattledamageassessments?

• Ifyouprovidethesupportedpartywithexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactarea,doyoualsotrainittoensurethatitsarmedforcesknowandunderstandthedirectandindirecteffectsofsuchweaponsinpopulatedareas?

• Ifyouprovidethesupportedpartywithexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactarea,doyoualsotrainittoensurethatitsarmedforcesimplementgoodpracticestomitigatetheriskofcivilianharm,includingrestrictionsandlimitationsontheuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas,asrecommendedby theICRC?

• Doyoushare,withpartnerforcesand/orsupportedparties,goodpracticesandlessonslearnedinrelationtotheuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas?

• Doyoutrainpartnersonthesafestorageof,andaccountabilityfor,weaponsandothermilitaryresources?

• Doesthesupportedpartyhavetheresourcesnecessarytousethetrainingmaterialsyouprovide?

• Whoisresponsibleforsettingupaninvestigativeorauditbodytoreviewhowthetrainingwas provided?

• Doesyourtrainingprogrammesuitthesupportedpartyintermsofthecurriculum,methodsandmaterials,choiceoftrainersandchoiceoftrainees?

• Doesthetrainingyouprovidetopartnerforcesincludepracticalexercises?

• Arethematerialsyouusefortrainingpartnerforcestranslatedintotheirlanguageandotherwiseadaptedtotheirneeds?

• Howdoyoumonitortheperformanceofunitstrainedbyyourpersonneland/orcontractorsduringtheiractualmilitaryoperations?

• Howdoyouevaluatetheeffectivenessofyourtrainingandincorporatetheresultsintosubsequenttrainingcycles?

• Howareyourtrainingprogrammesadaptedduringanoperationtotakeintoaccountthetrainedunits’observedperformanceandotherfeedback?

• Canthesupportedparty’sbehaviourleadtoachangeintheIHLtrainingyouprovide?

• WhenhiringaPMSCtoprovidesecurity-relatedservices,whichlegalstandardsdoyoutrainthemon?

• WhenhiringaPMSCtomaintainandassistinoperatingweaponsystems,includingthoseofapartner,doyoutrainthemontheirlegalresponsibilities?

• HowdoyouensurethatthepersonnelofaPMSCyouhireknowwhentheirconductmightaidorabetawarcrime?

• IfyouhireaPMSCtotrainyourpartner’sforces,howdoyouensurethatthetrainingitdeliversmeetsyourarmedforcestrainingstandards?

• IfyouhireaPMSCtotrainyourpartner’sforces,howdoyouensurethetrainingfocusessufficientlyonrelevantlegalobligations?

Detention

• Doyoutrainyourpartner’sarmedforcesonthehumaneanddignifiedtreatmentofthosetheycaptureordetain?

• Woulditbepertinenttomentororadvisepartnerforcesthatmanageplacesofdetentiontoensuretheyestablishandcomplywithappropriaterulesandprocedures?

• Doyouprovidethesupportedpartywithsupportandtrainingonnon-coerciveinterrogationtechniques?

Missing persons

• DoesyourtrainingforthesupportedpartyincludeasectionontheICRCandtheroleofitsCentralTracingAgency?

• Doesyourtrainingforthesupportedpartyincludeasectiononmaintainingfamilylinks?

• Doesyourtrainingforthesupportedpartyincludeasectiononthenationalinformationbureauorsimilarstructures(i.e.asystemtogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationoncaptured,wounded,deadandmissingpeopleandsharethatinformationwiththeotherpartiestotheconflict)?

• Doesyourtrainingforthesupportedpartyincludeprocessestoensurethatdetaineescanmaintain and/orrestorefamilycontact?

• Doesyourtrainingforthesupportedpartyincludemeasuresthatcanbetakentopreventpeoplefromgoingmissingduringmedicalevacuations?

The dead

• Canyouprovidespecializedtrainingintherecoveryandmanagementofthedeadinordertoensurethedeadaretreatedwithdignity,topreventdeadbodiesgoingmissingandtopreserveinformationthatmaybeneededtoidentifyhumanremainsinthefuture,inlinewithapplicabledataprotectionstandards?

• Howisyourtrainingonrecoveringthedeadadaptedtothesupportedparty’slawsandcustoms?

• Howisyourtrainingonrecoveringthedeadadaptedtothesupportedparty’sexistingpractices?

Health care

• Doyoutrainthesupportedpartyonhowtoavoidorminimizeharmtocriticalcivilianinfrastructuresuchasmedicalfacilities?

• Doesyourtrainingforpartnersaddressprotectingthemedicalmission?

• Doyoutrainandadvisepartnersecurityforcesonmanagingcheckpointsinawaythatminimizesthedelaytothemedicaltreatmentofpatients?

• Doyoutrainandadvisepartnersecurityforcesonconductingsearchoperationsinmedicalfacilitiesinawaythatensuresrespectforandtheprotectionofthewoundedandsickandminimizesthedisruptiontotheworkofmedicalpersonnel?

• Doyoutrainthesupportedpartyontheimpartialityofmedicalcareandtheevacuationprocess,notablyduringpre-deploymenttrainingprogrammesorbriefings?

• Doyoutrainoradvisethesupportedpartyinupdatingitsmapsoflocalhealthstructuresandotherprotectedsites?

• Doesyourtrainingontargetingclarifytherespectandprotectionduetomedicalpersonnelandfacilities,includingthelimitedcircumstancesinwhichprotectionmightbelost?

• Doesyourtrainingonsearchoperationsclarifytherulesgoverningbehaviourduringsearchoperations,prioritizethewoundedandsickatcheckpointsandlimittoexceptionalcircumstancesthedenialofmedicalevacuations,searchesofhealth-carefacilitiesortheremovalofpatientsfromthem?

• Canyourpersonnelprovidespecializedtraining,inaccordancewithinternationalhumanitarianstandards,indetecting,markingandclearinglandminesandERW?

• Doyouplantoembedatechnicaltrainingteamwithyourpartnertoassessitsneedsandprovidepre-deploymenttraining(insuchareasasIMASExplosiveOrdnanceDisposal,ExplosiveLimitLicencesandammunitionstorageandmanagementinconflictareas)?

Missing

General

• WhatIHLtrainingarethearmedforceslegallyrequiredtoundergo?

• DoesthesupportingactorrequiretrainingonIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansinpopulatedareas?

• DoyourarmedforcesreceiveregularIHLtraining?

• WoulditbehelpfultoreceiveIHLtraining,orhelpindeliveringIHLtraining,fromthesupporting actor?

• WhatdoesyourleadershipdotoreinforcetheimportanceofIHLtrainingthroughoutyourorganization?

• HowareIHLprinciplesincorporatedintoyourmilitaryeducation?

• HowdoesthetrainingyourforcesreceivereinforcetheimportanceofIHLcompliance?

• DoyourforcesreceivespecifictrainingonrulesandstandardsoncivilianprotectionandIHLcomplianceduringhostilities?

• Doyourarmedforcesreceivetrainingonissuesrelatingtotheprotectionofcivilians?

• HowdoestheirtrainingprepareyourforcestocomplywithIHLduringdynamictargetingdecisions?

• DotraineeshaveaccesstorelevantmaterialsintheirIHLtraining,includingacopyoftherelevantrules?

• Arelegalprinciplesincorporatedintotheoperationaltrainingdeliveredtoyourarmedforces?

• Doesyourpartnerrequirespecifictraininginthelawsandgoodpracticesrelatingtotheconductofhostilitiesinpopulatedareas?

• Whenyoureceiveoffensivemilitaryequipmentfromasupportingpartner,doyouaskthemtoprovidetrainingorinstructionsonhowtousetheequipmentinlinewithIHLrules?

• DoestheIHLtrainingprovidedtoyourarmedforcesincludepracticalexercisesonputtingtherules intoaction?

• Doyouhaveasystemforkeepingtrackofthetrainingcompletedbyeachunitorgroup?

• WhendevelopinganIHLtrainingcoursewithapartnerforce,doyouallowthecoursetobeadapted inresponsetoissuesarisinginoperations?

• HowdoyouprovideinputontheIHLtrainingdeliveredbyyourpartner(e.g.curriculum,methods andmaterials)?

• WhenagreeingtohaveapartnerdeliverIHLtrainingtoyourarmedforces,doyouensurethat thetrainingisadaptedtoyourtrainees’languageorculture?

• Aftercompletingatrainingpartnership,doyoumonitortrainees’subsequentperformanceandIHLcompliance?

• Afteratrainingpartnershiphasended,doyousharetheresultsofpost-trainingperformanceand IHL-complianceassessmentswithpartnerforces?

• Doyouhaveaprocessinplacetoreceivefeedbackontrainingprogrammesandtoensurethatitisusedtoimprovetheeffectivenessoffuturetrainingprogrammes?

• Isthereaninvestigativeorauditbodyinchargeofreviewinghowthetrainingwasprovided?Ifso,whosetsupitupandwhorunsit?

• Ifyoubecomeawareofreportsofproblematicbehaviourbypersonneltrainedbyapartner,doyouhaveasystemforraisingtheseissueswiththepartner?

Detention

• Doyourforcesreceivespecifictrainingonrulesandstandardsregardingtheprotectionofpeopledeprivedoftheirlibertyandtheadministrationofplacesofdetention?

General questions

7.2.3 ASSISTANCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW • Doesyourpartnerhavegapsintheircapacity,functionsorresourcesthatimpedeitsabilitytofulfilitsobligationstowardspeopleprotectedbyIHL?

• Canyouhelpyourpartnertoincorporatecivilianprotectionintoitsmilitaryplanningandcommitresourcesthataddressthesegaps?

• WhatcontingenciesdoyouhaveinplaceifthesupportedpartyprovesunabletofulfilitsobligationstowardspeopleprotectedbyIHL?

General questions

General

• Areyouabletocommitresourcestohelptominimizethenegativehumanitarianconsequencesofthearmedconflict?

Detention

• Doyouhavetheresourcesorknow-howrequiredtoimproveyourpartner’sdetentionfacilitiessothattheyoperateinaccordancewithinternationallawandstandards?

The dead

• Doyourarmedforceshaveinstructionsoncollecting,identifyingandmanagingthedeadfollowingyouroryourpartner’smilitaryoperations?

Health care

• Whatlevelofcareareyouhelpingtoprovidetocivilians(e.g.firstaidandemergencycare,evacuations,routineandfollow-uptreatmentsorpublichealthprogramming)?

• Doyousharewithyourpartnerthelocationsorcoordinatesofexplosivemunitionsyoulaunchoremplace,tofacilitatethetaskofdetecting,markingandclearinganyexplosiveremnants?

General

• Couldyourpersonnelhelpthesupportedpartytoincreasetheprotectionofpeopleaffectedbyconflict?

• WillyouassignpersonneltoadviseyourpartnerinmattersrelatingtoIHLcomplianceandcivilianprotection?

• WhatcontingenciesdoyouhaveinplaceifthesupportedpartyisunabletofulfilitsobligationstowardspeopleprotectedbyIHL?

• Areyouabletoprovideyourpartnerwithintelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissanceequipmenttoimproveitscapacitytodistinguishbetweenciviliansorcivilianobjectsandmilitaryobjectives?

• Canyoudevelopano-strikelisttosharewithyourpartner?

• Couldyourpersonnelassistbybeingpresentduringthesupportedparty’stargetselectionprocess?

• Canyouhelpyourpartnertosetuporimproveacivilianharmtrackingmechanism?

• Canyouhelpyourpartnertosetupmechanismstoinvestigateharmcausedtociviliansandensureaccountability?

• Howcanyouhelpyourpartnerintegratecivilianprotectionintoitsmilitaryplanning?

• Canyoudeployintelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissance(ISR)supportinordertosupplementyourpartner’starget-verificationprocessandcollateraldamageestimates?

• Canyouhelpyourpartnertoorganizeitscheckpointssoastoimproveitscapacitytodistinguishbetweencombatantsandcivilians?

The dead

• Canyouhelpyourpartnertorecoverandtransferthedeadwithdignity?

General questions

Missing persons

• Canyouhelpthepartiestoanarmedconflicttogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationoncaptured,wounded,deadandmissingpeople,includingthepossiblelocationofgravesites,andtopotentiallysharethatinformationwiththeotherpartiestotheconflict?

• Couldyouprovidethesupportedpartywiththeresourcesneededtocreateidentitycardsordiscs and/ortotakeDNAreferencesamples?

• Canyouhelpyourpartnertodocumentandrecordthelocationofallfallencivilians,combatantsand fighters?

• Canyouprovidetheresourcesorknow-howyourpartnerneedstodevelopasystemthathelpstopreventcombatantsorfightersbecomingunaccountedforasaresultofaconflict?

Health care

• Doyouhavetheresourcesorknow-howrequiredtoimproveyourpartner’sabilitytocareforthewoundedandsick?

• Couldyouassistbycarryingoutmedicalevacuationsofwoundedandsickciviliansandcombatantsorfightersfromthefrontlines?

• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacitytocarryoutmedicalevacuationsofwoundedandsickciviliansandcombatantsorfightersfromthefrontlines?

• Canyouprovidedirectsupporttolocalmedicalfacilitiesinareaswhereyourpartneroperatesandwheremedicalfacilitiesareimpairedbythemilitaryoperations?

• Howdoyouhelptoprepareyourpartnertocollectandcareforthewoundedandsick,includingwoundedadversaries?

• Isthehealth-careassistanceyouprovidedesignedtoincludecivilians?

• Couldyouhelpinupdatingthemappingoflocalhealthstructuresandestimatingthehumanitarianconsequencesofmilitaryoperationsinvolvingvitalmedicalinfrastructure?

• Couldyouworkwithhealth-careprofessionalsandtheauthoritiestoensurethatmedicalfacilitiesandpersonnelarerespectedandprotected?

• Canyouhelptosetupamedicalsupplyline?

• Doyouhavethecapacitytohelpyourpartnertosearchfor,collectandcareforthewoundedandsick,includingwoundedandsickadversaries?

• Canyouprovidesupportfordetecting,markingandclearinglandminesandERW?

• Canyouprovidesupporttorisk-educationprogrammesinordertoreducecivilianexposuretothedangersposedbylandminesandERW?

• CanyouprovidesupportfortheassistanceandrehabilitationofvictimsoflandminesandERW?

General

• Haveyoudiscussedwithyourpartnerwhattype(s)ofspecializedassistanceyouneedinordertoimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting?

• Doyourequireassistancetoimproveyourtarget-selectionprocess,suchastoincreaseyourcapacitytodistinguishbetweenciviliansorcivilianobjectsandmilitaryobjectives?

• Canyousharewithyourpartnerinformationthatcaninformtargetingdecisions,suchasthehumanterrain,geography,criticalcivilianinfrastructureandpatternsoflife?

• WillyoubeabletocontinuecomplyingwithIHLifyourpartnerreducesorendsitsassistance?

The dead

• Doyourequireassistanceinrecovering,identifying,disposingofortransferringremainswithdignity?

Missing

General questions

7.2.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF THE PARTNER • Doyouhavevisibilityonyourpartner’soperations?

• Howdoyouevaluatethehumanitarianimpactofyourpartner’soperations?

• Whatmetricsdoyouusetoreviewandmodifythesupportrelationshipovertime?

• Whatsystemdoyouusetoaddresspotentialmisconductbythepartner,orotherproblemsinthe relationship?

• IfIHLviolationsmayhaveoccurred,howwilltheybeeffectivelyinvestigated?

General questions

General

• Doyourequestaclearlistoffocalpointsfromthepartnerinordertoexchangeinformationandaddresspotentialproblems?

• Arethereclearcommunicationchannelsandproceduresforengagingwithyourpartner’sofficials?

• Doesyourpartnerhaveamechanismfortrackingcivilianharmresultingfromitsoperations?

• Whatinformation-sharingandcoordinationprocessesdotheactorsinthesupportrelationshipusetosupportinvestigations?

• Doyouhaveaprocessforconductingjointinvestigationswithyourpartner?

• Whichmeasuresmustbetakenduringoperationstoallowforpotentialinvestigationsandprosecutions?

• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacitytoconductbattledamageassessments?

• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacitytoinvestigateexplosiveincidents(e.g.post-blast,post-strike)?

• WhatprocessdoyourpersonnelfollowtoreportpossibleIHLviolationsbypartnerforces?

• Doyouhaveaneffectiveprocessfordiscussingcredibleallegationsofmisconductbyyourpartnerwithitshierarchy?

• Howdoesyourpartnerhandlecredibleallegationsofmisconductbyitspersonnel?

• Doesyourpartnerhaveeffectivemechanismstoensureaccountabilityforactionstakenbythemorontheirbehalf?

• Whatsystemdoyouhaveforaddressingpotentialmisconductbyyourpartnerorotherproblemsinthe relationship?

• DothelawsofyourStateallowyoutoprosecuteandholdpartnerforcesaccountableiftheycommitinternationalcrimes?

• Doyourmonitoringmechanismsensuresufficientevidencecanbecollectedforpossiblelegal investigations?

• Towhichactor(s)isthePMSCaccountable?

• WhatsystemisinplacetoholdthePMSCaccountableforviolationsofapplicablelaw?

• Isthereanindependentmechanismtoreceivecomplaintsfromindividualsorcivilsocietyorganizationsconcerningtheactivitiesofeitherthesupportingactororthesupportedparty?

• Istheindependentmechanismtoreceivecomplaintseasilyaccessibleandsafeforindividualstouseinviewoftheirpossiblevulnerabilities?

• Howdoesyourpartnerhandleinformationonpotentialviolationsfromindividualsorcivil-societyorganizations?

• Doesyourpartnerhaveaprocessforremedyingharmcausedbyitsmilitaryoperations?

• Doesthepartner’ssystemincludethepossibilityofcompensatingvictimsandtheirfamilies?

• Howistheinformationyourecordintegratedintolearning,trainingand,whereappropriate,investigations?

Detention

• Doyouhavemechanismstoassesstheriskoftransferringdetaineestoyourpartners?

• Whatmeasuresaretheretopreventtheuseoftortureandill-treatmentbyyourpartner?

• Doyouhaveprocessestoassesshowdetaineesaretreatedoncetheyaretransferredtothesupportedpartyandthentochannelanycredibleallegationsofmisconduct?

General questions

• Whatmeasuresdoyoutakeifyoureceivecredibleallegationsofill-treatmentbyyourpartnerofpersonswhomyoutransferred?

• Doyouconductpost-transfermonitoringvisits?

• Doyouensurethatindependentmonitoringbodies,inparticulartheICRC,haveunimpededaccesstoallplacesofdetentionthatholddetaineesyoutransferred?

Health care

• Howisthequalityofcareprovidedbymilitarymedicalcounterpartsmonitored?

General

• Doyouhavevisibilityonyourpartner’soperations?

• Whatcriteriadoyouuseovertimetoreview,modifyorterminateasupportrelationship?

• HowwillyoumonitorandreviewthemeasuresputinplacebyyouandthepartnertoimproverespectforIHL?

• Beforetransferringarms,doyourequireyourpartnertoagreetopost-shipmentverifications?

• Haveyoudeployedsufficientresourcestomonitorandevaluatewhatishappeningintheconflict,includingyourpartner’sconduct?

• Haveyouinstructedyourarmedforcestomonitorandevaluatetheconductofpartnerforcesduring hostilities?

• Dotheunitsassignedtotraining,advisoryorassistancemissionshavethecapacitytomonitorandevaluatepartnerforces?

• Aretheunitsassignedtotraining,advisoryorassistancemissionsinstructedandtrainedtoproactivelyidentify,collectandreportallegationsofIHLviolationsbytheirpartnerforces?

• Aretheresourcesthatyouhavedeployedqualifiedtomonitorandevaluateyourandyourpartner’sconduct?

• Aretheresourcesthatyouhavedeployedqualifiedtoinvestigateanyallegedmisconductbyyourpartner?

• HowwillpossibleIHLviolationsbeinvestigatedeffectively?

• Whatsafeguardshaveyouputinplacetoprotectindividualsorgroupsthatmakeallegationsagainstthesupportedparty?

• Willyoubepresentwhenthesupportedpartyplansandconductsmilitaryoperations?

• Haveyouputinplacejointafter-actionreviewprocesseswiththeauthoritytoevaluateallpositiveandnegativeaspectsofoperationsandtakeconcretemeasurestoadoptremedialmeasures?

• Willyouengage,whereappropriate,directlywithcivilians,peopledeprivedoftheirlibertyandothersaffectedbythearmedconflictinordertounderstandandassessthesupportedparty’sconduct?

• Doyoumaintainsomeoversightoverthemeasurestakenbyyourpartnertoaddresscivilianharm?

• Doyourequireend-usercertificatesasaconditionforyourarmstransfers?

• Doyouhaveasystemtomonitoryourpartner’suseorreporteduseofarmsyoutransfertoit?

• Doyouhaveasystemtomonitoryourpartner’suseorreporteduseofthecategoryofarmsyouintendtotransfertoit?

• Doyouhaveasystemtoensurethatpastconductisfactoredintoriskassessments?

• Doesyourrisk-assessmentprocesstakeintoaccountpastconductthatcouldpotentiallyamounttoaviolationofIHL?

• Whentransferringarms,doyourpersonnelhavethecapacitytoundertakepost-shipmentverificationsintherecipientState?

• WhatmeasureshaveyouincludedinthecontractwiththePMSCtoensureaccountability?

• IsthePMSCyouhiredcoveredbyanyrelevantorapplicablestatusofforcesagreements?

• DoyouhaveeffectivemeasuresformonitoringtheconductofPMSCsyouhire?

• Doesyouroversightovercivilianharmmitigationmeasuresmakegooduseofyourpartner’slocal knowledge?

General questions

• Doyoudeploypersonneltomentorpartnerpersonnelinidentifyingandcorrectingproblematicpractices?

• Doyouhaveaqualitymanagementsystemtoassessyourpartner’sPSSM?

• Doyouhaveasystemofongoingperiodicqualityassuranceandqualitycontroltoassessyourpartner’sPSSM?

Detention

• Howistheprincipleofnon-refoulement–includingpre-andpost-transferresponsibilities–integratedintoyoursupportagreements?

• Doyouhaveaqualitymanagementsystemtoassessthesupportedparty’sactivityinhumanitarianmineaction?

• Whenengagingathirdpartytoprovideservices(e.g.contaminationsurveys,theclearanceofERW,risk-awarenessandsafe-behaviourtraininginaffectedcommunities,orstockpiledestruction),howdoesthecontractofengagementprovideforpartneredpersonneltoreceive mentoring?

• Doyouhaveaqualitymanagementsystemtoassessyourpartner’sactionsintheareaofexplosiveordnancedisposal?

• Doyouhaveanongoingperiodicquality-assuranceandquality-controlsystemtoassessyourpartner’shumanitarianmineaction?

• Doyouhaveasystemofongoingperiodicqualityassuranceandqualitycontroltoassessyourpartner’sactionsintheareaofexplosiveordnancedisposal?

General

• Doesthesupportingactorhaveeffectiveoversightandaccountabilitymechanisms?

• Doyoukeepcompleterecordsofallarmsandequipmentreceivedfrompartners?

• Howdoyouensurethatarmsandothermilitaryequipmentprovidedtoyourforcesarenotlostor resold?

• Willyousetupaseparateprogrammeforcompensationforcivilianharmofyourmilitaryoperations,orwillyouintegrateitintoanexistingsystem?

• Hasyourpartnertakenmeasurestoremedyanyharmitcauseswhilesupportingyourarmedforces?

• HaveyoutakenparticularmeasurestoreducetheimpactoflandminesandexplosiveERWoneffortstorecoverandidentifythedeadormissing,providemedicalcareandrepairandmaintainessentialinfrastructure?

• Howdoyoumanagereportingproceduresinaccordancewiththird-partycontracts?

General questions

7.2.5 INTERNAL OVERSIGHT • DoyouhaveaprocedureforeffectivelyinvestigatingallpossibleIHLviolationsbyyourarmedforcesorpersonnel,includinginthecontextofasupportrelationship?

• Whatisyourprocessforreviewingyourowndecisionstoprovideorreceivesupport?

• Dootherpartsofthegovernmenthavethepowertocheckthatthesupportrelationshipisplannedandimplementedinaccordancewithinternationalanddomesticlaw?

General questions

General

• WhatmechanismsdoyouhavetoidentifypotentialsystemicissuesrelatingtoIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting?

• Doyouhavethenecessarylawsandregulations,aswellasthecapacity,toconducteffectiveinvestigationsintopossibleIHLviolationsandotherviolationscommittedinanarmedconflict?

• Doyouhaveaccesstothereportsgeneratedbyyourpartner’scivilianharmtrackingmechanism?

• Howarethereportsgeneratedbythecivilianharmtrackingmechanismusedinadministrativeandcriminalinvestigations?

• DoyourreportingproceduresallowforyourpersonneltoreportpossibleIHLviolationswhileoperatinginasupportrelationship?

• WhatistheprocessforyourpartnertoreportpossibleIHLviolationsbyyourpersonnel?

• Doyouhavethecapacitytoinvestigateexplosiveincidentsinvolvingyourpersonnel(e.g.post-blast,post-strike)?

• DoyousharewithyourpartnerthefindingsofanyreportsorinvestigationsintopossibleIHLviolations?

• WhatmechanismsensurethatPMSCsareselectedandhiredwithproperoversightandtransparency?

• Doesyourgovernancestructure(parliamentaryorother)haveadequateknowledgeoftheoperationsbeingconductedandtheauthoritytorequestandreceiveinformationsothatitcanshapeandframethewayinwhichsupportisprovided?

• DoesyourjudicialsystemhavethecapacityandauthoritytoconsiderquestionsofcompliancewithIHLandotherrelevantlawsandtoprosecuteseriousviolationsofIHLcommittedbyyournationalsoronyourterritory?

• Doyouhaveanationalmineactionauthority?

General

• Whatreviewproceduresdoyouapplytotheconductofspecialforcesoverseas?

• Canelectedrepresentativesaskquestionsaboutthegovernment’sdecisiontoprovidesupport?

• Whatmechanismsdoyouhavetoreviewdecisionsandconductrelatingtotheprovisionofsupportanditsimpactonciviliansandothersnotfighting?

• Doyouhavemechanismsforyourgovernancestructure(parliamentaryorother)tooverseethebehaviourofallforcesprovidingsupport?

• Doesthisoversightalsocoverspecial,paramilitaryandintelligenceforces?

General

• WhatcapacitydoyouhavetoinvestigatepossibleIHLviolationscommittedduringjointoperationswiththesupportingactor?

• Woulditbefeasibletoestablishajointinvestigativeandaccountabilitymechanism?

• Whatmechanismsdoyouhavetoreviewdecisionsandconductrelatingtothereceiptofsupportanditsimpactonciviliansandthosenolongerfighting?

• Dothesereviewmechanismsapplytoallagenciesreceivingsupport?

General questions

• Doesyourarmedforces’leadershiphaveawaytoreviewtheirmembers’conductduringsupportoperations?

• Doyouhavemechanismsforyourgovernancestructure(parliamentaryorother)tooverseethebehaviourofallforcesbeingsupported?

• Doesthisoversightalsocoverspecial,paramilitaryandintelligenceforces?

• Doesitapplytoallexistingforcesandthosenewlygeneratedbysupportingactors?

• Doesyourjudicialsystemhavethecapacityandauthoritytoreviewtheconductofthemilitaryandallotherrelevantagenciesandhowthatconductisshapedbysupportingactors?

7.3 TRANSITION7.3.1 STRUCTURED DISENGAGEMENT • DoesthesupportedpartydependonthesupporttocomplywithIHL,andwhatcanyoudotoensureitremainscompliantonceyoursupportends?

• Whatotherfunctionsthatthesupportingactorfulfilstopromotetheprotectionofpeopleaffectedbyconflictwillneedtobeassumedbythesupportedpartyoranotheractorwhenthesupportends?

• Howwillthesupportedparty’sintentiontocomplywithIHLandotherrelevantstandardsbeaffectedifthesupportrelationshipchangesorends?

• Haveyouagreedonresponsibleresourcedisengagementmeasures(suchasDDRprogrammesorarmsmanagementprogrammes)toputintoplace?

• Howwillyouassessandmitigatetheriskofharmtomembersofyourpartner’sarmedforcesandtheirfamiliesorcommunitiesoncethesupportorconflictends?

General questions

General

• Whatinternalcoordinationisneededwithotherrelevantcivilianservicesandinstitutionstoensurethatpeopleaffectedbythearmedconflictcontinuetobeprotectedbothduringandafterthetransition?

• HasaDDRprogrammebeenestablishedbylaw?

• IstheDDRprogrammepartofaregionalpeaceprocessthatisinclusiveofallparties?

Missing persons

• Willyourpartner’snationalbureauofinformation(orequivalent)continuetooperateafter theconflict?

Essential services

• Isthereaplaninplacetorestorecriticalcivilianinfrastructurethatwasdamagedasaresultoftheconflict?

• Hasastockpiledestructionphasebeenincludedinathird-partycontractoroperationsorder?

• Doyouhavealogisticsplanforthestockpiledestructionphase,includinganappropriatedisposalplanforWAM?

• Isthereacrediblehumanitarianmineactionprogrammeinplace?

• Whatinternalorexternalagencieswillcompletethesurveyandclearanceplan?

• Whatistheprojectedscopeofworkforthesurveyandclearanceactivities(e.g.expectedlevelofweaponscontamination)?

• Whatareyourpartner’sammunitiondisposalcapabilities?

• Whatproceduresdoyouhavetomanageammunitioninventories,thedestructionofstockpilesofopenedandunusedammunitionandthesafetransportandmovementofanyremainingammunitionstockpiles?

• Doesyourpartnerhaveadata-managementsystemtorecord,forexample,clearancerates (timetoclearandterritorycleared),numbersandtypesofweaponscleared,risk-awarenessandsafe-behaviourprogrammesandminevictimdata?

General

• Arethereparametersinplacethatwillhelptodeterminewhenthesupportrelationshipwillend,orhasanenddatebeenset?

• Willthesupportedparty’sinstitutionshavethecapacitytocontinueoperatingonitsownwithoutyoursupport?

• Haveyouconsideredhowendingyoursupportwillaffectthesupportedparty’scapacityandwillingnesstocomplywithIHLandotherrelevantstandards?

General questions

Missing

General questions

• Canyoumitigatetransition-relatedrisksthroughotherformsofengagement(e.g.diplomaticeffortsordevelopmentaid)?

• Whatotherfunctionsdoyoufulfiltopromotetheprotectionofpeopleaffectedbyconflict?Howwillyouensurethatthesefunctionsareassumedbythesupportedpartyoranotheractorwhenyoursupportends?

• Isthereariskthatfamiliesorcommunitiesperceivedtobealignedwithyourforcesorthesupportedpartywillfaceharmfromotherswhenyouwithdrawyoursupportorpresence?Howwillyoumitigatethisrisk?

• Howwillyouassessandmitigatetherisksfacedbymembersofyourpartner’sforcesandtheirfamiliesorcommunitiesoncethesupportorconflictends?

• Whereapplicable,haveyouagreedwiththesupportedpartyontheirinclusioninaDDRprogramme?

• DoestheDDRprocesstakeintoaccountthespecificneedsandrisksofthemostvulnerablegroups,suchaschildrenassociatedwitharmedgroups,foreignersandfemalecombatantsorfighters?

• DoestheDDRprocesstakeintoaccountthespecificneedsandrisksarisingfromthedetentionofvulnerablegroupssuchaschildrenassociatedwitharmedgroupsandforeigners?

• IstheDDRprogrammesufficientlyfundedandresourced?Isthereonebodyinchargeofit?

• Howwillyoumonitortheeffectivenessofthedisarmament,demobilizationandreintegration(DDR)programme?

• Areallweaponsandothermilitaryequipmentfullyaccountedfor,asrequiredbytheDDRprogramme?

• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveadequatestockpilemanagementprocessestopreventitsarmsstockpilesbeinglostordiverted?

Detention

• Whatmeasureswillyouputinplacetoensurethatprotectivestandardsgoverningdetaineetreatmentanddetentionconditions,especiallyforvulnerablegroups,willbemaintainedafteryoursupportends?

• Doesthesupportedpartyhavetheinfrastructure,resources,proceduresandtrainingneededtoensurehumanetreatmentandconditionsinplaceswherepeoplemaybeheld,includingplacesofdetention?

• Willyourdepartureharmtheabilityofimpartialhumanitarianorganizationstoaccessdetaineesandplacesofdetention?

Missing persons

• Hasyourpartnerestablishedadedicatedmechanismforclarifyingthefateandwhereaboutsofpeoplewhowentmissingduringorasaresultoftheconflictandforattendingtotheirfamilies’needs?

• Doesthismechanismincludeproceduresforfamiliestoreportmissingrelativesandreceiveinformationonthefateandwhereaboutsoftheirmissinglovedonesaftertheconflict?

Health care

• Howwillyourdepartureaffecttheabilityofsupportedpartiestocollectandcareforthewounded andsick?

• Howwillyourdepartureaffectthecapacityoflocalfacilitiestoprovidemedicaltreatmenttopeoplein need?

• Whatisyourexitstrategywhenyoudecidetoendassistancetoamilitarymedicalpartner?

Essential services

• Doesthesupportedpartydependonyoursupporttoprovideanyessentialservices?Howwillyouensurethattheseservicesaremaintainedonceyoursupportends?

• WhatWAMmechanismsdoyouhavewithrespecttoanyarmstobesoldorgiftedtoyourpartner?

• Canyouprovideassistancewiththedetection,markingandremovalofminesandERWinaccordancewithhumanitarianstandards?

Missing

General

• Canyourpartner’ssupportberedirectedfromthesecuritysectortoothergovernmentdepartmentsoragenciesinordertoassistwiththeaftermathoftheconflict?

• Whatfunctionsdoesthesupportingactorfulfiltopromotetheprotectionofpeopleaffectedbyconflictthatyouwillneedtoassumewhenitssupportends?

Missing persons

• Haveyouestablishedadedicatednationalmechanismforclarifyingthefateandwhereaboutsofpeoplewhowentmissingduringorasaresultoftheconflictandforattendingtotheirfamilies’needs?

• Doesthisnationalmechanismincludeproceduresforfamiliestoreportmissingrelativesandreceiveinformationonthefateandwhereaboutsoftheirmissinglovedonesaftertheconflict?

General questions

Missing

7.3.2 LEARNING • Doyouhaveaprocessforcapturingandmanagingobservationsandlessonslearnedthroughoutthesupportrelationship?

• DoesthelearningprocessallowyoutoidentifyissuesrelatingtoIHLandtheprotectionofthosenotfighting?

• Doesyourlearningprocessallowyoutoidentify,captureandincorporatelessonsinordertoimproveanongoingsupportrelationship?

• Howwillyouincorporateyourpartner’sfeedbackinthelearningprocess?

• Doyoushareyourlessonswithotherpartnersorallies,orotherparties,inordertoimprovesupport-relationshippractices?

General questions

General

• Whatlessonshaveyouincorporatedintothisrelationshipfrompreviousexperience?

• Doyouhaveaprocessforcapturingandmanagingobservationsthroughoutthesupportrelationship?

• Doyouperformafter-actionreviews?

• Whatarepossibleareasforremedialactions?

• Doyoushareyourlessonswithotherpartnersorallies,ormorewidely,inordertocontributetobestpractices?

• CanyoualsosharelessonslearnedfromPMSCswithpartners?

• Doesyourlearningprocessallowyoutoidentify,captureandincorporatelessonsinordertoimproveanongoingsupportrelationship?

• Howdoyoucaptureyourpartner’sinputonyourlearningprocess?

• Howdoyouincorporateyourpartner’sfeedbackinthelearningprocess?

• Howdoyoukeeprecordsoflessonslearned?

• Doyouhaveaprocessforreviewinganylessonslearnedwithyourpartner?

• Howwilllessonslearnedfromasupportrelationshipfeedintofuturepartneringdecisions?

General

• Doyouhavealearningprocessthatrequiresyoutoreviewyoursupportrelationships?

• Arelessonslearnedsharedamongcoalitionmembers?

• Doyoumaintainarepositoryoflessonslearnedthatgobeyondaspecificconflictsituation?

• Isacentralunitinchargeofidentifyinglessonslearnedattheendofaconflictorofasupportrelationshipinformedofmisstepsbythesupportedparty(misconduct,improperuseofsupport,etc.)?

• HowdoyousharelessonslearnedfromtheperformanceofaPMSCwithothergovernmentagenciesthatmayhiresuchcompanies?

General

• Isalessons-learnedprocessrequiredunderthesupportagreement?

• Doyouhaveasystemforidentifyingproblemsthatariseduringorasaresultofyouroperations?

General questions

GLOSSARYThefollowingtermsaredefinedforthepurposesofthisdocument.Althoughsomeofthetermsusedhaveabasisinlaw,nothinginthisglossaryisintendedtoconferlegalmeaningtotheseterms.

AccountabilityThistermisusedinthecontextofpracticalmeasurestodescribeoneoftwothings:measuresbywhichoneactorinasupportrelationshipisheldaccountablebytheother,ormeasuresbywhichasupportingactorisheldaccountablebyitsownstakeholders(e.g.parliamentorconstituents).

Armed groupAnoperationaltermthat,fortheICRC,includesabroadrangeofgroupswithvaryinggoals,structures,doctrines,fundingsources,militarycapacityanddegreeofterritorialcontrol.ItdenotesagroupthatisnotrecognizedasaStatebutthathasthecapacitytocauseviolenceofhumanitarianconcern.

Includedinthisbroadoperationalcategoryarenon-Statearmedgroups(NSAGs)thatqualifyaspartiestoanon-internationalarmedconflict(NIAC)andarethereforeboundbyinternationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL).Othergroupsinthiscategoryincludepro-governmentparamilitaries(bothlocalandnational),andlocalgroups(tribalorcommunity)thatserveassecurityforcesinalocalarea.

Arms transferAcatch-alltermforthetransfer(includingexport,import,transit,trans-shipmentandbrokering)ofarms,ammunition,andpartsandcomponentsofarmsandammunition.Armstransfersincludecommercialsales,militaryaidorgifts,loansandleases.

Central Tracing AgencyAnorganizationsetupbytheICRCtocollectalltheinformationitcan,throughofficialorprivatechannels,aboutprisonersofwarandprotectedpersons,particularlythosesubjecttointernment,andtotransmitthatinformationtotheircountryoforiginorofresidenceortothePoweronwhichtheydependunlesstransmit-tingthatinformationmightbedetrimentaltothepersonswhomtheinformationconcernsortheirrelatives.

Contracting StateAStatethatdirectlyentersintocontractsfortheservicesofprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompanies(PMSCs),includingwherethePMSCsubcontractsanotherPMSC.

Explosive weapons in populated areasExplosiveweaponsthat,becauseofthelargedestructiveradiusoftheindividualmunitionused,theinaccur-acyofthedeliverysystem,and/orthedeliveryofmultiplemunitionsoverawidearea,haveawideimpactareaorwideareaeffectsandarethusverylikelytohaveindiscriminateeffectswhenusedinpopulatedareas.Thesecategoriesofexplosiveweaponsincludelargebombsandmissiles,indirectfireweaponsystemssuchasmortars,rocketsandartillery,multi-barrelrocketlaunchersandcertaintypesofimprovisedexplosivedevices.

Financial supportAformofsupportrelationshipinwhichanactorprovidesdirectorindirectfunding,includingthroughloanagreementsandinvestments,thatsignificantlyenablesthesupportedpartytoengageinarmedconflict.

Force generationAformofpartneredmilitaryoperation(PMO)inwhichanactor,oftenanexternalState,recruits,trainsandequipslocalarmedforces.

GLOSSARy 157

Home StateTheStateofnationalityofaprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompany(PMSC),i.e.wherethePMSCisregisteredorincorporated.IftheStatewherethePMSCisincorporatedisnottheoneinwhichithasitsprincipalplaceofmanagement,thentheStatewherethePMSChasitsprincipalplaceofmanagement.

HostingAsituationinwhichanactorplacesitsterritoryorfacilitiesatthedisposalofapartytoaconflict.

Institutional capacity supportExternalsupportforinstitutionsthatisoftenlongterminnature.Suchprogrammesaretypicallyrelevanttosupportrelationshipswhentheyrelatetomilitaryacademies,detentionandjudicialsectorreform.

Intelligence supportAformofpartneredmilitaryoperation(PMO)inwhichpartnersshareintelligence,i.e.informationofmilitarysignificancetoaconflict.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs)Peoplewhohavebeenforcedorobligedtoleavetheirhomesbehind,notablyforreasonsrelatedtoarmedconflictorotherviolence,andwhoremainwithinthebordersoftheircountry.

Kinetic supportAformofpartneredmilitaryoperation(PMO)wherethesupportingactorengagesinhostilitiesinsupportofapartytoaconflict.

Logistical supportAformofpartneredmilitaryoperation(PMO)involvingthemaintenanceandtransportationofmaterial,facilitiesandpersonnel.

National information bureauAninstitutionoperatingonthenationalleveltocollectinformationregardingthefateofprotectedpersons.Itregistersthisinformation,conductssearchesandtransmitstheinformationthroughtheprotectingpower,theICRCortheNationalRedCrossorRedCrescentSocietiesoftheStateconcerned.

Partnered detention operationsAformofpartneredmilitaryoperation(PMO)thatconsistsofactivitiesthatcontributetothecapture-anddetention-relatedactivitiesofapartytoaconflict,includingcapacitybuilding.

Peace forcesMilitaryandcivilianpersonneldeployedonmultilateraloperationsconductedbytheUnitedNationsorother-wiseauthorizedbytheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilforpeace-enforcementorpeacekeepingpurposes.

Partnered military operation (PMO)Aformalarrangementbetweenpartnerstoachieveaspecificmilitaryaiminconflict.

Private military and security company (PMSC)Aprivatebusinessentitythatprovidesmilitaryand/orsecurityservices,irrespectiveofhowtheydescribethemselves.Militaryandsecurityservicesinclude,inparticular,armedguardingandprotectionofpersonsandobjects,suchasconvoys,buildingsandotherplaces;maintenanceandoperationofweaponssystems;prisonerdetention;andadvicetoortrainingoflocalforcesandsecuritypersonnel.69

69 TheMontreuxDocumentonpertinentinternationallegalobligationsandgoodpracticesforStatesrelatedtooperationsofprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompaniesduringarmedconflict,17September2008,https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/20192511-montreux-document_EN.pdf.

Political supportPoliticalexpressionsofsupportforapartytoanarmedconflictthataffecttheparty’scapacitywithinthearmedconflict.

Populated areaAnyconcentrationofciviliansorofciviliansandcivilianobjects,inacity,town,villageornon-built-uparea,whetherpermanentortemporary.

Support relationship (in armed conflict)Arelationshipinwhichanactorprovidessupporttoapartytoanarmedconflictthatincreasestheparty’scapacitytoconductarmedconflict.

Supported partyApartytoanarmedconflictthatreceivessupportfromanotheractorthatincreasesitscapacitytoconductarmedconflict.ThesupportedpartymaybeaState(includingwithinacoalition),internationalorganizationornon-Statearmedgroup(NSAG).

Supporting actorAState,internationalorganizationornon-Stateactorthatprovidessupporttoapartytoanarmedconflictthatincreasestheparty’scapacitytoconductarmedconflict.Thesupportingactormayalsobeapartytothearmedconflict,althoughthisisnotadefiningfeature.

Train, advise, assist, accompany (TAAA)Aformofpartneredmilitaryoperation(PMO)inwhichanactortrains,trainsandequips,advisesandassists,oraccompaniespartnerforces.

Territorial StateTheStateonwhoseterritoryoperationsoccur.KnowninsomecasesasthehostState.

BIBLIOGRAPHy 159

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