2010 NZ SCHOOLSand DECISION MAKING

Gregory MacRae

SEE6 2011Schools WorkshopTehran, Iran

1) NZ School Seismic Risk

2) Use of a Scenario to as a Decision Tool for Earthquake Risk

3) University of Canterbury Recent Decisions with Earthquake Risk

4) Damage to Schools in the Canterbury Earthquakes

OUTLINE

NZ School Seismic Risk

Acknowledgements to:Brian Mitchell, Ministry of Education

WHY SCHOOLS?

New Zealand has a wide variety of school building.

The, majority of school buildings are one- or two-storey braced timber-frame constructions with low vulnerability to earthquake damage.

NZ SCHOOL BUILDINGS

• The New Zealand Building Act regulates building design and construction.

• The Department of Building and housing administers this act and approves standards for loadings and all types of construction.

• Schools and other buildings must be designed and constructed, and inspected to ensure that they meet these standards.

• Design for ductility started in 1976 so buildings before this date were susceptible

NZ LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Mitchell et al. (2004)

NZ BUILDING VULNERABILITY

Ministry of Education developed requirements to minimize building seismic risk involving review of:(i) buildings of heavy construction (i.e. with concrete floors),

and(ii) all buildings with major assembly areas, and (iii) school buildings with a heavy tile roof If buildings did not meet code levels (with 1.2 factor), they

needed to be strengthened to those levels. In addition, - conventional timber-framed and floored school buildings

with light roofing were reviewed against two-third threshold of the full requirement levels.

- all other pre-1976 blocks containing at least two storeys were evaluated using a Rapid Evaluation (RE)

MINIMIZING SCHOOL RISK

• Implementation – to prevent life loss (1998-2001)(i) Ministry of Education commissioned a structural survey by

registered engineers of all 21,100 individual buildings at 2,361 state schools

(ii) Potential defects that required a more detailed investigation were identified

(iii) The key finding of the survey: • NZ school buildings and site structures were generally in

sound structural condition given the size and diverse nature of the school property portfolio.

• Only four buildings were found to have an unacceptable level of structural risk. Corrective action was undertaken immediately.

MINIMIZING SCHOOL RISK

• Approximately 11% of the buildings were found to have at least one structural defect that required remedial work.

Typical defects (Mitchell 2004):

MINIMIZING SCHOOL RISK

SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO - A Decision-Making Tool for Seismic

Risk

Acknowledgements to:The Seattle Fault Scenario Project Team

Fault

Surface

RockSite

R

2a Ground Motions

Magnitude M 1 Faulting

2b

3 Response

4 Loss ($$$)• Damage• Death • Downtime

BACKGROUND

Fault

Surface

RockSite

R

2a Ground Motions- Seismologists

Magnitude M 1 Rupture - Geologists

2b

3 Controlling Response

- EngineersHow are these decisions made?

4. Loss Related Decisions - People - Government - Business - Planners (Planning, Preparation, Response, Recovery)

BACKGROUND

DECISION-MAKING PROCESSTo Perform Mitigation for a Future Disaster,

the Decision-Maker must: (Based on Petak)

1) Be Aware of the Problem - E.g. Earthquake

2) Be Aware of Possible Solutions - E.g. Design/Retrofit

3) Be Prepared to Allocate Resources to address This Need,

Rather than Competing Needs

Based on - empirical evidence- studies (science/engineering)

Based on - empirical evidence- studies (engineering/science)

Based on - evidence from technical experts- support from stakeholders- ability to raise necessary funds

Lobbyists/Media are involved. It requires Policy

BACKGROUND

Fault

Surface

RockSite

R

2a Ground Motions- Seismologists

Magnitude M 1 Rupture - Geologists

2b

3 Controlling Response

- Engineers

4. Loss Related Decisions - People

- Government - Business - Planners

(Planning, Preparation, Response, Recovery)

ENGINEERINGPOLICY

SCIENCE

BACKGROUND

The Disconnect:

Engineers/Scientists Decision Makers

Need to coordinate/communicate to:

(a) Decide what should be done

+

(b) Ensure it is done

BACKGROUND

Armenia, 1988 (EERI) Northridge, 1994 (EERI)

BACKGROUND

Turkey, 1999 EQEKobe, 1995

EERI, EQE

BACKGROUND

Taiwan, 1999, (DRPI) Bhuj, 2001, (R. Goel)

BACKGROUND

Good building codes

Good structures=

Base Isolated

Demonstration Building

Pelabuhan Ratu

EERI, Taniwangsa

BACKGROUND

The Hierarchy of Denial(Cowan 2011)

1. It won’t happen

2. Or If it does happen it won’t affect me

3. Or, If it happens to me it won’t be too bad

4. Or If it’s bad, there is nothing I can do SO .....

Why are you worrying me with this?”

BACKGROUND

Why is there a problem?

- Different Priorities

- Different Languages

- Different Questions

BACKGROUND

Different Languages

E.g. Neotectonic Magnitude

Liquefaction potential Ductility

Business Interruption Reinsurance Loss of market share

BACKGROUND

Scientists (e.g. Geologists/Seismologists) ask :- What? and Why?

Engineers (e.g. Geotechnical and Structural) ask :- Why? and How?

Planners ask : - How can we get a good consensus?

Businesses ask : - Do I need to do anything? - Where are the facts in a form that I can understand

so that I can make a decision as to what I can do?

Different Questions/Culture

BACKGROUND

Fault

Surface

RockSite

R

2a Ground Motions- Seismologists

Magnitude M 1 Rupture - Geologists

2b

3 Controlling Response

- Engineers

4. Loss Related Decisions - People

- Government - Business - Planners

(Planning, Preparation, Response, Recovery)

ENGINEERINGPOLICY

SCIENCE

BACKGROUND

A scenario is a story ……

Types: analytic physical manipulations

Scenario studies are vivid and • highlight strengths/weaknesses pertinent to future events • help decision makers think through ramifications of events • may provide fuel for stakeholders wanting change

Why A Scenario?

BACKGROUND

EERI wanted a methodology for Scenario development

Previous studies existed …e.g. Hayward Fault Scenario (EERI, 1996)

…. but there have been changes since 1996• Increased knowledge about Seattle faults • Better tools for estimating losses (e.g. HAZUS)

The 2001 Nisqually earthquake affecting Seattle had just occurred

BACKGROUND

BACKGROUND

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

The result is a publication

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

LOSSES:

Deaths Deaths – > 1,600 Injuries – > 24,000Damage Buildings destroyed – About 9,700. Buildings unsafe to occupy - About 29,000. Buildings with restricted use – About 150,000. Fires – ≈ 130, causing $500m loss Property and economic loss – About $33 billion Downtime Business Interruption - Months Full repair - Years

Project coordination team - 12 volunteers

Areas of expertise

- Earthquake risk, emergency preparedness, lifelines, geotechnical engineering, management and decision making, planning, seismology, and structural engineering.

Employment:

- Consulting engineers, consulting planners, or as public servants with the University of Washington, National Science Foundation, Fire Department, City of Seattle Emergency Management, Washington Military Department Emergency Management or the United States Geological Survey (USGS)

PROJECT TEAM

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

REPORT LAYOUT:

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

REGIONAL FAULTS

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

Expected Demands

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

Scenario Shaking

Intensities

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

MAJOR ORGANIZATIONS:WSDOT Bridge Group

WSDOT Ferries GroupA Port AuthorityMajor Companies

GENERAL INFORMATION:AUTHORSHAZUS - CENSUS

- EXPERT OPINION

QUALITY CONTROL:REVIEWERS

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

ResidentialHousing Damage(HAZUS)

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

CALL TO ACTIONPriority Recommendations :

• Establish an Independent State Seismic Safety Board or Commission

• Implement Risk Reduction Plan for Critical Public Facilities • Retrofit of High Risk Buildings • Protect the Transportation Infrastructure

General Recommendations: i) Accelerate Earthquake Hazard Assessments, Geological Mapping and

the Use of these Studies, ii) Develop Incentives for Increased Seismic Safety, iii) Expand Public Education Programs with Emphasis on Self-Sufficiency; iv) Enhance the Pacific Northwest Seismographic Network; v) Establish an Earthquake Information Clearinghouse.

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

METHODS OF COMMUNICATIONTechnical Information - No technical jargon

Executive Summary Detailed Information

Glossy colour photos including damage- Regional damage after past earthquakes- Photos relevant to region or to similar situations

General Interest Information in text boxes

Non-Technical InformationPrologue

Introduces a school teacher, a businessman, a tourist, mother, etc. Chapter Introductions

Describes what happens to these people as the day progressesIt was apparent to Lisa and Marjorie Bona that they were not going to get home to Bainbridge Island; at this point, all they wanted was to escape from the horrors of the Alaskan Way Viaduct, portions of which lay amid twisted cars and bodies …… All transportation had stopped and they did not know what to do.

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

MEASURES OF SUCCESSThe impact of the scenario is quantified by

- awareness raised regarding earthquake risk

- activities initiated to better consider or manage earthquake risk which can be attributed in some part to the scenario effort.

There were several presentations to interested groups (of up to 100 people including city organisations such as planners, engineers, fire, police, emergency responders, insurance underwriters) both during the development of

the scenario, as well as after the scenario. At the rollout meeting in February 2004, 450 people from different professions attended. The local mayor spoke and the state governor’s office was represented.

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

MEASURES OF SUCCESS• More than a dozen television and radio interviews and newspaper stories including a big multi-page feature story starting on the front page of the Sunday Seattle Times

• Presentations to interested groups

• Distribution of 4,100 reports. Downloadable copy at: http://seattlescenario.eeri.org.

• Significant presentations were made to the Washington State Senate Transportation Committee and to the Puget Sound Region Freight Mobility Roundtable in Autumn 2004.

• Funding for renovation of the University of Washington Seismic Laboratory.

• The State Seismic Safety Committee was reconstituted.

• Washington State EMD used the scenario for its March 2006 response exercise.

• The City of Seattle proposal to analyze the cost effectiveness of retrofit investments

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

Seattle Times Editorial - Wednesday, March 1, 2006 - 12:00 AM

Puget Sound's Katrina The fundamental lesson of the Gulf states' hurricane miseries is that the worst can

happen. Puget Sound will be pummeled by storms and floods, but catastrophic earthquakes are the real natural menace here.

These issues get to Puget Sound's economic survival and recovery. The failure of layers of government to talk and function after the hurricanes haunts the Gulf states.

The Seattle Fault runs from Hood Canal in the west, through Puget Sound and south Seattle, and east through Bellevue and Issaquah roughly parallel to Interstate 90. Last year, a panel of experts looked at the region's earthquake hazards and picked this one to jolt the Bellevue gathering with an extreme disaster. Scenario losses include: 1,600 deaths; 24,000 injuries; 9,700 buildings destroyed; 29,000 buildings too damaged to occupy; 154,000 moderately damaged buildings with restricted use; and 130 fires. Estimated property damage and economic loss: about $33 billion.

For the next two days, the thinking gets ramped up several grim notches to contemplate physical destruction and institutional failures that would have been unimaginable before Hurricane Katrina.

MEASURES OF SUCCESS

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

Planners were initially noticeably uninterested in the scenario until Hurricane Katrina.

“They (the authorities) knew there was a problem, they knew that it was only a matter of time, and they did nothing!”

Planners started to evaluate their own vulnerability and risks to natural hazard.

American Planners Association is using this “window of awareness” to provide seminars on planning. The local APA branch is referencing the scenario document. Many communities, including smaller ones without large planning staff, are participating.

MEASURES OF SUCCESS

THE SEATTLE FAULT SCENARIO

SCENARIO CONCLUSIONS

● Communication between all stakeholders is important

● A scenario may be a useful tool leading to the implementation of earthquake disaster mitigation methods

UC RECENT DECISIONS WITH SEISMIC RISK

Canterbury Earthquakes1. Saturday 4 September 2010, 4:40am

M7.1 40km West of Christchurch to 20km West of ChristchurchPGA in CBD: About 0.23gCasualties: 0

2. Tuesday 22 February 2011, 12:50pmM6.3 8km South of ChristchurchPGA in CBD: About 0.50gCasualties: 183

+ many significant aftershocks

BACKGROUND

47BACKGROUND

48

Christchurch Botanical Gardens Records(From Brendon Bradley, U. Canterbury, New Zealand)

N-S

W-E

V

BACKGROUND

Canterbury Earthquakes

4 September 2010 22 February 2011

BACKGROUND

Period, T (s)

Sp

ectr

al A

ccel

erat

ion

(g)

CENTRAL CITY AND NZS1170 SPECTRACLASS D DEEP OR SOFT SOILLarger Horizontal Components

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5

Period T(s)

SA

(T) (

g)

NZS1170 2500-yr Class D

NZS1170 500-yr Class D Deep orSoft Soil

CHHC_MaxH_FEB

CCCC_MaxH_FEB

CBGS_MaxH_FEB

REHS_MaxH_FEB

GM_Larger_FEB

CENTRAL CITY AND NZS1170 SPECTRACLASS D DEEP OR SOFT SOILLarger Horizontal Components

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5

Period T(s)

SA(T)

(g)

NZS1170 2500-yr Class D

NZS1170 500-yr Class D Deep orSoft Soil

CHHC_MaxH_FEB

CCCC_MaxH_FEB

CBGS_MaxH_FEB

REHS_MaxH_FEB

GM_Larger_FEB

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

0 1 2 3 4 5

SA(T

) (g)

Period T(s)

NZS1170 Class D Deep or Soft Soil

Botanic Gardens CBGS

Cathedral College CCCC

Hospital CHHC

Resthaven REHS

Median Larger Central City

Period (s)

Sa (g)

Period, T (s)

Sp

ectr

al A

ccel

erat

ion

(g)

50

1. Rapid Damage Assessment

2A. Structural System Evaluation for Damage

2B. Structural System Risk Evaluation

3. Life Safety Systems Evaluation

4. Remediation (i.e. Hazard Removal)

5. Building WOF

Led by Facilities Management

+ Jeff Clendon (Holmes Consulting)

Many engineers participating from BECA, GHD, Holmes, UoC ….

- As described by Jeff Clendon

FIVE STEP PROCESS

51

Step 1. Rapid Damage Assessment (Week 1)External and internal walk-through inspection for obvious damage that could limit access

Tagging Red, Orange, Green

FIVE STEP PROCESS

52FIVE STEP PROCESS

53FIVE STEP PROCESS

54FIVE STEP PROCESS

55

Step 1. Rapid Damage Assessment (Week 1)

FIVE STEP PROCESS

56

Step 1. Rapid Damage Assessment (Week 1)

FIVE STEP PROCESS

57

Step 2A. Structural System Evaluation for Damage (Weeks 2-3)

Detailed evaluation of structural damage in all buildings

- Locations of potential damage identified from plans

- Involved - inspection of ceiling spaces

- removal of wall linings

- lifting of carpets, etc.

Revised tagging Red, Orange, Green

FIVE STEP PROCESS

58

Step 2B. Structural System Risk Evaluation (Weeks 2-6)

Life safety check of all UC buildings under a bigger earthquake (CTV Building Issue)

- All buildings rated in terms of risk:

H – High risk

M – Medium Risk

L – Low Risk

This involves inspecting all buildings and going through plans plus some simple analysis. Brittle failure modes of special concern.

Some relatively undamaged buildings which failed this check are: - Siemon building (which poses a threat to other buildings)

- Jack Mann auditorium (Dovedale campus)

- UCSA Building

FIVE STEP PROCESS

59FIVE STEP PROCESS FIVE STEP PROCESS Step 2B. Structural System Risk Evaluation (Weeks 2-6)

CTV Building IssueNot damaged in 9/2010 M7.1 earthquake

People were permitted to go back to work

Collapse occurred in 2/2011 M6.3 earthquake (117 deaths/183) ((117earthquakeinhttp://www.bing.com/images/search?q=ctv+building&view=detail&id=D08AF3EC98D82EA260818F63535616D30F5BA5A2&first=31&FORM=IDFRIR

http://project7.co.nz/wp-content/themes/LifeStream/timthumb.php?src=http://

project7.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/CIMG1586_ctv.jpg&w=580&zc=1

http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=ctv+building&view=detail&id=D08AF3EC98D82EA260818F63535616D30F5BA5A2&first=31&FORM=IDFRIR

60

Step 2B. Structural System Risk Evaluation (Weeks 2-6)

Some drawings

FIVE STEP PROCESS

61

Step 2B. Structural System Risk Evaluation (Weeks 2-6)

Some drawings

FIVE STEP PROCESS

62

Step 3. Life Safety System Evaluations

Electrical

HVAC

Sprinklers

Firewalls

Water/Toilets

Data Systems, etc.

FIVE STEP PROCESS

63

Step 4. Remediation (i.e. Hazard Removal)

Major risk issues identified in Steps 1 – 3 including:

- Ceiling tiles (All heavy tiles throughout the university are being replaced with much lighter tiles)

- Major seismic joint effects on passage

e.g. top of stairs, between different buildings

- Structural issues

Note: Some minor issues such as gypsum board cracking, left for later work

FIVE STEP PROCESS

64

Step 5. Building Warrant-of-Fitness (WOF)

Tasks in Steps 1-4 are reviewed and actions approved

This is conducted by an independent consultant (SGS) who:

- Reviews Step 2 and 3 reports

- Reviews remediation carried out

FIVE STEP PROCESS

65

Additional issues:

Inspections made of alternative teaching premises

E.g. Avonhead Baptist Church

Mandeville

Houses

Etc., Etc.

FIVE STEP PROCESS

66

Result of 5 step process:

An overall reduction in risk for staff and students with:

- remediation work, and

- high risk buildings (Step 2B) not occupied

FIVE STEP PROCESS

67

James Height Building:

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:UC_CentralLibrary01_gobeirne.jpg)

Some damage where the building is tied together at levels 2 and 4.

SOME UC STRUCTURES

68

Mushroom:

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:UC_CentralLibrary01_gobeirne.jpg)

Some rotation and movement affecting linkage structures,

Step 2B issues

SOME UC STRUCTURES

69

Registry Building:

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:UC_CentralLibrary01_gobeirne.jpg)

Some beam-column joint damage, basement damage + 2B issues.

SOME UC STRUCTURES

70

Commerce Building:

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:UC_CentralLibrary01_gobeirne.jpg)

Atrium Damage

East Stairwell damage

2B issues

SOME UC STRUCTURES

71

Boiler chimney:

Behaved well

Some slight cracking

Some existing cracks enlarged

Cracks are being grouted

Environmental concrete damage is being repaired

SOME UC STRUCTURES

72

Boilerhouse: Red tagged

Roof issues

SOME UC STRUCTURES

73

Law Building: Step 1 – OK Green

Step 2A/2B – OK Green

Step 3 – Cracking of floor found under carpet Orange

http://blogs.iesabroad.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/_dsc5589.jpg

SOME UC STRUCTURES

74

Tent teaching:

SOME UC STRUCTURES

UC Update – 11 May 2011“More than 200 of 240 campus structures have now been approved for general access. By the end of May relatively few buildings will remain closed to general access. Those still subject to investigation and ‘make safe’ remediation in June are likely to include: Law (early June access); Erskine faculty offices; Engineering College Office, E1 & E4; Student Services Centre; Warehouse; Science Lecture Theatre (7 lecture theatres); Registry; UCSA; parts of the Recreation Centre (Sports Science and Offices); Te Pourewa; Wheki; Commerce; Siemon; EPS Library; Engineering Mushroom; Hydrology Tower; Ilam Homestead. The Business Recovery Group continues to focus on opening teaching, study, and laboratory spaces and social spaces for students.

“Work related to remediation is underway in 17 buildings on site. More than 200 Hawkins staff and sub-contractors are on site and there are four full-time project managers assigned to earthquake remediation project management. We have eight engineers on site dedicated to assessment, remediation design and oversight, with others off-site undertaking modelling and support. 

“Any discussion of “relocating the University” has to take account of the fact that no buildings fell down and at this stage none have been condemned. In addition,  72 per cent of our students live within 2.5 km of the University and Halls of Residence provide accommodation for more than 1,000 students. The 87 ha campus is fit for purpose and this week more than 2,000 programmes and courses were being delivered by the University of Canterbury. The University is well on the way to being back in business with the James Hight Library due for re-opening by end of this month and all but a few special purpose laboratories are already accessible for general use.” UC Press Release

TYPICAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Joe’s

Beer!Food!

Joe’s

Beer!Food!

Joe’s

Beer!Food!

Ref: Ron Hamburger, FEMA273

Target Perform

ance(?)

F0 IO LS NC

FE

DBE

MCE

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

LOW DAMAGE STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS

a)Elastically Responding

b) Base isolated

c) Supplementally damped

d) Post-tensioned beam

e) Rocking

f) Friction

g) Other devices

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

78

Concrete post-tensioned beam systems

E.g. VUW Campus, Wellington, March 2010 - Dunning-Thornton (Cattenach), Concrete Structure

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

79

b)

Non-linear lead extrusion damper

A. LEAD DISSIPATOR: with Mander, Chase, Dhakal and Mander

• Steel low damage systems• Steel low damage systems

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

80

B. SLIDING HINGE JOINT CONCEPTB. SLIDING HINGE JOINT CONCEPT

• Steel low damage systems• Steel low damage systems

MacRae et al. 2010

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

81

DETAILS:DETAILS: Top Bolts

Top Web Bolts (Shear)

Bottom Flange Bolts (Sliding)

Bottom Web Bolts (Sliding)

Detail A

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

82

Deformations:Deformations:

1

Column Force

Displacement

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

83

Deformations:Deformations:

Column Force

Displacement

2

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

84

Deformations:Deformations:

3

Column Force

Displacement

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

85

Deformations:Deformations:

4

Column Force

Displacement

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

86

Deformations:Deformations:

5

Column Force

Displacement

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

87

Deformations:Deformations:

6

Column Force

Displacement

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

88

DETAILS:DETAILS:

360UB44.7

310UC158 1.5m

2.0m

Mackinven and MacRae, 2006

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

89

-75

-50

-25

0

25

50

75

-4 -2 0 2 4

Drift Ratio (%)

Co

ulm

n S

he

ar

Fo

rce

(k

N) Test #5 - 4.2.2.2S

Steel Shims

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

90

SHJ BEHAVIOUR MINIMAL DAMAGE (to connection and

frame)

LOW COST (and not patented)

RECENTERING CHARACTERISTICS

ISSUES CONSTRUCTION TOLERANCES DURABILITY

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

Courtesy: Darrin Bell of Connell-Wagner, 2007

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

Courtesy: Geoff Sidwell, Aurecon

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

http://www.nzwood.co.nz/case-studies/nmit-arts-and-media-building/

• Timber LVL system• Timber LVL system

LOW DAMAGE SYSTEMSLOW DAMAGE SYSTEMS

DAMAGE TO SCHOOLS IN THE RECENT CANTERBURY

EARTHQUAKES

Hallswell Primary

After September 2010 earthquake:

St Margaret’s College

After February 2011 earthquake:

Christ's College

From Dreamstime.com

Avonside Girl’s High School

After February 2011 earthquake:

Avonside Girl’s High School

After February 2011 earthquake:

Avonside Girl’s High School

After February 2011 earthquake:

Avonside Girl’s High School

After February 2011 earthquake:

Linwood North School

Aranui High School

Aranui High School

Aranui Primary School

South New Brighton School

Mount Pleasant School

Redcliffs School

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:54_Raekura_Place,_Redcliffs.JPG

Christchurch Schools

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:54_Raekura_Place,_Redcliffs.JPG

Over 15,000 students were effected by the earthquake ….. (Daily telegraph)

Questions?